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West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review Lolo National Forest, U.S.

Forest Service

National Oversight Review

National Incident Management Organization

5/9/2014

West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review Lolo National Forest U.S. Forest Service, March 2014

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.............................................................................................................................1Purpose............................................................................................................................................2Background......................................................................................................................................3Identify actions taken by the Incident Management Team (IMT) and Forest to meet the intent/direction of the Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol...........................................6Assess the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome..........................................8Identify best business practices used on fires this past season........................................................9Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making..................................10Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded.................................................11Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations..........................12Lessons Learned- Observations and Recommendations...............................................................14Fire Chronology.............................................................................................................................20West Mullan Cost Appendices......................................................................................................33

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Objective of this Review

The primary objective of these Programmatic/Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document risk management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect effect on costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management for incident-specific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive analysis of incident documentation.

This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the effectiveness of implementation in the field.

The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning environment and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.


Purpose

On December 20, 2013, James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry (SPF) issued a letter requiring review of several large Fiscal Year 2013 wildfires. The Washington Office Fire and Aviation Management (FAM) staff, with input from the Northern Region Fire and Aviation Management Director determined that the West Mullan would be reviewed. Fires were selected based on complexity and national significance. The designated fires represent a cross section of our risk management and investment performance, which includes financial, size, and oversight complexity. Further details will be sent to individual Regions/Forests prior to each review. The reviews will be conducted using the 2013 Risk Decision Framework. On January 17, 2014, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation Management delegated Dan Kleinman to be the Team Leader for the 2013 Programmatic/Cost Fire Review for the West Mullan wildland fire that occurred on the Lolo National Forest in Montana.

The purpose of the review is to learn from those who were involved and share those learned lessons. The review objectives include:

Conduct fire reviews to meet our responsibility to provide oversight at the national level.

Objectively look at actions taken by the Incident Management Team and local Agency Administrator to meet the direction provided by the Chief in his 6700; Chief’s Letter of Intent dated April 19, 2013.

Assess the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome.

Identify best business practices used on fires this past season. Identify how social and political issues factored into our

decision making. Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or

expanded. Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and

clarifying expectations.

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Review Objectives:

Objectively look at actions taken by the Incident Management Team and the local Agency Administrator to meet the direction provided by the Forest Service Chief

Asses the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome

Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires This Past Season

Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

Review Team Members:

Tracey Nimlos, Incident Business Coordinator, Northern Region

Alex Sienkiewicz, District Ranger, Gallatin National Forest

Al Watson, District Ranger, Pacific Southwest Region

Rick Connells, FFMO, Flathead National Forest

Dan Rose, FFMO, Kootenai National Forest


Review Team

The review team members consisted of: Tracey Nimlos, Incident Business Coordinator, Northern Region; Alex Sienkiewicz, District Ranger, Gallatin National Forests; Al Watson, District Ranger, Pacific Southwest Region; Rick Connell, FFMO Flathead National Forest; Dan Rose, FFMO Kootenai National Forest; Marty Mitzkus, AFFMO, Helena/Lewis & Clark National Forest, Reggie Day, DAFMO, Idaho Panhandle National Forest; and Bertram Smith, Helitack Squad Leader, Flathead National Forest.

Background

The team reviewed numerous documents located on the Forest, within the West Mullan ftp site, and on InciWeb. Documentation that was reviewed included: Incident Action Plans (IAPs); Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS); Incident Status Summaries (209’s); fire maps; and cost summaries. On-site interviews and phone interviews were held in Missoula and Superior Montana on March 25-27, 2014. Those interviewed included: retired Forest Supervisor; Forest FMO and deputy; Acting Forest Supervisor; District Ranger; District FMO; Incident Commanders; Operations Section Chiefs; Montana State Emergency Management personnel; and County Sheriff.

The review team found that there were many factors that influenced the outcome of the West Mullan fire. It was a complex incident located in difficult terrain with multiple values at risk including Wildland Urban Interface (WUI), national power grid, Montana Rail Link, Interstate 90 and also a Hazardous Material Superfund site that caused concern for firefighter safety.

The review team focused on the objectives of the review and was cognizant of not being influenced by hindsight bias when reviewing documents or interviewing people. The team had open discussions with personnel regarding the incident, their interactions, and what they thought was important to be shared as lessons learned.

Critical Values at Risk

Values at risk in the fire area as identified by Forest Service (FS) representatives, cooperators/partners, and stakeholders included: firefighters working in extreme terrain, public/cooperator/partner relationships and jurisdictions, private structures and property,

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Review Team Members Continued:

Marty Mitzkus, AFFMO, Helena/Lewis & Clark National Forest

Reggie Day, DAFMO, Idaho Panhandle National Forest

Bertram Smith, Helitack Squad Leader, Flathead National Forest


FS campgrounds, active timber sales, Iron Mountain Superfund site, the town of Superior, MT, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) transmission lines, Montana Rail Link railroad, and Interstate 90. Resource values such as road access for recreational use, wildlife habitat, threatened and endangered species, watershed values, aesthetics, etc. were identified by agency personnel. The community of St. Regis and Highway 135 are located a distance from the fire but were not directly threatened.

West Mullan Fire – Summary of Actions

The West Mullan Fire was ignited on July 14, 2013 in Montana on the Lolo National Forest (NF) Superior Ranger District and full suppression action was taken. The fire was deemed human caused on July 22, 2013 and declared 100% contained on July 28, 2013. The West Mullan Fire burned 6,282 acres.

The Lolo National Forest is a high fire frequency forest. However, energy release component (ERC) was approaching the 90th percentile which contributed to this being a statistically uncharacteristic early season large fire. The national preparedness level was 2 and the Lolo National Forest was at a preparedness level 3. Fire management submitted for severity funding on July 22, 2013 and received confirmation July 28, 2013 allowing requests for additional resource support for an already active initial attack (IA) load. At the onset of the West Mullan fire the Lolo National Forest fire load consisted of 61 IA fires, 48 of which were human caused and 1 extended attack fire. The West Mullan fire was the first fire of the season locally that was resistant to IA efforts.

