welcome to our backyard? public perception of renewable ... · welcome to our backyard? public...
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Welcome to our backyard? Public perception of renewable
energy production
Henrik Karlstrøm1 andMarianne Ryghaug1
Corresponding author
Henrik Karlstrøm, Centre for Energy and Society, Norwegian University of Science and
Technology. 7491 NTNU, Trondheim, Norway.
Telephone: +47 73591765
Email: [email protected].
Abstract
Transition to a sustainable society requires large-scale conversion of the energy system to
new, renewable, non-fossil sources of energy. This presupposes a public engagement with
new technologies, which includes the public dealing with challenges in terms of placement,
area requirements, ecological degradation and price developments. Several theories have
been proposed to explain the fact that renewable energy production is often favourably
viewed in theory while still meeting with a lot of resistance in actual construction
situations, among them the NIMBY thesis and attempts at explaining opposition to post-
carbon energy production as a question of a general information deficit.
This paper discusses the possible effect of the challenges mentioned above on how citizens
view the new, renewable energy technologies. It analyses responses to representative
surveys of the Norwegian population on the desirability of various energy technologies such
as hydro dams, onshore wind turbines, offshore wind, bioenergy plants, solar panels and,
for contrast, gas plants with and without carbon capture and storage. We find that the
1 Centre for Energy and Society, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
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sometimes lukewarm enthusiasm for renewable energy technologies cannot be fully
explained by existing theories, and that factors such as political party affiliation have a
larger impact on energy technology attitudes than previously believed.
Keywords
Renewable energy opposition, political affiliation, environmental attitudes
Introduction
Increasingly, there is scientific and political agreement that the world’s consumption of
fossil fuels must be phased out due both to the threat of destructive climate change and
the future shortage of available fuels. This has profound consequences for the global
energy system, which must move towards more sustainable modes of production and
consumption. While more efficient energy use can substantially contribute to deflating the
problem, a successful transition to a sustainable society requires the large-scale conversion
of the energy system to new, renewable, non-fossil sources of energy. This transition brings
with it a host of new challenges to be met in order for it to be successful, including such
issues as local area planning and requirements, ecological degradation, and price
developments. It also requires acceptance and a positive public engagement with the new
technologies, which in turn relies on the public’s evaluation of the positive and negative
aspects of new renewable construction. In order words, public acceptance is an important
issue shaping the widespread implementation of renewable energy technologies and the
achievement of energy policy targets. It is commonly assumed that ‘public attitudes’ need
to change to make more radical scenarios about the implementation of renewable energy
technologies possible (P. Devine-Wright 2008a).
Even though governments are increasingly interested in pushing for more renewable
developments, and the public generally view renewables favourably, specific construction
projects often meet with resistance, both locally and on a national level. Several theories
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have been proposed to explain the fact that post-carbon energy production is often
favourably viewed in theory while still meeting with a lot of resistance in actual
construction situations, among them the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) thesis and attempts
at explaining opposition to post-carbon energy production as a result of a general
information deficit.
This paper discusses the possible effect of the challenges mentioned above on how citizens
view the new, renewable energy technologies. We analyse survey responses by the
Norwegian population on the desirability of various energy technologies such as hydro
dams, onshore wind, offshore wind, bioenergy combustion plants, solar panels and, for
contrast, gas plants with and without carbon capture and storage technology. We then
discuss the various explanations for the sometimes politically lukewarm enthusiasm for
post-carbon energy technologies. Is the transition towards new renewables facing
challenges with respect to public engagement, and if so, what are these challenges?
In this paper we set out to research public perceptions or attitudes towards renewable
energy. Using large scale opinion polls as data sources, we utilise a typical social science
approach of doing empirical studies of public views about renewable energy technologies
and targeted views about renewable energy generally using quantitative research
methodology (P. Devine-Wright 2008b). We use quantitative data from two representative
surveys of the Norwegian population (N=1500 and N=1032, respectively) to examine a set
of theories about resistance to different types of renewable energy.
Rather than attempt to “solve” the problem of why new construction of renewables is slow
or non-existing - something which can have a number of causes - we wish to examine
different types of renewable technologies to discuss some factors that might contribute to
their (un)popularity. Different types of renewable energy of course carry with them
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different sorts of potential problems and obstacles. Consequently, this paper should be
seen as an attempt to draw up some possibilities for an aggregate analysis of disparate
technologies rather than the last word on the standing of all types of renewable in the
Norwegian public.
