more Air Cobras. The Army planes,which had serious altitude andclimb-rate deficiencies, were destinedto see most action in ground combatsupport roles.

The frenzied action in what be-came known as the Battle of theEastern Solomons was matchedashore. Japanese destroyers had deli-vered the vanguard of the Ichiki forceat Taivu Point, 25 miles east of theMarine perimeter. A long-rangepatrol of Marines from Company A,1st Battalion, 1st Marines ambusheda sizable Japanese force near Taivuon 19 August. The Japanese deadwere readily identified as Armytroops and the debris of their defeatincluded fresh uniforms and a largeamount of communication gear.Clearly, a new phase of the fightinghad begun. All Japanese encounteredto this point had been naval troops.

Alerted by patrols, the Marinesnow dug in along the Ilu River, oftenmisnamed the Tenaru on Marinemaps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki.The Japanese commander's ordersdirected him to "quickly recaptureand maintain the airfield at Guadal-canal," and his own directive to his

troops emphasized that they wouldfight "to the last breath of the lastman." And they did.

Too full of his mission to wait forthe rest of his regiment and sure thathe faced only a few thousand menoverall, Ichiki marched from Taivuto the Marines' lines. Before he at-tacked on the night of the 20th, abloody figure stumbled out of thejungle with a warning that theJapanese were coming. It was Ser-geant Major Vouza. Captured by theJapanese, who found a small Ameri-can flag secreted in his loincloth, hewas tortured in a failed attempt togain information on the invasionforce. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twicethrough the chest, and beaten withrifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewedthrough his bindings to escape. Takento Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pol-lock, whose 2d Battalion, 1st Ma-rines held the Ilu mouth's defenses,he gasped a warning that an estimat-ed 250-500 Japanese soldiers werecoming behind him. The resoluteVouza, rushed immediately to an aidstation and then to the divisionhospital, miraculously survived hisordeal and was awarded a Silver Star

20

for his heroism by General Van-degrift, and later a Legion of Merit.Vandegrift also made Vouza anhonorary sergeant major of U.S.Marines.

At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki'stroops stormed the Marines' lines ina screaming, frenzied display of the"spiritual strength" which they hadbeen assured would sweep aside theirAmerican enemy. As the Japanesecharged across the sand bar astridethe Ilu's mouth, Pollock's Marines cutthem down. After a mortar prepara-tion, the Japanese tried again tostorm past the sand bar. A section of37mm guns sprayed the enemy forcewith deadly canister. LieutenantColonel Lenard B. Cresswell's 1st Bat-talion, 1st Marines moved upstreamon the Ilu at daybreak, waded acrossthe sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream,and moved on the flank of theJapanese. Wildcats from VMF-223strafed the beleagured enemy force.Five light tanks blasted the retreat-ing Japanese. By 1700, as the sun wassetting, the battle ended.

Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in ownmind by his defeat, burned hisregimental colors and shot himself.Close to 800 of his men joined himin death. The few survivors fled east-ward towards Taivu Point. Rear Ad-miral Raizo Tanaka, whosereinforcement force of transports anddestroyers was largely responsible forthe subsequent Japanese troop build-up on Guadalcanal, recognized thatthe unsupported Japanese attack wassheer folly and reflected that "thistragedy should have taught us thehopelessness of bamboo spear tac-tics:' Fortunately for the Marines,Ichiki's overconfidence was notunique among Japanese com-manders.

Following the 1st Marines' tanglewith the Ichiki detachment, GeneralVandegrift was inspired to write theMarine Commandant, LieutenantGeneral Thomas Holcomb, andreport: "These youngsters are thedarndest people when they get start-

U.S. M-3 Light Tank

ed you ever saw" And all the Marineson the island, young and old, tyroand veteran, were becoming accom-plished jungle fighters. They were nolonger "trigger happy" as many hadbeen in their first days ashore, shoot-ing at shadows and imagined enemy.They were waiting for targets,patrolling with enthusiasm, sure ofthemselves. The misnamed Battle ofthe Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt'sregiment 34 killed in action and 75wounded. All the division's Marinesnow felt they were bloodied. Whatthe men on Tulagi, Gavutu, andTanambogo and those of the Ilu haddone was prove that the 1st MarineDivision would hold fast to what ithad won.