The fire was detected by Superior Ranger District fire management personnel as it was highly visible from the district office. Dispatch was contacted and IA action was taken at approximately 1700 Mountain Daylight Time (MDT) on July 14, 2013. There were multiple values at risk, extreme fire behavior, and rapid fire growth that led to the transition from Type 3 Incident Commander (IC) to Tom Heintz Northern Rockies Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT). Heintz Team assumed command on July 16, 2013.

The fire behavior and proximity to the town of Superior, MT population 830, Interstate 90, active timber sales, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) transmission lines that supply power to the national grid; Montana Rail Link railroad, agency infrastructure and Flat Creek Iron Mountain Mine (IMM) superfund (hazmat) site created a complex incident. The imminent threat to the town of Superior prompted Stage 1 evacuations and operationally aggressive fire suppression strategy.

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The close coordination between the cooperators and interagency entities allowed for management of values at risk. The fire did impact one agency timber sale that contributed to the salvage of part of that sale. The Interstate 90 corridor was not shut down or re-routed. The smoke impacts to BPA lines did not require de-energizing. Standard precautions were in place for firefighter safety working near the Flat Creek Iron Mountain Mine (IMM) superfund site. There were seven Management Action Points (MAPs) developed, none of which were breached. The general tactical approach included 24 hour operations, structure protection and indirect fireline with burnout. As containment percentage increased evacuation orders were lifted, rehab began and transfer of command back down to the local unit occurred on July 29, 2013. The fire burned 1,534 acres of Plum Creek industry timber land, 1,233 acres of State of Montana Department of Natural Resources (DNRC) land, 714 acres of private land and 2,801 acres of FS land for a cost of $10,079,080. The Lolo National Forest is responsible for wildland fire protection of all the noted lands due to the “Protection Offset Agreement” with the State of Montana.

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The following are key observations and correspondi

West Mullan Fire

West Mullan Fire


Identify actions taken by the Incident Management Team (IMT) and Forest to meet the intent/direction of the Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol

The actions addressed the intent of the Chief’s letter. The strategy the IMT took was fairly clear. The IMT utilized straight-forward full perimeter control. The risk assessment was in-line with the strategy. The IMT “ramped-up and went heavy with night-ops.” One person stated that night operations prevented the incident from going bigger and being more costly. From one person interviewed, the Forest wanted the fire put to bed before prime fire season kicked in. One person stated “Truthfully there was not a lot of talk about costs…a little bit of consciousness there, but it was more like, get what you need and keep that fire in the box.”

“There was a desire to avoid the long-duration fire scenario. It was stated that “we wouldn’t have caught [the fire] without night-ops.” There was fear that one little mistake during night operations would’ve taken the tool away.” From one perspective there was a reluctance to go direct on the fire during the day due to fire behavior and that night operations were a viable option. Also noted that Type 2 IMTs are not necessarily staffed or equipped for night-ops with the current staffing level.

The 7 Standards and 5 Rights were managed within the WFDSS. The Forest mirrored their partners’ language in their decision documents. Montana Department of Emergency Services (MTDES) assisted Mineral County. The Forest believes they met the intent of the Chief’s letter.

First WFDSS decision was difficult to meet timeframes of policy. There was not a lot of deliberation over the course of action. The second decision had a Strategic Operational Planner (SOPL) involved as well as IMT members. The WFDSS spatial components are helpful, but the Forest would have made the same decision without WFDSS. The Forest prefers the cost index they use better than the Stratified Cost index (SCI) in WFDSS. The SCI just validated their cost index. They used FSPro and short-term/near term fire behavior which validated what they already knew. The WFDSS tools were used more to validate the decision that had already been made. A Type 2 IMT was ordered because a lot of the values were at the heel of the fire with the community.

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Observation by Objective:

The following are key observations and corresponding lessons learned organized by the four objectives of the review.


The Forest had developed partnerships early in the season and is something they do annually to prepare for incidents. Partners getting together pre-season to go over scenarios. Forest level delegations and responsibilities were discussed through meetings and documentation.

Pre-incident meetings were critical for success. The Forest was very proactive in pre-incident meetings and scenarios which led to joint response that was seamless. Roles were defined early and trust was developed so decisions could be made in a timely manner. Example being the IMT and the Sheriff’s Department were able to work in concert regarding evacuations. The IMT took responsibility of when and worked with the Sheriff’s Department to implement.

Building working relationships with local county and local government with scenarios and meetings. Roles and responsibilities being outlined to facilitate a joint group response.

The District Ranger (DR) felt the incident went well overall. The pre-season preparedness was a big part of their success, noting that there are great relationships between the FS home unit and county, local Rural Fire Department (RFD), mayor, etc. The local unit and local cooperators are practiced at working together. Also the DR meets monthly with County Commissioners. Because the fire was right in town, there was a great deal of discussion about values at risk, including homes, power lines, a superfund site, etc. The decision to utilize night operations allowed them to get control of the fire more quickly. “Night operations actually improved the overall safety of the effort by containing the fire more quickly.”

The Forest had recognized and formed priorities before the IMT arrived. The decision to do full perimeter control and work a night shift contributed to reducing firefighter exposure.

The representative from the MTDES stated that the forest had gone through great lengths to building partnerships through pre-season meetings. This translated to federal and local agencies being engaged from the beginning.

The Lolo NF had invested heavily in the pre-season work and had developed outstanding relationships with the local community cooperators. The in-brief included the risk analysis process. Lots of actions were in play before the team arrived such as mutual aid for the local RFD that just needed support from the IMT to organize.

