Week 13: Security Forces

and Problems of

Democratization

INTL 450

Murat Somer © 2016

Chapter 3 («The New ‘Double Challenge» by F.

Agüero) in Stepan, A. (Ed.). (2009). Democracy

in Danger.

Forces of order and democracy

• Challenges faced by new democracies: – Developing firm institutions for the democratic control of

those services

– Turning them into effective tools for the protection and

security of their citizens.

• Common problems in pacted democracies: – autonomy and prerogatives enjoyed by security forces due to

authoritarian legacy

– undemocratic norms held by security forces, translated into

undemocratic practices

Forces of order and democracy

• Common problem in democracies established

through revolution: – poorly trained forces

– high levels of insecurity

1. Armed forces

• The military seeks autonomy vis-à-vis elected

politicians during transition. – In Brazil, the military saw its autonomy enhanced during the

first phases of democratization.

– In Chile, constitutional legacies from authoritarianism

granted the military large levels of autonomy for 15 years

after the end of military rule.

– Even in Spain, a successful case of democratic transition, the

military gained some autonomy and powers of contestation in

the early phases of transition.

– The demise of civilian one-party rule in Mexico created new

opportunities for the military.

1. Armed forces

Expressions of «autonomy»

• Military autonomy is reflected in the most important areas of: – budgets: eluding the scrutiny of congress and even of civilians in

the executive.

– education: eluding the supervision of national educational authorities or even top defence officials.

– justice: having a military justice outside the jurisdiction of national courts.

• Reforming military – The most thorough reforms in Spain: The military was removed

from positions in government, saw its constitutional role redefined and was subjected to complete control by a potent ministry of defense.

– Crucial role of civilian leadership in building a democratic relationship with the military.

1. Armed forces

Expressions of «autonomy»

• International military relations of democracies

became part of the problem. – Such as periodic armies’ international conferences in Latin

America resulting in the increased autonomy of the army.

– Positive role of NATO in east-central Europe: more

conductive to civilian assertion.

2. The police

• Security of citizens is indispensable for the

exercize and enjoyment of democratic rights.

• New democracies usually inherited police

forces that were – militarized

– abusive of human rights

– corrupt

– nearly everywhere feared by the population.

2. The police

• The paramaunt task is then; – demilitarization of the police forces

– its subjection to control by civilian democratic officials

outside the defense sector (ex: demilitarization of Spain’s

Civil Guard).

• In many cases, government officials failed to

pay enough attention to their relations with the

police, too much focusing on reforming the

military.

2. The police

• Further problems besides demilitarization and control: – lack of effectiveness which might be stemming from weakness in

organization, equipment training, methods, personnel policies, recruitment.

– lack of organization which would arise in the absense of clear chain of command, proper coordination among units.

– training which is not based on citizen’s rights might provoke human rights abuses.

– personnel and recruitment problems have to do with the size of the force which is usually smaller than needed mostly due to scarce financial resources.

– lack of transparency and accountability might arise in the absence of institutions monitoring the police.

3. Intelligence

• Indispensable tools for informed decision

making by democratic state officials in areas

concerning internal and external security. – In new democracies, the intelligence service was wither weak

and underutilized or strong and autonomous from new

democratic officials. Or it had to be recreated entirely.

• Challenges: – leadership and control requiring again a clear chain of

command.

3. Intelligence

• Challenges (cont’d): – accountability and oversight

– danger of an «intelligence state» threating citizen freedoms

and rights.

Conclusions

• Policies must follow an integrated approach that views all elements of the security sector as essentially interrelated.

• Need for a firmly established civilian leadership.

• Internal controls, external accountability and oversight are indispensible for both effectiveness and compliance with the rule of law.

• Active participation and engagement in official international organizations helps affirm civil political leadership and control over security sector agencies.

• Specific policies should be developed to adrdess and counter value and attitude gaps between members of security sector agencies and society.

Chapter 4 («Beyond Threats to Democracy from

the Armed Forces, Police and Intelligence: the

Spanish Case» by Narcis Serra) in Stepan, A.

(Ed.). (2009). Democracy in Danger.

Initial questions

• Seven policy questions about the Spanish experience and its implications for democracies in danger: – 1) In the area of intelligence, how can democracies effectively defend

themselves against international crime and terrorism in ways that are fully consistent with democratic values and practices?

– 2) Can 9/11 or attacks in Madrid in 2004 shed light on the interrelationship between democratic executives/legislatures and their management of the forces of order?

– 3) Has the fight against international terrorism changed the use of the armed forces, in the classic sense of the term?

– 4) How can governments design and train police forces that are accesible to and trusted by their democratic citizens?

– 5) What would be considered the democratically optimal international coordination among the democracies concerning their police, intelligence and military forces?

Initial questions

• Questions cont’d: – 6) Can new efficacious arrangements be considered that are fully

consistent with democratic values?