While the division's Marines andsailors had earned a breathing spellas the Japanese regrouped foranother onslaught, the action in theair over the Solomons intensified.Almost every day, Japanese aircraftarrived around noon to bomb theperimeter. Marine fighter pilotsfound the twin-engine Betty bombers

easy targets; Zero fighters wereanother story. Although the Wildcatswere a much sturdier aircraft, theJapanese Zeros' superior speed andbetter maneuverability gave them adistinct edge in a dogfight. TheAmerican planes, however, whenwarned by the coastwatchers ofJapanese attacks, had time to climbabove the oncoming enemy andpreferably attacked by making firingruns during high speed dives. Theirtactics made the air space over theSolomons dangerous for theJapanese. On 29 August, the carrierRyujo launched aircraft for a strikeagainst the airstrip. Smith's Wildcatsshot down 16, with a loss of four oftheir own. Still, the Japanese con-tinued to strike at Henderson Fieldwithout letup. Two days after theRyujo raid, enemy bombers inflict-ed heavy damage on the airfield, set-ting aviation fuel ablaze andincinerating parked aircraft.VMF-223's retaliation was a furtherbag of 13 attackers.

On 30 August, two more MAG-23

21

squadrons, VMF-224 andVMSB-231, flew in to Henderson.The air reinforcements were morethan welcome. Steady combat attri-tion, frequent damage in the air andon the ground, and scant repair fa-cilities and parts kept the number ofaircraft available a dwindlingresource.

Plainly, General Vandegrift need-

Cactus Air Force commander, MajGenRoy S. Geiger, poses with Capt JosephI. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanalwith 26 Japanese aircraft downed. CaptFoss was later awarded the Medal ofHonor for his heroic exploits in the air.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622

Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: '1 wanted to over There is a sense of being alone, naked and unprotect-catch on paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling ed. And time seems endless until the shell strikes somewhere."

4¶ 8'

I : 4 — LM_.- -

ed infantry reinforcements as muchas he did additional aircraft. Hebrought the now-combined raiderand parachute battalions, both un-der Edson's command, and the 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, over toGuadalcanal from Tulagi. This gavethe division commander a chance toorder out larger reconnaissancepatrols to probe for the Japanese. On27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Ma-

rines, made a shore-to-shore landingnear Kokumbona and marched backto the beachhead without any meas-urable results. If the Japanese wereout there beyond the Matanikau —and they were — they watched theMarines and waited for a better op-portunity to attack.

September and the Ridge

Admiral McCain visited Guadal-

canal at the end of August, arrivingin time to greet the aerial reinforce-ments he had ordered forward, andalso in time for a taste of Japanesenightly bombing. He got to ex-perience, too, what was becominganother unwanted feature of Cactusnights: bombardment by Japanesecruisers and destroyers. General Van-degrift noted that McCain had got-ten a dose of the "normal ration of

Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza

Jacob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko,Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands Protectorate,and educated at the South Seas Evangelical Mission

chool there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands Pro-tectorate Armed Constabulary, from which he retired atthe rank of sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.

After the Japanese invaded his home island in World WarII, he returned to active duty with the British forces andvolunteered to work with the Coastwatchers. Vouza's ex-perience as a scout had already been established when the1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7 August1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS Waspwho was shot down inside Japanese territory. He guidedthe pilot to friendly lines where Vouza met the Marines forthe first time.

Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines forthe Marines. On 27 August he was captured by the Japanesewhile on a Marine Corps mission to locate suspected ene-my lookout stations. Having found a small American flagin Vouza's loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a tree andtried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. Hewas tortured and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoul-der, face, and stomach, and left to die.

He managed to free himself after his captors departed,and made his way through the miles of jungle to Ameri-can lines. There he gave valuable intelligence informationto the Marines about an impending Japanese attack beforeaccepting medical attention.

After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza thenreturned to duty as the chief scout for the Marines. He ac-companied Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson and the2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made their 30-dayraid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.

Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for hisWorld War II service. The Silver Star was presented to himpersonally by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, for refus-ing to give information under Japanese torture. He also wasawarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service withthe 2d Raider Battalion during November and December1942, and the British George Medal for gallant conduct and

22

exceptional devotion to duty. He later received the PoliceLong Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member ofthe British Empire for long and faithful government service.

After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow is-landers. In 1949, he was appointed district headman, andpresident of the Guadalcanal Council, from 1952-1958. Heserved as a member of the British Solomon Islands Pro-tectorate Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.

He made many friends during his long association withthe U.S. Marine Corps and through the years was continu-ally visited on Guadalcanal by Marines. During 1968, Vou-za visited the United States, where he was the honored guestof the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979, he wasknighted by Britain's Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15March 1984.—Ann A. Ferrante

j-7 -

M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun

The M3 antitank gun, based on the successful Ger-man Panzer Abwehr Kanone (PAK)-36, was devel-oped by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as a

replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used inWorld War I but unable to destroy new tanks beingproduced.

The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire con-trol, penetration, and mobility. Towed by its prime mover,the 4x4 quarter-ton truck, the gun would trail at 50 mphon roads. When traveling crosscountry, gullies, shell holes,mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were negotiated withease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 whenthe muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake thatwas rarely, if ever, used.

At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy anytank then being produced in the world. However, by thetime the United States entered the war, the M3 was out-matched by the tanks it would have met in Europe. TheJapanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to theM3 throughout the war. In the Pacific it was used againstbunkers, pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, againstbanzai charges. It was employed throughout the war byMarine regimental weapons companies, but in reducednumbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in theEuropean Theater by the Ml 57mm antitank gun.

The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four whofired a 1.61-pound projectile with an effective range of 500yards. — Stephen L. Amos and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas

shells." The admiral saw enough tosignal his superiors that increasedsupport for Guadalcanal operationswas imperative and that the "situa-tion admits no delay whatsoever:' Healso sent a prophetic message to Ad-mirals King and Nimitz: "Cactus canbe a sinkhole for enemy air powerand can be consolidated, expanded,and exploited to the enemy's mortalhurt:'

On 3 September, the Command-ing General, 1st Marine AircraftWing, Brigadier General Roy S.Geiger, and his assistant wing com-mander, Colonel Louis Woods,moved forward to Guadalcanal totake charge of air operations. The ar-rival of the veteran Marine aviatorsprovided an instant lift to the moraleof the pilots and ground crews. Itreinforced their belief that they were

23

at the leading edge of air combat,that they were setting the pace for therest of Marine aviation. Vandegriftcould thankfully turn over the day-to-day management of the aerialdefenses of Cactus to the able and ex-perienced Geiger. There was noshortage of targets for the mixed airforce of Marine, Army, and Navyflyers. Daily air attacks by theJapanese, coupled with steady rein-

forcement attempts by Tanaka's des-troyers and transports, meant thatevery type of plane that could lift offHendersons runway was airborne asoften as possible. Seabees had begunwork on a second airstrip, FighterOne, which could relieve some of thepressure on the primary airfield.

Most of General Kawaguchi'sbrigade had reached Guadalcanal.Those who hadn't, missed their land-fall forever as a result of Americanair attacks. Kawaguchi had in minda surprise attack on the heart of theMarine position, a thrust from thejungle directly at the airfield. Toreach his jumpoff position, theJapanese general would have to movethrough difficult terrain unobserved,carving his way through the densevegetation out of sight of Marinepatrols. The rugged approach routewould lead him to a prominent ridgetopped by Kunai grass which wovesnake-like through the jungle to with-in a mile of Henderson's runway.Unknown to the Japanese, GeneralVandegrift planned on moving hisheadquarters to the shelter of a spotat the inland base of this ridge, a site

better protected, it was hoped, fromenemy bombing and shelif ire.

The success of Kawaguchi's plandepended upon the Marines keepingthe inland perimeter thinly mannedwhile they concentrated their forceson the east and west flanks. This wasnot to be. Available intelligence, in-

cluding a captured enemy map,pointed to the likelihood of an attackon the airfield and Vandegrift movedhis combined raider-parachute battal-ion to the most obvious enemy ap-proach route, the ridge. ColonelEdson's men, who scouted Savo Is-land after moving to Guadalcanaland destroyed a Japanese supply base

This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north withIronbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At

National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C)the left center is the 'Pagoda," operations center of Cactus AirForce flyers throughout their first months of operations ashore.

Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many fires occuring after aJapanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing the loss of much-needed aircraft.

Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection

24

t.

I

St

at Tasimboko in another shore-to-shore raid, took up positions on theforward slopes of the ridge at theedge of the encroaching jungle on 10September. Their commander latersaid that he "was firmly convincedthat we were in the path of the nextJap attack:' Earlier patrols had spot-ted a sizable Japanese force ap-proaching. Accordingly, Edsonpatrolled extensively as his men dugin on the ridge and in the flankingjungle. On the 12th, the Marinesmade contact with enemy patrolsconfirming the fact that Japanesetroops were definitely "out front:'Kawaguchi had about 2,000 of hismen with him, enough he thought topunch through to the airfield.

Japanese planes had dropped500-pound bombs along the ridge onthe 11th and enemy ships beganshelling the area after nightfall on the

12th, once the threat of American airattacks subsided. The first Japanesethrust came at 2100 against Edson'sleft flank. Boiling out of the jungle,the enemy soldiers attacked fearlesslyinto the face of rifle and machine gunfire, closing to bayonet range. Theywere thrown back. They came again,this time against the right flank,penetrating the Marines' positions.Again they were thrown back. Athird attack closed out the night's ac-tion. Again it was a close affair, butby 0230 Edson told Vandegrift hismen could hold. And they did.

On the morning of 13 September,Edson called his company com-manders together and told them:"They were just testing, just testing.They'll be back:' He ordered all po-sitions improved and defenses con-solidated and pulled his lines towardsthe airfield along the ridge's center

spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,his backup on Tulagi, moved into po-sition to reinforce again.

The next night's attacks were asfierce as any man had seen. TheJapanese were everywhere, fightinghand-to-hand in the Marines' fox-holes and gun pits and filtering pastforward positions to attack from therear. Division Sergeant MajorSheffield Banta shot one in the newcommand post. Colonel Edson ap-peared wherever the fighting wastoughest, encouraging his men totheir utmost efforts. The man-to-manbattles lapped over into the jungle oneither flank of the ridge, and engineerand pioneer positions were attacked.The reserve from the 5th Marineswas fed into the fight. Artillerymenfrom the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines,as they had on the previous night,fired their 105mm howitzers at any

The raging battle of Edson's Ridge is depicted in all its furyin this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,

as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal.Dickson's artwork later was shown widely in the United States.

Captain Donald L. Dickson, IJSMCR

25

pp — .—.... ,.

S

Edson's or Raider's Ridge is calm after the fighting on the nights Field and the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobsof 12-13 and 13-14 September, when it was the scene of a vali- at left background were Col Edson's final defensive position,ant and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson while Henderson Field lies beyond the trees in the background.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007

26

FORCE

AphTcQ.

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EDSON'S (BLOODY) RIDGE2-l4 SEPTEMBER 1942

MOno Po,ition 13 S.pISb'Art of Japon... AIIxk

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Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563)

Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander ofCompany C, 1st Raider Battalion, wasawarded the Medal of Honor posthu-mously for heroic and inspiring leader-ship during the Battle of Edson's Ridge.

called target. The range grew as shortas 1,600 yards from tube to impact.The Japanese finally could take nomore. They pulled back as dawn ap-proached. On the slopes of the ridgeand in the surrounding jungle theyleft more than 600 bodies; another600 men were wounded. The rem-nants of the Kawaguchi force stag-gered back toward their lines to thewest, a grueling, hellish eight-daymarch that saw many more of theenemy perish.

The cost to Edson's force for itsepic defense was also heavy. Fifty-nine men were dead, 10 were miss-ing in action, and 194 were wound-ed. These losses, coupled with thecasualties of Tulagi, Gavutu, andTanambogo, meant the end of the 1stParachute Battalion as an effectivefighting unit. Only 89 men of the

parachutists' original strength couldwalk off the ridge, soon in legend tobecome "Bloody Ridge" or "Edson'sRidge." Both Colonel Edson and Cap-tain Kenneth D. Bailey, commandingthe raider's Company C, were award-ed the Medal of Honor for theirheroic and inspirational actions.

