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WHITHER PAKISTAN?GROWING INSTABILITY

AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

New Delhi

Whither Pakistan? Growing Instability and Implications for India

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© Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system or transmitted in any formor by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of theInstitute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

ISBN: 81-86019-70-7

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are of the Task Force and do not necessarily reflect those of theInstitute and the Government of India.

First Published: June 2010

Price : Rs 299/-

Published by: Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesNo.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010Tel. (91-11) 2671-7983Fax.(91-11) 2615 4191E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.idsa.in

Printed at: A.M. OffsettersA-57, Sector-10, Noida-201 301 (U.P.)Tel.: 91-120-4320403Mob.: 09810888667E-mail : [email protected]

Cover Illustration :Maps on the cover page show the area under Taliban control in Pakistan andtheir likely expansion if the Pakistani state fails to take adequate measuresto stop the Taliban’s advance, which may lead to the fragmentation ofPakistan. Maps drawn are not to scale.

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD..............................................................................................................................5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................................7

PREFACE................................................................................................................................11

CHAPTER IPolitics in Pakistan: A Discordant Quartet................................................................. 15

CHAPTER IIProvinces of Pakistan:Politics, Militancy and Ethnic Nationalism.................................................................28

CHAPTER IIIPakistan’s Foreign Policy:Travails of Uncertainty.....................................................................................................44

CHAPTER IVFrom Islamisation to Talibanisation: Possible Lebanonisation?................................................................................................58

CHAPTER VThe Economy of Pakistan:Structural Weaknesses.....................................................................................................77

CHAPTER VICivil-Military Relations:Army as the Final Arbiter................................................................................................85

CHAPTER VIIPakistan’s Counter-insurgency Campaign:An Assessment ..................................................................................................................97

CHAPTER VIIIPakistan’s Nuclear & MissileProgrammes: On a Short Fuse?......................................................................................107


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CHAPTER IXPakistan’s Relations with India:The Unending Quest for Parity..........................................................................................................125

CHAPTER XPakistan 2020:Possible Scenarios and Options..........................................................................................................135

CHAPTER XIDealing with An Unstable Pakistan:India’s Options.......................................................................................................................................141

APPENDICES

Appendix IProfiles of Some Terror Groups Operating in Pakistan................................................................146

Appendix IIThe Image of Pakistan in Media..........................................................................................................152

Appendix IIIEconomic Indicators of Pakistan .......................................................................................................155

TASKFORCE MEMBERS...............................................................................................................................156

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FOREWORD

Pakistan has invariably evoked a great deal of interest among India’s strategic affairs community.Because of historical, geographical, economic and cultural linkages, developments in the neighbourhoodhave important implications for India’s politics, economy and security. This is especially true in the case ofPakistan. Recent developments in Pakistan have been a cause of concern for all the countries concerned aboutits future. Given the need for better understanding of developments in Pakistan, IDSA launched its PakistanProject in the year 2009. The project team began its work in March 2009 and has been meeting regularly todiscuss various developments in Pakistan. The team has developed through exemplary collaboration its firstreport on Pakistan. The report was reviewed by a panel of experts in January 2010 and finalized with theirinputs and suggestions.

The basic argument that flows from the report is that Pakistan is likely to remain unstable because ofinherent weaknesses in its political, economic and security policies. The absence of any long-term sharedvision of Pakistan, the over-securitization of the state apparatus because of its obsession with India as a threatand an enemy, and the state’s ambivalence towards the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism will keep Pakistanin a state of chronic turmoil. It is necessary therefore to develop a set of policy alternatives to deal with theconsequences of an unstable Pakistan, on a long term basis.

This report brings to fruition the year-long effort put in by the project team under the leadership ofDr Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA. I congratulate the team members on their efforts andam sure that this report will be widely read and appreciated.

N. S. SisodiaDirector General, IDSA

June 2010New Delhi


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AFP Associated Foreign PressANP Awami National PartyBLA Baloch Liberation ArmyBLUF Baloch Liberation United FrontBRA Baloch Republican ArmyBSO Baloch Students OrganisationCAR Central Asian RepublicsCBM Confidence Building MeasuresCD Conference on DisarmamentCGWIC China Great Wall Industry CorporationCHASNUPP Chashma Nuclear Power PlantCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCII Council for Islamic IdeologyCJ Chief JusticeCOIN Counter InsurgencyCTBT Comprehensive Test Ban TreatyCZEC China Zhongyuan Engineering CorporationDCC Development Control CommitteeDG Director GeneralDMG District Management GroupECC Employment Control CommitteeERL Engineering Research LaboratoriesETIM East Turkestan Islamic MovementFATA Federally Administered Tribal AreaFDI Foreign Direct InvestmentFODP Friends of Democratic PakistanFSS Fixed Satellite ServiceFTA Free Trade AgreementG T Road Grand Trunk RoadGDP Gross Domestic ProductGHQ General HeadquartersHGSS Hughes Global Satellite SystemsHM Hizbul Mujahideen

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


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HuA Harkat-ul-AnsarHuJI Harkat-ul Jihad-e-IslamiHuM Harkat-ul-MujahideenIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyIDP Internally Displaced PeopleIJI Islamic Jamhoori IttihadIJT Islami Jamiat-e-TulabaIMF International Monetary FundIRI International Republican InstituteISI Inter-Services IntelligenceISIS Institute for Science and International SecurityISPR Inter Services Public RelationIST Institute of Space TechnologyITU International Telecommunications UnionIWT Indus Water TreatyJAeH Jamaat Ahl-e-HadisJCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff CommitteeJeM Jaish-e-MuhammadJI Jamaat-e-IslamiJSQM Jiye Sindh Qaumi MahazJuA Jamaat-ul-AnsarJuD Jamaat-ud-DawaJuF Jamaat-ul-FurqanJUI Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-IslamJuM Jamiat-ul-MujahideenJUP Jamiat Ulema-e-PakistanKANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power PlantKKH Karakoram HighwayKRL Khan Research LaboratoriesKt KilotonKUI Khuddam-ul-IslamLeJ Lashkar-e-JhangviLeT Lashkar-e-TaibaLHC Lahore High CourtLoC Line of ControlMDI Markaz ud Dawa-wal-IrashadMMA Muttahida Majlis-e-AmalMoU Memorandum of Understanding

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MPA Members of Provincial AssemblyMQM Muttahida Quami Movement (previously Mohajir Qaumi

Movement)MuD Markaz-ud DawaaMWe Megawatt electricMWth Megawatt thermalNAP National Awami Party (Precursor of ANP- Awami National

Party)NCA National Command AuthorityNDC National Development ComplexNLI Northern Light InfantryNPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyNRO National Reconciliation OrdinanceNSAP Nuclear Security Action PlanNSG Nuclear Suppliers GroupNWFP North-West Frontier ProvinceOIC Organisation of Islamic ConferencePAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy CommissionPAL Permissive Action LinksPINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and TechnologyPLA People's Liberation ArmyPML Pakistan Muslim LeaguePML-N Pakistan Muslim League - NawazPML-Q Pakistan Muslim League - QuaidPNA Pakistan National AlliancePNRA Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory AuthorityPPP Pakistan Peoples PartyPVPV Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of VicePWR Pressurized Water ReactorRSSS Remote Sensing Satellite SystemSAARC South Asian Association for Regional CooperationSAFTA South Asian Free Trade AreaSASSI South Asia Strategic Stability InstituteSC Supreme CourtSGCS Satellite Ground Control StationsSLV Satellite Launch VehicleSNERDI Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design InstituteSNPTC State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation

List of Abbreviations


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SPD Strategic Plans DivisionSSP Sipah-e-Sahaba PakistanSUPARCO Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research CommissionTeJ Tehriq-e-JafariaTeKI Tehriq-e-Khuddam-ul-IslamTIP Tehrik-e-Islami PakistanTJ Tabligh JamaatTNFJ Tehrik-e- Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-JafariyaTNSM Tehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-MohammadiTTP Tehreek-e-Taliban PakistanUS United States (of America)WAMY World Assembly of Muslim YouthWAPDA Water and Power Development Authority

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PREFACE

Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, writing inBBC News Online on January 3, 2010 observed thatpeople in the south Asian region “will be holdingtheir breath in the new year” as the new year wouldpresent “Afghanistan and Pakistan with their mostdifficult set of challenges since the end of the ColdWar”. He went on to paint a bleak picture ofPakistan and said that it was facing “a triple crisis”of “acute political instability”, “an ever worseningeconomic crisis” and the army’s questionable“success rate in dealing with its own indigenousTaliban problem”.

Earlier, writing in New York Review of Bookson June 11, 2009, Rashid had said that “Pakistan isclose to the brink” and that it was heading towards“a permanent state of anarchy”. One could expect,he warned, “a slow, insidious, long-burning fuseof fear, terror, and paralysis that the Taliban have litand that the state is unable, and partly unwilling,to douse”. Writing in the Friday Times, its editor,Najam Sethi said that, “Pakistan is in a state of siege.But the veritable enemy is not India or Russia orIran or America. The enemy is within Pakistan”.

The media comments in Pakistan on thecountry’s future are full of despondency anddespair. The army which till the other day was beingdescribed as the villain is being perceived again asthe saviour of Pakistan. The civilian government isin power, but the Army controls Pakistan’s securityand foreign policy. As the endgame in Afghanistanunfolds, the Army is becoming even more assertiveand hoping to use its influence on Taliban to its

advantage. Nevertheless, some of the radicalelements are upbeat about the prospect ofwithdrawal of US troops and are launching regularattacks on security forces of Pakistan thuscomplicating the security situation even further.The economic situation is in a state of disrepair.What is happening inside Pakistan? Is it reallyheading towards collapse? What are theimplications of these developments in Pakistan forregional security and for Indo-Pak relations?This report of the IDSA Pakistan Project looks atthe current developments in Pakistan and tries todo some crystal gazing into the near and mediumterm future of the country.

The political, security and economic situationin Pakistan has changed dramatically over the pastdecade. In 2007 Musharraf appeared strong andunassailable until he made the cardinal mistake ofsacking Chief Justice Iftikhar MuhammadChaudhry to protect his actions from judicialscrutiny. With hindsight one can say, it was thatwhich marked the beginning of the end ofMusharraf. The lawyers were galvanized intoaction. Suddenly everyone started talking aboutthe empowerment of civil society in Pakistan.Musharraf panicked. He imposed emergency andmartial law for the second time in his tenure inNovember 2007.

Under a deal which led to the NationalReconciliation Ordinance (NRO), Benazir Bhuttoreturned to Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif returnedfollowing yet another deal. Benazir was


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assassinated subsequently during the course of theelection campaign— allegedly by TTP militants.This highlighted the seriousness of the militantthreat to the state. Elections were postponed andheld later in February 2008. The PPP and thePML-N, the two implacable foes, fought theelections on a common issue to restore the judges.

It all seemed to be going well for Pakistan untilfriction developed between the PML-N and the PPPover Zardari’s vacillation on the issue ofrehabilitation of the judges. Nawaz Sharif launcheda country-wide agitation in March 2009 over thisissue. The US was alarmed. Eventually, the tworivals made up, possibly under pressure from themilitary and the US. The sacked Chief JusticeIftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was reinstated.Under his leadership, the Supreme Court declaredNRO illegal and reversed the Presidential order toappoint judges to the apex court. The judicialactivism that Pakistan has witnessed since JusticeChaudhry’s restoration has also posed a criticalchallenge to the PPP-led coalition government.

Pakistan has continued to be unstable despitethe return of electoral politics. The internal securitysituation has continued to worsen despite thegovernment’s wholehearted commitment to fightterrorism. The civilian government, like the militarygovernment before it, struck deals with the Talibanin Swat in April 2009. This emboldened the TTP toextend its reach to the capital, Islamabad. A seriesof high profile terror attacks in Lahore, Peshawarand other places underscored the gravity of threatposed by the militants to the state. In fact, the year2009 was the most violent year in Pakistan’s recenthistory. The Pakistani Taliban nurtured by Pakistaniagencies, turned against them. More than a 100,000Pakistan army troops are now engaged in fightingthe Taliban in the tribal borderlands.

Yet, in 2009, the newly elected US PresidentBarak Obama launched his AfPak policy which

made it conditional for Pakistan to take strongaction against the militants in return for enhancedmilitary and economic aid. Under US pressure andfaced with growing Talibanisation, the Pakistanmilitary launched massive military operationsagainst the Pakistan Taliban in Swat, Buner and Dirin the Malakand Division of NWFP in May-June2009, and subsequently in North and SouthWaziristan in the FATA region. This created a humancrisis of large proportions, namely the displacementof two to three million people from the areas wheremilitary operations were undertaken. A massiveongoing rehabilitation effort will be required toaddress this humanitarian issue. The Pakistani armylaunched a military offensive in South Waziristan(October 2009) to flush out the Pakistani Talibanand claimed some success. Despite the reportedkilling of top Taliban leaders like Baitullah Mehsudand Hakeemullah, various reports from Pakistansuggest that the Taliban have not been destroyed inthe military operations, but are lying low in thehills and could resurface later. The Pakistan armyis likely to remain committed in the FATA regionfor an indefinite period and the country faces theprospect of long term insurgency in the region.

In December 2009, President Obama spelt outhis revised AfPak policy, wherein he indicated thatUS troops would start withdrawing fromAfghanistan from July 2010. This has brought adifferent political dynamic into play in Afghanistan.India was deliberately kept out of the conferenceson Afghanistan held in Istanbul and London(January 2010) to ensure greater Pakistaniinvolvement in the process of US withdrawal fromAfghanistan. There was a clear-cut approach inthese meetings to engage with the Taliban throughan official policy initiated by the Afghangovernment. According to this plan the Afghangovernment will set up the National Council forPeace, Reconciliation, and Reintegration and starttalking to the Taliban. The Afghan President has

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Preface

asked the UN Sanctions Committee to remove thenames of some Taliban leaders from theconsolidated list, urged the Saudi king to play aprominent role in the reconciliation process andsought support from Pakistani authorities in thiseffort. To soothe Pakistani nerves, he even calledPakistan a ‘conjoined twin’, during his visit toIslamabad in March 2010.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has stepped up itscounter-insurgency operations and nabbed sometop leaders of the Taliban inside its territory. Itsoperations in Bajaur and Waziristan have alsoshown some signs of success. Some analysts haveinterpreted Pakistan’s operations against theTaliban as pressure tactics to bring the Talibanleadership to the table for dialogue. However,this is a partial demonstration of its commitmentto root out radicalism from Pakistan. Pakistanhas not done anything to address Indian concerns.Anti-India jihadi elements continue to remainbeyond the purview of the security operationsin Pakistan and are openly allowed to makeprovocative speeches against India. Thus, thereis no significant change in Pakistan’s overallapproach to radical Islamist forces in the longterm. Ironically, for the moment the radicalelements do not seem to be in a mood to obligethe Pakistani establishment at the moment andare continuing their raids on security forces withimpunity. Pakistan’s ambivalence over the issueof jihadi terrorism has aggravated the securitysituation and made it worse.

The security crises have come at a time whenPakistan’s economy is not in good shape. It issurviving on foreign aid and IMF loans.The country’s leadership is once again seeking awaiver of foreign debts. High energy prices andacute power shortages are affecting the country’smanufacturing sectors. The disturbed securitysituation comes in the way of foreign investment.The foreign donors, the Friends of Democratic

Pakistan (FoDP), have been less than forthcomingin coming to its aid in this hour of need.

India-Pakistan relations have been on a rollercoaster ride since the Mumbai terror attacks on 26November 2008. The composite dialogue wassuspended and India demanded decisive actionagainst the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack basedin Pakistan. Instead of taking action against the LeTand its chief Hafiz Saeed, the Pakistani governmentfailed to build a strong case against him and othersin the courts. In a surprise development Indiaagreed to delink the action on terror by Pakistanfrom the composite dialogue and even included areference to Balochistan in the India-Pakistan jointstatement issued at Sharm-el-Shaikh on July 14,2009. Later, the foreign secretaries of the twocountries held talks in New Delhi on February 25,2010. India made it amply clear that these talksshould not be interpreted as the resumption of‘composite dialogue’ but reiterated its position thattalks must focus on the issue of terrorism alone.Given Pakistan’s recalcitrance over the issue ofbringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack tojustice, the fate of the composite dialogue remainsuncertain.

Pakistan is descending into a state of uncertaintyand prolonged chaos. Indian policy makers willhave to figure out how to deal with a country whichis becoming increasingly unstable. An unstablePakistan will have far reaching and adverseconsequences for regional security. It is doubtfulwhether external involvement, benign orotherwise, will reduce instability in the region.Pakistani leaders and society have to revisit theirpolicies and take strategic decisions which promotestability and cooperation rather than confrontation.One cannot say for sure that Pakistan willdisintegrate soon, but the portents suggest that itmay turn into a “Lebanonised” kind of state withvast areas where the writ of the government maynot run. The present report examines the


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developments in Pakistan at some length with aview to understanding their implications forregional security and for India-Pakistan relations.

Chapter I deals with the political developmentsin the country; Chapter II focuses on thedevelopments in the various provinces of Pakistan;Chapter III examines the foreign policy of Pakistan;Chapter IV deals with the Talibanisation andradicalisation of Pakistan society; Chapter V takesstock of the economic situation prevailing withinPakistan; Chapter VI provides an analysis of thecivil military relations in Pakistan in the changedcontext; Chapter VII gives an account of the counter-insurgency measures taken by the Pakistan military;Chapter VIII traces the evolution and development

of Pakistan’s nuclear Weapons and missileprogrammes; Chapter IX deals with India-Pakistanrelations; Chapter X offers a futuristic account ofPakistan 2020; and the final Chapter XI providesoptions for India to deal with Pakistan.

The report has been prepared by a group ofexperts which includes Arvind Gupta, SushantSarin, Ashok Behuria, Sumita Kumar, Alok Bansal,Smruti Pattanaik, P.K. Upadhayay, C.V. Sastry andHarinder Singh. The group was assisted by MedhaBisht, Kartik Bommakanti, Shamshad Khan andImtiyaz Majid.

It is hoped that the report will be found usefulby the policy makers and the wider audience.

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CHAPTER I

POLITICS IN PAKISTAN:A DISCORDANT QUARTET?

From a single-window clearance (an allpowerful president who was also the army chief)to a messy quartet— that is the state of Pakistanipolitics today.

The quartet comprises of the following: anunpopular but Machiavellian president whocontrols the ruling party and until 2010 hadimmense constitutional powers*; an increasinglyassertive prime minister; an army chief who holdsthe veto on issues concerning national security andforeign policy and acts as the arbiter of politicaldifferences from behind the scenes; and a hyper-activist judiciary, led by a chief justice (CJ) whoenjoys substantial popular support and is perceivedby the common man to be the panacea for all the illsof Pakistan because he is known for taking suo motonotice of anything that he considers important, i.e.,from oil prices and forced disappearances toconstitutional matters having grave politicalramifications.

In a sense, the latest democratic interregnum inPakistan that started after the general elections inFebruary 2008 is even more complicated than theearlier one in 1988-1999. At that time, it was only atroika in which the prime minister and the presidentsought the support of the army chief to fix eachother. The opposition was ready to destabilise thegovernment and the judiciary was pliable, obedient

and subservient to the powers that be. Now, thingshave changed. Today the troika has been replacedby a quartet with the emergence of the judiciary asan important player in Pakistani politics. However,this quartet is unstable because the relative strengthsof various constituents of this quartet keep shifting.The judiciary is quite a potent a factor in Pakistanipolitics because the opposition is looking at thisinstitution as an effective instrument to be usedagainst the government in its quest to return topower. It is no longer interested in attaining powerby holding on to the coat-tails of the military. At thesame time, since it expects to come back to powersoon, it is in a dilemma as to whether it shouldencourage judicial interference in executive andpolitical matters.

Another critical factor is the civil-war likesituation on the western border of Pakistan. Themilitary operation against the Islamist radicals andthe Baloch separatists is likely to keep the army toooccupied to play an active role in the politics of thecountry. The deep involvement of the US in militaryand political decision-making in Pakistan furthercomplicates an already complex situation. Giventhat Pakistan cannot survive without massive USeconomic and military assistance, the Americansare exercising enormous influence on the politicsof Pakistan.

* As this report was going to the press, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed the 18th Amendment Bill unanimouslyon 8 April 2010. The Bill was subsequently passed in the Senate on April 15, 2010. The Bill clipped the powers of thePresident. However, President Zardari is still likely to retain his hold over the government as the head of the ruling party.


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Elections and the Numbers Game

The general elections in February 2008, and thepolitical deals that preceded these elections, weresupposed to avoid precisely such a messy politicalscene. It was felt at that time that General PervezMusharraf desperately needed credible politicalsupport to be able to deliver on the War on Terror.The king’s party – Pakistan Muslim League-Qaid(PML-Q)– was not able to develop the kind ofpolitical consensus that was needed to marshalpublic support against the Islamists. The Americanswere convinced that only a government led by aliberal political force like the Pakistan PeoplesParty (PPP), working in conjunction withMusharraf and the army could provide the politicalenvironment to isolate the Islamists. The idea wasto provide a level playing field to all politicalparties and ensure a largely free and fair election,the result of which would be acceptable to all the

stakeholders.

Of course, to keep a check on the PPP, it was

necessary to ensure that no party should secure a

majority and a coalition government would cometo power, in which the king’s party would hold theupper hand in the national assembly. This was tobe achieved with the help of the localadministration packed with loyalists, which wouldintimidate voters and harass the candidates by thebrazen misuse of state resources to favour the rulingparty. Accordingly, pre-poll sops were providedto the electorate; the media and the judiciary wereused against opposition candidates and electorallists were changed to incorporate pro-governmentelectorates. But the assassination of Benazir Bhutto,the outrage caused by the imposition of the secondmartial law by Musharraf, the sharply deterioratingeconomic situation, the return of Nawaz Sharif fromexile, and the resentment fuelled by the War onTerror completely changed the political equationsin Pakistan.

Even so, the composition of the new NationalAssembly and the four provincial assemblies afterthe elections was exactly as Musharraf would havelike it to be. The National Assembly, and three outof four provincial assemblies (Sindh being the onlyexception), were so hopelessly hung that it did notseem possible for the PPP, which emerged as thesingle largest party in the national assembly, to forma government without the support of Musharraf’sminions. It was assumed that since the mainpolitical rival of the PPP was the PML-Nawaz, theformer would be left with no choice but to forge analliance with the political allies of GeneralMusharraf. Indeed, the political grapevine heldeven before the elections that Musharraf wanted aPPP-led coalition that would include the PML-Q,Muttahida Quami Mahaz (MQM) and JamiatUlema-e-Islam (JUI) and/or Awami National Party(ANP).

Results: A Short Analysis

The results of the 2008 elections were more orless along expected lines (See detailed results in Table1.1 & 1.2). The polls were relatively fair because thepolitical circumstances of the time militated againstany move by the government that would rob thepolls of their legitimacy. The polls also threw up afew political surprises. The performance of the PML-N was quite astounding despite the disarray in theparty just before the elections. It was difficult for it toeven field candidates on many seats, and yet itemerged as the second largest party in the NationalAssembly (90 seats out of 342). PML-N gainedmassively in central Punjab, and made its presencefelt in north and south Punjab. It also won a few seatsin the Hazara belt of NWFP, even though it had norepresentation in Sindh and Balochistan. PML-Nstood up to its reputation as the ‘GT Road party’, theparty that dominates the Raiwind-Rawalpindi beltalong the Grand Trunk road. It is important to notehere that the centre of gravity of Pakistani politicslies there as well.

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Politics in Pakistan: A Discordant Quartet?


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The PPP did quite well in south Punjab butoverall, its performance in Punjab was not tooimpressive, despite the sympathy wave occasionedby Benazir’s assassination. The PML-Q won in theconstituencies where it had put up very strongcandidates. The results showed that if the PML-Nand the PML-Q had combined to contest theelection, perhaps, there would have been a repeatof the 1997 when the PPP could not win a singleseat in Punjab. Also, the shift towards conservativepolitics in Punjab was too obvious to miss and thismight have played a role in the decline of the PPP’sinfluence, because it is seen as a liberal and secularparty. The results in Sindh were entirely alongexpected lines with the MQM dominatingconstituencies in urban Sindh – Karachi,Hyderabad, Mirpurkhas and Sukkur – and the PPPsweeping rural Sindh. An interesting developmentwas the victory of the ANP on two seats in the Sindhprovincial assembly. With Karachi emerging as thelargest Pashtun city in the world, this could wellbe the start of a bitter political rivalry between theMohajirs who support the MQM and the Pashtunswho back the ANP.

Balochistan threw up the usual hotchpotchresult. With the Baloch nationalists boycotting theelections, the tribal sardars won either on accountof their influence or with some help from themilitary-bureaucratic establishment. The split inthe JUI between the moderate and the pro-Talibanhard-liners, the division within the MuttahidaMajlis-e-Amal (MMA) and the boycott by theJamaat-i-Islami had a telling impact on theperformance of the religious forces in the province.

Reverses for the Religious Parties inNWFP

The results in the NWFP were quite interesting.The defeat of the divided MMA at the hands of theleft-leaning ANP and the PPP was widely toutedas evidence of Pashtuns of Pakistan rejecting

fundamentalism and extremism. However, thisvictory of moderate parties in NWFP was not somuch a defeat of the radical Islamists as it waspopular rejection of political forces who werealigned with Musharraf— either openly likePML-Q and the PPP-Sherpao or surreptitiously likethe JUI. The anti-incumbency factor also played acritical role and it was more a vote against the MMAthan support for liberal and secular parties.Moreover, the ANP and the PPP adopted anambiguous stand on the militancy in the province.While they condemned violence by radicalelements, they were equally critical of Musharraf’spolicy of deploying army in the tribal areas. ThePashtun nationalists played it safe by saying thatthe conflict was a conspiracy against the Pashtunswho were peace-loving and the suicide attackswere orchestrated by the army to give legitimacyto their plans to enslave them. Both the ANP andthe PPP offered to open a dialogue with theIslamists to bring peace to the state.

There are other important points that need to benoted about the elections in NWFP: the voterturnout was under 20 per cent in a large number ofconstituencies in the province, particularly in theMalakand division where the ANP and the PPPswept the elections; their victory was not as big asthe MMA victory in 2002; and finally, if the MMAhad not split, the mullahs might have got moreseats than they ultimately managed to get. Despiteinternal divisions, the massive shift of publicsupport away from them and the boycott ofthe elections by their core supporters, they stillmanaged to come second in nearly 35 provincialassembly constituencies.

Rise and Fall of Zardari

It goes to the credit of Asif Ali Zardari that heconverted a hung assembly into a two-thirdsmajority by doing the unthinkable and forging analliance with the PPP’s main political rival,



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the PML-N. He also roped in the ANP, the JUI andlater, the MQM, into the ruling coalition. By forgingsuch a broad-based alliance and forming almost anational government – Zardari destroyed whateverhopes Musharraf might have harboured of packingthe next government with his political underlingsand establishing his control over the PPPgovernment. Even in the provinces, unlike any ofhis predecessors, Zardari allowed parties other thanhis own to head the governments. The ANP formedthe government in NWFP and the PML-N inPunjab in coalition with the PPP. In Sindh, wherethe PPP enjoyed a simple majority on its own, heroped the MQM into the government in a spirit ofpolitical reconciliation. Balochistan was perhapsthe only exception where the entire PML-Q washijacked and a PPP man installed as chief minister.

While Nawaz Sharif was not exactlycomfortable with this arrangement, he was left withno other choice because this coalition seemed tohave captured the national imagination. Sharif alsodid not want to push Zardari into the arms ofMusharraf. Of course, the PPP - PML-N alliancewas not expected to last very long. Once Musharrafwas forced to leave in August 2008, it was going tobe just a matter of time before the alliance collapsed.Even before this, Nawaz Sharif’s party had walkedout of the government, within a few weeks ofjoining the cabinet, on the issue of the restoration ofthe dismissed chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.However, he continued to support the governmentfrom the outside while pressurising Zardari toremove Musharraf. Once this was achieved, Nawazpulled out of the alliance and decided to sit inopposition. And yet, the coalition continued inPunjab and the PPP remained part of the cabinet,albeit with lot of resentment against the PML-N.By this time, Zardari had consolidated his hold atthe centre to a point where he could easily survivewith allies like the ANP, the MQM and the JUI inthe national assembly.

That Zardari is a shrewd political operator isquite well-known. The manner in which heoutmanoeuvred Musharraf and replaced him aspresident, stitched together an unlikely coalition,reached out to old and bitter political rivals,consolidated his control over the PPP, tried toassuage the alienated Baloch nationalists, took atough and unambiguous stand against the Talibanand other radical Islamist groups and made the rightnoises on relations with India and the US, shouldhave all worked in his favour.

However, Zardari’s past continues to haunt him.He remains a pet object of hate among the powerfulchattering classes in Punjab, Pakistan’s politicalpowerhouse. They have launched a sustainedcampaign against his personal character and hisalleged proclivity to use public funds for his ownbenefits. Even the Baloch nationalists do not trustZardari. Despite attempts by him to give a healingtouch to Balochistan, there are not many takers forhis offers in that restive province. They argue thathis government is incapable of changing the militaryestablishment’s policy of repression and that hecannot be trusted with anything.

Zardari’s vacillation over the restoration of thechief justice cost him dearly in terms of populargoodwill. Of course, he tried to defuse the crisis byrestoring many of the deposed judges through theback door by making them take a new oath.He even invited Iftikhar Chaudhry to take a freshoath and rejoin the bench as an ordinary judgebecause there could not be two chief justices.This was seen by the lawyers as adding insult toinjury and only firmed up their resolve to continuewith their agitation.

Mishandling of the Judges Issue andLoss of Face

Zardari’s hubris coupled with the self-servingadvice given to him by his legal advisors like FarookNaek, Babar Awan and Latif Khosa, ensured a very

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expensive political miscalculation on the issue ofrestoration of the judiciary, and in particular ChiefJustice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Ideally, he should haverestored the judges within days of his partyassuming power, thus taking advantage of thenational mood and it would have tilted the balancefirmly in his favour and put the army on thedefensive. His indecisiveness on the restoration ofthe judges issue shifted the ire of the public andcivil society from Musharraf to Zardari in a matterof days. The deteriorating economic, political andsecurity situation only increased the alienation andanger of the people with the PPP. And Nawazreaped the benefit of it all.

After the lawyers’ first long march fizzled outin June 2008, Zardari was confident that he couldget away without restoring Iftikhar Chaudhry asthe chief justice. That is why, by the time, the secondlong march was announced for March 16, 2009,Zardari had in his complacency committed somemajor tactical errors. These included the move touse the February 2009 Supreme Court judgementdisqualifying Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif fromholding office to dismiss the PML-N ledgovernment in Punjab which confirmed thepopular suspicion that the PPP had contrived apolitically motivated judgement against the Sharifs.

This step, in a way, forced Nawaz Sharif to goon the war path with the government and throwhis political weight behind the second march. Butfor this, it would have petered out like the firstlong march. The failure of the PPP to install its owngovernment in Punjab was another devastatingblow. The civil bureaucracy, including the police,failed to control the mounting agitation. Even thearmy and America put pressure on Zardari toaccept the demand and restore Chaudhry as thechief justice. Ultimately, his government had to eatthe humble pie and announce on March 16, 2009,that all the judges would be restored. Chaudhry

was finally restored as CJ after the retirement of theincumbent chief justice on March 21, 2009. Be thatas it may, there can be no two opinions that Zardari’spolitical standing was greatly damaged by thisepisode. In these changed circumstances, he had tocontend with an enormously powerful politicalopponent like Nawaz Sharif who seemed to havecaptured the pulse and imagination of at least thepeople of Punjab.

As if this was not enough, Zardari made anotherattempt in February 2010 to establish the primacyof the executive in matters concerning appointmentof judges to the Supreme Court (SC). He overrodeIftikhar Chaudhry’s recommendations and elevatedJustice Khwaja Sharif, CJ of Lahore High Court(LHC) as SC judge and Justice Saqib Nisar as ActingCJ of the LHC through a notification. The SupremeCourt CJ took suo moto notice of the notificationand immediately formed a three-member bench forhearing the case, which held that it was in violationof Article 177 of the Constitution and overturnedthe presidential order. Prime Minister Gilani metthe CJ and averted the crisis. Finally the notificationwas withdrawn and all the recommendations ofthe CJ were implemented.

The NRO Issue

The SC headed by Iftikhar Chaudhry has notmissed any opportunity to create problems for theZardari government. In its verdict on July 31, 2009,the Supreme Court declared the provisionalconstitutional order (PCO) and other such orders(proclaiming emergency, promulgating ordinancesetc.) issued by Musharraf in November 2007 as“unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio”. Thus,the NRO promulgated under these orders lostits legitimacy and the court asked the NationalAssembly to “reconsider and, if thought fit, to enact,all the 37 Ordinances including the NRO, as Actsof Parliament” within 120 days. In a way,it offered an opportunity to the national and



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provincial parliaments “to legitimize the acts, actions,proceedings and orders, initiated, taken or done,under those Ordinances…....with retrospective effect”.However, the talks between the PPP andthe PML-N did not make much headway. TheStanding Committee of the National Assembly onLaw & Justice, in its meeting held on October 29-30,debated this issue and on November 2, 2009, theCommittee recommended that, the proposedamendments in the Bill for enacting the NRO mightbe passed by the Assembly later. However, the Billwas withdrawn and automatically the NRO lapsedin November 2009. The Supreme Court started hearingthe joint petition against the NRO by Mobashir Hassan,Roedad Khan, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Shahbaz Sharifand others against the NRO in early December 2009,and in its ruling on December 16, 2009, held that allcases suspended under the amnesty would nowrevert back to their status as of October 5, 2007 andwould be automatically reopened.1

The PPP-led government announced the deathof the NRO even before the Supreme Court verdict.Both Gilani and Zardari came out with statementsthat they were ready to work with the PML-N onall issues. It also needs to be mentioned that asPresident, Zardari enjoys immunity from beingprosecuted. Since the PPP is in power, it is wellwithin the competence of the government towithdraw any case against anyone. The fact thatZardari has already spent eleven years in jailwithout a single case being proved against himgives the government enough reason to withdrawthese cases.

However, in view of the declining popularityof Zardari the NRO verdict has undoubtedly dentedthe reputation of his party and government. He is

portrayed in the Pakistani media as anunscrupulous and corrupt politician and rumoursof conspiracies to dislodge him from powerabound.

Future Bleak for Zardari,18th Amendment Passed

Constitutionally, Zardari may be on a firmground. However, there is a widespread belief inPakistan today that moves are afoot to eitherremove him from office or reduce him to a harmlessfigurehead. In the current quartet, the army isunlikely to move openly against the president.What is more likely is a clash either between thepresident and prime minister or else between thepresident and chief justice.

It was even widely speculated in Pakistan thatthe instability which followed the NRO issuemight offer Gilani the opportunity to move againstZardari either by not backing him in the event ofany eventuality, or else by raising the banner ofrevolt with the support of a section of the party, theopposition and/or the army and the Americans.For some time, Gilani has been asserting himself onvarious issues, i.e., reshuffling the bureaucracy,dismissing the NSA, not signing the summary forposting a DMG officer as ambassador to France,resenting presidential interference in governmentaffairs, wanting to reshuffle his cabinet, smarting atthe attitude of ministers who do not care much forhim because they ostensibly enjoy the confidenceof the president etc. And the fact that he extractedan almost impossible concession from India on theBalochistan issue in Sharm-el-Sheikh in July 2009enhanced his popularity and boosted hisconfidence giving rise to a possibility that the army

1 For details see the Full Text of the Supreme Court Order cited in Dawn, December 17, 2009. The original textavailable at: http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Short%20order.pdf

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and the opposition headed by Nawaz might teamup with Gilani, to unseat Zardari and bring about achange in government.

However, the stories of discord between Gilaniand Zardari were laid to rest with Gilani comingout openly in support of Zardari in December 2009over the NRO issue.2 After the SC ruling againstZardari’s notification on judges’ appointment inFebruary 2010, Gilani asked everybody in Pakistanto give democracy a chance rather than setting adeadline on his government.3 In certain quartersthere is a view that the army is more comfortablewith Gilani who, unlike Zardari, may not kowtowto the Americans on every issue. But Gilani has hislimitations. Despite a massive image buildingexercise in the media, Gilani is not exactly a massleader. He does not have any independent power-base of his own and once he deserts Zardari, thereare chances that he will only end up in thestranglehold of Nawaz Sharif or the army only tobe used and then disposed of unceremoniously. Inthis context, Gilani’s statements in the media citedabove reveal that he is clearly disassociating himselffrom any plan to remove Zardari from power byforce. In fact, he has already issued unambiguousstatements to the press that “instead of being usedby the establishment or other forces, whodesperately want him to play the role of FarooqLeghari in the current situation, he would simplyquit like an honourable prime minister”, in caseZardari is “made to leave the Presidency at the gun

point or through the courts”.4 Despite Gilani’s openstatements of loyalty towards Zardari and the PPP,he has to deal with many imponderables in thecoming days.

In the meanwhile, the 18th amendment has beenpassed in Parliament undoing the changes broughtabout by Musharraf during his dictatorial rule.Zardari’s office is now shorn of all the powers andmost probably, he may now like to head thegovernment as prime minister. In that case, thedifferences between Gilani and Zardari will verylikely come to the fore. The PPP government couldbe destabilised if the opposition and the armychoose to manipulate these differences. There havebeen newspaper reports about a ‘minus one’formula being advanced by forces opposed toZardari to get rid of him heralding difficult daysfor Zardari in future.

Army Retains its Influence

Apart from the prime minister and thejudiciary, Zardari also cannot ignore the armywhich continues to retain its influence and hasrefused to take direction from his government.All moves to gain some degree of control over thearmy have been spurned so far. The army reactedvehemently against the Kerry-Lugar bill whichasked the civilian government to ensure its controlover the army, in return for the financial dolesfrom Washington, which Pakistan wantsdesperately. The fact that the army’s resistance

2 Commenting on the SC’s decision to strike down NRO, Gilani stated: “It will be tantamount to double jeopardyto ask him to resign on the grounds of cases for which he has already undergone 12 years’ imprisonment”.Reported Dawn, December 19, 2009. He also reportedly said, “These are not new cases. He (Zardari) remainedin jail for 12 years and Rs 4 billion to Rs 5 billion were spent in pursuing cases against him (though the charges werenever proved)”. Daily Times, December 19, 2009.

3 “It is necessary for all of us to defend democracy and not set a deadline for its fall. The country cannot affordto live with weak democracy. It is a panacea for the country’s problems. Even the worst democracy is betterthan the best of dictatorship,” Daily Times quoted Gilani, as saying on February 22, 2010.

4 Rauf Klasra, “Gilani to side with Zardari through thick and thin, Vows not to become another Farooq Leghari”,The News, January 2, 2010. (Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=216481)



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found a popular echo in Pakistan demonstrates theability of the military establishment to influencepublic opinion effectively on the issue of nationalsecurity. After the departure of Musharraf, popularconfidence in the army has been restored beyonddoubt. Moreover, the military operations againstthe Taliban have only added to the army’sreputation and made it indispensable for the US,which wants its continued help in fighting the warin Afghanistan. The arrest and killing of top Talibanleaders in early 20105 have improved the image ofthe army and made it even more popular.

However, the people may not like the army totakeover. The army may not also be interested tostep in at this hour, when the internal securitysituation looks so dismal and the economy is indoldrums. It is engaged in a suicidal battle on thetribal borderlands and is probably not inclined totake the risk of running an increasinglyungovernable country. Therefore, unless there is acataclysmic development, the army is unlikely tostage a coup. As reports from Pakistan indicate, itis likely to take every measure possible to increaseits influence by aligning with Nawaz and the CJ tocheckmate any effort by the Zardari government tosubject it to civilian control. The army chief wasseen to be playing a dominant role in laying downthe agenda for the Pak-US strategic dialogue duringMarch 23-25, 2010. Federal secretaries weresummoned to the GHQ prior to the dialogue tobrief the army chief on issues of national concern,and the fact that General Kayani accompanied thePakistani delegation as, what the US media called,

its star member, indicate that the military will notallow its influence over the security and foreignpolicies of Pakistan to wane.

Civil Society and Media

The lawyers’ movement and the role played bythe media and civil society organisations inbuilding up public opinion against the régime hascreated an impression that these two are importantfactors in Pakistani politics. However, theirinfluence is over-estimated.

Civil society is a weak link in Pakistan politics.There are so many forces working at cross-purposeswithin it that their net effect adds up to nothing.There are critics who would argue that civil societyin Pakistan is neither civil nor representative ofsociety. It can also by no means be assumed that thecivil society represents only the liberal, moderateand progressive sections of the population, becausea number of Al-Qaida and Taliban sympathisersand right-wing Islamist religious parties also formpart of it and wield a lot of influence in the mediaand society. They have their own network of NGOsfor promoting ‘human rights’ and undertakingwelfare activities. So much so that even the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its front organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa,calls themsleves welfare organisations. Even a self-confessed associate of Osama bin Laden, KhalidKhawaja, is running a ‘human rights’ organisation.

No doubt, the progressive section of the civilsociety has been very vocal but their importanceneed not be exaggerated. The success of lawyers’

5 On February 17, 2010, Pakistan announced the arrest of a senior Taliban leader Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradarfrom Karachi. On February 18, 2010, Taliban ‘commander’ Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son Muhammad Haqqani,was killed in a dronestrike in Danday Darpakhel village four kilometres north of Miranshah. On February 21,2010, police arrested Maulvi Kabir, one of the top ten most-wanted Taliban leaders and a former Governor ofNangahar province of Afghanistan, from Nowshera. Musa Khan, another senior Taliban ‘commander’ wasarrested in Damghar area of Kabal tehsil of Swat District on February 25, 2010. Tehrik Taliban’s deputy chiefMaulvi Faqir Mohammad was killed in a drone strike on March 5, 2010 and an Al-Qaeda commander AbuYahya was arrested in Karachi on March 6, 2010.

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movement, therefore, cannot be taken as anindication of the sway of liberal forces in Pakistanisociety.

As for the media’s role in civil society,a large number of top journalists in both the printand electronic media work with the so called‘establishment’ and toe the line set for them by theirhandlers. For instance, so long as the militaryestablishment was ambivalent about the Taliban,these journalists took the line that the Taliban aretheir own people and that there should benegotiations with them. But as soon as the armystarted fighting the Taliban, the media changed itsline and branded the Taliban as Indian agentsengaged in anti-Islamic and anti-Pakistani activitiesto give a bad name to Pakistan.

Of late, the media is out to prove that they havethe power to make and break governments. It isnow open season in Pakistan for Zardari-bashingover the Kerry-Lugar Bill and the NRO. A majorityof journalists are from a conservative, Punjabiurban lower middle-class background, and have adeep antipathy towards Zardari. So much so thatpeople who never had a good word to say aboutBenazir Bhutto during her lifetime, are nowextolling her virtues, only to use her name toportray her husband as a charlatan.

There is a clear attempt underway to destroythe credibility and legitimacy of the presidency andgiven the profile of journalists who arespearheading this campaign of vilification, thereare reasons to believe that powerful sections in themilitary establishment are backing this mediacampaign.

The Progress Report

The PPP government’s record has been rather

unimpressive during the last almost two years ofits rule. Right from the beginning, it has spent muchof its energy in saving the government, fighting theTaliban and the jihadi insurgency that has asserteditself in a major way and defending thegovernment’s foreign and security policies. It hasnot been able to focus its attention on satisfyingthe electorate. Due to the worsening securitysituation in Pakistan in 2008-2009, there has been anoverall decline of the Pakistani economy and theprospects of its revival appear rather grim. Thiswas acknowledged by the junior finance ministerwhile presenting the national budget in June 2009:“Terrorist attacks have undermined Pakistan’smacroeconomic stability and dampened growthprospects”.6 This is not to deny that the PPP-ledgovernment has tried to introduce some populistmeasures like the Benazir Income SupportProgramme (BISP) and many foreign aid agencieshave expressed their interest in funding suchprogrammes. However, there is no well-definedstrategy to rescue Pakistan economy from themorass it is in today. Its dependence on externalassistance makes it immensely vulnerable topolitical pressures from the outside. In view of therising popular antipathy towards Pakistanestablishment’s supposed surrender of nationalsovereignty to external powers, such dependencemay in the long term pose critical challenges forthe Pakistan state.

On the terrorism front also, the people ofPakistan believe that the civilian government hasbeen largely guided by the army’s policies underAmerican pressure and this has earned thegovernment a bad name. On the foreign policy front,it has only managed to continue the policies of theMusharraf government, without much success.For example, it has not gone beyond making some

6 Minister of State for Finance Hina Rabbani Khar made this remark during the course of the presentation of thebudget on June 14, 2009. Dawn, June 15, 2009.



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friendly overtures to India through the media. Inits relationship with the US it has not managed toconvince the people of Pakistan about the necessityto befriend the US. On the issue of the Balochmovement also it has failed to apply the healingtouch. Above all, Zardari’s government is toutedas a non-functioning lame-duck government, at themercy of the army and America. It has not madeany effort so far to come into its own and takeindependent measures which can restore its imageamong the people of Pakistan.

Against this backdrop, while the Zardarigovernment’s fortunes are on the decline, NawazSharif’s political acceptability is on the rise. Nawazhas taken a principled stand on the issues relatingto removal of Musharraf as president, restorationof judges, and the repeal of the 17th amendment andrestoration of the 1973 constitution. He hasdemonstrated his ability to be responsive to thepopular pulse and is waiting patiently to return topower at an opportune time. It is also reported thathe is cosying up to the army at a time when Zardarigovernment is losing the confidence of the army,the real power-broker in Pakistan. Thus the Zardarigovernment’s loss is likely to translate into Nawaz’sgain in future.

Trends and Conclusions

The popular euphoria after the elections hasdied down. The civilian government has failedto deliver on its promises to the people. Thepolitical situation in Pakistan is much worsetoday than early 2008, when the elections tookplace. The government appears to have nocontrol over the foreign and security policy ofthe state and it is fast losing popular support.It has absolutely no control over the ISI and thearmy.

The political situation in Pakistan is fluid andthere are indications that the army, the

judiciary, the opposition led by Nawaz Sharifand the media are coming together against theZardari government. The role played by theUS may decide the fate of Zardari in the longrun.

The army remains the most important centreof power in Pakistan today. It remote controlspolitical situation in the country from behindthe scenes. It retains its reputation as a politicalpower-broker and holds the veto on issues ofvital national importance.

Zardari appears to be under siege and whilehe still controls the PPP, attempts are beingmade to sideline him even inside his own party.Gilani could emerge as a potential challengerto Zardari but whether he will be able to takethe party with him is not clear.

Crucial allies like the MQM, the JUI and eventhe ANP are growing restive. The governmentcould easily be destabilised if one or more ofthese allies withdraw support. While this willnot necessarily mean fresh elections, thegovernment will be totally at the mercy ofpolitical forces who support it from theoutside.

Nawaz Sharif is emerging as the most popularand powerful politician in Pakistan today.With a clean chit from the judiciary. He canonce again re-enter Parliament and becomeprime minister because the bar on his thirdterm, imposed by Musharraf government, hasbeen lifted with the passing of the 18th

Constitutional Amendment Bill.

However, Nawaz Sharif is likely to lose muchof his popularity if he were to take over powertoday because the political, security andeconomic problems confronting the stateappear insurmountable. Moreover, it isunlikely that Nawaz will make any major

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change in the security policy of Pakistan. Thepopular belief in Pakistan that he will standup to the Americans is unfounded.

The judiciary is increasingly encroaching onto the domain of the executive, somethingwhich could lead to repeated clashes betweenthese two institutions in the future. Whetherthe judicial activism being witnessed todaywill survive the current CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry,and whether the politicians will be able to usethe judiciary to settle score with their rivalsremains to be seen.

The religious political parties appear to belosing ground to the extremists. They have beenmarginalised by the radical groups who havetaken up the mantle of Islamisation from them.

The US exercises a dominant influence on thepolitics of Pakistan. In order to create theconditions conducive to their strategicinterests, the US will have to create long termstakes in Pakistan by progressivelyempowering the democratic forces andreducing the influence of the army. However,this is a tall order, given the Americandependence on the Pakistani army for their warin Afghanistan.

Implications for India

Publicly, none of the main political partiesin Pakistan are against normalisation ofrelations with India. But perhaps they are notready to settle all outstanding issues withIndia in right earnest. All of them advocate avery rigid stand on the issue of Jammu andKashmir (J&K).

Even then, it is interesting to note that bothZardari and Nawaz Sharif have advocated abetter relationship between the two countriesand expressed their willingness to delink tradeand cultural exchanges from the Kashmir issue.However, there has been no substantial steptaken by the Zardari government in this regardbecause of the continuing instability in Pakistanand the government’s disinclination to addressIndian security concerns (post-Mumbai-attacks).

On the terrorism front, a consensus seems tobe developing among the political partiesagainst the Pakistani Taliban. However, thereis no such agreement on the issue of jihaditerrorism fostered by Pakistan in Kashmir. Thegovernment continues to be in a state of denialabout the activities of various jihadi outfitsoperating out of Pakistan. It is consideredalmost unpatriotic to act against these forces.Therefore, it is unlikely that there will be anymajor action taken to dismantle theinfrastructure of terror that is directed againstIndia.