– 7) How is the EU, within which Spain is a full and active participant,

creating new institutions and procedures to increase the security of its

citizens without diminishing any democratic freedoms?

• Responses to these questions are important,

because many of the transition processes in the

Third Wave suffered from a form of military

interventionism (different from direct coup).

The armed forces

• When Franco died, the armed forces became

the guarantors of the system’s continuity.

• Military transition: how?

– Consensus among political forces regarding

transition and the New Constitutions; which gained

massive popular support.

– King’s legitimacy

The armed forces

• Seven stages of gradual control over the armed

forces: – 1) Total control of political power by the armed forces or by

the Francoist framework within which the military were fully

involved (during Franco’s 40-year dictatorship).

– 2) Following the death of Franco, military tutelage over the

government.

– 3) Eroding power of the military, yet still the capacity to

condition government policy.

– 4) End of political intervention and pursuit of organizational

and political autonomy.

The armed forces

• Seven stages cont’d: – 5) Formal, albeit partial, acceptance of civilian supremacy.

– 6) Fight to maintain the ideological controls of the military as

a whole.

– 7) Democratic control in the last 2 years of the 1980s:

• Executive power defines military policy.

• The ministry directs military policy and exerts the control

and leadership of the armed forces while legislative power

controls the executive and the military.

• Military justice has become integrated within the justice

system.

The armed forces

• The creation and capacity building of a ministry of defense is key to the whole process.

• It is not necessary that laws explicitly grant powers to the armed forces.

• The elected democratic government’s active and willing acceptance of the need to take control of military policy is also crucial.

The police

• The police were loyal to dictatorship and were

controlled by the military in Spain.

• The challenge was to transform the repressive

police force into an institution whose aim

would be to guarantee law and order and to

preserve individual rights and freedoms.

The police

• The Public Order Tribunal was dissolved before the Constitution, and in 1978 a new Police Act was approved. – A new force, National Police Force was created to replace

Armed Police.

– The new constitutional duty for the police in the new Constitution: «protecting the free exercise of rights and freedoms to guarantee law and order.»

– Definite separation from armed forces.

– Legalization of police trade unions.

– Complete demilitarization in 1986, with Organic State Security Forces Act.

The police

• Two problematic areas: – The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice merged

as a solution to the problems of coordination or even disputes.

It did not contribute to the efficacy of the security system.

– Reserved funds issue: both Ministry of Defense (for the

intelligence service) and Ministry of Interior are endowed

with reserved funds.

Intelligence services

• At the time of Franco’s death, apart from the

police intelligence service, there were three

more intelligence services: – Higher Defense Staff (linked to the PM)

– Army Chief of Staff

– SECED (linked to the military).

• All four of these services had been controlled

by the military.

Intelligence services

• Facilitating role of the SECED during

transition: – played the role of mediator between the government and

moderate opposition during transition.

• Merge between High Defence Staff and

SECED in transition: foundation of the CESID

in 1978 as part of the Ministry of Defense. – Failure to inform the government about the attempted coup in

February 1981.

– Creation of CNI to replace the CESID in 2002.

Intelligence services

• Lessons to be learned: – It is better to have a certain plurality of intelligence services

even though this requires constant coordination efforts.

– Domestic intelligence services should be reduced drastically

in size.

– The military must be limited to intelligence services in their

own field.

– The NATO membership was beneficial in these respects for

Spain.

New missions of the armed forces in

the 21st century

• The relevant security threat is no longer

«territorial» but «human security».

• 4 lines of work with regard to armed forces in

countries that cannot yet be considered fully

consolidated democracies: – 1) Define new missions for the armed forces, especially in the

areas of human security and international collaboration.

– 2) Continue with the modernization of the security and

defense sector.

New missions of the armed forces in

the 21st century

• 4 lines of work cont’d: – 3) Foster mechanisms of regional coopeation in the field of

security.

– 4) Guide and direct the armed forces of each country toward a

progressive contribution to regional and international

governance.

The police as a public service

• Need for police reforms that would lead to

greater efficacy in terms of domestic security: – 1) Issues linked to globalization (international terrorism, drug

trafficking, organized mafias, control of immigration flows).

– 2) Coordination among the different police forces

– 3) Reforms to contribute to improve the efficacy of the whole

system of law and order (such as boosting local police forces)

– 4) Reforms in line with the EU demands against organized

crime and terrorism.

The intelligence services and new

challenges to security

• New threats, especially international terrorism, have shown the need for radical changes to boost intelligence services.

• Need for new laws with regard to the three issues that tend to be common problems of the intelligence services in Spain: – dependence (who do they receive orders from?)

– coordination

– control

Conclusions

• Risk of the use of intelligence services by the government in favor of a particular political party.

• Demilitarization of intelligence services is highly advisable.

• Battle against terrorism must be fought with all the arms of the rule of law.

• Greatest danger: difficulty of using army without provoking extremism in public opinion.