Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situ-ated Agents, and the Future

of Cognitive Science

Andy Clark

Summarized by Eun Seok LeeBioIntelligence Lab

20 Sep, 2012

Abstract

• “Brains are essentially prediction machines.” • Brains support perception and action by constantly attempting to match in-

coming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. • A hierarchical generative model – Minimize prediction error• A unifying model of perception and action• A ‘hierarchical prediction machine’ approach – It offers the best clue yet to

the shape of a unified science of mind and action • Sections 1 and 2 – Key elements and implications of the approach • Section 3 – Evidential, methodological, and the more properly conceptual

pitfalls and challenges • Sections 4 and 5 – Impact of such approaches on our more general vision

of mind, experience, and agency

Contents

1. Prediction Machines2. Representation, Inference, and the Continuity of

Perception, Cognition, and Action3. From Action-Oriented Predictive Processing to an

Architecture of Mind.4. Content and Consciousness5. Taking Stock (Discussion & Conclusion)

1. Prediction Machines

1.1 From Helmholtz to Action-Oriented Predictive Processing

1.2 Escaping the Black Box1.3 Dynamic Predictive Coding by the Retina1.4 Another Illustration: Binocular Rivalry1.5 Action-Oriented Predictive Processing1.6 The Free Energy Formulation

The (Traditional) Architecture of Mind and Action

Mind Architecture (traditional)

Action

Perception

Attention

Recogni-tion

Explicit Learning

Implicit Learning

Inference

Action Selec-tion

Self-Consciousness

Top-down Bottom-up

Concept FormatonMemoization

Analogies of Mind and Next One (1/4)

16-17 C.

Analogies of Mind and Next One (2/4)

18-19 C.

Analogies of Mind and Next One (3/4)

20 C.

Analogies of Mind and Next One (4/4)

20 C. ~

From Helmholtz to Action-Oriented Predic-tive Processing

• The whole function of the brain is summed up in: error correction – Ross Ashby – “How to minimize errors?”• Helmholtz (1860) in depicting perception as a process of probabilistic, knowledge-driven inference• Analysis by Synthesis – brain tries to predict the current suite of cues from its best models of the possible causes• Helmholtz Machine and its tradition – ‘back propagation’ and ‘Helmholtz Machine’ – learn new representations in a multi-level system (thus capturing increasingly deep regularities within a domain) without requiring the provision of copious preclassified samples of the desired input-output mapping (see Hin-ton (2007a))• Predictive coding – depicts the top-down flow as attempting to predict and fully ‘explain away’ the driving sensory signal, leaving only any residual ‘pre-diction errors’ to propagate information forward within the system

Evidence: Binocular Rivalry (1/2)

Evidence: Binocular Rivalry (2/2)

• Incoming signals remain constant while the percept switches to and fro (Frith, Perry, and Lumer (1999))• Hierarchical generative model -- explain away the incoming sensory signal by means of a matching top-down prediction• ‘Empirical Bayes’ – the higher level guesses are thus acting as priors for the lower level processing• “Makes the best predictions and that, taking priors into con-sideration, is consequently assigned the highest posterior probability” (Hohwy, Roepstorff, and Friston (2008))• Perceptual level processing impacts on consciousness level processing and vice versa

Action-Oriented Predictive Processing

• Hierarchical predictive processing: include action (Friston, Daunizeau et al (2009), Friston (2010), Brown et al (2011))

• Optimal feedback control theory: displays the motor control problem as mathematically equivalent to Bayesian inference (Todorov and Jordan (2002))

• “Perceptual learning and inference is necessary to induce prior expectations about how the sensorium unfolds. Action is engaged to resample the world to fulfill these expectations. This places perception and action in intimate relation and ac-counts for both with the same principle” (Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel (2009) p. 12)

2. Representation, Inference, and the Continuity of Perception, Cognition, and Action

2.1 Explaining Away2.2 Encoding, Inference, and the ‘Bayesian Brain’2.3 The Delicate Dance Between Top-Down and Bot-

tom-Up

Explaining Away

• “High-level predictions explain away prediction error and tell the error units to ‘shut up’ [while] units encoding the causes of sensory input are selected by lateral interactions, with the error units, that mediate empirical priors.” (Friston (2005) p.829)• Duplex architecture: it depicts the forward flow of information as solely conveying error, and the backwards flow as solely con-veying predictions• “Two functionally distinct subpopulations”: Encode the condi-tional expectations of perceptual causes and the prediction error respectively enabling an act between cancelling out and selective enhancement is only made possible (Friston (2005), p.829)