With it being second year of policy letter the struggle wasn’t there. Superior Ranger District personnel worked well together especially during the emergent phase. It was obvious that they are used to working together.

Assess the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome

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Implementing a full night operations definitely contributed to overall costs savings on the fire. Burnouts could have not been accomplished during the day as effectively as at night.

Letter of delegation and meeting with IMT to give Leader’s Intent to fire personnel was a major change from years ago where often line officers were not engaged with employees at the ground level.

The forest articulated to the incoming team its intent for management of the fire and also gave designation of authority to the Incident Commander (IC).

The Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation and the Montana Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association developed the STAR agreement which provides a mechanism to request additional law enforcement personnel from other counties.

It was the local District Fire Management Officer’s (DFMO) perception that having a night operation was beneficial in reducing the overall cost of the fire as they were able to keep the containment area to a smaller footprint. Although the short-term cost is larger due to 24 operational periods, the long-term impact to acres burned and firefighter exposure was less.

There was a perception that the use of airtankers may have been excessive, but due to the time lag when they arrived on the incident may have limited their use for the long term.

Early in the fire, there was concern over the lack of overhead that the IMT was supplying, particularly division supervisors and operations. Cause of concern from the forest was that information was late coming in and on several occasions real time fire information was not coming from the team but from locals. A cause for the lack of management could be attributed to the forest’s insistence on running a night operation that the team may not have had staff for day and night staffing.

The Logistics Section struggled with procurement of certain items such as reefers, rental vehicles, etc. Kudos to the Dispatch Center Manager who addressed problems quickly and successfully. There was confusion, in the context of procurement, as to what “local” means, and how far away would still qualify as a “local” business or resource.

The acknowledgement that all the values at risk ringed the “box” provided by the Lolo NF at the in-briefing combined with the early season activity and conditions enhanced the cost of this event. With day time fire behavior too extreme to facilitate burnout opportunities, it was recommended by the Lolo NF and accepted by the team, that a fully staffed operational night shift could increase the success of the suppression objective. Day light activities included significant use of aviation assets to minimize fire spread also lead to increased costs, but again with considerable values at risk around the fire, were appropriate.

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Felt the costs were commensurate with the values at risk. Had to encourage the IMT to be more aggressive in order to keep the fire from becoming a long-term event.

The request to build a long-term plan was done by the Forest to help solidify the assumption that if the fire exceeded the box, it would be tough to deal with and likely cost more and impact more values at risk.

The IMT used the Operational Planning Worksheet (ICS 215) and the Incident Safety Analysis (ICS-215a) to identify work assignments, risks and chances of success. Every day the Operations Section Chief (OSC) and the Safety Officer (SOF) went through the process to complete the ICS 215 and the ICS 215a forms. The Agency Administrator (AA) and Forest Fire Management Officer (FFMO) were involved on a daily basis going through the risk analysis process.

There was no debate over costs when the fire was coming down the face toward the town of Superior. The necessity to hold the fire in the box and away from power lines was a bigger discussion later. They knew if they didn’t catch the fire and contain it within the box, it would be big, long duration and expensive.

Running the night shift contributed significantly to containing the fire and precluded it from becoming a long-term event. Even though initially it was more expensive to run two shifts, overall costs were probably lower because of it.

Identify best business practices used on fires this past season

Aircraft assigned to the fire were also supporting IA within the zone. There was an overt effort from the IMT to only use the needed resources and also

release resources that were no longer needed in a timely manner. The IMT was very efficient at this.

A Type 2 IMT was ordered instead of a more costly Type 1 IMT. The community of Superior, MT remembered the last big fire. There was a lot of

desire to catch the fire quickly and put it to bed, for fear of other starts compounding the situation. One person interviewed stated that “this was one of the best experiences he’s ever had in regard to working with local communities and partners.” The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was run very well. The public information process went very well and made public meetings almost unnecessary. The interviewee noted that the local fire chief was “very dialed-in” and used mutual aid agreements well.

Fortunately this fire was early and the ability to get resources was not a limiting factor. However, logistics were tough due to the delayed arrival of the Logistics Section Chief (LSC) and the limited availability of local logistical support; which the team thought would be sufficient to cover for the delay. Additionally, there were some issues with determining what the Forest meant when they requested the IMT

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support “local” business when possible. Local was interpreted to mean Missoula by the IMT and Buying Team, when the Forest meant Superior and St. Regis.

Pre-season agreements were slow to get implemented. Additionally, rental cars were an issue.

Some lessons that were reaffirmed were the importance of maintaining relationships with local entities; and the effective component that night shifts can be when implemented safely. Cost-wise you are better to hit it hard with everything you can and keep it from becoming a longer term event.

Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making

The values at risk were self-evident, they knew immediately it was a full suppression event. Public information drove some decisions and the need to manage the media.

Stakeholders were part of the discussions, but did not have protection responsibilities so they were part of the process, but not part of the WFDSS. BPA probably did have influence on the decisions. The FFMO did not feel BPA necessarily caused higher costs on the fire. BPA was engaged directly with concerns to the power line and provided information at briefings.

There were no outside influences that effected decision making. For the community of Superior, there is an annual softball tournament that is critical

to the community regarding tourist dollars. The IMT was sensitive to this and worked with local community leaders to ensure that businesses were open and not impacted by the fire as much as possible to allow the event to continue.

There were excellent relationships in place between the FS and community entities and partners. The public was very supportive of the IMT and FS efforts. The Sheriff was a key supporter and partner during the incident.

With local relationships well established, situations were handled without issue. The use of the STAR Agreement to facilitate bringing in outside law enforcement help to the county was unknown to the Sheriff. The community was very supportive of the entire event.