In the following sections, we first present some theories about public resistance to
construction of new renewable energy production facilities, and discuss in what way these
theories seem to predict certain types of attitudes and behaviour in favour or opposition to
these issues. Then we present the case of possible resistance to renewable projects in a
Norwegian context and the findings from the survey data. Finally, we offer some concluding
remarks on the explanatory power of the theories in this particular case, as well as some
thoughts on how to better approach the issue of public engagement and new theories in
the future.
Explanations of lack of acceptance
Several studies have attempted to identify levels of public understanding and awareness of
different forms of energy technology and their impacts. These have produced a rather
mixed set of findings, in part due to the varied nature of questions asked. In terms of
general energy knowledge, McGowan and Sauter (2005:12) found that respondents
‘tended to have only a vague idea of where energy was used but a rather better sense of
the sources of energy’. Results suggest high levels of awareness that energy use is rising
(e.g. Eurobarometer, 2003), that energy sources are varied and often imported (e.g.,
Populus 2005), that renewable energy, particularly technologies such as solar panels, enjoy
strong support both in the UK and across Europe, but that most individuals are reluctant to
pay more for energy generated from renewable resources (Eurobarometer, 2006).
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The public generally views renewable energy very favourably. In spite of this, and
somewhat puzzling to us, most literature on the public perception of renewable energy
technologies focuses on public resistance. Following this line of thought, there exists a
broad range of theories that seek to explain why different renewable energy developments
are not always welcomed by the public. Most of them are location based theories (Schively
2007), claiming that one’s proximity to (or, in some cases, distance from) areas affected by
new development is a key factor in opposition to for example wind farms. Others claim that
it is rather a question of a combination of some socio-economic factors, and perhaps
especially level of education. This is the basis of various types of “knowledge deficit”
models.
New renewables are also clearly a political question, touching upon issues such as local
industrial development, the protection of vulnerable nature and wildlife, construction of
infrastructure and larger issues of security of energy supply and increasing electricity
demand. Some of these questions cut right through the classic left-right political scale,
making politics pertinent to the question of opposition to renewables. Somewhat
connected to this are theories of participatory democracy and feelings of inclusion or
exclusion on behalf of citizens, both on a local and on a more general level. Some theories
(Bell et al. 2005) claim that varying degrees of participation might go some way to explain
why opposition to new renewable developments sometimes arises and sometimes not.
We now discuss these various theories in greater detail, with a special focus on how they
predict behaviour and attitudes towards renewable energy before evaluating the strength
of the theories in relation to the specific context and data presented here.
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Location
The earliest explanations that surfaced regarding opposition to new renewable
development focused on the oftentimes locally based resistance. The NIMBY literature
claims that while support for renewables might be strong in the abstract, this support can
quickly evaporate when the development moves too close to one’s home. Citizens are
sometimes reluctant to accept large natural interventions in their local area, and this
reluctance is large enough to overcome the initial goodwill renewables enjoy. Thus, those
arguing for increased development of renewables need to find ways to overcome locally
based opposition (Smith & Marquez 2000).
NIMBY opposition can take many forms, including worries about the effect large
construction projects have on local flora and fauna, noise from wind turbines (Pedersen &
Persson Waye 2004; Pedersen et al. 2009) or other disturbances from renewables
installations, loss of tourist income (Dalton et al. 2008) or simply aesthetic preferences
(Ladenburg 2009). All these elements come into play in different ways in different locations,
and people will put weight on them according to personal preferences.
There are other theories about the relationship between geographical location and
opposition to renewables (or other kinds of large construction projects), with a large array
of abbreviations to go with them. To mention just a few, there is LULU – Locally Unwanted
Land Use (Mannarini et al. 2009), BANANA – Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near
Anyone (Tegou et al. 2007), NOPE – Not On Planet Earth, and CAVE – Citizens Against
Virtually Everything.2 The difference between these theories lies mostly in the degree of
blame they put on opponents of renewable developments for slowing down or stopping
construction, and some of these theories take a decidedly moral stance against any form of
opposition to renewable development.
2 All of these are extensively discussed in Schively (2007).
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All of them share the insistence on the importance of geography: where you live to a large
degree determines your perception of concrete construction plans (most NIMBY literature
acknowledges that there is widespread support for renewables in general). The literature is
mostly focused on descriptions of concrete empirical examples of both successful and
unsuccessful attempts at garnering local support for developments.
