University of the Philippines College of LawLaw 121 | Professor Charlemagne Yu

Case Digest

TOPIC: Fundamental Equality of Women and MenCASE Number (including date): 300 US 379 29 Mar 1937CASE Name: West Coast Hotel vs. ParrishPonente: Hughes, CJ

FACTS Elsie Parrish, employed as a chambermaid in West Coast Hotel was paid sub-minimum wage,

brought a suit to recover the difference between wages paid her and the minimum wage fixed pursuant to the state law of Washington entitled “Minimum Wages for Women,” authorizing and fixing the minimum wages for women and minors. The state law provides that:

o SECTION 1. The welfare of the State of Washington demands that women and minors be protected from conditions of labor which have a pernicious effect on their health and morals. The State of Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power declares that inadequate wages and unsanitary conditions of labor exert such pernicious effect.

o SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to employ women or minors in any industry or occupation within the State of Washington under conditions of labor detrimental to their health or morals, and it shall be unlawful to employ [p387] women workers in any industry within the State of Washington at wages which are not adequate for their maintenance.

o SEC. 3. There is hereby created a commission to be known as the "Industrial Welfare Commission" for the State of Washington, to establish such standards of wages and conditions of labor for women and minors employed within the State of Washington as shall be held hereunder to be reasonable and not detrimental to health and morals, and which shall be sufficient for the decent maintenance of women.

Petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of the minimum wage law of the State of Washington on the grounds that it violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

ISSUES1. Whether or not the fixing of minimum wage for women and minors constitutional

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi) Yes: The US Supreme Court ruled that the State has special interest in the protection of women

in relation to their employment. Considering that "woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence," and that her physical wellbeing "becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."

Moreover, women are more susceptible to be overreached and exploited by unscrupulous employers, thus, it is the duty of the State to forbid employment at rates below those fixed as the minimum requirement of health and right living to assure that even women will not be employed even at the lowest wage allowed unless they earn them, or unless the employer’s business can sustain the burden. The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power, and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage, is not only detrimental to their health and wellbeing, but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. What these workers lose in wages, the taxpayers are called upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met.

As regards the contention that the legislation in question constitutes arbitrary discrimination because it does not extend to men, is unavailing. This Court has frequently held that the legislative authority, acting within its proper field, is not bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach. The legislature "is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest." If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied.

RULING:The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is affirmed.

DISSENTING OPINION | Sutherland, J., Van Devanter, J., McReynolds, J., Butler, J.

The gist of their dissent that is related to our topic is that why should there be a legislation providing for minimum wage for women but none for men, when in fact, women are of equal legal and political standing with men and that they should no longer be put in different classes in respect to their legal rights to make contracts nor should they be denied the right to compete with men for work paying lower wages. According to them, men in need of a job are as likely as women to accept lower wages offered by unscrupulous employers. In fact, more men need to support themselves and dependents, and thus, because of such need, will work for whatever wages they can get, and that without regard for value of service even though the pay is less than minima prescribed in accordance with this act. The enactment of such state law is an arbitrary discrimination against men.

“An appeal to the principle that the legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and confine its restrictions accordingly, is but to beg the question, which is, since the contractual rights of men and women are the same, does the legislation here involved, by restricting only the rights of women to make contracts as to wages, create an arbitrary discrimination? We think it does. Difference of sex affords no reasonable ground for making a restriction applicable to the wage contracts of all working women from which like contracts of all working men are left free. Certainly a suggestion that the bargaining ability of the average woman is not equal to that of the average man would lack substance. The ability to make a fair bargain, as everyone knows, does not depend upon sex.

If, in the light of the facts, the state legislation, without reason or for reasons of mere expediency, excluded men from the provisions of the legislation, the power was exercised arbitrarily. On the other hand, if such legislation in respect of men was properly omitted on the ground that it would be

unconstitutional, the same conclusion of unconstitutionality is inescapable in respect of similar legislative restraint in the case of women,”