WhatDescartesDoubted,BerkeleyDenied,andKantEndorsed*KENNETHL.PEARCE TrinityCollegeDublin

ABSTRACT: According to Kant, there is some doctrine, which he sometimes calls ‘empiricalrealism,’ such that it was doubted by Descartes, denied by Berkeley, and endorsed by Kanthimself. The primary aim of this paper will be to reconstruct Kant’s own narrative of thehistoricalrelationshipbetweenDescartes,Berkeley,andhimself,inordertoidentifythedoctrineKant calls ‘empirical realism.’ I argue that the empirical realism that Descartes doubted,Berkeleydenied,andKantendorsedisthedoctrinethattheconceptofextendedsubstancehaslegitimateapplication.RÉSUMÉ:SelonKant,ilexisteunedoctrine,qu’ilappellequelquefoisle«réalismeempirique»,àproposdelaquelleDescartesauraitexprimédesdoutes,quiauraitéténiéeparBerkeley,etqueKantlui-mêmeauraitapprouvée.L’objectifprincipaldecetarticleserareconstituerlerécitfaitparKantdelarelationentreDescartes,Berkeleyetlui-même,etce,afind’identifierladoctrinequalifiéeparKantde«réalismeempirique».Jesoutiensqueleréalismeempiriqueenquestionestladoctrineselonlaquelleleconceptdesubstanceétendueauneapplicationlégitime.Keywords: Immanuel Kant, George Berkeley, René Descartes, empirical realism, idealism,substance

Idealism (Imeanmaterial idealism) is the theory that declares the existenceofobjectsinspaceoutsideustobeeithermerelydoubtfuland indemonstrable,orelse false and impossible; the former is theproblematic idealism of Descartes,who declares only one empirical assertion (assertio), namely I am, to beindubitable;the latter isthedogmatic idealismofBerkeley,whodeclaresspace,togetherwithallthethingstowhichitisattachedasaninseparablecondition,tobesomethingthatisimpossibleinitself,andwhothereforealsodeclaresthingsinspacetobemerelyimaginary.(CrB274)

According toKant, there is somedoctrine,whichhesometimescalls ‘empirical realism,’ suchthatitwasdoubtedbyDescartes,deniedbyBerkeley,andendorsedbyKanthimself.1Itmaybedoubtedwhethertherereallyissuchadoctrineor, ifthereis,whetherittakestheformKantseems to say it does. For instance, if empirical realism is takenas theassertion that familiarobjects like tables and chairs exist, then this doctrine was neither seriously doubted byDescartes,nordeniedbyBerkeley.Ifempiricalrealismistheviewthatsuchobjectsaremind-independent, then it was clearly denied by Berkeley, but was neither seriously doubted by

*ForthcominginDialogue:CanadianPhilosophicalReview.1ThisframingofthequestionofthenatureofempiricalrealismisduetoLucyAllais.See“Kant’sIdealismandthe

SecondaryQualityAnalogy,”461–462n11andManifestReality,9,55–56.

Descartes, nor straightforwardly endorsed by Kant. Kant’s assertion thus presents us with apuzzle:whatmightempiricalrealismbe?

The primary aim of this paper will be to reconstruct Kant’s own narrative of thehistorical relationship between Descartes, Berkeley, and himself, in order to identify thedoctrineKantcalls‘empiricalrealism.’Alongtheway,wewillexamineKant’sinterpretationsofDescartesandBerkeley.AlthoughIwillnotdefendthecorrectnessofKant’sinterpretations,2IwillshowthattheycanbeseenasarisingfromplausiblereadingsofspecifictextstowhichKanthadaccess.

On thebasis ofmy reconstructionof Kant’s historical narrative, Iwill argue that Kantunderstands empirical realism as the doctrine that the concept of extended substance haslegitimateapplication.AccordingtoKant,Descartescalledtheapplicabilityofthisconceptintoquestion,andBerkeleyarguedthatitwasoutrightincoherent.Defendingthelegitimacyofsuchconcepts is one of themain aims of theCritique of Pure Reason. On the interpretation thatemerges, Kant’s transcendental idealism is a genuinely idealistic thesis and thus involvesgenuine points of agreement with Berkeley. In particular, Kant endorses an analogue ofBerkeley’sesseispercipithesis.Nevertheless,inconjunctionwithKant’stheoryofexperience,his transcendental idealism yields the anti-Berkeleian thesis of empirical realism, that is, the(empirically)realexistenceofextended(material)substance.Kant,unlikeBerkeley,holdsthatperceived qualities exist in persisting (empirically) external substances. However, unlikeDescartes,Kantdeniesthatthepersistenceofsubstance isafeatureofrealityas it is in itselfandholdsinsteadthatthislawispartoftheaprioristructuretheunderstandingprescribestoexperience. In other words, Kant’s theory of the structure of the understanding makes itpossibleforhimtobeatonceagenuineidealistandabelieverinextendedsubstance.1.Descartes’sDoubt1.1ProblematicIdealismKant’sargumentagainstDescartes’s‘idealism’wascompletelyre-workedbetweenthefirstandsecondeditionsoftheCritique.ThefirsteditionplacestheargumentintheFourthParalogism,andthesecondinthenewRefutationofIdealism.Theformerdefinestheidealistas“someonewho … does not admit that it [sc. ‘the existence of external objects of sense’] is cognizedthroughimmediateperceptionandinfersfromthisthatwecanneverbefullycertainoftheirrealityfromanypossibleexperience”(CrA368–369).LaterintheFourthParalogism,whatistobedoubtedisdescribedas“externalobjects(bodies)”(CrA370),“matter”(CrA371,A377),or“things that are to be encountered in space” (Cr A373). Similarly, in the Refutation, “theproblematic idealismofDescartes” isdescribedas“the theory thatdeclares theexistenceofobjects in space outside us to be … doubtful and indemonstrable” (Cr B274). This view isascribedtoDescartesongroundsthathe“declaresonlyoneassertion(assertio),namelyIam,tobeindubitable”(ibid.).AfinalpassagethatshouldbeadducedinconnectionwithKant’sviewofCartesian ‘idealism’ ishis famous footnote in thepreface to thesecondedition:“italways

2 In fact, the footnotes will indicate some places where Kant’s interpretation of Berkeley differs from the

interpretationIdefendinLanguageandtheStructure.

remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of thingsoutsideus…shouldhavetobeassumedmerelyonfaith”(CrBxxxix).

Setting these assertions alongside Descartes’sMeditations,3 a clear picture emerges.Havingsetout todoubteverythingthatcanbedoubted, themeditatorquicklydiscoversoneindubitable truth: “I am, I exist” (Med 25). The view to which Descartes wants to lead themeditator is a substance-mode ontology with two distinct varieties of (finite) substance:thinkingsubstanceandextendedsubstance.Inthesecondmeditation,themeditatorisallowedtoconcludeimmediatelythatathinkingthing(himself)exists.Further,heisallowedtoexaminehisideaofextendedthings(bodies).Inthefamouswaxpassage,themeditatorreasonsthathehasfromhissensestheideasofvariousaccidentsofapieceofwax,butnoticesthatalloftheseaccidentsaresubjecttochangewhilethewaxpersists.Asaresult,heconcludes,theideaofthethingthathastheaccidents(thesubstance)mustbeprovidedonlybythepureintellect(Med30–32).However,themeditatorhererefrainsfromjudgingthatthereisarealitycorrespondingtothisidea:“ItispossiblethatwhatIseeisnotreallythewax;itispossiblethatIdonotevenhaveeyeswithwhichtoseeanything”(Med33).

IntheMeditations,theconceptofbody,whoseapplicationisinquestion,isanexplicitlygeometric concept: Descartes three times affirms that body is “the subject-matter of puremathematics” (Med49,50,51); that is,ofgeometry.Kantclearly recognizes thispoint in theProlegomena where he argues that his view, unlike the views of Descartes and Berkeley,securestheapplicationofgeometrytotheperceivedworld(Prol4:291–294).

Descartesdid,ofcourse,attempttosecurethelegitimacyoftheempiricalapplicationofgeometry.Inthesixthmeditation,themeditatorwillfinallyconfidentlyaffirmtheexistenceofbodies, understood as concrete instantiations of geometric natures (Med 61). However, theargumentforthelegitimateapplicationoftheideaofbodydependscruciallyontheclaimthatthe meditator and the world were created by a non-deceiving God. Many of Descartes’sfollowers found this argument unsatisfactory. For instance, NicolasMalebranche, one of themost influential 17th century Cartesians,writes, “I agree that faith obliges us to believe thattherearebodies;butas forevidence, it seems tomethat it is incomplete.”4 Ina laterwork,after rehearsingDescartes’s argument for theexistenceof extended substance from ‘naturalrevelation,’Malebranche,apparentlydissatisfiedwiththis‘proof,’writes:

3ThereissomequestionabouthowfamiliarKantwaswiththeMeditations,thoughmuchlesshasbeenwrittenon

this subject than on Kant’s familiarity with Berkeley (see below, §2). Jean-Marie Beyssade asserts (withoutargument)that“KantprobablydidnotreadDescartes’swritingsthemselves;ingeneralheonlyknewDescartessecondhand,mainlyfromhandbooks intheLeibnizianandWolffiantradition”(“Descartes’ ‘IAmaThingthatThinks,’”33).Kant’smisplacedcriticismofDescartesfor(allegedly)deriving‘Iexist’from‘Ithink’bymeansofasyllogism(CrB422n)suggeststhathehadnotreadordidnotrememberthetextfromtheSecondReplies inwhich Descartes explicitly disavows the very syllogism Kant attributes to him (Med 140; see Longuenesse,“Kant’s ‘I Think,’” 12–18). However, this need not be taken tomean that Kantwas entirely unfamiliarwithDescartes’swritings.LatineditionsofDescartes’sMeditationsandPrinciplesofPhilosophy,bothpublished inAmsterdam in1650,were inKant’s library at the timeof his death (Warda,KantsBücher, 47). In the text, IshowthatacoherentinterpretationofKant’sremarkscanbeproducedonthehypothesisthatKantwasquitefamiliarwiththemaintextoftheMeditations.

4Malebranche,Search,573.

faith teaches me that God has created heaven and earth. It teaches me thatScripture is a divinebook.And this book, or its appearance, teachesme clearlyandpositivelythattherearethousandsandthousandsofcreatures.Thus,allmyappearancesareherebychangedintoreality.Bodiesexist;thisisdemonstratedincompleterigor,givenfaith.5

Malebranche is quite explicit that the existence of extended substance cannot be provedbynaturalreasonandmustinsteadbeacceptedonfaith.

