What Explains the African Vote?

Department of Political ScienceUC San Diego

Clark C. GibsonJames D. Long

Using Exit Poll Data from Kenya to Explore Ethnicity and Government Performance in

Vote Choice

What Explains the African Vote?

What are the determinants of voter choice in the December 2007

Kenyan elections?

Plan of talk1. Back story: Six months of silence2. Theory: Approaches to African voting

behavior.3. Background: Kenya’s 2007 election context.4. Data: Exit poll.5. Tests and results:

a.) descriptive and cross tabsb.) multivariate testsc.) survey experiment

6. Wrap-up

1. Back storySix months of silence

Kenya: The Mysterious Exit Poll AllAfrica.com 1/15/8

What's Really Going On in Kenya? And why didn't a U.S.-funded group release its exit-poll data?Slate Magazine, 1/2/08

“IRI will not release any polling results unless and until we are confident in the integrity of the data.” International Republican Institute 1/15/08

Kenyan president lost election, according to U.S. exit pollMcClatchey newspapers 1/14/08

Kenya winner lost, U.S. poll indicatesBelated tally suggests election was stolenChicago Tribune 7/9/08

U.S. Ambassador Ranneberger:  “…it is my understanding that this ‘exit poll’ was part of a training exercise and was never intended for publication.”

America.gov 3/8/08

Testify before the Kriegler Commission 7/15/08

Exit Poll Results:Presidential Race

N = 5,495 Margin of error = 1.32

Raila 46.07%

Kibaki 40.17%

Kalonzo 10.22%

2. Theory: Approaches to explaining voting

behavior in Africa

Approaches to voting behavior in Africa

Identity/Expressive voting (Horowitz)

• Elections become ethnic head counts

• May even vote against their policy preferences

Policy voting (Hechter, Bates, Bratton, Mattes)

• Co-ethnics care about same policies

• Giving your co-ethnic a break on policy evaluation

• Can be observationally equivalent to identity

Identity and policy are incomplete explanations for Kenya’s electoral

outcomes

• Kibaki’s (Kikuyu) and Raila’s (Luo) groups cannot win election alone. Must at least have coalitions.

• Some ethnic groups split their presidential votes.

• Leaders from same ethnic groups join multiple coalitions.

Government performance• Retrospective evaluations – throw the rascals

out (Fiorina)• Prospective evaluations – who will do best

looking forwards (Fearon)• Spatial voting – select the candidate nearest

to you on the issues (Downs)

But ethnicity means something in Africa

Approaches to voting behavior in Africa

Applying theory to Africa

• Not clear what “performance” means in the African context.

• What is the relationship between ethnicity and performance? Do voters use an ethnic filter on this info as akin to party ideology in the U.S.?

• Observational equivalence of theoretical predictions.

Information (Popkin, Ferree, Dawson)• Like policy, but less direct link between interests

and behavior• Uncertainty pushes voter to seek cognitive

shortcuts:

• Leaders (co-ethnic or not gives information)• Past performance of ethnic groups• Campaigns / issues• Parties

Approaches to voting behavior in Africa

Argument: Government performance affects African (Kenyan) voting behavior

• Kenyan elections clearly not ethnic headcounts

• Information comes from:

– Ethnicity – hardcore

– Ethnic filters – policy history / filters (including retrospective and prospective thinking)

– Government performance

– (Candidates, campaigns, and issues only indirectly tested in this paper)

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. (Identity voting) If a voter has a co-ethnic candidate, she will vote for that candidate (if possible).

Hypothesis 2. (Policy voting) a. Co-ethnics are more forgiving for poor policy

performance (in this paper)b.Co-ethnics vote to secure favored policy (not).Hypothesis 3. (Government performance) If a

voter believes that the government has performed well, she will be more likely to vote for the incumbent.

3. Background:

Kenya’s 2007 election context

Background: Ethnic groups

Kikuyu 22% (President Kibaki’s group)Luhya 14%Luo 13% (Odinga’s group)Kalenjin 12%Kamba 11% (Musyoka’s group)Kisii 6%Meru 6%

Other African 15%, Non-African 1%

Background: The Players

• Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu) running for a second term; Kikuyu long dominant in Kenyan politics

• Raila Odinga (Luo) is main challenger

• Musyoka (Kamba) a distant third

• All three candidates members of the same coalition in 2002!

• 2007 is fourth multiparty election (1992, 1997, 2002)

Background: The Issues•High expectations for Kibaki after 2002 victory

•Economy grows (7%)

•Delivers free primary education, promises free secondary

• Shuffling of ECK

• Rendition of Muslims

• Raila says Kibaki unfulfilled promises, failed performance

• Failures in reform, corruption, poverty, unemployment, service delivery

• Majimbo (federalism)

4. Data: Exit poll

• UCSD, International Republican Institute (IRI), Strategic Research with USAID grant to study determinants of the Kenyan vote.