Stakeholder meetings were held every day. They were briefed and given the opportunity to provide input into the planning. The community of Superior was holding public meetings at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) every day and the IMT participated in those. Early on, input from the Sheriff and fire department was critical to influencing how resources were assigned and how the IMT approached the situation. On the day of the burnout, the IMT felt better having the extra local resources in place.

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Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded

At the beginning of the fire, there were issues with WFDSS in that the 24 hour policy was difficult to meet.

A good in-brief and delegation should be sufficient instead of spending hours on building WFDSS completely for the in-brief. Should Management Action Points (MAPs) actually be “evaluation” instead of action, given that time and conditions have likely changed and the “implementation” may need to change but we interpret actions as fixed.

There were concerns noted for the law enforcement officers that were exposed to wildfire hazard and operations and also unfamiliar with the IMT environment and associated processes.

From the MTDES perspective, there was nothing to be enhanced but continually strive to have a local and state government’s meeting prior to incidents to determine roles and responsibilities for all risk incidents.

Continue to develop partnerships and utilizing night operations as a viable suppression tool. Additionally, having the EOC engaged was valuable to keep a consistent message and manage rumor control.

We did as well as one could with several acting’s in key positions on the Forest. The local DR and DFMO were always available and present for the IMT. One person noted the awkwardness of transitions and the question as to whether the IMT should take the fire immediately upon arrival, or after an extended period of size-up and information gathering. When it became clear that night operations were a desirable strategy, there was question as to when was the right time to take the fire.

Night time medevac concerns were mitigated by the local ambulance being on call and having EMT/Medics staged where the most folks were located.

How do we get an IMT up to speed in an immediate high tempo environment, when the ability to gather experience in the environment is limited? Changes in policy lead to challenges in aligning delegations, course of action, etc., when all the pre-work has been completed. Limits to staff due to budgets are limiting the ability to generate paper work and meet time frames.

Commitment to IA versus large fire support, especially for aviation assets, needs to be forcefully adhered to. “A Type 1 helicopter likely will have minimal effect on large fire growth, but may have a large impact on an emerging fire.”

West Mullan was interesting and challenging, it was their first fire of the season. There was a lot of potential on the face above the community of Superior. Part of the town was already evacuated when they arrived. Lots of structures threatened, BPA power line. The IMT clearly understood from the briefing what their objectives were, which triggered ordering additonal resources immediately. During the initial and extended attack there was a lot of retardant delivered by airtankers. Lots of

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media interest due to the high visibility from I-90. There was a high level of media presence and with several public meetings. The IMT had a lot of interaction with the local fire departments, county sheriff, and local EOC.

Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations

There were communication struggles within the IMT. The Forest had to give strong direction to beef up operations oversight. The Forest did not print out the Organizational Needs Assessment or Relative Risk Assessment for the IMT as they should have.

The FFMO’s involvement with the objectives included pre-loading them in WFDSS by Fire Management Unit (FMU). They needed to be rolled into strategic objectives. The FFMO or DFMO usually writes the delegation of authority. The Forest is working on beefing up their delegation of authority templates so that they are readily available for the next fire.

National filming contract was problematic on a number of issues. The Forest Supervisor who received very little notice that there was an agreement to have the filming crew follow the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) hotshot crew. Decisions were being made at the fire level without discussions with Lolo NF line officers which was putting firefighters at risk. Examples include the film crew wanting to be at the head of the fire with Interagency Hotshot Crew (IHC) so they could get better footage, the filming crew including Arnold Schwarzenegger wanted to take assigned air resources to fly the fire for footage. Additionally, the MOU from the Boise office was not readily available due to the weekend so no clarification could be made.

From what we gathered from a few interviews from forest personnel there could have been improved communication from the firefighter to the IMT to the Forest. This was attributed to the lack of operational oversight.

The Mineral County Sheriff was very satisfied with expectations and also communication from the IMT. He specifically mentioned the IMT Public Information Officer (PIO) for the team as being consistently engaged with the law enforcement group and was able to keep them updated with timely information.

Expectations need to be in-sink up and down the line, this was a challenge. Changes in mid-stride can be difficult when direction changes. When local firefighters who are engaged in the incident report back to their supervisors their interpretation of what is going on but don’t have the big picture, that input when returned to the IMT generates unnecessary friction.

If local managers are going to take a flight make sure an IMT representative goes along so that consistent conversations and interpretations in the air can be made.

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Some members of the IMT felt somewhat intimidated when they were told by the Forest that “if they let the fire go outside a “box” that was drawn around it, a Type 1 IMT would be ordered.” With operational area that was defined by the Forest some felt it didn’t give them much room to do anything other than direct attack.

Delegation and WFDSS decision was in place when they arrived. Objectives were structure protection and full perimeter control. The IMT was given a tight box to work within; an escape to the north would have put the fire in rough, inaccessible country which would have caused the fire to be long duration with multiple IMTs. Direction was pretty straight-forward when they arrived. The fire bumped up against the box a couple of times, but they kept it inside the original parameters.

Balance local involvement at the tactical level. Day to day operations was mostly left to the IMT but a couple of times the Forest got involved in some of the tactics being used by the IMT.

There was no After Action Review (AAR) with the Forest, but there were discussions during the IMT evaluation.

Clear direction from the Forest was present from the beginning, even though it seemed like an ominous challenge at the time. Working with local communities and integrating them into the operation ensures success in building relationships. The IMT felt they could not have protected the town as well without having those folks integrated into the operation.

Lessons Learned- Observations and Recommendations

National Priority

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West Mullan Fire


Night Operations

Multiple interview subjects suggested that in the West Mullan Fire utilization of night operations strategies significantly contributed to overall mission success. This success was borne-out in the context of limiting the duration of the event; reducing the likelihood of higher costs associated with a longer event; as well as limiting the exposure of dayshift firefighters facing more extreme day-time fire conditions. Interviewees also suggested that the utilization of night operations strategies contributed to overall incident safety by limiting the overall duration and exposure that is associated with a long-duration incident and the cumulative fatigue and exposure associated with such incidents.