InKant’sowntime,theconclusionthattheexistenceofbodiesmustbeacceptedsolelyonthebasisoffaithwasendorsed(fromaperspectiveratherdifferentthanMalebranche’s)byF.H. Jacobi.6 Jacobi defends a kind of sceptical fideism, arguing that human reason ends inconfusionsfromwhichwecanextricateourselvesonlybya ‘mortal leap’ intoreligiousfaith.7JacobisawKant(inthefirsteditionoftheCritique)asholdingasimilarposition,8animputationtowhichKantstrenuouslyobjected.9Indefendinghisscepticalfideism,Jacobiwrites:

weareallofusborntofaith,andinfaithwemustperforcecontinue…if

every taking-to-be-true [Fürwahrhalten]10 which does not have its origins inrational grounds, is faith, then conviction based on rational groundsmust itselfcomefromfaithandfromfaithalonemustdrawitsstrength.

Itisthroughfaiththatweknowwehaveabodyandthatotherbodiesandotherthinkingthingsexistapartfromus.11

Since Kant denies that the existence or attributes of God can be demonstrated,12 he

regardsDescartes’s refutationof scepticismas inadequate (Cr Bxxxixn).13 Yet,Kantholds, aslong as such scepticism (‘problematic idealism’) remains unrefuted, Jacobi’s allegation thatevenreasonitselfrestsultimatelyonfaithmustbeallowedtostand.It isthisconclusionthatKantregardsas“ascandalofphilosophyanduniversalhumanreason”(ibid.).

In the Fourth Paralogism in the first (A) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kantsimplyassumesthat thesceptical result reachedbyDescartes’smeditator isabsurd,andsetsouttodiagnosetheerror.Yetsucharesponseisclearlyinadequateasareplytoathinkerlike

5Malebranche,Dialogues,§6.8.6IthankananonymousrefereeforpressingtheimportanceofJacobihere.7Jacobi,LehredesSpinoza,88–89.8Jacobi,MendelssohnsBeschuldigungen,158.9Kant,“WhatDoesitMeantoOrientOneselfinThinking?”10Translator’sinsertion.11Jacobi,LehredesSpinoza,120.12ThisisarguedatlengthinTheIdealofPureReason(CrA567/B595–A704/B732).13 InMrongovius’ lecturenotes,KantdescribesDescartes’s ‘God isnotadeceiver’argumentanddismisses itas

“quitelame,foronecanrightlyobjectagainstit:thatwedeceiveourselveswhenwebelievewhatoursensesteachus”(L29:928).Similarly,Malebranchearguesthatwearecapableofresistingournaturalpropensitytobelieveinbodiesandthereforewe,andnotGod,areresponsibleifwedonotresist(Search,574).

Jacobi,whoholdsthathumanreasondoesindeedleadtoabsurdresultswhennotfoundedonfaith.IntheRefutationofIdealismaddedtothesecond(B)edition,Kantthereforetakesamoreambitiousapproachandsetsouttodemonstratethatthemeditator’spositionisabsurd.Iwilldiscusseachoftheseargumentsinturn.1.2TheFourthParalogismKant says that all four paralogisms exhibit the same error, namely, that of equivocatingbetween ‘transcendental’ and ‘empirical’ usesof the samecategory (CrA402).The fallaciousargumentthat,accordingtoKant,resultsinDescartes’s‘idealism’isasfollows:

[1]Thatwhoseexistencecanbeinferredonlyasacauseofagivenperceptionhasonlyadoubtfulexistence:[2]Nowallouterappearancesareofthiskind…Thus,[3]theexistenceofallobjectsofoutersenseisdoubtful.(CrA366–A367)AlthoughKantsaysthattheparalogismsequivocateonthecategories,theequivocation

heidentifiesinthisargumentisactuallyontheterm‘outer.’14Kantexplainsthatthistermhasatranscendentalsenseinwhichitmeans“somethingthat,asathinginitself,existsdistinctfromus,” but also an empirical sense in which it means “something that belongs to outerappearance” (CrA373).Premise [2] isonly true if it is takentorefer toappearancesthatare‘outer’ in the transcendental sense—i.e., things in themselves.15 However, problematic(sceptical) idealism affirms [3] in the empirical sense: that is, it doubts whether there areextendedsubstances.

Because transcendental realism “regards space and time as something given inthemselves (independent of our sensibility),” it guarantees that whatever is outer in theempirical sense is also outer in the transcendental sense (Cr A369). This is the additionalpremiseneededtorendertheparalogismvalid. It is in thissensethat transcendental realismleadstoempiricalidealism.However,accordingtotranscendentalidealism,“itis…impossiblethat in this space anything outside us (in the transcendental sense) should be given, sincespaceitselfisnothingapartfromoursensibility”(CrA375).Sincespaceisonlytheformofourintuitionandnotafeatureofrealityasitisinitself,theconceptofextension,whichdependsonspace,canhavenoapplicationstoobjectsastheyareindependentofourrepresentations(i.e.,objects that are ‘outer’ in the transcendental sense). Hence the extended substanceswhoseexistenceisinquestioncouldnotpossiblybeanythingotherthanappearances.

Berkeley had responded to the sceptic by arguing that the “immediate objects ofperception … [are] the very things themselves” (3D 244). These immediate objects ofperceptionare ideasand“ideas cannotexistwithout [i.e.,outside] themind.Theirexistencethereforeconsistsinbeingperceived.Whenthereforetheyareactuallyperceivedtherecanbe

14Infact,noneoftheparalogismsworkinquitethewayKantsays.SeeBuroker,Kant’sCritique,213–225.15 “The transcendental realist therefore represents appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in

themselves”(CrA369).

nodoubtoftheirexistence”(3D230).In theFourthParalogism,Kantadoptsa very similar strategy for replying toCartesian

‘problematic’idealism.ThisisclearestinKant’sfootnoteonA374–375:Onemust notewell this paradoxical but correct proposition, that nothing is inspace except what is represented in it. For space itself is nothing other thanrepresentation;consequently,what is in itmustbecontainedinrepresentation,and nothing at all is in space except insofar as it is really represented in it. Apropositionwhichmustofcoursesoundpeculiaristhatathingcanexistonlyinthe representation of it; but it loses its offensive character here, because thethings with which we have to do are not things in themselves but onlyappearances,i.e.,representations.

AccordingtoKant,itfollowsfromtheidealityofspaceandtimethattheobjectsinspaceandtimemustbemererepresentationsorappearances.Suchobjects,Kantsays,existonlyinsofarastheyarerepresented.ThisistheanaloguewithinKant’ssystemoftheBerkeleianviewthatextension is merely an idea and therefore the being of an extended thing consists in beingperceived(itsesseispercipi).Further,KantmakesthesameuseofthisprinciplethatBerkeleydoes:sincetherealobjects justaretherepresentations, there isnoquestionofwhetherourrepresentationscorrespondtoobjectsandthescepticalargumentnevergetsofftheground.

This, of course, gives rise to the problem of distinguishing real representations fromthose that are imagined, dreamed, or hallucinated. Here again Kant adopts a strategy quitesimilar to Berkeley’s (see 3D 235): the criterion of truth for judgements about extension—including the judgement that extended substances exist—must rest in our perception.16 Thecriterion, according to Kant, is this: “Whatever is connectedwith a perception according toempiricallaws,isactual”(CrA376).TheCartesianscepticalargumentisutterlyirrelevanttothequestionofwhetherthiscriterionissatisfiedandso,giventranscendentalidealism,Descarteshasprovidednoreasonfordoubtingtheexistenceofextendedsubstance.

Kant’s adoption of this Berkeleian strategy—a strategy which, I will be arguing, Kantcontinues to employ in the second edition—sheds important light on the nature oftranscendental idealism and the sense in which that doctrine is idealistic. Transcendentalidealismclaimsthat“Timeandspace…applytoobjectsonlysofarastheyareconsideredasappearances, but do not present things in themselves” (A38/B55–A39/B56).17 Paul Guyeralleges that, according to this view, “space and time… cannot genuinely characterize thoseobjectswhichweexperienceasinspaceandtime.”18Thisallegation,however,misunderstands

16Kant,however,argues thatBerkeley’sversionof this strategy failsdue to theabsenceofgenuinelynecessary

empiricallawsfromBerkeley’ssystem.Seebelow§2.2.17Similarremarksapplytothecategories:theseare“conceptswhichprescribelawsaprioritoappearances…But

appearances are only representations of things that exist without cognition of what they might be inthemselves”(B163–164).

18 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 4; cf. 351, where Guyer implies that Kant denies “that a prioriknowledge…characterize[s]thingsastheyreallyare.”

the idealistic strategy employed by Kant and Berkeley. As Guyer elsewhere recognizes, it isKant’sviewthatappearances,notthingsinthemselves,are“theordinaryreferentsofempiricaljudgments.”19However,spaceandtimedogenuinelycharacterizeappearances.WhatKant,likeBerkeley,aimstodoistodefendtherealexistenceofspatiotemporalobjectsbyarguingthat(asubsetof) theappearances justarethereal things.To insist thatquestionsabouthowthingsreally or genuinely are must be questions about things in themselves is just to assumetranscendental realism. According to transcendental idealism, questions about things inthemselves are irrelevant to the truth of ordinary empirical judgements or the reality ofordinary empirical objects. This is what it means to place the criteria of truth, reality, andactualitywithinourperceptionorrepresentation.1.3TheRefutationofIdealismIt has long been recognized that Kant’s strategy in the Fourth Paralogism is similar toBerkeley’s.20 This section of the Critique was probably responsible for Christian Garve’simpressionthatKant’ssystemrestedonthesamefoundationasBerkeley’s.21Forthisreason,itis sometimes thought that, despite Kant’s protestations to the contrary (Cr Bxxxvii–Bxli), thechanges to the second edition,where Kant distances himself fromBerkeley so emphatically,representarejectionoftheviewtakenintheFourthParalogisminA.22Againstthisview,IwillarguethattheRefutationofIdealismrepresentsonlyachangeinstrategy.WhereastheFourthParalogism in A was designed to show that transcendental idealism undercuts the basis ofCartesian scepticism,23 the Refutation of Idealism is designed to show that the meditator’spositionattheendofthesecondmeditationisinconsistent(forreasonshavingnothingtodowith God). Kant will derive this inconsistency from the meditator’s willingness to apply thecategory“OfInherenceandSubsistence”(A80/B106)toinnersense,butnottooutersense.24Themeditatoraffirmsthatheisa“thingthatdoubts,understands,affirms,denies,iswilling,isunwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions” (Med 28)—that is, in addition toaffirmingtheexistenceofdoubting,understanding,etc.,heaffirmstheexistenceofasubstanceinwhich all of these inhere. Yet he refrains fromaffirming that there is a thing (empirically)

19 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 334. Guyer uses this phrase in the course of a discussion of the

disputebetween‘oneworld’and‘twoworld’interpretations.Thetwoviewsaresaidtodisagreeastowhetherthingsinthemselvesaretobeunderstoodas“asecondset…objectsinadditiontotheordinaryreferentsofempiricaljudgments.”Guyerisassumingthat“theordinaryreferentsofempiricaljudgments”areappearances,andthequestioniswhetherthesearenumericallydistinctfromthingsinthemselves.

