WHOIDENTIFIESWITHEUROPE?AMULTI‐LEVELANALYSISOF

EUROPEANIDENTITYANDPOLITICALSUPPORTFORAEUROPEANCOMMUNITY

by

AndreaNuesserBachelorofArts,Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität,2008

PROJECTSUBMITTEDINPARTIALFULFILLMENTOFTHEREQUIREMENTSFORTHEDEGREEOF

MASTEROFARTS

IntheDepartmentofPoliticalScience

©AndreaNuesser2010

SIMONFRASERUNIVERSITY

Spring2010

Allrightsreserved.However,inaccordancewiththeCopyrightActofCanada,thisworkmaybereproduced,withoutauthorization,undertheconditionsforFairDealing.

Therefore,limitedreproductionofthisworkforthepurposesofprivatestudy,research,criticism,reviewandnewsreportingislikelytobeinaccordancewiththelaw,

particularlyifcitedappropriately.

ii

APPROVAL

Name: AndreaNuesser

Degree: MasterofArts

TitleofThesis: WhoidentifieswithEurope?Amulti‐levelanalysisofEuropeanidentityandpoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity

ExaminingCommittee:

Chair: Dr.PaulDelanyChair,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,SFU

___________________________________________

Dr.SteveWeldonSeniorSupervisorAssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,SFU

___________________________________________

Dr.MarkPickupSupervisorAssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,SFU

___________________________________________

Dr.DavidLaycockInternalExaminerProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,SFU

DateDefended/Approved: __________13 April, 2010________________________

Last revision: Spring 09

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iii

ABSTRACT

Intoday’sEuropeanpolitics,Europeanintegrationandfurtherenlargementsof

theEuropeanUnion(EU)aretwoofthemostsalientissuesonthepoliticalagenda.

PublicopinionisbecomingincreasinglydecisiveforEUpolicy‐making,anditiscrucialto

identifythefactorsthatshapeEuropeanidentityandpublicopinionaboutthe

integrationprocessinordertounderstandandpredictthedynamicsofEuropean

integration.IargueaEuropeanidentitythatindicatessupportfortheEUisa“civic”or

“political”identitythatreflectseconomicandpoliticalvaluesandprinciplespromoted

byEUinstitutions.Employingsurveydatafromthe2005‐2006WorldValuesSurveyfor

17Europeancountries,Ievaluatetheeffectsofutilitarianandnationalidentityfactors

onEuropeanidentity.Theresultsofthemultiple,multi‐levellinearregressionanalysis

indicatethateconomicandpoliticalfactorsonboththemacroandmicrolevelshape

EuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegration.

Keywords:Europeanintegration;Europeanidentity;publicopinion;EuropeanUnion;hierarchicallinearmodel.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ThankyoutoeveryonewhomademytimeatSFUthefantasticexperiencethatit

hasbeen.Iamparticularlythankfultomyseniorsupervisor,Dr.SteveWeldon,forhis

endlessadvice,encouragement,andsupportoverthelastyearandahalf.Hehastaught

mealot,notonlyaboutresearchbutalsoaboutallaspectsofmycareer.Icouldnot

haveaskedforabettersupervisor.

Specialthanksgotomysecondsupervisor,Dr.MarkPickup,andmyinternal

examiner,Dr.DavidLaycock.AlthoughhewasnotdirectlyinvolvedinmyMAproject,I

alsowanttosay“mercibeaucoup”toDr.Jean‐FrançoisGodbout.Allofyouhavebeen

excellentadvisors,pushingmetobethebestthatIcouldbe.Iappreciatetheresearch

opportunitiesthatyouhaveprovided,whichallowedmetoworkwithyouasa

colleagueandgaininvaluableresearchexperience.

IwouldalsoliketothankDr.PaulDelanyfortakingthetimetochairthe

examiningcommittee,andDr.DouglasRossandthedepartmentalsupportstaffforall

theirhelpwiththeformalities.