NIMBY theories have been criticised for postulating an overly simple connection between
“local interests” and opposition to renewables (H. Devine-Wright & P. Devine-Wright 2009;
P. Devine-Wright 2005). The NIMBY term has been lambasted for entailing a condescending
simplification of citizens’ motives for opposing developments that should not necessarily be
free of controversies (Burningham 2000; Gibson 2005). It has also been criticised for
focusing too much on individuals’ perceptions of renewables and not enough on the wider
social context these perceptions are formed within (Bell et al. 2005). Still, it is conceivable
that local developments can sensitise citizens to the phenomenon of renewable
constructions to a larger degree than if it remains an abstract question of something one is
unlikely to encounter. For this reason examining the effect of local developments on
attitudes towards renewables might be a useful strategy.
NIMBY theories generally predict that there will be a clear discrepancy between popular
support for renewable energy in general and the level of support for local developments in
citizens’ area, with the latter being lower because of the physical, tangible presence of large
constructions. However, people’s reasons for opposing renewable energy have been
proven to often encompass a broad range of social and personal factors affecting human
interactions with social and political institutions that extend beyond NIMBYism (West et al.
2010; Upreti & van der Horst 2004; Bell et al. 2005; Walker & Cass 2007; Walker 2008;
Wüstenhagen et al. 2007). Earlier research on barriers towards onshore wind power in
Norway has also indicated little support for the NIMBY theory, as people living close to
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wind power plants generally have been positive towards the developments (Knagenhjelm &
Sataøen 2005). People tend to put relatively little emphasis on the visual impact of the wind
turbines and in fact seem to view the developments as positive for outdoor life.
Knowledge deficit
From economics comes the concept of a “knowledge deficit” when it comes to the
acceptance (or lack of such) of new technologies. The phenomenon is partly explained as a
pure function of the amount of information a person has about the technology, assuming
that more knowledge about a technology leads to more positive sentiments towards it.
Another explanation is due to the observation that experts who work with a technological
area have a different evaluation of risks and advantages associated with a new
development than laypersons (Hansen et al. 2003), an effect MacKenzie has described as
“the certainty trough” (Mackenzie 1990). The certainty trough describes the level of
certainty attached to particular technoscientific constructions as distance increases from
the site of knowledge production, and proposes that producers of a given technology and
its products are the best judges of their accuracy. The attitude of loyalists is represented by
a dip (thus producing a ‘trough’) in the connecting line representing the higher levels of
uncertainty found among the the knowledge producers (experts) and the alienated (general
public), as compared to those committed to the technological institution/program butusers
rather than producers of the knowledge (Mackenzie 1990). One result of this is that experts
are frequently surprised by the way non-experts overstate the risks of new developments.
This is often explained as a side-effect of the increasing complexity in new technologies,
together with a certain level of distrust of scientific expertise (Peters 2000).
Even though this vision of well-informed citizens faithfully supporting new technological
developments has been criticised repeatedly (Tipaldo 2011; P. Devine-Wright 2008b), it is
still not unusual to see such explanations for the lack of support for new renewables. This
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might be because the public knowledge about renewables is generally quite scant
(Eurobarometer 2007), especially compared to those experts and public servants who are
tasked with developing and deploying the new technology. Also, some studies indicate that
support for new renewables does increase if respondents are given thorough information
about the pros and cons of new developments in advance of being surveyed (Ogarra et al.
2005).
Regardless of which position one takes to the knowledge deficit model, there is still much
uncertainty about what “knowledge” in the case of new renewables really constitutes, not
to mention what shape it should take and how it should be disseminated in order to make
people more positive towards them (Ricci et al. 2008).3 What kind of knowledge is needed?
Is it facts about the working of the technology or effects of the technology on for instance
climate mitigation? This uncertainty makes the question of level of information about
renewables pertinent for anyone examining the conditions for new developments in any
country.
Political affiliation
Not much work has been done on the connection between voters’ political preferences and
their opinions of renewable energy, perhaps somewhat surprising given the highly political
nature of much of the debate surrounding renewables. One reason might be that
environmental issues do not easily fit into a traditional left-right policy pattern, as they in a
sense are a more recent political development than the types of questions that were the
focus of the earliest political parties (Rootes 1995). However, there is evidence that
agreeing with a party on one issue makes voters more likely to adopt that party’s policies
on other issues, bringing personal opinions in line with the party’s stance (Gerber et al.
3 After all, it is unlikely that one will get the opportunity to carefully explain this particular issue in
long conversations with every single citizen.
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2009). This means that those parties that do not traditionally have a strong environmental
focus has a chance to affect their voters’ opinions on energy issues, sometimes by “de-
sensitising” them to such issues by placing a higher priority on other matters, such as
industrial development.