20See,e.g.,Turbayne,“Kant’sRefutation,”229–236;Allison,“Kant’sCritiqueofBerkeley,”45–49.21See“TheGöttingenReview”inHatfield,Prolegomena,202.22ForabriefhistoryofthedebateovertheconsistencyoftheFourthParalogismwiththeRefutationofIdealism,

seeGuyer,KantandtheClaimsofKnowledge,280–282.GuyerhimselftakestheRefutationofIdealismtobeinconsistentwiththeFourthParalogism.RecentdefencesoftheconsistencyoftheFourthParalogismwiththeRefutation of Idealism include Bader, “The Role of Kant’s Refutation” and Nitzan, “Externality, Reality,Objectivity,Actuality.”

23AsHenryAllisonpointsout,acondensedversionoftheargumentisretainedatCrA490/B518–A491/B519.SeeAllison,Kant’sTranscendentalIdealism,494n15.

24Cf.McCann,“Skepticism,”71–72.

externaltohimselfthathastheattributesheconsidersinthediscussionofthewax.Kantwillattempttoderiveacontradictionfromthisbehaviourbyshowingthatinregardinghimselfasapersistentsubstratumofchangingthoughtsthemeditatornecessarilypresupposesapersistent(empirically)externalsubstratumofperceivedqualities.

Recall that at the beginning of the Refutation idealism is defined as “the theory thatdeclares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful andindemonstrableorelse falseand impossible” (CrB274).Kant’snewrefutationof thisview isinsertedattheendofChapterTwooftheAnalyticofPrinciples,whichisentitled“Systemofallprinciplesofpureunderstanding.”Itsplacementhereisnotaccidental.Theaimofthischapteris“toexhibit insystematiccombinationthe judgmentsthattheunderstandingactuallybringsabout a priori” by the application of the categories within the realm of experience (CrA148/B187)andtooffer“aprooffromthesubjectivesourcesofthepossibilityofacognitionofan object in general” to show the validity of these judgements (Cr A149/B188). The textappended to the end of this chapter in the second edition begins as follows: “However, apowerful objection… ismade by idealism, the refutation ofwhich belongs here” (CrB274).AlthoughKantdoesnotspellthisout,thereasonthatidealismprovidesanobjectionisthatinthis chapter the validity of a priori principles wasmeant to be proved “from the subjectivesources of the possibility of a cognition of an object in general” (Cr A149/B188, emphasisadded),butKant’sproof foroneof themost importantprinciples inthischapter, theSecondAnalogy,discussesonlythecognitionofouterobjects,suchasahouseoraship(CrA190/B235–A193/B237). The idealist, who doubts or denies that we actually have cognition of externalobjects,mayequallywelldoubtordenythatsuchcognition ispossible,holdingthatwehaveonly inner cognition—that is, cognition of our own subjective states. (Indeed, the ‘dogmatic’idealistpositivelyassertsthatoutercognition is impossible.)SinceKant’sproofoftheSecondAnalogyrestsonthe(sofar)undefendedassumptionthatcognitionofouterobjectsispossible,idealismwouldunderminethisproofandthuscastdoubtonKant’ssystemofsyntheticaprioriprinciples.

In response to this threat, Kant setsout toprove the ‘theorem’ that: “Themere,butempiricallydetermined,consciousnessofmyownexistenceprovestheexistenceofobjectsinspaceoutsideme”(CrB275).Thistheoremhasbeenvariouslyinterpreted.However,therearetwo powerful reasons for interpreting Kant’s aim here, just as in the Fourth Paralogism, asaffirmingtheempiricalrealityofextendedsubstances.First,althoughKantextensivelyrevisedthe Transcendental Aesthetic for the second edition, he retained its strongly idealistic claim“thatifweremoveourownsubject…thenallconstitution,allrelationsofobjectsinspaceandtime, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannotexistinthemselves,butonlyinus”(CrA42/B59).25Kantaimstoprovetheexistenceofobjectsinspace,andobjectsinspaceareappearances.Second,aswehaveseen,Kant’sassertionthatthe Refutation of Idealism “belongs here” makes sense if this refutation is seen as filling a

25SomescholarshaveattemptedtodeflateKant’sclaim,hereandelsewhere,thatappearancesdependonusfor

theirexistence.Against theseattempts seeVanCleve,Problems fromKant; Stang, “Non–Identity,”113–117;Allais,ManifestReality,§1.2andChapter4.

lacunaintheprecedingarguments.Thelacunaisthis:Kanthadsetouttoprovethatifwehavecognitionofanyobjectsatall,thenthesyntheticaprioriprinciplesarevalid,buthisargumentshowedonlythattheprinciplesarevalidifwehavecognitionofouterobjects.IftheRefutationof Idealismistofill this lacuna,thenitmustbeanargumentthat ifwehavecognitionofanyobjects at all, then we have cognition of outer objects. But we can have cognition only ofappearances(CrBxxv–xxvi).Hencetheobjectsinquestionmustbeappearancesandnotthingsinthemselves.

In theRefutation, justas in theFourthParalogism,Kant’sargument isconcernedwithourability to regardouterappearancesaspersistingsubstances.Despite theconstant fluxofourrepresentations,werepresentobjectsinspaceaspersisting(CrBxlin).WhatKantaimstoshowisthatonecannotcoherentlycallthispracticeintoquestion.Nevertheless,thepersistingsubstancesinspacewithwhichwearehereconcernedarenothingbutappearancesthatexistbybeingtheobjectsofrepresentations.

Itmaybeobjected to thisweak readingof theconclusionof theRefutation thatKantattempts,inhisproof,toestablishthefollowinglemma:“theperceptionofthispersistentthingispossibleonlythroughathingoutsidemeandnotthroughthemererepresentationofathingoutside me” (Cr B275).26 Admittedly, this text requires careful interpretation if it is to berenderedconsistentwithKant’sotherpronouncements.However,itisnotultimatelyinconflictwith the interpretation Ihaveproposed.Onmyreading, theCartesiansceptic is taken to fallintoacontradictionbyrefusingtoapplythecategoryofinherence-subsistencetooutersense.Thus,onthesceptic’sviewmyexperiencecontains(asensationof)whiteness,butthisisnotanexperience of awhite object located in space. Kant is arguing here that I cannot coherentlythink of myself as a persisting perceiver who earlier perceived some whiteness and nowperceivessomegreennesswithoutregardingmyselfasexperiencingwhiteandgreenthingsorobjects.“Anobject,however,isthatintheconceptofwhichthemanifoldofagivenintuitionisunited”(CrB137).This‘union’istheresultofthesynthesisperformedbytheunderstanding.Asproducts of the structure of our cognition, these objects are appearances and not things inthemselves. Nevertheless, Kant argues (against the empirical idealist), they are genuinethings.27

This,however,doesnotyetprovideacompletesolutiontotheproblem,for‘things’areherecontrastedwith‘mererepresentations’andIhavebeenclaimingthat,justasintheFourthParalogism,empiricallyrealthingsaremererepresentations.ThispointstoageneralproblemwithKant’stext:Kantsometimes,ashere,contraststhingsorobjectswithrepresentations,buthealsodefines‘transcendentalidealism’asthethesisthat“allobjectsofanexperiencepossible

26SeeAbela,Kant’sEmpiricalRealism,23–24.Dicker,“Kant’sRefutation,”100–101alsosuggeststhatKant’stalk

about ‘things in space outside me’ in the Refutation is inconsistent with ontological interpretations oftranscendentalidealism.

27Similarly,Emundtsarguesthat“TheaimoftheRefutationofIdealismistoprovetheexistenceofouterobjectsin the sense of objects of experience” and not in the sense of ontologically independent objects (“TheRefutation of Idealism,” 184; cf. Emundts, “Kant’s Critique of Berkeley,” 124–129). Stang, “TranscendentalIdealismwithoutTears”interpretstranscendentalidealismasfundamentallyathesisaboutwhatitistobeanobject.

forusarenothingbutappearances, i.e.,mererepresentations”(CrA490/B518–A491/B519).28NotethatKantheremakestwoidentifications:objectsofpossibleexperienceareappearancesand appearances are mere representations. The identification of empirical objects withappearances isa fundamentalprincipleof transcendental idealismonany interpretation,andtherearenumeroustextsidentifyingappearanceswithrepresentations.29However,thisisnotthe only text that appears to contrast objects with representations (see, e.g., Cr A19/B33,A92/B124–125,B137,A288–289/B345),andtherearetextsapparentlycontrastingappearanceswithrepresentations(see,e.g.,CrA19–20/B33–34,A23/B38,A358).

AsHokeRobinsonhaspointedout,30agreatmanyofthetextsthatidentifyappearanceswithrepresentationsweredeletedinthesecondedition,andsuchanidentificationoccursonlyonce (atB164) in thenewmaterial thatwasadded.Further (thoughRobinsondoesnotnotethis),mostoftheidentificationsthatareretainedoccuraftertheendoftheParalogismswhereKantsayshisrevisionsceased(CrBxxxviii–xxxix).

ItseemslikelythatinthefirsteditionKantwasthinkingofappearancesasonekindofrepresentation.However,eveninthefirstedition,theAnalogiesrelyonadistinctionbetweenfleeting representations and stable appearances. This distinction would have been relevantbothtotherewritingoftheTranscendentalDeductionandtoKant’sresponsetothechargeofBerkeleianism. Accordingly, in the second edition, Kant attempted to enforce thisterminological distinction consistently, using the term ‘representation’ only for the fleetingstatesofperceiversandnotfortheenduringappearances(i.e.,empiricalobjects).

TheclearestandmostdetailedaccountoftherelationshipbetweenrepresentationsandappearancestobefoundinthetextcommontothetwoeditionsisintheproofoftheSecondAnalogy. The aim of this section is to explain how enduring objects can be found in ourexperience. This kind of endurance, it is argued, requires an objective time-ordering (i.e., atime-ordering in the objects) distinct from the time-ordering of our representations. Kantfurtherarguesthatthisobjectivetime-orderingcanbefoundonlyinnecessarycausallaws.Inthecourseofthisdiscussion,Kantwrites:

The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. Therepresentations of the parts succeedone another.Whether they also succeed inthe object is a second point for reflection, which is not contained in the first …Thus, e.g., the apprehension of themanifold in the appearance of a house thatstandsbeforeme issuccessive.Nowthequestion iswhetherthemanifoldof thishouse itself is also successive, which certainly no one will concede … [But] thehouseisnotathinginitselfatallbutonlyanappearance,i.e.,arepresentation…therefore what do I understand by the question, how the manifold may becombinedintheappearanceitself(whichisyetnothinginitself)?Herethatwhichlies in the successive apprehension is considered as representation, but the

28Cf.CrA30/B45:“whatwecallobjectsarenothingotherthanmererepresentationsofoursensibility.”29 For a long list of passages in which this identification is “clear and unequivocal,” see Robinson, “Two

Perspectives,”419n35.30“TwoPerspectives,”436–437.

appearancethat isgiventome, inspiteofthefactthat it isnothingmorethanasumoftheserepresentations,isconsideredastheirobject,withwhichmyconcept,which I draw from the representations of apprehension, is to agree.Onequicklyseesthat,sincetheagreementofcognitionwithitsobjectistruth,onlytheformalconditions of empirical truth can be inquired after here, and appearance, incontradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can thereby only berepresentedas theobject that isdistinct fromthem if it standsundera rule thatdistinguishes it fromeveryotherapprehension,andmakesonewayofcombiningthemanifold necessary. That in appearancewhich contains the condition of thisnecessaryruleofapprehensionistheobject.(CrA189/B234–A191/B236)

At the end of this passage, appearance is explicitly ‘contradistinguished’ from “therepresentations of apprehension,” although earlier appearance had been identified withrepresentation. The appearance is said to be “nothing more than a sum of theserepresentations”andyettobeconsideredastheobjectrepresented.Theappearancegetstobean object, and provide criteria of truth for judgements, because and only because it is asynthesis of representations according to necessary laws. Thus, in this passage, therepresentationisamomentarystateofaperceiver(e.g.,theviewofahousefromaparticularperspectiveataparticularmoment)andtheappearanceisanenduringobjectrepresentedbythosestates(e.g.,thehouse),butthisobjectis‘synthesized’fromtherepresentations.AsKanthadarguedintheFirstAnalogy,theconceptofpersistingsubstanceisanineliminableelementof such synthesis. Since the representations are the materials from which the object isconstituted,ithasnoexistenceapartfromthem,anditisforthisreasonthatKantsometimes(especially in the firstedition) sayssuchobjects (appearances)are representations.Still, theyclearlydifferinkindfromthefleetingrepresentationsfromwhichtheyaresynthesized.

IntheAnalogies,Kantarguesthatsensorycognitionofobjectsispossibleonlybymeansof a synthesis of representations in accord with necessary laws prescribed a priori by theunderstanding. Intheabsenceofsuchapriori laws,Kantsays,“wewouldhaveonlyaplayofrepresentationsthatwouldnotberelatedtoanyobjectatall”(CrA194/B239).This,however,isprecisely the Cartesian scepticalworry, as Kant understands it: the idealist doubts or denies“the existence of objects in space outside us” (Cr B274). Thus, when Kant writes, in theRefutationof Idealism, that “theperceptionof thispersistent thing [the self] ispossibleonlythroughathingoutsidemeandnotthroughthemererepresentationofathingoutsideme”(Cr B275), he is arguing only that the synthesis of representations that generates outerappearancesandprovidesthebasis fortrue judgementsaboutthemis (logically)priortoourability tomake judgementsabout the time-orderingof representational statesofapersistingself.Inotherwords,itisonlyafterIrepresenttomyselfaworldofpersistingwhiteandgreenobjects that I can regardmy experience (representation) of whiteness as coming before myexperienceofgreenness.

Inmaking this case, the premise Kant asks the idealist to grant for reductio is “I am

conscious of my existence as determined in time” (Cr B275).31 Kant had argued in the FirstAnalogyforwhatHenryAllisonhasdubbedthe‘backdropthesis,’32whichisherestatedastheclaimthat“Alltime-determinationpresupposessomethingpersistent inperception”(ibid.). Inthesecondmeditation, themeditatorasks rhetorically,“Is itnotoneandthesame ‘I’who isnowdoubtingalmosteverything…and isawareofmanythingswhichapparentlycomefromthe senses?” (Med 28). The fleeting representations are set against the persistence of thethinkingsubstance.However,accordingtoKant,thethinkingsubstanceisnot“inperception”intherightwaytoserveasthe‘backdrop’tochange.33InthesecondnotetotheRefutation,Kantstatesquiteclearlythatthereisonlyonethingthatcanservethispurpose,namely,matter(CrB278). Thus, Kant argues, in attributing a determinate time-ordering to the sequence ofrepresentations themeditator implicitly (despite his protestations to the contrary) attributesperceived qualities to persistingmaterial objects. This is the sense in which “the game thatidealismplayshas…beenturnedagainst it” (CrB276):whereas themeditatorhadsupposedthathecouldcometoknowtheexistenceofmaterialobjectsonlyifhecouldinferthemfromhis sequence of representations, Kant has argued that the meditator can know that hisrepresentationsformasequenceonlybypresupposingmaterialobjects.

WhatKantattemptsintheRefutationistoforcethemeditatortoapplytheconceptofsubstance to the representations of outer sense, and so to affirm the reality of extendedsubstance.Thisisclearlyananti-Berkeleianthesis(see§2,below).However,givenKant’sownunderstanding of substance, this thesis is not in conflict with the Berkeleian aspects of theFourthParalogism.Onthecontrary,therearestrongreasonsforinterpretingtheRefutationasretainingtheseBerkeleianelements.Thefirstpointisthat,althoughKantstateshisthesisasaclaimabouttheexistenceofobjectsinspace,heintroduceshisdiscussionwiththeremarkthat“The proof that is demanded must … establish that we have experience and not merelyimaginationofouterthings”(B275).However,accordingtoKant,whatmakesforexperienceis“synthesisaccording toconceptsof theobjectofappearances ingeneral” (CrA156/B195). Inotherwords, experience is created by the structuring of appearances into objects that obey“generalrulesofunity”(CrA157/B196;cf.A494/B522).But,accordingtoKant’stranscendentalidealism, such rules are ‘prescribed’ by the understanding and hence are not found amongthingsinthemselves(CrB163).ThesecondpointisthatKantassertsinthesecondnotetotheRefutationthatthepersistenceofmatteris“presupposedaprioriasthenecessaryconditionof

31Cf.Allison,Kant’sTranscendentalIdealism,295–296.32Allison,Kant’sTranscendentalIdealism,239.AlthoughthedegreeofcentralityaccordedtotheFirstAnalogyand,

in particular, the backdrop thesis in Allison’s reconstruction of the argument of the Refutation (see Kant’sTranscendental Idealism, 288–298) is controversial, it iswidely agreed thatKant’s argumenthere appeals tothatthesisinsomeway.FordiscussionoftherelevanceoftheFirstAnalogy,see,e.g.,McCann,“Skepticism,”87–88;Hanna, “The Inner and theOuter,” 153ff.; Abela,Kant’s Empirical Realism, 188–189; Buroker,Kant’sCritique,191;Dicker,“Kant’sRefutation,”89ff.;Emundts,“TheRefutationofIdealism,”172–176.

33AndrewChignell,“CausalRefutations,”496–499arguesthatKantdoesallowcognitionoftheempiricalselfasathinking substance. This causes problems for some reconstructions of the argument of the Refutation. IfChignell is right about this, then it is unclear why Kant denies that the empirical self could serve as the“somethingpersistentinperception”requiredfortime-determination.Nevertheless,Kantdoesexplicitlydenythis.

alltime-determination”(CrB278).However,Kantinsiststhat“Thepossibilityofexperienceis…thatwhichgivesallourcognitionsaprioriobjective reality” (CrA156/B195).Thus,again, thepersistence of matter must be interpreted as part of the structure prescribed by theunderstanding and not as amind-independent feature of realitywe discover. The persistentmaterialsubstancetheRefutationaimstovindicateisafeatureofourexperienceandisnottobe foundamongthings in themselves.ForKant,as forBerkeley, thereasonourclaimsaboutordinaryobjects cannotbe radicallymistaken is that suchobjectsowe theirexistence toourrepresentingthem.2.Berkeley’sDenialKant’s response to Descartes rests on the Berkeleian thesis that the external objects whoseexistenceistobevindicatedareonlyappearanceswhoseexistenceandpropertiesdependonourrepresentingof them.Thisgivesrisetotwocloselyrelatedquestions.First,Kantprotestsvociferously thathis view is radicallydifferent fromBerkeley’s.What arewe tomakeof thisclaim?Second, ifKant’s idealism iscompatiblewithempirical realism,why isn'tBerkeley’s?AradicalandprovocativeanswertothesequestionswasfamouslygivenbyColinTurbayne,whoarguedthatKantdidnotdifferfromBerkeleyinanyimportantrespect,andKant’sattemptstodifferentiate himself from Berkeley involve “deliberate misinterpretations of Berkeley’sdoctrine…promptedbyanimus.”34However,nosuchextremeanswerisnecessary.IwillarguethatKant’scriticismofBerkeleyrestsontheclaimthatBerkeley’sempiricismleaveshimwithcognitive resources too sparse for the construction of a genuine world.35 Of particularimportance are space and time as a priori forms of intuition, and the a priori concept ofsubstance.36Thus,itwillturnoutthat,althoughKant’ssystemincludesananalogueoftheesseis percipi thesis, Kant’s affirmation ofmatter is a genuinely anti-Berkeleian thesis and not amereverbaldifference.2.1DogmaticIdealismIn the Fourth Paralogism, Kant had defined the dogmatic idealist as “one who denies theexistence ofmatter … because he believes he can find contradictions in the possibility of amatter ingeneral” (A377).37 InMrongovius’ lecturenotes from1782–1783, theperiodduring

34Turbayne,“Kant’sRefutation,”244.35A similar interpretationofKantandKant’s relation toBerkeleyhasbeendefendedbyNagel,TheStructureof

Experience.However,NageldoesnotprovideadetailedanalysisofKant’s remarksonDescartesorBerkeley.Kinnaman, “Epistemology and Ontology,” argues that all of Kant’s criticisms of Berkeley (with the possibleexception of the Refutation of Idealism) are epistemological and that, for this reason, they fail to answerGarve’s assertion that Kant built on the same foundation as Berkeley. (See above, §1.3.) I argue that theepistemologicalremarksdoserveasananswertoGarve.

36 That the account of space and time is crucial to Kant’s differentiation of himself from Berkeley is widelyrecognized.See,e.g.,Wilson,“Kantand‘TheDogmaticIdealismofBerkeley,’”461–462and470–471;Walker,“Idealism,”110–112;Morgan,“KantandDogmaticIdealism”;Emundts,“Kant’sCritiqueofBerkeley,”117–129.However,theimportanceoftheconceptofsubstancehasnotbeenadequatelyappreciated.

37IthasbeenarguedthatthedogmaticidealisthereandthroughoutthefirsteditionisnotBerkeleybutLeibniz.See Miller, “Kant’s First Edition Refutation”; Mattey, “Kant’s Conception,” 167; Nagel, The Structure of

which Kantwas preparing theProlegomena, Kant defines idealism as the view “that outsideoneselfthinkingbeingsareindeedpresent,butnotbodies”(L29:928;cf.Prol4:288–289).HegoesontocharacterizeBerkeley38aseliminatingbodiesonthebasisofOckham’sRazor.Finally,itissaid,“BishopBerkeleyinIrelandwentevenfurther,forhemaintainedthatbodiesareevenimpossible,becauseonewouldalwayscontradictoneselfifoneassumesthem”(L29:928).