Iamluckytohaveafamilyandfriendswhoarealwaysthereformeandsupport

meineverythingIdo.Thankyou.

v

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Approval .......................................................................................................................................... iiAbstract .......................................................................................................................................... iiiAcknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ ivTableofContents ............................................................................................................................ vListofFigures ................................................................................................................................ viiListofTables................................................................................................................................. viii

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1

WhatisEuropeanidentityandwhydoesitmatter?................................................................. 5Europeanidentity:Ameaningfulconceptoran“emptycategory”? .............................................. 5Europeanidentity:MeasureofdiffusepoliticalsupportfortheEuropeanUnion.......................... 8

TheoriesofEuropeanidentityandEuropeanintegration ....................................................... 12Theutilitarianperspective ............................................................................................................ 12

Micro‐leveltheories ............................................................................................................. 13Macro‐leveltheories ............................................................................................................ 15

Thenationalidentityperspective.................................................................................................. 17Micro‐leveltheories ............................................................................................................. 17Macro‐leveltheories ............................................................................................................ 20

Methodologyanddata .......................................................................................................... 22Researchdesign............................................................................................................................. 22Data ............................................................................................................................................. 23Variablesandmeasures ................................................................................................................ 25

Resultsanddiscussion ........................................................................................................... 27EuropeansidentifywiththeEU..................................................................................................... 27Macro‐levelfactors:nationaleconomicandpoliticaldevelopment............................................. 31Amulti‐levelmodelofEuropeanidentity ..................................................................................... 35

Economicfactors .................................................................................................................. 36Politicalfactors..................................................................................................................... 40

Conclusion:WhoidentifieswithEurope?............................................................................... 44

Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 48AppendixA:Listofvariables ......................................................................................................... 48

Dependentvariable.............................................................................................................. 48Independentvariables:Country‐levelfactors ...................................................................... 48

vi

Independentvariables:Individual‐levelfactors ................................................................... 48AppendixB:Additionaltables ....................................................................................................... 50

ReferenceList ........................................................................................................................ 55

Notes..................................................................................................................................... 59

vii

LISTOFFIGURES

Figure1: BarplotofEuropeanidentity......................................................................................... 28Figure2: RelationshipbetweennationaleconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity.......... 32Figure3: RelationshipbetweennationaldemocraticdevelopmentandEuropean

identity.......................................................................................................................... 34Figure4: RelationshipbetweenexclusiveandinclusivenationalidentityandEuropean

identity.......................................................................................................................... 41

viii

LISTOFTABLES

Table1: Countriesincludedintheanalysis ................................................................................ 24Table2: Microandmacro‐levelpredictorsofEuropeanidentity............................................... 26Table3: Cross‐nationaldifferencesinEuropeanidentity........................................................... 29Table4: Amultiple,multi‐levellinearregressionmodelofEuropeanidentity .......................... 37Table5: Effectsofmicro‐levelpredictorsbycountry(bivariatecorrelations) ........................... 39Table6: Bivariatecorrelations:educationandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 50Table7: Bivariatecorrelations:incomeandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 50Table8: Bivariatecorrelations:profession(worker)andEuropeanidentity,cross‐

nationaldifferences ...................................................................................................... 50Table9: Bivariatecorrelations:profession(manager)andEuropeanidentity,cross‐

nationaldifferences ...................................................................................................... 51Table10:Bivariatecorrelations:marketeconomyandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 51Table11:Bivariatecorrelations:welfarestateandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 51Table12:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinnationalidentity ............................................................. 52Table13:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinexclusivenationalidentity.............................................. 52Table14:Bivariatecorrelations:nationalandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 52Table15:Bivariatecorrelations:democracyandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 53Table16:Bivariatecorrelations:ethnicdiversityandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 53Table17:Bivariatecorrelations:postmaterialismandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 53Table18:Bivariatecorrelations:confidenceinEUandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national

differences .................................................................................................................... 54

1

INTRODUCTION

Intoday’sEuropeanpolitics,Europeanintegrationandfurtherenlargementsof

theEuropeanUnion(EU)aretwoofthemostsalientissuesonthepoliticalagenda.