Although situational conditions (fuels, weather, terrain, resource availability, values at risk, etc.) dictate whether night operations may or may not be appropriate; there was consensus that night operations proved a valuable tool in this incident. Although the daily costs of incident management might have been higher than otherwise due to running double shifts with added personnel, overall benefits to cost and risk management appear to have contributed to successful incident management. Nonetheless, there was concern among incident staff that the night shift tool would be taken away with any mishap.

The discussion of night shift operations and their utility as a fire management tool beg several policy questions:

Are night shift operations widely supported as a strategy and tool? Is there sufficient expertise left in the agency to perform significant nightshift

operations safely? Is there sufficient understanding of the potential safety and cost benefits in

utilizing night operations? Has enough discussion of the costs vs. benefits of night operations played out

in the crafting of relevant policy? Are managers too quick to preclude night operations due to perceptions that

night operations are universally hazardous and do not offer sufficient benefit?

Relevant Quotations

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“The [fire’s] proximity to town, the freeway, the power line, steep ground and risky terrain, and lots of values at risk meant we had to take action [on the fire].

“There was a desire to avoid the long duration fire scenario. In my opinion, we wouldn’t have caught the fire without night-ops.”

“The choice to work nightshifts allowed us to contain the fire much quicker.” “The way it was burning at night; conditions lent themselves to success.” “Using night shifts actually improved the overall safety of the effort by

containing the fire more quickly.” “During the day, we were unable to do burnout operations due to the timing

of the fire season and other situational challenges.”

The Northern Region and their interagency partners developed the NRCG Decision Document Template which outlines roles and responsibilities (including financial responsibilities) for wildland fire, structure protection, structure suppression, evacuations, road/highway management, and search and rescue. The Decision Document Template may be utilized to document these types of decisions when there will not be a cost share agreement, and allows us to document financial responsibilities and significant decisions made with agencies that would not normally be party to a cost share agreement, such as the Department of Transportation or the Sheriff’s Department.

The Decision Document Template is also used to define selected cost share methodologies agreed upon by AAs. The use of this template has allowed them to streamline our cost share agreements to only include the basic information needed by agency payment centers. Once a cost share agreement is completed, it becomes an addendum to the Decision Document Template. One of the major advantages to using the Decision Document Template is that filling out the template and identifying responsible parties assists AAs with the decision-making and negotiation process.

WFDSS

Policy Observations

The policy direction to publish a decision within 24 hours of determining a decision is needed, or within 24 hours of requesting an IMT is sometimes being interpreted as a published decision is needed within 24 hours of all fires that

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escape IA or exceed initial response (Redbook 2014, Chapter 11, pages 11-10 & 11-11).

Unintended outcome looks like this; we are spending time and resources during an IA/Extended Attack fire situation that can distract key people in the oversight role from the developing situation. Often these published decisions need to be re-visited immediately in the event the suppression tactics are not successful and an IMT is ordered. The other end of the spectrum is we spend time publishing a decision on a fire that is contained at 8 acres in 48 hours that always had a high tactical probability of success, firefighters needed more time. This direction generally comes from the Regional level asking units for published decisions on fires that are over 24 hours old and we are still engaged in tactical operations.

Recommendation

If the intent is to have a published decision within 24 hours of a fire exceeding initial response and we have a fire we will be successful with but need a longer time frame an option to pick a preplanned response for extended attack much like the preplanned response feature already in WFDSS. This could simplify the process for publishing a decision. We click a button that pulls pre-populated planned contain/control objectives by FMU, require no planning area boundary only point of origin and perimeter, conduct the relative risk and complexity analysis (RCA) within WFDSS and publish that decision.

Operational Functionality with WFDSS Recommendations:

When printing the published report the relative RCA does not automatically print out. They have to be manually attached to the printed report. Consider making this part of the print out.

The format of the printed report with all sections is difficult to read. For some IMT members this may be the only format they see the decision in. It would aid the local units in communicating the most important issues if the format could be cleaned up. Course of Action, Strategic Objectives and Management Requirements need to be front and center in the report. With the lists of information towards the back, should be a simple fix.

Potential Direction for WFDSS Enhancements

If we wanted to really help the local unit that is dealing with an extended attack fire WFDSS could be used to publish an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the

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incident. The map, weather and objectives/requirements are part of the published decision. If we could preload frequencies, medical protocols, with a blank division assignment sheet to be completed, that would be the basis of an initial IAP for an extended attack fire without a lot of extra effort or additional people needed.

The spatial component of WFDSS is valuable, if we could increase the functionality of the mapping and analysis tools, they could be used for more than wildfire decisions. Just by including our forest fuels treatment layer it became the tool to use to identify areas for fuels treatment areas impacted by wildfire monitoring requirements.

It could be used to house fuels analysis tools for NEPA specialist reports or even produce burn plans.

Regional and Local Priority

The STAR Agreement

The STAR Agreement is entered into between the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation and the Montana Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association. The purpose of this agreement is to facilitate rapid deployment of law enforcement strike teams to a major wildland fire incident in the event of a large scale evacuation of the public in situations in which a local jurisdiction is overwhelmed by events and cannot effect the evacuation on that scale without reinforcement. Montana law provides for mutual aid and assistance between law enforcement agencies crossing county and jurisdictional lines. This agreement does not replace mutual aid or the responsibility of counties to carry out law enforcement duties or evacuations, nor the fiscal obligations associated with those duties or mobilizations.