TheseremarksshowanunderstandingoftwodistinctdialecticalstrainstobefoundinBerkeley’sThreeDialogues.39Kant'slaterremarkabouttheimpossibilityofbodyclearlyreferstothemainargumentofthefirsttwodialogues,whereHylastriesagainandagaintoconstructa coherent definition of ‘matter’ and fails, finally retreating to a sense of the term hecharacterizesas“obscure,abstracted,andindefinite”(3D225)beforegivinguponthenotionaltogether.TheearlierOckham’sRazor remark is likelyanallusion toBerkeley’s treatmentofMalebranche’s occasionalism (3D 217–220). At this point in theDialogues, Hylas has agreedwith Philonous that matter cannot resemble our perceptions and cannot be a cause of ourperceptions. Instead, it is agreed, God causes our perceptions. Hylas then tries out twohypotheses in an attempt to reintroduce matter. The first is that God uses matter as aninstrument in causing our perceptions and the second is Malebranche’s view that certainconfigurationsofmatterserveas‘occasions’forGodtogiveusperceptions.ThesehypothesesarerejectedongroundsthatGoddoesn’tneedaninstrumentoroccasiontoworkGod’swill;both hypotheses involve an unnecessary multiplication of entities. In putting forward thesehypotheses, Philonous concludes, Hylas has been “supposing [he] know[s] not what, for nomannerofreason,andtonokindofuse”(3D220).

The Prolegomena similarly manifests familiarity with theDialogues. After mentioning“the mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley,” Kant goes on to ask: “if it is an in factreprehensibleidealismtotransformactualthings(notappearances)intomererepresentations,withwhatnameshallwechristenthatidealismwhich,conversely,makesmererepresentationsinto things?” (Prol 4: 293). A similar remark appears in both editions of the Critique: “Therealist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility intothings subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things inthemselves”(CrA491/B519).40ThesetwopassagesareaclearechoofBerkeley:“Iamnotfor

Experience,244.Iwillnotattemptadirectrefutationofthisposition,butIwillarguethatwecanmakegoodsenseofthefirsteditionremarksonthehypothesisthatBerkeleyisintended.

38Orrather,“BishopCloydinIreland”—butthisisclearlyacopyist’serrorfor“theBishopofCloyne.”39 Three Dialogues was the primary source for Berkeley’s idealism available to Kant. A German translationwas

publishedinRostock in1756,bundledwithCollier’sClavisUniversalis.ThesourceforthetranslationwastheFrencheditionof1750,whichwouldalsohavebeenaccessible toKant (Turbayne,“Kant’sRefutation,”226).Mattey, “Kant’s Conception,” 164–166 provides a detailed argument for Kant’s early familiarity with thistranslation.

AnewGermantranslationofThreeDialoguesappearedin1781,theyearthefirsteditionoftheCritiquewas issued. A copy of this translationwas in Kant’s personal library at the time of his death (Warda,KantsBücher, 46). SeeMattey, “Kant’s Conception,” 163 n 11 and Kenneth P.Winkler, “Berkeley and Kant,” 143.Berkeley’sPrinciples,ontheotherhand,wasnottranslatedintoanylanguageotherthanEnglish(whichKantdidnotread)until1869(A.A.LuceandT.E.Jessop,“Editors’Introduction”inBerkeley,Works,2:4–5).

40Winkler,“BerkeleyandKant,”157–158,noticesthefirstofthesepassagesbutnotthesecond.Henotesthata

changingthingsintoideas,butratherideasintothings”(3D244).The1756Germantranslationby Johann Christian Eschenbach had rendered Berkeley’s ‘idea’ sometimes as Gedanke(thought) and other times asVorstellung (representation).41 In both of these passages, Kantusesthelatter.ThisstronglysuggeststhatKanthasBerkeleyinmind. PerhapsmostnotoriousamongKant’sremarksaboutBerkeleyisthefollowing:

Thethesisofallgenuineidealists,fromtheEleaticSchooluptoBishopBerkeley,iscontained in this formula: “All cognition through the senses and experience isnothing but sheer illusion, and there is truth only in the ideas of pureunderstandingandreason.”(Prol4:374)

Thisisaratherpuzzlingassertion,sinceBerkeleyisstandardlyinterpretedasanempiricistwhorejectsanyfacultyofpureunderstanding.Infact,Berkeley’sempiricismisoneofthekeypointsonwhichKantcriticizeshim.42Twohistoricalfactorshelptoexplainthisclassification.Thefirstis thatmany18thcenturycommentatorsclassifiedBerkeley (much tohischagrin)asahyper-Malebranchist,43andMalebranchecertainlyacceptsthis‘thesis.’44Thesecondfactoristhat,asKennethP.Winklerpointsout,therationalist/empiricistdichotomyisarelativelyrecentone.InKant’s day, Plato’s rather more colourful division of philosophers into ‘gods,’ who pulleverything up into heaven, and ‘giants,’ who pull everything down to earth, was current.45Berkeley certainly belongs among the ‘gods.’ However, the passage remains troubling, sinceBerkeleydoesappeartoacceptLocke’sviewthatallideasderivefromsensationandreflection,andnotfromaCartesianfacultyofpureunderstanding.

One explanation that has been proposed is that Kant had Siris, rather than theDialogues,inmindhere.46AsWinklerpointsout,47thiswouldhelptoexplainhisassociationof

passageofGarve’s review,whichwas cutoutof theGöttingenversionby Feder,makesa similar reference.However,sincethelanguageappearedinthefirsteditionoftheCritique,itcouldnothavebeenborrowedfromGarve.

41Winkler,“BerkeleyandKant,”153.Hence,contrarytoNagel,TheStructureofExperience,249n13,theverbalparallelbetweentheseremarksofKantandBerkeleyisnot‘forced.’

42Seebelow(§2.2),andalsoKinnaman,“EpistemologyandOntology.”43SeeBracken,EarlyReception,15–22,etpassim.44“yoursensesbeguileyouinfinitelymorethanyoucanimagine…Theimaginationisafool…Reasonmustalways

remaininchargeofourdiscussion”(Malebranche,Dialogues,4).45Plato,Sophist246a–c;Winkler,“BerkeleyandKant,”149–157.46Mattey,“Kant’sConception,”172–173.SiriswasindeedavailabletoKant,andisinfacttheonlyworkofBerkeley

explicitlymentioned inKant’s corpus. The reference is a joke atBerkeley’s expense,which appears in notesfromalecturegivenbetween1762and1764:“BishopBerkeley,inthetreatiseOntheUseofTarwaterforOurBody[i.e.,Siris],doubtedwhetherthereareanybodiesatall”(L28:42).However,thisjokeisfollowedbyanaccountofBerkeley’sidealismthatismorelikelytohavebeenderivedfromtheDialoguesthanfromSiris.

AcompleteFrenchtranslationofSiriswaspublishedinAmsterdamin1745.SeeKeynes,Bibliography,148andMattey, “Kant’s Conception,” 163. This contradicts A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, “Editors’ Introduction,” inBerkeley,Works,5:5,whosaythatthiseditionwaspartialandthatthewholewasnottranslatedintoFrenchuntil1920.Ihaveconsultedadigitalfacsimileofthe1745editiononGoogleBookstoverifythatitcontainsall368sectionsoftheoriginalSiris.ThiseditionwasreprintedinGenevain1748(Keynes,Bibliography,157–158).

BerkeleywiththeEleaticschool,since inSirisBerkeleyhimselfmakesthat link.ThenatureofBerkeley’s epistemology in Siris, and the relation of Siris to Berkeley’s earlier doctrinesgenerally, is a vexed question. Regardless of whether Berkeley does affirm a Cartesian orPlatonicfacultyofpureunderstandinginSiris,itiseasytoseehowKantmighthavethoughthedid.

In fact,however,Kant’s remarkcanbeexplainedwithout theassumption thathewasreferringtoSiris.First,considerthefollowingpassagefromtheDialogues:

Hyl.Butwhatsayyou topure intellect?Maynotabstracted ideasbe framedbythatfaculty?Phil.SinceIcannotframeabstractideasatall,itisplain,Icannotframethembythe help of pure intellect, whatsoever faculty you understand by these words.Besides,nottoinquireintothenatureofpureintellectanditsspiritualobjects,asvirtue, reason,God, or the like; thusmuch seemsmanifest, that sensible thingsareonly tobeperceivedby senseor representedby the imagination. (3D 193–194)

Itiseasytodismissthispassage.ThepureintellectisintroducedasanobjectiontoBerkeley’scritique of abstraction, and Philonous at first isn’t sure what the termmeans (“whatsoeverfacultyyouunderstandbythesewords”).Philonousrejectsthesuggestionbypointingoutthatthediscussionissupposedtobeaboutsensiblethings,andeveryoneagreesthatwhatcanonlybeapprehendedbythepureintellectisnot,strictlyspeaking,sensible.ThispassagethereforedoesnotprovidestrongevidencethatBerkeleybelievedinpureintellect(inanysense).

However,thisdismissalwouldbetooquick.AsimilarpassageoccursinDeMotu,whereBerkeleyassertsthatabsolutespace“escapesthepureintellect.Thatfacultyisconcernedonlywithspiritualandunextendedthings,suchasourminds,theirstates,passions,virtues,andthelike” (DM53, translationmodified).48 Inbothof thesepassages,Berkeleyassociates thepureintellect with the knowledge of those things that are fundamental to his ontology. In theDialogues,thisseemstotaketheformofaconcession,butinDeMotuitispositivelyasserted.WhateverBerkeley’sintentionmayhavebeen,thesetwopassages,especiallywhencombinedwith the contextual factors indicated, are surely adequate to explain Kant’s remark withoutappealtoSiris.49 Germaneditionscontainingshortextractsfromthe‘medical’partofthetreatisealsoappearedin1745in

Amsterdam, Leipzig, andGöttingen (Keynes,Bibliography, 151–154). As an anonymous referee pointed out,Kantdisplaysconsiderableinterestinmedicalwritings.SeeKant,“EssayonMaladiesoftheHead”and“OnthePhilosophers’MedicinefortheBody.”ItthereforeseemslikelythatKant’sjokeaboutSiriswasbasedononeofthesemedicalextracts.WewillseebelowthattheevidencesomescholarshaveadducedforKant’sfamiliaritywiththerestofSirisisweak.

47Winkler,“BerkeleyandKant,”153.48DeMotuwasoriginallypublishedinLatin(alanguageKantread)inLondonin1721.Itishardtosayhoweasyor

difficultitwastofindcopiesofthistextinPrussiainKant’stimebutfurtherevidenceforKant’sfamiliaritywiththisworkwillbeadducedbelow.

