Week 6.1 The Scottish Executive and the Scottish

Parliament: Evidence for the centrality of

committees

Lecture Plan:

1. Brief discussion of the CSG proposals.2. A comparison of the legislative processes of old

(Westminster ) and new (Scottish Parliament).3. A discussion of “inputs” or the formal structures/

“powers” of committees4. A discussion of “withinputs”, or those factors – such as

the role of parties, committee size, legislative load, etc. - which qualify committee power.

5. An initial discussion of “outputs” (inquiries, bills, amendments, etc.),.

6. Discussion powers in relation to: (a) other legislatures (b) the executive (for me the most crucial point)

7. Brief analysis of amendments process.

(1) The CSG Proposals on Parliamentary Business

• The CSG approach as a whole used Westminster as a point of departure, but aims for executive-legislative relations are not new

• Point 6.1 recognises “the need for the Executive” to govern – legislation and use of budget

• No “new” relationship, just improved role

Committee Power

The difference is improved scrutiny based on a strong committee role:

• “All-purpose” committees with combined Standing and Select Committee functions

• Ability to call witnesses and oblige ministers (and civil servants) to attend

• Ability to hold Inquiries• Ability to initiate legislation• Committees as the “revising Chamber”?• Pre-legislative monitoring role to avoid “draft-Act”

problems (see Richardson and Jordan, 1979)• But NB – no (power sharing) direct Scottish Parliament

role in formulation

Comparing Legislative Processes

Westminster (of old? ie NB convergence):

• No formal involvement at pre-legislative stage• Plenary debate first• Then standing committees consider

amendments• Committees report to House and more

amendments made• Third reading debate• Passed to House of Lords – if amended, passed

back to Commons

Comparing Legislative Processes

Holyrood:

• “Hands-off” monitoring role at pre-legislative stage• Procedure to introduce bill (PO statement, finance, policy

explanation)• Bill referred to committee before House• Lead committee takes evidence and reports to House• House considers general principles• Back to committee for stage 2 consideration of

amendments• Stage 3 amendments• (then assessed for competence)

Differences:

• Scottish Parliament Committees are charged with the scrutiny of the initial consultation process.

• They consider the principles of the bill before it is presented to the House.

• They take evidence on the nature and effects of the bill before considering general principles and before making detailed amendments.

• More committee experience given select committee role

• Non-Executive Bill process was more straightforward – 12 names and the bill goes to stage 1

• Now 19 names, with restrictions on use of NEBU• (NB Committee role crucial to member’s bill progress)

(3) “Inputs” or the capacity/ “powers” of Scottish Parliament

committees

• Relatively powerful compared to functions of other West European legislatures

The Scottish Parliament has:

(1) Permanent and specialised committees with relatively small numbers of members;

(2) A proportional (by party) number of chairs selected by a committee;

(3) Committee deliberation both before the initial and final plenary stages;

(4) The ability to initiate and redraft bills; and, (5) The ability to invite witnesses and demand

government documents.(6) Unique supervisory role

(4) Withinputs

• Party influence – voting majority most committees,, informal whip (meetings before meetings)

• Turnover of members (high)

• Resource constraints (including committee size)

• Legislative overload – bills and amendments

Effect of input/ withinput discussion• 2 hypotheses on committees (Arter 2004a):

EFFECTIVE1. Small size will foster an effective collective identity and hence committee autonomy. 2. The combined roles of standing and select committees will foster policy expertise. 3. Committees will foster an agenda-setting role though inquiries which are not in the

control of party managers. 4. Working practices will be consensual rather than partisan.5. The openness of proceedings will discourage adversarialism.

INEFFECTIVE1. The committees will be too small to make scrutiny effective (especially if there are

attendance problems). 2. High turnover undermines a committee ethos and the combined roles leads to

overload. 3. The legislative load means that committees have no time for agenda setting through

inquiry work. 4. The open process will lead to party posturing (extending to witness examination

which is often ritualistic). 5. Committee specialization will also fragment the House

(5) Outputs

• Healthy number of Public Petitions• Inquiries shaping agendas – water, mobile

phone masts, free care for elderly, poindings

• 11 of 61 Bills 1999-2003 were non-executive

• High proportion compared to other West European Legislatures

• Amendments

(6) Powers in relation to the Scottish Executive

• NB traditional Westminster relationship- the government governs.

