white paper: response redefined – ict and the future of public safety

ICT AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Mobile broadband and distributed computing, coupled with industry-wide

standardization efforts, can transform emergency response.

This paper explains how to use ICT architecture and consulting frameworks to create

truly mission-critical, multiagency platforms that enable effective communications and

information sharing. At the same time, factors such as affordability and ease of

implementation should lead agencies to embrace solutions based on open standards.

ericsson White paper 284 23-3288 Uen | April 2016

Response redefined

RESPONSE REDEFINED • INTRODUCTION 2

IntroductionAging populations, changing social norms, global terrorism, extreme weather, and natural and

man-made disasters are among the diverse situations that today’s public safety organizations

are required to manage.

At the same time, many national governments are looking to reduce budget deficits, while the

public has ever higher expectations with regard to security and safety. As a result, government

scrutiny of spending has increased, as have demands for higher productivity from organizations

that work with public safety.

Technology can and will play a key role in bringing about this improvement in efficiency and

productivity – but technology alone is not enough. Solutions with a diverse range of attributes

are required to satisfy the needs and alleviate the concerns of all stakeholders. These attributes

range from affordability to flexibility. The key to satisfying these different needs, and maximizing

the utility of each solution, is to understand and manage the flow of information.

This paper describes how an Enterprise Architecture-led approach can transform public safety

through the use of ICT. Recent advances in mobile broadband and distributed computing, coupled

with accelerating efforts in industry-wide standardization, make this transformation a more

realistic proposition than ever before.

RESPONSE REDEFINED • WHY INFORMATION FLOWS MATTER 3

Com

mun

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and

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shar

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Ris

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Emer

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Com

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Com

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Figure 1: Key elements of the emergency management legal framework.

Why information flows matterPublic safety organizations are challenged on all sides – to lower costs, improve response times,

reduce crime, improve outcomes for victims, and manage the impact of natural disasters and

extreme weather. Dealing with this range of events requires multiple skills and capabilities, often

from many different organizations, each with its own specialist capability. In addition, the time

that elapses from the moment an alert is raised to the response can be critical to the outcome.

For example, a study carried out by the Scottish Ambulance Service and the University of

Glasgow showed that reducing paramedic response times from 15 minutes to five doubled the

survival rate of heart attack patients [1].

Heart attacks are by no means a special case. In general, the faster the response time of

emergency services, the smaller the chance of damage occurring or life being lost.

However, when serious incidents occur, the response rarely involves only one public safety

organization [2]. In major emergencies, multiple groups and specialists tend to be required.

In many countries there is a legal framework that mandates what constitutes an emergency

and how the response should be managed. The definition of who should respond extends beyond

the traditional blue-light emergency services (the police, ambulance and fire services) and requires

utilities, transport, environment, commerce and trade unions to be involved, albeit on a secondary

basis. The roles and responsibilities of the state, public safety organizations and other responders

are incorporated into these legal frameworks to give responders the necessary emergency powers

to be able to respond effectively without undue bureaucracy [3]. Importantly, these laws explicitly

differentiate such powers from any military action or threats to national sovereignty.

The emergency management legal frameworks, as shown in Figure 1, require first and foremost

cooperation and information sharing between all the responsible agencies. Risk assessments

must also be made to evaluate where populations are most vulnerable, and where investments

and resources should be deployed to minimize the impact of an event. In addition, emergency

plans are made and rehearsed on a

regular basis to ensure responders

remain familiar with the tools and

processes at their disposal.

A critical part of this planning is the

establishment of a chain of command

to take responsibility not only for

communicating with responders, but

also with the public (many countries

already have or are considering

establishing national civil alerting

systems [4]), as well as business and

voluntary organizations. Scenarios can

range from terrorist attacks, severe

weather and industrial accidents, to the

outbreak of an infectious disease.

Fulfilling these obligations requires

organizations to have common

processes and systems, so information and instructions can be shared, and the organizations

can respond appropriately. If these systems break down, or are not in place at all, the consequences

can be tragic.

CASE 1: TASMANIA BUSHFIRES, 2012-2013

Bushfires are an important part of the ecosystem in southern Australia and particularly in Tasmania

[5]. However, high fuel loads, coupled with dry, warm and windy weather, meant the 2012-2013


bushfire season lasted for almost six months – unprecedented in the recorded history of Tasmania.