49Allison,“Kant’sCritique,”59comestoasimilarconclusion:“This[passage]canbeunderstoodontheassumption

G.J.Mattey has argued that the appropriateness of an appeal to Siris here is furthersupportedbyapassagefromanearlierdraftoftheProlegomenathatKantleftoutofthefinalversion50:

Berkeley found nothing constant, and so could find nothing which theunderstandingconceivesaccordingtoaprioriprinciples.Hethereforehadtolookfor another intuition,namely themystical oneofGod’s ideas,which requiredatwo-fold understanding, one which connected appearances in experience, andanotherwhichknewthingsinthemselves.51

However,thistoocanbeexplainedintermsoftheDialogues.52Inthatwork,althoughBerkeleydeniesadirect‘intuition’ofthedivineideas(3D213–214),thedivineideas(or‘archetypes’asBerkeleycallsthem)areapparentlyintroducedtodealwiththeproblemofpersistence,andsotohelpreturnaworldthatis“strictlyspeaking”composedonlyoffleetingperceptionstothekind of orderly structure posited by common sense and natural science (3D 248).53 As I willarguebelow(§2.2),thesuccessofthisprojectispreciselywhatKantsetouttoattack.

In the same sectionof theProlegomena, Kantgoeson todescribehis similaritiesanddifferenceswithBerkeleywithrespecttospace:

Spaceand time, togetherwitheverything contained in them, arenot things (orpropertiesofthings)inthemselves,butbelonginsteadmerelytotheappearancesof such things; thus far I amofonecreedwith theprevious idealists.But theseidealists,andamongthemespeciallyBerkeley,viewedspaceasamerelyempiricalrepresentation, a representation which, just like the appearances in spacetogetherwithallof thedeterminationsofspace,wouldbeknowntousonlybymeansofexperienceorperception.(Prol4:374–375)

Thisviewofspace ismost likelyderived fromDeMotu, though itcouldbe inferred fromtheDialogues. If Kant read the New Theory of Vision, this would have reinforced his

thatKantwasacquaintedwiththemuchmoreaccessibleDeMotu,whereinthePlatonizingtendencieswhichbecameexplicitintheSiris,arealreadyclearlypresent.”

50Mattey,“Kant’sConception,”170.51Kant,VorarbeitenundNachträge,58.TranslationfromAllison,“Kant’sCritique,”61.52AsAllisonhadearlierargued(“Kant’sCritique,”61).53InLanguageandtheStructure,IdefendaninterpretationofBerkeleythatdoesnotmakeuseofthearchetypes

in solving the structure problem. In “Berkeley on Unperceived Objects,” I show how Berkeley’s talk ofarchetypes can be interpreted as a sort of expository ‘short cut’ in the Dialogues, consistently with thelanguage-based strategyBerkeleyemploys inotherpassagesof theDialogues and inotherworks.However,Kant is far from alone in regarding the archetypes as the core of Berkeley’s strategy: this interpretation issuggested,forinstance,byBerkeley’sdiscipletheAmericanSamuelJohnson(Hight,CorrespondenceofGeorgeBerkeley, 290–291, 310–311). Berkeley’s response to Johnson’s suggestion is notoriously evasive (Hight,CorrespondenceofGeorgeBerkeley,318;seeWinkler,Berkeley,229–232).

interpretation.54 In that work, Berkeley describes at length how we acquire the (different)concepts of visible and tangible distance andmagnitude from experience. Berkeley explicitlyandrepeatedlydeniesthatwecanhaveanabstractideaofspaceingeneralthatisnottiedtoeithertouchorvision.55

InadditiontothecharacterizationsintheFourthParalogisminAandtheProlegomena,twocharacterizationsofBerkeleywereadded to the secondeditionof theCritique. The firstoccursintheadditionstotheTranscendentalAesthetic:

For ifoneregardsspaceandtimeaspropertiesthat,asfarastheirpossibility isconcerned, must be encountered in things in themselves, and reflects on theabsurditiesinwhichonebecomesentangled,becausetwoinfinitethingsthatareneithersubstancesnoranything really inhering insubstancesmustneverthelessbe something existing, indeed the necessary condition of the existence of allthings,whichalsoremainevenifallexistingthingsareremoved;thenonecannotwellblamethegoodBerkeleyifhedemotesbodiestomereillusion.(CrB70–71)

TheonlytextwhereBerkeleyexplicitlymakesthisargumentisinDeMotu:

Itwouldbeeasytoconfirmouropinion[i.e.,therejectionofabsolutespace]byargumentsdrawn,astheysayaposteriori,byproposingquestionsaboutabsolutespace,suchaswhetheritisasubstanceoranaccident,orwhetheritiscreatedoruncreated, and showing the absurditieswhich follow from either answer. But Imustbebrief(DM§57,translationmodified).56

AlthoughBerkeleydoesnotusethisargumentintheDialogues,andeveninDeMotusaysheisomitting thedetails forbrevity,Kant regards thisasBerkeley’smost importantargument,anargument that excuses the absurdity of his other conclusions. Kant even uses Berkeley’sargumentforthebenefitofhisowntheory(CrA39/B56–A40/B57). ThesecondaddedcharacterizationisatthebeginningoftheRefutation:

Idealism (Imeanmaterial idealism) is the theory that declares the existenceofobjectsinspaceoutsideustobe…falseandimpossible;…[this]isthedogmaticidealismofBerkeley,whodeclaresspace,togetherwithallofthethingstowhichit isattachedasan inseparablecondition, tobesomething that is impossible initself, andwho therefore also declares things in space to bemerely imaginary.Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if one regards space as a property that is topertaintothethingsinthemselves;forthenit,alongwitheverythingforwhichit

54 Ithasnotpreviouslybeennotedthat theNewTheoryofVisionwasavailable toKant.Winkler (“Berkeleyand

Kant,”231n4)notes thatKant couldhave readAlciphron in French translation,butdoesnotnote that theFrencheditionpublishedinLaHayein1734containedtheNewTheoryofVision(Keynes,Bibliography,47).

55Berkeley,NewTheoryofVision,§§122–123.56Cf.Mattey,“Kant’sConception,”173.

servesasacondition,isanon-entity.(CrB274)

Thisisessentiallythesamecharacterizationasbefore.Kant’sclaimisthatBerkeleyrecognizedtheabsurdities involved in thetranscendental realistpicture,especiallywithrespect tospaceandtime.Berkeleyresponds,Kantsays,by“declaringtheexistenceofobjectsinspaceoutsideustobe…falseandimpossible.”

In theDialogues,Berkeley foundabsurdities in theconceptofmatter. InDeMotu,hefound similar absurdities in the concept of (absolute) space. These absurditieswere derivedfrom the assumption thatmatter and space, if they are to exist,must bemind-independentobjects made known to us in empirical representations (i.e., in Berkeley’s terms, ‘ideas ofsense’).KantconsistentlycreditsBerkeleyforhavingdiscoveredthesegenuineabsurdities,andeven takes over some of Berkeley’s arguments as his own: most importantly, the scepticalargumentagainst representative realism,whichKant gives in the FourthParalogism, and thedilemmasagainstabsolutespace,whichKantemploys intheAestheticandwhichprovidetheargumentstructurehegoesontodeployintheAntinomies.Furthermore,Kantknowsperfectlywell that after rejecting the concepts of matter and space Berkeley goes on to attempt torestore the common-senseworldbymaking representations into things, a strategy that verynearlymirrorsKant’sown.Nevertheless,KantarguesthatBerkeley’spositionhastheeffectof“demot[ing]bodiestomereillusion”(CrB71).Thereasonforthis,Iwillbearguing,isBerkeley’sdenialofmatter.Kantholdsthat,inturningideasintothings,Berkeleyisrejectingthenotionofapersistingsubstratumofperceivedqualitiesandthereforerejectingtheexistenceofthingsorobjectsinspace.Thus,onKant’sinterpretation,thethesisthatDescartesdoubtedisindeedthesameasthethesisthatBerkeleydenied.2.2Kant’sCriticismofDogmaticIdealismAlthoughit isclearthatKantbelieveshehasrefutedBerkeley’sposition, it isnottotallyclearwherethisrefutationissupposedtohaveoccurred.IntheFourthParalogisminA,Kanthadsaidthatthe“followingsectionofdialecticalinferences”(i.e.,theAntinomies)would“helpusoutof[the]difficulty”raisedbythedogmaticidealist(CrA377).IntheRefutationofIdealisminB,Kantsaid that “the ground for this [dogmatic] idealism … has been undercut by us in theTranscendentalAesthetic” (B274). Turbaynehas argued that Kant resorts tomisdirection; hedoes not refute Berkeley anywhere, because he cannot refute Berkeley without refutinghimself.57However,Turbayne’sradicalconclusionis,again,unwarranted.First,to‘helpusoutof the difficulty’ is different than to ‘undercut the ground.’ Second, the Antinomies areintimatelyrelatedtotheAestheticsince,accordingtoKant,itistheidealityofspaceandtime(establishedintheAesthetic)thatsolveseachantinomy.

A structural overview of Kant’s argument against Berkeley, which relies on both theAesthetic and theAntinomies, is provided in theAppendix to theProlegomena. In that text,

57“ThisbringsustothequestionofKant’spromise…todealwithBerkeley’sdoctrineandhisfailuretodoso…If

[Kant]had sought to refuteBerkeley…hemusthaveended inhopeless confusion, forhewouldhavebeenrefutinghimself.Hethereforedidnoteventry”(Turbayne,“Kant’sRefutation,”243).

Kant, fuming over theGöttingen review, sets out to show, once and for all, that Berkeley isbadlymistakenand that theCritiqueofPureReasonproves it.After thepreviouslydiscussedpassage in which Berkeley is characterized as viewing “space as a merely empiricalrepresentation,”Kantdrawsasharpcontrast:

Ishow,onthecontrary,first:thatspace(andtimeaswell,towhichBerkeleygavenoattention),58togetherwithallitsdeterminations,canbecognizedinusapriori,sincespace(aswellastime)inheresinusbeforeallperceptionorexperienceasapureformofoursensibilityandmakespossibleall intuitionfromsensibility,andhenceallappearances.Fromthisitfollows:that,sincetruthrestsuponuniversalandnecessarylawsasitscriteria,forBerkeleyexperiencecouldhavenocriteriaoftruth,becauseitsappearances(accordingtohim)hadnothingunderlyingthemapriori; fromwhich it thenfollowedthatexperience isnothingbutsheer illusion,whereas for us space and time (in conjunction with the pure concepts of theunderstanding)prescribeaprioritheirlawtoallpossibleexperience,whichlawatthesametimeprovidesthesurecriterionfordistinguishingtruthfromillusioninexperience.(Prol4:375)

Berkeley, like Kant, holds that reality is distinguished from illusion by its connectednessaccording to laws (3D 235; Cr A218/B266). However, Hume had shown that necessaryconnectionscouldnotbegleaned fromexperiencealone.59Since lawsmustbeuniversalandnecessary,Berkeley’sempiricismpreventshimfromdiscoveringanylawfulconnections,andsoleaveshimwithnothingbutillusion.60

Inordertoavoidillusionism,onemustfirstshowthatspaceandallits‘determinations’arecognizedapriori(thedoctrineoftheTranscendentalAesthetic);thenonecanunderstandhow the structure of our cognition prescribes laws a priori for all possible experience (thedoctrineof theAnalyticofPrinciples,andespecially theAnalogiesofExperience).These laws

58BerkeleydiscussestimeinPrinciples,§§97–98andinalettertoJohnson,March24,1730,§2.Neitherofthese

textswasavailabletoKant.59 Hume, Enquiry, §7. Earlier versions of this argument can be found in Malebranche (Search, 660–661; for

discussion see Kail, “Hume, Malebranche, and ‘Rationalism,’” 320–327) and Leibniz (New Essays, 49–51).Berkeley was much influenced by Malebranche and certainly would have been familiar with this line ofthought.Hisresponse(followingMalebrancheandotheroccasionalists)istodenythatlawsinvolvenecessaryconnectionsandhold insteadthattheyaremerelyamatterofGod’scustomarymodeofactionandthatwe“cannotevidentlyknow”thatGodwillinfactcontinuetoobservetheselaws(Principles,§107).(OnBerkeley’stheoryoflawsandcauses,seePearce,LanguageandtheStructure,188–192.)KantdoesnotseemtorecognizethatBerkeleywasawareofthisproblemforhisviewandattemptedasolutiontoit.Thisisnotsurprising,sincethetreatmentof theproblem is lessexplicit in theDialogues (whichKant read) than in thePrinciples (whichKantdidnotread).