President Zardari has made some boldstatements in favour of normalisation of tieswith India. But whether he can convert themilitary and political establishment to hisviewpoint and sell peace to the people ofPakistan is still unclear.

While India has no choice but to deal with thegovernment and the military establishment,all efforts must be made to engage with otherpolitical forces inside that country. If Indiaplays its cards well, it could gain some leverageinside Pakistan.



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This chapter focuses on political developmentsin all the four provinces of Pakistan and examinesthe impact that these may have on national politicsand the stability of the government. It will also seekto analyse the nationalist and sub-provincialmovements in the provinces and estimate theirpotential.

Dynamics of Provincial Politics

Provincial nationalism has been looked at withsuspicion by the ruling class ever since Pakistancame into existence. In an attempt to foster anoverarching ‘Pakistani’ identity, based on Islam the‘establishment’ has tried to suppress regional, ethnicand provincial identities, lest they promotefissiparous tendencies. Local languages like Sindhi,Balochi, Pashtu and even Punjabi have beendiscouraged and Urdu has been imposed as thelingua franca to forge a sense of commonnationhood. In fact, it was the imposition of Urduupon the Bengalis that led to widespread protestsin erstwhile East Pakistan and gave a fillip to Bengalinationalism which culminated in the creation ofBangladesh in 1971.

Further, the smaller provinces of Pakistan haveseveral complaints against the largest province –Punjab. After the division of Pakistan in 1971, the1973 constitution tried to address the issue ofprovincial autonomy. But no meaningful action was

CHAPTER II

PROVINCES OF PAKISTAN: POLITICS,MILITANCY AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM

taken to translate the rhetoric of provincialautonomy into reality. The smaller provinces (interms of population)–namely Balochistan, Sindhand NWFP (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa)– havecontinued to suffer from a feeling of deprivationand exploitation by the largest province, Punjab.Ironically, despite the secession of East Pakistan,the problem of one of the federating unitsdominating all others has continued to hauntPakistan. While earlier, East Pakistan outnumberedthe whole of West Pakistan, after 1971, Punjab hashad a higher population than all the other threeprovinces put together.

Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Pakistanhad to contend with restiveness, even rebellion, inone or the other province. In the 1970s, a full blowninsurgency broke out in Balochistan. The Pakistanarmy brutally crushed it— the fourth such outburstin that province. The NWFP was also in fermentwith the Pashtun nationalist party, the NationalAwami Party (NAP), led by Wali Khan, articulatingthe aspirations of the Pashtuns in Pakistan. The 1980ssaw insurgency breaking out in Sindh. The Sindhinationalists were influenced by GM Syed’s JiyeSindh movement. Moreover, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’sexecution by Zia-ul-Haq alienated the Sindhimasses. Even as the Sindhis went on the warpath inthe interior areas of Sindh, a Mohajir movementstarted in the urban areas, perhaps as a counter to

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Sindhi nationalism. The Mohajir Quami Movement(MQM)1 started dominating urban Sindh,particularly Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur andMirpurkhas. A large number of Urdu-speakingpeople had migrated from various provinces inIndia at the time of Partition in 1947 and settled inthese urban areas.

The 1990s saw the return of electoral politicsafter Zia-ul-Haq’s death. Many of the disgruntledand separatist elements participated in the politicalprocess. Insurgent activities in Balochistan andSindh stopped and there was a semblance of peacein these provinces. In NWFP, the NAP changed itsname to Awami National Party (ANP) and alloweditself to be co-opted into the system. It aligned firstwith the PPP and later with PML-N and joinedcoalitions both in the province as well as the centre.Sindhi nationalism was kept in check by the returnof the PPP to power at the centre in 1988 and laterin 1993. Most of the old guard of the Sindhinationalist movement had been either eliminatedor bought over by the establishment. By the end ofthe 1990s, the issue of ethnic or provincialnationalism had receded into the background.Although nationalist groups in the smallerprovinces continued to stick to their programmes,they seemed to have lost their influence and wereregarded as marginal players.

When Gen. Pervez Musharraf usurped powerby overthrowing Nawaz Sharif in 1999, in his firstaddress to the people of Pakistan, he promised to‘strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincialdisharmony and restore national cohesion’ as oneof the seven-point agenda he laid out before thecountry. But during the eight years he remained inpower, he did nothing to address the concerns ofthe smaller provinces. In fact, he left things muchworse than before.

The allegations of Punjabi dominationresurfaced in a big way because of the policiesadopted by the Musharraf regime. Musharraf’sdecision to build the Kalabagh dam, cantonmentsin Balochistan and implement the Gwadar portproject evoked hostile reactions in the smallerprovinces. His response to Baloch resistanceconvinced the people in the smaller provinces thathe would perpetuate Punjabi domination ratherthan address the issue of inter-provincial inequality.In fact, since the military and bureaucracy ofPakistan is dominated by Punjabis, and to someextent the Pashtuns, other ethnic groups feel quitemarginalised and lend their support to ethnic andprovincial nationalist parties.

Mainstream politicians and the military-bureaucratic establishment in Pakistan view ethnicnationalism with suspicion. While it is true thatmost of the nationalists would settle for autonomywithin Pakistan instead of independence, the stateapparatus in Pakistan considers ethnic assertion asa prelude to secession. The secession of EastPakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971, has added totheir sense of insecurity in this regard. Rather thanresponding positively to the legitimate demandsof the nationalist groups, the Punjabi dominatedmilitary and bureaucratic establishment has reactedin a high-handed manner, which has left the otherethno-nationalist groups with no other choice butto openly advocate separatism.

This has been the case in Balochistan where afull-blown insurgency is underway for the last onedecade. More seriously, even in Sindh, the latentseparatist sentiment is slowly coming to the fore. InNWFP, while the Pashtun nationalism of the oldendays may be dead and gone, ethnic sentiments arenow getting dovetailed with Islamism of theTaliban variety.

1 Subsequently the name was changed to Muttahida Quami Mahaz with the same acronym.

Provinces of Pakistan: Politics, Militancy and Ethnic Nationalism


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While ideologically, the Taliban believe in pan-Islamism and have little or no use for ethnicnationalism as a predominantly Pashtun force, thereis an inescapable xenophobia of Pashtun tribalnationalism propelling the ongoing armedresistance against foreign forces in Afghanistan,which may metamorphose into a Pashtunnationalist struggle especially in the present

circumstances, when the radical Islamist Pashtuns

increasingly view the Pakistani state as their

worst enemy.

Approach of the New Government

To an extent, the new civilian government thatcame to power after the February 2008 electionshas tried to reach out to the smaller provinces inPakistan. There are broad-based coalitiongovernments in every province and smallerprovincial level parties have been allowed toparticipate in the coalition at the centre. However,unfortunately, these initiatives have been marredby political exigencies, compulsions andconstraints of both the PPP as well as its coalitionpartners both at the centre and in the provinces.

Apart from such political measures the PPP-led government has also made a commitment toaddress the grievances of the provinces and hastaken a very accommodative position on theNational Finance Commission award which seeksto increase the share of the provinces in thedistribution of revenues by evolving a new formulato distribute resources between provinces. The oldformula that was based on the criteria of populationfor resource distribution favoured Punjab. This isnow being revised to bring in other criteria likearea, backwardness, contribution to the nationalpool, and royalties for resources of the provincesetc. Moreover, the 18th amendment theoreticallygives greater autonomy to the provinces. Theconcurrent list has been abolished and all residualmatters now vest with the provinces.

Whether these measures will be enough to satisfythe aspirations of the provinces or whether it isgoing to be a case of “too little too late” is somethingthat remains to be seen.

Baloch Politics

The Baloch people of Pakistan have demandedindependence from the Pakistani state right sincepartition. They have staged armed insurrection infour different phases and sustained their strugglefor independence in spite of brutal repression oftheir movement by the Pakistani state. There havebeen several efforts to divide the Baloch and buyout their leaders. However, the idea of anindependent Balochistan has always stayed alivein the minds of the people of the province. Ethnicityintertwined with a sense of political isolation andrelative economic deprivation has sustained theBaloch ethnic movement for the last six decades.There is a deep-seated feeling amongst the Balochthat they have been denied representation in thegovernment and their resources have been divertedto fulfil the needs of other provinces in Pakistan.There are hardly any Baloch in the army orbureaucracy. Even most of the provincial jobswithin Balochistan are held by outsiders. As a result,the rate of unemployment in Balochistan is thehighest in the country. They fear marginalisation intheir own province by Pashtuns and other ethnicgroups.

The Musharraf regime had started a series ofmega-projects in Balochistan, ostensibly, to usherin development in the province— Gwadar portbeing the most notable amongst them. It was arguedby the Pakistani establishment that these projectswould address the issue of lack of development inPakistan’s most resource rich and yet economicallymost backward province. However, these measureshave alienated the Baloch further, because they viewthese mega-projects as instruments of domination.They feel that they have no control over these

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projects and have no stakes in them. The way theseprojects have been implemented, has added to theirconcerns. The Baloch people allege that the entirelabour force was imported from other parts ofPakistan and cronies of the establishment reapedall the benefits from these projects. At the same time,the Pakistan army decided to establish a string ofmilitary cantonments across the province. This wasseen by the Baloch as a step to tighten thestranglehold of Islamabad on the resources of theprovince. The mega-projects and militarycantonments are also seen as measures to alter thedemographic composition in the province andreduce the Baloch to a minority.

With matters coming to a head, an armedinsurgency broke out in Balochistan. The Islamistinsurgency in FATA and NWFP and the devastatingimpact this has had in the form of suicide bombingsand fidayeen attacks on security installations incities like Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar etc., has toa great extent pushed the resurgent separatism inBalochistan to the background. Partly because ofmomentous political events taking place in the restof Pakistan and partly because of an informalmedia censorship on the coverage of the incidentsin Balochistan, the Balochi problem has not receivedthe attention it deserves.

But while developments in Balochistan mightnot have made it to the front pages of newspapers,the situation in the province is spiralling out ofcontrol. Today the situation in Balochistan is, inmany ways, far more serious in terms of its potentialrepercussions for the Pakistani federation than eventhe militancy in the Pashtun areas. The alienationof the people in the Baloch areas of Balochistan isalmost total and separatist sentiments are now beingopenly expressed in various forums. Sowidespread is the disaffection with Pakistan thateven the moderate nationalist forces are beingforced to favour the separatists. Even pro-Pakistannationalist politicians are constrained to tell their

Pakistani interlocutors that they are fast gettingmarginalised and that their pleas for seeking asolution within the Pakistani federation are findingfewer takers by every passing day.

The assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti inAugust 2006 was perhaps the tipping point in theBaloch national movement. While the simmeringdiscontent in Balochistan was palpable even whenNawab Bugti was alive, his death acted as a catalystfor the movement. Bugti’s death gave the Balochiseparatists the symbol they needed against thePakistani establishment. After the 2008 generalelections, attempts were made by the civiliangovernment to reach out to the Baloch and assuagetheir feelings. President Asif Ali Zardari started inright earnest and apologised to the Baloch for allthe acts of state repression in the past and promisedto address all the issues that they had raised. Apartfrom the development package, he promised toundertake the necessary constitutional reforms tomake provincial autonomy a reality. In addition,the PPP government freed most political prisoners,including many of the so-called ‘missing persons’who had been kept in illegal custody by the securityagencies.

Zardari’s peace initiative was accorded acautious welcome by the Baloch. One reason forthis was that the Baloch did not expect the PPP-ledcoalition government to overturn the strategy putin place by the army under Musharraf. Moreover,the Baloch had boycotted the elections and hencedid not regard the provincial government aslegitimate and representative. The horse-tradingorganised by the PPP in Balochistan made the entireexercise suspect in the province (See Map 2.1 forparty positions in the provincial assembly). In fact,in a House of 65 members, there is only oneopposition member and that too because he had ablood-feud with the chief minister. The MPAs(Members of Provincial Assembly), including thechief minister, are nothing more than figureheads



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and they do not enjoy any credibility with thedisaffected people, nor do they have the power todo anything to satisfy the aspirations of the people.Both the chief minister and the governor ofBalochistan have gone on record to say that theyare powerless before the security establishment.

In any case, matters have come to a point wherethe Pakistani state is willing to offer autonomy tothe Baloch, in terms of larger share in the federalresources and partial control over the resources ofthe province. However, this is no longer consideredenough to satisfy the Baloch. Caught, as if they are,in a time-warp, the Pakistani political authoritiesseem unable to comprehend that the Baloch politicaland social scene has undergone a fundamentalchange; that the tribal sardars no longer call theshots and a new generation Baloch youth haveassumed the leadership of the movement.

In the past, the state had successfully adoptedthe tactic of winning over the sardars to bring downthe Baloch movement. However, today, this is nolonger the case. Although many of the tribal sardarscontinue to exercise lot of influence, they wouldnot dare to go against the movement. The leadershipof the movement has passed on to a younger lotwho do not follow the sardars blindly. This changehas been summarised by Hirbyair Marri: “Today,even if my father (Khair Bux Marri) wants to hijackthe movement and betray the Baloch, he cannot doit”. The sardars are thus, compelled to defend theseparatists, just to retain their influence andlegitimacy. Nationalist sardars like AttaullahMengal, Khair Bux Marri and Akbar Bugti and theirfamilies continue to command respect, but they aremere figureheads and are no longer the driving forceof the separatist movement.

The Baloch separatist movement is led todayby organisations like the Baloch Liberation Army(BLA), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), BalochLiberation United Front (BLUF), Baloch LiberationFront (BLF), Baloch Students’ Organisation (BSO)

etc. Interestingly, despite these outfits havingoperated for a number of years now, nobody seemsto have adequate information about theseorganisations. At one level, these are amorphousand faceless organisations. There is more conjecturethan any hard evidence regarding their form,structure, leadership and membership. Someanalysts in Pakistan doubt whether theseorganisations even exist on the ground. They feelthat these shadowy organisations serve the interestsof recalcitrant tribes like the Marris, Bugtis andMengals. However, these outfits have certainly gonebeyond the control of the sardars and even if theyhave separate agendas and strategies, they are alldriven by a common goal, i.e., independence fromPakistan. The amorphous structure of the Balochseparatist armies makes them quite an enigma forthe Pakistani security forces. They are like phantomorganisations. And despite the mass arrests ofalleged operatives of these organisations, theyhave been able to conduct their operationsuninterrupted. The state authorities have no cluesabout their organisational structure, leadership,cadre, funding, training etc. The guerrilla warfaretactics adopted by these groups— planting roadsidebombs and mines that target military convoys,targeting and eliminating people who are close tothe government, ambushing soldiers and officersrandomly while they are off-duty, killings ofpeople working for or supporting the stateauthorities, attacking and destroying economicinfrastructure like gas pipelines, electricity lines,railway tracks, and carrying out reprisals againstPunjabi settlers in Balochistan (which has led to anexodus on the non-Baloch from the Baloch areas ofthe province) — coupled with the mass publicsupport they enjoy, have made them a nightmarefor the Pakistan establishment.

So far, the authorities have adopted a two-pronged strategy to deal with the Baloch separatistmovement, which poses a clear threat to theintegrity of the Pakistani federation. On the one


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hand, they have used force to quell the rebellionand on the other they have taken political andeconomic initiatives to address the concerns of theBaloch. In fact, these two strategies have worked atcross-purposes. The use of brute force by themilitary has offset the political initiatives andstrengthened the resolve of the Baloch to continuetheir armed struggle. Moreover, the authorities haveused other tactics to divide and discredit themovement. They have used the Islamists, inparticular the Taliban and political groups like theJUI, which shares a fraternal relationship with theTaliban, against the Baloch nationalist forces; andthey are instigating ethnic conflict between theBaloch and the Pashtuns in Balochistan.

The alienation of the Baloch people is so completethat, at the moment, they refuse to accept any offerfrom the Pakistan state, howsoever well-meaning sucha gesture may be. A case in point is the popularrejection of the reform package titled ‘Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan’, which was discussed andapproved in a joint session of the Parliament onDecember 7-9, 2009. It contained 39 points and soughtto address the political, economic, administrativeand security related grievances of the Baloch people.Baloch leaders rejected this package as a ‘politicalgimmick’ and held that “Zardari and his governmentmay have good intentions but they were powerlessand the real powers rested with the militaryestablishment, which would not allowimplementation of the policies recommendedby the Parliament.”2 Under these circumstances, it isunlikely that there will be any positive movementtowards restoration of peace and harmony in theprovince in the near future.

NWFP: Assertion of Pakistani Taliban

For the first time in Pakistan’s history, a Pashtun

nationalist party, the ANP, is heading thegovernment in NWFP, in coalition with the PPP(See Map 2.2 for party positions in the provincialassembly). This is not to deny that the ANP hasbeen part of the provincial government in the pastas well – in 1973 as a coalition partner with the JUI,and then in the 1990s with both the PPP and thePML-N at different times. However, the ANP’ssuccess has been overshadowed by the Islamistinsurgency that has ravaged the province andsurrounding Pashtun dominated areas in FATA andnorthern Balochistan.

It is an irony that Islam, which was seen as abinding force by the Pakistani establishment, todayposes the most serious threat to the existence of thePakistani state, while the Pashtun nationalists, whowere always treated with suspicion and distrust,have today emerged as the torch-bearers of thePakistani state. It is hard to tell whether this is atactical adjustment by the Pashtun nationalists oran exercise in self-preservation, especially whenthe Islamist radicals are killing ANP cadres andleaders by the dozens. It is also difficult to agreewith some of the analysts who suggest that it is asign of co-option of the Pashtun nationalists by thePunjabi-dominated Pakistani establishment

What form politics will finally take in NWFP –whether the Islamists or nationalists will succeed infuture (as was attempted in Swat on the issue of theNizam-e-Adl regulations), or whether the Pashtunswould forsake both ethnic nationalism and religiousradicalism in favour of a larger Pakistani identity– willdepend largely on the response of the Pakistani state tothe Islamist insurgency not only in Pakistan but also inAfghanistan. It will also depend to a great extent on theway the ANP-led coalition in NWFP tackles the urgentissues of governance in the coming days.

2 Cited in news report “Baloch nationalists reject package“, The News, November 25, 2009. Available at: http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=25763


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The portents are not very good as far as the trackrecord of the ANP-PPP coalition is concerned.Politically, the coalition has been hobbled by theraging insurgency in the province and in FATA.The targeting of political leaders by the insurgentshas forced many of them to reduce public contactto a minimum. The veteran ANP leader, AsfandyarWali, grandson of the Frontier Gandhi Khan AbdulGaffar Khan, has completely disappeared from thepublic eye. He is hardly ever in NWFP, and staysmostly either in Islamabad or abroad. The chiefminister is also living practically in a bunker andeven when he makes an appearance in public, thearea is so completely sanitised that he can hardlymake any contact with the people. The performanceof the PPP leadership is even worse and mostprovincial level leaders are hardly ever seen outsidetheir ‘bunkers’. Apart from a few ministers in theprovincial cabinet like the redoubtable BashirBilour, and Mian Iftikhar, who take the trouble totravel to all affected areas and maintain publiccontact even at grave risk to their lives, all otherpolitical activity has practically come to astandstill. If there is any political activity,it is by the supporters and sympathisers ofthe Islamists – JI and to an extent the JUI.

At another level, the ongoing militancy has notonly inflicted huge economic damage on theprovince, but also it has prevented the provincialgovernment from taking up any developmentalinitiative or projects that could ameliorate the lotof the people of NWFP. The massive crisis createdby the influx of hundreds of thousands of internallydisplaced people (IDPs) because of the militaryoperations in Swat, Bajaur, Waziristan and otherparts of NWFP and FATA has imposed anunbearable burden on the provincial administrationand government.

Although resources have been made availableby the federal government as well as international

donors to take care of the IDPs, it is going to be anenormous task given the sheer scale of the crisisand the problems of providing relief andrehabilitation to hundreds of thousands of IDPs.If the provincial government can deliver on thisthen it will redeem itself in the eyes of the people.But if it fails, as is likely given the moribund anddysfunctional administrative structures in theprovince and widespread corruption in thepolitical and bureaucratic establishment, then itwill lead to popular resentment against thegovernment and the state.

Even as the problems of governance continuedto mount, the provincial government was still stuckwith the political symbolism of the past – renamingNWFP as Pakhtunkhwa – through the 18thamendment bill (after much opposition from thePML-N and the PML-Q) and passed in theParliament as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, in April 2010.This has led to a demand for recognition of otheridentities within NWFP. The non-Pashtunsespecially those inhabiting the Hazara division arelikely to keep up their demand for a separateprovince for themselves. There is also a fear thatsuch political concessions will only bolster Pashtunnationalism, which according to many in Pakistan,runs counter to Pakistani nationalism.

Apart from emotional political issues, theprovincial government is also spending a lot of itsenergy in getting the maximum resources out ofthe federal government. Torturous negotiationsover the criteria for finance commission awards,royalties for hydel power projects and the oil andgas resources of the province, seem to be occupyingthe ANP-led government far more thanadministrative action on the ground to providesuccour to the people. But since these are the long-standing demands of the nationalists, the ANPbelieves that if it can extract major concessions onthese issues it will be able to reap political mileage

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in the province. While this would certainly havebeen the case if all these negotiations were takingplace in normal circumstances, the abnormalsituation that exists in the province has added asurrealistic dimension to the ANP’s politics.

At a time when people are losing their lives andlivelihoods to Islamist militancy, it is hard to believethat the Pashtuns of NWFP would really carewhether the ANP has managed to wrangle a fewbillion rupees more from Islamabad, or whetherthe name of the province has been changed toKhyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

Political Situation in Sindh

The province of Sindh has for long beenconsidered the soft underbelly of the Pakistanifederation. Sindhi nationalism, articulated by the‘Jiye Sindh’ movement, has found a resonance allover the province but has failed to translate into amajor political force. One major reason for this isthe strong roots of the PPP in Sindh, which isarguably the only party in Pakistan with acountrywide footprint. The Bhutto factor hasdeprived the ‘Jiye Sindh’ nationalist movement ofthe oxygen it needs to grow into a potent force inthe province.

As a result, despite harbouring nationalistsentiment, the Sindhis have generally cast their lotwith and their vote in favour of the PPP. On its part,the PPP has used its support-base in Sindh to playthe ‘Sindhi card’ whenever it has been persecutedor pushed into a corner by the Pakistaniestablishment. The explosion of public anger thatwas witnessed in Sindh after the assassination ofBenazir Bhutto proves this point. At that stage, hadAsif Zardari, endorsed the slogans of ‘Pakistan nakhappay and not countered them with the slogan of‘Pakistan khappay’, Sindh could have easilydescended into chaos.

Apart from Sindhi nationalism vis-à-vis

Pakistani nationalism, there is another fault-linebetween the Mohajirs (who dominate urban areaslike Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur and Mirpurkhas)and the Sindhis who dominate the rural areas ofthe province. Despite efforts to paper over thesedifferences and mutual animosities the chasmbetween these two communities has widened overtime.

Often enough, the political alignments in theprovince have exacerbated the ethnic antagonisms.The Sindhis tend to support the PPP while theMohajirs overwhelmingly back the MQM.Normally, an alliance between the PPP and theMQM should be both natural (because their votebanks do not overlap) and beneficial (because itgives both ethnic groups a common stake). But themutual antagonisms between the Sindhis andMohajirs appear to be so deep that a mere politicalalliance between the PPP and the MQM is unableto bring about a genuine rapprochement betweenthem. Whenever the PPP and the MQM join hands,there is a temporary lull but no sooner the alliancecollapses, the animus erupts to the surface.

After the 2008 elections, there was really no needfor the PPP to strike a deal with the MQM in theprovince (See Map 2.3 for party positions in theprovincial assembly). Sindh was the only provincethat gave a clear mandate – a simple majority tothe PPP. Yet Asif Zardari roped in the MQM,perhaps for two reasons: MQM seats in nationalassembly provided an insurance to the PPP-ledcoalition in case PML-N left the coalition; it was anact of political sagacity in the province becauseexcluding the MQM would not only amount toignoring the mandate of urban Sindh but also openup the possibility of agitation and unrest in the citiesof Sindh. The only problem with striking a dealwith the MQM was that it did not go down wellwith the PPP’s core support base – the Sindhis –who had voted in large numbers for the party and



36

perhaps, did not want to see the MQM back inpower in the province.

Perhaps, the growing disconnect between thePPP and its Sindhi support base is being reflectedin the reassertion of Sindhi nationalist groups,which were reduced to marginal players in theprovince. Most of the Sindhi nationalist leaders havebeen coopted by the Pakistani state over the years,and they have merely played the role of a safetyvalve for the simmering discontent among theSindhi masses. The old guard amongst the Sindhinationalists has also suffered from dissensions andfactionalism which has seen the Jiye Sindhmovement break into multiple factions. But now anew leadership seems to be emerging andconnecting with the indigenous people of theprovince.

A recent public rally by the ‘Jiye Sindh QaumiMahaz’ (JSQM) led by Bashir Qureshi on November7, 2009 set alarm bells ringing in the corridors ofpower in both Karachi and Islamabad. Qureshi hadearlier aligned with the MQM (in the 1990s whenthe latter was out in the cold and being houndedby the Pakistani establishment) to forge a commonfront for the rights of Sindh. But the JSQM seems tohave come into its own and in the above-mentionedrally, slogans of independent Sindh were beingraised openly and quite provocatively.

Resentment in Sindh is ironically being fuelledby the campaign against a Sindhi president, AsifAli Zardari, which is suspected to be orchestratedby the Pakistani military establishment andimplemented by the Punjabi dominated media andpolitical class. MQM supremo Altaf Hussain’sadvice to Zardari to ‘make a sacrifice for the sake ofdemocracy’ has added fuel to the fire. In this case,it is highly probable that the ‘Sindhi card’ may onceagain be played by the PPP to take the heat offZardari.

This may not discourage the Punjabi dominatedestablishment from toppling Zardari from thepresidency using means fair or foul, however, it isnot easy to predict the course ofSindhi nationalism in the months ahead. For themoment, the PPP and the MQM are in an uneasycohabitation in both Islamabad and Karachi. TheMQM is using its position in the National Assemblyto extract maximum concessions out of the PPP,especially on issues like retaining the localgovernment system in Sindh (which has given theMQM control over Karachi something thatthe PPP is not very comfortable with).

Given the MQM’s proclivity to switch sides,often at a wink and nudge from the establishmentwith which it shares a love-hate relationship, it maynot be long before it pulls out of its alliance withthe PPP and lends support to some alternativearrangement. If this happens, the cleavage betweenthe Sindhis and Mohajirs will only deepen. Thefuture of the Sindhi nationalist movement willdepend, to a large extent, on the ability of the PPPto handle the Sindhi electorate.

The division between the Pashtuns and Mohajirsin Karachi is another worrying factor in Sindhpolitics. Due to the increasing influx of (internallydisplaced) people from the disturbed areas ofNWFP and FATA to Karachi, there has been aninevitable rise in the numbers of Pashtuns in thecity over the years. These Pashtuns have alsobecome politically assertive and provoked the ireof the Mohajirs. This has led to frequent clashesbetween these two ethnic communities, the latestinstance of which was the three-day long (April 29-May 1, 2009) bloody fighting in Karachi whichleft almost 50 dead and many more injured.This has caused lot of embarrassment to thecoalition government in Sindh which has both theMohajir dominated MQM and the Pashtundominated ANP in it.


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Punjab: The Political Powerhouse

Punjab is the most populous state of Pakistan. Itaccounts for 23 per cent of Pakistan’s territory and55 per cent of its population.3 However, Punjabisconstitute about 65 per cent of total strength of thearmy.4 They also have a dominant presence in thebureaucracy. Punjab contributes about 50 per centof the GDP of Pakistan and most of it comes fromagriculture and services sector. In fact, Punjab isconsidered the ‘bread basket’ of Pakistan. It is themost industrialised province of Pakistan.The literacy rate in Punjab is higher than the nationalaverage.5 In view of this overwhelming dominanceof Punjab in Pakistan, some observers haveremarked that without Punjab, Pakistan will loseits vitality and importance.6

Punjab is also clearly the political powerhouseof Pakistan. And within Punjab, the famous GTroad (Lahore to Rawalpindi) constitutes the centreof gravity of the entire country. Any political partythat dominates this belt, dominates the politics ofPakistan, not only in terms of numbers in theNational Assembly and Provincial Assembly butalso in terms of its control over the public discourseand setting the social, political and economicagenda of Pakistan. Thus, when PPP loyalist andgovernor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, refers to thePML-N as a GT Road party, he is tacitlyacknowledging the control of that party over thepolitical nerve centre of Pakistan.

This was the belt which propelled Zulfikar AliBhutto and the PPP to power during the 1970elections and it is precisely the loss of its control

over this belt that has prevented the PPP fromforming a government in Punjab after 1977 orattaining a simple majority in the NationalAssembly since then. The PPP now dominates southPunjab, which is economically under-developedand under the control of the feudal class. The partydoes manage a few seats in central Punjab (GT Road)and north Punjab. But these are not enough to giveit a majority in either Lahore or Islamabad. Thepolitics of Punjab has moved too much to the rightfor the left-of-centre PPP to recover its lost ground.And if it were not for the divide in the MuslimLeague, the PPP would have not have even securedas many seats in Punjab in the 2008 elections (SeeMap 2.4, for details of party positions in theprovincial assembly).

Advantage NawazAdvantage NawazAdvantage NawazAdvantage NawazAdvantage Nawaz

For over two decades now, Nawaz Sharif hasdominated the politics of Punjab. The performanceof his party in the 2008 elections surprised everyoneincluding Nawaz himself. The party was incomplete disarray when it went to the polls. It hadfaced the brunt of the Musharraf dictatorship fornearly a decade and most of its top leaders haddefected and joined the ‘King’s party’, PML-Q.Nawaz returned from exile just weeks before thegeneral elections and found it difficult to put upsuitable candidates in many constituencies andfaced numerous obstacles in mounting an effectivecampaign. And yet, despite all these constraints, itemerged as the single largest party in Punjab.The PML-N has also survived the machinations ofthe PPP-led government since it came to power.

3 Projections based on 1998 census in Pakistan.4 Punjabis 65 percent; Pashtuns 14 percent; Sindhis and Baluchis 15 percent; Kashmiris 6 percent; and Minorities

0.3 per cent. (Data provided by Globalsecurity.org., at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/army.htm)

5 Total Adult Literacy Rate as per 1998 Census: 54 per cent ( Male 66.25 per cent , Female 41.75 per cent) and forPunjab it is 60.8 per cent (Male 70 per cent, Female 51 per cent).

6 Ian Talbot has argued this in his book Pakistan: A Modern History, St Martin’s Press: New York, 1998.


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Even when the PPP and the PML-N were coalitionpartners during April 2008 and February 2009, thePPP tried its best to divide the PML-N and bringdown its government in Punjab. It tried to capitaliseon the adverse judgement by the Supreme Court inMarch 2009, which disqualified Shahbaz Sharif, andimposed Governor’s rule in the province throughSalman Taseer, a well-known PPP supporter andgovernor of Punjab.

The PML-N has weathered these challengesquite well and the PPP-led government had toretrace its steps under popular pressure. Perhaps,for the first time in the political history of Pakistan,PML-N legislators refused to come under the spellof the government and defect to the ruling party.This is because Nawaz has conducted himself withdignity through the crises he has faced so far andprojected himself as a reliable alternative inPakistani politics today. In view of the risingdissension within the ranks of thePML-Q, especially against the leadership of theChaudhry cousins – Pervez Elahi and ShujaatHussein, it is quite probable that PML-Q dissidentsmay defect to PML-N in the future. Under theexisting circumstances, the possibility of a PPP-PML-Q alliance against PML-N appears remote.Nawaz’s stance on the judges’ issue, the NRO andthe 18th amendment to the constitution to restore itto the pre-1999 position has won him accoladesfrom the media and the people of Pakistan.

In fact, the show of political magnanimity byNawaz Sharif in allowing the PPP ministers torejoin the government in Punjab has endeared himto the people further, even if the arrangement doesnot last. This decision may have given the PPPsome tactical advantage by providing it withan opportunity to nourish and expand its politicalbase by being part of the government. However,the PML-N has certainly secured populargoodwill by this act of benevolence.

The CaThe CaThe CaThe CaThe Case for Seraikistanse for Seraikistanse for Seraikistanse for Seraikistanse for Seraikistan

Nonetheless, it is true that in the meanwhile thePPP is trying hard to regain its advantage in thePunjab. It has the advantage of having a loyalist asgovernor of Punjab and maintaining its control overthe PML-N government. At another level, it hassought to consolidate its position in southernPunjab by expressing its willingness to considerthe demand for Seraikistan.

In fact, there has been a long-standing demandfor a separate province for Seraiki-speaking peopleof Pakistan. This has gained some politicalmomentum in recent years, especially after theruling PPP demonstrated its willingness to considerthis demand favourably. It is believed that any suchprovince will divide Punjab into two equal halvesand reduce the influence of Punjab on nationalpolitics. Moreover, it will provide an opportunityfor seraiki-speaking southern Punjab to developthis tract independent of the influence of centraland northern Punjab which have monopolised thestate’s resources for years. For instance, politiciansin favour of the Seraiki province argue that in thecurrent fiscal year while the whole of south Punjabhas been allocated only Rs 5 billion fordevelopment, the ring road project in Lahore alonewas allocated Rs 26 billion.

According to the advocates of the proposedSeraiki province Multan would be the capital ofthe province which would include the districts inBahawalpur and Multan divisions, namely,Bahawalpur, Khushab, Mianwali, Bhakkar, Layyah,Muzaffargarh, Rajanpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, RahimYar Khan, Bahawalnagar, Vihari, Lodhran,Khanewal, Jhang, Chiniot, Pakpattan, Sahiwal,Toba Tek Singh and Sargodha.

The PPP is interested in such a province becauseit wields a lot of political influence in this region.However, it would require a larger politicalconsensus for the province to be carved out of

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Punjab. In July 2009, the Federal Minister forDefence Production Abdul Qayyum Jatoi said thatSupreme Court will be moved for establishingSeraiki province. Apart from this, Seraiki leadersare planning to launch a massive campaign forcreating awareness among the people of southernPunjab for establishment of Seraiki province.Political parties are expected to engage in a longdrawn-out debate over this issue in the comingdays. Some analysts in Pakistan believe that the finalshape of Seraiki province will be largelydetermined by the nature of the reaction from thePunjabi heartland.

For the moment there is a lot of resistance to theidea from the politicians in central and northPunjab. This is natural because they dominate thepolitics of Punjab and while the population of southPunjab adds to the overall clout of Punjab andenables it to garner the lion’s share from the federaldivisible pool, the province does not have toallocate resources to south Punjab on the basis ofits population, which in turn allows them todevelop their own constituencies. But there areother reasons as well for opposition toa Seraiki province.

The creation of a new province will mean areallocation of seats in the Senate. It will also reducethe influence of Nawaz Sharif and his party in the

sense that he will appear to be more of a divisionalleader rather than a national leader. Some peoplesuspect that the demand for the Seraiki province,which was revived by Mohammad Ali Durrani, apolitician who does his politics on the back ofinfamous agencies, is an establishment drivendemand to reduce Nawaz Sharif’s influence inPunjab.

But there are more serious implicationsinvolved in the formation of the Seraiki province.There is a genuine fear that it could give rise todemands for creation of more provinces – northPunjab (Potohar), Hazara in NWFP, a separatePashtun dominated province in north Balochistanand a Mohajir-dominated province in Sindh. Thisis a Pandora’s Box that no Pakistani politicianwould like to open. Not surprisingly, PrimeMinister Gilani, who belongs to south Punjab andas such should be supportive of this demand, hasrejected all proposals for carving out newprovinces. Nevertheless, a fledgling movement thatenjoys cross-party support from politiciansbelonging to south Punjab has started to articulatethe demand for a Seraiki province. Even seniormembers of the PML-N like Makhdoom JavedHashmi, who belongs to Multan, are supportingthis demand. Whether this movement will pick uppace or fizzle out remains to be seen.



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CHAPTER III

PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY:TRAVAILS OF UNCERTAINTY

A stable Pakistan is in the interest of regionaland global security. Yet, developments in Pakistanin recent years suggest that it is likely to be anincreasingly unstable state in the foreseeable future.Despite this, the army will remain at the core of thedecision-making processes within Pakistan. Onecan also surmise that instability in Pakistan is likelyto increase if Afghanistan becomes more unstableas the US contemplates withdrawal from thatcountry. It is useful to examine Pakistan’s foreignpolicy orientation in this context. It is almost certainthat Indo-Pak relations will become highlyunpredictable if instability persists. Tensionbetween the two neighbours would become a causeof worry for the international community owing tothe nuclear factor. An unstable Pakistan may evenbecome more dependent upon the US, China andsome Middle Eastern countries.

Growing instability in Pakistan is alreadydeepening the inherent contradictions in Pakistan’sforeign policy. Pakistan wants to have a dialoguewith India but remains in denial mode over 26/11and cross-border terrorism. It would like to havegood relations with Afghanistan but continues toseek strategic depth there. It relies on Saudi Arabiafor its economic, political and ideological support,yet it is a victim of radical Islamist ideology that

has its origin in Saudi Arabia. It continues to bedependent on US aid, yet resists American effortsto make such aid conditional. In spite of its criticalreliance on multifaceted Chinese support,Pakistani radicals link with Uighur separatists inXinjiang, and the issue of providing adequatesecurity to the Chinese engineers and technicians,continue to be irritants in Sino-Pakistan relations.

This chapter analyses the possible directionsPakistan’s foreign policy could take and thecontradictions that have emerged in its foreignpolicy stances and practices. The focus of thischapter is on Pakistan’s relationship with regionalcountries like India, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabiaas well as important extra-regional powers like theUS and China.

India1

In a situation of increasing instability, Pakistan’ssense of insecurity is likely to rise and lead to amore aggressive posture towards India resultingin turbulent India-Pakistan relations. It has to beremembered here that the basic framework ofPakistan’s foreign policy has always been India-centric. Pakistan, in the initial years after its creation,held the belief that India posed an existential threatto it. It has suffered from the small-state syndrome

1 For details on Pakistan’s perception of India and how Pakistan conducts its foreign policy towards India seeChaper IX, which is devoted entirely to the discussion on India-Pakistan relations.

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ever since its inception and has held on to the imageof India as the enemy. This has made it adopt ahighly aggressive posture towards India. It hasrelied on the strategy of sponsoring non-state actorsagainst India to destabilise it through covert means.It has continued to pursue an asymmetric optionin terms of a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir(J&K). Simultaneously, it has been following astrategy of destabilizing the Indian hinterland,which was underscored by the terror strike inMumbai on November 26, 2008 (26/11). Even whilePakistan has made overt gestures of cooperationwith India in the aftermath of 26/11, the subsequentarrest and release of suspects like Hafeez Saeedby the Pakistan government make amockery of Pakistani intentions. Pakistan’s existinginsecurities vis-à-vis India have been furtherheightened in the context of a ‘Rising India’ andit’s improving relations with the US. Pakistanperceives the differentiated strategy followedby the US towards India and Pakistan as a matterof grave concern2 (especially the Indo-UScivil nuclear deal).

In this context, it seems doubtful whether thePakistani establishment will give up its efforts tobuild up military capability against India or stopsponsoring non-state actors from fomentingtrouble within India. Richard Boucher at a SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations hearing in

December 2007 stated that most of the weapons tobe bought by Pakistan were meant principally forexternal security, although they were going to beused to support its counter-terrorism efforts as well.There is substantive evidence that Pakistan has usedmilitary aid from the US for shoring up its stock ofmodern weapons and equipment which could beused in conventional warfare rather than forcounter-insurgency purposes.3

There is a contradiction in Pakistan’s stand thatit would like dialogue to be resumed with Indiawithout taking any decisive action to root outentities based on its soil like the Lashkar-e-Taiba(LeT), which has been implicated in the Mumbaiterrorist attacks. India has time and again expressedits unhappiness at Pakistan’s inaction. Pakistan hasdone virtually nothing to bring the perpetrators ofthe Mumbai attack to book and has shown itsreluctance to destroy their camps and eliminate theirinfrastructure.4 It does not seem plausible that thePakistan government could deliver on this front,given its intricate links with the non-state actorsinvolved in terrorist acts in India. Any action takenagainst the LeT leadership is likely to be seen asbuckling under Indian pressure and is likely tocreate an intense domestic backlash. It could evenbe resisted by sections of the army. Pakistanleadership’s lack of intent has in any case been quiteperceptible since 2002. It has banned the LeT but

2 For instance former Foreign Secretary and High Commissioner to India Riaz Khokhar in an interview statedthat, “…this is where the US has ill-treated Pakistan. They have de-hyphenated this relationship. India is nowperceived to be in a different league…”. Interview with Shehryar Fazli, Newsline, February 2009, p.50.

3 In an interview with the Express News Channel in Pakistan, in September 2009, former president Musharrafreportedly stated: “Wherever there is a threat to Pakistan, we will use it [equipment provided by the US]there. If the threat comes from al-Qaeda or Taliban, it will be used there. If the threat comes from India, we willmost surely use it there….There is nothing like this equipment has come from the US and must only be usedagainst Taliban, or that equipment has come from China and must be used against this or that”. See for detailsBBC Report available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8254360.stm (Accessed January 19, 2010)

4 Indian Prime Minister’s address at a public meeting in Wanpoh (J&K) as reported by Shujaat Bukhari, ‘We’llInsist on Pakistan Taking Action Against Terror Network: Manmohan’, The Hindu, October 29, 2009, p.12.

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Travails of Uncertainty


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allowed it to operate under the name of Jamaat-ud-Dawa.5 The same is true for other India-focussedterrorist outfits like Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM),Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). Pakistan’s reliance on jihadiorganisations to fulfil its strategic objectives againstIndia largely explains its half-hearted approachtowards these outfits. Reports in early 2009 revealedthat the ISI had instructed area commanders of theLeT and HM to send at least 1,500 militants fromdifferent camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir(POK) to cause disruption in J&K and elsewhere.This despite the fact that there is internationalcondemnation of Pakistan’s complicity in abettingterrorism in neighbouring countries.

Afghanistan

Instability in Pakistan could adversely affect itsobjectives in the FATA region. As long as there is astrong and stable central authority in Pakistan it isable to control Taliban (both Pakistani and Afghan)activities across the border in Afghanistan. However,if the central authority weakens, the Taliban couldemerge as independent players, move intoAfghanistan at will and indulge in disruptiveactivities which could further vitiate relationsbetween Pakistan and Afghanistan. At the moment,sentiment within Pakistan for the formation of anindependent Pashtunistan has been contained.However, in the event of increasing instability

within Pakistan, the Pashtuns of Pakistan maygravitate towards Pashtuns across the Durand Lineand revive their demands for an independentPashutun homeland.

As it obtains today, Pakistan desires to havefriendly relations with Afghanistan. However, itspolicy of seeking strategic depth6 in Afghanistanby either seeking allies in Afghanistan or by tryingto establish a pliable regime in Kabul has onlyincreased the quotient of Afghan mistrust againstPakistan. Even as the Pakistan establishment is beingviewed by the US as part of the solution to theAfghan problem, it continues to support the Talibanwhich pose a challenge to Western forces inAfghanistan. The support which consists of money,military supplies and providing strategic planningguidance to Taliban commanders is said to becoordinated by operatives within the ‘S Wing’ ofthe ISI.7 Maintaining links with the Taliban isconsidered important for Pakistan to maintain itsinfluence in Afghanistan in the eventuality of anAmerican withdrawal from Aghanistan. Pakistandoes not want the vacuum to be filled up by anyother country in the region (especially India).8

This fear was articulated clearly by the Pakistanarmy spokesperson, Gen Athar Abbas, who said:“What we see is an over-involvement of Indians inAfghanistan— their government, their ministriesand their army. The fear is tomorrow what happensif these Americans move out and they are replaced

5 It was reported in a story by Zahid Hussain, in the Pakistani newsmagazine Newsline of December 2008, thatinspite of the ban on the LeT, Hafiz Saeed is allowed to address public rallies which call upon Muslims to jointhe jihad against India and the US. See p.22.

6 Strategic depth in Afghanistan is a fairly old concept in Pakistani thinking. In a recent statement, General Kayanireaffirmed this position while talking to a group of foreign correspondents at Rawalpindi. He reportedly stated:“If Afghanistan is peaceful, stable and friendly we have our strategic depth because our western border issecure ... You’re not looking both ways.” Reported in The News, February 2, 2010, Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/print3.asp?id=27014 (Accessed February 3, 2010).

7 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “US Says Agents of Pakistan Aid Afghan Taliban”, New York Times, March 26, 2009,athttp://www.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EDA1E30F935A15750C0A96F9C8...

8 Ibid.

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by Indians as military trainers? That becomes aserious threat.”9

Given this perception, it has suited Pakistan todraw a distinction between the ‘good Taliban’ andthe ‘bad Taliban’. The good ones are those who arereluctant to fight the Pakistani security forces anddo not indulge in suicide bombings within Pakistan.They are instead focused on resistance againstUS led Western forces in Afghanistan. The latterare those fomenting trouble within Pakistan.Disclosures about the Pakistani Army Chief GeneralKayani’s reference to Jalaluddin Haqqani, apowerful Taliban leader as a ‘strategic asset’10,reveal the Pakistani mindset and speak volumesabout its future intentions. Haqqani’s group is oneof the major ones said to be supported by the ISI,the other two being the Taliban based in Quetta,commanded by Mullah Muhammad Omar, and thenetwork run by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.11

The policy of overtly supporting the Karzairegime and taking on the so-called bad Talibanallows Pakistan to avail of monetary benefits fromthe international community. However this doesnot discourage Pakistan from covertly supportingthe so called good Taliban. American efforts to bringthese forces into the political mainstream wouldgive Pakistan future leverage within Afghanistan.Yet, Pakistan will have to calibrate its actions inAfghanistan if it values the US economic largesse.After the London Conference held on January 28,

2010, it is obvious that a strategic decision has beentaken to engage the Taliban, and Pakistan seeks toplay an increasingly important role in Afghanistan.The arrest of Mullah Omar’s son-in-law in March2010 and his right-hand man, Maulana Baradar inmid-February as well as the reported killing ofMohammad Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqaniin a US drone attack would indicate that Pakistanis under US pressure to act against the Taliban.

Even in the midst of deep-rooted mistrustbetween Pakistan and Afghanistan, there has beenan unprecedented growth of economic activitybetween the two countries during the last few years.However, in the short term it appears that despiteefforts to improve their economic relationship thedisturbed political equation between them wouldcontinue. It remains to be seen whether the twocountries will be able to resolve contentious issuesand formulate mutually acceptable options torenew their transit trade agreement as scheduled.The political and the economic relationshipsbetween the two countries are likely to run on twoparallel tracks. Due to its landlocked geography,Afghanistan not only offers a captive market forPakistan’s goods and services, but also provides anopportunity for Pakistan to establish its strategiccontrol, by leveraging Afghan economicdependence.

Pakistan would continue to be wary of Indianinfluence in Afghanistan and would continue totake measures to neutralise India’s presence as is

9 Quoted in The Times of India, July 12, 2009.10 In a telephonic conversation General Kayani was overheard saying this, as the transcript of intercept passed

to Mike McConnell, the Director of US National Intelligence, revealed in May 2008. Mentioned by DavidSanger in his book The Inheritance, Bantam Press: London, 2009, p. 248.

11 Christine Fair, Asistant Professor at Georgetown University in the US, in her testimony to the House ArmedServices Committee’s Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on November 5, 2009 also accuses Pakistanof “limiting its war on terrorism to those elements that undermine the Pakistani state” and states that “thoseelements are not comprehensively the enemies of the United States”. She also confirms that there is continuedsupport for the Afghan Taliban by Pakistan. Available at http://home.comcast.net/~christine_fair/index.html



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evident from the two bomb attacks on the Indianembassy in Kabul in July 2008 and early October2009 and the recent attacks on Indians in March 2010.Pakistan accuses India of fomenting trouble inBalochistan through its consulates in Afghanistan,but the Afghan government has consistentlyrebutted such claims.

Pakistan’s increasingly strident endeavours toprevent India from playing a constructive role inAfghanistan have become more apparent of late. Itwas primarily because of Pakistani insistence thatIndia was kept out of the Istanbul Conference andconsigned to a secondary role at the LondonConference held in January 2010.

There has been intense debate within variousstrands of the US decision-making apparatus aboutUS withdrawal from Afghanistan within the next2-3 years. President Obama’s speech onDecember 2, 2009, while annoouncing the increaseof US troops by 30,000 in Afghanistan, also indicatedtheir exit from Afghanistan within 18 months. Realaction on the ground, however, will be determinedby the course of the war on the one hand, and thenegotiations with the Taliban on the other.

At the same time, there is an opinion in somesegments of Afghan officialdom that US strategicinterests would dictate a long-term presence of notless than 10-15 years. This will, of course, haveimplications for Pakistan’s relations withAfghanistan. If the US moves out sooner rather thanlater, Pakistan will probably get an easierenvironment to operate in Afghanistan, but at thesame time it could feel constrained if some regionalarrangement to manage Afghanistan is arrived atafter the US exit.

