"when does new science become a threat?".
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"When does new science become a threat?". . The scientific process. problem - experimentation - discovery. The scientific process. problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination. The scientific process. problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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"When does new science become a threat?".
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problem - experimentation - discovery
The scientific process
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problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
The scientific process
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problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
The scientific process
Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC
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• Jackson et al. 2001: Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus suppresses cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox
• Cello et al. 2002: Chemical synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious Virus in the Absence of a natural Template
• Tumpey et al. 2005: Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish Flu influenza Pandemic Virus
• Wein et al. 2005: Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinim Toxin in Milk
• Herfst et al. 2012: Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus between Ferrets
• Imai et al, 2012: Experimental Adaptation of an Influenza H5 HA confers respiratory Droplet Transmission to a Reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 Virus in Ferrets
• Xiong et al. 2013: Receptor binding by a ferret-transmissible H5 avian Influenza Virus
• Bieringer et al. 2013: Experimental Adaptation of Wild-Type Canine Distemper Virus (CDV) to the Human Entry Receptor CD150
• Zhang et al 2013: H5N1 Hybrid Viruses Bearing 2009/H1N1 Virus Genes transmit in Guinea Pigs by Respiratory Droplet
Controversial biological publications
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problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
The scientific process
Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC
Vanity publishing
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problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
The scientific process
Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC
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problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination - repetition - adoption
The scientific processFunding Scientists Open innovation
Science is a moving target – good science identifies new ground
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Engineer a new functional organism from scratch
Engineer an organism to do something completely new
Introduce new traits into an organism at the genetic level
Engineer an organism to modify to an existing pathway
Use an existing pathway to make something new.
1 2 3 4 5
The pace of change
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The politics of 20/20 hindsight
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Code of conduct – what is you want scientists to do differently?Security culture – responsible conduct
The pace of change
Can we prevent access to new sciences: e.g. oligonucleotide synthesis
Interferon gamma 17kDa, 166aa, 498 bp
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problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination
The scientific process
Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC
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Constant vigilance!!
• Provide education – at all levels• Engender a community responsibility• Provide a reporting framework• Provide confidential contacts• Provide a knowledge base
Self policing
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Categories of Experiments that might be DURC
1. Enhance the harmful consequences of a biological agent or toxin. 2. Disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of immunization without clinical
and/or agricultural justification. 3. Confer to a biological agent or toxin, resistance to clinically and/or
agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies.
4. Increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate a biological agent or toxin.
5. Alter the host range or tropism of biological agent or toxin. 6. Enhance the susceptibility of a host population. 7. Generate a novel pathogenic agent or toxin, or reconstitute an eradicated
or extinct biological agent.
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), USA, 2012; http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity_documents.html
A problem
Emerging Science Makes Security a Moving Threat Beyond the 15 Key Pathogens/7 Core Experiments of Concern – moving target
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No common framework in which to conduct sound risk/benefits analyses of science:
• In different countries• In different cultures• In different communities (e.g. science vs. security)
Therefore probability that too risky experiments yielding too little benefit will be conducted.
• However, can we apply universal rules? • Should the restrictions/expectations placed on a 3rd world be
the same as a developed nation? • Rather do we really need common ethical guidance?
A problem
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• Convergence of science
• Divergence of scientists - in interest/expertise - who is doing the science - including “the public”
Safety
Risk Threat
Security
Quid est veritas: What is truth
Who provides the solution
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Advise on risk/benefit assessment and risk mitigation • don´t do it • do it in another way
Dissemination• don’t publish it • publish it with balancing/redacted information
• Advise on supporting structures, e.g. local/regional ethical review committees
The language
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What is the cost of security?
“The biological world is displacing the machine as a general world of design.”
DARPA – Living Foundries: Large U.S. investment in next-generation bio-based manufacturing
Unknown unknowns – horizon scoping and the pace of scientific development
• Most science develops iteratively and easy to map. • Some scientists work in a different way and think about where
they want to be and describe the route to get there, real scientific breakthrough
• Step change is often serendipitous, or is unrecognized at the point of discovery.
• Nature as a threat – biggest bioterroist.
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Discussion between science, policy and security ….
Identifying a clear and present danger
Horizon scoping 10 years and beyond less reliable – pace of change
Coreponsibility …..
Dealing with potential issues in advance ….
How good at this are we?
Scientists are good at identifying where science is going in the near future