As the fires spread to populated areas, public mobile communications services and the internet

were compromised, as the fires disabled power and telephone lines. Some radio base station

sites used by the emergency services lost power, and the public lost communication services in

the same way when they were unable to recharge their mobile phones.

During the 2012-2013 bushfire season, more than 20,000 hectares of land were burned,

resulting in a cost of more than AUD 69 million (over USD 52 million).

Incompatibility between the police and fire service radio systems compounded the problem

of organizing an effective response. Following the official inquiry into the fires, 103 recommendations

were made, many of which related to planning and chains of command, specifically:

> that all agencies and the government support the transition to an integrated communications

technology for the police and emergency services.

As a result, significant steps have been taken since 2013 to improve the interworking between

the police and fire service’s radio systems.

CASE 2: HURRICANE SANDY, OCTOBER 2012

Hurricane Sandy was the second-largest Atlantic storm ever recorded. It made landfall on the

east coast of the US on October 29, 2012, and in the aftermath, 8.5 million people were without

power, thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed, and many areas were flooded. A total

of 162 fatalities were recorded in the US as a direct result of the storm.

In the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was well prepared for Hurricane

Sandy, and had been tracking the storm’s progress through weather reports since early October

2012. A large-scale response had been organized, and local and federal organizations mobilized.

Local communities were warned and were able to take steps to evacuate and protect their

property as best as they could. Sandy led to one of the largest deployments of emergency

personnel in history; FEMA also provided housing assistance to 174,000 survivors and over USD

800 million of emergency funding to clear debris and restore infrastructure.

Despite the successful response, the storm also presented FEMA with a challenge in terms

of how to coordinate operations between federal, state and community organizations, as well

as survivors [6].

FEMA issues mission assignments to direct federal partners to complete specified tasks in

response to an emergency. In the case of Sandy, the process proved to be complex and the

communications ambiguous. Support departments reported having received conflicting

messages, and there were delays in processing requests.

During the peak of the recovery process, 12 days after the storm struck, FEMA deployed more

than 7,000 personnel, including full-time staff, reservists and volunteers.

Despite the success of mobilizing so

many response workers, problems were

encountered in trying to deploy these

people effectively to perform the roles

they were trained for and capable of

doing. Keeping track of who was on duty

and the tasks they were assigned proved

difficult. Many had no access to FEMA’s

intranet, and in many areas, public

telecom networks were unavailable owing

to flooding and power outages.

The examples of Tasmania and

Hurricane Sandy illustrate the need for

effective communications and information

sharing across organizations – not only

among the regular emergency services,

but also among support workers and the

general public. Failure on the

communications front can lead to

confusion, wasted effort and lost time,

compromising actions to protect both

people and property.

Industry Highways

Transport

Telecoms UtilitiesPublic safety

Commerce

Figure 2: The diversity of organizations in emergency management.


Each responder needs to know what to do, and where and when to do it. The people in charge

must make quick decisions in a rapidly evolving situation about what information to share, and

with whom to share it. The simple answer may be to share everything, but that can be problematic.

As was seen in the case of Hurricane Sandy, too much information can be hard to assimilate

and can cause confusion. It is not necessary to share certain sensitive information outside the

public safety organization, and some may be confidential: medical records, for example.

Technology should be used to assist, rather than hindering, the process of distributing information.

Many public safety organizations use technology that limits the information they can disseminate

and share rapidly. Many IT systems have evolved from point solutions with incompatible databases,

operating systems and data formats, as was the case in 2013 with the respective radio systems

of the Tasmania Police and Tasmania Fire Service. Furthermore, many legacy systems are unable

to discriminate between “releasable” and confidential material, and lack the fine control required

to manage both sensitive and non-sensitive data. Vital information becomes difficult to extract

under time pressure, which leads to bad decision-making and poor outcomes for the victims [7].

And of course, in severe situations, the underlying infrastructure on which these systems rely

may be disrupted. Power and telephone lines may come down, and flooding can destroy vital

hubs. At worst, an over-reliance on non-mission-critical systems can and has caused a near

total breakdown of the emergency response effort [8], with disastrous consequences for people

and property.