Saudi Arabia

In a situation of instability Pakistan will considerit important to safeguard its economic well being.Its approach to Saudi Arabia will be determinedby the fact that the latter is a critical element inPakistan’s energy security calculus. Pakistanimports more than 50 per cent of its crude oil fromSaudi Arabia. Of late, Pakistan has sought to importoil from Saudi Arabia on a deferred payment basisin an attempt to boost reserves and offset the impactof rising international petroleum prices. This is notsurprising given that in the past, Pakistan has beenable to extricate a similar concession especially afterthe 1998 nuclear tests.

Reportage on the issue points to the fact thatSaudi Arabia, after three years of deferredpayments, wrote off the rest. However, somedoubts exist as to whether the remaining amountwas converted into a grant or is outstanding evennow.12 In 2008, the Saudi government agreed inprinciple to defer payment for crude oil sales toPakistan, worth about $5.9 billion. Nevertheless, itis not clear whether there was a delay in activatingthis facility for deferred payment. It is believed thatSaudi Arabia made its support contingent on thePakistan government’s agreement with the IMF.13

On the other hand, Pakistan is likely to beincreasingly relevant for Saudi Arabia in the latter’squest for food security. Saudi efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat production are expected to befurther constrained due to water shortages, asunderground water in the Arab countries is fastdepleting. The Saudis hope to grow food inPakistan, amongst other countries, on land leasedto them in Pakistan and then take it back home, to

12 Syed Rashid Husain, ‘Saudi Oil Facility or Grant?, The Dawn, July 28, 2008, at http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/28/ebr13.htm

13 ‘Saudi Response ‘Positive’ to Pakistan’s Requests: Tarin’, The Dawn, November 6, 2008, at http://www.dawn.com/2008/11/06/top3.htm

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lower consumer prices as well as their food importbill. The Saudi government will take on lease about700,000 acres of farmland in Pakistan as reported inSeptember 2009. The attempt by the Pakistangovernment to attract investment through farmingwas initiated during President Musharraf’s rule.14

Such policies also promoted by the currentgovernment have given rise to concerns withinPakistan.

Pakistan would also try to broad-base itsdefence cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Pakistantraditionally sent military units/instructors/airforce pilots to Saudi Arabia to bolster its internaland external security requirements, before the UScame in as the guarantor of Saudi Arabia’s security.While Pakistan cannot aspire to become an armssupplier of any consequence for Saudi Arabia whichhas been primarily relying for modern weapons onthe West (especially the US), it can still hope to gainsome petro-dollars from by selling the Al Khalidtank and through the marketing of the JF-17 fighterjet co-produced with China to Saudi Arabia.15

Pakistan has established its relevance to Saudi

Arabia’s security interests as well. It seems that theimportance of safeguarding Saudi oil reserves hasbecome intertwined with Saudi Arabia’s otherregional security concerns in which threatperceptions from Iran and Israel form a significantcomponent.16 In such a situation, Pakistan hashelped assuage Saudi security concerns in variousways. According to some reports Pakistanconcluded a secret agreement with Saudi Arabiato provide nuclear weapons technology in 2003.Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have denied theseclaims. However, reports claimed that there hadbeen a deal according to which Pakistan agreed totransfer nuclear technology in exchange for cheapoil.17 While such reports cannot be easily verified,earlier instances point to the mutual understandingin this respect, between both countries.Saudi Arabia reportedly provided financialsupport for Pakistan’s nuclear programme18, andit is believed that in the early 1990s Saudi Arabiawas interested in seeking Pakistani nuclearwarheads for its CSS-2 missiles acquired fromChina19. The Defence Minister of Saudi ArabiaPrince Sultan bin Abdulaziz visited the Kahuta

14 Najma Sadeque, ‘Giving Away the Family Silver’, Newsline, October 2009,pp.22-23; ‘Pakistan to Lend 700,000Acres Farmland to Arab States’, The Dawn, September 2, 2009 at http://www.dawn.com

15 Syed Rashid Hussain, ‘Crown Prince Abdullah due on 15th’, April 4, 2006, at http://www.dawn.com/2006/04/04/top9.htm; Ahmed Faruqui, ‘Pakistan’s Three Way Relationship with China and Saudi Arabia’, 18 December,2006 at http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=fb5752ba203daf8e9...; ‘PakistanMarketing its new JF-17 Fighter Jet, Developed with China, 25 March, 2009, at http://worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2009/ea_china0248_03_25.asp

16 For a discussion on Saudi Arabia’s threat perceptions from Iran and Israel see Kate Amlin, ‘Will Saudi ArabiaAcquire Nuclear Weapons?’, Issue Brief, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Instituteof International Studies, August 2008, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_40a.html.

17 Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‘Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in Secret Nuke Pact: Islamabad Trades Weapons Technologyfor Oil’, The Washington Times, October 22, 2003 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/031022-pakistan_saudi-arabia.htm

18 ‘Saudi Nuclear Pact’, Washington Post, January 18, 1981; ‘Mohammed Al-Khilewi: Saudi Arabia is Trying ToKill Me’, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 5, No.3, September 1998, p.74 cited in “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan,A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assesment”, The International Institute for StrategicStudies, London, 2007, p.83.

19 Mansoor Ijaz, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Metastasis: How Widespread Is The Cancer?, The Weekly Standard, January8, 2004; Ronen Bergman,‘El-Sulayil Missile Base-Saudi Desert’, Yediot Ahronot, 27 March 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020327-saudi.htm cited in Ibid, p.83.



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Research Laboratories in May 1999, and also inAugust 2002.20

Pakistan’s dependence on Saudi Arabia formediation in its domestic politics is also likely tocontinue. Saudi Arabia’s influence in Pakistan canbe gauged from the fact that in the past, in times ofpolitical crisis, Pakistan has relied on mediation bySaudi Arabian high officials. This was apparentduring Z.A. Bhutto’s time, when the Saudiambassador in Islamabad was called upon to bringabout reconciliation between the Pakistan NationalAlliance (PNA) and the Pakistan People’s Party(PPP). Later, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifvisited the US during the Kargil crisis, he wasreceived at the airport by the Saudi ambassador.Saudi leadership was closely involved indiscussions with General Musharraf for facilitatingNawaz’s exile to the Saudi kingdom, and later in aface-saving exit for Musharraf himself.21 It was againthrough Saudi good offices that Nawaz Sharif’swife and his brother were allowed to enter Pakistanin the run up to the elections after PresidentMusharraf demitted office. It is because of itsapparent power of persuasion and acceptability toall parties, including the US, Afghanistan andPakistan, that the leadership of that country has oflate been closely involved in negotiating with theTaliban, in an effort to manage the situation inAfghanistan.

Pakistan’s ties with Saudi Arabia have helpedit in consolidating its Islamic identity. Yet, Saudifunding for madrassas in Pakistan during theAfghan jihad spawned the phenomenonof fundamentalism within Pakistan, thereverberations of which are being felt in Pakistantoday. This has given rise to concerns within certainsections of the country, other than the Deobandis,

about the role of Saudi Arabia. Yet, Saudi Arabia’sclose ties with both the political leadership, as wellas the clergy, in Pakistan are likely to continue.

The US

Growing instability in Pakistan could makePakistan increasingly dependent on the US.Pakistan’s fragile economic situation will becomean important imperative in formulating its policytowards the US. In the past, Pakistan’s alliance withthe US was shaped by its strategic location in thecontext of the Cold War and this determined itsstrategic outlook. Since then, Pakistan has soughteconomic and military assistance from the West.During President Musharraf’s time, in addition tothe above stated goals, safeguarding the country’snuclear and missile assets, the Kashmir cause andregime survival were other factors that shapedPakistan’s policy towards the US.

There are bound to be fluctuations inPakistan’s relationship with the US due to the factthat Pakistan’s response or attitude towards theUS is not homogenous. In such a situation, the USfinds it possible to play one section against anotherto attain its objectives. Taking the plea ofsuppressing terrorism, the US finds it possible, ina way, to infringe on Pakistan’s sovereignty withdrone attacks which cause immense collateraldamage. Pakistan has had to bear the brunt ofAmerican interference in its internal affairs,because of growing instability. This hasengendered huge anti-American sentiment inPakistan. Given the worsening economicsituation, Pakistan will have to bear with theopposition and allow US intrusions to ensureuninterrupted US aid. While a stable Pakistan mayhave developed an ability to resist American

20 Ibid., p.83.21 Mushahid Hussain, ‘Family Ties’, Newsline, October 2009, pp.33-34.

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interference, an unstable Pakistan will most likelybe unable to do so.

Pakistan has succeeded in garnering economicassistance from the US through the controversialKerry-Lugar Act, which sanctioned $7.5bn ineconomic aid for a period of five years. This is byfar the most generous package by a single country,even though the Act became the focus oftremendous criticism from different quarters inPakistan including the politicians, the army andthe media due to the conditionalities imposed by itpertaining to strenghtening democratic governance,combating terrorism and cooperation indismantling the nuclear proliferation network.However, Pakistan should be happy becauseviolation of conditionalities will affect onlysecurity related assistance, not development aid.Yet, continued compliance with the US dictates mayprovoke the militant groups to further target themilitary and intelligence establishment in Pakistan.

Pakistan will also continue to use the US toachieve its objectives vis-à-vis India, even though itfaces increasing threats to its internal security onaccount of American presence in the country.Pakistan has been able to use arms transfers fromthe US to build up its conventional war-fightingcapacity against India. On the political front, sincethe Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008,Pakistan has placed emphasis on resumption ofdialogue with India and tried to use the US in thisrespect. Pakistan succeeded to some extent in itsgoals as contacts at the political level were resumed,as was evident at Sharm-el Sheikh in July 2009, evenas India remained dissatisfied with Pakistan’sactions against the perpetrators of the Mumbaiattacks. The foreign secretary level talks on February2010 also suggest that American persuasion may beworking to a certain extent. However, Indiacontinues to insist that Pakistan has to takeappropriate action against terrorists and terroroutfits operating from its soil against India. The

conditionalities attached to the Kerry-Lugar Actalso underscore the need for serious action againstterrorists operating against India which point to agreater emphasis on results by the US.

Given the chance, Pakistan would inveigle theUS into pressurising India for arriving at asatisfactory solution to the Kashmir issue. The UScontinues to refuse any mediatory role andemphasises a bilateral approach to resolve the issue.Nevertheless, there are sections within the USadministration who believe that the US must notabandon Kashmir entirely. The Indian government,however, rejects third party intervention in Kashmirand has gone to the extent of saying that Kashmir isnot negotiable, as was evident in the Indian HomeMinister Chidambaram’s statement that Pakistan isan “unnecessary third party” to the Kashmirdispute.

The profile of the US-Pakistan relationship ischanging. The expansion of the US embassy overacres of land in Pakistan implies a long termmilitary and diplomatic presence in Pakistan.American strategy would be focused on capturingor killing the Al-Qaeda leadership reportedlyhiding in Pakistan. Besides, the US would like toensure that Pakistan’s nuclear assets do not fall intowrong hands. Despite the demand in a major sectionof the Pakistani population to make a break withthe US, the latter would continue to be an importantfactor in Pakistan’s foreign policy and strategicoutlook.

China

As Pakistan veers towards increasing instability,its already deep reliance on Chinese assistance inmultiple areas is going to increase. Pakistan,playing on China’s desire to prevent or slow downIndia’s ascendance as an Asian power ofconsequence, will continue to bolster its capabilitiesin diverse areas with Chinese assistance. Pakistanhas looked for allies outside the region in an effort



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to redress its multi-dimensional imbalance vis-à-vis India. In addition to traditional cooperationbetween the two countries in the areas of defence,nuclear weapons and missile production, which isembedded in their common urge to countervailIndia, there has arisen a mutual interdependencefor finding markets for their goods, investment forindustrial growth, assured sources of energy, andinfrastructure development in transport andcommunications.

Pakistan’s reliance on China for defencesupplies is likely to continue. During the 1970s andthe 1980s, Pakistan continued to be among the topfive recipients of Chinese arms.22 In terms ofvolume, Pakistan imported approximately 28.25per cent of its weaponry from China between 1995-2005 making it the largest exporter of weapons toPakistan followed by Ukraine, France, the US andItaly.23 Even today Pakistan’s dependence onChinese technology to upgrade its future militarycapabilities is more than apparent, especially withrespect to the modernisation of its air force. InNovember 2009, Pakistan signed a $1.4 billioncontract for the supply of 36 J-10 fighter jets

supposed to be China’s most advanced combataircraft.24 Various reports suggest that the J-10 couldbe a derivative of the 1980s Israeli Lavi project, withChinese and Russian equipment instead of Westernavionics and engines. It has been pegged as a thirdgeneration fighter comparable to the American F-16 Fighting Falcons. The option of inducting moresuch aircraft remains open.25 In addition, Pakistanand China, in March 2009, signed a contract for 42co-produced JF-17 Thunder jet fighters which arelight weight, all-weather and multi-role combat jetsand are expected to form an important componentof the Pakistani aerial combat fleet in the future.26

In fact, the first JF-17 was inducted into the fleet ofthe Pakistani Air Force on November 23, 2009.27 Asfar as the Pakistan Navy is concerned, it receivedthe first of four Chinese F-22 P Frigates in September2009 with the rest expected by 2013. Out of theremaining three, two are to be built in China, andone in Karachi. The F- 22P Frigate is equipped withstate of the art weaponry and sensors including anti-surface-missiles, surface-to-air missiles, guns,torpedoes, depth charge and air surveillanceradars.28 Besides such major weapons systems

22 Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-1985, Oxford University Press,Oxford, 1987; SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 208-211 cited in Samina Yasmeen, ‘Sino-Pakistan Relations and theMiddle East’, in P.R. Kumaraswamy (ed.), China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence, Sage PublicationsIndia Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1999, p.95.

23 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, ‘Imported Weapons to Pakistan in 1995-2005’, March 2, 2006, at www.sipri.org24 The Daily Times, ‘Pakistan-China in $1.4 Billion Fighter Jet Deal’, 11 November, 2009 at http://

www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C11%5Cstory_11-11-2009_pgl_525 ‘Pak to Buy 36 Chinese J-10 Fighters, Options Open for 114 More’, November 11, 2009, at http://

www.dnaindia.com/world/report_pak-to buy-36-chinese-j-10-fighters-options-open-for-114-more_1310...;‘Pakistan Buying Chinese J-10 Fighters’, 11 November, 2009, at http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Pakistan-Buying-Chinese-J-10-Fighters-05937/

26 ‘China, Pakistan Sign JF-17 Production Agreement; China to Credit Finance PakistaniFighter Jets’, March 8,2009, at http://www.india-defence.com/print/4265

27 ‘PM Hands Over Pak-Made JF-17 Aircraft to PAF’, 23 November, 2009 at http://www. dawn.com; ‘FirstPakistan-Made JFFighter Rolls Out’, November 23, 2009, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/23/content_12526588.htm

28 ‘Pakistan First F-22 Frigate Arrives in Karachi’, September 12, 2009, at http://www.nation.com/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/12-Sep-2009/Pakistan-first-F22-frigate-arrives-in-Karachi;‘Pakistan Navy To Acquire Four Chinese F-22 P Frigates By 2013’, April 13, 2007, at http://www.india-defence.com/print/3034

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China has provided $290 million for capacitybuilding of the Pakistani security forces in counter-terrorism,29 as per the reports in June 2009, whichsuggests a more direct role for China in helpingPakistan fight militancy.

The emphasis by the leaderships of both thecountries on economic cooperation is likely tocontinue. In August 2009, Zardari visited theindustrial hubs of China, Zhe Jiang and GuangDong, which account for more than US $ 3 billionof the trade volume between Pakistan and China,to explore further possibilities of bilateral trade andeconomic cooperation. The civilian governments’aspirations to improve the economic content of thePakistan-China relationship are no different fromthat of the military-led government of PervezMusharraf, who worked towards broadening thestrategic economic engagement between the twocountries. Trade and investment can be expectedto be a major focus of bilateral relations. While thequantum of bilateral trade has gone up over theyears, the balance of trade has never been inPakistan’s favour.

This is due to the fact that Pakistan’s export mixto China is narrow, comprising of low-margin, low-value raw material and commodity exports ratherthan value-added high-margin and high-valuegoods . Yet, Pakistan is the first south Asian countryto sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with China,and both countries are seeking to increase thevolume of trade to US $ 15 billion by 2011 (thevolume of trade in 2008 was around US $ 7 billion).The key issue in progress in trade relations and theFTA will be the ability of the Pakistani economy to

make a quantum leap in its exports to China. Thiswould depend on structural changes in Pakistan’seconomy as well as export-driven investment invalue-added sectors by Chinese firms in Pakistan.There would be a strong emphasis on bilateralinvestments as both countries realise that enhancingthe trade relationship is a long-term project that ishighly dependent on the initiative of Chineseenterprises and on administrative and policychanges in Pakistan. It will also depend on thevision and farsightedness of Pakistani businessmenwho are currently profitably engaged in exportingto the US and Europe where their value-addedgoods enjoy a competitive advantage. Hence,investment-driven growth will assume importance,as it is the only key result area in which bothcountries can show fast progress. Chinesecompanies have invested in different sectors of thePakistan economy ranging from oil and gas,information technology, telecommunications,power generation, engineering, automobiles,infrastructure, mining, real estate, and financialmarkets. This trend is bound to strengthen in thefuture.

Energy cooperation will continue to be a keycomponent of cooperation between Pakistan andChina. Energy security has been a prime concern inPakistan’s development strategy. According toreports in the Pakistani media, one of the majoroutcomes of President Zardari’s visit in October2008 was the signing of a civilian nuclearcooperation agreement for the setting up of twomore nuclear energy plants— Chashma III andChashma IV. These two units are expected to yield680 MW of electricity.30 However, this was not

29 On June 24, 2009, Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s Interior Minister, said in the National Assembly: “Due to theefforts of the President and the Prime Minister, the Chinese Government has provided $290 million forcapacity building of our security forces.” cited by B. Raman, “The China Connection”, Outlook, June 29, 2009.Avaliable at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?250311

30 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Beijing To Help Build 2 N-Plants: Islamabad Eyes New Era In Ties’, October 19, 2008, athttp://www.dawn.com/2008/10/19/top2.htm



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included in the MoUs signed between the twogovernments during that visit. While this could bebecause of the requirement of a waiver from thenuclear suppliers group, a report of the FinanceMinistry of Pakistan lists, in the budget estimatefor 2009-2010, loans from China including that forChashma Nuclear power plants III & IV.31 Also itwas reported that in April 2009, the ShanghaiNuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute(SNERDI), a subsidiary company of the StateNuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC),signed a General Engineering Contract in Shanghaiwith China Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation(CZEC) to provide engineering design andtechnical service for Pakistan’s Chashma III and IVunits.32 Whether a formal agreement was signedbetween Pakistan and China, or if an agreementwas signed and not made public, such cooperationcould help Pakistan in achieving the future goal ofthe Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, whichhopes to increase the country’s nuclear powergeneration capacity to 8,800 MW by 2030.

Pakistan is also looking to China for furtherinvestment in its hydro-power sector as is evidentin the signing of the MoU in August 2009 for theBunji Dam mega power project in the NorthernAreas, which is only one of the many being planned.President Zardari has also shown keenness to startthe Thar coal project because of its potentialsignificance in Pakistan’s quest for self-reliance inenergy. The importance of China for Pakistan in itsstrategic calculations is evident in Pakistan’sproposal for inclusion of China in the Iran-Pakistan-

India gas pipeline project, in which the Chinesehave evinced interest. Reports still do not clearlyindicate whether the Chinese would want thepipeline to be extended to China or whether theywant to just invest in it.

China has been closely involved in the task ofimproving Pakistan’s capabilities to import andexport seaborne energy supplies by assisting in thedevelopment of the Gwadar port. China, of course,hopes to benefit by having an alternate route for itsoil imports. The importance of this project for Chinacan be gauged from the fact that the total projectcost of constructing Phase-I was US $ 248 million,of which China supplied nearly 80 per centamounting to US $ 198 million. Of this, US $ 50million was to be an outright grant, US $ 50 milliona commercial credit, and US $ 98 million ChineseState credit.33 However, the operational utility ofthe port has been disappointing. The poor securitysituation due to the disruptive activities of theBaloch insurgents and the lack of infrastructureconnecting Gwadar to the rest of Pakistan has beenpartially responsible for this.

Terrorism and separatism have majorimplications for China’s plans to groweconomically by linking its western provinces tocentral Asia. The Karakoram Highway (KKH) linksPakistan with Xinjiang which has abundant naturalresources. It is also a strategic area vis-à-vis centraland south Asia. Beijing believes that this highwayhas facilitated the spread of Islamic ideology inXinjiang and enbled radical Uighur militants

31 Available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/admin/images/budget/Estimates%20ofForeign%20assistance%202009-10.pdf

32 ‘SNERDI Signed Engineering General Contract For Chashma IIIand IV Units To Help Pakistan Build MoreNuclear Power Plants’, at http://www.snptc.com.cn/sites/english/Lists/corporate%20news/DispForm.aspx?ID=34

33 ‘Economic Viability of Chinese-aided Strategic Port Development Questioned’, The News (Islamabad), August26, 2001; John W. Garver, ‘Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-westand South Asia’, The China Quarterly, 185, March 2006, pp.8-9.

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studying in Pakistani madrassas, to enter Xinjiang.34

Chinese concerns about Pakistan-based terroristshave been serious and the Chinese government hasrequested investigation of these by Pakistan fromtime to time. In April 2009, Chinese officials metNWFP politicians to request that access to Uighurseparatists be curtailed. In June 2009, Pakistanhanded over ten members of the Uighur diasporawho were reportedly rounded up during counter-insurgency operations in FATA and belonged tothe East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). toChina. While China will continue to pressurisePakistan to clamp down on Uighur dissidentswithin Pakistan, the Sino-Pakistan strategicrelationship may not get adversely affected in anyfundamental sense, as the other issues areoverwhelmingly important.

The security of Chinese nationals involved ininfrastructure development projects or otherwisein Pakistan has become a matter of concern forChina. The kidnapping of Chinese nationals byIslamic extremists in Islamabad, in July 2007 led tostrong condemnation by the Chinese ambassador.The storming of the Lal Masjid which wasattributed in part to Chinese concerns underscoresPakistan’s anxiety to address Chinese grievances.That Pakistan attaches importance to the safety ofChinese citizens on its soil is evident in theestablishment of a new Foreign Security Cell witha special unit responsible for the security of Chinesenationals.35

Apart from the threat of terrorism that theChinese face in Pakistan, rising Islamic extremism

would also influence Chinese policies towardsPakistan and developments there. In case Islamicextremists appear to be gaining the upper hand inPakistan, the Chinese can be expected to takemeasures to insulate the Xinjiang region from thisinfluence. The involvement of the Chinese can beexpected to grow if a situation arises whichthreatens their interests. There is a possibility thatthe Chinese may further increase their presence inthe Gilgit-Baltistan area where it is alreadynoticeable in the engineering and constructionteams of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) wherethey are undertaking various ‘developmental’projects including maintenance and up-gradationof the KKH and hydro-electric projects. Sourcessuggest their number to be in thousands.36

Attitude of the above CountriesTowards Pakistan

India’s attitude towards Pakistan is determinedby Pakistan’s endemic hostility, reflected in theaggressions of 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Besides,Pakistan’s “all-weather friendship” with China, andits strategically subservient relationship with theUS, is predicated on their presumed supportagainst India, even though on certain occasions thissupport may not have come up to the expectationsof Pakistan. India’s future attitude will flow fromthe extent to which Pakistan controls anti-Indiamilitancy and terrorism emanating from its soil.

Afghanistan’s perception of Pakistan has beeninfluenced by two fundamental geopoliticalrealities: one, that it is a landlocked country

34 Ziad Haider, ‘Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang’s Uighurs’, Asian Survey, Vol.No. 45, Issue No.4, July/August 2005, pp.523-524.

35 Mansoor Khan, “Guests in Town”, The Herald, May 2009, p.33.36 During discussions with some of the civil society activists from Gilgit-Baltistan during their visit to India in

September 2009, it was suggested that there were about 5000 Chinese in Gilgit-Baltistan alone. Anotherinternet source which features translations from Chinese government sources suggests that there are about2000 Chinese engineers involved in the upgrading of the KKH. For details see: http://www.sourcejuice.com/1305686/2010/02/17/Pakistan-Luo-Zhaohui-met-Pakistan-new-Gilgit-Baltistan-Province/



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contiguous to Pakistan and therefore dependenton it, and two, the politically and economicallydominant ethnic group of Afghanistan, namelyPashtuns, straddle the Afghan-Pakistan border andobliterate any concept of boundary between thetwo countries. In fact, the Durand Line is notrecognised by Afghanistan. Since its creation,Pakistan has looked upon Afghanistan withcovetous eyes, hoping to acquire direct or indirectcontrol over Afghanistan, so that it obtains therequisite strategic depth. This being the primarymotivation of Pakistan, it will seriously jeopardiseAfghanistan’s attempts to acquire political stabilityand strategic autonomy, on the basis of anindigenously evolved stable political system.

Saudi Arabia has always looked upon Pakistanas a strategic ally so that it can have access toPakistan’s rich resources and avail of its militarycapabilities for its own internal security purposes.However, predominant religious sections withinthe country have promoted Wahabism, which hasstrengthened the forces of Islamic orthodoxy inPakistan. This has resulted in the creation of themadrassa movement, support for the anti-Sovietjihad, and a broad-based popular support for theTaliban movement, after the exit of the former SovietUnion. These sections may not be concerned aboutdemocratic stability in Pakistan, and will beprimarily interested in the promotion of anorthodox version of Islam, close to Wahabism.

The US attitude has always been determinedby the strategic importance of Pakistan, first in thecontext of the Cold War, and then in the context ofthe war on terror. Currently, Pakistan is ofparamount importance for the US in the context ofthe latter’s Af-Pak policy. Irrespective of the extentto which Pakistan has been able to serve theseobjectives, the US perceives Pakistan as a very

important strategic ally, and will continue to paythe price in terms of military and economic aid toPakistan.

China, particularly after the 1962 war, haslooked upon Pakistan as a geopolitical asset whichcan be used to offset and neutralise India, andundermine the prospects of its dominance in southAsia. Ranging from diplomatic support at theUnited Nations, to transfer of nuclear technology,reactors, and other equipment, China has playedan important role in building Pakistan as a middlelevel power of some consequence. In the process,China is reaping considerable benefits, having beenenabled a role in creating and utilising strategicfacilities like ports, roads and possibly, pipelinesin Pakistan. The benign attitude of China towardsPakistan will continue in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

As different elements within the Pakistani statestruggle for control, there is likely to be an increasingpolitical role for the US in the region. The US hasalready approved of back-channel negotiationswith the Taliban. It is not only garnering the supportof Saudi Arabia, a long time ally, but also of Chinain trying to stabilise the situation in Pakistan. Evenif the US moves out of Afghanistan, it is bound tomaintain a significant presence within Pakistan.This would give it an opportunity to balance thealready overwhelming presence of China in thatcountry. The importance of Gwadar port is not loston the US. China’s involvement in Balochistan couldbe a matter of concern to the US as it would giveChina access to the Gulf and Iran.37

In fact, the US was allowed base facilities inGwadar by Pakistan, during the Afghan war (1979-1989) due to fears of the Soviets crossing intoBalochistan, and occupying Gulf oil fields, or the

37 See statement by Lt.Gen. (retd.) Talat Masood in article by Gloria Caleb, ‘Foreign Hand: Conspiracy or Fact?’,November 10, 2008, at http://www.dawn.com/2008/11/10/top17.htm

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fishing harbours of Gwadar and Pasni. The facilitieswere perhaps being used to monitor submarine andother naval movements in Makran.38

There is suspicion that the US is using Balochterritory in Pakistan to foment trouble in the Iranianprovince of Sistan-Balochistan by supporting theJundullah. Gwadar port being so close to the Straitsof Hormuz also has implications for India as itwould enable Pakistan to exercise control overenergy routes. It is believed that Gwadar willprovide Beijing with a facility to monitor US andIndian naval activity in the Persian Gulf andArabian Sea respectively, as well as any futuremaritime cooperation between India and the US.39

It is apparent that countries like the US and Chinaare in the future going to carve out their spheres ofinfluence in Pakistan. This would present a furtherchallenge to India’s security and foreign policy.

Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistancan be expected to remain adversarial given itsstrategic imperatives. If the militants succeed incontrolling the levers of power in Pakistan, thesituation will become perilous for India as theintegrity of the Pakistani state will be underminedand its will to improve relations with India will becompromised. In such a situation, the US rolewould decrease, and it is probable that the militantswould give a tough fight to the NATO forces inAfghanistan. Such a situation would be a cause ofconcern to China as it could have grave implicationsfor militancy in Xinjiang. The reasons may bedifferent, but the interests of all countries can onlybe assured if Pakistan is supported in its quest forstability. This offers a unique opportunity for Indiato work together with Afghanistan and the US tostabilise the situation in the Af-Pak region.

38 Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-1994, I.B.Tauris, London,1997, p.90.

39 Zia Haider quoted in article by Abdus Sattar Ghazali, ‘India Alarmed As Chinese Built Gwadar Port ofPakistan Becomes Operational’, March 8, 2009, at http://pakalert.worldpress.com/2009/03/08/india-alarmed-as-chinese-built-gwadar-port-ofppakistan-becomes-operational/



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CHAPTER IV

FROM ISLAMISATION TO TALIBANISATION:POSSIBLE LEBANONISATION?

Islamic forces in Pakistan have acquireddistinctly radical ‘Jihadi’ and activist characterunder Wahabi-Salafi and Deobandi influences. Thishas major implications for the country. Despite theirkeen desire to create a state for the Muslims of thesubcontinent based on Islamic values and savethem from having to live in a secular and free Indiaas a grossly outnumbered minority1 , mostprotagonists of the Pakistan movement did not wantPakistan to be a Shariat (The Islamic Law) basedtheocratic state.2 Since such a state demands allaspects of life to be governed by the injunctions ofIslam, it would have opened the Pandora’s Box ofsectarian differences within Islam. It would havebeen problematic for the leadership to accept thefiqh (the Islamic Jurisprudence) of one sect anddisregard all others. Any attempt to rationalise the

contested provisions of different fiqhs and create auniform shariat-based order for the whole nationwould have been suicidal.

It was, therefore, no surprise that on the eve ofindependence, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, theundisputed leader of the Pakistan movement, spokeof setting up a secular order in the country (hisspeech on August 11, 1947 in the ConstituentAssembly of Pakistan).

3 His successors made effortsto create a façade of ‘Democratic Islam’. DuringZulfikar Ali Bhutto’s time, there was even a talk ofgiving this Islam a ‘socialist’ colour. However, thetendency to exploit Islam for political purposeswas a constant in Pakistani society and politics. Theelite in Pakistan— the feudal landowners, urbanpetit bourgeoisie, the Muslim bureaucrats of

1 Choudhary Rahmat Ali who coined the term PAKISTAN in a pamphlet ‘Now or Never: Are we to Live orPerish Forever?’, (published on January 28, 1933), felt that the new nation was to be the home of Punjabis,Afghans (Pashtuns), Kashmiris, Sindhis and Baluchistanis. Interestingly, this definition of the proposed Muslimstate did not include the Bengalis, who were to be the most populous ethnic group in it.

2 Muslim League’s 1940 Lahore Resolution, later dubbed as Pakistan Resolution, demanded that the“geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted ……….that theareas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority……..should be grouped to constitute ‘IndependentStates”. Earlier, preparing the background for this call for a separate nation for the Muslims, in his presidentialaddress Jinnah declared that India should be free, but, “If the Hindus were to be free and the Muslims wereto be their slaves, it was hardly a freedom for which Muslims could be asked to fight”.

3 Jinnah had said, “You may belong to any religion or cast and creed that has nothing to do with the business ofthe State.” He went on to add that the new nation should keep that goal before itself and “in course of timeHindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense…………..butin the political sense as citizens of the State”.

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the erstwhile British Indian Government and thenewly created Pakistan army — even whileswearing by Islam, had no desire to convert theirnation into a shariat based state and had ‘secularist’tendencies.. Politicians and political parties like thePakistan Muslim League (PML) used Islam only asa political tool. The call to Islam became a means toovercome ethnic, sectarian and cultural diversities.It is interesting to note that throughout Pakistan’shistory, periodic chants of “Islam in Danger” havebeen accompanied by efforts to drum up anti-Indiahysteria to keep Pakistan together.

However, despite Jinnah’s secular vision, theIslamic right, mainly comprising Islam-pasandparties like the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) that had opposed partition, and theJamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) that was a creationof free Pakistan, did not take long to mount pressureon the regime to concede their demands for greaterreligious measures. The anti-Ahmadiya agitationof the 1953 became the first political bandwagon inthe country for these Islamists. The ruling elite didnot have any clear strategy to deal with thefundamentalist brigade’s challenge and ended upconceding many of its demands in the 1956Constitution of Pakistan4 and declared Pakistan an“Islamic Republic”.5

Islamic orthodoxy hascontinued to cast its lingering shadow on the

nation’s psyche ever since. Jinnah’s successors didnot have the required charisma, appeal, convictionand ability to inspire respect amongst the peopleto take a bold and principled stand and steer thenation away from Islamist and theocratictendencies. However, Jinnah’s vision of creating asecular Pakistan remained a romantic politicaldream and, even while speaking of setting up ademocratic order in the country, the ObjectiveResolution, which Pakistan’s Constituent Assemblyadopted on March 12, 1948, vested sovereignty ofthe state in ‘Allah’ (not in the people of Pakistan)and sowed the seeds of religious fundamentalism.....

6

The first constitution adopted in 1956 emphasisedIslamic credentials and termed Pakistan as ‘IslamicRepublic of Pakistan’.

This phenomenon continued during the Ayubera. Even though his constituency consisted of thearmy and the expanding Pakistani industrialistclass, General Ayub Khan still had to pander to theIslamists and their sentiments. The newConstitution prepared under him had initiallychanged the name of the state to “Republic ofPakistan” by dropping the word ‘Islamic’ from it.However, it was reverted to “Islamic Republic ofPakistan” when the National Assembly formedunder the new Constitution (promulgated inMarch 1962) carried out the First Amendment in

4 Details of the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan, as obtained from http://pakistanspace.tripod.com/archives/56_00.htm

5 Hassan Abbas also makes more or less the same points in his book, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, theArmy and America’s War on Terror, London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005.

6 The Objective Resolution, officially titled as Resolution on the Aims and Objective of the Constitution, declared,“Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority, which He hasdelegated to the State of Pakistan.... for being exercised within the limits set by Him, is a sacred trust”. Underthe new order “the principles of democracy, freedom, equality tolerance and social justice, as enunciated byIslam shall be fully observed” and under it, “Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual andcollective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam, as set in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah”. It isinteresting to note that the Objective Resolution was included in toto in the Preamble of the Constitution (1956)or formed the basis of the Preamble (1962). However, the 1973 Constitution did not refer to it directly, thoughit carried its key provisions relating to State’s commitment to ushering in an Islamic polity in the country.Ultimately, however, in 1985, General Zia-ul Haq made the Objective Resolution an Annexe of the 1973Constitution through a Presidential Order.

From Islamisation to Talibanisation: Possible Lebanonisation?


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December 1962 and inserted Islamic measures inthe statute book.

7

During the rule of Zia-ul Haq, Pakistan’s latentradical Islamic instincts, finding a conduciveatmosphere, sprouted new shoots and jihadi fervourovertook Pakistan after Soviet intervention inAfghanistan in December 1979. Islamic politicalparties and their front organisations in the Deobandispectrum, who were quick to jump on Zia’spolitical bandwagon, gained the most andexpanded their influence and reach at the cost ofothers like the Barelvis, Shias, minorities and others.A radical and activist Islamic agenda wasprogressively encouraged by almost all the rulersof Pakistan who followed Jinnah, including ZulfikarAli Bhutto who called himself a socialist. However,this ‘jihadist Islam’ did not come from outside thecountry; its seeds were lying embedded in thecollective sub-consciousness of a large section ofthe Muslim masses of the country. ConcernedPakistani official and non-official lobbies played adistinct role in nurturing and exporting this jihadifervour to other countries in the context ofAfghanistan and, to a major extent, to Kashmir. Thisspirit of jihad has now come home to roost. Theprevailing fundamentalist and activist religioustraits in Pakistan makes one dread the inevitabilityof the looming national catastrophe, particularlybecause there is still no debate on where themosque’s role is to end and the state’s responsibilitiesto start in the affairs of the nation.

The Era of ‘Pan-Islamism’

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who assumed power in the

most peculiar circumstances following the 1971debacle in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh),mouthed socialistic slogans as also Islamic ones,particularly those stressing egalitarianism andsocial justice to legitimise his economic doctrines,as also to avoid running foul of the Islamists.However, there was no attempt to include specificIslamic laws in the legal system until it becamepolitically expedient to do so towards the beginningof 1977.8 Bhutto’s preference to stay on the rightside of the Islamic lobby was clear in the 1973Constitution itself. This document represented acompromise consensus on the issue of role of Islam.9

Islam was declared as the state religion andPakistan continued to be “Islamic Republic ofPakistan”. Some other Islamic measures that wereintroduced in the 1973 Constitution included,among others, a definition of those as non-Muslimswho did not believe in the finality of Prophethood.Acting under this provision, through the SecondAmendment (September 17, 1974) the Ahmadiyaswere subsequently declared as non-Muslims and along-standing demand of the Islamic lobby wasconceded.10

However, Bhutto’s most significant action thatnot only strengthened the Pakistani Islamists, butalso laid the foundations of internationalnetworking between official and non-official Islamicbodies, was his encouragement to pan-Islamism.Islamic countries had come together at Rabat inMorocco in September 1969, but had done very littlesince then to organise themselves into a well-knitbody. Bhutto seized the opportunity and broughtHeads of Islamic States to Lahore for the 2nd Islamic

7 Details of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan can be obtained from http://pakistanspace.tripod.com/archives/62_00.htm

8 “Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia” by Anita M. Weiss in her book Islamic Reassertion inPakistan, Vanguard Books: Pakistan, 1987.

9 Ibid.10 Details of the 1973 Constitution with the amendments can be accessed at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/

constitution/

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Summit on February 22-24, 1974, to not only launchthe Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) butalso to define its structure and agenda.

The Lahore OIC Summit in 1974 organised byZ.A. Bhutto immediately after Pakistan’s defeat in1971 offered Pakistanis some solace by offeringvisions of pan-Islamic grandeur. They felt certainthat the summit had sown the seeds of a “UnitedStates of Islam”, with themselves at its centre, havingaccess to its vast oil resources and riches, substantialstrategic assets and even military muscle. Closerelations between Pakistan and a fast militarisingIran and Pakistani defense personnel on deputationin a number of Gulf countries during this periodstrengthened those notions. This general pan-Islamic drift of official policies strengthened similartendencies in the non-official circles. The Karachi-based Motamar al-Alam al-Islami (The WorldMuslim Congress) that had practically beendormant for the past so many years got a new leaseof life, and with official, as well as non-governmentalsupport, organised Islamic activities in variousMuslim countries. There was increased interactionbetween various other Pakistani Muslim NGOs andgroups with their counterparts in other Muslimcountries and communities. This increasednetworking among them had major implicationsfor growth of radical Islam in Pakistan in particularand the entire region as a whole in the next decade.

The myth of a united Ummah (the worldwideIslamic community) also strengthened the bondsbetween Pakistan’s Deobandi radical Islamists andWahabi-Salafi Saudis. The latter were already inascendancy because of the clout they enjoyed inthe OIC due to their oil-wealth and the massiveZakat money they could dole out to Islamiccommunities in less-developed Asian and Africancountries. The association between them and thePakistani Deobandis stoked the simmering sectariantensions in Pakistan (Deobandi versus Barelvis,Shias versus Sunnis) on the one hand, and promoted

Wahabi inspired radicalism internationally on theother. Greatly facilitated by Saudi zakat funding,Pakistani Deobandi radicals spread their madarssanetwork in the country far and wide. Sinceeducation ranked very low in state’s priorities andprivately-run schools were beyond the reach ofmost people, it was the madrassas run by Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and other radical Islamic parties, thatbecame, and still continue to be, the major providersof education for younger Pakistanis. They are usedto religiously brainwash and indoctrinate the youth,and the Islamic right, particularly the JI,successfully mobilised the youth to take to thestreets during late years of Bhutto’s rule. The JI’sstudent arm, the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT),played a critical role during the anti-Bhuttoagitation during the later part of the 1970s, and theforce which supported Afghanistan jihad in the1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s when the Pakistaniestablishment started training radical Islamic non-state actors to act as its agents to further its covertagenda in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the madrassasbelonging to various Islamic outfits became therecruiting grounds for jihadi foot soldiers.

The ‘Islamisation’ Era

The next phase of radicalisation underDeobandi influence came during General Zia-ulHaq’s period. Islamic political parties constituteda major bloc in the Pakistan National Alliance(PNA) that spearheaded the anti-Bhutto agitationin the second half of the 1970s over the issue ofrigging of the 1977 elections. Introduction of anIslamic order – Nizam-e-Mustafa (The order of theProphet)— was one of the major election planks ofthe PNA in these elections. As the confrontationbetween the PNA and the Bhutto regime continuedto paralyse the country, the Army Chief GeneralZia moved in and deposed Bhutto on July 5, 1977with a clear promise of holding fresh election within90 days. However, as the political situation becamemore vexed, elections were postponed and



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General Zia continued in power. He needed apolitical slogan and a constituency outside thearmy to counter Bhutto and his PPP. To create thesehe appropriated the PNA’s agenda of Islamisation.He contended that Pakistan was created in the nameof Islam and, therefore, Islam should be supreme inthe country, and he was going to ensure that.This suited the Islamic parties in the PNA, (JI, JUI,JUP and the Khaksar Tehriq) who welcomed Zia’sIslamisation call, as it allowed them to ascend topower without winning any election.11

Zia’s Islamisation programme covered fourbroad areas: economic matters, judicial reforms,introduction of Islamic penal code and a new‘Islamic’ educational policy. However, even in theseareas, at no stage did he seek to introduce Shariatprovisions in their totality which would havesupplanted the existing systems. He merely removedthose sections from the existing laws which were feltto be repugnant to the principles of Islam. Thewestern oriented secular system createdby the British, and retained by hisown Martial Law Administration, was allowedto continue untouched.12 Given this reality ofZia’s Islamisation measures, it was no surprise thatby the mid-1980s Islamic parties began todistance themselves from his government and bythe beginning of 1988, even the JI had enteredinto an anti-Zia alliance with the PPP.

Nonetheless, Zia’s Islamisation drive didstrengthen the Deobandi Islamic fundamentalistlobby in the country and provided it with an

opportunity to gain entry and find acceptance inthose sections of the society where it was treatedwith disdain until then.13

It also allowed Deobandi-oriented14 Islamic political parties (like JI, JUIfactions and groups like Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadis(JAeH)) to get better organised, widen theirorganisational networks and gain more popularacceptance, which played a crucial role in the nextphase of Islamic development in the country.A programme to convert Pakistan into a theocracyas per Deobandi precepts commenced.Naturally, it accentuated not only the existingShia-Sunni differences, but even intra-Sunnidifferences between the Deobandis and the Barelvis.It also made radical Deobandis even less tolerantof the non-Muslim minorities and there weremany attacks on the Christians on flimsyallegations of committing blasphemy againstIslam. It is also interesting to note that it wasduring Zia’s rule that Pakistan’s officialagencies began to raise non-state actors inclose association with JI and others to targetthe Shias and the Christians who were resentful ofvarious aspects of official Islamisation policiesand to export and sponsor armed-insurrection inJammu & Kashmir.

The Era of Jihad and the Emergenceof the Taliban

Two events in the late 1970s, namely, AyatollahKhomeini’s Islamic revolution in Iran and the Sovietentry into Afghanistan (both in 1979) ensured that

11 “Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia” by Anita M. Weiss in her book Islamic Reassertion inPakistan, Vanguard Books, Pakistan.

12 Ibid.13 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and the Military, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Washington D.C., 2005.14 JI and Deobandi organisations differ on many issues at the political level. However, they share the same

religious perspectives as far as their approach to Islam is concerned. That is why JI is also being presented herein the discussion as a Deobandi-oriented organisation.

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Pakistan could no longer cloak its ‘radical’ Islamicsensibilities under the veneer of ‘Islamicdemocracy’. The era of the political exploitation ofIslam in Pakistan had come to an end and the one inwhich a radicalised Islam was to call the shots hadbegun.

Khomeini’s revolution unleashed an ‘activistIslam’ which did not accept the status quo. TheShiite identity of the Iranian revolution not onlyencouraged Shiite minorities in other countries tobecome bolder and assertive, but also created an‘activist’ Sunni backlash. By the beginning of the1980s, organisations like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan(SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) had emergedwith the express agenda of quelling Shiiteassertiveness by violence, because of their resistanceto be subjected to Islamic provisions of the FiqhHanafi (Sunni Jurisprudence) and instead ofdemanding Islamisation measures as per their FiqhJafariya (Shia Jurisprudence). The other targets ofthese groups were Pakistani Christians, whoopposed the Blasphemy Law vehemently as itbecame a tool in the hands of radical Islamists tohound them. Although the Pakistani state seeminglytried to restrain the SSP and the LeJ, the impunitywith which they carried out their pogrom againstShias and Christians, clearly hinted at theirpatronage by some sections of the establishment,particularly the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).....

15

The ISI, through political parties like the JI, hadalready launched a project to subvert the Kashmiris’emotional links with India by exploiting religioussensibilities. The era of involvement of Pakistanistate sponsored ‘non-state players’ in pursuit of‘national agenda’ had truly and fully dawned.

The Soviet entry into Afghanistan enabled Ziato play, albeit with US assistance and in activecollaboration with Pakistan’s Islamic politicalparties, the great game of espionage and subversionin Afghanistan that had been played by Russia andBritain in the nineteenth century. The Afghan Jihadmarked the beginning of a wider plan for launchingglobal Islamic activism under Pakistani leadershipthat continued well after Zia.16

By the end of 1980not only massive US military and economic aidwas flowing into Pakistan for the Pakistanis as wellas the mujahideen, but also there was a massiveflow of over one million Afghan refugees intoPakistan. This refugee population provided therecruiting grounds for the Afghan Islamicmujahideen groups and their Pakistani Deobandi/Wahabi supporters. One of the first PakistaniRefugee Commissioners was one Abdullah, whohad close links with the JI of Pakistan.

17

As the Afghan jihad expanded, so did theinfluence of ‘radical’ and activist Islamic ideologyin Pakistan. The Barelvi JUP was pushed out of thepicture and the Deobandi-oriented JI and the JUIwere encouraged by the Zia regime to get closelyinvolved with mujahideen activities not only tocover the tracks of the ISI and the Pakistan Army,but also to counter-balance each other.18

. Soon, theybecame the major conduits for funnelling the aid inmen and material that was coming through variouspan-Islamic bodies, like the Saudi Arabia basedRabitat al-Alam al-Islami (The Muslim WorldLeague), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth(WAMY), and other international Islamic groupsbased in other countries to mujahideen groups.19 Itis interesting to note that most non-state Pakistani

15 Hassan Abbas, n.3.16 Hussain Haqqani, n.13.17 Ibid.18 Ibid.



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and foreign players collaborating in propping upAfghan Jihad belonged to the Salafi-Wahabi/Deobandi spectrum and had close links with Saudiofficial and non-official Islamic bodies. PakistaniIslamic sects like the Shias, Barelvis, Ismailis, etchad virtually no, or at best a very marginal, role toplay in the Afghan Jihad.

Another fallout of the development of closenexus between these Islamic radical groups,particularly the JI, and the Zia regime, was theirvirtual take-over of such state organs as the Councilfor Islamic Ideology (CII), Ministry of ReligiousAffairs and all such other bodies that were expectedto play a role in the introduction of Islamic order inthe country. These Deobandi-oriented groupsutilised their positions to push their agenda ofestablishing a Deobandi Islamic order in thecountry, by blanking out views and beliefs of otherIslamic sects. This led to the emergence of radicalIslamic activism among such other Sunni groupsas the Barelvis, Ahl-e-Hadith, etc. that in turn led toemergence of their respective armed wings andaccentuation of intra-Sunni rivalries. Emergence ofgroups like Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), Harkat-ul Ansar (HuA), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) andLashkar-e-Taiba(LeT) was also facilitated throughactive patronage by the State (read army/ISI).