These indications point towards politics being an important factor in informing citizens’
views on energy questions, but do not say much about the general direction of this
influence. Some evidence that voters of left-wing parties are generally more
environmentally oriented than others exists (Neumayer 2004). Empirical findings suggest
that political beliefs are correlated with social acceptance of different low carbon
technologies. In the case of the UK, Populus (2005) indicated that 37% of individuals
indicating support for the Conservative party were supportive of new nuclear power
stations (in comparison to only 12% of Labour supporters and 14% Liberal Democrat) whilst
being less strongly supportive of new renewable energy developments (62% as against 86%
and 84% respectively).
Socio-demographic variables
One other background variable that could conceivably affect opinion to renewables is age.
Earlier studies from the UK gives a somewhat unclear picture of the relationship between
opinions on renewable energy and age, as some regional surveys have found higher levels
of opposition towards renewable energy amongst older respondents (MORI Social Research
Institute for Regen SW, 2003; Somerset County Council, 2004), while a national study found
levels of opposition to be lower in younger and older cohorts (ages 16-24 and 65+) in
comparison with middle-aged respondents. There are few explanations as to why this
category should play a role, but is not inconceivable that generational effects on attitudes
can be found.
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Gender has previously been known to play a role regarding environmental concern, and
may therefore be expected to affect attitudes towards renewables. In general, surveys have
demonstrated fairly consistent results that women are more environmentally oriented and
have stronger environmental attitudes than men (Stern 1998, Zelezny et al 2000). However,
whether environmental attitudes issues would actually predict attitudes towards
renewables is a more difficult question, as one may easily foresee that strong
environmental attitudes also may foster reluctance towards renewable energy, as it can be
seen as a threat towards both biodiversity and vulnerable natural areas due to large area
demands.
Renewables in Norway
The situation regarding construction of renewables in Norway must be seen in relation to
the specific context of the Norwegian electricity system, which is dominated by renewable
hydroelectricity, itself a clean and cheap energy source. In the period from the end of WWII
to the late 1980s, several factors combined to accustom both individual and large-scale
Norwegian electricity consumers to abundant electricity at a very low price. Norway has
many waterfalls and a history of social democratic governments willing to subsidise dam
construction to provide cheap electricity for industry and price controls for household
consumers. It also has had a highly centralised supply-driven approach to generation and
transmission of electricity that relied on constructing new production capacity well in
advance of increases in demand (Thue 1996). This means that many Norwegian hydro
plants have been in operation for decades and are paid for many times over.
However, the last large-scale hydro development in Norway took place in the early 1980s,
when a large dam project in the far north was constructed against opposition from
conservationists and indigenous activists. The controversy led to a de facto moratorium on
large hydro dam constructions. As a result, when demand for electricity caught up with
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available supply towards the end of the 1990s, the question of more small-scale new
electricity generation came to the front of public discussion. At the same time, Norway
committed to increasing its production of renewable energy through EU agreements.
Thus, Norway finds itself in the paradoxical situation of having to increase its production of
new types of renewable energy that are far away from competing with the country’s
traditionally cheap main source of electricity. Norway has chosen to adopt a “technology
neutral” approach to renewables, meaning a fixed governmental support for renewable
production regardless of type, but so far the renewable construction has been mainly wind
and small-scale hydro.
Data material and methods
This paper consists of two sets of survey data sampled from a representative population of
Norwegian citizens. The two sets consist of 1500 and 1032 respondents and were sampled
in the autumns of 2009 and 2011, respectively. The surveys were large, consisting of
questions on a broad range of energy related issues. Here we will concentrate on the
responses to questions about various types of renewable energy.
Through the use of survey data on these questions, it is possible to get a more general
overview of the state of opinions on renewables than specific case studies can provide. It
should be noted, however, that there are limits to the explanatory power of this data.
Aggregated survey data does not resolve the problem of measuring opinions on the level of
the individual, and hence does not say much about the larger social context these opinions
are formed within. Similarly, the types of standardised questions utilised in questionnaires
cannot to a large degree capture certain types of information, like how much knowledge an
individual actually has about renewables (that would require longer, more in-depth
interviews) or the way respondents associate their opinions on renewables with opinions
they might have on other issues of a political nature. As a final caveat we add that there is
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evidence for considerable differences in public support for renewables in various countries
(Gelissen 2007), so the findings we present are not necessarily universal.
The data is analysed using simple correlation measures, as well as ordinary least squares
regression using background variables selected with an eye to the theoretical debates
discussed above. The way these methods are utilised in relation to the theories discussed
above will be dealt with in the findings section.
What the data show
In this section, we present the findings from the survey data. Mainly, the statistical tests are
carried out on the data from the Climate Barometer survey, as it contains more background
variables that are of interests – especially the question of political affiliation. The
Deregulated Consumer survey is used as a control where applicable, to corroborate the
data from the Climate Barometer.
