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White Paper on Defence and Defence Review

“Defence Update 2005”

Portfolio Committee on Defence: 17 May 2005

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Scope of Presentation to PCDIntroduction & Overview

WP&DR Process

Changed Strategic Environment

Collective Security

South African Approach to National Security

Role, Functions, Objectives & Missions

Overview of Report 2

Mr Tsepe Motumi

Nick Sendall

Mr Sagaren Naidoo

Dr Phenyo Rakate

Mr Sagaren Naidoo

Col(dr) Willie Wagner

Nick Sendall

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WP & DR Macro Process

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Required Results of Defence Update 2005

RESULT #1Renewal & Modernisation

DWP DR WP&DR Update

MISMATCH RESULT #2 (RISKS) Alignment

MTEF MTEF

1996 1998 2005 2009 2014

RESULT #3Consolidated Defence

Vision

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Defence Update 2005 Architecture

Ministerial ForewordIntroductionChapter 1: The Changed Strategic EnvironmentChapter 2: Collective SecurityChapter 3: South Africa’s Approach to National SecurityChapter 4: Defence Role, Functions, Objectives, & Missions

Chapter 5: Required Defence CapabilitiesChapter 6: Required Defence ResourcesChapter 7: Defence GovernanceConclusion

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Status of the WP&DR Chapters

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Status of Chapters (1)Chapter 1: The Changed Strategic Environment

Chapter 2: Collective Security

Chapter 3: South Africa’s Approach to National Security

Chapter 4: Defence Role, Functions, Objectives, & Missions

Chapter 5: Required Defence Capabilities

Chapter 6: Required Defence Resources

Chapter 7: Defence Governance

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Status of Chapters (2)

 Chapter 5: Required Defence Capabilities CCS to present the Force Design Proposal to the PDSC on 20 June 2005. CCS will submit Chapter 5 to the editing committee one week thereafter.

Chapter 6: Required Defence Resources CFO will present the Financial Instruction for the costing of the Force Design

to the DSC on 30 May 2005. CFO will present the Force Costing Proposal at the PDSC on 18 July 2005. Submission of Chapter 6 to the editing committee will be one week

thereafter, i.e. 25 July 2005.

Report 2 The Editing Committee tasked to prepare Report 2 for presentation at the

PDSC of 15 August 2005.

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CHAPTER ONE

A CHANGED STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

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IntroductionA main determinant for an update of the WP and DR is the changing nature of the strategic environment.

The contemporary strategic environment depicts a world confronted by non-traditional security threats, new actors, and non-conventional methods of destabilisation and destruction.

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The Global Context

General Trends Intra-state Conflict The Contribution of Non-State Actors to insecurity The Rise of International TerrorismPossession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)The Military Capacity of StatesUnilateral Acts of ForceCompetition over Scarce and Strategic ResourcesMercenaries and Private Military CompaniesNegative Effects of GlobalisationNorth-South DisparitiesRegionalismInformation and Communication Technology

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The Continental Context

A new section to previous chapter in 1996 WP.The establishment of the African Union is a milestone achievement.However, conflicts have continued – some longstanding others of a recent occurrence.

Causes: Weak and non-functional states; Poor political and economic governance; The politicisation of ethnicity; Armed competition over scarce and strategic resources; and Unconstitutional changes of governments.

Accordingly, the AU and its mechanisms for resolution of conflict i.e. PSC, ASF, the CEW, CADSP and the PAP; are critical for a peaceful and stable continent.

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The Regional ContextResolution of long standing internal conflicts and the institutionalisation of democratic practices. Post-war reconstruction poses a challenge.However, much of the region continues to be stricken by chronic underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment in addition to the spread of killer diseases, environmental degradation, and a proliferation of small arms. Therefore, the Operationalisation of SADC security structures and institutions is of critical importance. Another development to further regional peace and security is the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP).

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The Domestic Context

The domestic security environment is affected by:

Endemic crime influenced largely by foreign and local criminal syndicates.

Exacerbated by the availability of small arms. The spread of killer diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, and

environmental degradation. Acts of Terror.

The domestic situation remains stable.

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ConclusionThe inter-relatedness and transnational nature of many contemporary security threats dictates that solutions are beyond the control of any single state. A resolution to many of the present days security threats require collaborative action among states within multilateral fora and collective security mechanisms at the international, continental and regional levels.