The Creation of the Taliban

The Geneva Accords signed on April 18, 1988paved the way for ending the Soviet occupation ofAfghanistan. It also marked a turning point in theevolution of the Islamic movement in Pakistan andits transformation from an activist-radical Islaminto a jihadist Islam, out to pursue a global agendaof jihad and setting up of puritanical theocracies in

Islamic states. Despite the Geneva Accord, Afghanpeace was still a mirage. The formerly allied Afghanmujahideen groups fell out with each other oversharing the spoils of power and plunged the just-freed Afghanistan into a devastating civil war.Before the Taliban emerged on the Afghan scenetowards the end of 1994, the country was in a stateof disintegration. Along with this Pakistan’s hopesof creating an Afghan client state, which wouldprovide it with ‘strategic depth’ against India, asalso access to the markets and fossil fuel resourcesof the newly emerged Central Asian Republics(CAR) were also fast evaporating. Therefore,Pakistan had to act fast. Benazir Bhutto, who becamethe Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1993 for the secondtime, was especially keen to contain the damageand open a land-link with the CARs.20

Under her directions, the Pashtun PakistaniInterior Minister, Major General (Retd.) NaseerullahBabar, initially explored the possibility of openinga shorter route to Uzbekistan and other centralAsian republics through Khyber Pass, Kabul andacross the Hindukush ranges to Tashkent. However,fierce fighting between contending mujahideengroups in northern Afghanistan made that plan anon-starter. An alternative route was sought fromQuetta, Kandahar, Herat to Ashgabat inTurkmenistan, as there was less fighting in that area.Although Babar led a delegation of some Islamabad-based diplomats and Pakistani technocrats inOctober 1994 to Kandahar and Herat to demonstratethe viability of that route, the Kandahar-basedmujahideen commanders remained suspicious ofthe Pakistani plan and did not extend it the desiredcooperation. They believed, the Pakistanis wereopening up this route in order to intervene in theAfghan civil war on behalf of their opponents.21

19 Ibid.20 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia. IB Tauris & Co.: London, 2002.

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It was at this point that a group of 200 theologicalstudents from Pakistani Deobandi Islamicseminaries— the Taliban (students)— mysteriouslyemerged and entered Kandahar from Pakistan.22

They attacked Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s localgarrison and overran it with just one casualty. Withclear Pakistani official direction as well as overtand covert assistance, they took over the arms andother local assets of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar andother Afghan warlords in the area. Soon theirnumbers swelled and they began to fan out to otherareas of Afghanistan. Although initially BenazirBhutto denied any Pakistani hand behind the riseof Taliban, she later conceded that her governmentwas in no position to stop volunteers from goingacross the border and joining the Taliban. ThePakistan government and the JUI celebrated the fallof Kandahar, and Babar credited himself with thesuccesses of Taliban, terming them as “our Boys” inprivate .23

Soon, the Taliban were in control of almostentire Afghanistan, with the exception of thenorthern parts of the country. Their Wahabi/Deobandi orientation and commitment began tomanifest immediately. They did not need the façadeof Islamic Democracy like their Pakistani mastersand began to implement Shariat as per the Deobandiinterpretation in the areas under their control.Afghanistan was declared the “Islamic Emirate ofAfghanistan” in 1996, after the capture of Kabul.24

The Taliban regime’s harsh Islamic measures likefloggings, public executions of ‘criminals’ and thedemolition of the Bamiyan Buddhas soon began to

invite strong international opprobrium. The linksbetween Osama bin-Laden, leader of the Al-Qaedaand the Taliban regime alarmed the West,particularly the US, which carried out missilestrikes against alleged Al-Qaeda-training camps inAfghanistan after attacks on the US Embassies inNairobi (Kenya) and Dar-as-Salaam (Tanzania) inAugust 1998. Pressure began to mount on Pakistanto rein in its former protégés.....

25 However, by then,the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban had grown out of thecontrol of Pakistan. They were pursuing their ownglobal Islamic agenda that led to 9/11. The Pakistaniestablishment chose not to confront them with anyvigour due to its vested long-term interest in theircontinuance for the sake of retaining its influence.

Post 9/11 US-led ‘War on Terror’ andStrains in Pak-Taliban Nexus

The immediate price Pakistan had to pay for9/11 was to end its open support for the Talibanregime in Afghanistan and join the US-led ‘War onTerror’. However, covert links with Talibancontinued and Pakistani supporters of the Taliban,the Pashtun tribes, the JUI and the ISI continued tobe in contact with them. Many Taliban and Al-Qaedacadres found refuge in Federally AdministeredTribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, areas of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in northernBalochistan. Pakistan sought to justify this duplicityin its policies as a “major strategic reorientation”.26

As time passed, General Pervez Musharraf, whohad assumed power in the meanwhile through a

21 Ibid.22 The first group of cadres and those who followed them subsequently, were the products of Jamia Asharfia

(Lahore), Jamia Arabia (Raiwind), Jamia Uloom al-Islamia (Binori Town, Karachi) and Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania(Akhora Khattak).

23 Ahmed Rashid, n.13.24 Ibid.25 Speech given by General Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan Ambassador to the US, Brookings Institution, December

14, 2004



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coup, was forced to get more deeply involved withUS operations against the Taliban/Al-Qaeda inreturn for easing of US sanctions and receivingmassive economic and military assistance. Whatwas initially limited to intelligence sharing, led tooperations against Al-Qaeda fugitives in Pakistanand eventually military operations against theirpockets of presence in Pakistan, particularly if theyor their local allies threatened to supplant thePakistan government’s writ in that area with theirown. Under US pressure top leaders of manyreligious parties like Fazl-ur Rehman (JUI), QaziHussain Ahmed (JI), etc. were arrested and manyPakistani and Arab militants who were returningfrom Afghanistan to their sanctuaries in Pakistanwere taken into custody. On January 12, 2002,Musharraf in his address to the nation announced aban on JeM, LeT, SSP, Tehriq-e-Jafaria (TeJ) andTehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).27

However, these measures were either merelycosmetic, or were not taken to their logical end.They remained half-hearted, designed to please theWestern audiences.

28 Most of the arrested religious

leaders, extremists and militants were releasedwithin a few months, as the government declaredthat there was ‘insufficient evidence’ implicatingthem in the plots to harm the country.

29 There were

apparently strong lobbies in Pakistan, including inthe military establishment that were stronglyopposed to totally decimating the jihadi groupsthat had so painstakingly been nurtured over theyears as ‘Strategic Assets’ of the country, as part ofa well-thought-out national policy in tune with its

Islamic ethos. Even while appearing to be actingagainst them, the Pakistan establishment wanted tomaintain surreptitious links with them as aninsurance policy for the future.

According to Hassan Abbas, the noted Pakistaniauthor and political commentator, on September 14,2001 Pakistan Army’s top commanders, includingall the corps commanders, met to decide on aresponse to the US ultimatum to Pakistan to join its‘War on Terror’ by ditching the Taliban. Most corpscommanders agreed with Musharraf’s assessmentthat Pakistan had to stand with the US in accordancewith the UN Security Council resolution, or bedeclared a ‘terrorist state’, leading to economicsanctions. However, there were some lieutenantgenerals like Mohammad Aziz Khan, JamshedGulzar and Muzaffar Usmani who differed with himand wanted the country to stand with Taliban andAfghanistan.30

Even though Musharraf’s viewsprevailed and all the generals eventually ‘agreed’with him, strong support for Taliban manifested itselflater in the lukewarm Pakistani response totransformation of Afghan Taliban into PakistaniTaliban and their increasing assertiveness in the TribalAreas along the Durand Line. Apparently, Pakistanwas hoping to keep the US happy and obliged overits commitment to deal with Taliban terror, and atthe same time maintain links with the latter throughIslamic political parties like the JUI so as not to losethem altogether. This ‘hunting with hounds andrunning with hares’ approach was clearly a result ofthe fundamental dichotomy over the role and use ofIslam in state policy.

26 Hussain Haqqani, n.13.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Ibid.30 Dexter Filkins, New York Times, September 5, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/

07pakistan-

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The seemingly final break with Islamic radicalscame with the December 2003 attacks on GeneralMusharraf, and on the then Prime Ministerdesignate Shaukat Aziz and the Karachi CorpsCommander (middle of 2004). The Talibanappeared to have finally lost faith in thecommitment of the Pakistani dispensation to theircause and were not willing to accommodate it anymore. Pakistan’s continuing failure to either comeout of US-led ‘War on Terror’, or at least preventdrone attacks from its soil, convinced the Taliban –Afghan as well as Pakistani – that whether under amilitary regime like that of Musharraf, or a civilianone like that of Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan had nodesire to give up American financial and militaryassistance for a jihad to usher in Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Islamic Law as laid down by Prophethimself). Jihad, they seemed to have concluded, hadbecome a dispensable commodity for mostPakistanis. This assessment seems to persist eventoday. However, they would continue with theirzeal to bring about Islamic rule in Pakistan andAfghanistan and hope, as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid,alias Abu Saeed al-Masari, Al-Qaeda commanderin Afghanistan, reportedly said: the “Pakistan Armywould be defeated (in Swat) and that would be itsend everywhere”.31

Secondly, the Pakistani Taliban and Islamicradicals have a clear Islamic agenda to introduce astrict Shariat-based Islamic order (Nizam-e-Adal) forthe Muslims as per their Deobandi/Wahabi-Salafiinterpretation. It spares no space for such hybridPakistani ideas as ‘Islamic democracy’ and ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’. This Islamic ideology of the Taliban andtheir cohorts, active under different nomenclaturesin various countries, does not want to make anycompromises. They want to bring Muslim societies

overnight under Shariat. This Islamic system wouldencompass all aspects of human life, personal,societal, political, domestic and international. Theirultimate goal is to create an Islamic Caliphate thatwould closely follow the model of the First IslamicCaliphate that was set up by Prophet Mohammadhimself in Medina in the early years of Islam. TheIslamic order they visualise, if enforced in Pakistan,would mean an end to the existing Pakistani civilian,military and social order, and make it like Afghanistan,or a Sunni version of Iran.

The Conflict in Swat and FATA

Swat and other areas of the FATA have been thebattleground for the two sides for some time now.Islamists like Sufi Muhammad, leader of TNSMhad started imposing Shariat on the people of Swatas far back as 1992, even before Taliban emerged asa political force in Afghanistan. He had under hissway the tribal districts of Swat, Malakand andBajaur. In 1995, TNSM followers occupiedgovernment offices in Swat district and demandedimposition of Shariat in the area. On September 6,1998, in reaction to the August 1998 Americanmissile attacks on Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan,the TNSM threatened to attack American citizensand property in Pakistan, unless the US apologisedto the Muslim world for the missile strikes. Lateron October 27, 2001, in the wake of 9/11, about10,000 heavily armed TNSM cadres from Bajaur,led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed crossed the Pak-Afghan border to join the Taliban to fight the US-led forces. The influence of pro-Al-Qaeda/Talibanradicals in the country was so extensive and intensethat the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifintroduced the fifteenth amendment to the PakistaniConstitution in 1998. Clause 2 of the proposed Bill

31 Reuters India, July 1, 2009



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stated:

The Federal Government shall be under an obligation

to take steps to enforce the Shariat, to establish salat,

to administer zakat, to promote amr bil ma’roof and

nahi anil munkar (to prescribe what is right and to

forbid what is wrong), to eradicate corruption at all

levels and to provide substantial socio-economic

justice, in accordance with the principles of Islam, as

laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

The Bill was passed by the Lower House ofthe Parliament on October 8, 1998, but it wasnot presented in the Upper House becauseNawaz Sharif’s party did not have the requiredmajority there and the moderate Pakistani lobbiesopposed it.32

After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, Pakistanimilitants siding with them came back home toimpose their Deobandi/Wahabi precepts in thetribal hinterland and made their writ run in localpockets in Waziristan, Bajaur, Malakand, Swat andeven in Khyber. All this came to the fore in 2004-2005 with the resurgence of the Taliban inAfghanistan and the militant assertions of localPakistani Taliban like the one in Miranshah in NorthWaziristan. The Pakistani army also did not have apolicy to tackle the Taliban in Pakistan. It claimedin 2005 that it had deployed 80,000 of its troops inFATA and taken 700 casualties in its fight againstthe Al-Qaeda. It was, however, never serious aboutits fight with the local Taliban and was fearful ofthe adverse political fallout in the rest of thecountry. Its forays into the Tribal Areas were morelike knee-jerk responses to local crises and werelargely ineffective.

On October 24, 2007, more than 3,000 Pakistani

troops were sent to Swat to confront the Taliban.By October 31 , the army claimed that up to 130militants had been killed. However, the very nextday nearly 700 militants overran a military post ona hill in Khwajakhel, forcing nearly 50 soldiers todesert their positions and 48 others were taken asprisoners. On November 3, 2007, police and para-military forces in nearby Matta also surrenderedafter being surrounded by the militants.On November 12, more troops were sent to Swat tobolster army positions and by December 5, thePakistan army managed to regain most key areas inSwat. However, the Taliban had not beenoverwhelmed. They began to creep back into thearea and continued to engage the army in skirmishesthroughout 2008. Finally on February 16, 2009, theNWFP government was forced to announce that ithad abolished all “un-Islamic” laws in the Malakanddivision and put security forces engaged in themilitary operation in Swat in ‘reactive mode’ afterreaching an understanding with Islamic radicals onenforcement of Nizam-e-Adal regulation in sevendistricts of the Malakand division and the Kohistandistrict of the Hazara division.33

Later, on April 13,2009, President Asif Ali Zardari sanctified theagreement through an ordinance imposing Shariatin the Swat Valley and its surrounding areas thuseffectively empowering the Taliban and other groups.This followed the passage of a unanimous resolutionon the subject by the Pakistani Parliament.

The deal led to a huge international outcry,particularly when the Taliban began to administerIslamic justice and punishment to men and womenalike (March 2009). Under tremendous US pressure,the Pakistan government was forced to moveagainst the Taliban despite the Swat deal. On April

32 Ashok K. Behuria, “ “ “ “ “Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at war with itself”, Australian Journal of InternationalAffairs, November-December 2007.

33 The News, February 17, 2009

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23, 2009 Pakistan troops were moved into the areato protect government buildings in Buner,

34

triggering large-scale military operations in Swatwhich extended to almost all the areas of FATAinvolving over 150,000 Pakistan troops who weremostly non-Pashtun.

Ever since, the Islamic radicals have respondedby carrying out terror strikes in many majorPakistani cities, as also in Muzaffarabad in PakistanOccupied Kashmir (POK). Despite massivePakistani deployment in Swat and other areas ofthe Malakand Division, there is an uneasy calm,broken by sporadic attacks by Islamic militants.There is neither complete restoration of the civilianauthority in the region, nor any plans to withdrawPakistani troops from the area. If anything, there isa talk in Pakistan military circles of setting uppermanent military cantonments and posts in Swatand its adjoining areas. Pakistan seems to be headingfor a protracted engagement with the radicalIslamist forces in the coming days. The discussionabove suggests that Pakistan’s Islamic birds havefinally come home to roost.

The situation in North and South Waziristan ispretty much similar to the one in Swat. In July 2002,Pakistani troops entered the Tirah Valley in theKhyber Agency for the first time since 1947 andproceeded to the Shawal Valley of North Waziristanand later to South Waziristan. Immediatelyafterwards, Musharraf was attacked twice in a spanof two weeks in Rawalpindi in December 2003.These attacks were later traced to Waziristan. Likein Swat, there have been repeated deals and brokenaccords, interspersed with violence in the twoWaziristans. From April 2009, Pakistan Army hastaken on the Taliban in South Waziristan, as also inBajaur, Buner and Lower Dir after consolidatingits hold on Swat. In the second half of June 2009,

Pakistan Army began a largescale build-up oftroops for an imminent offensive in SouthWaziristan. The offensive began in mid-October2009 and it is still continuing. The army has shownsome resolve to take on the militants since early2010 and a number of operations have beenconducted in the tribal areas (in Swat, Bajaur andWaziristan in particular) resulting in the arrest andkilling of some of the top Taliban leaders. However,despite repeated claims of successes by Pakistanmilitary, neither the Pakistan military nor thecivilian government has been able to indicate anyschedule for concluding these operations.Meanwhile, out of a total population of 429,841, asmany as 330,000 people have taken refuge in campsin D.I. Khan and Tank according to UN aid agencies.

The Power and the Reach of JihadiGroups

It is well-known that Taliban leaders and mostof their cadres are products of various PakistaniDeobandi Islamic seminaries like the Binori Townmadrassa in Karachi, where a large number ofPakistanis have been indoctrinated (incidentally,Maulana Masood Azhar, the chief of JeM wasa contemporary of Mullah Omar, the supremeleader of Taliban at the madrassa). Organisationslike the JI, JUI, JAeH, the Markaz-ud Dawaa (MuD)and its militant arm the LeT (which follows Ahl-e-Hadis ideology close to the Salafis); the JeM, theLeJ, the SSP, (all linked with the JUI and followDeobandi ideology); and even the JI’s Kashmirspecific Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) , have all beenpreaching an orthodox, uncompromising andmilitant version of Islam based on theirown interpretation of Islamic law and its practices.It is hardly surprising that there isoperational cooperation between these outfits andthe Taliban in Pakistan.

34 BBC News, Thursday, April 23, 2009



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Interestingly, all these groups including theTaliban, have until recently had a close nexus withPakistan army and its ISI. The SSP, an offshoot ofthe JUI (that had earlier created Harkat-ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) and HuM and later merged into HuAin the context of Afghan jihad), came into existencein 1985 to quell Shiite opposition to the Deobandiinspired Islamisation measures of Zia-ul Haq. TheSSP, and later its militant arm LeJ were responsiblefor a large number of attacks on Shias, includinglawyers, doctors and government officials. Yet, noneof the perpetrators of those crimes were everarrested. In many cases, those attackers wereaccompanied or helped by lower level ISIfunctionaries. Shocking still, if some upright andhonest police investigator ever came anywhere nearcracking those cases, he was mysteriously killeddespite official protection provided to him.35

There are several evidences of close association andactive operational cooperation between the SSP/LeJ and the the Taliban in Afghanistan, both in preand post 9/11 period.

Similarly, the Salafist oriented Markaz-udDawa-wal Irshad (MDI - Centre for ReligiousLearning and Propagation) which was founded in1985 (later renamed as Jamaat-ud Dawaa (JuD) inearly 2002 after its militant wing LeT was declareda terrorist organisation by the US) follows the Ahl-e-Hadith philosophy and is close to the Deobandi/Wahabi version of orthodox Islam. The MDI/JuDowes a lot to ISI’s plan to indirectly intervene inKashmir through non-state actors. The Chief of theMDI/JuD/LeT conglomerate, Hafiz MohammadSaeed is a hardline Salafist who has readilyexpanded his organisation’s Islamist agenda fromKashmir to the rest of India. However, he also speaksof his pan-Islamic vision of creating a pious and

correct international Islamic order by strengtheningPakistan’s ties with the Islamic countries (readradical Islamic forces) and reducing dependenceon the US.36 Significantly, he has also worked inclose cooperation with the Taliban in Afghanistanand vowed to launch a jihad to turn Pakistan into apure Islamic state.

37

The Lal Masjid incident in 2007 in Islamabadclearly demonstrated the reach and the impact ofPakistani jihadi groups and the distance they hadcreated between themselves and the Pakistanestablishment. No doubt, Pakistani governmentagencies created and nurtured these groups as perPakistan’s national agenda in Afghanistan and Indiaand these groups cooperated fully in pursuit ofthose agendas. However, whenever there has beena clash between their Islamic jihadi goal and that ofthe Pakistan government, the Taliban and theirallied Pakistani jihadi groups have not hesitated togo their own way even if that meant a violentconfrontation with their patrons. To that extent,these groups seem to have grown beyond Pakistan’scontrol and have acquired independent muscle,which they are not averse to flexing.

The worsening of the situation in Swat and otherareas of FATA can be directly traced to the Pakistangovernment’s crackdown on Lal Masjid and itsattached madrassas— Jamia Hafsa and JamiaFaridia. Mullah Fazlullah of the TNSM, theorganisation which spearheaded the Nizam-e-Adalmovement in Swat, declared war on the Pakistangovernment on his FM radio station in the wake ofthe attack on Lal Masjid. One of the two Imams ofthe masjid, Mohammad Abdul Aziz, who had beenarrested during his attempted escape in a burqa fromthe siege, declared in his very first sermon after his

35 Hassan Abbas, n.3.36 Ibid.37 Ibid.

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release from detention in April 2009 thatimplementation of the Shariat in Swat and otherareas of FATA was a direct result of the attack on LalMasjid.

38

The Present and Future Scenarios—Leap of jihad to south Punjab

The most likely extension of the jihadi challengeto Pakistan establishment in the days to come islikely to materialise in south Punjab (See Map 4.1).Pakistan Army’s iron-fisted action in FATA hasdriven most Taliban cadres from there to theadjoining areas of Afghanistan. This is alsoaccompanied by an increase in terrorist attacksagainst government targets and others who appearto oppose the Taliban, in Peshawar and other areasof NWFP, Capital region of Islamabad andRawalpindi, Lahore and other places. Even thePakistan army’s General Headquarters (GHQ)located inside the high security Rawalpindicantonment, and the Pakistan Naval Headquartersin Islamabad have been attacked. Significantly, theseattacks do not seem to have been carried out byPashtun Taliban from FATA. Reports in the Pakistanimedia reveal the involvement of south Punjab basedjihadi organisations like LeJ in these attacks. Thereare reports that south Punjab districts likeBhawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan are full ofDeobandi madrassas belonging to JeM and othergroups, which continue to operate their militanttraining camps in these areas from the hey-days ofKashmir jihad. A very large number of their cadresregularly move from south Punjab to FATA andAfghanistan to fight against Pakistani and the USsecurity forces respectively. Local police andadministration are virtually non-existent in southPunjab or are unable to do any thing to control thelocal jihadi groups. Even the Pakistan Rangersdeployed in the area are only concerned with

protecting an oil pipeline passing through the area.Hence, south Punjab appears to be the next flashpoint for conflict between the Pakistanestablishment and the Islamic jihadi groups.

Despite the clear and present danger fromradical Islam , Pakistan remains confused andambivalent on both the tactics to be used againstthe radical elements, as well as on the basicideological issue, i.e., what should be theideological contours of the “Islamic Republic ofPakistan”? What should be the relationship betweenthe state and the mosque? If it were to remain anIslamic Republic, what would be the role of Shariatin its governance, and as per which fiqh? Whatpower would the Ulema and the clerics exercise indeciding what is Islamic and what is not? Whowould interpret Islam for the nation, its institutionsand the people? What would be the powers of thelegislature and the judiciary in this Islamic set-up?In a nutshell, where would Islam stop anddemocracy commence and vice-versa? It wouldseem that the ideological ghosts of the early 1950shave come to haunt the Pakistani nation once again.

Unfortunately, there is no debate anywhere inthe country on these issues. The Pakistangovernment and its institutions like the army seemto think that the current crisis will blow over just asthe earlier ones and Pakistan would not have tosort out the dilemma of its ideological moorings.Perhaps, duplicity and an opportunistic recourseto Machiavellian craftiness have become a naturalway of life in the Pakistani nation and it feelscomfortable with it. A survey carried out by someUS experts like C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotraand Jacob Shapiro in April 2009 in Pakistan showedthat an overwhelming number of Pakistanisaccepted the militant dimension of jihad inprinciple. Nearly 77 per cent of the respondents

38 Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Disaggregating the Pakistani Taliban”; DIIS Brief, September 2009.



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felt that either the state or the state and the non-stateactors together could use force to protect theUmmah. Over 90 per cent of the respondents feltthat Shariat provided service and security to thepeople, free of corruption. It was hardly anysurprise when various surveys conducted by theInternational Republican Institute (IRI) in 2008-9showed that a majority of Pakistanis disapprovedof the military action against Islamic radicals inFATA until March 2009. The picture changed laterand reflected a sense of confusion amongst therespondents with nearly 70 per cent refusing toexpress their views on the subject or claiming tohave no views on it. On their part, the Taliban andtheir allied Salafi-Wahabi/Deobandi radicalPakistanis seem to have clearly assessed that theircall for a strict Shariat-based Islamic order has thesupport of a fair number of Pakistanis, both withinand outside the government and those who do notsupport them could be tamed. Therefore, they havebegun to term their current conflict with the‘oppressor Pakistani Army’ as jihad.

The Pakistani armed forces also rely on religionto indoctrinate their rank and file to fight India,described as the number one enemy of Pakistan.Even the Pakistani educational system uses religioussymbolism to create and sustain anti-Indiasentiments. Therefore, the Taliban ideology enjoysextensive popular support in Pakistan. There isalso a social angle to the looming crisis. Secularand ideological opposition was never allowed todevelop in Pakistan. The leftists were hounded byreligious forces and the entry of Soviet forces intoAfghanistan in December 1979 virtuallyemasculated the leftist movement in Pakistan. Theruling oligarchy, through its control andexploitation of the state apparatus has mademosques and the mullahs as their major source ofsupport. Radical orthodox Islam has gradually

presented itself as an alternative and won popularacclaim. Besides, the Taliban and their allied groupshave developed deep roots, widened their reachand acquired great strength. When all these silentpro-radical sentiments will come out in support ofthe Taliban and their pro-Shariat struggle to tip thebalance in their favour, remains to be seen.

This, however, does not mean that the Talibanand their radical associates can sweep the countryso easily. This is primarily because of the divisionswithin Islam. Any attempt to impose a particularversion of Islam on the people is likely to be resistedby all others. Even within the Sunnis, the sect whichis dominant in Pakistan, there is a major schismbetween the Deobandis and the Barelvis. TheBarelvis, who constitute over 50 per cent ofPakistani Muslims, do not subscribe to theDeobandi interpretation of Islam and are unlikelyto abide by the Talibani dictates. Many Muslims inPunjab and most Mohajirs in Pakistan also belongto the Barelvi School and are present in largenumbers in Karachi and various other urban centresof Sindh. They amply demonstrated their capabilityto successfully resist attempted arms-twisting byothers, particularly the Pashtuns in Karachi in themid-1980s. The Taliban are likely to encounter stiffresistance not only from the Mohajirs but also fromethnic Sindhis as most of them are stronglyinfluenced by the Sufis.

Then, there are the Shias, who constituteroughly 30 per cent of Pakistan’s populationaccording to Vali Nasr .39 It is interesting to notethat the Taliban efforts to dominate Parachinar inthe FATA, which is Shia dominated, have not beensuccessful. Parachinar Shias are receiving assistancefrom their fellow Afghan and Iranian Shias.Similarly, the Gilgit and Baltistan areas aredominated by the Ismailis, who are also unlikely to

39 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, Norton, 2006, p.160


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follow the Talibani version of Islam, despite someinroads made by the Deobandis among them. InBalochistan, the ethnic Baloch have been relegatedto the central and southern parts of the province,particularly the Makran coast. Some of them followthe Zikiri order, which is moderate and is closer tothe Omanis and the Malikis of UAE. Further, theymay still harbour some leftist instincts left over fromthe past when it was the prevailing ideology in theregion.

Signs of serious and violent strains between theTaliban and these Pakistani Islamic sects havealready emerged. A leading Barelvi clericDr. Sarfraz Naeemi was killed on June 12, 2009 inLahore by Taliban elements. Other anti-Talibanclerics and leaders, propped up by the regime havebeen systematically eliminated in the FATA/NWFP.The Taliban have also issued sharply wordedwarnings to Shias and Ismailis asking them to changetheir attitudes and practices.

The Pakistan army and the ISI now appear eagerto exploit the mass-based evangelical movement ofthe Tabligh Jamaat (TJ) as an ideological challengeto the Taliban and their allies. The TJ leadershipappears to have agreed to this with great reluctance.However, if the TJ begins to undercut the Taliban’sideological base, it may take recourse to targetingthe TJ leaders and cadres as it has done with theBarelvis and others. That would either dissipateTJ’s influence as an ideological counter to theTaliban, or force it to arm itself for self-defence.If that happens, it could be the actual beginning of‘Lebanonisation’ of Pakistan. In this situation, thecountry could get divided into various pockets

controlled by militarised ethno-sectarian groupsand, correspondingly, the reach and the role of thegovernment and its institutions may be reduced,like that of the Lebanese government in that country.Another implication could be the emergence of abroad-based formal or informal alliance betweenvarious sectarian/theological/ethnic groupsopposed to the Taliban that may challenge theiradvance, just as the ‘Northern Alliance’ did inAfghanistan. This would be particularly so if theState appears to be failing to stem the Talibanadvance.

However, in the immediate future one factorstanding against such a scenario is the Pakistanarmy. It is a professional and well-trainedinstitution. It packs enough punch to deliver severeblows to the Taliban. However, its Achilles Heel isits extraordinary emphasis on Islamicindoctrination of its soldiers to enhance their martialspirits, which has mostly been based on Deobandiprecepts from the time of Zia-ul Haq. Would thatat some time de-motivate the lower ranks to fightthe Taliban? Interestingly, religion and politicswhich used to be taboos in Officer’s Messes in thepast, are no longer so and some botched up effortsat coup-plotting have been reported from thebarracks by Islamic elements.40 The possibilities ofa repetition of the Iranian syndrome in Pakistanshould not be totally discounted.41 Indications arealready there that the Pakistan army’s GHQ is atpains to keep predominantly Pashtun units awayfrom FATA operations, in which most of theclose fightings are being done by troops ofNorthern Light Infantry (NLI), who are mostlyIsmailis. Interestingly, Pakistan Army is mainly

40 Hassan Abbas, op. cit.41 The late Shah of Iran wanted to create a modern and progressive Iran defended by a well-trained and

equipped Army. When the Islamic revolutionary challenge from Ayatollah Khomeini’s supporters intensified,while the Officer Corps remained loyal to the Shah, the soldiery joined hands with the revolutionaries. Possibilitiesof something similar happening with the Pakistani soldiers, particularly its Pathan elements, should not berejected out of hand, particularly if the anti-Taliban operations prolong and intensify.


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relying on armour, artillery and airpower in its ownterritory to deal with Taliban and is generallyavoiding any direct contact between its Punjabi-dominated formations and Taliban cadres, leadingto large-scale casualty among them.

Moreover, Pakistan army’s iron-fisted responseto the Taliban has driven them to launch prolongedmedium-to-high intensity insurgency and terroristattacks. This is clearly seen in the recentdevelopments after the Pakistan Army regainedcontrol over Swat and killed Baitullah Mehsud,the chief of Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Talibanattacks in FATA and other areas of NWFP, includingfresh rocket attacks and car-bombings in Peshawarhave resumed and in the post-Baitullah Mehsudperiod, despite the reported divisions in their ranks,the Taliban groups appear determined to fight tothe finish. Even the reported killing of Baitullah’ssuccessor, Hakeemullah Masud, has not affectedtheir resolve to take on the Pakistan army. Theyhave conducted attacks on military facilities locatedoutside the FATA in Islamabad and Lahore, whichindicate that Pakistan will have to prepare itself fora long-drawn-out war with these elements.

Unfortunately, Pakistan does not have anyspecialised agency to deal with the threat ofprolonged and sustained insurgency, nor does itsarmy have any such prior experience. How longwill it be able to withstand the impact of suchattrition is something worth pondering over. ThePakistan GHQ has already committed over 110,000troops in Swat and other areas of FATA and another50,000 for South Waziristan operations. It does nothave many reserves left to meet the requirementsof the local commanders who want at least 50,000more troops in the area. Over three millioncivilians have also been uprooted from the conflictzone so far and forced to take shelter in refugeecamps as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

Lastly, Pakistan’s military leadership has

repeatedly shown itself incapable of dealing withvexed socio-political problems in the countrybecause of its sledgehammer approach to dealingthem. Yet, it has assumed right to deal with suchproblems in the name of defending the country.Absence of effective political institutions andmechanisms has been facilitating this approach.Unless realistic and principled political elite, notaverse to acting in a statesman-like manner, emergesin the country to take charge of affairs and the armyreverts to the barracks in letter and spirit, the darkclouds hovering over Pakistan are unlikely to goaway.

Summing Up

The threat to Pakistani establishment fromTaliban and the other Wahabi/DeobandiIslamist radicals stems from the basiccontradictions in the concept of the Pakistanination. The propensity of successive regimesto live with this ambiguity has kept the instinctsfor creating a theocratic state alive in Pakistanisociety.

The progressive Islamisation of politics inPakistan has slowly allowed the Wahabiideology to make inroads into Pakistanisociety. This process was enthusiasticallyencouraged by Zia-ul Haq who took up theissue of Islamisation to serve his politicalobjectives. The Afghan war furtherstrengthened the Wahabi/Deobandi hold onthe Pakistani army and the establishment.

The creation of the Taliban by Pakistan wasanother instance of exploiting Islam for narrownational and regional goals. The Taliban grewmuch bigger in time and spun out of control ofPakistan and its agencies like the ISI.

Post 9/11, instead of realising the implicationsof the Taliban/Al-Qaeda nexus and taking aprincipled stand against it, the Pakistani


71

establishment took recourse to duplicity andtried to protect these elements as its ‘strategicassets’ even as it assured the Americans of itsresolve to fight these forces.

The Swat deal of April 2009 made it clear tothe Pakistani government that manipulatingthe Taliban for its ends was no longer possibleand unless they are dealt with effectively, theymay destroy the existing order and system inthe country. Very reluctantly, the Pakistan armyhas launched several operations against theTaliban in the aftermath of the Swat deal.

. However, the larger issue of combating Islamicradicalism is nowhere on the horizon. UnlessPakistan deals with the basic issue of ‘Islamand the Sate’ and resolves the basiccontradictions, the threat of radical Islam willremain.

Radical Islamic forces with sanctuaries andsupport bases in south Punjab, now appear setto expand their area of influence to otherplaces. Finding its military capabilities alreadyoverstretched and realising that its usual

sledge-hammer approach to tackling militancyin Punjab would not be effective, the Pakistanimilitary establishment and the ISI seem to becontemplating using the Tabligh Jamaat toconfront the Taliban and their other Islamicradical cohorts ideologically. This policy couldeventually force a pacifist TJ movement to armitself for protection against attacks from Islamicradicals rooting for jihad. This could effectivelymark the beginning of the ‘Lebanonisation’ ofPakistan.

The outcome of the conflict between Islamicradicalism and the state would depend ingeneral on the basic instincts of the people atlarge, and the commitment of the army to fightthe radical Islamic forces it has fostered overthe years.

There are important sectarian minorities inPakistan that may together with the Barelvisconstitute the majority. If such a group engagesitself in a bloody struggle with the Taliban, it maylead to a ‘Lebanonisation’ of the Pakistani state.


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Pakistan is in the midst of a serious economiccrisis. Its GDP growth declined to 2 per cent in2008-2009.1 The debt service to GDP ratio stood at2.1 per cent of GDP during July 2008-March 2009.In October 2009, Pakistan’s foreign exchangereserves were just sufficient to meet six weeks’imports. Exports had fallen; inflation was runningat over 30 per cent. The rupee had depreciated by20 per cent between March and November 2008.The balance of payments situation had alsodeteriorated considerably. Even on socio-economicparameters, Pakistan ranked 141 out of 182 on theHuman Development Index (HDI) taking intoaccount factors like life expectancy, educationalachievement and purchasing power.2

Pakistan sought help to manage its capital crisisfrom a variety of sources, including multilaterallending agencies and sympathetic countries whichcame together under the name of the “Friends ofDemocratic Pakistan (FoDP)”. While Pakistan ismanaging to stay afloat by securing funds fromexternal sources, this obviously has implicationsfor the future stability of Pakistan. How the Pakistaneconomy is going to perform in the future is goingto have a bearing on Pakistan’s ability to come outof its multiple crises. For stability, Pakistan needs

CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN:STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES

long term economic growth and socio-economicdevelopment. Yet, Pakistan’s economy is sufferingfrom structural weaknesses which are not easy toremove overnight. Presently, the economy isdependent upon external assistance and workers’remittances. In this context, the worsening securitysituation is likely to hamper the prospect ofsustained economic recovery which in turn mayfurther aggravate the security situation. ThusPakistan is caught in a vicious cycle of adeteriorating economy and a worsening securitysituation.

Economic Growth

When General Musharraf took control ofPakistan after the coup in 1999, Pakistan was in thethroes of economic disrepair and in need of debtrelief given the freeze of foreign currency accountsafter the nuclear tests in May 1998. However, withina couple of years, Pakistan was witness to generallystrong economic growth for around seven years,with the economy running into problems in 2008.Real GDP growth (See Figure 5.1) which averagedabove 7 per cent during 2005-2007, declined to 5.8per cent in 2007-2008 and further to 2 per cent in2008-2009. This gave the impression that

1 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2008-09.2 Human Development Report 2009, Country Fact Sheets on Pakistan.

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Pakistan’s economy was making impressive stridesduring the last few years.

Post 9/11, remittances coming into Pakistanincreased substantively, the value of the rupeeimproved, and the ratio of Pakistan’s deficit to itsGDP decreased. The inflow of external financingensured that banks were free to lend to the privatesector rather than the government. However, thisrate of growth could not be sustained. This waspartly due to the fact that the growth was not fuelledby sound economic fundamentals. Rather, thisgrowth was credit driven, which in turn only addedto the already significant existing external deficit.

While the banking sector should have tightenedinterest rates, policy makers and the elite who havethe ability to spend resisted this step, whichunderscores the fact that the Pakistan economy isan elitist economy. The complacency that set in withthe external financing post 9/11 perhaps slowedthe pace of critical fiscal reforms. Yet, the high rateof growth in these years obfuscated the realproblems of disproportionate private sector creditand the lack of social development.

If one takes a look at the sectoral breakup ofGDP (See Figure 5.2) over a period of 40 years from1960 to 2000, it becomes apparent that the

Figure 5.1— Source: International Monetary Fund, 2009

Figure 5.2— Source: World Development Indicators Online, World Bank, Washington DC, 2000

India-Pakistan GDP Growth

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21

1988 onwards

%ch

ange

India

Pakistan

Figure 5.1:

Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices (Annual percentage change)

Composition of GDP in Pakistan

Value Added(% of GDP)

Agriculture Manufacturing Services, etc.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Figure 5.2:


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composition of Pakistan’s GDP in terms of the valueadded by sector, has shifted slowly. It moved awayfrom its initial dependence on agriculture, withmanufacturing remaining relatively constant, anda significant growth in the services sector. Theagriculture sector has been affected by its highdependence on the cotton crop, which is in itselfvulnerable to drought and flooding as well asadverse weather conditions and pest damage. Theirrigation system is not efficient, water supply isinadequate and the amount of land undercultivation has not increased. Additional factorswhich hamper production include soil erosion,water logging and salinity.

It is difficult to expect a change in the statusquo given the dominance of the agriculture sectorby wealthy landowners who profit by evadingtaxes, borrowing heavily, and becoming baddebtors. While the growth of the services sectorgives an indication of the development of the retailsector in Pakistan, it also signals the inequalitybetween the rural and urban sectors, withagriculture on the decline. While globally, relianceon agriculture has been on the wane given theemphasis on manufacturing and services, it wouldbe important for a human resources intensivecountry like Pakistan to attach due importance toagricultural development and productivity tilleducation levels improve. This is because thesoaring population levels coupled with decliningbirth rates could lead to increased unemploymentrates, and increase disparity thus impacting thequality of life.

While the share of manufacturing in GDP hasincreased since about 2002-2003, this sector has beenaffected by both international factors and domesticproblems pertaining to shortage of skilled workers,

poor physical infrastructure, official corruption,political instability and continuing terrorist attacks.In addition, acute energy shortages preventedindustry from performing optimally.Manufacturing output has really been affected dueto the fact that Pakistan has a very narrowproduction base, with an overemphasis on yarn-spinning and sugar refining. In the last few years,the textile sector has faced problems and there is aneed for diversification of the manufacturing baseto include high value added goods. The majorimpetus to growth has really come from the servicessector. In the past five years (since 2003-04), theservices sector has grown at an average of6.6 per cent annually, specially in the sectors oftransport, storage and communication, wholesaleand retail and social services. It has a growing butas yet small information technology sector. The flowof tourists to Pakistan is limited.

Pakistan suffers from a lack of infrastructure inmultiple sectors like water, irrigation, power andtransport which adversely affects its attractivenessfor investment, growth and competitiveness ofindustry and makes exports unviable. Pakistan hasbeen facing water shortages, and it is expected thatPakistan will probably face an acute water crisis inthe next two decades. In addition the waterinfrastructure is in poor condition. Pakistan is toinvest nearly Rs 60 billion (US$ 1 billion) per year innew dams and related infrastructure over the nextfive years.3 It has also been facing severe energyshortages. The per capita energy consumption inPakistan is supposed to be amongst the lowest in theworld. In 2007, the shortfall in electricity was about4,500 MW. This is expected to increase to 6,000 MWby 2010.4 Reports suggest a net electricity deficit of40 per cent. The price of electricity has risen by 700

3 “Pakistan Infrastructure Implementation Capacity Assesment (PIICA)”, Report No. 41630-PK, November2007, World Bank.

4 Ibid.

The Economy of Pakistan: Structural Weaknesses

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per cent in the last 15 years.5 It has been found thatabout 40 per cent of firms in Pakistan felt that lack ofelectricity caused severe constraints in the operationand growth of their businesses.6 It is widely believedthat the country’s transmission and distributionnetworks need to be improved and that regulatorytariffs need to keep up with operational costs.According to noted Pakistani economist, ShahidJaved Burki, Pakistan’s GDP per capita could doublein the next 15 years from US $ 700 to US $ 1400 inconstant terms by 20207 with adequate supply ofenergy. The energy crisis is likely to continue unlessthere is an increase in investment in power generationwhich can only come about if there is requisite capitalfrom private investors and commercial banks. Tillthen, there would continue to be a constraint inindustrial growth, impacting all sectors of theeconomy. Inefficiencies in the transport sector havealso affected the economy negatively, and there is anapparent need for huge investments in road, rail,

and airport infrastructure.

Weaknesses in Pakistan’s infrastructure have alsodriven away Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) andaffected trade prospects as well (See Figure 5.3 fordetails). One of the major weaknesses whichdampens the investment climate in Pakistan is thejudicial system. In a survey of managers in 2002-2003 in India, there was a lack of confidence in thePakistani system, for accountability in upholdingcontracts, particularly for small businesses witheither limited political connections or none. Also,the time taken to enforce a contract is much longerin Pakistan (taking an average of 395 days), as wasevident from calculations done in 2004. Other factorswhich affect the inflow of investment include hightax rates, corruption, policy uncertainty,inadequate finance, shortage of electricity, andproblems of crime, labour regulations andinadequate labour skills..

5 Mohammad Asif, “Let There Be Light”, Newsline, April 2008, p.71.6 World Bank Report No.41328-PK, May 22, 2008.7 ShahidJaved Burki, “The Weight of History: Pakistan’s Energy Problem”, in Robert M. Hathaway, Bhumika Muchhala,

Michael Kugelman (eds.), Fueling The Future: Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs in the 21st Century, WashingtonD.C., Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2007.

Source

Figure 5.3:


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In fact, even according to the GlobalCompetitiveness Index 2009-2010, Pakistan scorespretty low in most of the basic requirements likeinstitutions, infrastructure, macroeconomicstability, health and primary education, goodsmarket efficiency and labour market efficiency,financial market sophistication, technologicalreadiness and market size. The top problem areaswhich affect the business environment in Pakistaninclude government instability, policy instability,corruption, inflation, access to financing, inefficientgovernment bureaucracy and inadequateinfrastructure.8 It is increasingly apparent that theinternal security situation in Pakistan has had a hugeimpact on the economy. Pakistan’s role as a frontlinestate in the war on terror affected normal tradingactivities. Economic growth declined. There was adecline in tax collection due to a compression inimport demand. At the same time, inflow of foreigninvestment and privatisation efforts were affectedadversely. Also Pakistan has lost human capital andinfrastructure. The Pakistan government estimatesthe cost of the war for Pakistan at around US$ 35billion since 2001-2002.9

Impact of Recession on the PakistanEconomy

While the recession did impact Pakistan’seconomy negatively, most of the country’s economicwoes are due to the long existing structuralweaknesses, as is evident from the fact that thePakistan economy was already in crisis mode sinceJanuary 2008, eight months before the recession. ThePakistan economy was already in dire straits beforeit felt the reverberations set off by the global financial

crisis. Within the first eight months of 2008, thecountry was faced with the problems associatedwith increasing oil and food prices, devaluation ofthe rupee, an acute shortage of electricity leadingto long blackouts and a decceleration in growth/development led by Pakistan’s real estate andservices. This was augmented by the financial crisisand persisting political instability. This led to a lossin confidence among foreign investors. There wasa massive impact on Pakistan’s foreign exchangereserves which fell by 75 per cent to 3.4 billion.During this time, huge numbers of the Pakistanielite also pulled out their money from Pakistan. Insuch a situation Pakistan was forced to fall back onthe IMF for help.

The effect of recession on the Pakistan economybecomes quite visible if one looks at the changes insome of the key economic indicators. Large-scalemanufacturing as of March 2009 had witnessed acontraction of nearly 20 per cent. Export growthduring the same period also declined by 26 percent.10 The current account deficit of the countrygrew by US$ 1 billion during July-August 2008 as aresult of the deteriorating balance of paymentsituation. The deficit surged to US$ 2.572 billion inJuly-August 2008 as compared to US$ 1.571 billiondollars during the same period in July-August2007.11 This was largely due to the tremendousincrease in the oil import bill and the growing tradedeficit.

The Pakistani economy has picked up post-recession. The real sectors of the economy includinglarge-scale manufacturing and exports have shownsigns of recovery. The large-scale manufacturing

8 The Global Competitiveness Report 2009-10, World Economic Forum.9 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2008-09.10 Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Principal Economic Adviser’s Wing, “Pakistan Economic Update,

First Quarter Fiscal Year 2009-10”, (July-September 2009) at http://www.finance.gov.pk.11 The Nation, September 18, 2008.


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sector grew by 0.9 per cent in August 2009 after 13months of negative growth. There was a significantincrease in cement production and a decline inpetroleum products and in steel. The rate of growthin overall large scale manufacturing productionwas 1.01 per cent in August 2009. Export growthwas recorded at -14.2 per cent for September 2009,after a -5.4 per cent year on year decline till August,the lowest contraction since December 2008.Investment conditions have improved, yet creditto the private sector has gone down by 3.0 per cent.12

This would continue to fuel consumption drivengrowth. Unfortunately credit is not going intoproductive investment like factories, infrastructureand services like India’s software services andBPO’s.

The domestic economic activity in any caseexperienced retarded growth due to multiplefactors like the effects of the IMF policies intendedto stabilise the economy, poor balance of paymentssituation, deteriorating internal security condition,increasing energy shortages, and lack of FDI. Thetendency towards a declining rate of inflation hadheld for 11 months by September 2009. Inflation asgauged by the Consumer Price Index came downto 10.1 per cent only in September 2009, a fall from23.9 per cent in September 2008, and this was dueto the food as well as nonfood categories.13

While the balance of payments situation hasimproved, this is mostly on account of lesserimports and the huge inflow of workers’remittances which stood at US$ 806 million inSeptember 2009.14 In fact, growth in remittances has

continued contrary to expectations that the globalrecession would lead to a decline in remittancesdue to massive job losses by overseas workers.Remittances from most countries have increased,but especially so from Abu Dhabi which has beenlinked to the construction boom there. Even thoughpost-recession the Pakistan economy has improved,structural weaknesses led to the economycollapsing even before the effects of recession couldbe felt. Therefore, there is enough reason to doubtthat the Pakistan economy can sustain this path ofrecovery. Pakistan’s GDP growth in 2008-09 at 2.0per cent was even below the IMF expectations of3.4 per cent growth. IMF projections for 2009-10stand at 5.0 per cent. The Advisor to the PrimeMinister on Finance, Shaukat Tarin has said thatthere will be attempts to increase the tax to GDPratio from the current 9.5 per cent of GDP to 15-16per cent so as to broaden the tax base for socio-economic development.15 Such projections wouldbe contingent on whether Pakistan is able to carryout IMF prescriptions in its fiscal, monetary andexchange rate polices. For instance, Pakistan hasagreed to lower its fiscal deficit as a percentage ofGDP by increasing taxes and eliminating subsidies.However, all these are politically sensitive issuesand the end result hinges on successfulimplementation. The massive task ahead can begauged from the fact that Pakistan has the lowesttax-to-GDP ratio in South Asia, as less than 1 percent of its population pays income tax.16

Even though the Pakistani economy has beenteetering, government expenditure on defence

12 See f.n. 10.13 Ibid.14 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report on Pakistan”, November 2009.15 The Nation, April 3, 2009.16 Report of the Atlantic Council of the United States, “Needed: A Comprehensive US Policy Towards Pakistan”,

Washington DC, February 2009.


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continues to be substantial. Although there was anexpectation that there would be a decrease inPakistan’s defence budget due to IMF dictates, thefigures given in the Pakistan government’s budgetfor 2009-10 indicated that defence spending hadincreased by 15 per cent to Rs. 342 billion (US $ 4.11billion). There are various indications thatPakistan’s actual defence spending may berelatively higher than the official figures, as theydo not take into account heads like militarypensions, benefits for the retired and servingpersonnel, military aid from Gulf states, space andnuclear programmes and income generated byvarious business interests of the Armed Forces.17

Pakistan can hardly afford to be in a debilitatingarms race. It needs to have good relations with India.However, ever since the Mumbai terror attacks onNovember 26, 2008, India-Pakistan relations havedeteriorated. This may suit the Pakistan Army, butthis cannot be in the interest of the Pakistani economyor its people.