Prior to requesting a resource order to mobilize strike teams, the line officer or IMT from a wildland fire protection agency must confer with and have the concurrence of the Sheriff or county official with authority to order an evacuation and the authority to make related expenditures to do so. Reimbursement for personnel wages will be based on the “you order, you pay” basis. This agreement does not automatically obligate the wildland fire agency to pay for law enforcement duties which would ordinarily be the county’s responsibility, but does augment deployment and support (including reimbursement in some circumstances) in large or prolonged evacuation deployments by Sheriff’s Officers outside of their normal jurisdiction to another jurisdiction which has surpassed its capabilities due to a wildland fire. All costs

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submitted for payment by the sending agency will be reimbursed by the ordering agency. Federal wildland fire protection agencies in Montana may utilize this agreement, and any negotiation to place a resource order is between that wildland fire protection agency and the local Sheriff.

Public Information

Observations

The Public Information Officer (PIO) for the team was not engaged with the public. Additionally, he was not responding to line officers recommendations. This created an air of distrust between the PIO and the local DR. Even though there was discussion with the IMT IC, no improvement was noted. Also information from the fire line was not real time. Information that was coming in from the IMT was already stale by the time things changed. Local resources were getting more up to date information from residences than from the IMT. This improved over time with communication and more overhead management.

Recommendations Deliberate efforts need to be made to ensure correct and timely information is to

be distributed to the public. The appropriate actions need to be taken to ensure this recommendation is addressed in the future.

Law Enforcement groups need to be included in the IAP. This was important to the law enforcement group as it made them feel as if they were part of the IMT and provides for accountability and safety.

Having public meetings and discussions locally and in the community helped open up communication lines. Having the IMT go to the community in a local setting was a success.

Having public meetings on neutral ground instead of the ranger station or similar was a good step. This was positively received by the local community.

The STAR Agreement was a success and put law enforcement in the field that, for the most part, understood a wildfire environment.

Have the appropriate level of resource advisors for conditions. At times, dozer line was built with no direction or oversight towards the end of the fire. A resource advisor could have mitigated hours of rehab.

Biggest success was relationships with the local RFD, there’s a feeling that relationships were better after the IMT left. The District works well with them, so the relationship was set up ahead of time.

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Day time sleeping facilities

Observations

At times schools used for night shift crew sleeping facilities can be noisy, hot etc., and do not allow for quality sleep.

Recommendations

Explore other means to mitigate cumulative fatigue and allow for quality of rest when implementing night or swing shifts.

Preparation for the in-brief of the IMT should be on their needs to get up and running for the first 24-48 hours. Being flexible and expect that there will be change during that time as the IMT gains situational awareness.

Long-term Planning

It is important to develop a long-term plan on a full suppression fire. It is important to have all the right people to be involved to develop the plan and

agree on the plan. This includes forest and IMT personnel. There is an insufficient amount of SOPLs, there should be deliberate efforts to

address this void.

Fire ChronologyDate % Command Acres + Comments Person Est. Cost7/14 0 T3 S.

Borgen400 Running, Torching,

town of Superior MT, threatened T2 Team Ordered,

80,000

7/15 0 T3 S. Borgen

700 +300 Crown Fire, Structure protection, T2 Team assuming command end of shift

177 180,000

7/16 15 T2 T. Heitnz 1800 +1100 Active Fire, Evacuations 353 421,000

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7/17 20 T2 T. Heitnz 2100 +1000 Spotting downhill making runs uphill, moving towards BPA Transmission line

479 1.3 mil

7/18 23 T2 T. Heitnz 4150 +2050 Evacuation notice for residence in Pardee Creek, some residences in the town of Superior and in Flat Creek.

572 2.8 mil

7/19 23 T2 T. Heitnz 4550 +450 Day and Night structure protection, continue with line construction

787 4 mil

7/20 30 T2 T. Heitnz 5230 +680 Backing and flanking, isolated single and group tree torching

799 4.7 mil

7/21 35 T2 T. Heitnz 5880 +650 Major smoke impacts to BPA power lines causing arcing and power shut downs/ safety concern for Firefighter

923 5.8 mil

7/22 45 T2 T. Heitnz 6090 +210 Active fire on NE flanks, mandatory evacuation still in effect

914 6.5 mil

7/23 60 T2 T. Heitnz 6300 +210 NE corner of fire still has activity, but minimal activity on rest of fire

821 7.2 mil

7/24 74 T2 T. Heitnz 6300 +/-0 Evacuation orders lifted for residents, patrol, mop monitor fire behavior

600 8 mil

7/25 82 T2 T. Heitnz 6300 +/-0 Patrol, mop up and rehab has begun

507 8.6 mil

7/26 88 T2 T. Heitnz 6282 -18 Creeping, smoldering FB

383 9 mil

7/27 100 T2 T. Heitnz 6282 +/-0 Rehab 226 9.5 mil7/28 100 T2 T. Heitnz 6282 +/-0 Transfer of Command 166 9.7 mil7/29 100 T3 T. Pfister

(T)6282 +/-0 Patrol, mop up, rehab 166 9.7 mil

8/1 100 T3 T. Pfister (T)

6282 +/-0 Patrol, mop up, rehab, fire received rain

166 9.749 mil

ATTACHMENTS

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WFDSS Summary for July 15 and July 22; see pages 21-27. Progression Map July 15, 2013; see page 28. Progression Map July 21, 2013; see page 29. Progression Map July 24, 2013; see page 30. Fire Progression Map; see page 31.

WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Rationale)

July 15, 2013 - Day 2 of Fire Heintz T2 IMT

Weather

Dry, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps 55-65, 85-95 degrees.

Objectives

Communication

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Coordinate and communicate appropriate incident information with the appropriate agency (Mineral County, Sanders County, Sheriff Department, Montana Department Natural Resource Conservation, Bonneville Power Company).

Provide appropriate incident information to the public (Superior area residents) in regards to fire status and road and trail closures. Consider establishing a fire information point.