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CHAPTER TWO

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

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Introduction

A changed strategic environment compels a collective response to non-traditional security threats, new actors, and non-conventional methods of destabilisation and destruction.

Our security as a country is inextricably linked to the region and the continent.

Therefore, there is a need to strengthen regional and continental structures – SADC and AU

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Approach to Collective Security

The 1996 WP on Defence does not replace ‘state security’ with the adoption of a human security approach. The two are inextricably linked. This approach is supported by the UN Report on Human Security(2003). Security is no longer viewed in national terms. Most of the non-military threats that face South Africa have regional, continental and international implications.The DOD is but one instrument that may be employed to promote national, regional, continental and global security.

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Collective Security Developments

Peacekeeping-The UN experience with peacekeeping in Bosnia and Somalia.

Brahimi Report- to undertake a thorough review of UN peacekeeping.

A purely military approach to peacekeeping which ignores human security aspects does not produce a lasting peace

UN Stand-by arrangements to be linked to regional co-operation – Member states to make available a brigade type force.

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Reforming the UN SC

UN membership has grown threefold.

UN SC decisions to be legitimate, credible and effective.Report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change (2004).

Representation will provide Africa with a forum to shape and influence the international security agenda.

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Continental Security Mechanisms

The objectives of the PSC supported by concomitant structures (ASF, MSC, Early Warning, Panel of the Wise, Peace Fund) is to provide peace, security and stability in Africa. ASF envisages a brigade-size force per region for each of the five regions. Early Warning System is to provide political, economic, social, military indicators to be used to analyse developments in the continent.CADSP provides a framework for a common vision of defence and security on the continent and will inform future developments related to non-aggression and mutual defence pacts.

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Regional Security Mechanisms

Institutionalisation of the objectives of the OPDSC particularly the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ(SIPO)SADC Mutual Defence Pact (2003) to prevent conflict between and against SADC member states.Operationalisation of the SADCBRIG and the Early Warning Centre is currently underway – Modality Report.

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Collective Security Management

Poverty and Underdevelopment Eradication of poverty is central to ensuring security

of all people and the security of the state (Human Security Report).

SIPO lists 14 security challenges and it includes the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment in the SADC region.

South Africa remains committed to the NEPAD process and the UN Millennium Development Goals.

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Unconstitutional Changes of Government AU-Algiers Decisions on Unconstitutional Changes of

Government(1999) and the Lome Declaration (2000) Constitutive Act of the African Union reject

unconstitutional changes of government. SADC Protocol on Principles and Guidelines

Governing Democratic Elections (2004)

Collective Security Management

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Mercenarism Mercenary activities undermine the values of human

rights and international law as expressed in the Constitution.

Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 prohibits South Africans from participating in national and international armed conflicts

South Africa is not party to the UN & AU Convention on Mercenarism

Collective Security Management

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International Terrorism Although international terrorism will continue to

dominate the global security agenda poverty and underdevelopment remains a challenge for developing countries (MOD Comments)

South Africa has implemented UN SC resolutions on terrorism – IDWG on terrorism

Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004.

Collective Security Management

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Disarmament and Arms Control Threat of WMD between major powers continues to

decline. However, the use of WMD cannot be discounted.

Pelindaba Treaty – preserve Africa as Nuclear free zone.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993.

Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002 – creates the NCACC to regulate trade over conventional arms.

Collective Security Management

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Small Arms and Light Weapons South Africa has participated in regional, continental

and global initiatives aimed at the eradication of illicit small arms and light weapons

SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001) and the Bamako Declaration(2001)

Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000

Collective Security Management

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Anti-personnel Landmines Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act 36 of 2003 Surrender, forfeiture to the state and destruction of

anti-personnel mines Co-operate with UN and other organisations to clear

landmines in SADC

Collective Security Management

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Conclusion (1)The broadening of security to include human security suggests a need to forge a new approach to collective securityGlobal threats posed poverty, mercenarism, terrorism, arms proliferation etc are interconnected and transnational in nature and cut across departmental responsibilities.These threats are addressed (inter-alia) through multilateral structures at regional, continental and global levels.