Some segments in Pakistan have been of the viewthat stronger trade relations with India would helpPakistan, and the expenditure incurred on theKashmir issue has affected the rate of economicgrowth in Pakistan. For instance Shahid JavedBurki, identifies four areas which would havebenefited with improvement in Indo-Pak relations.They include a reduction in military expenditures,an increase in intra-regional trade especiallybetween Pakistan and India, an increase in the flowof foreign direct investment, and an investor-friendly domestic environment. After computingthe advantages for the Pakistan economy withrespect to the four factors given above, he states

that if the country had not got entangled in theKashmir dispute, the country’s long term growthrate could have been about 2-2.5 per cent higherthan what it has actually achieved. A higher rate ofgrowth of this magnitude, sustained over 50 years,would have increased the gross domestic product(GDP) by a factor of between 3.5 and 4.5. He goeson to state that Pakistan’s GDP could have beenthree and a half times larger than that in 2004-5—US$ 450 billion rather than US$ 110 billion— andits income per capita would have been US$ 2900rather than US$ 710.18

Pakistan has approached multiple donors formonetary assistance. The IMF agreed to givePakistan a loan of US$ 7.6 billion with conditionswhich require fiscal tightening. In July 2009, thefund enhanced its loan assistance to US$ 11.3 billionfrom the initially sanctioned US$ 7.6 billion. In April2009, FoDP donor countries pledged an assistanceof US$ 5.8 billion. However, there has been aproblem of slow disbursement of funds. In themeanwhile, the US has pledged to provide Pakistanwith US$ 1.5 billion assistance every year for civilianpurposes under the Kerry-Lugar Act. Westernefforts to prop up the Pakistan economy are quiteexpected due to Pakistan’s indispensability inmanaging the situation in Afghanistan. While thiswill allow Pakistan to extract increasing aid fromthe West, the question remains as to whether suchexternal assistance can sustain Pakistani economyin the long run.

Future Trends

From the aforesaid, it is clear that economy ofPakistan is going to be in a crisis situation for the

17 Military Balance 2010, IISS, London, Availbale at: http://pdfserve.informaword.com/26092_75891250_919051843.pdf (accessed March 3, 2010)

18 Shahid Javed Burki, Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality: Pakistan’s Economy under Musharraf, 1999-2006,Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007.


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next few years. So far, the consumption-led servicesector has grown artificially. There has been agrowth in retail buying by the privileged classes,which has led to an increase in the GDP. However,this GDP growth collapsed even prior to therecession, due to structural weaknesses in theeconomy. Agriculture has declined and themanufacturing sector has not grown appreciablydue to lack of investment, as the investment climateis not good. The export sector is not efficient becauseit is mostly agriculture-driven. There is an emphasison cotton production which is dependent on water,and energy supplies which are imported. Value-added exports are low which in turn affect themargins of profit. All this has led to a dependenceon imports leading to problems of foreign exchange.

As has been mentioned earlier, there are manystructural weaknesses in the economy of Pakistan.Therefore, it is foreign aid only that will be able tokeep the economy going. The flow of foreign aid istied to conditionalities and structural adjustmentsdictated by international financial institutions.Pakistan carried out some changes underMusharraf, but even then the economic decline wasapparent eight months before global recession. IMFprescriptions have their limitations. They are fiscalprescriptions which focus on factors like interest rates,balance of payments and inflation. They do not includecuts in defence spending and do not prescribe how toimprove investment in manufacturing, or how toinvest in exports. Due to the worsening security

situation in Pakistan, the investment climate is notlikely to improve in the near future.

Future trends of the Pakistani economy are notvery optimistic, according to the projections madeby The Economist Intelligence Unit (See AppendixIII). For instance, the real GDP growth is projectedto decline from 3.7 per cent in 2009 to 1.9 per cent in2010. Similarly, the services sector growth isexpected to decline from 3.6 per cent in 2009 to1.9 per cent in 2010. The rate of unemployment islikely to rise from 15.2 per cent in 2009 to 16.2 percent in 2010. The fiscal deficit of the country isprojected to increase from 5.2 per cent in 2009 to 5.8per cent in 2010. Similarly, the current accountdeficit is expected to increase from US$ 2.406 billionin 2009 to US$ 5.05 billion in 2010. However, theinternational reserves in Pakistan are expected torise marginally from US$ 15.304 billion in 2009 toUS $ 16.347 billion in 2010.

In sum, the vicious cycle of economic declineand political instability in Pakistan is likely tocontinue. At this critical juncture, Pakistan has torealise that the existing policy of increasing defencespending is taking a heavy toll on socio-economicdevelopment and it will impact its economynegatively in the long run. Rather than having anadversarial policy vis-à-vis India it must take stepsto improve its relationship with India which willcertainly have a positive effect on its economy.However, Pakistani behaviour, post-Mumbaiattack, does not indicate any change in its thinking.


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CHAPTER VI

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:ARMY AS THE FINAL ARBITER

The military has been the most important playerin Pakistani politics determining not only thecontours of civil-military relations but directing thecountry’s foreign policy pertaining to India,Afghanistan and its nuclear program. Given theideological contradictions and its aspiration forparity with India, Pakistan entered into Westernsponsored military alliance to enhance its defencecapability soon after its creation. To quote Ayub, “Theconsideration of security embraces the defence ofour country and the preservation of our ideology….And since we live in a world of combatingphilosophies, we have to fight to preserve ourideology which is the basis of our national defence(emphasis added)”1. Since India is portrayed as animminent threat the actions of the armed forces andtheir several forays into politics have beenunquestioningly accepted. An analyst has aptlydescribed this prominence in the following words,“Pakistan’s preoccupation with the security threatand the attendant priority for defence, partially ledto the supremacy of the Defence Ministry and theGeneral Head Quarters (GHQ) in the weakenedparliamentary process in the post-Jinnah years”2.

This chapter seeks answers to two importantquestions in the context of civil-military relationsin Pakistan. First, would the relations between thecivil and the military witness any significant changein the post Musharraf period, and second, has thewar on terror further strengthened the military inPakistan? The paper is divided into four sections.The first section dwells upon the history of civil-military relations in terms of what are the majorlessons learnt. The second section encapsulates thedevelopments in the post-Musharraf period andhow the military which was extremely unpopularis slowly regaining its legitimacy. The third sectionreflects upon how the war on terror has not onlyenhanced the army’s defence capability but hasmade it the lynchpin of Pakistan’s relations withthe US notwithstanding the requirement of civilianoversight of the military as mentioned in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The last section analyses the future ofcivil-military relations.

There have been several in-depth studies onPakistan’s military and civil-military relations.3

However, this chapter dwells on the post-Musharraf

1 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, London: Oxford university Press, 1967, p.1142 Iftekhar H Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, London: St Martin, 1997, p.753 Some of these works are Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86, Lahore: Progressive Publishers,

1987, Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990, Stephen Cohen, Pakistan Army Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998,A.R.Siddiqui, Pakistan Army: Myth and Reality, Lahore, Vanguard, 1996, Brian Cloughley, Pakistan Army: War andInsurrections, Karachi: Oxford university Press, 2002, Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy,London: Pluto Press, 2007, Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Sword: Pakistan, its Army and the War Within, Karachi: OxfordUniversity Press, 2008, Brian Cloughley, Pakistan Army: War and Insurrections, Karachi: Oxford university Press,2002, Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, London: Routledge, 2008.

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phase in detail. The study of this phase is significantfor two reasons. First, the restoration of democracyafter nine years of Musharraf’s rule stirred hopesand expectations that the civilian government ledby the PPP will seek to institutionalise democracy.Second, an elected civilian government will bringin democratic consensus and support for theongoing war on terror because the earlier militarygovernment lacked popular legitimacy. This chapterattempts to look at the civil-military relations inthe post-Musharraf period to analyse whetherdemocracy would bring any shift in the relationsbetween the two.

History of Civil Military Relations

Bitter political contestation, disagreement overthe nature of the state and constitution, frequentchanges of government and the ensuing politicalinstability and above all a strong perception of theIndian threat gave Pakistan army – the only cohesiveinstitution in the country– a central position inPakistani society and polity. Even before themilitary was invited to takeover power by the thenPresident Iskander Mirza in 1958, the army was seenas playing a clear role in dealing with internalsecurity problems in the wake of anti-Ahmadiyariots at home and also in negotiating the MutualDefence Agreement signed with the US in 1954. Inthe process it developed its own opinion aboutpolitics, politicians and country’s security. As themilitary remained in power for more than threedecades of Pakistan’s existence, the popular beliefthat the military is better poised to take care of thesecurity and foreign policy needs of the countrytook strong roots. The civilian governments failedto inspire public confidence and rather than takingsteps to strengthen democracy they wasted theirenergy in meaningless political rivalries and used

the army for political purposes and indirectlyhelped it grow as a powerful institution.4

The brief period when the army really wentback to the barracks in the political sense was during1971-1973, after Pakistan suffered a humiliatingdefeat and lost its eastern wing. However, itregained part of its lost glory from its successfuloperation in Balochistan. By 1977 the army’s helpwas sought to diffuse the political crisis arising outof Bhutto’s rigged elections. In no time Zia-ul-Haq,the supposedly pliant general– the onlyqualification for which he was made to supersedemany of his seniors to become army chief of Pakistan– took over power with the promise of conductingelections soon afterwards. However, he did notkeep his promise and went on to execute Bhutto.Zia ruled Pakistan for eleven years and compelledthe political parties to accept article 58(2b), whichhe inserted in the Constitution, which gave himimmense power as the President in lieu ofconducting a party-less election in 1985 andpromising not to form a National Security Council.

Zia’s death in a mysterious plane crash saw theemergence of a troika in which military remainedan important centre of power. The militarypropped up the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) todefeat the PPP, which was being led by BenazirBhutto in the 1988 elections. Lt. Gen (Retd.) AssadDurrani, former ISI chief in an affidavit submittedto the Supreme Court admitted later that he wasasked by the former army chief Mirza Aslam Beg todistribute funds among politicians to form the IJIto defeat Benazir Bhutto given the hostility betweenthe PPP and the army. The military’s role in thehanging of Z.A.Bhutto was an important factor indefining PPP’s relations with them. Benazir wasnot given oath of office till she conceded the civilian

4 For an analysis of Pakistan’s Army’s mindset see, Satish Nambiar, “The Pakistan Military’s Mindset”, in SatishKumar ed., India’s National Security Annual Review 2006, New Delhi: Knowledge World 2006, pp.292-93


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government’s powers pertaining to three areaswhich army considered as core to Pakistan’ssecurity and its own institutional interests:government policy towards India, Afghanistan andthe nuclear issues5. It is not surprising that Benazirlater lamented to Christina Lamb when she said, “Iam in office not in power”.6

Having failed to defeat her in the 1988 elections,the establishment used the ISI in 1989 to subvertPPP’s loyalists to vote against her in the NationalAssembly. Reportedly, they played the tapes of asecret meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazirto win over her loyalists. According to an analyst,Lt Gen (Retd.) Hamid Gul and other intelligenceofficers believed that Bhutto would ‘sell out’Pakistan to rival India because of her family’s realor imagined connections with India.7 Therelationship between the two was never smooth;Benazir was sacked twice in 1990 and 1996 with theapproval of the army.

Democratically elected governments weresacked at will till the troika system was done awaywith under the 13th Amendment to the constitutionin 1997, which removed Art 58 (2b) and restoredthe supremacy of Parliament and civiliangovernment. Prior to this amendment elaboratediscussions took place between the then primeminister Nawaz Sharif and the then army chiefJehangir Karamat and the army accommodated thecivilian government’s proposal in return for thearmy chief’s right to hold the post of ChairmanJCSC simultaneously. It needs to be noted here that

PPP refused to cooperate with the PML in movingthis amendment. Gen Jehangir Karamat’sresignation in 1997 under pressure from the civiliangovernment for his suggestion to have a NationalSecurity Council seemed to suggest at a superficiallevel that the army was forced by the turn ofcircumstances to accept civilian supremacy.However, subsequent events proved that the armyas an institution was not prepared to play secondfiddle to the civilian government on importantissues.

It should also be mentioned here that the civiliangovernments also allowed the army to connect withpeople at the cost of undermining the civiliangovernment’s ability to govern by using the armyin civilian duties like collecting electricity bills,helping in census exercises, fixing sewerage andmanaging the WAPDA. The military has alsodeveloped an interest in economic matters andacquired vast economic powers during longperiods of military rule. To quote Ayesha Siddiqa:“The military echelons pursue policies to acquireopportunities and assets that facilitate capitalformation, which enhances the position of themilitary officers and brings them onto a par withother members of the ruling elite”.8 To safeguardthese interests the military would not hesitate tointervene and finally take over power.

The Kargil war in early 1999 and the sacking ofGen Pervez Musharraf by Nawaz Sharif in October1999 ultimately paved the way for militaryintervention after some years of uneasy relationship

5 It needs to be mentioned that Army created and funded Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad to defeat Pakistan People’sParty. It tried to sponsor a no-confidence motion in 1988 by playing a cassette of Rajiv Gandhi-Benazir Bhuttomeeting in Islamabad that it had secretly taped but failed and finally in 1990, her government was sacked byusing the article 58-2b.

6 Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991, p.1077 Christina Lamb and Edward W Desmond, The Times, London, March 27, 19898 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc., London: Pluto Press, 2007, p.60. Also see the chapter on “Expansion of Milbus”,

pp.139-173

Civil-Military Relations: Army as the Final Arbiter in Pakistan

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between the two institutions. Gen Musharraf,blamed Nawaz Sharif for seeking to undermine thearmy. He reportedly stated that “few at the helm ofaffairs in the past were intriguing to destroy thelast institution of stability left in Pakistan by creatingdissention in the ranks of the armed forces”.9

Musharraf introduced his brand of democracyunder a draft entitled “Sustainable Democracy inPakistan” and circulated it widely. He made itvery clear in the draft that the army had a role in therunning of security affairs of the country. Hedivided the political parties and was able to getsupport from the PML-Q, otherwise known as theKing’s Party. He played an important role incrafting the controlled democratic system that cameto the fore after the 2002 elections. He enabled thealliance of religious forces known as MuttahidaMajlis-e-Amal (MMA) which secured sixty seats inthe National Assembly. He subverted each of thestate institutions to perpetuate himself in power.The 17th Amendment to the constitution introducedsignificant changes that diluted the civiliangovernment’s authority. The infamous Article 58(2b) which according to him would prevent directmilitary intervention in future was restored. Dueto political opposition, he constituted the NationalSecurity Council through an act of Parliamentrather than making it part of the Constitutionthrough the 17th Amendment.

The military takeover of October 12, 1999 hassome important lessons for political forces and thecivilian governments:

The military has always waited for the civiliangovernment to be delegitimised both in itswords and actions.

It has taken advantage of political fractureswithin the system and the unending politicaldeadlocks.

The prevailing political atmosphere has alwaysfacilitated the army take-over. For example: thepolitical impasse over constitution-making anddeep rivalry among political forces madeIskander Mirza invite Ayub Khan to take overas he thought it will work out to his advantage.In 1977, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)led by Air Vice Marshal (Retd.) Asghar AliKhan wrote a letter to Gen Zia requesting himto take over and interestingly, Z.A. Bhutto alsorequested Zia to take over and conduct freeand fair elections; in 1999 the Grand DemocraticAlliance openly asked the Army to take over.Nawaz Sharif was also conducting himself insuch a dictatorial manner that even BenazirBhutto asked the army to step in. Finally,Nawaz forced the army to intervene in a wayby sacking Gen Musharraf, when he was on atour of Sri Lanka. A similar kind of situationmay arise in the future given the relationsbetween the political parties.

The army has always found support from thepolitical parties and people at the time of itstake over as the civilian governments in thepast have acted in the most arbitrary mannerundermining democratic opposition. Peopleperceive the army as a neutral arbitrator andsee it as the only force which can replace anautocratic government.

However, the political scenario in Pakistanindicates that these lessons were not learnt. Thefollowing are some illustration of the lessonsunlearnt.

For example: Zardari’s promise to restore thejudges including chief justice made himunpopular and the army played a positive rolein the February 2009 crisis thereby regainingits image as the neutral arbitrator.

9 Text of General Musharraf’s speech as appeared in Dawn, October 18, 1999


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The army is also likely to gather furtherstrength from the continuing problems betweenthe PPP and the PML-N. It regained thepopularity which it had lost during theMusharraf’s regime when it quietly advisedPresident Zardari to restore Shahbaz Sharif’sgovernment in Punjab.

The PPP has failed to build a workingrelationship with the main opposition partythe PML-N. It is bogged down by charges ofinefficiency and corruption. This has worked tothe advantage of the army.

The army’s popularity should be seen in theright context. The army had become highlyunpopular during Musharraf’s rule. His exittherefore generated a hope that the advent ofdemocratic rule would minimise the army’s role.Unfortunately, the current PPP government has notbeen able to consolidate democracy. Developmentsover the past one year suggest that the army hasassumed its central role in domestic, foreign andsecurity affairs after a brief interlude.

Civil-Military Relations since 2008:From Marginal to Central

The relations between the civilian governmentand the military in the post-Musharraf phase havenot witnessed any major shift given the politicaldynamics of the country. It needs to be kept in mindthat the PPP has always had an uneasy relationshipwith the military. Mutual distrust has been a markedfeature of their relationship. Even during Benazir’shomecoming in 2007 after clinching a deal withMusharraf, an attempt was made on her life in whichmore than hundred people were killed. She openlyaccused the army and the ISI of hatching a plot toassassinate her. Security lapses that finally led toBenazir’s assassination in December 2007 continueto remain a major controversy. That the PPPdemanded the investigation into her death to be

conducted by the United Nations indicates the utterlack of trust in the internal security systemdominated by the army.

After the elections of 2008, the PPP along withthe PML-N campaigned for the removal ofMusharraf from Presidency. This campaign led bypolitical parties (in which the lawyers also activelyparticipated) forced him to resign. Earlier underpressure, Musharraf had given up his uniform andchosen Gen Kayani as his successor. Previously, GenKayani was the military secretary to Benazir whenshe was the prime minister and he also reportedlynegotiated the deal between Musharraf and Benazirthat facilitated her return from exile. Gen Kayani’srise was the beginning of the end of Musharraf’sregime. Given the prevailing anti-Army sentimentsGen Kayani approved the withdrawal of aroundthree hundred army officers posted in civiliandepartments. The army assisted the ElectionCommission in conducting free and fair electionsthat saw PPP’s emergence as the largest party. UnderGen Kayani, the army, as an institution, alsodistanced itself from various controversies relatingto Musharraf and played a neutral role forcingMusharraf to resign. It played an important role innegotiating with the political parties to spareMusharraf from being tried by the court of law oncharges of treason. Once he left the scene, the armyregained its stature.

The army has not been very happy with the closerelations that the PPP government under Zardari hascultivated with the US. Gilani’s crucial maiden visitto Washington in 2008 helped the PPP governmentto come closer to the US, after Musharraf’s exit.The army was then having several problems withthe US on operational matters like intelligencesharing and drone attacks and was extremely criticalof September 2008 ground operation by the US troops.It found the civilian government wanting in itsreaction to such US interventions.


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Further, President Zardari’s statement that Indiawas not a security threat and Pakistan would notuse its nuclear weapon against India was not to theliking of the army. To the great discomfort of thearmy he had also reportedly stated that “we have aParliament which is already pre-agreed upon afriendly relationship with India. In spite of ourdisputes, we have a great future together”. Heemphasised greater trade between the two countriesas a way forward. The fact that army did not approveof Zardari’s view on India was confirmed on 19November 2009 when the PPP informationSecretary Fauzia Wahab admitted that the Presidentand the Army Chief have major differences on threatperceptions from India. Interestingly, theParliamentary Committee suggested that“Pakistan’s strategic interests should be protectedby developing stakes in regional peace and tradeby developing trade ties with neighbouring andregional countries”10. It is therefore not surprisingthat President Zardari was designated as a ‘securityrisk’ for Pakistan.11 To allay the army’s concerns heresigned from the Chairmanship of the NuclearCommand Authority (NCA), a power that he hadinherited as per the 17th Amendment to theconstitution, and handed over the power to PrimeMinister Gilani.

It was also reported in the Pakistani media thatthe political differences between Prime MinisterGilani and President Zardari were growing asGilani felt marginalised in the affairs of the statebecause of an interfering President. Therefore, anasserting Prime Minister, supported by the army,reportedly asked the National Security AdvisorMohammad Ali Durrani to resign for his publicstatement regarding Mumbai made on the direction

of the President without consulting the PrimeMinister. Gilani also refused to approve thePresident’s nominee as Pakistan’s Ambassador toFrance. The uneasy relationship between the armyand Zardari also indirectly contributed todifferences between the Prime Minister andPresident.

The PPP government for the first time inPakistan’s history, and of course after the priorapproval of the army, initiated a debate on thedefence budget in the National Assembly eventhough the control of the civilian government overthe army remained notional. This process,nevertheless, gave an impression of thedemocratisation of defence spending whilesubjecting the budget to the scrutiny of theParliament. The defence budget however did notgenerate any debate and was passed without anycuts. Similarly, for the third time in Pakistan’shistory the military and intelligence agencies gavean in camera briefing about the security situationin the tribal areas to Parliamentarians. Legislatorslike Ayaz Amir complained that the presentationdid not have anything which was not known to theParliament. Though the civilian government andarmy gave the impression that there was a strongcoordination between the two institutions, theiraction reflected a growing sense of mistrust abouteach other’s intentions.

The government, on June 25, 2008 had deputedthe chief of army staff for the principal applicationof military effort’ and to politically engage peoplethrough their political representatives andsimultaneously pay attention to the economicdevelopment of the region. It was suggested that

10 A reference to the Report of the 17 member Parliamentary Committee can be found in “Foreign Policy and theWishes of the People”, Daily Times, April 15, 2009

11 See two interesting reports: Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, “What led to Change in N-Command”, and ShakeelShaikh, “Fear”, in The News International (internet edition), December 1, 2009


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the army chief would have the authority “to decideon the quantum, composition and positioning ofmilitary efforts”. This meeting was chaired byPrime Minister Gilani and was attended by the chiefminister and the governor of the NWFP, along withforeign minister, frontier affairs minister andnational security advisor, army chief and the ISIchief12. The civilian government also increasedsalaries and perks of the military personnel andannounced extra grants to the soldiers deployedin FATA whereas no such benefits were given tothe police or the paramilitary fighting the militantsin equally difficult situations.

On the political front the army continued toremain important in spite of several setbacks inrestoring peace in the FATA. The successful militaryoperation in Swat and South Waziristan has restoredpeople’s faith in the military in the meanwhile. Ithas also regained some degree of politicallegitimacy during the Punjab crisis when thegovernor removed the chief minister after theSupreme Court declared his election ‘null andvoid’. Many believed that this was done with theactive connivance of President Zardari as it wasdifficult for him to deal with the PML-N over manyissues— the most important being restoration ofthe Chief Justice. This crisis threatened to deraildemocracy as the lawyers’ protest paralysed thecountry. Gen Kayani was actively involved toresolve this issue and President Zardari held a seriesof meetings with him before he restored ShahbazSharif as the chief minister. Iftikhar MuhammadChaudhry was finally restored as the Chief Justiceof the Supreme Court.

The Mumbai attack in November 2008 againstrained civil-military relations in Pakistan.Immediately after the attacks, Gilani’s proposal to

send the ISI chief for further investigation into theattacks was opposed by the army. As a result thegovernment back-tracked from its earlier statementto say that it would send a Director level officer ofthe ISI to help in the investigation. The governmenttook a hardline and refused to own Kasab as itscitizen till the Guardian newspaper (London)carried an interview with Kasab’s father whoconfessed that Kasab was his son. Many analysts inPakistan believe that given the war hysteria in thewake of the Mumbai attacks, the army regainedsome of its lost glory. Even the civiliangovernment’s tough stand subsequently wasprompted by the intervention of the militaryestablishment. The army clearly wanted to use theplea of Indian threat to shift some of its troop fromthe western border to the eastern border with Indiaand use this to highlight the Kashmir issueinternationally. It also appeared that the Pakistanarmy was not comfortable with the idea of India-Pakistan dialogue where they did not have anydirect role to play. The Director General of the ISI,Lt Gen Shuja Pasha in a meeting with the officials ofthe Indian High Commission openly conveyed theneed to include the army in the dialogue process.This indicates their lack of faith in the civiliangovernment in general and the PPP government inparticular.

War on terror and Pakistan’s Military:

The war on terror elevated the Pakistanimilitary’s status as an important partner of the US.The Pakistan army has always shared a strongrelationship with the Pentagon compared to theState Department which has helped the military totide over stringent foreign policy measures that attimes have threatened US-Pakistan relations. Dueto its close relationship with the Pentagon, Pakistan

12 Iftikhar A Khan “Carrot and Stick Plan to Tackle Militancy: COAS gets Vast power/ Tribals to Expel Foreigner”,Dawn, June 26, 2008


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military has been able to procure sophisticatedweapons that many fear, would be used againstIndia as they have limited use in the Westernborder13. In spite of differences between the USand Pakistan over several operational matters, thePakistan army has received generous aid from theUS thus far.

The US military assistance of about more thanUS $ 10 billion, since the beginning of the war onterror, has strengthened Pakistan army.14 UnabashedUS support has manifested in various forms whichhas undermined the civilian government. TheKerry-Lugar Bill that was approved by the Congresshad made civilian control of military one of thepre-conditions for continued aid from the US. Itneeds to be mentioned that the US was extremelyreluctant to let Gen Musharraf go out of power.This is one of the reasons why it had worked outterms of return for Benazir Bhutto in lieu of hersupport to Musharraf as the President of Pakistan.

The civilian aid passed by the US Congress inSeptember 2009 became a major bone of contentionfor the Pakistan army that was slowly building upits relations with the US. The US $ 7.5 billion aidover five years has a precondition that necessitatescivilian oversight of the military. The military in thepast has resisted this as ‘interference’ in its affairs toundermine its role in Pakistan – the saviour of thenation. According to a New York Times report thearmy chief after a meeting with the president and the

prime minister insisted that the foreign minister ShahMahmood Qureshi should visit the US to conveythis message15. The army sent a public message thatit had legitimate ‘concerns’ about the Kerry-Lugarbill and would like the Parliament to debate it. Thisissue was also taken up in the corps commanders’meeting. Both the president and prime minister hadno objection to the conditionality because they feltthe funds were required urgently. Moreover, it feltsafe to have a powerful guarantor outside of thecountry given the predatory nature of the Pakistanarmy.16 The Kerry-Lugar Act also known as“Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009”says that during fiscal year 2011-2014, no securityrelated assistance may be provided to Pakistan in afiscal year until the US Secretary of State, under thedirection of the president, makes a certification(Section 203)” to appropriate congressionalcommittees that “(T)he security forces of Pakistanare not materially and substantially subverting thepolitical or judicial processes of Pakistan” [Section203 (c)(3)] Section 302 (a) (15) of the Kerry-Lugar actalso says the Secretary of State must offer thefollowing every six months: ‘an assessment of theextent to which the Government of Pakistan exerciseseffective civilian control of the military, including adescription of the extent to which civilian executiveleaders and parliament exercise oversight andapproval of military budgets, the chain of command,the process of promotion for senior military leaders,civilian involvement in strategic guidance andplanning, and military involvement in civil

13 See, “Military Aid to Pakistan has been Used Against India: PM”, available at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/military-aid-to-pakistan-has-been-used-against-india-pm_100182257.html,accessed on February 14, 2010.

14 See a report by Julian E Barness and Paul Ritcher, “US Plans to Boost Civilian Aid to Pakistan”, Los AngelesTimes, March 24, 2009

15 Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Aid Places US in the Midst of a Divide”, The New York Times, October 12, 2009.16 This guarantee has not worked in the past. For example after the withdrawal of Pakistani forces during the

Kargil war, the US issued a strong warning to the Pakistan Amy not to stage a coup on Sharif’s insistence.17 The electronic version of the full text of the Act can be obtained from the following web address of the US

Government Printing Office (GPO): http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s1707enr.txt.pdf


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administration.”17

An important aspect in the civil-militaryrelations has been the pressure exerted by the USon the military for accommodation of the civilianpolitical leadership. Whether it was to give awarning to the military not to conduct a coup in1999 or putting pressure on Musharraf to reach anunderstanding with the political parties, the UShas been an important player in the democratisationeffort, of course as and when it has suited its owninterest. Benazir Bhutto’s return was negotiated bythe US as it began to realise that continued supportto the military regime could be a liability. The USwas apprehensive about Musharraf’s exit given therapport it had established with the government onthe ongoing war on terror. The PPP tried its best toconvince the US that the exit of Musharraf andushering in of a democratic dispensation would beimportant to tone down the anti-US sentiments thatprevailed in Pakistan. It urged on the US thenecessity to have faith in the democratic regime todeliver on this count. Therefore, it is not surprisingthat the PPP’s relations with Washington warmed upafter Gilani made his first visit in August 2008.

As an effort to demonstrate its commitment tothe war on terror and indicate that the civiliangovernment was really in charge Gilani gaveinstruction to put the ISI under the Ministry ofInterior, before he left on his maiden trip to the US.The Press Information Department published anotification in the newspapers on July 26, 2008which stated that the ISI, from now onwards, wouldfunction under the administrative, financial andoperational control of the Ministry of Interior under

rule 3(3) of the Rules of Business of 1973. Theactivities of the ISI had been under the US scannerfor a very long time. During his visit to IslamabadMike Mullen, US Joint Chiefs of Staff had providedincriminating evidence of ISI’s involvement infuelling insurgency in Afghanistan. Controlling theintelligence agency was considered as one of theimportant levers both to have a handle on the waron terror and to prevent it from sabotaging thecivilian government as was the case in the past.

However, the government was forced to reverseits decision within twenty four hours saying thatthere was a “misunderstanding” and the ISI wouldcontinue to function under the prime minister.The ISI has effectively remained with the army andthe civilian government hardly ever had any controlover the organisation. The ISPR in a notification,which indicated a clear division on the issue, statedthat the army top brass was not even consulted bythe government before issuing the notification eventhough coordination of various organisations fornational security was discussed.18 The ISI in thepast has been used to spy on civilian governmentsmaking it highly controversial in Pakistan politics.There were media reports that the Pakistangovernment was considering the US suggestion toreform the ISI. It was also proposed to take awaytwo functions of the agency i.e. internal securityand coordinating the war on terror.19

The military aid to Pakistan has strengthenedthe Pakistan army and built its arsenal. The US hasgranted US $ 700 million each year for strengtheningits counter-insurgency capability. This aid wouldcontinue till 2013 as the US believes by that time thearmy would be capable enough to take on

18 “ISI controversy Result of Misunderstanding : ISPR”, Daily Times, July 28, 2008, Hamid Mir, “How decisionwas reversed so Soon”, The News International, July 28, 2008

19 “ISI’s Functions to be discussed in the US”, Dawn, July 28, 2008.20 Baqir Sajjad Sayed, “Petraeus Paid Secret Visit to Islamabad”, Dawn, May 29, 2009


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insurgency.20 At the same time the US wants tostrengthen the civilian oversight of the military. TheKerry Lugar Act takes a first step towardsintroducing institutional control of the army whichhas left the military weary of US intentions. TheArmy feels that the civilian government has a handin the insertion of this clause. What angered thearmy the most was the fact that the governmentaccepted the Kerry-Lugar Bill without any protest.However, since 2001, the US has paid Pakistan forthe military facilities it used for its operation inAfghanistan apart from US$ 10 billion worth ofmilitary aid which has been provided in theexpectation that the military would deliver. Its aidpolicy received a severe blow when PresidentMusharraf openly acknowledged that Pakistanwas diverting US military aid to strengthen itscapability to fight India rather than strengtheningits counter-insurgency capabilities.21

Future of Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations have not seen anysignificant shift after Pakistan reverted to civilianrule in 2008. The military has slowly regained itslegitimacy in Pakistan’s politics. Successfuloperations in Swat and North Waziristan haverestored some of the lost glory of the army whichhad seen several reversals in its operation in othertribal agencies. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks andsubsequent jingoistic war cries in Pakistan (basedon the perception that India might launch an attack)have revived the army’s image as the ultimatesaviour. Later, with its successful intervention insettling the political crisis in Punjab and its role inthe restoration of Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhryas the chief justice, the army was able to emerge asa major power broker.

War on terror and various military aids have

strengthened Pakistan army’s fighting capabilitiesand helped it to emerge as a powerful actor thatwill determine the success of the war on terror. Thearmy also knows that it is central to the US war onterror. The role of the civilian government is toprovide popular legitimacy to the war effortbecause it is a democratically elected government.It needs to be pointed out here that the US hadearlier lent its support to the military rule at thecost of the democratic forces for several years untilMusharraf became a liability. The move towardsdemocracy was done with the Pakistan army’sconsent and the blessing of the US. Given the criticaldependence of the US on the Pakistan army for itscounter insurgency efforts in Afghanistan, it willnot hesitate to stand by the Pakistan army, in casethere is a strain in civil-military relations. The army’sassertion was quite visible in early 2010, whenGen Kayani, rather than the civilian government,was seen to be taking the initiative in laying downthe agenda for Pakistan-US strategic dialogueduring March 23-25, 2010. In fact, secretaries of thegovernment of Pakistan were reportedlysummoned to the GHQ to apprise the army chiefabout their requirements to firm up the agenda forthis dialogue. Gen Kayani also accompanied thePakistani delegation and was received warmly inthe US. Some reports even stated that he was the‘star of the show’, indicating the importance theUS accorded to the Pakistani army to fight its waron terror in Pakistan-Afghanistan.

In the mean time, Zardari’s position hasweakened after the supreme court declared theNational Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) illegaland listed some cases against him dating back to1998-99. The judiciary’s dismissal of Zardari’s orderto appoint judges to the apex court in February2010 and Zardari government’s capitulation over

21 “Musharraf Admits US Aid Diverted”, September 14, 2009, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8254360.stm


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the issue suggests that the uneasy relation betweenthe executive and the judiciary is likely to continuein the future. The 18th amendment to the Constitutionhas also stripped him of the dictatorial powers heused to wield until now. There are also pressureson the Zardari government from many quarters.The French newspaper Liberation reported a US$4.3 million kick-back to Zardari for the Agostasubmarine. The timing of this report and severalothers indicates a well-planned media campaignto oust Zardari. The current political situation onlyhelps the army, which has always taken advantageof the differences within the political parties.The army is reportedly repairing its relations withNawaz Sharif. There were reports in December 2009that Nawaz Sharif and army chief met in Lahore.This suggests that after the exit of Musharraf therelations between the army and the PML-N are beingre-worked. The army realises that without thesupport of the PML-N it would be difficult to getrid of the PPP government. At another level, thePPP and the PML-N are trying to come togetherbut it is not going to be easy because the PML-Nhas not shown much interest in the relationship andconsiders PPP as its main political opponent. Toadd to the volatile political situation, the PPP hasalso opened up dialogue with the PML-Q.

It is interesting to note that because of mountingpressures on Zardari and the necessity of becomingmore acceptable to the public, he has changed hisposition vis-à-vis India, and in clear contrast to hisearlier stance that ‘India is not an enemy’, he hasreportedly declared in Muzaffarabad that Pakistanwill wage a thousand years’ war with India toliberate Kashmir.

Conclusion

The political class in Pakistan has remainedfeudal in its outlook and action. It has an interest inthe continuation of an inequitable social andpolitical order in Pakistan because it helps the

feudal elite to perpetuate its hold on power.However, these political forces have not managedto hang together and establish a democratic politicalsystem in Pakistan. They have remained dividedand have brought the country almost to the brinkof several political crises that have often threateneddemocracy and strengthened the hand of thePakistan army. In the recent past, the relationshipbetween the two main political parties, the PPPand the PML-N, has been less than cordial givingthe military an opportunity to intervene and re-establish its reputation as the only reliableinstitution which can guide Pakistan’s future.The army has also sought to undermine the politicalleadership even while it has engaged some leadersquietly. Various retired army officers haveselectively leaked information regarding NawazSharif to undermine him politically. Similarly therevelation of the terms of understanding betweenSharif and Musharraf was made to damage himpolitically.

The army has also not completely severed itsties with the Islamic jihadists. This is reflected in itsreluctance to pursue the Haqqani group given hisstrategic relevance to Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Itfollows the dual policy of fighting Tehrik-e-TalibanPakistan (TTP) at home and retaining its links withthe terrorist groups operating in Kashmir andAfghanistan. It is likely that Pakistan army willcontinue to use the jihadists in furthering itsstrategic interests vis-à-vis India. There have beenefforts in the past to purge some of the army officerssuspected to have links with the jihadists. However,the military-mullah nexus is likely to continue andit will have an influence on the manner in which itdevelops its outlook on various domestic andforeign policy issues. The involvement of airmenin plotting an attack on Musharraf convoy is a casein point. The Pakistan army was affected by Zia’sIslamisation drive, and its officers developedsympathy for the jihadist during the long war in


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Afghanistan and had deep involvement in trainingand facilitating jihadists in Kashmir.

Above all, it is most likely that the military willremain central to Pakistan’s domestic and externalstability. Institutionalisation of democracy over timemay help ease civil-military relations and bringabout some coordination between the two indevising the foreign and defence policies ofPakistan, however, the military will continue tohave a large say on Pakistan’s policy towards India,Afghanistan and nuclear issues. As long as thecivilian governments do not interfere in themilitary’s institutional affairs and important foreignpolicy goals that impinge on army’s institutionalinterest they can continue in power.

In this context, the reorientation of Pakistan’ssecurity perceptions can only help redefine the roleof the army in Pakistan politics. At the moment,Pakistan needs to take stock of its internal securitysituation where ethnic assertions, rise of radicalmilitants and sectarian divides have posed a gravethreat to the state’s existence. The political forces,

the military and other institutions of the state needto come together and evolve a consensus and focuson internal threats rather than waste their energyand attention on non-existent external threats fromIndia. However, as things stand today, the politicalforces are getting weaker and the internal securitysituation is deteriorating very fast. Pakistan isslowly moving towards a situation where the armywill emerge as the only option in Pakistani politics.In such a scenario, there is not going to be anyfundamental change in the relations between themilitary and the civilian government in Pakistan.What Benazir Bhutto had said when she becamethe prime minister for the first time still holds true,“the army is a very powerful institution….Anyonethinking that after the elections the power of thearmy will automatically wane is being unrealistic”.In any case, an economically weak andpolitically unstable Pakistan with anoverdeveloped military machine having deeplinkages with the radical Islamic forces is certainlya dangerous proposition.

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Since 2004, the Pakistan Army has waged severalcampaigns to contain the raging insurgency in thefrontier provinces of FATA and NWFP. Thesecampaigns conducted as intense conventionalbattles and replete with high calibre weapons andaerial assets have left over 2000 troops dead andover 3400 injured. Besides this, the counter-insurgency operations have also been a cause of thelarge-scale dislocation and alienation of the localpopulation. Many analysts have criticised thisheavy handed approach and Pakistan’s consistentfailure to prepare its forces for counter-insurgencyoperations. The primary obstacle to counter-insurgency operations has been its conventionalmilitary doctrine built around the possibility of apotential Indian invasion. This purposeful evasioncan be attributed to a deliberate attempt to divertpopular attention towards India and thus underlinethe importance of the army in the Pakistani politicalsystem. The strong opposition from militaryconstituencies to force transformation is yet anotherfactor, and the scant regard paid to building therequired operational capabilities to tackleinsurgency is obvious. The moot question iswhether the Pakistan army is really keen ondeveloping required counter-insurgencycapabilities. If yes, then how far would the Pakistanarmy proceed in the organisational and doctrinalcontext? And if not, then how much does itimpinge upon its future security concerns.

CHAPTER VII

PAKISTAN’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY

CAMPAIGN: AN ASSESSMENT

This chapter attempts to analyse the impact ofthe ongoing counter-insurgency operations on themilitary doctrine, structures and capabilities inPakistan. It begins with an assessment of the currentinsurgent leadership in the frontier provinces, itsmotivations, capabilities and tactics; followed byan examination of the military responses undertakenby the Pakistani armed forces thus far to containthe Taliban insurgency. The operational dilemmasand dichotomies that inhibit building of the desiredCOIN capabilities have been identified anddiscussed. This is followed by an assessment of thepossible options available to Pakistan to transformits armed forces into a viable counter-insurgencyforce. And finally, the chapter concludes bypresenting a few plausible scenarios that mayemerge in Pakistan in the long term. The securityimplications in the Indian context are alsodiscussed.

The Taliban Insurgency

The Taliban insurgency began as early as 2002,when the Al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban fighterswere driven out of Afghanistan by the US ArmedForces. The relatively insignificant insurgency inthe Pashtun belt in due course coalesced as theTehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The alliance nowunites more than 20 disparate militant groups andcommanders throughout the FATA and the NWFP.The Taliban alliance had remained united under

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the leadership of the now deceased BaitullahMehsud, but on occasions has also reflected shiftsin allegiance and tribal loyalties. For instance, HafizGul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir, senior leaders ofthe alliance committed to fighting the US andNATO forces in Afghanistan, have generallyremained ambivalent about their stance vis-à-visPakistan.

Though the alliance features a decentralisedcommand and control set-up with emphasis onregional power structures, it has not shown anysigns of fragmentation or vulnerability to the‘divide and rule’ tactics adopted by the Pakistanadministration. The Pakistan military and the ISIhave played a key role in maintaining close relationswith several key tribal leaders. But then the Talibanleaders too have learnt to hedge against the federalpolicies by cutting deals, frequently assassinatingcollaborators and prominent tribal leaders, QariZain being one of them. Cooperation with the US isperceived as inimical to the Taliban interests, andthis is also known to drive cohesion between thedisparate Taliban groupings.

Several assessments have been made of thestrength of the Taliban fighters operating in theFATA and the NWFP. Some conservative estimatessuggest that the number of militants operating inthe tribal areas to be between 30,000 to 40,000, whilethe more exaggerated estimates point towards1,50,000 militant cadres and more. The strength ofthe militants is also reported to have increased dueto the pattern of military operations undertaken inthe past six months. There could have even beensome double counting due to the presence of Al-Qaida, Uzbek and Afghan militants in the region.And the Punjabi militant cadres no longer engagedon the Kashmir front could have added up to theassessed strength.

Since all of these estimated militants cannot behardcore ones, it could be assumed that around ten

per cent of them are highly motivated, another 20to 30 percent are ambivalent about their role vis-à-vis Pakistan and the balance 60 to 70 percent merecamp followers or ‘accidental guerilllas’, as DavidKilcullen calls them. All in all, the first twocategories comprising approximately 12,000 to16,000 militant cadres form the core of the counter-insurgency problem in Pakistan. The importantissue is that, no matter how the militant strength iscalculated, the insurgency is quite sizable byempirical standards and poses a formidablechallenge to the Pakistan military.

The Taliban insurgency in the frontier provincesis a curious mixture of Pashtun nationalism andreligious extremism. There are several other issuessuch as lack of governance, large-scaleunemployment and stifling tribal structures, whichdo not necessarily drive the problem, but getentangled with other causative factors in the region.By de-legitimising the tribal leadership under themaliks through frequent deals with the Taliban,the establishment has contributed to worsening theproblem. Economic motivations too have played arole in the emergence of the Taliban. The money towage insurgency comes from Al-Qaida activists,the mullahs who replaced the maliks, and theroyalty earned from mining rights in the region.CCCCContributions from donors, taxes, drugs,smuggling and dacoity have also filled Talibancoffers. The Taliban have also exploited theresentment against feudal structures in the Swatregion. In fact, the Taliban have been successful indelivering to the people of the area some notionalsystem of governance, have adopted a policy ofeconomic redistribution which appeals to the poorPashtuns of the region, put in place a speedy(Islamic) justice delivery system (oftendisparagingly termed as kangaroo courts) and takenquick action against local criminal gangs andtherefore, continue to earn the support of a largesection of the society in the frontier provinces.


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The Taliban strategy in the frontier provincesseems to be very complex. While some leaders arefocused against the US and NATO forces inAfghanistan, there are others who are committedto a more expansionist agenda within Pakistan. Onthe domestic front, the Taliban essentially seeks tocontrol certain stretches of the FATA, take advantageof the discontent amongst the local populace, andcultivate operational cells in urban areas ofPeshawar and deep within Pakistan. As regardstheir fighting abilities, the Taliban have developeda reputation of being tough fighters and are fairlywell-equipped. The recent exchanges in the Swatdistrict revealed that the Taliban combatantspossessed sniper rifles, machine guns, rocketlaunchers, mortar tubes, night vision goggles andbullet proof jackets. It is unclear whether theTaliban alliance also possesses surface to airweapons or missiles and artillery. The Taliban areknown to use state-of-the-art communicationequipment and pick-up trucks to facilitatecoordination and transportation.

Though the Taliban cadres do not receive anyformal training, the new recruits manage with somerudimentary training in guerrilla tactics givenin makeshift camps located all across the frontierprovinces. The training deficit is made up by theirfamiliarity with the terrain, local culture and age-old fighting tradition. Their cadres are trained to digin and prepare fortified positions essentially toprotect themselves from aerial strikes and highcalibre weapons. They are also known to indulge inextensive tunnelling to escape from preparedpositions. Suicide bombing is yet another powerfuland lethal weapon available to the Taliban.This represents a careful blend of a terrorist tacticinto an insurgency campaign. The use of IEDs androadside bombs by militant groups has haddevastating effects. The issue of salience here is thatthe Taliban alliance has been fairly successful inestablishing parallel authority in areas under

their control for dispensing local justice,conducting policing duties, taxing the public andmaintaining a large irregular force to fight Pakistanisecurity forces.

Pakistan’s Counter-insurgencyApproach

Tribal unrest in the frontier areas began soonafter the US invasion of Afghanistan. US militaryoperations at Tora Bora, because of lack of troopsand coordination with the Pakistani authorities,enabled the Al-Qaida and Afghan fighters to escapeand establish themselves across the Durand line inPakistan. Since Pakistan had mentored the AfghanTaliban for several years, it felt that they could becontained at will. Their presence in the frontierprovinces was ignored by the Pakistani leadership,and this gave them an opportunity to reconstituteand consolidate their influence in the region. Thepresence of Al-Qaida and Afghan Taliban leadersin the region and local grievances discussed earlierallowed the rise of the Pakistani Taliban in thefrontier provinces.

The worsening security situation and growingpressure from the US eventually compelled thePakistani military to move against the militants. In2004, the Frontier Corps was tasked to launchoperations in South Waziristan, but the setbackreceived at hands of the Taliban forced the Pakistanarmy to deploy in strength. The military operationstoo proved to be a disaster with the security forceslosing 200 men as well as several desertions in theprocess. The operations caused large-scalecollateral damage and nearly 50,000 people weredisplaced. The debacle led to the deployment of anadditional 80,000 troops for high intensityoperations against the Taliban. The militaryoperations instead of defeating the Taliban led toan interesting process of deal-making between themilitants and the Pakistani security forces.

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Each time the militants came under pressure,they cut a deal with the security forces, which inturn gave them the time and space to regroup andprepare for the next fight. Another major operationwas launched in late 2007 in Swat and the BajaurAgency to get rid of the Taliban militants who hadestablished their presence in the region. The illconsequences of this military offensive actually ledto the spread of violence in Swat and MalakandDivision in early 2009. The Pakistan armyresponded with conventional methods includingair strikes thus displacing more than two and a halfmillion people from the region. Attempts to clearTaliban controlled areas with brute force provedcounter-productive, and the repressive tacticsadopted would have prompted many displacedpeople to join the Taliban.

Pakistan’s approach to counter-insurgencyoperations in the frontier provinces from 2004 to2009 has followed a set pattern. The reliance onheavy calibre weapons and aerial platforms seemsto have been in response to the mounting pressurefrom the US to do something to contain the Taliban.The operational emphases have largely been onweapon platforms based search and destroymissions, similar to those adopted by the US in Iraqfrom 2003 to 2005. Lack of people-centric operationshas been the prime cause of failure in containingthe Taliban spread. As several analysts have said,the Pakistan army simply lacks the concept to fightcounter-insurgency operations and continues totreat these operations as low intensity conflicts. Themilitary outcome so far has been that it stillcontinues to fight in Swat and South Waziristan,and has yet to make decisive inroads into NorthWaziristan.

The other aspect has been Pakistan army’sambivalence vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban who arefighting against the US and NATO forces inAfghanistan. Selective targeting of militant groupsand lax operations along the Durand line to check

cross border infiltration have proved counter-productive in containing the Taliban. Other ill-advised strategies such as, divide and rule, crownthe war lord, brutal repression, decapitation etchave begun to backfire, and in fact have createdmore cohesion amongst the Taliban. The Pakistancounter-insurgency campaign has failed to addressthe broader grievances of the local population, andits perceived alignment with the US has constrainedits strategic and tactical options. Pakistan is yet tofocus on a campaign centred on the well-being ofits people in the frontier region and is yet tounderstand the nature of insurgency, the centre ofgravity and the force composition required toundertake a successful counter-insurgencycampaign.

The approach per se has to focus on a politicalsolution rather than military action. A balancedapproach has to focus on ‘people-centric’ ratherthan ‘enemy-centric’ operations. This would implyemphasis on ‘winning hearts and minds’ rather thancoercive military action..... And this needs to becapped by a political and ideological offensive todeny legitimacy to insurgents. The most recentdefinition on COIN calls for a comprehensivecivilian-military campaign to contain theinsurgency. Military operations have to be aimedat securing the people so that the developmentalagenda can be pursued. Military capacity isnecessary but is not the only pre-requisite forsuccessful counter-insurgency operations.The military campaign undertaken by the Pakistanmilitary so far demonstrates that it is yet to evlove awell-thoughtout counter-insurgency strategy.