While,atthebeginning,theEuropeanUnionwasconsideredaneliteproject,andpublic

supportforeconomicintegrationcouldbetakenforgranted,publicopinionabout

Europeanintegrationisbecomingincreasinglydecisiveforpolicy‐makingonthe

Europeanlevel(DaltonandEichenberg,1993;NiedermayerandSinnott,1995).Since

theTreatyofMaastricht,theEUhasceasedtobemerelyaneconomicentity;instead,it

hasmovedforwardwiththepoliticalintegrationprocessandgraduallyexpandedits

politicalpower.EUcitizensarebeingmoredirectlyaffectedbyEuropeanUnionpolitics

and,asaresult,EuropeanUnionmattersarebecomingincreasinglypoliticized(Hooghe

andMarks,2006).Hence,inordertounderstandandpredictthedynamicsofEuropean

integration,itiscrucialtocomprehendthenatureofEuropeanidentityandthefactors

thatdrivepublicopinionabouttheEUandtheintegrationprocess.

TheinterestinEuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegrationhas

producedanextensiveliteraturethatisdominatedbytwotheories:autilitarian

(economic)andanationalidentity(political)perspective.Authorswithintheutilitarian

approachclaimthatcitizensaremorelikelytosupportintegrationifitresultsinanet

benefittotheirpersonaleconomicsituationortheircountry’snationaleconomy

(EichenbergandDalton,1993;AndersonandReichert,1995;GabelandPalmer,1995;

2

Gabel1998).Proponentsofthenationalidentityorpoliticalperspectivehighlightthe

importanceofdomesticpoliticsandfeelingsofidentityinshapingsupportforEuropean

integration(Carey,2002;McLaren,2002;Luedtke,2005).Recentstudieshaveshown

thatbothutilitarianmotivesandnationalidentityareimportantdeterminantsof

supportforEuropeanintegration(HoogheandMarks,2004,2005;deVriesandvan

Kersbergen,2007).

Mostpriorstudies,however,havefocusedon“old”EUmemberstates—theEU’s

sixfoundingmembersortheEUfifteen.Fewstudiesinclude“new”membersthatwere

admittedin2004orthereafter.Yet,theaccessionofcountriesfromtheformerEastern

blochasfundamentallychangedtheEU—andEuropeasawhole—andislikelytohave

affectedEuropeanidentityandpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration.Inorderto

assessthecurrentstateandidentifythedeterminantsofEuropeanidentityandpublic

opiniononEuropeanintegration,weneedtoexpandthescopeofanalysisandinclude

thesenewmembers.Inaddition,weshouldincorporatepossiblefuturemembersas

wellasotherEuropeancountries.Why?Europeanintegrationisacomplexand

multifacetedprojectthatisbuiltaround—butnotlimitedto—theEU.Onewayor

another,EuropeanintegrationaffectseverycountryinEurope—notonlyEUmember

states.

Iseektofillthisgapintheliterature.MyanalysisofEuropeanidentityincludes

17Europeancountries,whichcanbegroupedascurrentEUmembers,candidate

countries(futuremembers)andotherEuropeancountries(non‐members).Basedon

surveydatafromthe2005‐2006WorldValuesSurvey,Itestutilitarianandnational

3

identitytheoriesofEuropeanidentitytofindoutwhetherornottheystillholdforthe

EUpost2004.Furthermore,Iseektoanswerthefollowingresearchquestions:After

fiftyyearsofEuropeanintegration,isaEuropeanidentityformingamongthecitizensof

EuropethatcanbeinterpretedaspublicsupportforEuropeanintegration?Ifso,what

arethecharacteristicsofthisEuropeanidentity,andhowcanweexplaininter‐and

intra‐countrydifferences?Aretheresystematicdifferencesinthestrengthandnatureof

EuropeanidentitybetweenEUcitizensandresidentsofnon‐EUcountries?

InordertostudyEuropeanidentityasameasureofpoliticalsupportfora

EuropeancommunityandanindicatorofdiffusepublicsupportfortheEuropean

integrationprocessweneedtodistinguishbetweenthe“civic”and“cultural”

componentofthiscollectiveidentity.Iargue,thereisadifferencebetweenfeeling

attachedtoEuropeandsupportingtheEU;feelingEuropeanisamatterofgeographical

locationwhilefeelinglikepartoftheEUisamatterofpoliticaldecision.AEuropean

identitythatisindicativeofsupportfortheEuropeanUnionisa“civic”or“political”

identitythatreflectsthevaluesandprinciplespromotedbyEUinstitutionssuchas

democracy,humanrights,multiculturalism,amarketeconomy,andcommitmenttothe

ruleoflaw.WhetherornotEuropeansdevelopasenseofEuropeanidentitydependson

politicalandeconomicfactorsonboththeindividualandthecountrylevel.