Safety

Make public, firefighter and aviation safety your number one priority by using the Tactical Hazard Analysis (215A) as part of your operational planning process, ensuring all IAPs reflect this commitment to safety through the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and the 18 Watch Out Situations, and if you cannot mitigate a tactical hazard don’t implement the corresponding tactical action. Ensure that Leader’s Intent is clearly communicated and understood, and is based on current factual information.

Provide relevant information to maintain situational awareness at all times, ensure risks are being mitigated based on changing conditions.

Emphasize the use of contingency and trigger points to manage risk associated with tactical actions.

Course of Action

July 15, 2013 Follow the planned initial response. When the weather, fuels, and/or topography presents a viable window of

opportunity, establish anchors and move from one anchor point to another minimizing the size of the fire and limiting fire in the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI). This will be done to minimize fire spread and reduce the potential of WUI exposure. Only construct line that you are reasonably assured you can hold.

Planning area encompasses approximate 41,000 acres and is contained by the Clark Fork River on the North and South. Keystone Creek is the western most boundary with the ridge system on the east side of Johnson Creek as eastern boundary. Prioritize the southern boundary to protect private property values and structures.

Full perimeter control is the intent at this time, re-evaluate as necessary.

Rationale

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Risk Assessment

What are the critical values at risk?

Structures along southern boundary and Pardee Creek.

What is the chance the critical values will be impacted and, if so, what are the consequences?

High, Structure protection has been initiated along the southern boundary and in the mouth of Pardee Creek.

What are the opportunities to manage the fire to meet land management plan objectives?

None

What are the possible low probability/high consequence events?

Fire spotting south of I-90. Northwest winds pushing the fire through the town of Superior.

Who are the stakeholders that should be consulted prior to making a decision?

Mineral County, State of Montana, and BPA, town of Superior, potentially impacted private landowners.

Risk Decision

What alternatives (objectives, strategies, and tactics) are being considered?

Indirect attack using roads, mechanical lines and natural barriers with burnout.

What is the exposure to responders for the alternatives being considered?

Lack of safety zones, under slung control lines (rolling debris), unburned fuels between firefighters and main fire.

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What is the relative probability of success associated with the alternatives being considered?

High for modified direct (going as direct as possible utilizing natural features, roads, and burnout while avoiding under slung line) and low/moderate for true direct or indirect.

What alternative provides for the best balance between the desired outcome and exposure to responders?

Modified direct attack.

What are the critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed alternatives and how will they be monitored?

Fire reaches or makes a major run at the current planning area and is expected to exceed.

July 22, 2013 - Day 8 of Fire Heintz T2 IMT

Weather

Dry, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps 55-65, 85-95 degrees.

Objectives

Communication Coordinate and communicate appropriate incident information with the

appropriate agency (Mineral County, Sanders County, Sheriff Department, Montana Department Natural Resource Conservation, BPA.

Provide appropriate incident information to the public (Superior area residents) in regards to fire status and road and trail closures. Consider establishing a fire information point.

Safety

Make public, firefighter and aviation safety your number one priority by using the Tactical Hazard Analysis (215A) as part of your operational planning process, ensuring all IAPs reflect this commitment to safety through the 10 Standard

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Firefighting Orders and the 18 Watch Out Situations, and if you cannot mitigate a tactical hazard don’t implement the corresponding tactical action. Ensure that Leader’s Intent is clearly communicated and understood, and is based on current factual information.

Provide relevant information to maintain situational awareness at all times, ensure risks are being mitigated based on changing conditions.

Emphasize the use of contingency and trigger points for to manage risk associated with tactical actions.

BPA line bisects the planning area 500Kvolt lines create an aviation hazard and potential hazard to ground crews. Smoke and heat can cause the lines to arc. Operation efforts should not utilize aviation and helicopter efforts within the immediate area of the lines. The exposure time of crews working in the vicinity of the lines should be limited.

Course of Action

July 22, 2013 When the weather, fuels, and/or topography presents a viable window of

opportunity, establish anchors and move from one anchor point to another minimizing the size of the fire and limiting fire in the WUI. This will be done to minimize fire spread and reduce the potential of WUI exposure. Only construct line that you are reasonably assured you can hold.

Full perimeter control is the intent at this time, re-evaluate as necessary. Planning area encompasses approximate 97,560 acres and is contained by the Clark

Fork River on the North and South. Fourmile Creek is the western most boundary with Second Creek as eastern boundary. Prioritize the southern boundary to protect private property values and structures.

Given the current elevated early season fuel conditions (ERC levels), full perimeter control may not be effective or feasible if fire spread rates and intensities increase to the point that firefighter safety may be compromised under that strategy. Suppression priorities would focus on protection of the WUI along the Clark Fork River corridor and point protection of structures within the private in-holdings and other values at risk within the planning area. In the event the fire becomes well established north of the Superior Ranger District boundary, concentrate protection efforts on values at risk along the Clark Fork River drainage between St. Regis and Siegel Creek.

Rationale

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The West Mullan Fire is currently 5,500+ acres burning adjacent to Superior, MT with private in-holdings with the fire and planning area. The relative risk assessment is rated as high due to the high values at risk and elevated seasonal severity for this early in the season. A plan has been developed and entered into WFDSS to manage this potentially long-duration fire if current incident objectives are not successful.

Risk Assessment

What are the critical values at risk?

Structures along southern planning area boundary adjacent to the Clark Fork River from Sloway Creek to Johnson Creek and within the in-holdings in the Pardee, Flat, and Keystone drainages. Other values at risk include a communication site on Keystone Peak, a timber sale in Keystone Creek, the Superior Municipal Watershed, and the BPA transmission line.

What is the chance the critical values will be impacted and, if so, what are the consequences?