Before presenting the statistical tests, it can be useful to look at the simple distributions of
attitudes. The graph below shows the attitudes of respondents to different energy
technologies.
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
Very negative Somewhatnegative
Neither nor Somewhatpositive
Very positive
Pe
rce
nta
ge
Attitudes to different energy technologies
Onshore wind
Offshore wind
Hydro
Bio
Gas w/ CCS
Gas w/o CCS
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As can be seen from the graph, people are generally positive to most energy technologies in
the sample, with the mean lying somewhere around the “somewhat positive” value. The
clear exception is gas without carbon capture and storage, which is predominantly viewed
negatively. Gas with CCS is also somewhat ambiguously viewed, with a mean score almost
exactly on the “neither positive nor negative” category.
Exploring possible factors
Based on the theoretical arguments presented above and the relevant socio-demographic
variables in the survey, we performed a least squares regression analysis of the attitudes
towards different energy technologies with a series of relevant background variables as
independent variables. The following tables present the regression coefficients for the
attitudes towards different energy technologies. The variables used in the analysis are age,
gender, party affiliation, education (low/high) and income.
Table 1: Regression results for energy technologies
Onshore
wind
Offshore
wind Hydro Bio
Gas with
CCS
Gas w/o
CCS
Constant 4.405 4.611 4.497 3.907 2.766 2.560
Age -.070* -.101** .053 .002 .261** .036
Gender -.003 .010 -.187** .111** -.146** .052
Income -.014 -.017 -.028 -.040 -.014 .108**
Education -.066* -.036 .046 -.004 -.019 -.096**
Labour Party .012 .080 .010 .032 .124** -.047
Progress Party -.022 .010 .018 -.020 .044 .057
Conservative Party .113** .125** .074 -.014 .124** .048
Christian Democrat Party .023 .033 .025 -.005 -.024 -.075*
Red Party .020 .031 -.039 .030 -.066* -.080*
Centre Party .015 .065 -.061 -.014 .038 -.021
Socialist Left Party .016 .078* -.010 .057 .043 -.132**
Liberal Party .052 .055 -.013 .026 .074* -.107**
R-squared .022 .024 .057 .023 .131 .074
N 1017 1007 1011 969 910 904
Standardized coefficients reported
* and ** indicate significance at the .05 and .01 level, respectively
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Table 1 shows that older people are generally more sceptic towards onshore and offshore
wind than younger people, and more favourable towards gas with CCS. Here, age is used as
a continuous variable. When age is broken down into generational segments, it becomes
clear that it is people over the age of 60 that are significantly negative to renewables.
Women are more prone to have positive attitudes towards bioenergy than men, and are
more negative towards hydropower than men. Women’s tendency to be more negative
towards hydropower might be explained by the fact that women are generally more
environmentally oriented than men and that hydropower is seen as having the highest
impact on nature. Another notable feature of these tables is the presence of definite party
affiliations in the cases of energy sources that are not renewable, as in gas with or without
CCS. For the most part, voters’ views on these technologies correlate well with the
distinction between industry oriented and environmentally oriented political parties. Of
course, gas is pretty unpopular on average, but even more so among voters of parties that
emphasise their environmental profile. One telling exception is gas with CCS, which sees
the environmentally minded voters of the Liberal Party in favour together with the industry
friendly Conservatives and Labour party voters. This points to the complicated discussion
over the environmental merits of CCS. Whether or not these issues are partly the reason
voters affiliate with certain parties or whether the parties shape their voters’ opinions on
these matters is unclear, but there are signs that having a clear affiliation with a party tends
to make voters align more closely with the policies of that party (Gerber et al. 2009).
NIMBY
Because of the need to standardise interviews, the survey material does not contain good
data on respondents’ views on local developments. However, it is possible to say something
about the connection between views on energy technologies and location. Using opinion
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and location data from the survey in combination with information about which
municipalities have various types of renewable constructions, it is possible to gauge
whether living near an installation in some way affects the opinion of that renewable
technology in general. The term “near” is of course a rather imprecise one. Here we have
taken it to mean “within the same municipality”, because this brings the construction
within the individual’s sphere of possible political influence, but it does not mean that one
can see or feel the direct effects of the construction. If the NIMBY thesis holds, we should
expect people who are more directly affected by renewable construction to be more
negative towards that technology. To examine this, we have collected information about
both finished and planned constructions from the Norwegian Directorate of Water and
Energy and run correlations testing whether living near or in affected municipalities have an
effect on attitudes towards renewable energy technologies. Table 2 reports the findings.