60KantisnotquitefairtoBerkeleyhere:therequirementsofuniversalityandnecessityareKant’s,notBerkeley’s.Berkeley only says that real ideas are “connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequenttransactions of our lives” (3D 235). Although he sometimes refers to laws in the context of the distinctionbetweenrealandimaginaryobjects,Berkeley’slawsarenotnecessaryconnections(seepreviousnote).

providethecriteriafortruth,andsomakeveridicalperceptionpossible.61Amongtheapriori laws,oneisespecially important inthiscontext:thepersistenceof

substance. In the FirstAnalogy,whichwas also crucial to Kant’s response toDescartes, Kantarguedthat itwasanecessary lawofourcognition that“Allappearancescontain thatwhichpersists(substance)astheobjectitself,andthatwhichcanchangeasitsmeredetermination”(Cr A182). Berkeley cannot introduce anything that genuinely persists into our perception;lackingeitherDescartes’spure intellectorKant’sapriori laws,hemustconfineperceptiontofleetingideas.Infact,thefleetingnatureofideasisaconsistentBerkeleiantheme:

Howthenisitpossible,thatthingsperpetuallyfleetingandvariableasourideasshouldbecopiesofanythingfixedandconstant?(3D205)Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel … Whatthereforeifyourideasarevariable;whatifoursensesarenotinallcircumstancesaffectedwiththesameappearances?Itwillnotthencefollow,theyarenottobetrusted, or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else,except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single,unchanged,unperceivable,realnature.(3D245)as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed realthings,itnecessarilyfollowstheycannotallbetruecopiesofthem.(3D246) ifthetermsamebeusedintheacceptationofphilosophers…itmayormaynotbepossiblefordiverspersonstoperceivethesamething.(3D247)

TherejectionofanypersistentexternalsubstratumofperceivedqualitiesisacentralprincipleofBerkeley’s immaterialism. Further,Berkeleyexplicitly rejects theview that, in constructingobjectsfromideas,weareconstrainedbynecessaryapriorilaws,holdinginsteadthatwehaveconsiderablefreedominassemblingobjects.Thus,Berkeleywrites:

suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, thechambers are all pulled down and new ones built in their place, and that youshouldcallthisthesameandIshouldsayitwasnotthesamehouse.Wouldwenotforallthisperfectlyagreeinourthoughtsofthehouse,consideredinitself?Andwouldnotallthedifferenceconsistinasound?Ifyoushouldsay,wedifferedin our notions; for that you superadded to your idea of the house the simpleabstracted ideaof identity,whereas Ididnot; Iwould tell you I knownotwhatyoumeanbythatabstractedideaofidentity.(3D248)

61 Here I am in agreementwith Dina Emundts,whose account of Kant’s argument against Berkeley focuses on

Kant’sconceptionoftruth.SeeEmundts,“Kant’sCritique.”

Theexampleofahouseis,ofcourse,thesameexampleKantemploysintheSecondAnalogy.Berkeleyheredeniesthatwehaveanyconceptofapersisting,self-identicalhouseitselfdistinctfromoursensory ideas.There issimplythefluxofsensory ideasandthedecisiontoapplyornotapplytheword‘same.’

AccordingtoKant,senseexperiencesofthissortcouldneverhopetobeanythingotherthanillusion.IntheFirstAnalogyandtheRefutationofIdealism,Kantattemptedtoshowthatourthinkingabouttheworld,oreventheself,dependsonapplyingtheconceptofextendedsubstance,aconcept that,according toBerkeley, is fullof contradictions.Kantaddresses thecontradictions engendered by the transcendental realist conception of the world in theAntinomies,andattemptstoshowthattranscendentalidealismprovidesasolution.

ThisapproachshowstheconsistencyofKant’sremarkslocatingthecriticismofBerkeleyinthefirstandsecondeditionsoftheCritique.AccordingtoKant,Berkeleyhadmadeempiricalobjectsintoillusionsbydiscoveringcontradictionsintheconceptsofmatterandspace.IntheTranscendental Aesthetic, Kant had attacked transcendental realism about space and time,whichwastheassumptionnecessarytogeneratethosecontradictions.FollowingtheAesthetic,intheAnalogiesandelsewhere,Kanthadshownhowtranscendentalidealismcouldprovidethesortofstructurerequiredtogenerateagenuineempiricalworld.62Finally, intheAntinomies,Kant exhibited the paradoxes following from transcendental realism, and showed howtranscendentalidealismpreventsthemfromarising.63

ThisreadingalsohelpstomakeintelligibleKant’sfrustrationwiththeGöttingenreview.FromKant’s perspective, nearly thewholeCritique is, inonewayor another, a refutationofBerkeley.ThisisnottosaythatBerkeleywasKant’sprimarytarget;theprimarytargetissurelythe Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition. However, Kant understands Berkeley as being a victim ofpreciselythoseerrorstheCritiquesetsouttocorrect.2.3TheThinginItselfSeveral scholars have argued that Kant’s doctrine of the thing in itself is the key differencebetweenKant andBerkeley,64 and there is support for this claim inKant’s text (Prol4: 289).However,this interpretationdoesnotmakesenseofKant’sclaimsabouthisdifferencesfromBerkeley.

First,KantclaimsthatBerkeley“demotesbodiestomereillusion”(CrB71)whereasKantcanmaintain that our body perceptions are veridical and notmerely illusory. However, theKantianthinginitselfcannotbeusedtodistinguishveridicalperceptionfromillusion,sinceitisunknowable (or, knowable only as it appears to us). Additionally, as JamesVan Cleve pointsout,65 since (onKant’s view)wecannotknowwhat thingsare likeas theyare in themselves,

62 That Berkeley recognized the problem of giving structure to the world within his view, and developed a

sophisticatedsolutiontothatproblembasedonhisphilosophyof language, ismycentral thesis inLanguageandtheStructure.

63KantdoesnotusethesameparadoxesasBerkeley,butitisreasonabletosupposethatKantbelievedthesamestrategywouldapplytoBerkeley’sparadoxes.

64See,e.g.,Guyer,KantandtheClaimsofKnowledge,414–415;Emundts,“Kant’sCritique,”134–141.65 Van Cleve,Problems from Kant, 137; also seeWalker, “Idealism,” 110; Emundts, “Kant’s Critique,” 135–137;

theymaywellbeBerkeleianspiritsorLeibnizianmonads.Hence,theexistenceofthethinginitselfisnot,byitself,adifferencebetweenBerkeleyandKant.

More importantly, this interpretation does not pay sufficient attention to Kant’s ownremarks about the interpretive errors contained in the Göttingen review. Kant strenuouslyobjectstothereview’sclaimthattheCritiqueofPureReason“isasystemoftranscendental…idealism”(Prol4:373–374).AccordingtoKant,thisisamistakeonparwithregardingEuclid’sElements asaguide todrawing.Althoughheadmits thataversionof idealism“runs through[his] entirework” he denies that this idealism “constitute[s] the soul of the system” (Prol 4:374).After clarifying thenatureof transcendental (or, ashe thereprefers toput it, ‘critical’)idealism,Kant complains that the reviewerhas completelymissed thepointbecause “hedidnotsayawordaboutthepossibilityofsyntheticcognitionapriori,whichwastherealproblem…towhichmyCritique(justasheremyProlegomena)wasentirelydirected.Theidealism…wastaken up into the system only as the sole means for solving this problem” (Prol 4: 377). Adifferenceover the statusof things in themselves simplydoesnot get at the ‘soul’ of Kant’ssystem,inthewayKantthinkshisdisagreementwithBerkeleydoes.

On the other hand, the concept of extended substance and themanner inwhichweapplythatconceptinexperienceispartofthe‘soul’ofKant’ssystem.IntheProlegomena,Kantemphasizes his differences with Berkeley over space and time: Berkeley takes them to beempirical,Kantapriori.Kantinsiststhatonlyifspaceandtimeareaprioriformsofintuitioncanwebeassuredoftheapplicationofgeometryinexperience(Prol4:287–288).Further,itisonlyif subsistence-inherence is recognizedamongtheapriori categoriespresupposedbytheverypossibility of experience that we can know that it is legitimately applied to experience.Myinterpretation therefore explains why Kant would regard the assimilation of his view toBerkeley’sintheGöttingenreviewasimplyingthattheauthorhadcompletelymisunderstoodhis system,despite the fact thatKant stillheld the idealistic viewsput forward in theFourthParalogism.3.Kant’sEmpiricalRealismKant is an empirical realist insofar as he holds that there are extended substances given inexperience about which we can make true assertions. Kant’s task is to show how theproblematicnotionsofmatterandspacecanbeunderstoodinunproblematicidealisticterms.In order to do this, however, these concepts must be given a priori and imposed on orprescribedtonature,andthisisacourseofactionBerkeleytheempiricistcannottake.