RESPONSE REDEFINED • MAPPING OUT THE TRANSFORMATION JOURNEY 6

Mapping out the transformation journeyWith the advent of mission-critical wireless broadband systems, ultra-reliable distributed

computing systems and accelerating standardization efforts, the next step can now be taken

toward effectively managing emergencies of all sizes. But how should agencies make this

transformation journey happen?

The process of developing a truly effective ICT-based solution starts with the architecture – and

construction of the architecture needs to start with the mission the agency is required to perform.

For every responder agency, the mission must satisfy the following five key objectives:

> deliver successfully

> exceed citizens’ expectations

> use tax money wisely

> share services and information to collaborate effectively

> empower a highly effective workforce.

As shown in Figure 3, every mission rests on a

hierarchy of needs. A top-down approach is

therefore a useful way for an agency to plan its

transformation journey. At the same time, a

bottom-up approach can help the agency

evaluate the usefulness of new technologies

as they become available.

Agencies need to assess how ICT

can transform each stage of this

hierarchy. Starting with the mission,

the agency should determine how

it can be enabled by new

capabilities. The next question

is which systems can interact

to form these capabilities.

Systems in turn consist

of people, processes and

tools working together,

which makes the latter the

most fundamental layer when it comes to the mission’s needs. The unique ability of ICT to process,

distribute and store information makes it one of the key foundation tools on which an effective

emergency response mission can be built.

As an example, consider an organization with the mission of saving lives from fires. One of the

capabilities required is to coordinate the response of all other agencies involved in providing

support in an emergency. This capability is supported by a range of systems. Figure 4 shows, in

a simplified format, how this mapping works in practice.

Each of the systems on the right-hand side of Figure 4 could be implemented as a separate

system and still deliver the capability. However, ICT allows these systems to share resources

and be integrated in a way that increases their effectiveness. It is important to understand that

the integration of systems does not always fundamentally change the capability (although this

can happen); rather it allows the capability to be delivered more efficiently, faster and with fewer

mistakes.

Mission

Capabilities

Systems

People

Processes

Tools

Figure 3: The hierarchy of needs supporting a mission.


For example, the address book and

directory can be shared with all other

systems such as telephony, e-mail and

social media systems. The logging

system can record who sent and

received which message. Taken a step

further, the directory can be integrated

with a resource management system,

so it is easy to see who is on duty. This

can be further enhanced by tagging the

status of a user with their location and

displaying this information on a map. If

the resource management system is

populated with skills and coupled with

machine-readable messages, it is

possible for the system to suggest to

those in command who is the best

person to respond in terms of time and

skills.

This kind of integration can have a

profound impact on the effectiveness

of the agency’s mission. For instance,

an ambulance team can not only

respond quickly, but can do so with the

right skills and equipment to treat the

patient more effectively. This capability

is essential for high-quality emergency

response [9].

Once the capabilities are established,

the flow of information through the

chain of command can be mapped to

gain an understanding of who needs to

be involved, where they are, and the

best way to communicate with them.

This information begins to guide the

solution toward the type of network

needed, whether it requires the users

to be fixed or mobile, and even what

sort of device is appropriate for

communication purposes.

A FICTITIOUS SCENARIO BASED ON THE TASMANIA CASE STUDY

A fire officer coordinating the response to a forest fire may

need to ask a local military commander for helicopter

support to rescue victims cut off by fire. The request could

be issued as an e-mail, and similarly, the response may be

a confirmation e-mail or phone call containing details of the

helicopter flight and radio frequencies, so the pilot may be

contacted. This simple example assumes an implicit level

of trust between all parties. Trust may also be enforced by

the ICT solution, if required.

The interaction can be mapped as shown in Figure 6,

which illustrates how the different systems interact to create

a capability – in this case, coordination of responders. This

diagram can also be redrawn to show the message flow in

time sequence, if necessary. An ICT solution can incorporate

timers and escalations that will trigger alarms if a response

is not received within a certain amount of time.

Save livesfrom fire

Coordinate otherresponders

Telephone

Mission Capabilities Systems

E-mail

Social media

Meeting andbriefings

Address bookand directory

Logging andrecording system

Training system

Other capabilities

Other capabilities

Other missions

Figure 4: Mapping from mission to systems.