Encoding, Inference, and the ‘Bayesian Brain’ (1/3)

Encoding, Inference, and the ‘Bayesian Brain’ (2/3)

Belletto, A View of Old Market in Schoesser-gasse

(adapted from Daniel Dennett, Sweet Dream)

Encoding, Inference, and the ‘Bayesian Brain’ (3/3)

• For in many real-life cases, substantial context information is already in place when new information is encountered. An apt set of priors is thus often already active, poised to impact the processing of new sensory inputs without further delay.

• The brain, in ecologically normal circumstances, is not just suddenly ‘turned on’ and some random or unexpected input de-livered for processing. So there is plenty of room for top-down influence to occur even before a stimulus is presented.

• Bayes’ Optimality: taking into account the uncertainty in our own sensory and motor signals, and adjusting the relative weight of different cues according to (often very subtle) contextual clues.

3. From Action-Oriented Predictive Pro-cessing to an Architecture of Mind

3.1 The Neural Evidence3.2 Scope and Limits3.3 Neats versus Scruffies (21st Century Re-

play).3.4 Situated Agents

Challenges

• Evidential: What are the experimental and neuroanatomical implications, and to what extent are they borne out by current knowledge and investigations?

• Conceptual: Can we really explain so much about perception and action by direct appeal to a fundamental strategy of mini-mizing errors in the prediction of sensory input?

• Methodological: To what extent can these accounts hope to il-luminate the full shape of the human cognitive architecture?

Situated Agents

• Synergies: Perception reduces surprisal by matching inputs with prior expectations. Action reduces surprisal by altering the world (including moving the body) so that inputs conform with expectations.

• Mobile robotics: show perception and behaviour productively interact via loops through action and the environment: create ex-tra-neural opportunities for the minimization of prediction error

•“Behavioural feedback modifies stimulus sampling and so pro-vides an additional extraneuronal path for the reduction of pre-diction errors”. (Verschure et al (2003) p.623)

Situated Agents

• Self-structuring of information flows: action-based structuring of sensory input (the linked unfolding across multiple sensory modalities that occurs when we see, touch, and hear an object actively manipulated)

• Promote learning and inference (Pfeifer, et al (2007), Clark (2008))• Robotic simulations in which the learning of complex co-ordination dy-

namics is achieved by maximizing the amount of predictive information present in sensorimotor loops. (Zahedi et al (in press))

• "The architecture of the brain and the statistics of the environment are not fixed. Rather, brain-connectivity is subject to a broad spectrum of input-, experience-, and activity-dependent processes which shape and structure its patterning and strengths… These changes, in turn, result in altered in-teractions with the environment, exerting causal influences on what is ex-perienced and sensed in the future” (Sporns (2007) p.179)

4. Content and Consciousness

4.1 Agency and Experience4.2 Illuminating Experience: The Case of Delusions4.3 Perception, Imagery, and the Senses4.4 Sensing and World

5. Taking Stock

5.1 Comparison with Standard Computationalism5.2 Conclusions: Towards A Grand Unified Theory

of the Mind?

Summary

• Action-oriented (hierarchical) predictive processing model: bring cognition, perception, action, and attention together within a common framework.

• Suggesting probability density distributions induced by hierar-chical generative models as basic means of representing the world, and prediction-error minimization as the driving force behind learning, action-selection, recognition, and inference.

• Specific phenomena: nonclassical receptive field effects, bi-stable perception, cue integration, and the pervasive context-sensitivity of neuronal response.

Summary

• Engagement with evolutionary, embodied, and situated ap-proaches are needed.

• Prediction and prediction error minimization is powerful and illuminating.

• Unifying: Computational approaches (such as unsupervised and self-supervised forms of learning using recurrent neural network architectures), Probabilistic generative models for perception and action), Testable accounts of neural implemen-tation Addressing the levels of (in the vocabulary of Marr (1982)) the computation, the algorithm, and the implementa-tion.