Table 2: Correlations for onshore wind and hydro energy and living in municipalities with planned
and completed construction4
Climate Barometer The Deregulated Consumer
Planned Completed Planned Completed
Onshore wind Pearson’s r -.038 .009 .025 .008
Sig. (2-tailed) .225 .771 .328 .765
Hydro Pearson’s r .017 .027
Sig. (2-tailed) .588 .299
i * and ** denote significance below the .05 and .01 level, respectively.
For those energy technologies where we have access to construction data, there is little
trace of NIMBY type of explanations.
4 Only data for these two technologies are presented, because these are the only ones with any
substantial propagation and size of installations.
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Other specific contexts might produce different results. As an example, consider the three
counties of Norway that can be said to have especially interesting situations in the context
of energy: Rogaland, Nordland and Finnmark. Rogaland is the seat of the Norwegian oil and
gas industry, with a large percentage of the population employed in the sector. Nordland is
facing a large controversy over the possible opening of oil fields outside one of the world’s
richest fishing areas, and Finnmark is where the last, most controversial large-scale hydro
dam was constructed.
Table 3 shows the significant results from a correlation test of the opinion of various
renewable energy sources and all counties of Norway.
Table 3: Correlations renewables and living in counties with energy related controversies
Offshore wind Hydro Gas without CCS
Oslo Pearson’s r .080*
Sig. (2-tailed) .011
Rogaland Pearson’s r .081*
Sig. (2-tailed) .015
Nordland Pearson’s r -.068*
Sig. (2-tailed) .032
Finnmark Pearson’s r -.198**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 i * and ** denote significance below the .05 and .01 level, respectively.
As can be seen from Table 3, the context mentioned above might explain why people from
Rogaland are above average positive to gas plants, while people in Nordland might be
sceptical of increased offshore activity in the form of large offshore wind turbines and
people in Finnmark are markedly less enthusiastic about hydro energy. This shows that
local contexts might play a role for attitudes towards renewables without it being related to
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NIMBYism. Explaining why citizens of Oslo are more positive to offshore wind than average
is not straightforward, and left for further scrutiny.5
Political views and renewables
As noted above, renewable construction touches upon a host of political issues, and
different parties across the political spectrum might give varying weight to the importance
of these. We examine the correlations between positive view of various renewables (and
some non-renewables) and affiliation with various political blocks of Norwegian politics,
based on self-reporting of voting in the last general election. The voters are placed in blocks
according to two criteria: the first is a left-right scale based on the political parties’ views on
economic policy, and is a traditional delineation in Norwegian politics (Ryghaug & Jenssen
1999). The parties in the blocks are Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party, SV) and
Arbeiderpartiet (Labour Party, AP) in the “left” block, Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian
Democrats, KrF), Venstre (Liberal Party, V) and Senterpartiet (Centre Party, SP) in the
“centre” block, and Høyre (Conservative Party, H) and Fremskrittpartiet (Progress Party,
FrP) in the “right” block.
Not all political divisions follow the traditional left-right schema. Environmental issues can
to a certain degree be said to comprise a separate political axis, where some voters on the
right can agree with some on the left in putting environmental concerns before industrial
development or jobs, and vice versa. The second criteria is based on the parties’ public
profile for being “environmentally friendly”, prioritizing conservation efforts or the cleanest
renewables regardless of cost, and “industry friendly”, which is more concerned with jobs
and efficient investments in the power infrastructure. In the environment block we find SV,
5 A test of a different type of location based explanation which posits that there is a correlation
between living in an urban (or, conversely, rural) setting and opinions on renewables was also done,
but yielded no significant results at all. The details and correlation table can be found in the
Appendix.
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SP, KrF and V, and in the industry block AP, H and FrP6. One way of testing the assumption
of environmental and industrial focus among voters is to check the two blocks against some
more general questions about the state of the environment and energy system of the
world. Table 4 shows some correlations between statements about the environment and
the answers among the two blocks. The responses are on a five-point Likert scale where
positive correlation implies agreement with the statement.
Table 4: Correlations between political blocks and statements about the environment
Industry Environment
I am worried about the consequences of global
warming
Pearson’s r -.132** .161**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
I think climate change is caused by human
action
Pearson’s r -.176** .211**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
Norway doesn’t put enough effort into
constructing new renewables
Pearson’s r .070* .037
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 .239
The world’s energy demand will have to be
met by oil and gas for a long time
Pearson’s r .182** -.204**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
More hydro is needed for Norway to meet its
emissions goals
Pearson’s r .115** -.126**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
The Norwegian power industry is concerned
about climate change
Pearson’s r .032 -.083**
Sig. (2-tailed) .300 .008
The Norwegian power industry is concerned
with conservation
Pearson’s r .048 -.111**
Sig. (2-tailed) .127 .000
The Norwegian power industry is developing
more climate friendly production techniques
Pearson’s r .040 -.085**
Sig. (2-tailed) .202 .007
i * and ** denote significance below the .05 and .01 level, respectively.