Thispaperisstructuredasfollows:Ifirstestablishthetheoreticalcontextformy

analysisandreviewtherelevantliteratureonEuropeanidentityandEuropean

integration.Basedonpreviousworks,Idevelopmyhypothesesaboutthenatureand

strengthofEuropeanidentityasanexpressionofpoliticalsupportforaEuropean

4

community.Employingsurveydatafromthe2005‐2006WorldValuesSurvey(WVS),I

thentestmyhypothesesbasedonasampleof17Europeancountries,includingcurrent

EUmembers,futuremembers,andnon‐members.Finally,inafullyintegrated,multi‐

levelmultiplelinearregressionmodel,Iexaminehowaggregateandindividuallevel

factorsshapeEuropeanidentityandpoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity.Inmy

conclusion,Irelatemyfindingstothebiggerpictureandspeculateaboutthemeaning

ofmyresultsintermsofsupportfortheEuropeanUnionandthefutureofthe

integrationprocess.

5

WHATISEUROPEANIDENTITYANDWHYDOESITMATTER?

SincethebeginningoftheUnion,scholarshaveclaimedthataEuropeandemos

isnecessaryforasuccessfulEuropeanintegrationprocessandthedemocratic

legitimacyoftheEuropeanUnion(Deutschetal.,1957;Haas,1958;Habermas,1994).

OnecharacteristicandkeymeasureofaEuropeanpeopleisasharedsenseofidentity

amongitsmembers.EarlierresearchontheEUfifteenhasshownthat,overthelast50

yearsofEuropeanintegration,EuropeanshavedevelopedanattachmenttoEuropeand

asenseofEuropeanidentity(Herrmannetal.,2004;Fligstein,2008;HoogheandMarks,

2005,2008).WhetherornotthisEuropeanidentityisameaningfulconceptandreflects

asharedsenseofbelongingtoaEuropeanpeopleiscontested.

Europeanidentity:Ameaningfulconceptoran“emptycategory”?

InviewofEurope’sculturaldiversity,lackofterritoriallimits,andheterogeneity

ofEuropeannationstates,somescholarsaredoubtfulthataEuropeandemoswitha

meaningfulcollectiveidentityispossible.Theyargue,“Europe’sidentities[…]existin

theplural.ThereisnooneEuropeanidentity,justasthereisnooneEurope”

(KatzensteinandCheckel,2009,213).Inotherwords,Europeanidentityisas

multifacetedastheEuropeancontinent.Ithasadifferentmeaningtoeachperson

dependingonherorhisnational,cultural,social,orethnicalbackground.Proponentsof

thisviewargue,ontheelitelevelandincontrasttoothergeographicalunits,Europeis

6

perceivedasacommunityofsharedvalues.“Yet,atthelevelofmasssociety,

‘European’oftenmeanslittleelsethangeographicexpansionofaspecificnational

identity—asupranationalnationalism—ontoEuropeanbeachesandintoEuropean

soccerarenas”(KatzensteinandCheckel,2009,214).Consequently,theyquestionthe

meaningofEuropeanidentityasanexpressionofasenseofbelongingtoaEuropean

communityanddescribeitasan“emptycategory”(Meinhof,2004;Breakwell,2004).

OtherresearchersapproachthestudyofEuropeanidentityfromadifferent

angle.Theyagreethatacollectiveidentitycanonlydeveloponthebasisofshared

valuesandprinciplesamongthemembersofacommunitybuttheyarelessdemanding

astowhatthisentails.“Weassumethathomogenizingthepluralityofnationalcultures

toformaEuropeannationisaprojectthatisneitherpracticablenoruseful.Fora

EuropeandemosbeforewhichtheEUregimecanbelegitimatedandwhichparticipates

inthedemocraticprocessinEurope,commonpoliticalvaluesandbehavioursare

presumablyquitesufficient”(FuchsandKlingemann,2002,20).