Dilemmas and Dichotomies

Pashtuns are often dubbed as the perfectinsurgents. Constituting approximately 74 percentof the NWFP and 99 per cent of the FATApopulations, the Pashtuns are the second largestethnic group in Pakistan. They have always been


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known to fiercely resist efforts aimed atpacification, nation-building and external rule. Infact, the tribes in Waziristan have never beensubjugated by any foreign power, includingPakistan. The British tried defeating these tribes in1897, 1919, 1930 and 1936 but never succeeded fullyin their efforts. The Pakistan military too has failedrepeatedly since 2004 and several peace dealsonly demonstrate their inability to subdue thesetribes. This implies that any effort aimed at even apacifist and people centric counter-insurgencyoperation is bound to encounter some resistanceand hostility from the local population. In otherwords, the approach has to be more nuanced andresourceful in the frontier provinces, than itsgeneral conceptual understanding in the Pakistaniestablishment.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border is rife withmountain passes and trails facilitating cross-borderinfiltration. The border stretching 1640 miles isriddled with over 300 odd illegal and mannedcrossings. Cracking down on cross-bordermovement in the absence of an elaborate bordercontrol mechanism and adequate troops isextremely difficult. This cross-border movementfacilitates flow of money, weapons, equipment andmilitants to the advantage of Pakistan and Taliban.Inability to check cross-border movement ofTaliban cadres is therefore a major operationallacuna of the current military strategy in Pakistan.

The frontier region is also very large in size. TheFATA and the NWFP are 27,000 and 74,000 squarekilometres respectively, which makes it extremelydifficult to build an effective force ratio for counter-insurgency operations. A related issue is that onlythree percent of FATA and 15 percent of the NWFPpopulation live in urban areas, and the remainderis widely dispersed along the countryside. Thedispersed population calls for an even higher forceratio to secure the affected populations. The militant

groups are known to exploit these ungovernedterritories and coupled with the dispersedpopulation, it necessitates a more ingeniouscounter-insurgency approach.

Limited mobility in the FATA and the NWFP,due to lack of suitable roads and tracks affects theconduct of military operations. A sparse roadnetwork coupled with a diffused populationimpinges upon its ability to deploy and sustaintroops for operations. The army is often forced tooccupy isolated posts with supply lines susceptibleto the militant attacks. Securing these lines ofcommunication is troop-intensive and detractsforces from primary operations. The larger thelogistic tail, the more the number of troops neededto ensure operational success.

Tactical air mobility is the key to successfuloperations in the mountainous region. It is notknown whether Pakistan is going full throttle andwholeheartedly utilizing its present fleet of rotarywing aircraft comprising Bell-412 utilityhelicopters, Cobra gunships and Mi 8/Mi 17 classof helicopters to deter the insurgents and supportlogistical operations. These air assets require safeand secure operating bases within operational reachof the insurgency affected areas, thus raising yetanother logistical dilemma for conduct of effectivecounter-insurgency operations.

Poor force to population ratios have been yetanother dichotomy in Pakistan’s counter-insurgency campaign. As a guide line, a force topopulation ratio of 25:1000 is prescribedworldwide. While this ratio evolved by JamesQuinlivan, a military analyst and seniormathematician at Rand Corporation in the US, hasseveral inconsistencies, it is still a favoured measureto evaluate the effectiveness of counter-insurgencycampaigns. The force ratio is essentially a functionof the agitative capacity of the rebel population in


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an affected area. The Pakistan army has beenundertaking counter-insurgency campaigns sincepartition. But since most of these have been basedon high calibre weapons, the Pakistan Army hashad little experience in working out ideal forceratios for a COIN campaign. Even for troopintensive cordon and search operations in Karachiin years 1992 to 1995, the force ratios have neverbeen more than 3.2:1000, an extremely poor ratiofor operations. While various case studies revealthat a force ratio of 20:1000 is adequate, the Pakistanarmy has continuously maintained a low ratio of15:1000 in the frontier provinces. The large numberof insurgents (estimated to be around 40,000) andan extremely difficult terrain complicate theadequacy of even a 20:1000 force ratio for thePakistan army. Reluctance to deploy additionaltroops to meet the required combat ratios is perhapsthe biggest lacuna in the counter-insurgencyoperations being undertaken by Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Counter-insurgencyOptions

The NWFP and the FATA collectively report apopulation estimate of 26 million, which on a forceto population ratio of 20:1000 requires a field forceof approximately 5,20,000 troops. The estimateddeployment stands at around 1,50,000 troops, witha breakdown of approximately 70,000 and 80,000troops in FATA and NWFP (including Malakand)respectively. The shortfall of 3,10,000 troops is theminimum mathematical requirement to formulatea viable counter-insurgency strategy for the frontierprovinces in Pakistan. This needs to be weighedagainst total force levels available within the stateof Pakistan.

Regular army troops in Pakistan along with thereservists total about 10,20,000. The paramilitarieswhich include the Frontiers Corps and the PakistanRangers total another 1,25,000 troops. The policeforces are another 3,50,000 men and around 1,00,000

plus lashkars can be marshalled. All in all, the totalforce potential stands at 16,00,000 soldiers andpolicemen. These figures clearly indicate that whilethe Pakistani state possesses the numerical capacityto deploy for an effective counter-insurgencycampaign, it has restrained itself from deploying aviable military component to contain the raginginsurgency in the frontier provinces.

The mechanics of a counter-insurgencycampaign also depend on the nature of forcesemployed and their proportion. Each type of forcehas its own strengths and weaknesses for a counter-insurgency campaign. However, a commonproblem with security forces is their inherentreluctance to fight fellow tribals or communitiesat someone else’s insistence, including thegovernment of the day. In the case of Pakistan, theissue is acutely sensitive as Pakistanis in general donot support operations against the Taliban ormilitary cooperation with the US. Notwithstandingthis, the Pakistan army is the only one which is mostsuited to undertake protracted counter-insurgencyoperations. It is a well-trained and professional forcebut lacks the motivation and skills to fight theTaliban. Re-training the conventional force forcounter-insurgency operations could prove to be amajor asset for the campaign in the frontierprovinces. However, since only 20 per cent of thetroops hail from the Pashtun belt, the Pakistani armylacks the soft skills such as the knowledge of terrain,language and local customs, to pursue thesubsequent phases of the counter-insurgencycampaign.

On the other hand, the Frontier Corps which isdrawn from tribal areas is knowledgeable in termsof terrain and demography. But then these troopshave inherent limitations in confronting theirtribal brethren, the Taliban. These troops also lacktraining, equipment and good leadership. TheFrontier Corps however can be employed to extendsecurity cover to the vulnerable populations, thus


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sparing the Pakistan army to confront the Taliban.The Pakistan police too can play a pivotal role inthe counter-insurgency efforts, but it faces severalfunctional limitations. Under the givencircumstances, the best option is to boost the forceto population ratios and offset the Taliban’sadvantage by employing lashkars, who are familiarwith the terrain, language and demography, andwho may well like to take on the Taliban.

The fundamental constraint for undertakingeffective counter-insurgency operations is thePakistan military’s obsession with its easternborders with India. Pakistan’s fears of a strong andsuperior force in the neighbourhood which is readyto launch at short notice and break its territorialintegrity, obfuscates its approach towards tacklingthe Taliban. The close proximity of Pakistan’s linesof communication, their industrial centres andmajor cities to the international boundary affectsits strategic calculus. Identifying minimuminescapable deployment along its eastern borderswould enable the Pakistan army to assess the forceavailability in dealing with the Taliban.

A re-aggregation of the available force levelswould reveal that Pakistan is capable of fielding5,20,000 troops to wage an effective campaign inthe frontier provinces.1 Besides the police,paramilitary and military force levels alreadydeployed, the re-aggregated figures wouldinclude additional 1,50,000 troops from easternborders, 40,000 troops from Karachi and QuettaCorps, 30,000 policemen, 40,000 rangers and 1,00,000plus lashkars. The availability of troops could evenbe enhanced if the force to frontage ratios vis-à-vis

India is increased. Some analysts have suggestedthat this could make additional brigades availablefor operations in the FATA and the NWFP. Theimbalance caused along the eastern borders couldbe offset by investing in superior war fightingtechnologies or further lowering the threshold foruse of nuclear weapons.

While all this is well-said, the resistance in thepolitical circles to affect this re-deployment isobvious. The senior military leadership is boundto strongly canvas against any re-deployment forseveral reasons. The most important reason is ofcourse the suspicion of India, but the other reasoncould be the apprehension that prolongedcommitment for counter-insurgency operationsmay degrade its conventional combat potential.Perhaps the biggest fear is that adoption of a counter-insurgency strategy would reduce it to the statusof a glorified police force, and that in turn, wouldcompromise its status as the nation’s most powerfulinstitution.

The other inhibiting factor is the difficulty inadapting to counter-insurgency operations,especially for an army so steeped in conventionaloperations. Fighting militants calls for a differentset of soldierly skills, battle procedures andconceptual practices. This can be hard for aconventional force to achieve, if it doesn’t getadequate time to re-orient itself. Re-training5,20,000 troops for COIN operations may take a longtime and also be quite expensive. The Americandeployment of 4000 trainers in Afghanistan to raiseand train 1,26,000 Afghan soldiers is expected totake up to seven years and cost up to 20 billion


1 Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment”, New AmericaFoundation, Washington, September 2009. available at http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/NAFPakistanSept09.pdf (accessed March 4, 2010)

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dollars, inclusive of the equipment needs.

Besides the cost and time factor, the Pakistanarmy fears that the force transformation could havea negative effect on its readiness vis-à-vis India andoverall professionalism of the force – a point madeearlier in this chapter. All in all, there is no seriousmotivation for the Pakistan army to transform itselffor counter-insurgency operations. Moreover, acounter-insurgency strategy requires tremendousemphasis on unified civilian and military decisionmaking at the national and provincial level. Andsince the Pakistan military is not accustomed tosharing the stage with the civilian leaders, its abilityto effect serious consensual counter-insurgencyoperations may be suspect.

Likely Scenarios

The foregoing discussion proves beyond doubtthat the Pakistan military possesses sufficientcapacities to contain the Taliban insurgency,without jeopardizing its defence capability on theeastern borders. But what comes in their way areseveral inhibiting factors ranging from terrain,demography, military consensus, transformationalhurdles and cost and the political will to undertakelarge-scale counter-insurgency operations.Notwithstanding these constraints, the state ofPakistan will increasingly come under pressurefrom the international community and the rationalelements within Pakistan to perform. It maytherefore be prudent to make an assessment of thesecurity scenarios that may result as a consequenceof the operational trajectories that the Pakistan armymay adopt from time to come to counter the threatfrom Taliban. Three broad scenarios emerge –business as usual, slight improvement in thesituation or a complete downslide of events inPakistan.

One possible scenario is that, Pakistan continuesto bide its time in the hope that the raging Taliban

insurgency subsides, and is eventually controlledby cutting new deals and accords. Since the USoften talks about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, and somerecent reviews from Western media reiterate theneed to disaggregate the Afghan Taliban, thePakistan establishment too may be tempted to workon these lines. However, any efforts to disaggregatethe Taliban would require detailed understandingof various factions, attentiveness to the resistancenarratives and trust building initiatives based ongenuine concern for local development andredressal of tribal grievances. This path would savePakistan army from re-locating additional forcesto the frontier region, the need to re-orient them forcounter-insurgency operations and dilute itsdefensive profile along the eastern borders. Givena choice, the Pakistan army would prefer the optionof ‘business as usual’ with limited accretion to forcelevels deployed in the frontier provinces andchange the operational tempo to keep off theinternational pressure.

Another plausible scenario is that Pakistan doesre-locate some additional troops from its easternborders in an incremental fashion and in the processextracts a high ‘commitment’ cost from the US andFriends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP). In the givencontext, the Pakistan army may even resort to re-training a portion of the force levels for counter-insurgency operations. The cost of undertaking acredible counter-insurgency campaign in thefrontier provinces could have some ramificationsfor the growing Indo-US strategic partnership inrecent years. The US could be forced to pay thiscost in several different ways – immediate transferof high end military technology to compensate foroperational voids created along the eastern borders,restrain forward deployment of Indian troops, denyor constrain Indian military procurements in thepipe line etc.

The worst case scenario could result from a


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premature exit of the US troops from Afghanistan.The Obama Administration’s revised Af-Pakpolicy spelt out after his West Point speech inDecember 2009, hints at beginning of thewithdrawal of the US troops by 2011. Even if it hasbeen termed as a result-driven and not a calendar-driven pull out, the possibility of a pullout willbring an altogether different dynamic to thesituation on the ground. Exit of the US troopswould give the Pakistan establishment anopportunity to reclaim its influence in the Pak-Afregion. It would be more than keen to back theAfghan Taliban in its pursuit to establish controlover Kabul. The resulting situation could givea free run to both the Afghan and Pakistani Talibanin the long run. This in turn could lead to furtherradicalisation of the society and institutions inPakistan. But then having known and managed theTaliban leadership in the past, it would continueto play one against the other in order to ensure thatthe tribal insurgency does not spill over to thePakistani heartland. In the process, it may indulgein providing some political and economicconcessions to the Pashtun belt to calm downthe tribals.

Should the Pakistan military establishment failto control the resulting tribal violence beyond thePashtun belt both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, itmay have to pay a serious price in the long term.Increased instability in the region may even afflictsome of the Muslim dominated areas in theneighbourhood, especially the province of Xinjiangin China and some of the central Asian States.The resulting situation may also fuel thefledgling insurgencies raging in Balochistan andGilgit-Baltistan.

Implications in the Indian Context

The evolving situation in the frontier provincesof Pakistan does not portend well. Though it seemsthat the Pakistan establishment under increasing

pressure from the US is trying hard to tackle theproblem, there is as yet no sign of how soon thethreat could be contained. Terrorism when underpressure tends to move to areas which offer little orno resistance and the operational tempo built upby the security forces could have different results.It could lead to the elimination of the Taliban orpush them into newer areas where they couldflourish with ease. These areas could be anybody’sguess. The worst case could be the large-scale influxof ‘Talibanised’ cadres into the Indian hinterland.While the situation in Jammu and Kashmir couldstill be controlled, Indian security forces are yet todevelop the capability of handling terror in urbanareas. India needs to seriously prepare for it, lest itgets too late to build capacities to combat themenace when it crops up. At the same time, thesecurity agencies will have to invest considerabletime and effort to check the occurrence of untowardincidents prompted from across the border. Thiswould entail better intelligence gathering andsharing, equipping and training of forces andinvolving local communities for ensuring securityof the populated areas.

Conclusion

Fighting the Taliban in the NWFP and the FATAhas been a kind of a turning point in the history ofPakistan. So far, it seems that the counter-insurgencyoperations undertaken in Swat have been successfulin containing the Taliban threat. But this successmay be short-lived, as the army has still notmanaged to effectively contain the insurgentleadership ensconced in North and SouthWaziristan, even if combined operations by the USand Pakistani security forces have been able toeliminate the top leadership. The Talibaninsurgency that emerged in early 2002, now unitesmore than 20 disparate militant groups under anumbrella organisation called the Tehrik-i-Taliban.The alliance features a decentralised command and


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control structure, but even then it continues to gainin strength and internal cohesion. The alliance hasan estimated strength of 30,000 to 40,000 cadres, ofwhom around 12,000 to 16,000 are considered to behardcore militants.

The Pakistan army’s approach to counter-insurgency operations in the frontier provinces from2004 to 2009 has followed a set pattern. The militarycampaign has been unable to address the broadergrievances of the local population, and Pakistan’sperceived alignment with the US has narrowedthe strategic and tactical options for Pakistan. Poorforce ratios have also constrained Pakistan’scounter-insurgency campaign. The NWFP and theFATA collectively need a field force ofapproximately 5,20,000 troops for effective counter-insurgency operations and the total force potentialstands at 16,00,000 soldiers and policemen inPakistan. These figures clearly indicate that whilethe Pakistani state possesses the numerical capacityto deploy the required force on the ground, it hasnot yet been able to go into its COIN operations

wholeheartedly. There has been a clear gap betweenits capacity and performance as a result of under-utilisation of its force potential.

Three probable security scenarios can resultfrom the operational trajectories that the Pakistanarmy may adopt to counter the Taliban threat.One possible scenario is that, Pakistan continuesto bide time and hope that the ragingTaliban insurgency subsides, and is eventuallycontrolled by cutting new deals and accords.Another scenario may be that Pakistan deployssome additional troops in an incrementalfashion and extracts a high ‘commitment’ cost fromthe US. While it may induce Pakistan to undertakea credible COIN campaign it could have negativeimpact on the Indo-US strategic partnership. Theworst case scenario could be a premature exit ofthe US troops from Afghanistan, which wouldgive the Pakistan establishment an opportunity toreclaim its strategic influence in the region andfoment further trouble for India by continuing touse terrorism as an instrument of state policy.


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CHAPTER VIII

PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR & MISSILE

PROGRAMMES: ON A SHORT FUSE?

It has been the prime obsession of the Pakistanileadership to obtain parity with India at all levels.Shortly after the end of the 1971 war with India, thethen Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,convened an important meeting in Multan inJanuary 1972 and requested the scientists presentthere to work for developing a nuclear bomb forPakistan. He also invited the noted Pakistaniscientist, Munir Ahmed Khan, who was serving inthe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) atthat time to return to Pakistan and lead the scientificcommunity in that pursuit. After two years, whenIndia conducted the peaceful nuclear explosion inMay 1974, Bhutto declared that Pakistanis wouldeat grass, but would develop a nuclear bomb.

As a first step in that direction, Pakistan signeda contract in 1975 with a French company, SGN(Societe Generale pour les Techniques Nouvelles),under IAEA safeguards for the construction of areprocessing plant at the Chashma nuclear site.However, the deal was abrogated mid-wayfollowing US pressure on France citingproliferation concerns in the year 1977. It is believedthat the facility was partially built and work on ithas resumed in the recent past.

While the utility of the reprocessing plant wasbeing discussed among the strategic experts,Pakistan covertly shifted to the uranium route fordeveloping nuclear weapons following the servicesoffered by Dr. A. Q. Khan in the mid-1970s.

Dr. Khan was a metallurgist at the URENCO’sAlmelo plant in the 1970s and he returned toPakistan in 1975 with the secret blue prints foruranium centrifuge technology along with a list ofWestern supplier companies of the componentsneeded. Under Dr. Khan’s supervision, Pakistancould quickly setup a uranium enrichment plantat Kahuta. Interestingly, Pakistan had alsodeveloped 2-3 test sites at Ras Koh Hills in Chagai,Balochistan and the Kirana hills before 1980 at atime when the nuclear capability was beingdeveloped. This indicates Pakistan’s dedicationand resolve to attain nuclear capability. Thus,within a short span of less than six years, Pakistancould develop highly enriched uranium for themaking of a nuclear fission bomb. Recentdisclosures by Dr. Khan suggest that China hadsupplied Pakistan, in 1982, with 50 kg of highlyenriched uranium, an unknown quantity ofuranium hexafluoride and drawings of a nuclearweapon under a deal struck between Mao Zedongand Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1976. The US also lookedthe other way all these years despite the CIA beingaware of Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weaponsprogramme. The US was also believed to beinstrumental in the acquittal of Dr. Khan in the casesfiled in the Dutch High Court on the charges ofstealing and smuggling of secret nuclear-enrichment technology.

Following the indefinite and unconditionalextension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

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(NPT) in 1995, India conducted five undergroundnuclear tests in Pokhran on May 11 and 13, 1998, towhich Pakistan responded within days byconducting six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, atChagai hills and declared itself as a nuclearweapons state. International seismological experts,however, doubted the results of these tests andopined that the signals received suggest that onlytwo tests were successful. Even after 12 years of thenuclear tests, neither the Pakistani nuclearestablishment nor the military commented on thesuccess of the nuclear explosions publicly nor werethere any two opinions on the issue in Pakistan.

While India declared a no-first-use policy fornuclear weapons and a moratorium on nucleartesting immediately after the tests, Pakistan rejectedthe no-first use policy using the conventionalimbalance with India as an excuse. AlthoughPresident Asif Ali Zardari, hinted in November 2008that Pakistan would like to offer a no-first use policy,he was forced to retract his words, following theobjections by the Pakistan army. However, Pakistandeclared that it would not resume undergroundnuclear testing, unless India would do so.

Like other states in possession of nuclearweapons, Pakistan maintains a high level ofsecrecy regarding nuclear materials it hasacquired, the number of warheads it is inpossession of, its weapons designs, storage sitesetc. It is also not known how much successPakistani scientists/engineers have achieved inmating the nuclear warheads with ballisticmissiles and aircrafts. Though there were noindications about the design, size and explosiveyields of the Pakistani nuclear weapons, it iscommonly felt that they were implosion-typeweapons with a yield of 15 kT. Recent estimatesby various think-tanks suggest that Pakistan mightbe in possession of about 60-80 nuclear weapons.A few of these weapons could be in the assembledstate, while a majority of the weapons are stored

in separate sites in a disassembled state.

There are no indications whether Pakistan is inpossession of a thermonuclear weapon. During the1970s and the 1980s, Pakistan had shown keeninterest in the development of a thermonuclearweapon, but in later years, there was hardly anymention of this weapon in the statements ofPakistani political leaders, scientists and armyofficials. While it was reported that China hadsupplied Pakistan with a nuclear weapon design(CHIC-4), which it had tested earlier in 1966, highlyenriched uranium and other materials, not manydetails were available in public domain about theirinteraction relating to the thermonuclear weapon.It was also reported that a Pakistani derivative ofCHIC-4 was apparently tested in China on May 26,1990. Thus, given the close relations between thetwo countries, the chances of sharing of informationon the thermonuclear weapon may not be ruled outcompletely.

Following the nuclear tests in 1998 by India andPakistan, many believe that Pakistani attitudetowards India, though assertive in late 1980s andearly 1990s, has become more aggressive than in thepast. Be it the adventure in Kargil in 1999,deployment of armed forces following the IndianParliament attack in December 2001 or tensionsfollowing the terrorist attack on Kaluchak armycamp in May 2002, Pakistan has indulged in nuclearsabre-rattling. Subsequent to the 9/11 attacks,Pakistan had become a close and crucial ally forthe US in its war on terror and the US pressure onPakistan to cap, reduce and eliminate its nuclearcapability has substantially receded. The sanctionsimposed on Pakistan in 1998 following the tests,along with India, were also lifted in 2001.

The joint-statement by the then US PresidentGeorge Bush and the Indian Prime MinisterManmohan Singh in July 2005 in Washington to enterinto civil nuclear cooperation, which ended the


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three-decade long nuclear apartheid for India,raised serious concerns in Pakistan. It startedcanvassing against the deal describing it asdiscriminatory. According to Pakistan, India wouldbe free to use its domestic uranium resources forweaponisation as the deal allows India to importuranium for its safeguarded nuclear powerreactors. It also warned that the deal would scuttlethe nuclear balance in South Asia and soon therewould be an arms race. When its efforts did notbear fruit, Pakistan changed its course of action andstarted demanding a ‘criteria-based approach’ fromthe 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, thanmerely an India-specific exemption.

Though the Indo-US relations have been on therise following the economic liberalisation by theP V Narasimha Rao government in 1991, the BushAdministration paved the way for a new andstrategic partnership with India through the Indo-US nuclear deal. The aim was to strengthen theglobal nuclear non-proliferation regime by bringingseveral Indian indigenous nuclear reactors underthe IAEA safeguards, in return for relaxing NSGguidelines for allowing nuclear trade by the NSGcountries with India. This resulted in an end to thethree-decade old nuclear apartheid for India andthe deal recognised India as a state with advancednuclear technology as well as a strategicprogramme. Though Pakistan demanded a similartreatment, the US said that it was not willing toconsider such an option. India has offered to place14 of its existing 22 reactors and also the reactors tobe imported in the future under IAEA safeguards.In case of Pakistan, other than the two nuclear powerreactors, KANUPP and CHASHNUPP, alreadycovered by the IAEA safeguards, the rest of thenuclear facilities are strategic in nature and Pakistancannot afford any of these installations beingcovered by the IAEA safeguards in return for havingthe NSG guidelines relaxed. As far as India wasconcerned, its impeccable nuclear track record on

proliferation also contributed significantly to theUS action. In the case of Pakistan, the Dr. A.Q. Khanepisode would have definitely been a dampener.The US was also aware of India’s economic growthcoupled with its growing demand for energy andits efforts to increase nuclear output, given itsproven capabilities to design and operate nuclearpower reactors. However, till date, Pakistan hasnot relented and is known to be demanding asimilar deal from the US.

As an alternative, Pakistan turned to China toconclude an agreement on the lines of the Indo-USnuclear agreement. During the October 2008 visitto China by the Pakistan President, Asif Ali Zardari,a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) wasreportedly signed for the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors at Chashma. The reactorswith a capacity of 340 MWe would come up atChashma where China is constructing a secondplant. It is understood that China would supplythe nuclear fuel for the entire life time of thesereactors. Pakistan also engaged with France forcivil nuclear cooperation and announced that it hadconcluded an agreement with Paris. French officialslater clarified that their cooperation with Pakistanwas limited to the area of nuclear safety and it wasnot possible for France to export nuclear reactors andtechnology, overlooking the NSG.

Pakistan is also concerned by the launch of INSArihant by India and claimed that it would createstrategic imbalance in south Asia. It has announcedthat it would take corrective measures to bring backparity with India. Pakistan has also expressed onnumerous occasions, reservations about the Indian‘Cold-Start’ doctrine and maintains that the newinitiative is against the normalisation of relationsbetween the two countries.

Following the seizure of the ship ‘BBC China’carrying shipment and designs required for theLibyan nuclear enrichment programme in October

Pakistan’s Nuclear & Missile Programmes: On a Short Fuse?

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2003, the 16 year-old nuclear black-market ringoperated by Dr A.Q. Khan was laid bare. TheMusharraf government quickly summoned DrKhan, who publicly acknowledged his clandestinedealings with countries like North Korea, Iran andLibya and apologised to the nation for his deeds. Aday later Musharraf pardoned Dr Khan keeping inview ‘his services to the nation’ but confined himto his house for the next six-years. Pakistan alsoavoided exposing Dr. Khan to the internationalcommunity and maintained that it had shared therelevant information with the US and the IAEA.Later, Pakistan declared that the Dr. A. Q. Khanchapter was closed. The repeated efforts of the USand the IAEA to interrogate Dr Khan have failed.The arrests and subsequent releases of other majorplayers in the network like Tinners, T. S. A. Bashiretc did not mean much. There are, however, noindications whether the Dr. Khan network actuallyceased to exist. Accusing Khan to be acting on hisown, former President, Gen (Retd.) PervezMusharraf claimed that neither the Pak army norprevious governments were ever involved or hadany knowledge of Dr. Khan’s proliferationactivities. On the other hand, Khan told AFP in atelephone interview that “I saved the country forthe first time when I made Pakistan a nuclear nationand saved it again when I confessed and took thewhole blame on myself”.1

Pakistan boasts that it had established a nuclearCommand and Control structure in February 2000,three years ahead of India, which was headed tillNovember 2009 by the Pakistani President.Pakistan’s nuclear command and control of nuclearweapons is based on three components, namely theNational Command Authority (NCA), itssecretariat called the Strategic Plans Division (SPD)

and the Strategic Forces Command. Besides theprime minister who is the chairman of the NCA, itconsists of the defence minister, foreign minister,finance minister and the interior minister from thecivilian government. From the military side, theNCA has the Joint Chiefs of Staff, three service chiefsand the Director General (DG), SPD as members(See Figure 8.1 for details).

The SPD, since its inception, is headed by athree-star general, Lt. Gen (Retd.) Khalid AhmedKidwai. It plays a central role in all issues relatingto nuclear weapons and their development, storageand security (the structure of the SPD is shown inthe Figure 8.2).

The two main elements of the NCA are theEmployment Control Committee (ECC), whichprovides policy direction and has authority overthe strategic forces. It was initially chaired by thepresident and included the prime minister andother cabinet ministers. The second committee wasthe Developmental Control Committee (DCC) andcomprised military and scientific elements. Theobjective of this committee was to optimise thetechnical and financial efficiency of the entireprogramme and to implement the strategic forcegoals set by the ECC.

In November 2009, Pakistani President, Asif AliZardari relinquished the charge as chairmanof the NCA and entrusted the responsibility to theprime minister who succeeded him on November28, 2009. While many view that Zardari made thedecision following pressure from governmentquarters and the military, it could be possible thatZardari wanted to avoid impeachment orprosecution. However, there was no informationon the restructuring of the NCA so as to restore thebalance.

1 See report, “Nuclear scientist says he confessed to ‘save’ Pakistan”, April 7, 2008. Available at : http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hKZQFrI-rPtBKI4GfHYs4eg3eKkQ (accessed February 12, 2010)


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Figure 8.1:

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Figure


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Since 9/11, Pakistan has also received USnuclear security assistance in the form of aid andadvanced-level training in the US nationallaboratories. About US$ 100 million have beenspent, besides the economic assistance provided toPakistan. Pakistan also claims that it has notaccepted any technology transfers from the USincluding the Permissive Action Links (PALs).

To allay concerns of the Western world on thesafety and security of Pakistani nuclear weaponsand other assets, Kidwai made a presentation inNovember 2007 to over 50 journalists from all overthe world, to highlight the steps taken by the SPDto safeguard Pakistani nuclear weapons, theirstorage sites and movement. He later made twoseparate presentations to foreign military attachesand diplomats and elaborated the measuresinitiated and executed by Pakistan. According tohim, a force of about 10,000 security personnelguards all the strategic sites and these measureswere at par with those employed by other nuclearweapons states. Pakistan also claims to haveestablished the Nuclear Security Action Plan(NSAP) which would be overseen by the PakistanNuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) under theSPD. This was to address the issue of securingnuclear materials, radioactive sources from illegaltrafficking and preventing their use in thedevelopment of radiological weapons.

Despite the tall claims by Pakistan regarding thesafety and security of its nuclear weapons and otherstrategic assets, concerns do persist among themembers of the international community because ofthe deteriorating security situation. Growinginstability in Pakistan coupled with the advance ofthe Taliban forced the Pakistan military to undertakelarge-scale operations in the FATA region and morerecently in South Waziristan. Simultaneously, terrorattacks have escalated in various parts of Pakistanincluding at Wah cantonment.

Seymour Hersh, the noted US journalist, in hisarticle in the New Yorker elaborated on theissue of nuclear safety in Pakistan. According tohim, the Obama administration has been negotiatinga highly sensitive understanding with the Pakistanimilitary to allow specially trained US troops toprovide added security for Pakistani nuclearweapons, in case of an emergency. Simultaneously,the Pakistani military would be given money toequip and train Pakistani soldiers and to improvetheir housing and facilities. To this end, the USCongress has approved in June 2009 a US$ 400million request.

Pakistan is in possession of F-16A/B andMirage V aircrafts acquired from the US and Francerespectively for the delivery of nuclear weapons.It is widely assessed that Pakistan might have mademodifications to these aircraft so as to use them fornuclear missions. In February 2010, Pakistanannounced that it inducted the first squadron of JF-17 Thunder multi-role combat aircraft it jointlydeveloped with China as part of its efforts tomaintain a balance of conventional forces in theregion.

Till 1992, Pakistan was known to be laggingbehind in the ballistic missiles field and not muchprogress was reported in the development ofmedium-range ballistic missiles. The Hatf-1 andHatf-2 were very short-range missiles and Pakistanencountered several difficulties in theirdevelopment. Pakistan launched the liquid-fuelledGhauri missile with a reported range of 1300 km inApril 1998 and the test came as a shock for the entireworld. Ultimately, it came to light that NorthKorean Nodong-1 missiles had been supplied toPakistan and had been re-named as Ghauri. It waswidely believed that Pakistan had struck a barterdeal with North Korea, under which ballisticmissiles were supplied to Pakistan in return foruranium centrifuge technology. North Korea was


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2 Kidwai’s interview finds detailed mention in Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear Safety,Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A concise report of a visit by Landau Network - CentroVolta”, Como, Italy: Landau Network-Centro Volta, January 21, 2002, p.5. Available at: http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf (accessed February 12, 2010).

known to be operating a 5-MW research reactor atits Yongbyon nuclear complex from which itseparated enough plutonium for a small numberof nuclear weapons. The US believes that NorthKorea was secretly developing uraniumenrichment capability and the issue was central inthe six-party talks among the US, China, Japan,Russia, South and North Korea. Despite the denialby Pakistani leaders, the recent acknowledgmentby North Korea that it had mastered uraniumenrichment technology confirms Pakistani supportfor North Korea.

By the end of the 20th century, Pakistan startedtest-firing a variety of ballistic missiles includingShaheen-1, Shaheen-2 and Ghaznavi. In thebeginning of the 21st century, Pakistan furtherdisplayed its capability to develop and launchcruise missiles viz., Babur and Ra’ad. The speed,with which Pakistan has developed, tested anddeployed some of these missiles, indicates thatPakistan has benefited immensely from Chinathrough the imports of designs, materials,equipment and technology.

However, Pakistan is yet to develop substantialskills to develop and operate space assets forcivilian/military applications. Though Pakistan isaware of the fact that space capabilities are essentialfor making its nuclear command and controlcredible, it is yet to make any headway in this field.As on date, Pakistan operates one leased satelliteand is very anxious to develop/launch a satellitebefore 2012 by which time the sole slot allocated toPakistan would expire. Towards meeting the target,Pakistan has concluded an agreement with Chinain 2008.

Pakistan does not have a ‘no-first-use’ policyon nuclear weapons. At the same time, there hasnot been much public debate or discussion onissues related to nuclear weapons in Pakistan.Though a nuclear doctrine was never formulatedofficially, Pakistan has reiterated on many occasionsthat its nuclear weapons are India centred and thatit will use nuclear weapons if the very existence ofPakistan as a state is at stake. In an interview withItalian scholars in 2002, the DG of the SPD, KhalidKidwai said that the nuclear weapons were “aimedsolely at India” and “in case that deterrence fails,they will be used if ,

India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large partof its territory (space threshold)

India destroys a large part either of its land orair forces (military threshold)

India proceeds [with] the economic stranglingof Pakistan (economic strangling)

India pushes Pakistan into politicaldestabilization or creates a large scale internalsubversion in Pakistan (domesticdestabilization)”.2

While ruling out any risk of inadvertent nuclearconflict, Kidwai emphasised that India andPakistan would stay clear of the nuclear thresholdand reftrain from aggressive behaviour that couldtrigger any nuclear reaction. However, in the recenttimes there are several indications coming outfrom various military leaders which suggest thatperhaps there has been some lowering of the nuclearthreshold. Reacting to the Indian Army Chief’sremarks on use of space for limited war under anuclear overhang, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff,


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Gen. Pervez Kayani remarked that it would lead toincalculable consequences, meaning lowering ofthe nuclear threshold. Lt Gen (Retd.) Shahid Aziz,who was Chief of General Staff under Musharraf,speaking on a Television show in Pakistan talkedabout firing a nuclear-tipped missile across theIndian landmass into the Bay of Bengal as a forcedemonstrator. After the Mumbai terrorist attacksin November 2008, Lt Gen Hamid Nawaz, a formercorps commander, also warned on a TV show thatthe conflict would turn into nuclear within hours,in the event India launched an attack on Pakistan.Such statements however were not limited to themilitary alone. Maria Sultan, Director General ofthe Islamabad-based South Asia Strategic StabilityInstitute (SASSI) also reiterated similar views in aTV show3. All these statements raise questions as towhether the red-lines laid down by Kidwai havebeen blurred.

Scenario in Next 10 Years

Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state, which isactively engaged in the past few years in increasingand modernising its nuclear weapons stockpile. In2008-2009, there were reports suggesting thatPakistan was constructing two more plutoniumproduction reactors (of unknown capability); areprocessing facility to support these reactors;expanding the Dera Ghazi Khan nuclear site; andhad new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles/cruisemissiles under production. Further, Pakistan is setto increase its nuclear weapons stocks in the next10 years. Though it would be difficult to estimatethe number, it might be mentioned that though theCIA estimated in 1999 that Pakistan would needanother 20 years to double its stockpile from 25-35nuclear weapons, it took only about 10 years to

achieve that. It is also difficult to estimate at whatstage Pakistan would like to halt the production ofthe nuclear arsenal and nuclear materials.

Pakistan is also actively engaged in thedevelopment/production of ballistic missiles andnuclear capable cruise missiles. In the next 10 yearsor so, Pakistan is likely to be engaged in improvingtheir performance, and accuracy. Pakistan wouldalso like to place its long-awaited PAKSAT-1R intospace with Chinese assistance in 2012. With noproven space capabilities, Pakistan may dependon China for its strategic requirements includingsatellite imagery.

In all probability, the Pakistan establishmentmight have decided to drastically increase itsproduction of plutonium in the coming years.Towards achieving this, Pakistan is engaged insetting up additional facilities to produce nuclearmaterials. It is also likely that Pakistan might beinterested to build plutonium-based nuclearweapons to supplement the uranium-basedweapons.

With the current global recession, increased USpressure on the safety of nuclear weapons andincreased reliance on outside financial support forits very survival, it is not known how Pakistan isgoing to sustain the development of its nuclear andmissile programmes. In May 2009, it was reportedthat Pakistan’s nuclear programme was facingsevere budget cuts to the tune of 35 per cent thathave hampered about 30 projects including someclassified projects run by the Pakistan AtomicEnergy Commission (PAEC). It was also widelyreported that senior nuclear scientists and officialsholding key positions in the nuclear programmewere upset with the situation and feared that the

3 In the programme called “Islamabad Tonight” on December 29, 2008. Can watch the video on http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=1448968651699687880 &ei=WHCgS_7aHoG2wgOvsIyGDQ&q=maria+sultan&hl=en#


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cuts were tantamount to a quiet and unannouncedrollback and it would badly damage theprogramme.

A brief description of Pakistani space, missileand nuclear programmes is as follows.

Space Programme

Pakistan realises that space technology is vitalfor a state possessing nuclear weapons, to make thenuclear command and control mechanismscredible. The giant steps taken by India in this fieldmust be a source of concern and worry for Pakistan.

Unlike the nuclear and missile programmes,Pakistan’s space programme is not well-advanced.Despite the fact that the nodal agency for spaceactivities in Pakistan— the Pakistan Space andUpper Atmosphere Research Commission(SUPARCO)— was established as a committee in1961, not much progress had been achieved by it inthe first three decades of its existence. TheSUPARCO was given the status of a Commissionin 1981. In 1962, SUPARCO began launchingimported sounding rockets from a test range nearthe Indian Ocean and by 1970 SUPARCOdeveloped the capability to fabricate rocket motorsfrom raw materials. It has a solid-fuelmanufacturing plant and maintains an instrumentdevelopment facility and a rocket testing range.

In the early 1980s, SUPARCO, in collaborationwith Hughes, conducted a feasibility study definingthe broad parameters of PAKSAT. The project’sestimated cost was US$ 400 million. However,PAKSAT never came off the drawing boards.

Pakistan was successful only in sending twoindigenously built satellites into space, namelyBadr-I and Badr-II in 1990 from China, and in 2001from Russia. They had a life span of six-monthsand two years respectively.

Pakistan was allocated five slots in 1984 by theInternational Telecommunications Union (ITU), butfailed to put a satellite in the orbit in the stipulatedtime and subsequently lost four slots in that process.With the fear of losing the sole spot of 38º East ingeo-stationary orbit, which was strategically vital,Pakistan scrambled to retain that slot. The satellite’sfootprints covers the commercially hot markets ofIndia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Africa and Europe.

As on date, Pakistan has only one operationalsatellite which is Pakistan’s NationalCommunications Satellite PAKSAT -1, at an orbitallocation of 38° East longitude. Pakistan is trying toreplace PAKSAT -1 by PAKSAT IR before its lifeceases in end 2012. Pakistan acquired the HughesGlobal Systems Satellite (HGS3) on lease for fiveyears in 2003 and renamed it as PAKSAT-1.Later, its lease was extended by another 5 years tillend of 2012. Pakistan paid US$ 4.5 million at thetime of signing the contract and a sum of US$ 4.5million (US$ 2.5 million as operational costs andUS$ 2 million as fees for transponders) a year to bepaid to the company. Pakistan insisted that theleased satellite would be used only for commercialpurposes. Pakistan also planned to recover the costof the present satellite by selling the transpondersto telecommunication or broadcasting companiesin other countries, but there have been noindications in that direction.

Pakistan does not have the capability to developits own satellite launch vehicle (SLV) or thecapability to develop satellites. However, there hasbeen much talk about it for a few years now. In2001, Dr A.Q. Khan had reportedly stated thatPakistan was in the process of building a low-cost,light-weight SLV, but the plan never took off.Given this scenario, the future of Pakistan’s launchvehicle programme remains quite bleak,particularly when SUPARCO’s second priorityhappens to be remote sensory satellites rather than


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SLVs. Apart from the obvious question of funding,which SUPARCO lacks, some analysts also questionthe country’s capability to build and maintain anSLV. According to a renowned physicist Dr PervezHoodbhoy, Pakistan can at best construct one SLVif the SLV design and components are given toPakistan, but to manufacture something from itsown engineering and technical resources seemsimpossible. But this view was contradicted byShahid Qureshi, Head of the Institute of Space andPlanetary Astrophysics, Karachi University, whoobserved: “If we can launch a missile up to a rangeof 1,500km, why not build an SLV that can launchlow-atmosphere satellites?”4

There were attempts by the Pakistanadministration to suggest that it was keen to achieveprogress in the development of satellites and theirlaunch vehicles. In August 2005, the then PresidentPervez Musharraf had reportedly approved aproject, costing about Rs. 19.3 billion, which wasdesigned to be executed over six years. The aim ofthe project was to launch a self-controlled RemoteSensing Satellite System (RSSS) to ensure thestrategic and unconditional supply of satelliteremote sensing data for any part of the globe overthe year. At that time, Musharraf instructed theSUPARCO to develop the capability to make andlaunch different types of satellites. However, notmuch was heard about the project later.

About a year later, Musharraf had againexpressed his resolve to put Pakistan on the“world’s map of space-faring nations”. Speakingat ceremony to mark the passing out of the firstbatch of Institute of Space Technology (IST), hecalled on the SUPARCO to emulate the feats ofinstitutions like PAEC, NESCOM and KRL.5

As its efforts to launch an indigenous satellitedid not make any headway, Pakistan signed acontract with China Great Wall IndustryCorporation (CGWIC) for the on-orbit delivery ofthe Paksat 1R communication satellite in October2008 . The satellite will have a service life of 15 yearsand will be launched on August 2011. The satellitewill support all conventional and modern FixedSatellite Service (FSS) applications. The satellitewill have a total of up to 30 transponders: 18 in Ku-band and 12 in C-band. To ensure high degree ofreliability/availability of the system, two fullyredundant Satellite Ground Control Stations(SGCS) would be established in Karachi and Lahore,one to act as the Main and the other as Backuprespectively. Again China is likely to assist Pakistanin the supply of equipment and assistance.

Missile Programme

Though the Space and Upper AtmosphereResearch Commission (SUPARCO) was created in1961 to oversee all space research and developmentprogrammes, the surface-to-surface ballistic missileprogramme was launched only in the 1980s. TheHatf-1, with an estimated range of 80 km and 500 kgpayload is the first short-range missile to bedeveloped, followed by the Hatf-2, with anestimated range of 300km and a 500kg payload. Likethe nuclear programme, Pakistan’s missileprogramme was also heavily dependent onexternal assistance for technology, materials andassistance. Pakistan is known to be developing bothsolid- and liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles withChinese assistance. Besides supplying a smallnumber of M-11 missiles with a range of 300 km inthe early 1990s, China also helped Pakistan build aturnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility at

4 Sa’adia Reza, “Pakistan risks losing orbital slot if satellite not launched”, Dawn, October 19, 2008.5 Reported Dawn, August 11, 2006. Available at http://www.dawn.com/2006/08/11/welcome.htm (accessed

on February 14, 2010)


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Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi. Pakistan isbelieved to have built Ghaznavi (Hatf-III) short-range missiles based on the Chinese M-11 missiles.Ghaznavi was flight-tested for the first time in 2003followed by test in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 (someimportant facilities are shown in the Map-8.1).

By the late 1990s, China helped Pakistan developthe solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 (Hatf-IV) ballisticmissile. According to Western strategic experts, themissile is modelled on the Chinese M-9 missiles. Itwas flight-tested on April 15, 1999 for the first time.It was reported that the missile was handed over toPakistan army in 2003 and the army last test-launched it in May 2010. The missile can carry apayload of 1000 kg, but the range is not exactlyknown. While some put the range to be around 400km, Pakistan claims its range to be 700 km. TheNational Development Complex (NDC) isdeveloping these missiles.

Shaheen-II (Hatf VI) is a two-stage solid fuelledintermediate-range ballistic missile, which wassuccessfully test-fired for the first time on March 9,2004. Pakistan claimed that Shaheen II has a rangeof 2,500 km and can cover many parts of India.Efforts are on to increase its range to 3,500 km. Thereare indications that Pakistan is working onShaheen-III as well.

In the late 1990s, Pakistan also acquired a smallnumber of liquid-fuelled medium-range ballisticmissile Nodong (Ghauri) ballistic missiles (alsoknown as Hatf-V) from North Korea. Pakistanflight-tested the Ghauri missile on April 6, 1998 forthe first time. The missile has an optimum range of1,500 km and can carry a payload of 700 kg. TheGhauri-II is a newer variant with an increased rangeof 2,300 km developed by increasing the motor

assembly length and using improved propellants.The latest variant, Ghauri III is under developmentwith a planned range of 3500-4000 km.

In addition to ballistic missiles, Pakistan is alsoknown to be working on cruise missiles. Babur(Hatf VII) is the first land attack cruise missile to bedeveloped by Pakistan. With a reported range ofaround 500-700 km, it can be launched from ground-based TELs, warships, submarines and aircrafts. Tilldate five test-launches have taken place, the firstbeing in August 2005, and the last being in May2009. A submarine launched version of the Babur isbelieved to be under development.

Pakistan also developed the air-launchednuclear capable cruise missile Ra’ad (Hatf VIII),which was tested for the first time in August 2007.Its range is similar to that of Babur. The second testwas conducted in May 2009.

The New York Times reported in August 2009that Pakistan has modified the anti-ship Harpoonmissiles supplied by the US in 1980s to expand itscapability to strike land targets.6 This charge wasreportedly made by the US in an unpubliciseddiplomatic protest in late June 2009 to PrimeMinister Yousaf Raza Gilani and other top Pakistaniofficials. Pakistan while rejecting the allegationssuggested that Pakistan has indigenouslydeveloped the new missile.

Nuclear Programme

Pakistani nuclear programme dates back to 1955when it established Institute of Atomic Energy, withDr Nazir Ahmed being the founding Chairmanwhich was renamed as the Pakistan Atomic EnergyCommission (PAEC) a year later. In 1957, when theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was

6 See Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Says Pakistan Made Changes to Missiles Sold for Defense”, TheNew York Times, August 29, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/world/asia/30missile.html (accessed February 12, 2010).


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established, Pakistan joined it with the objective ofbenefiting from the peaceful uses of nucleartechnology. During the 1960s, some progress wasmade to increase the knowledge base and build thebasic infrastructure for research and developmentin the field of nuclear sciences. As a step in thatdirection, Pakistan set up the Pakistan Institute ofNuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) atNilore, near Islamabad, which later served as atraining ground for the future generation of Pakistaninuclear scientists (some important facilities are shownin the Map-8.2).

The first major nuclear cooperation agreementwas signed with Canada in 1965 under whichCanada supplied a 137 MWe nuclear power plantknown as the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant(KANUPP). The KANUPP started functioning in1971 under the IAEA safeguards. In December 1966,10 MW nuclear research reactor (PARR-1) built withthe US assistance became critical. Another researchreactor PARR-2 became operational in 1989. Chinasupplied a 300 MWe pressurised water reactor(PWR), the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant(CHASHNUPP) to Pakistan, whose design wassimilar to that of Chinese Quinshan Nuclear PowerPlant. Its construction started in 1993 and the reactorwas operational by May 2000. At the same site, asecond reactor with a 325 MWe output is underconstruction and it is expected to be operationalby 2010. Pakistan is also believed to be inconsultation with China to import 600 MWe as wellas 1000 MWe power reactors from China(Nucleonics Week, Volume 47, No. 40, September5, 2006. p.1). As mentioned earlier, Pakistan andChina have signed a MoU in October 2008 pavingthe way for the construction of two more nuclearpower plants of 340 MWe each. The ShanghaiNuclear Engineering Research DevelopmentInstitute (SNERDI) website has claimed in March2009 that the design work on these reactors wasunder way. However, Pakistan’s ambassador toChina denied that there was any such agreement

(Nucleonics Week, November 6, 2008). Recently,Pakistani media reports claimed that the FederalCabinet had ratified, in its last meeting in March2010, the agreement under which China wouldprovide 82 per cent of the total US$ 1.91 billionfinancing to Pakistan as soft loan.

However, it is not clear, how China, being amember of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)would export nuclear reactors to Pakistan withoutclearance from the NSG. The present NSGguidelines stipulate that nuclear exports would beallowed only to those countries who have signedthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). TheChinese nuclear cooperation issue had earliercropped up at the time when China joined the NSGon May 27, 2004. China maintained that itscommitment to construct the C-2 was madeearlier on May 4, 2004.