Save livesfrom fire

Coordinate otherresponders

Telephone

Add

ress

boo

k an

d di

rect

ory

Logg

ing

and

reco

rdin

g sy

stem

Map

ping

sys

tem

Mission Capabilities Systems

E-mail

Social media

Meeting andbriefings

Training system

Other capabilities

Other capabilities

Other missions

Figure 5: A modified architecture showing shared support systems.

Pilot/Helicopter

Police department Airfield

Flight planRadio

Phone

Radio

Radio Video

E-mail: request

Air traffic control

Figure 6: A simplified information flow for a helicopter support request.


In this example, the airfield and air traffic control contact points are probably fixed and can

use a screen and keyboard. The pilot probably needs to use a hands-free device, while the fire

department may require the flexibility to switch between fixed and mobile resources.

The examples in Figures 4, 5 and 6 show how systems can be mapped and organized through

the use of ICT to enhance capabilities. Once the people and groups that need to be involved are

identified and their preferred means of communicating documented, reasonable assumptions

can be made about the type of network and devices to use. However, the environment that the

solution operates in and the quality required also need to be taken into account.

RESPONSE REDEFINED • ACCELERATING THE TRANSFORMATION JOURNEY 9

Accelerating the transformation journeyOnce the architecture begins to take shape, other aspects of the design can begin to be

considered, so a complete picture of the solution can be formed. These considerations often

concern quality attributes that go beyond the required functionality and yet are critically important

to the overall effectiveness of the solution.

AFFORDABILITY

The first consideration is affordability. As discussed earlier, using taxpayers’ money wisely is a

key concern for public safety organizations. The key functional aspects of the solution will not

be the only factors impacting affordability. Non-functional and other quality aspects are just as

important.

The example in the previous section shows that a sizable catalog of messages and information

flows can emerge when analyzing a mission, and that any effective solution must support that

catalog. Developing a unique solution for each type of message is time-consuming and fraught

with technical risk, as well as costly and difficult to maintain.

Affordability is a key attribute of open standards. Open standards have created a diverse

ecosystem of suppliers and a competitive market for products, solutions and expertise. Open

standards are promoted by various bodies including 3GPP and the Internet Engineering Task

Force.

LTE and 4G technology standards are examples of open standards from 3GPP that are widely

supported and used by the global telecommunications industry. 3GPP is currently extending its

standards to include public safety and other mission-critical applications.

Some open standards are designed specifically for public safety. One example is Emergency

Data Exchange Language (EDXL). This suite of specifications allows organizations to exchange

emergency information in a secure and reliable manner without having to purchase identical

equipment. EDXL is built on XML, which is a generic data standard widely used across the

internet to support machine-to-machine communications.

EASE OF IMPLEMENTATION

Open standards have done much to simplify message processing and reduce risk during

implementation.

For example, if the ICT solution shown in Figure 5 supports open standards, the introduction

of new capabilities becomes much simpler. The mapping system showing where responders are

can also be used to show rising water levels or roads blocked by debris, as the underlying

message format is the same and can be read by a machine.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

As a result of the impact of open standards on affordability and ease of implementation, public

safety agencies should always consider these standards as the first option, unless there is a

need for very high performance or security.

However, agencies also need to consider a range of additional factors in their ICT transformation,

including reliability and resilience, an effective workforce, flexibility, accessibility and ease of

procurement.

RESPONSE REDEFINED • ACCELERATING THE TRANSFORMATION JOURNEY 10

1) Reliability and resilience

The environment in which the systems have to operate must be taken into account. The attributes

of reliability and resilience are important. Harsh weather conditions will often disrupt electricity

supplies and other utilities, and geographic redundancy and fallback sites should be considered,

as should systems that fail gracefully, with decreasing levels of functionality rather than a sudden

blackout.

Natural and man-made disasters should not be the only considerations; systems should also

be resilient to cyber attacks and other malicious activity that can prevent an organization from

fulfilling its mission.

2) An effective workforce

The emergency context means that an effective workforce is required to be available, along with

robust business processes.

Training and test systems should be implemented. They should utilize real data and have real

interfaces. These systems should be isolated from the production system to allow the workforce

to rehearse and practice scenarios. Recording and playback systems allow events to be examined

to establish the lessons learned and identify the process improvements necessary.