• Scottish Executive has more resources to consult, research, initiate

• If we include SSIs, then most legislation receives no scrutiny

• Non-executive bills are restricted in scope and can be reversed

• Scottish Executive still the main source of legislation

• Committees have traditional scrutiny role

Outputs revisited?

• There are many petitions, but their practical effect is limited.

• Inquiry work is constrained by legislative load. Inquiries are too slow to be produced. The examples of influence are exceptions to the rule.

• The emphasis on legislation is misplaced. Examples:

Non-executive legislation

• Limited scope (e.g. dog fouling, St Andrews, national galleries, TRADING)

• Reliance on committees to consult after bill proposed

• Wild Mammals took 2 years

• Poindings replaced before enacted?

• Committee Bill on children reliant on SPICE and Welsh

Conclusion?

• Unusual powers compared to other West European legislatures

• But not in comparison with the Scottish Executive which has a much larger staff equipped for research and consultation

• Limited policy initiation

• Fairly traditional hands-off relationship with scrutiny at bill stage

Effect of bill scrutiny?

• Analysis of amendments

• Did these change the substance of the bill?

• How much change comes from the Scottish Parliament and its committees?

• In other words, is the Scottish Parliament an actor involved in legislative change or just an arena for policy change?

Initial point

• The Scottish Executive appears dominant since it proposes the majority of the successful amendments and MSPs propose most of the failed ones

Qualification of Scottish Executive success

• Amendments vary in value, from consequential to detail to substantive

• Most successful Scottish Executive amendments are consequential

• The detail is devolved from SP to Scottish Executive

• Most go through on the nod without voting• There are very few substantive

amendments

Qualification of MSP failure• Most “failed” amendments are really withdrawn

(56%)• They are often introduced to stimulate debate

or ask questions, not to be won• Many are withdrawn after assurances that the

Scottish Executive ill address the issue• As a result, there is considerable Scottish

Parliament influence over the production of and inspiration for the most important amendments.

• Committees are particularly influential.

Inspired/ Original Authorship

• Some backbench Labour MSPs are successful with substantive amendments

• Others (LD and opposition) tend to rely on indirect influence through withdrawal- reassurance

• Latter should not be underestimated (little difference between 2 styles?)

• Aggregate figures – 37.2% of all substantive amendments relate to direct and indirect non-executive influence

• Of the 62 “inspired” amendments, two-thirds attributed to committees, while there is no coalition bias to the remainder

See table in next slide

• Over half – 59% of all substantive amendments presented at stage 3 can be attributed to non-executive actors

• The committees are central to this process

• Stage 2 is less significant, but the 16.9% inspired element is testament to a stage 1 process envisaged by CSG

Stage 3 – 58.9% non-executiveOriginal Detail Substantive

Author

Total (n = 2303)

% of stage 2

(stage 2 share)

% of stage 3

(stage 3 share)

Total (n = 249)

% of stage 2

(stage 2 share)

% of stage 3

(stage 3 share)

Executive

83.2%

85.4% (67.1%)

78.9% (32.9%)

62.8%

71.8% (80.9%)

41.1% (19.1%)

Non-Executive

16.8%

14.6% (56.7%)

21.1% (43.3%)

37.2%

28.2% (53.8%)

58.9% (46.2%)

(Non-Executive Inspired)

8.4%

4.8% (37.3%)

15.2% (62.7%)

24.8%

16.9% (48.4%

43.8% (51.6%)

(Non-Executive Presented)

8.5%

9.8% (75.9%)

5.9% (24.1%)

12.4%

11.3% (64.5%)

15.1% (35.5%)

Total

100%

100% (65.3%)

100% (34.7%)

100%

100% (70.8%)

100% (29.2%)

Qualification to committee influence

• The Scottish Executive still produces and amends the majority of bills

• Evidence of bill change throughout the process? Note the rules on “wrecking amendments”

• Alternative explanations for figures:• Voting on Scottish Executive amendments – few

object because few understand?• Withdrawal makes no difference? Amendment

would be lost anyway?

Conclusion

• Evidence of traditional Westminster relationship

• No wholesale changes in relationships

• Scottish Parliament has unusual range of powers compared to other legislatures, not the Scottish Executive

• Some evidence of influence in inquiries and scrutiny