High. Structure protection has been initiated along the southern boundary, in the mouth of Pardee and Keystone Creeks. Potential for loss of structures adjacent to the fire on the private in-holdings surrounded by National Forest lands. BPA transmission line is threatened with potential of power being shut down. There is a potential loss of a timber sale in Keystone Creek.

What are the opportunities to manage the fire to meet land management plan objectives?

None

What are the low probability/high consequence events?

Fire spotting south of I-90.

Northwest winds pushing the fire through the town of Superior and threatening numerous other residences and structures in the Clark Fork River corridor.

Strong SW winds causing fire spread to the N-NE up the side drainages spreading across the Keystone Ridge and Ninemile Divides onto adjacent Ranger Districts.

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Who are the stakeholders that should be consulted prior to making a decision?

Mineral County, State of Montana, and BPA, town of Superior, potentially impacted private landowners.

Risk Decision

What alternatives (objectives, strategies, and tactics) are being considered?

Objectives for the incident include:

Provide for safety of firefighting resources, public and aviation safety.

Full perimeter control is the intent at this time; re-evaluate as necessary.

Contain the fire on the north and south by the Clark Fork River, Keystone Creek on the west, and the ridge system on the east side of Johnson Creek. Prioritize the southern boundary to protect private property values and structures.

Display regard and professional courtesy toward every person involved in this incident, the local public, local officials and the land management agencies.

Implement food storage standards to eliminate potential for bear encounters.

Give BPA one to two hour notice if power-lines will be threatened.

Coordinate closely with the Mineral County Sheriff on all evacuation related actions.

Course of Action alternatives include:

Modified direct attack taking advantage of natural features, roads, and favorable weather conditions to construct line and patiently conduct burnout operations to secure.

What is the exposure to responders for the alternatives being considered?

Lack of safety zones, under slung control lines (rolling debris), unburned fuels between firefighters and main fire. Elevated seasonal severity and associated fire behavior increases the exposure to responders.

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What is the relative probability of success associated with the alternatives being considered?

High for modified direct (going as direct as possible utilizing natural features, roads, and burnout while avoiding under slung line) and low/moderate for true direct or indirect given the elevated ERC level this early in the season.

What alternative provides for the best balance between the desired outcome and exposure to responders?

Modified direct attack.

What are the critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed alternatives and how will they be monitored?

Fire reaches or makes a major run at the current planning area and is expected to exceed.

The IMT has a plan to manage this incident as a potentially long duration fire MAPs established. If the proposed alternative is not successful, the MAPs will be monitored and if the fire crosses any established MAPs within the planning area, specific actions will take place to protect lives, private property, structures, and other values at risk.

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July 15th Fire Perimeter

July 21st Fire Perimeter

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July 24th Fire Perimeter

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http://inciweb.nwcg.gov/photos/MTLNF/2013-07-14-2048-West-Mullan-Fire/picts/2013_07_24-10.41.19.117-CDT.gif


West Mullan Fire Progression Map

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http://inciweb.nwcg.gov/photos/MTLNF/2013-07-14-2048-West-Mullan-Fire/picts/2013_07_27-10.59.36.689-CDT.gif


West Mullan Cost Appendices Activity Date CAMP

PERSONNELCAMP SUPPORT

AIRCRAFT CREWS EQUIPMENT LINE PERSONNEL

Grand Total

7/14/2013 $1,146 $3,788 $43,158 $13,794 $13,917 $2,066 $77,8697/15/2013 $24,463 $44,447 $314,204 $125,551 $51,569 $20,120 $580,3547/16/2013 $39,306 $77,433 $365,435 $130,363 $80,666 $36,997 $730,2007/17/2013 $48,096 $103,925 $429,746 $193,685 $111,254 $32,814 $919,5207/18/2013 $56,668 $115,665 $436,776 $243,119 $138,218 $41,885 $1,032,3317/19/2013 $63,137 $222,617 $137,978 $291,629 $142,367 $46,677 $904,4057/20/2013 $62,730 $173,120 $159,676 $310,343 $144,542 $49,356 $899,7677/21/2013 $65,952 $195,578 $128,158 $316,736 $143,714 $47,901 $898,0397/22/2013 $66,637 $165,580 $97,559 $315,257 $146,202 $49,196 $840,4317/23/2013 $67,025 $161,725 $40,561 $287,924 $145,510 $48,299 $751,0447/24/2013 $62,856 $129,180 $38,287 $231,477 $141,699 $37,409 $640,9087/25/2013 $57,713 $107,682 $31,955 $153,582 $104,459 $27,468 $482,8597/26/2013 $48,796 $90,374 $5,758 $103,978 $84,832 $19,471 $353,2097/27/2013 $45,049 $92,230 $5,464 $77,589 $79,735 $19,017 $319,0847/28/2013 $38,486 $67,521 $3,796 $32,402 $33,305 $12,778 $188,2887/29/2013 $23,097 $26,374 $3,796 $32,983 $32,680 $8,631 $127,5617/30/2013 $9,502 $25,052 $0 $32,547 $18,180 $4,930 $90,2117/31/2013 $7,981 $21,077 $0 $32,983 $16,083 $4,490 $82,614

8/1/2013 $7,609 $20,870 $0 $24,859 $12,934 $4,517 $70,7898/2/2013 $6,649 $19,633 $0 $16,041 $7,402 $3,856 $53,5818/3/2013 $6,159 $17,261 $0 $5,681 $4,124 $2,791 $36,016

Grand Total $809,057 $1,881,132 $2,242,307 $2,972,523$1,653,39

2 $520,669 $10,079,080

CAMP PERSONNEL8%

CAMP SUPPORT

19%

AIRCRAFT22%CREWS

30%

LINE PER-

SONNEL5%

EQUIPMENT16%

Total Cost Percentage by Resource Category

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