Despite the heavy odds in importing nuclearreactors and materials from outside, Pakistanmaintains that development of nuclear energyremains a top-priority for its government. In 2005,the Planning Commission and the PAECformulated the Energy Security Plan (ESP) whichformulates plans to increase the installed nuclearcapacity to 8800 MWe by 2030. To meet this target,Pakistan is also negotiating with France on possiblenuclear cooperation, but Paris has reportedly madeit clear that the cooperation would be limited tothe supply of safety and security equipment forPakistani nuclear assets. France also ruled outsupply of any nuclear reactors, citing the NSGguidelines.

Pakistan is known to be pursuing a clandestinenuclear weapons programme since the 1970s.Following the separation of East Pakistan after the1971 war Zulfikar Ali Bhutto convened the Multanmeeting of scientists on January 20, 1972 andnominated Munir Ahmad Khan as the newChairman of the PAEC. Bhutto, for the first time,

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openly asked the scientists present at the meetingto help Pakistan develop a nuclear bomb, aimed atnarrowing down the military disparity betweenIndia and Pakistan.

Following the French refusal to supply Pakistanwith a safeguarded plutonium reprocessing plantunder US pressure, Pakistan embarked on theuranium enrichment route to develop nuclearweapons technology. The major boost to itsaspirations came when Dr A. Q. Khan, a German-trained metallurgist, offered his services toPakistan. Dr. Khan had an extensive knowledge ofgas centrifuge technologies, which he had acquiredthrough his position at the classified URENCOuranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Hebrought with him secret designs of uraniumenrichment technology from Europe. He was putin charge of Engineering Research Laboratories(ERL) in 1976 for building, equipping and operatingthis facility, which was later renamed as KhanResearch Laboratories (KRL) in recognition of hisservices. Pakistan also employed an extensiveclandestine network to obtain the necessarymaterials and technology for developing uraniumenrichment capability. By the mid-1980s, Pakistanhad an operating uranium enrichment facility; andas early as 1989-1990, the US concluded thatIslamabad had acquired the capability to assemblea first-generation nuclear device.

Apparently with a view to developing light andcompact nuclear weapons, Pakistan also startedworking on the plutonium route since 1990s. Withthe Chinese assistance, Pakistan constructed a 40MWth heavy water plutonium production reactorat Joharabad near Khushab, which becameoperational by 1998. Though there were no reportson the functioning of this plant, it is believed toproduce 8-10 kg of plutonium per year. A spent-fuel reprocessing plant has also come up at NewLabs in PINSTECH with Chinese assistance.

Despite the growing instability in Pakistan inthe recent times coupled with the global economicrecession, there are indications that Pakistan isconstantly engaged in stepping up its capabilitiesto develop nuclear weapons. The tacit acceptanceby US officials and the subsequent disclosures bythe Washington-based Institute for Science andInternational Security (ISIS) suggest that Pakistanhas been pursuing the modernisation of its nuclearweapons programme vigorously. Satelliteimageries obtained by ISIS shows that Pakistan isconstructing two additional plutonium productionreactors adjacent to the first reactor. While theconstruction of the second reactor is beingcompleted, work on the third reactor work isprogressing rapidly. The ISIS experts, DavidAlbright and Paul Brannan, reported on March 24,2010 that the recent imagery of the site indicatesthat the reactor is in initial operation. To supportthese two new reactors, a second reprocessing plantis also coming up at the site. Some reports suggestthat Islamabad is constructing newer installations,especially at the Dera Ghazi Khan nuclear complex.As of today, Pakistan has established several nuclearfacilities required for the nuclear fuel cycle.

The ongoing construction of two newplutonium production reactors at Khushab (withunknown capacity), would again raise the samequestion: how Pakistan is planning to feed the newreactors? Pakistani officials must have negotiatedfor the uranium required for the operation of thesenew plants and possibly could have made alternatearrangements for the uranium. With all the NSGcountries declining to offer nuclear cooperationwith Pakistan because of their stringent exportcontrol laws, Pakistan might have got an assurancefrom China to supply uranium clandestinely at leastfor the near future. The recent revelations by Dr.Khan that China had supplied Pakistan, in 1982 with50 kg of highly enriched uranium enough for themaking of two nuclear weapons, besides supplying


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the nuclear design, would only confirm these views.

In any case, the construction of these tworeactors by Pakistan is indicative of the fact that itwould pursue the plutonium route to nuclearweapons more vigorously. With the fading out ofDr. Khan and his global network of illegalprocurements, Pakistan might be finding it difficultto arrange for spares and equipment for the Kahutaplant. The problems related with the domesticproduction of uranium would also contribute topursuing the plutonium route.

Nuclear Materials

Pakistani nuclear programme, since itsinception, is inherently a military orientedprogramme. Most of its facilities were establishedwith covert assistance and were not known tooutside world for many years. Pakistan has tworesearch reactors, namely the PARR-1, PARR-2, aplutonium production reactor at Khushab, and twonuclear power plants at Karachi and Chashma. Asecond reactor unit is under construction atChashma. Pakistan is also constructing twoplutonium production reactors at Khushab.

Pakistan also operates a uranium enrichmentprogramme at Kahuta while a second plant is underconstruction at Golra. Pakistan has a pilot-scalecentrifuge plant at Sihala. There are also reportssuggesting that a plutonium reprocessing plant isalso coming up at New Labs at PINSTECH.Pakistan has to provide for enough uranium forrunning all these programmes. However, it cannotimport uranium, even for its nuclear plants underIAEA safeguards as Pakistan is not a party to theNNPT and current NSG guidelines stipulate thatmember states only supply nuclear materials andequipment to states who have signed the full-scopesafeguards agreement.

The current uranium reserves in Pakistan areestimated at 11, 200 MT. The first uranium mine

was opened in Bagchalchur in Dera Ghazi Khanand mining operations here were closed in the year2000. A second deposit of uranium in DG Khanwas discovered in Nangar Nai in the year 1980 andthe mining operations began in 1996, though somereports claim that operations began only in the year2000. The second uranium mine was opened atQubul Khel in 1992 and mining operations beganin 1995. Uranium deposits were also found inTaunsa in 1999 where mining operations began in2002-03. Pakistan had established an ore processingplant at DG Khan in 1977-78 with a capacity of 200-300 tonnes. Milling is done at DG Khan and also atthe Atomic Energy Minerals Centre in Lahore.Uranium is purified and converted to uraniumhexafluoride gas at DG Khan, whose capacity is200 tonnes. Uranium hexafluoride gas is enrichedin centrifuges to weapons grade at Kahuta plant.

The current uranium reserves of 11,200 MTwould allow Pakistan to make about 1600 MWe ofnuclear energy through operation of nuclearreactors for their full life span. In the absence of anexternal supply of natural uranium, the Pakistaniclaims to achieve 8800 MWe energy by 2020 wouldnot be possible. It is to be seen how Pakistanovercomes the fuel crisis if it is serious aboutachieving its target of 8800 MWe.

In comparison, India has the estimated naturaluranium reserves of about 91,000 MT which wouldbe suffice for 13,000 MWe. But, India, well aware ofthe uranium shortage, had long planned for thethree-stage nuclear power programme where theFast Breeder reactors will come into the picture.The role of these reactors is to produce moreuranium than they consume, and the third stagewould be taken over by thorium-based reactors.India has enormous stocks of thorium and hencethe ultimate goal is to utilise these thorium reservesfor nuclear energy production. Pakistan, however,unlike India, had no such plans to develop fastbreeder reactors.


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At the current level, Pakistan’s annualproduction of natural uranium is about 30-40 MT.Pakistan’s KANUPP nuclear reactor consumesabout 15 MT of natural uranium per year. Besides,Pakistan is also operating the 40 MWth Khushabreactor, which was dedicated to the production ofplutonium for weapon purposes. This reactorconsumes about 18.25 MT of natural uranium.Pakistan is also known to be operating the Kahutauranium reprocessing plant, which is also fed onnatural uranium.

Interestingly, Pakistan’s position at the UNConference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva isnot always linked to that of India. Conscious ofdisparity in the stocks of nuclear fissile materialsheld with India, Pakistan has been demanding atthe CD that the past stocks of the fissile materialsheld by the other countries should also be includedfor verification. India, however, argues that theban should only be on the future production ofnuclear materials. The logjam at the CD could beovercome only in May 2009 after more than 12

years, when agreement was reached on a work-plan which would address the four contentiousissues namely, FMCT, prohibition of space-basedweapons, nuclear disarmament and provision ofnegative security assurance to non-weapon states.However, Pakistan objected to the consensusciting security issues, because of which the CDended the session without an agreement. Pakistanreiterated its stance again when the CD resumedin January 2010. The decision to take anuncompromising stance appears to have beentaken at the highest level. The NCA which metunder the new chairmanship of Prime MinisterGilani, observed that Pakistani position at the CDwould be determined by its national securityinterests and the objectives of the strategic stabilityin south Asia. It may be possible that Pakistan isintending to increase its nuclear fissile materialsstocks for its weapons programme. This alsosubstantiates Western allegations that Pakistan isexpanding its nuclear weapons programme in abig way.


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Pakistan’s Perception of India

Pakistan’s perception of India is premised onthe ‘two nation theory’ and rooted in the belief thatIndia as a Hindu-majority state could never have agood relationship with the Muslim-majority stateof Pakistan. Flowing from it, there is a pathologicalsuspicion of India which prompts the ruling classto believe that India would never get used toPakistan’s sovereign status and conspire eternallyto suck and reabsorb it. This fear psychosis iscompounded by the fact that Pakistan suffers froman acute identity crisis because of its inability togenerate a popular consensus on what should formthe basis of the Pakistani nation. Various attemptsto build an identity based on Islam have failed. Theinter-sectarian differences have disallowed the stateto bank on any particular version of Islam.

Therefore, the elite of Pakistan sought togenerate and perpetuate anti-India sentiments,which have formed the basis of the Pakistani nation.1

It has provided Pakistan with the only glue thatbinds the people together. The official line onPakistani nationalism has been to define it inexclusive terms, in direct opposition to the idealand values that India stands for. For the elite,Pakistan has to be, what India is not. Such an

CHAPTER IX

PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH INDIA:THE UNENDING QUEST FOR PARITY

exclusive definition has also deepened the sense ofdistrust towards India and sustained an adversarialrelationship with it. Its policies towards India,therefore, are devised in a zero-sum way. Anythingthat would benefit India has to be shunned even ifthat were to benefit Pakistan in some way.

This insecurity complex, vis-à-vis India, iscompounded by the military reverses Pakistan hassuffered in each of its misadventures against Indiain 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Particularly, India’srole in the vivisection/dismemberment of Pakistanin 1971 rankles in Pakistani minds to this day. Hence,the elite in Pakistan feels that there is an urgentneed to checkmate India at every step. Producingthe nuclear bomb was thus regarded as anexistential necessity and as a deterrent, even ifPakistanis were to “eat grass”, as Zulfikar Ali Bhuttofamously stated in the early 1970s. Simultaneously,India has to be kept engaged internally so that itwould have neither the time nor resources to attackPakistan.

However, much of this sense of insecurity isself-inflicted. Pakistan’s basic approach to India isrooted in a communal perception of history. Theidentity of Pakistan has been created very carefullyin direct opposition to the secular, democratic and

1 Senior Pakistani journalist Khaled Ahmed came out with this observartion during the course of his presentationin the SAFMA Regional Conference, “Interstate Conflicts in South Asia”, at The Ashoka Hotel, New Delhi, India,on October 9, 2004. He also said that 99 per cent of Pakistani nationalism was based on anti-Indian sentiments.

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multi-cultural identity of India. There is a tendencyto project Pakistan as the heir to the Muslim empiresthat enveloped much of the Indian subcontinentfor several centuries. As a corollary, the myth ofone Muslim Pakistani soldier as being equivalentto ten Hindu Indian soldiers is propagated tostrengthen the morale of the Pakistan army.

Thus Pakistani perception and policies areconditioned by a convoluted insecurity complexon the one hand and an exaggerated self-importanceas an Islamic power with a manifest destiny on theother.

Pakistan has refused to accept India’s naturalpreponderance in south Asia and sought toequalise/balance India at all levels either throughalliances with external powers or through massiveinvestment in its defence-preparedness. It regardsIndia as a pseudo-secular hegemonic state seekingto impose its will on all its smaller neighbours byall means. Seen from a communal perspective,Pakistan has viewed Indian predominance asHindu predominance and as a certain threat to itsexistence as an Islamic state. Unable to evolve as ademocracy and labouring under military control,Pakistan refuses to accept the Indian emphasis ondiversity and democracy and interprets India’sstand on Jammu and Kashmir on communal lines.

Unfortunately, the communal perception ofIndia permeates Pakistan’s thinking on trade andcommerce and cultural exchanges with India. Veryoften, in both English language and vernacularmedia, the image of the Hindu baniya (the tradingor merchant caste) is deliberately built up in apejorative manner to reinforce propaganda againstIndia. In school text books also the Hindu isportrayed as an untrustworthy kafir. The anecdotalaccounts of many Indian diplomats and visitors toPakistan show how small children in Pakistanwould make their hatred perceptible at the verymention of the word ‘Hindu’.

Strangely, in spite of concerted effort to nurturesuch an anti-India mindset, one comes across aprecipitate sense of goodwill and willingness toengage the Hindu Indian at the popular level inPakistan. However, such bonhomie at the popularlevel, during people-to-people contacts does nothave any visible impact on official reactions fromPakistan. It is difficult to predict whether ademocratic Pakistan would respond to suchpopular sympathy and be inclined to have apeaceful relationship with India.

It is rather strange that, even after acquiringnuclear weapons as a deterrent to any probable all-out Indian attack, Pakistan continues to be plaguedby a sense of insecurity. Repeated Indian assurancesto the contrary (which include former PrimeMinister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s declaration duringhis visit to Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore, in 1999) havefailed to convince Pakistan that India is reconciledto Pakistan’s sovereign existence and would notpose any physical threat to it, unless provoked.Pakistan has rather continued with its strategy of‘bleeding India’ through cross-border subversion.It has raised a constituency of armed non-state actors(for example Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad,Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen etc.)to spread terror in India by all possible means. Themost effective of them, Lashkar-e-Taiba, has evengone to the extent of asserting itself as the only trueand usable ‘nuclear bomb’ that Pakistan has in itsarsenal.

Even when Pakistan has been compelled topursue peace through dialogue with India underpressure from outside, it has kept this option open.As investigations into the serial bomb blasts in Indiaduring 2006-2007 and the Mumbai carnage inNovember 2008 invariably reveal, Pakistancontinues to use terror as an instrument of its policytowards India even when there is enough evidenceto prove that such policy has started affecting itsown internal security.


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Strategy to Counter India

As has been outlined above, Pakistan has soughtto deal with the perceived Indian threat by seekingparity with India through various means, i.e.,alliance with external powers, acquisition ofstrategic weapons, use of terrorism as an instrumentof its foreign policy towards India and by tarnishingIndia’s image through hostile propaganda onKashmir and its role in regional politics.

It has also launched several armed operationsagainst India (Operations Gulmarg 1947, Venus-1948, Gibraltar and Grand Slam-1965 and Badr-1999)and consistently denied involvement of thePakistani state in any of them. However, memoirsof Pakistani officials (both civilian and military)clearly indicate that the Pakistani state had plannedand implemented these operations to seize controlof the Kashmir valley and inflict a conclusive defeaton the Indian army. Even after successive defeatsat the hands of the Indian army, its sense ofbelligerence is driven by the basic assumptionwhich led Ayub to war in 1965: “As a general ruleHindu morale would not stand more than a coupleof blows delivered at the right time and place. Suchopportunities should, therefore, be sought andexploited”.2 Pakistani army continues to appeal tothe “Superior Valour and Martial Qualities of thePakistani (Punjabi and Pathan Muslim soldier) vis-à-vis the Hindu Indian soldier, as proved in 1965 war”.

This sense of martial superiority is boosted by amissionary zeal that Pakistani Muslims are blessedby Allah who would support them in their actagainst non-believers or kafirs. Even if Kashmir

were to be wrested away from Indian controltomorrow per chance, this missionary appetitewould not be satiated. Pakistan has developed itsarmy as an army of believers and sought to inculcateIslamic ethos in its soldiers. It can be best observedfrom the motto it has selected for its army (Iman,Takwa and Jihad-fi-sabilillah)3, which laysemphasis on holy war.

Obsession with Kashmir

Pakistan’s obsessive antipathy towards Indiamanifests most visibly in its approach towardsKashmir. Pakistan considers it a terra irredenta(unredeemed territory). It is regarded as anunfinished agenda of partition. There is thus apropensity to project Kashmir as the core disputebetween India and Pakistan. The Pakistani argumentholds that as a Muslim majority state, it shouldhave rightfully belonged to Pakistan. This is contraryto the fact that at the time of the partition, thepopular resistance movement in erstwhile Jammuand Kashmir state, led by National Conference, wasdecidedly against partition on religious lines. Itprofessed to be a secular movement and aimed at asecular administration. That explains India’sinclination to hold a plebiscite even if the king ofthe state should seek to accede unconditionally toIndia under threat from Pakistani lashkars inOctober 1947.

It was Pakistan’s concern that the Kashmirismight spurn its offer that made it non-committalover the issue during the late 1940s. India’s stancechanged only when Pakistan’s unjustified demands

Pakistan’s Relations with India: The Unending Quest for Parity

2 Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin, “Grand Slam— A Battle of Lost Opportunities”, Defence Journal,September 2000. Available at : http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sept/grand-slam.htm (accessed onFebruary 21, 2010)

3 The motto of the Pakistan Army is analysed in detail on the Pakistan Army’s official website available at:http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=17&rnd=108#iman

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were accorded precedence over Indian concernsby external mediators. Pakistan’s refusal towithdraw its troops from the territory under itscontrol basically killed the UN resolutions forplebiscite. Kashmiris went on to affirm their faithin the Indian constitution and adopteddemocracy in early 1950s. Pakistan continued tointerfere with the democratic administration of thestate and took due advantage of political turmoilwithin the state to strengthen militancy thereinduring the mid-1960s and the 1990s.

At the same time, it brought about extensivechanges in the demography as well asadministrative arrangement in the other part of theJammu and Kashmir state which was under itscontrol. The Northern Areas comprising Gilgit andBaltistan were de facto merged with Pakistan andruled by brute force. The remaining areas werecalled Azad (or Free) Kashmir and subjected tonominal representative rule under a ministry in thecentral government. For all practical purposes amiddle ranking secretary was the de facto headof administration in Azad Kashmir.

Official Bilateral Relationship

It is interesting to note that in spite of an abidingsense of rivalry between them, the leaderships ofthe two states have talked to each other on manyoccasions. It is also quite amazing that the twocountries resolved the issue of water sharing ratheramicably in 1960 through negotiations under theauspices of the World Bank. However, if one wereto analyse bilateral relations between the twocountries, almost all the leaders of Pakistan, LiaqatAli Khan, Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, hisdaughter Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif hadalmost a common approach towards India. Theysought to checkmate India at every cost at all levels.Even if they would choose to talk, they would stickto their agenda of weakening India’s influence byall means, i.e, alliance with external powers (like

US and/or China), use of terrorism/subversion asan instrument of foreign policy vis-à-vis India, andbuilding up of anti-India mindset at the domesticlevel to support and sustain the adversarial posturevis-à-vis India.

It is also worth mentioning that even whenPakistani leaders expressed their willingness to talk,there was always a parallel process at work withinPakistan to continue to either ‘wreck India fromwithin’ and acquire strategic weapons as well asconventional arms and ammunition to balanceIndia. From ‘Operation Gibraltar’ to ‘OperationKargil’ and now attack on Mumbai, process ofdialogue has been followed by military adventuresdisguised as militancy or terrorist activity by non-state actors. Against this backdrop, it is useful toanalyse the ongoing peace process with India,which has not yet been called off even under graveprovocations.

Peace Process with India (2004-tilldate)

The ‘Composite Dialogue’ between India andPakistan which started in October-November 1998resumed in February 2004. It encompassed eightdifferent issues, which are: (i) Peace and Security,including CBMs; (ii) Jammu and Kashmir; (iii)Siachen; (iv) Sir Creek; (v) Wullar Barrage/TulbulNavigation Project; (vi) Terrorism and DrugTrafficking; (vii) Economic and CommercialCooperation; and (viii) Promotion of FriendlyExchanges in Various Fields. Apart from thedialogue on all these issues, technical and expertlevel talks on Nuclear CBMs, Conventional CBMs,Cross Line-of-Control CBMs, Cooperation betweenCoast guards, Narcotics Control Agencies, CivilAviation etc were also held regularly. The mostsignificant achievement of the Composite Dialoguetill the Mumbai attacks had been the successfulcontinuation of the ceasefire on the InternationalBorder, LoC and AGPL, which came in to effect in


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November 2003. The process was also buttressedby intensification and expansion of people-to-people interaction, as a result of the establishmentof several transport linkages between the twocountries and people-centric Confidence BuildingMeasures(CBMs).

Bilateral TBilateral TBilateral TBilateral TBilateral Trade: Unable to Realise Fullrade: Unable to Realise Fullrade: Unable to Realise Fullrade: Unable to Realise Fullrade: Unable to Realise FullPotentialPotentialPotentialPotentialPotential

The effect of Composite Dialogue was visibleon bilateral trade to some extent, even if there wasa reluctance on the part of Pakistan to realise its fullpotential. Bilateral trade stood at US$ 1.86 billionin 2007-08, while it was US$ 859.33 million in 2005-06, $ 616 million in 2004-05 and US$ 344.29 millionin 2003-04. In 2006-07 India’s exports to Pakistanwere valued at US $ 1.34 billion and its imports atUS $ 0 .32 billion. Unofficial trade which increasesthe transaction costs for end users in Pakistanthrough third countries is also significant.

Pakistan continues to restrict items of importfrom India through a positive list of 1075 items.Even after signing SAFTA, the regional tradeagreement, Pakistan has refused to extend thenegotiated tariff concessions to India on itemsoutside the positive list thereby negating the letterand spirit of the agreement. Both countries agreedin August 2007 to allow each other’s trucks to crossat Wagha/Attari border up to designated pointson either side and the agreement was implementedwith effect from October 1, 2007. The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad truck service across the Line ofControl (LoC) for trade in agreed items also startedon October 21, 2008. However, due to the negativetrade policy of the Pakistan government, suchmeasures have largely failed to realise their fullpotential.

Other Areas of Engagement

India and Pakistan have done particularly wellin creating opportunities for people-to-people

contact through facilitation of cross-border andcross-LoC travel. The two countries have thus faragreed to continue the Delhi-Lahore bus service,launch bus services between Amritsar and NankanaSahib, between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad,between Poonch and Rawalkot, resume thebi-weekly Delhi-Attari-Wagah-Lahore Samjhautarail service, establish the Munabao-Khokrapar raillink and to increase frequencies of air services.Apart from this, there have been attempts to addresshumanitarian issues relating to prisoners andfishermen. Technical level joint working groups onagriculture, health, science & technology,information, education, I.T. & telecommunications,environment and Tourism have also discussedthese issues at the official bilateral level. However,the attack on Mumbai stalled this process ofengagement.

From January 2010, two large media groups inIndia and Pakistan, the Times of India and the JangGroup respectively, have launched a peaceinitiative titled Aman Ki Asha, which aims atcreating a constituency of peace in both thecountries involving “all segments of society - thecivil society, students, the business community,artists, politician, and academia”. This Track IIinitiative has taken off in right earnest but its successwill largely depend on the way the relationshipshapes up at the official level.

Out-of-box Thinking on KashmirOut-of-box Thinking on KashmirOut-of-box Thinking on KashmirOut-of-box Thinking on KashmirOut-of-box Thinking on Kashmir

During 2004-2007, Musharraf issued manystatements on Kashmir, which included the onerevealing his wish to sidestep UN resolutions onKashmir. He came out with many proposals whichindicated that he was floating many trial balloonsto find out the extent of Indian flexibility overKashmir. The Pakistani foreign ministry’s brief onKashmir did carry Musharraf’s four step formulawhich proposed that all proposals unacceptable toIndia, Pakistan and the Kashmiris should be taken


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off the table and the best solution acceptable to allshould be taken up for discussion.4 However,media reports suggest that neither Musharraf norPakistani foreign office made any attempt to isolatesolutions unacceptable to India, even if ManmohanSingh, the Indian Prime Minister, reportedly askedMusharraf about this during their meeting at theUnited Nations in September 2004. At best,Musharraf argued during his meeting with Indianjournalists on April 18, 2005 that tentatively optionslike self governance, autonomy, joint control andindependence could be taken up for discussion.

If Musharraf advocated out-of-the-box thinkingand advocated (in October 2005) division of wholeof Kashmir into seven different regions and ascertainpopular opinion on their accession to India orPakistan, then he was basically referring to the oldDixon formula and had his eyes fixed on the valleyof Kashmir. This is in line with Pakistani thinkingon Kashmir right since 1947. In fact, closeexamination of the Pakistani foreign office’spronouncements relating to Kashmir shows that itcontinues to project Kashmir as the core dispute.Its official brief on Kashmir states even today: “Wehave also reiterated in unequivocal terms that theJammu and Kashmir issue is the core issue, whichcannot be sidelined and put on the backburner”.5

Peace Process with India under thePresent Administration

The present democratic administration, whichcame to power after February 2008 elections, had

reservations about Musharraf’s foreign policy whichincluded his policy towards India and Kashmir.However, it was interesting to see that ‘foreign policy’or ‘policy towards India’ received scant attention inthe manifestoes of most of these parties. A closereading of these manifestoes revealed that there wasa consensus that the Kashmir issue was to be resolvedin accordance with the wishes of the people ofKashmir and that solution to Kashmir would haveto be peacefully arrived at through negotiations withIndia. Most importantly, the two most popularparties, the PML-N and the PPP, wanted to pursuepeace with India with vigour. The PPP outlined veryclearly that it “will pursue the composite dialogueprocess agenda that it initiated with India, includingKashmir and Indo-Pak issues” and that “it will notallow lack of progress on one agenda to impedeprogress on the other”.6

Immediately after the elections, Zardari drewlot of criticism in the Pakistani media for reiteratingthis position. He stated clearly on March 1, 2008,that good relations with India would not be heldhostage to the Kashmir issue and the two countrieswould wait for the future generations to resolvethe issue in an atmosphere of trust. He reiteratedthis later and went on to state: “We don’t feelthreatened by India. India should also not feelthreatened by us…I want change andreconciliation.” During the course of thisinteraction with Indian media through a satellitelink up on November 22, 2008, he offered a no-first-use of nuclear weapon against India.7 This wasforgotten because of the terrorist attacks on Mumbai

4 See for details the Brief by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan provided on the Ministry’swebsite: http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pages/Brief.htm.

5 Ibid.6 See “Towards peace and prosperity in Pakistan”, PPP manifesto, p. 20. Available at: http://www.ppp.org.pk/

manifestos/2008.pdf A critical anlysis of manifestos of different political parties on their policy towards Indiais provided by I.A.Rehman, “Too early ti kill hope”, Dawn, March 6, 2008.


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three days later. However, in spite of the fact that hehad drawn lot of domestic criticism for his standon peace process with India, he has not changed hisline.

Before the Mumbai attack, the Indian PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh met both Pakistan PrimeMinister Yusuf Raza Gilani (on 1 August 2008 inColombo on the sidelines of SAARC summit) andPakistani President Asif Ali Zardari (on September25, 2008 in New York), during the UN GeneralAssembly meeting, wherein the new democraticleadership expressed its interest in carrying theprocess forward. In fact, on the very day, terroristsfrom Pakistan attacked Mumbai, Pakistani foreignminister was in New Delhi to restart the process ofdialogue.

However, following the Mumbai attacks, theleadership of Pakistan dithered and relapsed into amode of denial, which was taken seriously by India.In fact, immediately after the attacks, the civilianleadership condemned the attacks and offered tosend the ISI chief to New Delhi to help investigatethe case. However, there was perceptible resistancefrom the Pakistani army on this issue and the civilianleadership had to go back on its pledge and startedadvocating a policy of denial which led India tosuspend the talks.

Zardari made the offer of a pact with India toallow each other to question terror suspects in theother country, however, it was not taken seriouslyby India. This was because he did not seem to be incontrol of things in Pakistan. His statements thatthe perpetrators were non-state actors, that therewas no involvement of state agencies in the matterand moreover the unwillingness of the state to takeimmediate action against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the

terrorist outfit responsible for the carnage, onlyexposed his sense of helplessness further. ThePakistani state reacted only after substantialinternational pressure. The UN designation of LeTas a terrorist organisation and its leaders like HafizSaeed, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and HajiMuhammad Ashraf as terrorists on December 11,2008, forced Pakistan to take action on December12, 2008. This was full 16 days after the Mumbaiattacks. This was despite the fact that one of theterrorists, Ajmal Kasab, captured during the attackshad confessed his links with LeT and telephonecalls made by the terrorists were traced to Pakistan.

That Pakistan was not serious about bringingthe perpetrators of Mumbai crime to justice becameeven clearer when in early June 2009, the LahoreHigh Court held the evidence produced againstHafiz Saeed and other co-accused too weak toprosecute them and asked the government to releasethem. Later in July 2009, the Supreme Court ofPakistan also turned down prosecution chargesagainst Saeed and others. The Indian dossier givento Pakistan for action was dealt with in a frivolousmanner and so far Pakistan is not treating Indianevidence with any seriousness.

All this indicates that even if the civilianleadership may be intent on picking up the threadand pushing the process forward, it will have nocontrol over elements in the Pakistani securityestablishment, who would continue to dictatePakistan’s foreign and security policies vis-à-visIndia. In fact, emotional reactions following Gilani’soffer to send the ISI chief to India after the Mumbaiattacks, by even liberal commentators in Pakistanimedia, indicates that there is a tendency, evenamongst the informed and influential people inPakistan, to regard the army or security


7 Vinod Sharma and Zia Haq, “There is a bit of India in every Pakistani: Zardari”, Hindustan Times, November22, 2008. Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/There-is-a-bit-of-India-in-every-Pakistani-Zardari/H1-Article1-353488.aspx (accessed February 12, 2010).

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establishment of Pakistan as a sacred and inviolableorgan of the state, which commands more respectthan the elected democratic leadership in allimportant matters concerning the Pakistani state.The fact that finally the issue of sending in the ISIchief was hushed up and no step was taken againstthe LeT in the immediate aftermath of the attacksshows the incapacity of the civilian leadershipto control the levers of power in Pakistan. It isonly a truism to say that Pakistan’s Indiapolicy continues to be dictated by the GHQrather than Aiwan-e-Sadr.

Engagement, Post-Mumbai

Post-Mumbai the offical Indian stand ondialogue with Pakistan has been quite predictable.India has stuck to its stance that it will join thedialogue process only after Pakistan bringsperpetrators of Mumbai attacks to justice.Manmohan Singh has reiterated this in his meetingswith Zardari in Yekaterinburg, Russia (June 16,2009), and with Yusuf Raza Gilani in Sharm-el-Shaikh (July 16, 2009), Egypt. A lot of hue and crywas raised in India on the inclusion of Balochistanin the joint statement at Sharm-el-Shaikh. Pakistanhas been accusing India of meddling in Balochistanand helping the Baloch insurgents through itsconsulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad. There is astrong view in India that this would complicatematters for India given Pakistan’s bid to lowerIndia’s image at the international level and diluteIndia’s demand for visible Pakistani action onMumbai carnage.

India has expressed its readiness to talk only onissues relating to terrorism and security at themoment. It has sought to put pressure on Pakistanthrough official dialogue to bring the perpetratorsof Mumbai tragedy to justice. India reiterated thisstand at the foreign secretary level meeting that washeld in New Delhi on 25 February 2010. India also

handed over two more dossiers to Pakistancontaining additional names of terrorists andevidences of their involvement in terrorist activitiesin India and urged Pakistan to take adequate stepsin this regard. The future of composite dialoguewill depend on the way Pakistan addresses Indianconcerns on terrorism.

Some Options

The above discussion suggests that Pakistanseems to have a well-defined policy towards India.However, in contrast, India does not have anydefined policy option towards Pakistan. At thisjuncture it is useful to ask what should be India’spolicy towards Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks.Various options available to India are : a) businessas usual, restart dialogue and continue to engagePakistan at various levels, b) benign neglect, c) adopta proactive policy (play on the faultlines; keep upinternational pressure; and prepare for the effectsof disintegration or any such eventuality).

Bus iness as usua lBus iness as usua lBus iness as usua lBus iness as usua lBus iness as usua l

Each of these options needs careful elaboration.There are different segments in the civil society inIndia advocating these options. Those advocating‘business as usual’ would argue that Pakistan ispassing through a crisis and by not talking to thecivilian leadership in Pakistan, India will only fallinto the traps set by the spoilers. While it is truethat the civilian leadership has no control over thecountry’s security and foreign policy, India’sengagement with it would steady the process oftransition from a military dominated system to ademocratic and representative one. In view of thepositive sentiments expressed by the leadership ofvarious political parties, it can be argued that thereis a critical mass emerging in Pakistan, who seekpeace and mutual understanding with India evenif that may not automatically mean that level ofmutual suspicion and hatred will disappear


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overnight. There is a value in engaging the pro-peace constituency in Pakistan on a long term basis.India should pursue the dialogic track withoutexpecting too much out of such a process.Advocates of this policy would argue that the costof not engaging may be greater than engagingPakistan in the long run. Moreover, the elements,bent upon hurting Indian interests, may not beunder the control of the Pakistani state any longer.That is why, by cancelling the talks and assumingan adversarial position, it may only create asituation which will reinforce the hold of themilitary over power in Pakistan. Also, India maynot be able to handle pressure from the internationalcommunity to restart dialogue with Pakistan.Therefore it is in the interest of India to help Pakistanevolve as a strong and stable democracy, which willautomatically be at peace with itself and the world.

Ben ign Neg l e c tBen ign Neg l e c tBen ign Neg l e c tBen ign Neg l e c tBen ign Neg l e c t

The critics of the above policy would argue thatengagement at a time when the establishment inPakistan is unwilling to take care of genuineconcerns of India would be tantamount torewarding Pakistan for its misconduct. This wouldembolden elements opposed to India and silencethe voices of sanity. They suggest that India shouldrather adopt a policy of ‘benign neglect’. India candeal with a hostile Pakistan without maintainingthe charade of talks that are ineffective. Not talkingto Pakistan will impose some constraint onPakistan’s behaviour and force it to shun the strategyof subversion vis-à-vis India. They would say thatif India leaves Pakistan alone, the contradictionswithin Pakistan, which are at an unmanageablelevel at the moment, may soon lead Pakistan todisaster. A fragmented and failing Pakistan willhave less time for mischief vis-à-vis India. By notdoing anything and staying aloof, India may benefitmore than by getting engaged in a process that haswitnessed a parallel surge in terrorist activitiesthroughout India, sponsored by elements within

Pakistan. India should rather strengthen its internalsecurity mechanism and take measures to dissuadeits citizens from falling prey to hostile propagandafrom across the border. If such a stance is coupledwith a policy of working with the internationalcommunity over the issue of terrorism in Pakistan,this may compel introspection in Pakistan and forceits security establishment to rethink its policy ofsponsoring cross-border terror on India.

Counter StrategyCounter StrategyCounter StrategyCounter StrategyCounter Strategy

There is a third view that India must have anaggressive counter-strategy in place to deal withPakistan. It should take advantage of the fragilityof the state system and exploit the faultlines inPakistan and encourage secessionist elementswithin Pakistan. It should drive home the messagethat India will not sit silently and suffer Pakistan’spinpricking in a stoic fashion. Critics of such apolicy would argue that India may not be able tocontrol the fallout of such a policy and adisintegrating Pakistan will be a bigger headachefor Indian policy makers.

With these options in mind, Indian policymakers should make a realistic assessment ofpossible fallout in each case and do a propercost-benefit analysis before choosing any one ofthem. India is regarded as an ascendant power inthe global arena and as a regional super power insouth Asia. Thus, its dealing with Pakistan willalways be viewed as a measure of its maturity anddiscretion. India has to guard its security and strategicinterests (vis-à-vis Pakistan) and simultaneouslyprove its intentions to the wider world as the biggerand more responsible power. It can hardly adopta regional Monroe doctrine and expect itsneighbours to submit to its preponderanceespecially at a time when the region is soeffectively penetrated by global capital andexternal influence. That is why, despite India’sgenuine concerns, India may have to find some


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way of engaging Pakistan constructively.Simultaneously, India should work withinternational community to put pressure onPakistan to stop using terror as an instrument of

its foreign policy. It can take up a stand that talksfor peace will have to be continually weighed againstPakistan’s will and intentions to stop sponsoringterrorism against India.


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The Context

The discussions in the earlier chapters underlinethe uncertain security environment and internalturmoil in Pakistan. In this context, it is necessaryto constuct the scenarios likey to occur in Pakistanand formulate India’s options in the event. It isimportant to examine whether the present situationwould lead to greater chaos and instability inPakistan, or are there any visible and positive signsof recovery in its domestic situation. While it maynot be possible to predict the future conclusively,the key drivers that affect the situation in Pakistancould be identified and analysed, in order to builda few plausible scenarios. Thinking about the futurecan help prepare for uncertainties anddiscontinuities in Pakistan, and their possiblefallout in the Indian context. This chapter attemptsto isolate the key drivers that would shapePakistan’s behaviour in the future. Basing theanalysis on these, three plausible scenarios that mayemerge by 2020 are discussed in this chapter.

Scenario Building: Methodology

Pakistan is in the throes of serious internalunrest. A wide range of political, economic andsocial imponderables will determine future courseof events in Pakistan. While these may be relevantin one context or the other, there is a need to assesstheir importance in the evolving context. Thefollowing sections analyse some of the key drivers

CHAPTER X

PAKISTAN 2020:POSSIBLE SCENARIOS AND OPTIONS

which could shape the future prospects in theregion. A number of high impact and highlyuncertain drivers, which could cause adisproportionate effect on the security situation,have been discussed. Each key factor has beenanalysed at length to visualise the general trendlines. These trend lines have then been inter-wovento build three plausible scenarios for Pakistan. Thescenarios are ‘suggestive’ in nature and by nomeans ‘prescriptive’ to enable a meaningful policycorrection in the Indian context.

The Key Drivers

The key question that needs to be addressedhere is: What shape will the state of Pakistan takeby 2020? To address this question, six key drivershave been analysed. These will decide the directionin which Pakistan is likely to evolve in times tocome. These are as follows:

Driver No 1: Political DynamicsDriver No 1: Political DynamicsDriver No 1: Political DynamicsDriver No 1: Political DynamicsDriver No 1: Political Dynamics

The post-Musharraf period witnessed a change

Methodology

Step 1 Identification of Key Drivers

Step 2 Examination of Drivers

Step 3 Impact-Uncertainty Analysis

Step 4 Identification of Trend Lines

Step 5 Preparation of Scenarios

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in the political dynamics of Pakistan. There wastemporary unity amongst the major political forcesto get rid of Musharraf, the disgraced military ruler.However, this unity could not survive Musharraf’sdeparture. Though much was expected from theZardari-Sharif duo, their strong mutual animosityinhibited the process of democratic revival andweakened the political forces vis-à-vis the army inPakistan. In fact, the fragile political structures havealready started showing signs of stress in Pakistanand the military is gradually regaining its lostimage in the prevailing political conundrum.

The emerging political situation raises severalquestions. Can Pakistan ever have a stable politicalstructure? Can the legitimacy of the government inpower be challenged by the Pakistan army? Whichinternal and external factors could possiblyrevitalise the political process in Pakistan? Ispolitical rejuvenation a plausible scenario at all inPakistan? Would this call for drafting of a newfederal constitution? Can the current constitutionalarrangement be tweaked to strengthen the politicalstructures and processes? Would the existing feudaland tribal structures enable vibrant politicalstructures and activity in Pakistan? How bad is thelaw and order situation in Pakistan? How effectiveare the police forces and civilian law enforcementagencies? What are the prime reasons for sectarianand ethnic violence in the provinces? The futurecourse of events looks quite grim in both the shortand the medium term. The continuing politicalfragility in Pakistan is sure to have an adverseimpact on its health and structural well being inthe long term.

Driver No 2: Radicalisation of the PakistaniDriver No 2: Radicalisation of the PakistaniDriver No 2: Radicalisation of the PakistaniDriver No 2: Radicalisation of the PakistaniDriver No 2: Radicalisation of the PakistaniS o c i e t yS o c i e t yS o c i e t yS o c i e t yS o c i e t y

Growing fundamentalism and radicalisation ofPakistani society is a major cause of concern.Unprecedented acts of terror and incessantbloodshed caused by militant and sectarian groups

reflect a deep sense of radicalisation within the stateof Pakistan. The ability of radical forces to strike atwill, even against the most powerful stateinstitutions, raises doubt about the very survival ofthe Pakistani state. What will be the role of Islam inPakistan in this context? The previous politicaldispensation used Islam blatantly to appease theradical fringes of the civil society to stay in power.Would the Pakistani state ever be in a position tocontain radical forces or would it continue toconnive with them in pursuit of its convolutedinternal and external policy objectives? How muchdoes the sectarian divide affect cohesiveness of thePakistani state?

Driver No 3: The Mil i taryDriver No 3: The Mil i taryDriver No 3: The Mil i taryDriver No 3: The Mil i taryDriver No 3: The Mil i tary

Ever since the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the Pakistanarmy has for the first time come under seriousdomestic and international pressure to perform. Themilitary resources seem badly stretched incontaining the raging insurgency and growingacts of terror. The counter-insurgency operationshave been characterised by a conventional mindsetand driven largely by use of heavy calibre weapons.Its inability to re-orient conventional force levelsfor an effective COIN campaign is a major causefor concern.

Can the Pakistan army sustain itself forprotracted operations? Will the army continue toremain a cohesive force? Would the army possiblylean in favour of radical forces? Is the military reallyin a position to set things right in Pakistan? Is itlogistically too over-stretched to undertakesuccessful counter-insurgency operations againstthe Taliban? Do the raging insurgencies affectconventional operations along its eastern borders?Does the Pakistan army intend to create tailor-madeforces to counter insurgency in the frontierprovinces? The future course of events in Pakistansurely looks uncertain. Continued engagement forprotracted counter insurgency operations would affectits conventional combat potential in the long term.


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Driver No 4: EconomyDriver No 4: EconomyDriver No 4: EconomyDriver No 4: EconomyDriver No 4: Economy

The current economic situation is grim. Whilethe immediate outlook may look reasonable, thelong term view does not look good. Pakistanieconomy could stabilise in the medium termbecause of IMF loans, the US multi-billion dollaraid and pledges from the Friends of DemocraticPakistan (FoDP). There are pressing economyrelated issues of dependence on foreign aid, a largefiscal deficit, poor economic activity, decreasedsavings and remittances and high defence spending.Can the confidence in the economy be restored?Can the Pakistan establishment take unpalatabledecisions to restructure its failing economy? Canthe economy get over its dependence on foreignaid? Will the prevailing environment give a fillipto new investment policies and projects? Can thestate of Pakistan ever get over its macro-economicand structural defects such as low domestic savings,investment deficit, foreign trade and fiscal deficits?Is the equitable management of national resourcesand creation of a conducive business environmentpossible in Pakistan? Would Pakistan be in aposition to address the economic issues effectively,provide employment opportunities and containinflation in the long term? The long term impact ofthe failing economy on the wellbeing of the state islikely to be adverse.

Driver No 5 : Relat ions with IndiaDriver No 5 : Relat ions with IndiaDriver No 5 : Relat ions with IndiaDriver No 5 : Relat ions with IndiaDriver No 5 : Relat ions with India

Pakistan has sustained a hostile relationship withIndia since its very inception. It has fought fourwars with India and supported insurgencies inPunjab and Kashmir. How has this animosity servedPakistan’s interests? So long as Pakistan regardsIndia as its prime threat, it will continue to betrapped in an unhealthy race for conventional andnuclear parity with India. This is bound to cause asevere strain on its meagre resources. In recenttimes, the relations with India have been at a lowebb post 26/11. This can be ascribed to India’s

reluctance to resume the composite dialogue withPakistan, until the 26/11 perpetrators are broughtto book. Would Pakistan ever accept its clandestinerole in fomenting terror in the Indian hinterland?Would Pakistan ever shut down Kashmiri andPakistani tanzeems? How can the two countriesaddress contentious issues? How can India scaledown Pakistan’s fears of a conventional strike alongits eastern borders? And how does India containPakistan’s drive for acquiring strategic depth inAfghanistan? The relations do not look toopromising at the moment. The future trajectory ofthe Indo-Pak relationship will largely be governedby domestic events within Pakistan.

DriveDriveDriveDriveDriver r r r r No 6No 6No 6No 6No 6: Fore ign Pol i cy: Fore ign Pol i cy: Fore ign Pol i cy: Fore ign Pol i cy: Fore ign Pol i cy

Pakistan has benefited militarily andeconomically from being a front line state for theWest during the Cold War, and again in the globalwar against terror. It has used its geo-strategiclocation to make itself indispensable to the West,and also to extract advantages from the West. It hasused Western help to strengthen itself militarilywhich has help it in sustaining its rivalry with India.The West considers Pakistan as a haven for militantactivities and a threat to peace and stability andthus it is likely to have a long-term engagementwith Pakistan. How will Pakistan deal with theUS? Will it blindly follow the US diktats or will itdefy the Americans at some point of time? WillChina play an active role in propping up Pakistanagainst India? What will be the level of Saudiinvolvement in Pakistan politics and its economy?Will the precarious security situation in Afghanistanbe defined and driven by Pakistan or will theconverse happen? How would rest of the Islamicworld view the recovery or fall of Pakistan? Howdoes the world view the safety and security of itsnuclear arsenal? Could the fragility of the securityof nuclear weapons become a prime cause ofconcern in the international context?

Pakistan 2020: Possible Scenarios and Options

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Pakistan today is at the crossroads of history. Theinternational opinion on Pakistan is fairly negativeat the moment. Much will depend on how Pakistanconducts its foreign policy in the coming days.

Impact – Uncertainty Analysis

The foregoing discussion is tabulated above todelineate the broad trends in Pakistan. Each driver(column a) is evaluated for its impact (column b)and uncertainty (column c) and then leads to themost plausible outlook (column d).

Graphic Representation

Since each of the key drivers is considered to beof high impact and highly uncertain, these havebeen plotted on an XY scatter chart to derive a

probable behavioural pattern. The drivers havebeen rated on a scale of 0-10. The graph has beencreated on the basis of comparative values asfollows: Politics (8,10), Radicalisation (9,8),Economy (8,8), Military (9,7), Relations with India(9,9), and Foreign Policy (8,6).

Plausible Scenarios

Depending on how the six drivers play out, thefollowing three scenarios can be consideredplausible for Pakistan in the next 10 years,leading up to 2020.

Scenario IScenario IScenario IScenario IScenario I - - - - - LebanonisationLebanonisationLebanonisationLebanonisationLebanonisation

In this scenario, the key drivers continue withtheir current downward trend, which leads to

Key Drivers (a) Impact (b) Uncertainty (c) Broad Outlook (d)

Politics High High Fragmented or stable?

Radicalism High High Extreme or moderate?

Economy High High Stable or failed?

Military High High Under civilian control or the most

important power centre?

Relations with India High High Hostile or friendly?

Foreign Policy High High Principled or opportunistic?

Key Drivers: Impact - Uncertainity Graph

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Uncertainity

Imp

ac

t

POLITICS RADICALISM ECONOMY

MILITARY RELATIONS WITH INDIA FOREIGN POLICY


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gradual deterioration of the security situation. Thegovernment in power is unable toconvincingly address issues of good governance.Maladministration robs the government of itslegitimacy. Opposition parties increasingly becomecombative and try to pull down the government.The military starts manipulating the politicalparties and fears of a likely coup flourish. Thejudiciary becomes assertive and occasionallyoversteps its legal and constitutional mandate. Theeconomy does not pick up despite several sharpinfusions of external aid. Unemployment rises,economic distress levels remain high, inflation soarsand production constraints lead to food shortages,profiteering and corruption. Agriculture andmanufacturing sectors remain weak. Lowconfidence levels in the economy leads to largeflights of capital and de-valuation of the Pakistanirupee. The right wing political and radical partiesbecome active and Islamists continue to expandtheir influence inside Pakistan. The Pakistan armyunder international pressure continues to play thecat-and-mouse game on the issue of Islamists. Toforestall the threat from India, the Pakistan armyramps up militancy inside India. Provincialgrievances mount and movements for secession pickup pace. Parts of Pakistan become un-governable.Pakistan gets Lebanonised. The military takes overthe reins of the country.

Scenario II - Stable PakistanScenario II - Stable PakistanScenario II - Stable PakistanScenario II - Stable PakistanScenario II - Stable Pakistan

In this scenario, the key drivers surprisingly look

up and there is marked improvement in the securitysituation, due to strong coordinated action by thecivilian government and the military. The mistrustbetween the two disappears, as they both realisethat Pakistan is in danger and concerted correctiveaction is required. The political climate in Pakistanstabilises. And political differences no longer tellupon issues of governance. The army standssidelined and the political atmosphere turns againstthe Islamists. But the army still continues to exercisemajor influence over issues of national security.The economic situation remains difficult but atentative recovery seems underway. Foreign aidflows provide some relief.