• Allows researches to match attitudes and government evaluations with vote choice.

• 5,495 surveys, nationally representative:

• 8/8 provinces; 69/71 districts; 179/210 constituencies.

• Good for provincial estimates (“25% in 5 provinces” rule).

• Multi-stage cluster sampling proportionate to size, using final ECK published registration.

• Random selection of polling stations within constituencies, random selection of respondents (every 5th person).

• Demographics

• Process and timing of voting

• Performance of local, parliamentary, and central government

• Attitudes about policies, issues and ethnicity

• Vote choice for local, MP, president

5. Tests:

a.) descriptive and cross tabs

State of the nation's economy (by vote)

Is it more important for candidates to have experience or new ideas? (by vote)

Which issue matters most to your presidential vote?

5. Tests:

b.) multivariate

Logit Model for Kibaki Vote

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Govt Services 1.09*** 1.933***

Promises 2.497*** 2.718***

Economy 0.987*** 1.784***

Security 0.023 0.459*** 0.403*** 0.399***

Health 0.189* 0.36*** 0.408*** 0.295**

Family's econ 0.236* 0.399*** 0.226* 0.293*

Kikuyu 2.835*** 2.732*** 2.464***

Luo -2.846*** -2.853*** -2.657***

Kamba -1.641*** -1.682*** -1.835***

N 5479 5483 5484 5482Pseudo-R2 0.43 0.45 0.4 0.52

sig * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001Coefficients shown.Constants and controls suppressed.

Good Performance Evaluations

Bad Performance Evaluations

Kikuyu .99 (.986, .993)

.575 (.511, .633)

Non-Kikuyu.877 (.849, .902)

.083 (.074,

.093)

Predicted Probabilities of a Vote for Kibaki (confidence intervals)

Government Services on Vote for Kibakicoefficients standard errors

Services 2.411*** 0.101

Kikuyu 3.092*** 0.135

Luo -2.967*** 0.34

Kamba -1.713*** 0.235

Services*Kikuyu -1.005*** 0.246

Services*Luo -0.522 0.698

Services*Kamba -0.085 0.321

N= 5493

Pseudo R2 0.4292

Kibaki’s Promises on Vote for Kibakicoefficients standard errors

Promises 3.362*** 0.11

Kikuyu 2.975*** 0.158

Luo -2.753*** 0.385

Kamba -0.907*** 0.212

Promises*Kikuyu -1.428*** 0.24

Promises*Luo -0.287 0.634

Promises*Kamba -1.813*** 0.309

N= 5492

Pseudo-R2 0.5145

Family Economy on Vote for Kibakicoefficients standard error

Family Economy 1.245*** 0.101

Kikuyu 3.176*** 0.131

Luo -3.386*** 0.339

Kamba -1.462*** 0.167

F/Economy*Kikuyu -0.882*** 0.243

F/Economy*Luo 0.554 0.696

F/Economy*Kamba 0.016 0.354

N= 5494

Pseudo-R2 0.3467

5. Tests:

c.) survey experiment

Survey experimentPercent all respondents saying very or somewhat likely

to vote for that candidate; random assignment of ethnicity and performance

Good Performer

Bad Performer

Kikuyu 70.37% 21.05 %

Luo 71.92% 21.52 %

Survey experimentPercent all respondents saying very or somewhat likely

to vote for that candidate; random assignment of ethnicity and performance

Good Performer

Bad Performer

Kikuyu 70.37% 21.05 %If respondent K= 79% if L = 62%

Luo 71.92% 21.52 %If respondent K= 75%, if L = 76%

Survey experimentPercent all respondents saying very or somewhat likely

to vote for that candidate; random assignment of ethnicity and performance

Good Performer

Bad Performer

Kikuyu 70.37% 21.05 %If respondent K= 79% if L = 62%

Luo 71.92% 21.52 %If respondent K= 75%, if L = 76%

6. Wrap up: What Explains the African Vote?

What Explains the African Vote?• Hundreds of millions of $ spent on democracy

promotion – be we don’t even know what motivates African voters!