This interpretation requires Kant to be a genuine idealist: his response to Descartesturns on the claim that assertions about empirical objects aremade true (or false) by factsaboutour representationsandourcognitiveapparatus.At thesame time, this interpretationseesKantasradicallydifferentfromBerkeley.Thefundamentalpointisthis:forbothDescartesandBerkeley,experienceconsistssolelyofsensations.Sensations,liketheexperienceofseeingwhite, areunstructured. Kant’sCritiqueofPureReason is an investigationof the structureofexperienceandthemanner inwhichwegainknowledge fromexperience.Acentral thesisof

Winkler,“BerkeleyandKant,”169–170.

theCritique is thatexperience itselfexhibits robust structure,andhence isnotexhaustedbysensation.We do not only experience sensations of whiteness or greenness; we experiencewhiteandgreenobjects,positionedinspaceandtime,interactingcausallyaccordingtolaws.66Because,onKant’sconception,experienceissorich,Kantcansecuretheexistenceandrealityofobjectslocatedinspacewithouttheneedtoinfersomethingbeyondorbehindexperience.674.Conclusion:AKantianNarrativeAccordingtoKant,Descartesassumedthatifthereweretobeextendedsubstancestheywouldhave to exist (and be extended substances) independent of my mind. However, I haveunmediatedepistemicaccessonlyto itemsthataredependentonmymind,namely,myownrepresentations.Asaresult,theexistenceofextendedsubstancesmustsomehowbeinferredfrommy representations.This ispossibleonly ifmy representationscan somehowbe shownnottobedeceptive,as,forinstance,byshowingthattheyaretheproductofanon-deceivingGod.Thisargumentfails,leadingtotheviewofMalebrancheandJacobi,accordingtowhichtheexistenceofbodiesmustbetakenonfaith.

BerkeleywentfartherthanDescartes:hearguedthat,ontheassumptionthatspaceandmattermustbemind-independentiftheyaretoexist,itcanbeshownconclusivelythatneitherof them does exist, since both concepts contain contradictions. Thus, whatwas doubted byDescarteswasdeniedbyBerkeley.

Kant saw himself as having finally discovered the key to resolving this difficulty: byrecognizing space and time, along with the pure concepts and especially substance, asnecessary conditions for human cognition, Kant could resolve the contradictions located byBerkeley and banish the doubt introduced by Descartes. The structure of our cognitionguaranteesthattheobjectsofoutersenseareextendedsubstances.Acknowledgements: Ancestors of the present paper received very helpful comments fromEdwin McCann and James Van Cleve. Additionally, the author is grateful to this journal forsecuring an astounding seven sets of referee comments, which resulted in substantialimprovementstothepaper.Abbreviations3D George Berkeley. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713). InWorks, 2:

167–263.

66LucyAllaisarguesthat“what[Kant]takestobecommontoDescartesandBerkeley[is]thattheobjectsofour

immediateexperienceare inourmind”(ManifestReality,97). Ihavebeenarguing,onthecontrary, thatthecommon view of Descartes and Berkeley that Kant rejects is that the objects of our experience aremerelyqualitiesratherthansubstancespossessingthosequalities.Kantneverthelessholdsthatthesesubstancesexistonlyinourexperiencingofthemandhenceinsome(transcendental)senseexistonlyinourminds.Allaisgivesacharacterizationofthecontrastclosertomyownlaterinherbook(ManifestReality,102).

67Kant,ofcourse,doesinfersomethingbeyondexperience,namely,thethinginitself.However,thisplaysnoroleinsecuringourcognitionofreallyexistingobjectsinspace.

Cr Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Tr. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998.

DM GeorgeBerkeley.DeMotu.Tr.A.A.Luce.InWorks,4:11–52.L Immanuel Kant. Lectures on Metaphysics. Tr. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon.

Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997.Med RenéDescartes.MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy(1641).InThePhilosophicalWritingsof

Descartes. Tr. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984,2:3–397.

Prol Immanuel Kant. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783). Rev. ed. Tr. GaryHatfield.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004.

3Discitedbypagenumber;Cr,L,Med,andProlarecitedbymarginalnumbers.Allemphases(italicorboldface)areoriginalunlessotherwiseindicated.ReferencesAbela,Paul

2002 Kant’sEmpiricalRealism.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Allais,Lucy

2007 “Kant’sIdealismandtheSecondaryQualityAnalogy.”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy45(3):459–484.

Allais,Lucy2015 ManifestReality:Kant’sIdealismandhisRealism.Oxford:OxfordUniversity

Press.Allison,HenryE.

1973 “Kant’sCritiqueofBerkeley.”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy11(1):43–63.Allison,HenryE.

2004 Kant’sTranscendentalIdealism.Revisedandenlarged.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Bader,RalfM.2012 “TheRoleofKant’sRefutationofIdealism.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie

94(1):53–73.Berkeley,George

1709 AnEssaytowardsaNewTheoryofVision.InWorks,1:161–241.Berkeley,George

1710 ATreatiseconcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge.InWorks,2:21–115.Berkeley,George

1948–1957 TheWorksofGeorgeBerkeley,BishopofCloyne,editedbyA.A.LuceandT.E.Jessop.London:ThomasNelsonandSons.

Beyssade,Jean-Marie2008 “Descartes’‘IAmaThingthatThinks’versusKant’s‘IThink,’”inKantandthe

EarlyModerns,editedbyDanielGarberandBéatriceLonguenesse.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,pp.32–40.

Bracken,HarryM.

1965 TheEarlyReceptionofBerkeley’sImmaterialism1710–1733.Rev.ed.TheHague:MartinusNijhof.

Buroker,JillVance2006 Kant’sCritiqueofPureReason:AnIntroduction.Cambridge:Cambridge

UniversityPress.Chignell,Andrew

2010 “CausalRefutationsofIdealism.”PhilosophicalQuarterly60(240):487–507.Dicker,Georges

2008 “Kant’sRefutationofIdealism.”Noûs42(1):80–108.Emundts,Dina

2008 “Kant’sCritiqueofBerkeley’sConceptofObjectivity,”inKantandtheEarlyModerns,editedbyDanielGarberandBéatriceLonguenesse.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,pp.117–141.

Emundts,Dina2010 “TheRefutationofIdealismandtheDistinctionbetweenPhenomenaand

Noumena,”inTheCambridgeCompaniontoKant'sCritiqueofPureReason,editedbyPaulGuyer.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.171-184.

Guyer,Paul1987 KantandtheClaimsofKnowledge.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Hanna,Robert2000 “TheInnerandtheOuter:Kant’s‘Refutation’Reconstructed.”Ratio13(2):146–

174.Hight,MarcA.(ed.)

2013 TheCorrespondenceofGeorgeBerkeley.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Hume,David

1748/1999 AnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding.Ed.TomL.Beauchamp.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Jacobi,F.H.1785 ÜberdieLehredesSpinoza,inBriefenandenHerrnMosesMendelssohn.In

Vallée,TheSpinozaConversations,78–125.Jacobi,F.H.

1786 WiderMendelssohnsBeschuldigungenindessenSchriebenandieFreundeLessings.InVallée,TheSpinozaConversations,150–160.

Kail,P.J.E.2008 “Hume,Malebranche,and‘Rationalism,’”Philosophy83(3):311–332.

Kant,Immanuel1764 “EssayonMaladiesoftheHead.”Tr.HollyWilson.InAnthropology,History,and

Education,65–77Kant,Immanuel

1786a “OnthePhilosophers’MedicinefortheBody.”Tr.MaryGregor.InAnthropology,History,andEducation,184–191.

Kant,Immanuel1786b “WhatDoesitMeantoOrientOneselfinThinking?”InReligionandRational

Theology,ed.andtr.AllenWoodandGeorgediGiovannie.Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress,1996,7–18.Kant,Immanuel

1955 VorarbeitenundNachträge.Vol.23ofGesammelteSchriften.Ed.DeutschenAkademiederWissenschaftenzuBerlin.Berlin:DeGruyter.

Kant,Immanuel2007 Anthropology,History,andEducation,ed.RobertB.LoudenandGünterZöller.

Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Keynes,Geoffrey

1976 ABibliographyofGeorgeBerkeley,BishopofCloyne:HisWorksandHisCriticsintheEighteenthCentury.Oxford:ClarendonPress.

Kinnaman,Ted2002 “EpistemologyandOntologyinKant’sCritiqueofBerkeley.”IdealisticStudies

32(3):203–220.Leibniz,G.W.

1996 NewEssaysonHumanUnderstanding,ed.andtr.PeterRemnantandJonathanBennett.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Longuenesse,Béatrice2008 “Kant’s‘IThink’versusDescartes’‘IAmaThingThatThinks,’”inKantandthe

EarlyModerns,editedbyDanielGarberandBéatriceLonguenesse.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,pp.9–31.

Malebranche,Nicolas1674–5/1997b TheSearchAfterTruth,tr.ThomasM.LennonandPaulJ.Olscamp.

Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Malebranche,Nicolas

1688/1997a DialoguesonMetaphysicsandonReligion,tr.DavidScott.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Mattey,G.J.1983 “Kant’sConceptionofBerkeley’sIdealism.”Kant-Studien74(2):161–175.

McCann,Edwin1985 “SkepticismandKant’sBDeduction.”HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly2(1):71–89.

Miller,GeorgeW.1971 “Kant’sFirstEditionRefutationofDogmaticIdealism.”Kant-Studien62(1–4):

298–318.Morgan,VanceG.

1993 “KantandDogmaticIdealism:ADefenseofKant’sRefutationofBerkeley.”SouthernJournalofPhilosophy31(2):217–237.

Nagel,Gordon1983 TheStructureofExperience.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

Nitzan,Lior2012 “Externality,Reality,Objectivity,Actuality:Kant’sFourfoldResponseto

Idealism.”ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie94(2):147–177.Pearce,KennethL.

2017a “BerkeleyonUnperceivedObjectsandthePublicityofLanguage.”HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly34(3):231–250.

Pearce,KennethL.2017b LanguageandtheStructureofBerkeley’sWorld.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Plato1997 Sophist,tr.NicholasP.White,inCompleteWorks,editedbyJohnM.Cooper.

Indianapolis:Hackett,pp.235–293.Robinson,Hoke

1994 “TwoPerspectivesonKant’sAppearancesandThingsinThemselves.”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy32(3):411–441.

Stang,Nicholas2013 “TheNon-IdentityofAppearancesandThingsinThemselves.”Noûs47(4):106–

136.Stang,Nicholas

2017 “TranscendentalIdealismwithoutTears,”inIdealism:NewEssaysinMetaphysics,editedbyTyronGoldschmidtandKennethL.Pearce.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.82–103.

Turbayne,ColinM.1955 “Kant’sRefutationofDogmaticIdealism”PhilosophicalQuarterly5(20):225–244.

Vallée,Gérard(ed.)1988 TheSpinozaConversationsBetweenLessing&Jacobi:TextwithExcerptsfromthe

EnsuingControversy.Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica.VanCleve,James

1999 ProblemsfromKant.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Walker,R.C.S.

1985 “Idealism:KantandBerkeley,”inEssaysonBerkeley:ATercentennialCelebration,editedbyJohnFosterandHowardRobinson.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.109–129.

Warda,Arthur1922 ImmanuelKantsBücher.Berlin:MartinBreslauer.

Wilson,MargaretD.1971 “Kantand‘TheDogmaticIdealismofBerkeley’”JournaloftheHistoryof

Philosophy9(4):459–475.Winkler,KennethP.

1989 Berkeley:AnInterpretation.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Winkler,KennethP.

2008 “BerkeleyandKant,”inKantandtheEarlyModerns,editedbyDanielGarberandBéatriceLonguenesse.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,pp.142–171.