There is increased public investment in thesocial sectors and infrastructure projects. Thecounter-insurgency campaign witnesses somesuccess and the danger of Islamists acquiringcontrol of the state recedes. The law enforcementagencies are able to penetrate and break the jihadi

networks and substantially degrade their capabilityto strike against the state. The Pakistan army andintelligence agencies no longer make distinctionbetween good and bad jihadis. LeT and JeM aretargeted and gradually decimated. Pakistan nolonger regards India as the number one enemy.Kashmir is relegated to the background. NuclearCBMs hold and both countries sign the CTBT.Relations with India improve which in turn leadsto boom in trade, travel and investment betweenthe two countries. Greater autonomy is conceded

Pakistan 2020: Possible Scenarios and Options

Lebanonisation

Factors Trend

Politics Fragmented

Radicalisation On Sharp Rise

Economy Lack Lustre

Military Stronger

India Relations Tense

Foreign Policy Opportunistic

STABLE PAKISTANFactors Trend

Politics ConstructiveRadicalisation Under ControlEconomy Fairly StableMilitary SidelinedIndia Relations Friendly and

Cooperative

Foreign Policy Balanced

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the boil and Gilgit-Baltistan reverberates with callsfor independence. China shows a more thannormal interest in Gilgit-Baltistan to buffer itssensitive border province of Xinjiang. Karachidescends into ethnic blood-letting. The safety ofnuclear weapons becomes a serious issue. Attemptsto snatch these weapons are met with limitedsuccess. The anarchic situation leads to a stream ofrefugees into India. The jihadi elements takeadvantage of the situation and infiltrate in largenumbers. This in turn leads to horrendous acts ofterror and law and order becomes unmanageablein some parts of the country. The US exits fromAfghanistan and this brings the Taliban back topower in Kabul. This further de-stabilises the regionand in turn de-stabilises Pakistan. China takesadvantage of the situation and increases its influenceon both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistanimplodes.

Summation

These are the three broad scenarios. There areseveral intermediate scenarios also in which some keydrivers pan out positively and others do not. But thecrucial point to note is that, unless some serious effortis made at the domestic level, the state of Pakistancontinues to face prospects of instability in the longterm. A stable and democratic Pakistan is usuallyconsidered to be in everyone’s interest includingIndia.1 But then the big question is whether Pakistancan succeed in holding itself together against variousfissiparous tendencies that afflict it today?

to the provinces which effectively addresses thegrievances of disaffected provinces like Balochistan.Pakistan becomes stable and prosperous.

Scenario III - ImplosionScenario III - ImplosionScenario III - ImplosionScenario III - ImplosionScenario III - Implosion

In this scenario, the key drivers show a sharpdownward slide and the situation deterioratesbadly. The campaign against Islamists stretchesthe Pakistan army beyond its ideological and

logistical limits. The consensus on combating theinsurgency breaks down within and between thepolitical and military establishment. Dividedopinion within the armed forces ensures that noeffective action is possible against the jihadis. Thebasic orientation of the Pakistan army remains anti-India. The army continues to parley with the Talibanand at the same time partakes American dollars forthe fight against terrorism. The Islamists extendtheir operations into Punjab and Sindh. The lawand order situation deteriorates, and with it thehopes of economic revival also disappear. There ispolitical instability and failure to manage affairsleads to rise of ethnic nationalism. Balochistan is on

Implosion

Factors Trend

Politics Directionless

Radicalisation Very Extreme

Economy Unsustainable

Military Stretched

India Relations Near Collapse

Foreign Policy In Disarray


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TTTTThe previous chapters have analysed thedifferent dimensions of the current situation inPakistan and explored the likely scenarios thatmight emerge in the next ten years. While stablePakistan is perceived to be in the interest of regionalsecurity, one cannot be too optimistic at this pointabout the emergence of a stable and peacefulPakistan. The Indian policy towards Pakistan, sofar, has been dictated by the assumption thatPakistan will remain stable and that its governmentwill be able to control the situation there. Indianpublic opinion, despite the bad state of affairs, hasexpressed itself in favour of a stable and peacefulPakistan being in Indian interest. India hassubscribed to a composite dialogue process despitethe fact that the Pakistani agencies have beeninvolved in various subversive acts aimed atdestabilising India. On Kashmir too India hasengaged with Pakistan in the hope that soft borderswill reduce tensions and unite the dividedKashmiris. India engaged with the military dictatorGeneral Musharraf even though he was the architectof the Kargil misadventure. India has also exercisedconsiderable restraint despite the attack by the ISIsupported terror groups on the Indian Parliamentand despite 26/11. It has not hesitated to engagewith whosoever is in power in Pakistan.

However, the situation is changing. India’sapproach may require adjustments as Pakistanbecomes unstable. Multiple centres of power have

CHAPTER XI

DEALING WITH AN UNSTABLE PAKISTAN:INDIA’S OPTIONS

emerged in Pakistan and the civilian governmentdoes not seem to be in charge. The compositedialogue has been suspended as Pakistan has failedto dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism on itssoil.

In the coming years, India-Pakistan engagementwill become even more complicated as Pakistanbecomes more unstable and radicalisation of thePakistani society gathers pace. Radicalisation hasalready begun to affect the institutions ofgovernance. The civilian governments at thecentre and in NWFP have been compelled to makedeals with the radical elements even though thesedeals have been short-lived and counterproductive.In the short to medium term – 5 to 10 years – thePakistan army is likely to remain embroiled in longterm counter-insurgency. This might change thecharacter of the Pakistan armed forces which in turnwill have major impact on Indo-Pak relations. It isstill too early to say whether the Pakistan army,generally regarded as a professional army, willitself get radicalised.

The scenarios painted in the last chapter are notpredictions. They seek to capture a range ofplausibile developments. India’s policies will haveto be formulated on the basis of following likelytrends in Pakistan:

An increasingly unstable Pakistan may manifestin several ways – Lebanonisation or in the worst

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case scenario even disintegration.

Multiple centres of powers will emerge withthe army being the most important.

The army’s behaviour might becomeunpredictable due to a variety of factorsincluding the increasing radicalisation of asection of it. It will also need more resources tofight the insurgency. This will, in turn, affectPakistan economy adversely. This could resultin incoherent and inconsistent policies.

The army will get more aggressive as it findsitself fighting to save Pakistan; and its ownidentity. This could result in more sabre-rattling and brandishing of the nuclear threat.

For Pakistan, India and not the Taliban remainsthe prime threat. It is very much likely thatagencies in Pakistan will continue with theirpresent strategy of using terror as a tool ofpressure against India.

Within Pakistan, the society will getfragmented. The ethnic, linguistic andprovincial fault lines may get accentuated.Insurgency in Balochistan might get worse.Sindh and NWFP will not remain unaffected.They will challenge Punjab’s dominance.

Pakistan’s economy will suffer due to thedeteriorating internal situation. Pakistan’sdependence upon external assistance willincrease which might help but would not curePakistan’s’ economic ills. A faltering economywill accentuate Pakistan’s internal problems.

There could be flight of capital from Pakistanif the situation gets out of control There areindications that many of the elite have alreadysecured alternative homes outside Pakistan andtheir children are sent out for education inWestern countries. Thus, an outflow ofPakistanis to other countries cannot be ruled

out. Pakistan has seen in 2008 and 2009 a massivemovement of internally displaced people dueto the worsening security situation,radicalisation and military action. India shouldfactor in the possible flow of refugees into Indiain the event of an implosion.

The civil society in Pakistan remains weak butits members are keen that India’s policiesshould not be such that they strengthen thehands of Pakistani hardliners. They expectIndia to strengthen the civil society. Manypeople from the poorer sections will continueto visit India due to family ties, culturalexchanges and for receiving better medicaltreatment.

The people in Gilgit-Baltistan, who havesuffered at the hands of Pakistan in the last sixdecades, look towards India with some hopeand expectation considering that India regardsthese areas as part of India. India needs todevelop a well-thought-out forward-lookingpolicy to engage with the people of PakistanOccupied Kashmir (POK) who are legallyIndian citizens.

China’s influence and presence in Pakistan isgrowing steadily. The China-Pakistan militaryand nuclear nexus is a matter of securityconcern for India. The nexus will only deepenin the coming years. India has to be mindful ofthe growing Chinese influence in POK. TheGwadar port is of great strategic importancefor both Pakistan and China. In an unstablePakistan, Chinese influence will grow further.China will like to ensure that its Xinjiangprovince is not threatened by radical groupsbased in Pakistan. The Pakistani governmentand the army will become even moredependent upon China.

Developments in Afghanistan will have majorimpact on Pakistan. President Obama has


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announced that US troops will start pullingout of Afghanistan from July 2011. If Talibanreturn to power, Pakistan may wish to imposeits will on them. But, the return of the Talibancan also have a negative impact on Pakistan’sintegrity as this could give a fillip toTalibanisation of Pakistan where a significantminority is still sympathetic to Taliban. In anycase, Pakistan will continue to seek strategicdepth and annul India’s influence inAfghanistan.

US-Pak relations are likely to be on a rollercoaster ride. If the US leaves Afghanistanfacilitating the return of the Taliban, the USinterest in Pakistan might decline. Even if theUS does not leave Afghanistan in the nearfuture, the relationship between US andPakistan is likely to remain under stress as anti-US feeling in Pakistan is high and may grow inthe future. Pakistan is extremely unhappy atthe increasing warmth in Ido-US relations.

India’s Options

India’s policy towards Pakistan will be shapedby the emerging reality based on the above trends.In such a scenario, the anti-India mindset of itsmilitary and the ruling elite is not likely to changeand may in fact worsen. In such a scenario whatshould be India’s policy options?

India need not be apologetic about its policiestowards Pakistan. It should make clear that ithas genuine security concerns in Pakistan andthat it would deal with them appropriately.

India’s policies will need to be based on hardreality and not on any wishful thinking thatsuddenly Pakistan will change course andbecome friendly towards India.

In an unstable Pakistan, the society will getdifferentiated. The idea of Pakistan may be

challenged by many groups. Therefore, Indiashould be prepared to engage and deal withall sections of Pakistani society which may beamenable towards better relations with India.In this regard India should engage with theMohajirs, the Barelvis, the Shias, the Baloch,the Gilgitis, the Baltis and civil society groupsand not just the government of the day. Indiashould also take care that Indian actions do notgive a pretext to anti-India constituencies inPakistan to unite against India.

India cannot let its guard drop as Pakistanbecomes unstable and unpredictable. Thus,India must remain prepared to deal with anymilitary challenge that Pakistan may throw atit. At the same time India should foresee anddeal with any challenge posed by the Talibanand other radicalised groups in the future.

India must not let its policies be overlysecuritised as this will detract it from itsfundamental task of ensuring inclusive growthfor its people. In other words, the challengefrom Pakistan should not make India think onlyin terms of military responses. India shoulddevelop a wide variety of responses, usingboth hard and soft power options to deal withPakistan. Thus a nuanced approach to Pakistanwill be required while dealing with challengeslike 26/11. It would be prudent not to rule outany option and choice of any option should bemade judiciously.

India should use its soft power proactively. Itshould develop a range of policy optionswhich aim at developing people-to-peoplecontacts. This will help create constituenciesin Pakistan which look at India not as a threatbut as an opportunity. Offering scholarshipsto students from Pakistan can be considered asalso help in providing medical treatment toPakistanis. India’s visa policy should be made

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more liberal for Pakistanis trying to takeadvantage of opportunities in India. Aman kiAsha, the media initiative started in January2010, should be used as an opportunity toindicate its benign intent. At the same time itshould be ensured that security agencies arewell-equipped to stop the infiltration ofterrorists from Pakistan.

India should closely monitor the developmentswithin Pakistan particularly in the context ofprovincial and sectarian faultlines which maydeepen in the coming years. India should besensitive to developments in Sindh and Punjab,the two provinces which share borders withIndia. India must maintain contacts with peoplefrom different regions of Pakistan.

Diplomacy should be the first line of defencefor India. India should sensitise theinternational community about the seriousthreats to international security that an unstablePakistan presents, particularly in the contextof the security of nuclear weapons.

India at the moment has limited options tonudge Pakistan in the right direction as thePakistani military elite has an obvious anti-India mindset. However, India must offerPakistan the alternative of bilateral and regionalcooperation as a way out of instability. Anincrease in bilateral trade could help thePakistani economy enormously and also createconstituencies on both sides with stakes inpeace and stability.

India should try to open its links with thePakistani military, the most important playerin Pakistani polity, even if it may be difficult tobegin with. A structured dialogue withPakistani military will help India both inunderstanding the military’s view-point andgetting its own point of view across directly.

Nuclear CBMs should be strengthened andfollowed through.

It is important that India should deal with theseparatists in Kashmir by itself rather thanthrough Pakistan. Pakistan should have no rolein the resolution of India’s internal problems.Confidence building measures to strengthenlinks between the two parts of Kashmir shouldbe encouraged.

Water is likely to emerge as a major issue inIndo-Pak relations in the future. The highlyirresponsible and misleading propaganda inPakistani media forecasting wars, even anuclear conflict, over water should beeffectively countered through disseminationof facts. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) iscoming under stress as Pakistan has delayedthe projects proposed by India on the westernrivers. India should pursue its water policymore assertively. The concerns of the Kashmiripeople regarding the IWT and their demandson the western rivers need to be underlined inbilateral discussions. India should ensureoptimal use of eastern rivers within the limitsset by the IWT. Legal instruments relating tothe possibility of stopping or suspending IWTcan be explored to put pressure on Pakistan ifit does not stop its subversive policiestowards India.

India must offer proposals for bilateral andregional cooperation with Pakistan in aproactive manner. This will create internationalgoodwill and expose Pakistani insincerityabout pursuing peace with India.

India must retain at all times a decisive edgeover Pakistan as far as conventional militarymight is concerned.

India should assess the importance of Pakistanimilitary getting involved in fighting


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insurgency on the western front. A two-frontsituation is developing for the Pakistani army.The Pakistani army is not as yet geared tosimultaneously fight India as well the Taliban.However, India remains the common enemyof both the Taliban and the Pakistan army. Indiashould not follow any policy which wouldbring them together against India.

To sum up, Indian policy towards Pakistan mustbe geared to the new unfolding situation inPakistan. India has a range of options, both soft andhard, to deal with the situation. India’s growingeconomic profile and its rising internationalrecognition give it a chance to deal with thePakistan problem in a much better way than wasthe case before. The challenge before India will behow to protect itself from the consequences of ablow-back from an unstable Pakistan and also toevolve a sophisticated approach combining hardand soft options in dealing with it.

Finally, there are a few recommendations forthe Pakistani establishment and civil society.Pakistan needs to change its mindset towards Indiawhich perceives India as an eternal enemy andthreat. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Indianpublic opinion is in favour of a stable, prosperous

and peaceful Pakistan. Pakistan has to make anhonest appraisal as to what it has gained fromnurturing and sustaining an enduring enmity withIndia. The policy of bleeding India and gainingstrategic depth against India has proved to becounterproductive.

The Pakistani leaders make the strategic errorin thinking that India does not want a sovereignand united Pakistan. This impression must becorrected. They should not blame India butthemselves for the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971and the genocide in East Pakistan. Pakistan brokeup because of its own contradictions. The Pakistanileadership should appraise— as many Pakistanisseem to be doing at the moment— the role thatreligion should play in Pakistani society and polity.They should realise that Pakistan will profitimmensely by linking up with the growing Indianeconomy and promoting regional cooperationwhich will help Pakistan tide over the currenteconomic crisis. There is enormous potential inbilateral cooperation and regional cooperation tothe benefit of Pakistan, India and the south Asiancountries. Pakistan should seek salvation in southAsia and recognise that good relations with Indiawill help it in evolving as a peaceful andprogressive country in the comity of nations.

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There are several terrorist groups that areoperating in Pakistan which have transformed thatcountry into a hub of international terrorism. Someof these groups are funded, patronised and trainedto achieve Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Kashmirand Afghanistan and are described as strategicassets. There are other groups who have beentargeting the Pakistani state for ideological reasons.Some of these Taliban groups perceive the Pakistanistate as an agent of the US. Though Islamabadinitially tried to make a distinction between Talibanand Al-Qaida elements and pursued only foreignterrorist on its soil after 9/11 these home-grownmilitants which Pakistan had spared have nowemerged as a threat to Pakistan’s stability and itspolitical future.

The Taliban and the groups associated with itare active in implementing their ideology ofcreating an Islamic state in the tribal regions andhave established basic organisational structures.They have divided their leaderships into two wings.One wing looks into policy issues while the otherdeliberates on military issues and is responsiblefor executing different strategies. There are linksbetween various groups that are operating inPakistan in terms of ideology, training and financialresources. The intelligence agency, the ISI stillmaintains links with many of these groups,something that prevents their decimation. Theyhave also changed their names, grouped andregrouped under different banners making it

APPENDIX I

PROFILES OF SOME TERROR GROUPS

OPERATING IN PAKISTAN

difficult to deal with them legally. LeT which wasKashmir focused now have shifted its area ofoperation beyond Kashmir to include entire Indiaand now boasts of a global network to carry out itsactivities. Recent arrest of David Coleman Headely is acase in point.

Apart from Taliban groups operating in thetribal areas there are other groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)— now renamed as Tehreek-e-Khuddam-ul-Islam (Movement of Servants ofIslam), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)— now renamed asJamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD — Party for propagation ofIslam), Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin (HuM) — nowrenamed as Jamiat-ul-Ansar (JuA—Party of Hosts),which are mainly operating in Kashmir and havealso been involved in terror attacks in other parts ofIndia. Apart from these groups there are sectariangroups who are mainly operating inside Pakistanbut have links with several other terror groups.Their operations are targeted at Afghanistan andPakistan who they consider as their enemy forsacrificing Afghan ‘cause’ at US insistence. Profilesof some of these groups are discussed below.

Haqqani group

The group was formed by Jalaluddin Haqqaniin the late 1970s during Soviet occupation ofAfghanistan. Haqqani established various trainingcamps and madrassas in tribal regions across theAfghan-Pakistan border and became very popularboth in Pakistan and Afghanistan because of his


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contribution to ‘Jihad’ during Afghanistan war. Hewas also the interior minister during Taliban’s rule.The group remains active on its ideology even todayand enjoys support from Al-Qaida and otherinternational terror groups. There are thousands ofcadres of this group on both sides of the DurandLine. They are strong opponent of the NorthernAlliance and Shia sects. Haqqani is the head of theTaliban group in North Waziristan

At present his son Serajuddin Haqqani aliasKhalifaji heads the operational wing of the group.This group serves as a bridge between foreignterrorists and the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban andhas also established political wing and think tanksconsisting of Arab and Central Asian experts.

The military wing is headed by his two othersons Nasiruddin and Badruddin Haqqani. Themilitary wing coordinates with various Kashmiriand Arab groups. The Haqqani group has influenceover other groups working in Afghanistan andWaziristan and in event of disputes or clashes amongthe groups arbitrates and mediates between them.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is anumbrella group of the Taliban which has spread itstentacles across different tribal agencies and otherparts of Pakistan. The TTP was founded by BaitullahMehsud in 2007 and the group operated from itsheadquarters in Makeen, South Waziristan. Thecommanders and supporters of this group arepresent in South and North Waziristan, Kurram,Aurakzai, Mohmand, Khyber, and Bajaur. Thisgroup has established branches in Punjab, Sindhand Balochistan and recruits people from there. Itssupporters are also present in more than a dozen ofdistricts of NWFP. Media reports reveal thatBaitullah used to run a syndicate of terrorists inKarachi and South Punjab for robbing in banks andextortion through kidnappings. FollowingBaitullah’s death in a drone attack the TTPleadership has gone to his deputy Hakimullah

Mehsud. Despite the speculations that Baitullah’sdeath and feud over succession of leadership willlead to the TTP’s disintegration, the organisationhas unleashed a series of attacks in different citiesof Pakistan, including an audacious attack on theArmy General Headquarters in Rawalpindi onOctober 13, 2009.

Tehreek-e-Taliban (NorthWaziristan)

This group was part of the Tehreek-e-TalibanPakistan till 2007-08, but due to some dispute withthe TTP it broke away and formed another groupin 2009 under the leadership of Gul Bahadur. Thisgroup is considered pro-Pakistani government andis opposed to the Mehsud group and foreignterrorists in Pakistan. This group participated in aflush out operation launched by the Pakistan armyagainst the Uzbek commander Tahir Yuldashev andpushed the Uzbeks out from Southern Waziristan.

Mehdi Militia and Haideri Taliban

The Mehdi Militia and the Haideri Taliban areShia militant groups and were established tocounter the TTP and its allies. The Mehdi Militiawas founded by Hussein Ali Shah while theHaideri Taliban was formed by Abid Hussein inthe militancy infested Kurram Agency. Both theShia groups consist of eight to ten thousandfighters. Both the organisations enjoy supportfrom Iran and Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance.In Kurram Agency alone these groups enjoyenormous support from the local populace.Commanders from the Northern Alliance wereseen fighting against the TTP and Qari Hussain inKurram Agency.

Amar-bil-Maroof wa Nahi-Anil-Munkar

Haji Namdar was instrumental in foundingthe Amar bil Maroof wa Nahi Anil Munkar-(Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice

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(PVPV)). The organisation represents a rigid versionof Islam, and draw inspiration from Salafi Schoolof thought who believe in direct contact betweenGod and man.

Haji Namdar was one of the influential personsof this group who supported the Taliban inAfghanistan. But after a photograph in a Peshawarbased Urdu language daily, showing him seatednext to the Frontier Corps Colonel MujahidHussain, he was termed as “a government puppetposing as mujahid”. This became the reason for arift between him and Baitullah Mehsud’s aideHakimullah Mehsud and led to his assassination bythe TTP in 2008. Now this group is headed byCommander Niyaz Gul.

Lashkar-e-Islam

Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) represents the DeobandiSchool of thought1, akin to the LeT and Jamiat -ul-Mujahideen (JuM) and justifies use of force forreligious ends. The organisation has around 5000well trained fighters. This group was founded byHaji Mangal Bagh of the Afridi community in theKhyber Agency initially to fight against thecriminals in the area. Later this organisation tooksteps to set up an alternative system based on theformula of the Taliban and took the initiative topunish those who did not offer Namaz, forcedclosure of shops and markets during prayer timeand punished those found involved in immoralactivities.

Since the PVPV considered Ansar-ul-Islam(AuI) its ideological enemy it sided with the LeI tocounter its influence in Khyber agency. LeI was thefirst organisation to set up an FM radio in the regionto unleash a propaganda war against its rival groupAuI resulting in violent clashes. This group has beentaking stringent action against its opponent, theAuI, and as per an estimate around 600 peopleshave been killed during factional fights. This groupexecuted different crimes in Peshawar in 2009which is considered its biggest target.

Ansar-ul-Islam

Ansar-ul-Islam (AuI) represents the Barelvischool of thought2. This group has its influence inthe Khyber Agency and was founded by Pir SaifurRahman. In late 2003, the AuI also set up its ownFM radio and launched a propaganda war againstits rival LeI. Amid the escalation of bloody feudsbetween rival factions in Khyber in February 2006a tribal Jirga ordered Pir Saifur Rahman to leavethe area to ease tensions. Now this group is headedby Mehbubul Haq . Since the TTP is also focusing onKhyber which is close to Peshawar, it may becomea flash point for a conflict between the two in nearfuture.

Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)

Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi(TNSM) was founded by Sufi Muhammad in

1 Deobandi school of thought is affiliated to Sunni sect of Islam. It originated from Madrssas of Deoband city inIndia where revival and purification movement of Islam began in the 19th century. The leaders of the movementcalled on Muslims to “return to the basics of Islam” as they believed that Muslims in the Indian subcontinentwere drifting from the tenets of Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad’s way of life) and Quran into the realm ofSufism, which they termed as a Hindu conspiracy to introduce Hindu rituals into Islam.

2 The Barelvi school of thought is also affiliated to the Sunni sect of Islam. Peace tolerance, harmony andacceptance of other faiths and sects have remained at the core of the Barelvi interpretation of Islam.The Barelvis take a relatively a liberal view of the religion including Sufism and see no problem in praying attombs and shrines of saints who they term as intermediaries between man and God, which separates themfrom Deobandi school of thought within the Sunni sect and their interpretation of basic tenets of Islam.Interestingly, the Barelvi branch of Sunni Islam also originated from India in the city of Bareilly inUttar Pradesh.


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the Malakand division of Swat in 1992 with theobjective to enforce Sharia law in Pakistan. TheMusharraf Government outlawed the organisationin 2002 and put its founder in prison. After SufiMuhammd’s imprisonment his so- in-law MullahFazlullah, took over the leadership of TNSM andaligned with Baitullah Mehsud and the TTP.By 2008 TNSM gained foot hold in the Swat valleyand forced the Pakistan government to sign a peacedeal that allowed them to enforce Sharia law in thevalley. The truce deal between the government andthe local Taliban could not last as the TNSMorchestrated the seizure of Buner in 2009, close toIslamabad, prompting the Pakistan army to launchan operation which ended with dismantling ofFazlullah’s Imam Dheri headquarters.

Apart from these groups, the other groupswhich played a catalytic role in the Talibanisationof the tribal regions are LeT, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),SSP, HuM, JeM, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami(HuJI)and Harkatul Mujahideen-e-Islami. These groupsshifted to the tribal regions when the governmentof Pakistan disbanded them following internationalpressure. They are assisted by the Haqqani groupoperating in Waziristan.

Analysing the basic structure and activities ofthese organisations in tribal regions one can reachthe conclusion that these organisations are active inpromoting Talibanisation but with differentperspectives. Some organisations have limited theiractivities to Afghanistan and consider suchactivities inside Pakistan wrong. These are the“good Taliban” and enjoy the support of thePakistani government. There are several differenceswithin these groups which have resulted in thecreation of new groups. Often government agencieshave aggravated these rifts.

Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria(TNFJ)

It was established in 1979, in reaction to Zia’s

Islamisation programme on the basis of Hanafi Fiqh.It is a Shia organisation and presented six-pointdemand to Zia, including the implementation ofFiqh-e-Jafaria for the Shias of Pakistan. Believed tobe supported by Iran, this organisation has beeninvolved in sectarian violence in Pakistan but mostof its attacks have been retaliatory in nature.

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is an offshoot ofJamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). They receivedsubstantial support and funding from Saudi Arabiaand Kuwait. Based on the Deobandi version of Islam,the party was founded in the Jhang district ofPunjab in 1984. It was established by Haq NawazJhangvi after he broke away from the JUI. It had thesupport of small time traders in Pakistan and wasinitially ranged against the Shia landlords in Jhang.SSP has reportedly managed to set up17 clandestine branches abroad, in the UAE,England and Canada.

These offices are a major source of party funding,apart from donations from Saudi Arabia. Theyemerged as natural allies of the Taliban and wereable to establish training camps and operate fromAfghanistan. In the mid-nineties Lashkar-e Jhangvi(((((LeJ) was born out of the SSP. After GeneralMusharraf imposed a ban on the organisation, itrenamed itself as the Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan.Its student group which was also banned termeditself as the Dars-e-Quran committee in variouscolleges and later changed its name to IslamicStudent Movement of Pakistan. Due to its anti-Shiaactivities, it was banned later.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

LeJ is an offshoot of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam(JUI). It is considered by many as an armed wing ofthe SSP. It broke away from the SSP in 1996 and wasfounded by Riaz Basra and Malik Ishaque andAkram Lahori. It derives its name from MaulanaHaq Nawaz Jhangvi who was one of the founder

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members of SSP. Riaz Basra was killed on May 14,2002. The organisation is currently headed byMaulana Akram Lahori who is under policecustody. According to some reports the LeJ split in2000 and one group was headed by Riaz Basra andthe other group by Qari Abdul Haye alias QariAssadullah. The LeJ was banned by the Musharrafgovernment. Even though the leaders of SSPdisassociate themselves from the activities of theLeJ, the two share close links and draw their cadresfrom same madrassas. It has close links with theTaliban and operated training camps in Afghanistanbefore the US war on terror.

The organisation has been involved in anti-Shiaviolence and has attacked Imambaras and isresponsible for killing of Shia doctors andprofessionals. It is based primarily in Punjab andKarachi. It has also targeted Pakistani Christians,Western interests and attempted to assassinateNawaz Sharif twice in 1999. It has close links with ,JeM, HuM, and HuJI. Both LeJ and LeT are part ofOsama bin Laden’s Global Islamic Front. It issupposed to have 300 active members with regionalunits which are coordinated by the central unit.This is further divided into small; cells consistingof five to eight members who work independentlyof each other. The organisation has since changedits name to Tehrik-e-Islami Pakistan (TIP).

Sipah-e-Mohammad

Sipah-e-Mohammad is a Shia sectarianorganisation and is considered the military wingof TNJ. It is led by Ghulam Raza Naqvi. Theorganisation is believed to have been created in 1993and consists of members of the erstwhile TNFJ, TNJand Imamia Students Organisation. It is active inPunjab province, the hotbed of Sunni militantactivities with the village of Thokar Niaz Beg onthe outskirts of Lahore as its headquarters.According to an intelligence estimate, the strengthof the group was nearly 30,000. It was banned byGeneral Musharraf in 2001. This organisation isriddled with factionalism. The groups under the

leadership of Major (Retd.) Ashraf Ali Shah andNaqvi have been engaged in incessant fighting andthe organisation is now defunct after the lawenforcing authorities killed most of its leaders andarrested its cadres. Individual members haveoperated in their individual capacity. It changedits name to Millat-e-Jafaria in 2001 after the banimposed by General Musharraf.

Major Pakistani based jihadi groupsOperating in India

Ja ish-e-Mohammad ( JeM)Ja ish-e-Mohammad ( JeM)Ja ish-e-Mohammad ( JeM)Ja ish-e-Mohammad ( JeM)Ja ish-e-Mohammad ( JeM)

Jaish-e-Mohammad, yet another Deobandiorganisation created in the name of Jihad againstinfidels was formed in January, 2000 in Karachi byMaulana Masood Azhar after he was released inexchange for the passengers in the hijacked Indianaircraft IC814 in Kandahar. He announced hisintention to raise an anti India force, the Jaish-e-Muhammad, during a Friday sermon in the BinouriMosque in Karachi soon after his release. He wasearlier associated with Harkar ul Ansar whichchanged its name to Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin after itwas put under the list of terrorist organisations bythe US. Azhar is reportedly close to Osama binladen and has travelled with him to Sudan. Hereceived support from the Pakistani state forwaging ‘jihad’ in Kashmir and opened militanttraining camps in Afghanistan with the support ofthe Taliban. The Pakistan government had arrestedhim after immense pressure by the internationalcommunity for his links with Indian Parliamentattack in December 2001. However in 2002 he wasreleased as the Lahore High Court did not find anyevidence against him to keep him under housearrest. The JeM has close links with other sunnisectarian organisations and received officialpatronage until the Jaish decided to launch asuicide attack on President Musharraf. By 2003, JeMhad splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI) andJamaat ul-Furqan (JUF). Pakistan banned KUI andJUF in November 2003. JeM is involved in legalactivities like commodity trading, real estate and


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production of consumer goods to generate fundsapart from the donation it receives from varioussources. It has its network in seventy eight districtsof Pakistan and maintains large centres inWaziristan, Malakand, Kohat, and Muzaffarabad,the capital of PoK. It is believed to have used assaultrifles, mortar, IEDs and rocket grenades. Its mainweapon has been the usage of suicide bombers.

Lashkar-e -TLashkar-e -TLashkar-e -TLashkar-e -TLashkar-e -Taiba (LeT)a iba (LeT)a iba (LeT)a iba (LeT)a iba (LeT)

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the armed wing ofPakistan based Sunni religious organisation-Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad, was formed in 1989.The organisation has been through several re-incarnations after it was banned in 2002. A favouriteof the Pakistani establishment for its militantactivities in India, this organisation made acomeback in the form of Jamaat-ud-Dawa till it wasbanned in 2008. It has been responsible for severaldeadly attacks in India and is believed to have closelinks with the Pakistani intelligence agency, ISIthat facilitates the cadres’ movement into India.The LeT maintains ties with religious and militantgroups around the world ranging from thePhilippines to the Middle East through the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad. Presently, it is headed byHafiz Saeed, He is one of the prime accused in theMumbai 26/11 terrorist incidents. Pakistan hadreportedly arrested Hafiz Saeed after hisorganisation was banned by the United Nations buthe was set free by the court as the government ofPakistan could not prove any of the charges againsthim. The organisation gets its recruits from Pakistanimadrassas and is believed to provide hefty rewardsto its cadres for their success in various jihadioperations. It has several mouth pieces to propagateits views. Some of its magazines are al Dawa, Gazwa(in Urdu) and the Voice of Islam. It is believed to

have split into two organisations namely alMansurin and al Nasirin. Its reincarnated frontorganisation Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) remains aformidable force. JuD has been engaged incharitable activities which have earned it thesupport and sympathy from the people of Pakistan.It established its credentials in the Kashmirearthquake in 2005 where its workers were the firstones to reach the quake affected areas with reliefmaterial. It has links with the Taliban and Al-Qaida.After its ban it has been operating from the tribalagencies.

H a r k a t - u l - M u j a h i d e e n ( H u M )H a r k a t - u l - M u j a h i d e e n ( H u M )H a r k a t - u l - M u j a h i d e e n ( H u M )H a r k a t - u l - M u j a h i d e e n ( H u M )H a r k a t - u l - M u j a h i d e e n ( H u M )

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen emerged as HarkatulAnsar in the 1980s with a mission to fight the SovietUnion in Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawalfrom Afghanistan, the group reorganised its cadresand moved them into Kashmir. Harkat-ul-Ansar(HuA) changed its name to Harkatul Mujahideenand split into Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI) after it was banned by theUS in 1997. According to some sources HuM andHuJI merged in 1993 to form Harkat-ul-Ansar. Laterthe HuM was revived when HuA was banned. Itswebsite describes it as a purely jihadi organisation.The HuM announced its merger with JeM inKashmir. In 1993 under the leadership of SajjadAfghani the HuM entered Kashmir jihad. Its headMaulana Fazlur Rahman Khalili was one of thesignatories to Osama bin Laden’s 1998 call for jihad.In 2001, HuM was declared a terrorist organisation.After the ban on HuM it was named Jamait-ul-Ansar which was again banned (Daily Times, 12Aug 2004). It is based in Muzaffarabad and iscurrently operating in Kashmir. According to mediareports it has resurfaced as Al Hilal trust which is based inKarachi.

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The vast array of factors responsible for theevolution of a weak Pakistani state have been amplyunderlined in the diversity of literature availableon Pakistan. While foreign observers like SeligHarrison (April 2009) have argued that the “slideof Balkanisation” in Pakistan could only be arrestedif the autonomy provisions of the 1973 Constitutionwere respected and strengthened, Pakistani writerslike Usman Khalid (February 2009) vehementlydisagreed with any such approach. Khalidcontended that such measures would weaken thePakistani state, as autonomy based on ethnicdivisions was hard to achieve in the country due tothe mixed geographical spread of differentethnicities across different provinces.

Many analysts have also focussed on the factorsbehind growing challenge of Islamic radicalism toPakistan. Some like, Zaid Haider (January 2009)and Hassan Abbas (May 2009), pointed to thedeclining system of overall governance and theweakened government control in FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (FATA), particularly, asan explanation for the outbreak of Islamic militancy.However, foreign observers like Jones and Mason(2008) attributed this phenomenon to the signals ofa varied and differentiated treatment that Islamabadsends to the Baluchis on the one hand and the Talibanon the other. The authors also rejected the notion of“ungoverned spaces” and argued that thisterminology is a severe blow to recognising the

APPENDIX II

THE IMAGE OF PAKISTAN IN MEDIA

tribal code in FATA— Pashtunwali. The authorstraced the growth of Talibanisation in Pakistan toMusharraf’s policy of appeasement and suggest edthat a solution to the problem lay in rebuilding thetribal structures from inside, while reducing thepressures on them from outside. This, they argued,would help in restoring the traditional balance inthe system. Meanwhile,, in an article published inthe Washington Post (May 2009), Selig Harrisonasked the US to support Pashtun demands and amerger of FATA and NWFP, followed byconsolidation of Pashtun enclaves in Balochistanand Punjab into a single Pakhtunkhwa province.He felt that this move could be important not justbecause the Al-Qaida relied heavily on Pashtunsfor recruiting its cadres, but also to alienate thatentity from Pashtuns.

The spread of radical elements to Karachi andPunjab is yet another challenge, which has beenhighlighted by many scholars. Ahmad Rashidtaking note of the geographical spread of Talibanwrote in the New York Review of Books (May 2009)that the Taliban had made inroads into Punjab underthe ambit of the Tehreek-e-Taliban. An editorial inthe Christian Science Monitor (May 2009) drewattention to the phenomenon of the Talibanisationof Karachi and contended that there were 3,500madrassas in the city that were indoctrinating theyouth. An editorial in Al Jazeera (July 2009) attestedto this development, stating that the Pakistani


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Taliban had not only been using Karachi to fundtheir fight across Pakistan, they were also addingto the ethnic tensions between Muhajirs andPashtuns, the largest local ethnic communities.

Military operations by the Pakistan army havebeen criticised by many scholars on variousgrounds. Rahimullah Yusufzai (July 2009)expressed concern over the spatial spread of thoseoperations, which he cautioned would “overstretchPakistan’s armed forces”. He also pointed out thatanother repercussion of the military action wouldbe the coming together of Pakistani Talibancommanders, which he argued, would in manyways blur the distinction between the ‘good’ and‘bad’ Taliban. Saleem Safi (June 2009) in an essaytitled “Coherent Strategy Against Militancy”proposed that instead of military action, it wasimportant to address the basic causes of Islamicmilitancy and that a political solution was the onlyanswer. Safi emphasised that it was important toroot out the ideological basis of the Taliban andnoted that the main reason for intelligence failurewas the weakened socio-economic structure ofFATA, which was further worsened by the recentmilitary operations. Safi urged the government toalso involve religious parties and other influentialtribal personalities with any negotiating process infuture. Meanwhile, an editorial in Christian ScienceMonitor (June 2009) pointed out that popularsupport was considered to be the primary reasonfor the success of the ongoing military action.

In an interview published in Arab Times (July2009), Imran Khan, leader of Tehrik-e-Insaf, pointedout that military operations would contribute tothe further Talibanisation of society and emphasisedthat rather than focusing on political personalitiesin Pakistan, the concerns of people should be givenpriority. Hassan Abbas (2009), assessing the policeinfrastructure in Pakistan asserted in an article thatunless the state parted with the outdated,

unaccountable, authoritarian and oppressivesystem of policing, victory in any of the insurgencyoperations would be far-fetched. Abbas alsopointed out that inadequate training andinvestigation facilities and lack of funds, amongothers, were some of the areas, which madefunctioning of the police ineffective.

External aid to Pakistan has been yet anotherremedy offered by many analysts to shore upPakistan’s economy and bail the country out of itscurrent predicament. Ahmed Rashid in an articlein Washington Post (2009) stated that the USCongress should clear expeditiously emergencyfunds for Pakistan and the first year’s US$ 1.5 billionshould have no conditions attached. He pointedout that the U.S. lawmakers should stipulate thataid for Pakistan should focus on development, andno conditionalities be attached to aid foragriculture, education and job creation. JayashreeBajoria (April 2009) also offered her solution forPakistan’s economic ills by highlighting the needto strengthen the Pakistani economy againstcollapse. She wanted special emphasis to be laidon boosting trade with Pakistan, where investmentsto develop energy, water, and transportinfrastructure should be undertaken. Makingeconomic aid programmes more transparent, sheargued, should be the primary goal of theinternational efforts to salvage Pakistaneconomically, which was basically suffering frominfrastructural constraints, corruption, weakintellectual property rights, and a feudal system ofland distribution.

Indo-Pakistan engagement receivedconsiderable attention from analysts worldwide.Farrukh Saleem (July 2009) painted a murky pictureof the future of Indo-Pak relations. He felt that giventhe tense environment on the borders and the risingdefence expenditures in both the countries,a composite dialogue would mean little.

Appendix 2

147

A commentary in Christian Science Monitor (June2009) meanwhile suggested that India should seizethe opportunity to engage Pakistan in the post-Mumbai attacks period, as jihadis could use thisperiod to destabilise Kashmir. The commentaryoffered a number of suggestions for taking theIndo- Pakistan summit forward: (a) high-levelintelligence cooperation between the twocountries should be encouraged; (b) aninstitutional approach for facilitating suchconfidence could be built on the lines of America’sIMET, which is a military education programme;(c) India should clarify its objectives inAfghanistan, and Pakistan should be invited tomonitor Indian efforts which would enhancetransparency and (d) Pakistan should send theperpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to India for

trial. The commentary further pointed out thatwhile in Kashmir, India should systematicallyreduce its troops and focus on economic growthand opportunity, Pakistan, on its part, should stopsupporting the jihadis. An editorial in KhaleejTimes (June 18, 2009) supplemented the abovearguments by proposing that the Kashmir issuebe addressed by the leaders of the two countriesin their future engagements, who should “exhibitmaturity and strong willed commitment to reacha level of understanding that allows the people ofKashmir to decide their fate.” Anothercommentary in Khaleej Times (June 11, 2009)suggested that India should be respectful ofPakistan’s investigative agencies and trust itsjudicial system. Kashmir, it observed, should bean integral part of the bilateral talks.

References

Abbas, Hassan. “Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and CounterterrorismSuccess”. Clinton, Mich.: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, April 2009.

Abbas, Hassan. “Pakistan Can Defy the Odds: How to Rescue a Failing State”. Clinton, Mich.: Institute for Social Policyand Understanding, May 2009.

Al Jazeera, “Karachi’s war on Taliban”, July 7, 2009.

Bajoria, Jayshree, Stabilizing Pakistan: Boosting its Private Sector, Council on Foreign Relations, April 30, 2009.

Christian Science Monitor, Are the Pakistani Taliban finding new footholds into South, May 6, 2009.

Christian Science Monitor, Pakistan Army’s Challenge: Holding onto gains against militants, June 27, 2009.

Haider, Zaid, “Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Tribal Belt: A Human Rights and Security Perspective”, Belfer Center

Student Paper Series, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2009.

Harrison, Selig , “Pakistan: The State of the Union”, Centre for International Policy, April 2009.

Harrison, Selig, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Fault Line”, Washington Post, May 11, 2009.

Jones,Thomas H. and Mason, M. Chris, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-AfghanistanFrontier,” International Security, 32(4), Spring 2008.

Kalid, Usman, “MQM scheme for break-up of Pakistan”, Islamabad Obsever, February 2, 2009.

Khaleej Times, Restarting India-Pakistan Dialogue, June 11, 2009.

Khaleej Times, “The Manmohan –Zardari Icebreaker”, June 18, 2009.

Massod, Azhar, Zardari “Government will not last long”, Arab Times, July 11, 2009.

Rashid, Ahmed, “Pakistan on the Brink”, New York Review of Books, May 2009.

Rashid, Ahmed, Pakistan’s Critical Hour, Washington Post, May 5, 2009.

Safi Saleem, “Calls for Coherent Strategy against Militancy”, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, June 15, 2009.

Salim, Farrukh, “India-Pakistan Rivalry”, The News, July 19, 2009.

Yusufzai, Rahimullah, Good Taliban: Where are they? A Formidable Enemy, July 2009, at http://letusbuildpakistan.blogspot.com/2009/07/good-taliban-where-are-they.html


148

APPENDIX III

ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF PAKISTAN

Annual data and forecastAnnual data and forecastAnnual data and forecastAnnual data and forecastAnnual data and forecast2005a 2006a 2007a 2008b 2009b 2010c 2011c

G D PG D PG D PG D PG D P ddddd

Nominal GDP (US$ bn) 109.9 127.3 143.0 165.2a 166.5 174.4 186.1Nominal GDP (PRs bn) 6,500 7,623 8,673 10,284a 13,095a 14,571 16,100Real GDP growth (%) 7.7 6.2 5.7 2.0a 3.7a 1.9 3.7Expenditure on GDP (% real change)Expenditure on GDP (% real change)Expenditure on GDP (% real change)Expenditure on GDP (% real change)Expenditure on GDP (% real change)ddddd

Private consumption 12.9 1.0 4.7 -1.3a 5.2a 2.1 3.8Government consumption 1.7 48.3 -9.6 39.0a -13.5a 3.8 4.2Gross fixed investment 13.5 19.9 13.6 3.8a -6.5a 1.7 4.5Exports of goods & services 9.6 9.9 2.3 -5.3a 9.0a -0.2 0.9Imports of goods & services 40.5 18.7 -3.5 3.6a -9.2a 1.5 2.2Origin of GDP (% real change)Origin of GDP (% real change)Origin of GDP (% real change)Origin of GDP (% real change)Origin of GDP (% real change)ddddd

Agriculture 6.5 6.3 4.1 1.1a 4.7a 3.9 3.5Industry 12.1 4.1 8.8 1.7a -3.6a 0.2 3.4Services 8.5 6.5 7.0 6.6a 3.6a 1.9 4.0Population and incomePopulation and incomePopulation and incomePopulation and incomePopulation and incomePopulation (m) 165.9 169.5 173.3b 177.3 181.4 185.5 189.6GDP per head (USS at PPP) 2,051 2,201 2,341b 2,383 2,450 2,477 2,546Recorded unemployment (av:%) 7.7 7.7 12.9b 13.6 15.2 16.2 16.7Fiscal indicators (% of GDP)Fiscal indicators (% of GDP)Fiscal indicators (% of GDP)Fiscal indicators (% of GDP)Fiscal indicators (% of GDP)ddddd

Central government revenue 13.3 14.0 12.8 15.1 14.4 14.1 14.9Central government expenditure 16.5 18.2 17.3 22.8 19.6 20.0 19.8Central government balance -3.2 -4.2 -4.5 -7.6 -5.2 -5.8 -5.0Net public debt 53.9b 51.5b 50.9b 51.5 46.4 48.2 49.3Prices and financial indicatorsPrices and financial indicatorsPrices and financial indicatorsPrices and financial indicatorsPrices and financial indicatorsExchange rate PRs: USS (end-perlod) 59.83 60.92 61.22 79.10a 83.20 86.88 88.82Consumer prices (end-period; % change) 8.5 8.9 8.8 24.0a 10.8 6.8 7.8Stock of money M2 (end-period; % change) 16.5 14.6 19.5 19.0 20.6 16.0 11.3Lending interest rate (av; %) 8.2 9.9 10.2b 12.4 13.3 12.5 11.5Current account (US$ m)Current account (US$ m)Current account (US$ m)Current account (US$ m)Current account (US$ m)Trade balance -6,340 -9,647 -10,587 -16,769 -10,372 -13,318 -14,149Goods: exports fob 15,433 17,049 18,188 21.328 18,285 18,330 18,494Goods: imports fob -21,773 -26,696 -28,775 -38,097 -28,657 -31,649 -32,643Services balance -3,830 -4,912 -5,044 -5,363 -3,021 -3,199 -3,568Income balance -2,514 -3,131 -3,740 -4,294 -1,681 -3,652 -3,702Current transfers balance 9,079 10,941 11,085 11,024 12,668 14,664 15,273Current-account balance -3,605 -6,750 -8,286 -15,402 -2,406 -5,505 -6,146External debt (US$ m)External debt (US$ m)External debt (US$ m)External debt (US$ m)External debt (US$ m)Debt stock 33,158 35,877 40,680 46,249 51,140 55,612 56,214Debt service paid 2,429 2,290 2,600 3,917 3,423 4,132 4,091Principal repayments 1,702 1,437 1,504 2,891 2,456 2,835 2,785Interest 727 853 1,095 1,026 967 1,297 1,305Debt service due 2,429 2,290 2,600 3,917 3,423 4,132 4,091International reserves (US$ m)International reserves (US$ m)International reserves (US$ m)International reserves (US$ m)International reserves (US$ m)Total international reserves 10,948 12,816 15,689 8,903a 15,304 16,347 16,978a Actual, b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates, c Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts, d Fiscal years (ending June 30th).

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, December 2009

149

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Arvind Gupta is Lal Bhadur Shastri Chair at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),New Delhi, India.

Alok Bansal is currently Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India.He was earlier Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi,India.

Ashok K Behuria is Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),New Delhi, India.

C.V. Sastry is Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi,India.

Harinder Singh is Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), NewDelhi, India.

P.K. Upadhayay is Consultant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), NewDelhi, India.

Smruti S Pattanaik is Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),New Delhi, India.

Sumita Kumar is Senior Research Associate at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses(IDSA), New Delhi, India.

Sushant Sarin is Consultant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi,India.

Research Assistance Provided BResearch Assistance Provided BResearch Assistance Provided BResearch Assistance Provided BResearch Assistance Provided Byyyyy

Kartik Bommakanti is Research Asistant, at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses(IDSA), New Delhi, India.

Medha Bisht Research Asistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), NewDelhi, India.

Shamshad Khan Research Asistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), NewDelhi, India.

Imtiyaz Majid Research Asistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), NewDelhi, India.

Maps in the report are drawn byMaps in the report are drawn byMaps in the report are drawn byMaps in the report are drawn byMaps in the report are drawn by

VVVVVivek Dhankerivek Dhankerivek Dhankerivek Dhankerivek Dhanker,,,,, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India.

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