From Table 4 it should be clear that there is a definitive distinction between political blocks,
with the conflict lines being interest in and concern about environmental issues on the one
hand and a more engineering and construction oriented political outlook.
6 Note that these three parties are by far the largest in Norwegian politics, and this block amounts to
about 75 % of votes.
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There is some overlap between the two block categories of left-right and environmental-
industrial. The parties on the right are both in the industrial block, while the centre parties
have a very environmentally oriented profile. In this issue, it is the left that is split between
industrial and environmental concerns. A look at the correlations between the blocks
reveals this: The right is strongly correlated with industry (r = .570, sig. < .01) and the centre
with environment (r = .698, sig. < .01), while the left is positively correlated with both
blocks (industry: r = .229, sig. < .01, environment: r = .081, sig. < .01), with some overweight
on the industrial block due to the Labour Party being by far the largest party on the left.
Table 5: Correlations for various renewable energy technologies and affiliation with different
political blocks
Left Centre Right Industry Environment
Onshore wind Pearson’s r -.017 .056 -.006 -.027 .050
Sig. (2-tailed) .586 .073 .847 .385 .108
Offshore wind Pearson’s r .021 .032 .015 .014 .050
Sig. (2-tailed) .503 .307 .635 .654 .114
Hydro Pearson’s r -.037 -.031 .095** .082** -.057
Sig. (2-tailed) .243 .322 .002 .010 .068
Gas w/ CCS Pearson’s r .016 -.008 .098** .156** -.062
Sig. (2-tailed) .623 .805 .003 .000 .063
Bio-energy Pearson’s r .072* -.002 -.064* -.029 .045
Sig. (2-tailed) .024 .939 .048 .373 .165
Coal w/o CCS Pearson’s r -.077* -.071* .031 .036 -.152**
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .030 .340 .277 .000
Gas w/o CCS Pearson’s r -.112** -.118** .160** .139** -.207**
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
i * and ** denote significance below the .05 and .01 level, respectively.
Table 5 has some interesting results. Firstly, with no significant correlations, wind power
does not “belong” to any of the political blocks. This could indicate that voters either see
wind both as an environmental measure and as industrial development, and therefore a
win-win solution, or as ambiguous because the benefits do not easily outweigh the
drawbacks. Secondly, hydro – a clean, cheap and abundant resource in Norway that carries
21
with it some large negative effects of damming up creeks, rivers and lakes – is more
favourable viewed by the right and industrial blocks than by the rest. This might be
explained by its connection to Norway’s industrial production base (especially in the so-
called power intensive industry sector, mostly aluminium production).
The third notable finding here has to do with gas plants. There is a heated debate about the
use of gas in power plants in Norway, and the issue seems to divide the voters. The centre-
left government have announced their plans to construct large-scale carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS) facilities in order to start utilising more gas in electricity production
without increasing the emission of CO2. These plans have assuaged the environmentally
minded somewhat (which might be why there is no clear correlation between the left,
centre and environment blocks and the issue of gas plants with CCS), but also represent a
significant cost to the construction of new gas plants. This last point can explain the most
polarised of the above technologies, gas plants without CCS. Clearly, this is unacceptable for
the environmentally oriented voters on the left and in the centre, while the cheaper
construction cost of these plants might explain why right voters are even more strongly in
favour of this option than the one with CCS.