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Conclusion (2)South Africa will support regional, continental and global security arrangements and initiatives such as the AU PSC and the operationlisation of its concomitant structuresSouth Africa will support the implementation of the SADC SIPO, and the SADCBRIG etc

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CHAPTER THREE

SOUTH AFRICA’S APPROACH TO NATIONAL

SECURITY

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Introduction

South Africa’s National Security Policy (NSP) has undergone a marked overhaul since the end of apartheid. In a democratic South Africa “national security is an all-encompassing condition in which all citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of democratic governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.” Accordingly, South Africa’s national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social, and environmental matters.

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INTRODUCTION (Cont..)The objectives of South Africa’s NSP thus entail:

Consolidation and maintenance of democracy. The achievement of sustainable economic

development. The pursuit of social justice. Ensuring a peaceful and safe environment by

addressing the levels of crime, violence and political instability.

Achieving security within the principles of collective security, non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes.

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Foundations of SA’s National Security Policy

South Africa’s NSP is based on constitutional principles, the country’s national interests, and governmental priorities as espoused through the Cabinet Makgotla and the Ministerial and Director General Cluster system of governance.

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Constitution principles that govern the NSP

SA’s NSP must reflect the resolve of South African’s, as individuals and as a nation, to:

live as equals, in peace and harmony and to be free from fear and want, to seek a better life;

resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, national or internationally, except as provided for in-terms of the constitution and national legislation;

National Security must be pursued in compliance with the law including international law; and

National Security is subject to the authority of parliament and national executive.

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South Africa’s National Interests

The security and survival of South Africa, its values and institutions and the safety of its people;Sustainable economic growth and development in South Africa and the region;A peaceful and stable international environment; andInternational engagement with and participation in the international community;

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Governmental Priorities from the Cabinet Makgotla and the Cluster System of governance

          Transform the foreign, defence and intelligence organisations;Crime prevention and combating organised crime;Ensure South Africa’s acceptance into the community of nations and establish relations with other countries;Promote international peace, security and stability (including international crime prevention and management);Prioritise commitment to the interests and development of Africa;Promote South-South co-operation and the transformation of North-South relations;Reform and strengthen the multilateral rules-bound political, economic, security and environmental organisations in order to advance the interests of developing countries. 

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Challenges for Defence-related Priorities

Support the AU PSC in its efforts to contribute to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace keeping in Africa.Promote and strengthen multilateralism at regional, continental and global levels. Play and active and leading role in the implementation of NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism.Ensure AU structures and programmes are implemented, operationalised and consolidated.Enhance the capacity of the intelligence structures, and the SANDF;Improve efficiency in both ports of entry and in respect of border control; andImproving intelligence, visible policing and social partnerships, particularly in dealing with priority crime.

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Implications for the DODNational security is viewed in a broader context as an all-encompassing condition, which includes the safeguarding of South Africa and its people against a wide range of threats, many of which are non-military in nature.National security policy and priorities thus imply that government will require the DOD/SANDF to participate in and contribute to the combating of a range of non-military threats to security. These may include crime, terrorism and the effects of natural disasters.South Africa’s national security policy and cluster priorities also reflect a strong commitment to regional and continental peace, stability and development. This manifests in government’s commitment to NEPAD, the AU and SADC and their structures and mechanisms.

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Implications (2)Government’s commitment to international peace and security and its manifestations at regional and continental levels consequently imply a long term DOD/SANDF involvement in collective defence and security including participation in security structures, peace missions, standby arrangements and other defence co-operation. These include the PSC, ASF, Continental and Regional Early Warning, and the SADC Brigade.South Africa’s national security policy and priorities thus have clear implications for the role, functions, objectives, missions and capabilities of the SANDF.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ROLE, FUNCTIONS, OBJECTIVES & MISSIONS

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ROLE (1)• Role & Functions

• “The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people…” *

• “The primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression.” **

• “The primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression.” ***

* Constitution, Ch 11, Art 200(2).** White paper on Defence, Ch 2, par 11.9*** White paper on Defence, Ch 5, par 2

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…to defend and protect …implies

Engage in war

Military Diplomacy

Peace MissionsProtect againstEnvironmentNon-state threats

…to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people…

ROLE “primary object”

ROLE (2)

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FUNCTIONS (1)

Influences on

Defence Functions

TerrorismWMD

Weak StatesNon-military Threats

Right to Self-defenceRegional security

Support to the People of South Africa

Collective Security

POSTURENon-

threateningDefence

•Collective Security•Bi/multi-lateral arrangements

•Peace Missions

Offensive Capabilities remain

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FUNCTIONS (2)•Service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity

•Service in compliance with international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and states•Service in the preservation of life, health or property•Service in the provision or maintenance of essential services•Upholding law and order in support of SAPS•Support to departments of state for socio-economic upliftment;

Primary Function**

Defence Functions*

Secondary Functions

* Act 200 of 1993** White paper on Defence, Ch 5, par 3

Change in environment and focus“no need for a conventional capability”

Determines the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF

REVIEWConcept of

Primary and Secondary Functions

andDefence

Objectivesand

Missions

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DEFENCE OBJECTIVES

4. To implement the One-Force Concept

Defence Objectives

3. To ensure good

governance

5. To ensure continuous improvement of defence capabilities

1. To defend and protect the territorial integrity of the Republic and supporting its people

2. To contribute to global security

Military Strategic

Objectives

Missions

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MISSIONS

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

Function 4

Function 5

Function 6

Mission1

Mission2

Mission 3

Mission n

Task

Task

Task

Task

Task

Task

……………

……………

Own ApproachOwn Force Design

Executive Level

Heterogeneous

HomogeneousCollection ofTasks

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MISSION HIERARCHY

RoleMissions

Functions

DefenceObjectives

Mil StratObjectives

ConstitutionWhite Paper

Defence ReviewDefence Strategy

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DEFENCE CONCEPT• Shape

•Co-operation•Common security regime•Regional defence co-operation

• Contain•Mediation & Arbitration•Diplomacy

•Respond•SANDF•As ordered by government, expected by the people

.

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CONCLUSIONS: Ch 4•Mission-based Approach

•Conventional Capability – Constitutional imperative

•Robust suite of capabilities

•Employed within means provided – Selective Engagement

•“Citizen in Uniform” Concept

•Defence Strategy

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Overview of Report 2

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CHAPTER FIVE

Required Defence Capabilities

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PurposePurpose

To provide the Statement of Required Defence Capabilities needed to execute the Missions in the next

decade.*

*DOD Planning Instr 17/04 dd 06 Dec 04

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Force Design

Force Structure

Mission-based Option “Design to Cost” Option

CHAPTER 5REQUIRED DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

PROCESSPROCESS

FORMCJ Ops & Serv/Div

Serv/Div

Serv/DivCDSPCFO

CDSP

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CHAPTER SIX

Required Defence Resources

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Chapter 5 & 6 – Mutual Adjustment

Chapter 1: Strategic Environment

Chapter 2: Collective Security

Chapter 3: SA National Security

Chapter 4: Role, Functions, Objectives & Missions

Chapter 5: Defence Capabilities

Chapter 6: Defence Resources

Chapter 7: Defence Governance

Force Design Standard

Resource Requirement

Expectation/Intent

Affordability / Sustainability

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Chapter 6: Structure

- Introduction/Scope

- Defence Facilities (Land and Buildings)

- Defence Materiel (Category 1 Equipment)

- Defence Materiel (Category 2 Equipment)

- Defence Materiel (Stores/Inventories)

- Defence Services (Professional/Specialist)

- Defence Personnel

- Defence Information

- Defence Funding

- Conclusion

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Defence Governance

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Purpose

To confirm proper civil oversight and control over defence

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Basis for Defence Governance and Accountability

Regulatory Framework

The Constitution and Public Administration Defence Governance Civil Control Other Legislation and Regulations

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ParliamentLegislative Function

CabinetExecutive Structure

ParliamentaryCommittees

FOSADDGs Clusters

Joint StandingCommittee on

Defence

PortfolioCommittee on

DefenceCabinetCommittee

International Relations &

Trade

Governance andAdministration

Social Affairs

Justice, Peace &Crime Prevention

Joint CabinetCommittee

Investment And Employment

Economicaffairs

Social Section

Justice Peace& Crime

Prevention

GovernanceAnd

Administration

InternationalRelations &

Trade

Economicsector

Minister of Defence

COD

National Structures and Mechanisms

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The Cabinet Committee System Parliamentary Committees

Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD)

Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD) Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence Standing Committee on Public Accounts

(SCOPA) and the Auditor General National Treasury Other External Controls

Audit Committee

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Defence Command and Management Bodies

Council on Defence Defence Staff Council Subordinate Command and

Management Structures

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DOD Processes and Controls

Alignment and Synchronisation of Processes Strategic Business Plan Performance Management Internal Audit Management Reporting Requirements