On 13 and 14 September, theJapanese attempted to supportKawaguchi's attack on the ridge withthrusts against the flanks of the Ma-rine perimeter. On the east, enemytroops attempting to penetrate thelines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,were caught in the open on a grassplain and smothered by artillery fire;at least 200 died. On the west, the3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holdingridge positions covering the coastalroad, fought off a determined attack-ing force that reached its front lines.

The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters forCactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations

on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sentagainst Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921

27

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The victory at the ridge gave agreat boost to Allied homefrontmorale, and reinforced the opinionof the men ashore on Guadalcanalthat they could take on anything theenemy could send against them. Atupper command echelons, the lead-ers were not so sure that the groundMarines and their motley air forcecould hold. Intercepted Japanese dis-patches revealed that the myth of the2,000-man defending force had beencompletely dispelled. Sizable navalforces and two divisions of Japanesetroops were now committed to con-quer the Americans on Guadalcanal.Cactus Air Force, augmented fre-quently by Navy carrier squadrons,made the planned reinforcement ef-fort a high-risk venture. But it wasa risk the Japanese were prepared totake.

On 18 September, the long-awaited 7th Marines, reinforced bythe 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, andother division troops, arrived atGuadalcanal. As the men fromSamoa landed they were greeted withfriendly derision by Marines alreadyon the island. The 7th had been thefirst regiment of the 1st Division togo overseas; its men, many thoughtthen, were likely to be the first to seecombat. The division had been care-ful to send some of its best men toSamoa and now had them back. Oneof the new and salty combat veteransof the 5th Marines remarked to afriend in the 7th that he had waiteda long time "to see our first team getinto the game:' Providentially, aseparate supply convoy reached theisland at the same time as the 7th'sarrival, bringing with it badly need-ed aviation gas and the first resup-ply of ammunition since D-Day.

The Navy covering force for theAmerican reinforcement and supplyconvoys was hit hard by Japanesesubmarines. The carrier Wasp wastorpedoed and sunk, the battleshipNorth Carolina (BB 55) wasdamaged, and the destroyer O'Brien(DD 415) was hit so badly it broke

up and sank on its way to drydock.The Navy had accomplished its mis-sion, the 7th Marines had landed,but at a terrible cost. About the onlygood result of the devastatingJapanese torpedo attacks was that theWasp's surviving aircraft joined Cac-tus Air Force, as the planes of theSaratoga and Enterprise had donewhen their carriers required combatrepairs. Now, the Hornet (CV 8) wasthe only whole fleet carrier left in theSouth Pacific.

As the ships that brought the 7thMarines withdrew, they took withthem the survivors of the 1stParachute Battalion and sick bays fullof badly wounded men. GeneralVandegrift now had 10 infantry bat-talions, one understrength raider bat-talion, and five artillery battalionsashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,had come over from Tulagi also. Hereorganized the defensive perimeterinto 10 sectors for better control, giv-ing the engineer, pioneer, and am-phibian tractor battalions sectorsalong the beach. Infantry battalionsmanned the other sectors, includingthe inland perimeter in the jungle.Each infantry regiment had two bat-talions on line and one in reserve.Vandegrift also had the use of a selectgroup of infantrymen who weretraining to be scouts and snipers un-der the leadership of Colonel WilliamJ. "Wild Bill" Whaling, an ex-perienced jungle hand, marksman,and hunter, whom he had appoint-ed to run a school to sharpen the di-vision's fighting skills. As menfinished their training under Whal-ing and went back to their outfits,others took their place and the Whal-ing group was available to scout andspearhead operations.

Vandegrift now had enough menashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, toexpand his defensive scheme. Hedecided to seize a forward positionalong the east bank of the MatanikauRiver, in effect strongly outpostinghis west flank defenses against theprobability of strong enemy attacks

28

from the area where most Japanesetroops were landing. First, however,he was going to test the Japanesereaction with a strong probing force.