Table 6: Correlations for various renewables and specific party affiliationi
Ap FrP H KrF Sp SV V
Onshore wind Pearson’s r -.033 -.043 .087
** .009 -.002 -.012 .031
Sig. (2-tailed) .286 .166 .005 .779 .955 .703 .318
Offshore wind Pearson’s r -.002 -.050 .061 -.002 .032 .034 .019
Sig. (2-tailed) .955 .113 .052 .958 .307 .283 .552
Hydro Pearson’s r -.011 .023 .094** .036 -.069** -.028 -.022
Sig. (2-tailed) .737 .455 .003 .254 .028 .377 .488
Gas w/ CCS Pearson’s r .069* .016 .103** -.052 .007 -.034 .028
Sig. (2-tailed) .038 .619 .002 .114 .836 .302 .400
Bio-energy Pearson’s r .032 -.044 -.038 -.018 -.016 .061 .022
Sig. (2-tailed) .327 .175 .232 .574 .611 .056 .501
Coal w/o CCS Pearson’s r .006 .061 -.014 -.044 -.008 -.119** -.080*
22
Table 6 breaks down the political affiliation correlations on the individual party level. While
it mostly confirms the impression from the block data, a few things are worth noting. The
most important is that some parties’ voters have much more polarised views on these
issues than others. For example, Labour Party voters are not more or less strongly in favour
of various energy technologies than the average, and the same goes for Christian
Democrats and people voting for the Centre Party. In contrast, the voters of the
Conservative Party are strongly in favour of gas power plants (and also onshore wind and
hydro), while voters of the Socialist Left Party and the centre-right Liberal Party are equally
opposed. This can either imply that gas plants are clearer examples of an energy technology
that is less ambiguous in terms of the trade-off between environmental and industrial
concerns than for example wind, or that this specific issue has been made into a political
talking point, where the involved parties already have invested prestige in backing or
opposing the issue – or a combination of the two.
Conclusion
Our data indicate that many of the theories for public opposition to renewable energy
constructions are, if not directly wrong, then at least insufficient to explain why some
citizens are less than supportive of new renewables constructions even when they are in
general positive to the idea. We find little support of the NIMBY-theory in our data
material. Nonetheless, geographical proximity seem to produce some variation regarding
attitudes to renewables and other energy sources, as regions with particular developments
seem to foster positive or negative sentiments.
Sig. (2-tailed) .845 .065 .672 .186 .818 .000 .015
Gas w/o CCS Pearson’s r -.012 .098** .107** -.068* -.019 -.136** -.101**
Sig. (2-tailed) .730 .003 .001 .041 .560 .000 .002
i * and ** denote significance below the .05 and .01 level, respectively.
23
In light of the focus of much research on public perception of renewables, we believe the
findings of this paper should challenge some assumptions about the role of renewables
policy. While it is known that the public generally views renewable energy technologies
positively, this is to a limited degree reflected in public policy. Rather than focus so much
on why a (sometimes vanishingly small) minority oppose renewable constructions, we
might ask why there is so little analysis of the overwhelming favourability of renewables.
These are, after all, expensive and intrusive technologies. What work has been done to
make them so popular?
Some research into public perception of energy constructions focuses on the degree to
which the public is asked to participate in decision processes around proposed
constructions. Previous studies have concluded that including the public in such processes
at an early stage increases public support for the construction plans (Brunsting et al. 2011).
This might be a worthwhile avenue of exploration for future planning of renewable
constructions. If the plans for increased renewable construction are to come to fruition,
governments and planners might want to look into citizen participation as a way of
achieving the support they need.
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Appendix 1
Urban placement and renewables
Most renewable facilities are constructed in somewhat remote areas, chiefly in order to
maximise output from placement-sensitive installations such as wind turbines or solar
panels. This has led some to claim that part of the NIMBY effect is not due to locals being
26
very negative to construction in their area, but rather people living in densely populated
areas having an especially positive opinion of renewables because there are relatively few
or no negative impacts from remotely placed renewable installations. So far, there has
been little academic evidence supporting that people living in a densely populated area are
more positive than those living in more sparsely populated areas. However, it is an issue
worth pursuing. Appendix Table 1 shows some correlation measures from both surveys (not
combined because they do not completely overlap) measuring the correlation between
living in an urban environment (defined as living in a municipality with more than 50.000
inhabitants7) and positive view of renewables.
Appendix Table 1: Correlations between urban location and impression of renewables
Climate Barometer The Deregulated Consumer
Onshore wind Pearson’s r .030 -.005
Sig. (2-tailed) .340 .838
Offshore wind Pearson’s r .045 -.050
Sig. (2-tailed) .158 .058
Hydro Pearson’s r .038 .008
Sig. (2-tailed) .231 .767
Bio-energy Pearson’s r -.030 .013
Sig. (2-tailed) .348 .617
Solar Pearson’s r .003
Sig. (2-tailed) .903
Tidal Pearson’s r -.003
Sig. (2-tailed) .910
Gas w/ CCS Pearson’s r .014 -.008
Sig. (2-tailed) .665 .777
Gas w/o CCS Pearson’s r -.024 -.001
Sig. (2-tailed) .475 .981
Coal w/o CCS Pearson’s r -.032
Sig. (2-tailed) .324
7 Note that this is considered a large municipality in Norway, which has 431(?) municipalities. Eleven
of these have more than 50.000 inhabitants.
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As can be seen, there is no statistically significant correlation between living in an urban
area and viewing any energy technology favourably.