• Ethnicity• Performance through filters • Performance• Future work

– Ghanaian elections (December 2007)– South African elections (Spring 2008)– Campaign speeches

"IRI is the sole funder, producer, and/or source of the exit poll"

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5Services 1.926***

0.101Promises 2.672***

0.1National Economy 1.779***

0.102Security 0.405*** 0.347*** 0.345***

0.095 0.101 0.096Health 0.302** 0.239* 0.347***

0.092 0.096 0.093Family Economy 0.302* 0.212 0.119

0.118 0.127 0.118Employment -0.333*** -0.276*** -0.212** -0.193* -0.225**

0.058 0.074 0.082 0.088 0.081Experience 1.213*** 1.274*** 1.121*** 1.035*** 1.124***

0.059 0.077 0.085 0.091 0.084Kikuyu 3.133*** 2.834*** 2.464*** 2.727***

0.115 0.123 0.136 0.123Luo -3.355*** -2.912*** -2.665*** -2.943***

0.297 0.3 0.3 0.294Kamba -1.514*** -1.659*** -1.900*** -1.709***

0.154 0.164 0.208 0.174Age 0.065*** 0.053** 0.047* 0.053**

0.016 0.018 0.019 0.018Income 0.04 -0.059 -0.008 -0.051

0.031 0.034 0.037 0.033Male -0.161* -0.161* -0.177* -0.154

0.074 0.081 0.087 0.08Education -0.089** -0.100** -0.100** -0.094**

0.032 0.035 0.037 0.036Urban -0.512*** -0.493*** -0.404*** -0.485***

0.082 0.091 0.1 0.091Constant -0.680*** -0.917*** -1.488*** -1.867*** -1.447***

0.048 0.117 0.135 0.145 0.133Pseudo R2 0.0672 0.3818 0.4773 0.5402 0.468N 5495 5493 5483 5482 5484* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Prospective and Retrospective Votes for Kibaki

Raila Voters Kalonzo VotersEmployment -0.21 1.014*

0.225 0.419

Family Economy -0.810*** -0.190.22 0.418

Majimbo 1.798*** 1.241**0.257 0.464

Corruption 0.957*** 2.04***0.24 0.429

Education -2.082*** -0.3880.236 0.427

Constitution 1.848 1.7**0.321 0.528

age -0.047** -0.0180.015 0.022

income -0.174*** -0.157***0.029 0.04

male 0.239*** 0.0140.068 0.099

urban 0.622*** 0.0210.072 0.111

education 0.035 0.117**0.029 0.043

_cons 0.497* -1.729***0.229 0.428

Kibaki Voters as base outcome N=5298 p<0.05* p<0.01** p<.001***

Multinomial Logit Vote Choice Model

   Total Nairobi Coast

North-eastern

Eastern CentralRift

ValleyWestern Nyanza

Raila

Exit Poll 46.07 54.55 67.16 76 7.18 2.54 54.63 72.68 83.42

Official 44.1 43.96 59.37 47.51 5 1.89 64.66 65.82 82.33

Difference (Official-Poll)

-1.97 -10.59 -7.79 -28.49 -2.18 -0.65 10.03 -6.86 -1.09

Kibaki

Exit Poll 40.17 33.08 24.58 17 42.54 91.91 41.17 24.17 14.67

Official 46.38 47.69 33.12 50.53 50.25 96.87 33.47 32.16 16.88

Difference (Official-Poll)

6.21 14.61 8.54 33.53 7.71 4.96 -7.7 7.99 2.21

Kalonzo

Exit Poll 10.22 6.58 7.2 7 46.85 3.5 1.87 2.48 1.02

Official 8.92 8.06 6.53 2.34 43.7 0.65 1.39 0.69 0.28

Difference (Official-Poll)

-1.3 1.48 -0.67 -4.66 -3.15 -2.85 -0.48 -1.79 -0.74

Other/RTA Exit Poll 3.53 0.58 1.06 0 3.43 2.05 2.33 0.66 0.89

Official 0.61 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

 % registered voters 100 8.92 8.24 2.21 16.61 15.3 23.49 10.95 14.23

 Poll sample 5495 517 472 100 905 828 1285 604 784

 Margin of error 1.32 4.31 4.51 9.8 3.26 3.41 2.73 3.99 3.5

Difference between exit poll and official results

Religion and Gender

Education

Income

Income

Urban vs. Rural

Party Identification(58% say party member; 38% say no)

Logit Model for Kibaki VoteVariable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Govt Services 1.09*** 1.933***0.101 0.098

Promises 2.497*** 2.718***0.087 0.097

Economy 0.987*** 1.784***0.102 0.099

Security 0.023 0.459*** 0.403*** 0.399***0.102 0.093 0.095 0.1

Health 0.189* 0.36*** 0.408*** 0.295**0.093 0.095 0.096 0.097

Family's econ 0.236* 0.399*** 0.226* 0.293*0.12 0.113 0.114 0.126

Kikuyu 2.835*** 2.732*** 2.464***0.12 0.119 0.133

Luo -2.846*** -2.853*** -2.657***0.304 0.294 0.313

Kamba -1.641*** -1.682*** -1.835***0.158 0.166 0.191