He chose the fresh 1st Battalion,7th Marines, commanded by Lieu-tenant Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty"Puller, to move inland along theslopes of Mt. Austen and patrolnorth towards the coast and theJapanese-held area. Puller's battalionran into Japanese troops bivouackedon the slopes of Austen on the 24thand in a sharp firefight had sevenmen killed and 25 wounded. Van-degrift sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Ma-rines, forward to reinforce Puller andhelp provide the men needed to car-ry the casualties out of the jungle.Now reinforced, Puller continued hisadvance, moving down the east bankof the Matanikau. He reached thecoast on the 26th as planned, wherehe drew intensive fire from enemypositions on the ridges west of theriver. An attempt by the 2d Battal-ion, 5th Marines, to cross was beat-en back.

About this time, the 1st RaiderBattalion, its original mission one ofestablishing a patrol base west of theMatanikau, reached the vicinity ofthe firefight, and joined in. Van-degrift sent Colonel Edson, now thecommander of the 5th Marines, for-ward to take charge of the expandedforce. He was directed to attack onthe 27th and decided to send the raid-ers inland to outflank the Japanesedefenders. The battalion, command-ed by Edson's former executiveofficer, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B.Griffith II, ran into a hornet's nest ofJapanese who had crossed theMatanikau during the night. A gar-bled message led Edson to believethat Griffith's men were advancingaccording to plan, so he decided toland the companies of the 1st Battal-ion, 7th Marines, behind the enemy'sMatanikau position and strike theJapanese from the rear while Rose-cran's men attacked across the river.

The landing was made without in-

The President of the United Statestakes pleasure in presenting

the Medal of Honor posthumously toDouglas Albert MunroSignalman First Class

United States Coast Guardfor service as set forth

in the following citation:

For extraordinary heroism and conspicuousgallantry in action above and beyond the callof duty as Officer in Charge of a group oftwenty-four Higgins boats engaged in theevacuation of a battalion of Marines trappedby enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. Aftermaking preliminary plans for the evacuationof nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,Munro, under constant strafing by enemymachine guns on the island and at great riskof his life, daringly led five of his small crafttoward the shore. As he closed the beach, hesignalled the others to land and then in or-der to draw the enemy's fire and protect theheavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed hiscraft, with its two small guns, as a shield be-tween the beachhead and the Japanese. Whenthe perilous task of evacuation was nearlycompleted, Munro was instantly killed byenemy fire, but his crew, two of whom were

wounded, carried on until the last boat hadloaded and cleared the beach. By his out-standing leadership, expert planning, anddauntless devotion to duty, he and his cou-

rageous comrades undoubtedly saved thelives of many who otherwise would haveperished. He gallantly gave up his life indefense of his country. Is! Franklin Roosevelt

ambushed and cut off from the seaby the Japanese. A rescue force oflanding craft moved with difficultythrough Japanese fire, urged on by

Puller who accompanied the boatson the destroyer Ballard (DD 660).

Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area and Forces, VAdm Wil-liam F Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st Marine Division. Here he is showntalking with Cot Gerald C. Thomas, 1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer).

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523

head. Once the 7th Marines compa-nies got back to the perimeter,landing near Kukum, the raider and5th Marines battalions pulled backfrom the Matanikau. The confirma-tion that the Japanese would stronglycontest any westward advance costthe Marines 60 men killed and 100wounded.

The Japanese the Marines had en-countered were mainly men from the4th Regiment of the 2d (Sendai) Di-vision; prisoners confirmed that thedivision was landing on the island.Included in the enemy reinforcementswere 150mm howitzers, guns capa-ble of shelling the airfield from po-sitions near Kokumbona. Clearly, anew and stronger enemy attack waspending.

As September drew to a close, aflood of promotions had reached thedivision, nine lieutenant colonels puton their colonel's eagles and therewere 14 new lieutenant colonels also.Vandegrift made Colonel Gerald C.Thomas, his former operations

Painting by Bernard D'Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard Historical Office

cident and the 7th Marines' compa-nies moved inland only to be

The Marines were evacuated afterfighting their way to the beach co-vered by the destroyer's fire and themachine guns of a Marine SBD over-

29

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