3) Flexibility

Many agencies have day-to-day roles as well as emergency functions. This calls for the attributes

of flexibility and other aspects of usability.

Systems need to be flexible and adaptable for use in everyday situations in addition to

emergencies. They may be preconfigured with plans that can be invoked in the event of an

emergency. Putting a system in emergency mode may allow extra staff to be deployed or extra

permissions granted during the emergency, while maintaining its intrinsic operations as well as

its look and feel.

4) Accessibility

As far as possible, solutions should be commercially available and in widespread use.

Maintainability and extensibility should be considered as integral aspects of any architectural

requirements and technology choice. It may also be useful to allow volunteer responders to use

their own smartphones or laptops when required in order to access information that supports

the emergency effort.

5) Ease of procurement

To complete the journey, the architecture must be documented and used as the template to

guide the procurement phases. Choosing open standards and open source software represents

an effective procurement approach that public safety agencies should consider. Partnering with

volunteer organizations, industry and government can also help agencies speed up introduction

of ICT and realization of the benefits it offers.

RESPONSE REDEFINED • CONCLUSION 11

ConclusionEmergencies and natural disasters are inevitable. Cases have shown that effective planning and

emergency response efforts can lessen their impact on life and property. Effective communications

and information sharing are vital, with ICT providing a transformative tool.

It is now possible to create truly mission-critical, multiagency platforms that will enable the

most effective response to emergency events.

The maturity of ICT architecture and consulting frameworks allows the objectives of the agency

to be captured and linked to the underlying system solutions with far greater fidelity. This allows

leaders to see with greater clarity how their requirements are being met by ICT, and how each

part of the solution contributes value to the success of their mission.

Whatever the solution chosen, factors such as affordability and ease of implementation need

to be addressed. In most cases, these considerations should lead public safety agencies to

embrace solutions based on open standards as their primary option.

As leaders across public safety organizations review and update their strategic plans, lessons

will be learned from past emergencies. Processes and policies will be updated. Continuous

advances in mobile broadband, cloud computing, architecture and consulting will play a major

role in this strategic review process, and will enable additional ways of working and thinking

about emergencies and information sharing that were not possible before.

RESPONSE REDEFINED • GLOSSARY 12

EDXL Emergency Data Exchange Language

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

XML Extensible Markup Language

GLOSSARY

RESPONSE REDEFINED • REFERENCES 13

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of reducing ambulance response times on deaths from out of hospital cardiac arrest: cohort study, June 2001,

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[2] National Policing Improvement Agency, Guidance on Multi-Agency Interoperability, June 2009, available

at: http://library.college.police.uk/docs/acpo/Multi-agency-Interoperability-130609.pdf

[3] UK Government, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, accessed March 2016, available at:

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/contents; Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed

March 2016, available at: http://www.fema.gov

[4] Government of the Netherlands, Nationwide launch of emergency alert system NL-Alert, November 2012,

available at:

https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2012/11/08/nationwide-launch-of-emergency-alert-system-nl-alert

[5] Tasmanian Government, 2013 Tasmanian Bushfires Inquiry Report, October 2013, available at:

http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/osem/2013_tasmanian_bushfires_inquiry_report/2013_tasmanian_

bushfires_inquiry_report

[6] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report, July 2013, available

at: https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1923-25045-7442/sandy_fema_aar.pdf

[7] London Assembly, 7 July Review Committee, Volume 4: follow-up report, August 2007, available at:

https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/archives/assembly-reports-7july-

follow-up-report.pdf

[8] United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Emergency Preparedness – Staffing and Communications,

March 2015, available at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/emerg-preparedness.html

[9] Emergency Medicine Journal, B Stoykova, R Dowie, P Bastow, K V Rowsell, R P F Gregory, Ambulance

emergency services for patients with coronary heart disease in Lancashire: achieving standards and improving

performance, 2004, available at: http://emj.bmj.com/content/21/1/99.full.pdf+html

references

© 2016 Ericsson AB – All rights reserved

http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/osem/2013_tasmanian_bushfires_inquiry_report/2013_tasmanian_bushfires_inquiry_report

http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/osem/2013_tasmanian_bushfires_inquiry_report/2013_tasmanian_bushfires_inquiry_report