Thisdistinctionbetweenculturalandpoliticalelementsissupportedbyempirical

works,whichfindthatthereisadifferencebetweenfeelingattachedtoEuropeand

feelinglikeapartoftheEU(Bruter,2004).Inviewofthat,feelingEuropeanisamatter

ofgeographicallocationwhilefeelinglikeaEUcitizenisamatterofpoliticaldecision.It

isthusimportanttodistinguishbetween“identityelementsderivedfromhavingasense

ofbeingEuropeanandthosederivedfrombeingacitizenofacountrythatispartofthe

EU”(Breakwell,2004,25).

7

Bruter(2004)definesEuropeanidentityasaconceptwithtwocomponents:a

“civic”anda“cultural”one.TheculturalcomponentappliestofeelingEuropeanand

encompasseshistory,ethnicity,civilization,heritage,andothersocialsimilarities.

Culturalidentityformsthecoreofcitizens’identificationwithEuropeasawhole.In

contrast,theciviccomponentreferstotheidentificationofcitizenswiththepolitical

structureoftheEU(Bruter,2004).InhispreliminaryresearchBruterfindsthatpeople

systematicallydistinguishbetweenthesetwodimensions.Otherworkscorroborate

Bruter’sfindings;theyprovideevidencethatidentificationwiththeEUcentersarounda

civicidentityofliberalvaluessuchashumanrights,democracy,amarketeconomy,and

thewelfarestate(Laffan,2004;CitrinandSides,2004).Thedistinctionbetweencivic

andculturalidentityisanimportanttheoreticalconcept.“[It]allowsustodifferentiate

betweenidentificationwiththeEUasadistinctcivicandpoliticalentity,ontheone

hand,andalargerEuropeasaculturallyandhistoricallydefinedsocialspace,onthe

other”(Risse,2004,256).Thus,Europeanidentitybecomesameaningfulconceptand

indicatorofsupportfortheEUwhenweseparatetheculturalorgeographical

component—attachmenttoEuropeasawhole—andnarrowitdowntothecivicor

politicalcomponent—identificationwiththeEU.

Yet,previousresearchhasexaminedEuropeanidentityonthebasisofpeople’s

attachmentto“Europe”withoutspecifyingwhat“Europe”entails—ageographical,

cultural,orpoliticalconcept.However,onlythelatteraspectmattersfortheanalysisof

EuropeanidentityasameasureofpoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity.In

consequence,forthepurposeofthispaper,IfocusonEuropeandtheEuropeanUnion

8

aspolitical(notgeographical)unitsandanalyzeEuropeanidentitysolelyintermsofa

“civic”or“political”identity(Easton,1965;FuchsandKlingemann,2002;Bruter,2004).

Europeanidentity:MeasureofdiffusepoliticalsupportfortheEuropeanUnion

Justlikeanyotherpoliticalsystem,theEuropeanUnionreliesonthepolitical

supportorsolidarityfromitsmembers.AccordingtoEaston’sconceptofpoliticallife,a

politicalsystemconsistsofthreedistinctpoliticalobjectstowardswhichpolitical

supportcanbeexpressed:thepoliticalcommunity,theregime,andtheauthorities.A

minimumofsupportforeachofthethreepoliticalobjectsisvitalforthepersistenceof

apoliticalsystem.However,membersofapoliticalsystemdonotnecessarilyfeelthe

samelevelofsupportforeachpoliticalobject.Itis,forexample,possibleforamember

tofeelconnectedtothepoliticalsocietybutdisagreewiththepoliticalelites.Thus,

supportfordifferentobjectsmayvaryindependently.Politicalsystemscansustain

fluctuationsinsupport,thoughthecompletelossofsupportforeitherobjectmight

resultinthecollapseofthesystem(Easton,1965,1975).

Whileallthreeobjectsarevitalpartsofapoliticalsystem,therearequalitative

differencesinthetypeofsupportexpressedtowardthem.Thepoliticalcommunityis

themostbasicobjectofsupport,andthekindofsupportthatisexpressedtowardsitis

“diffuse”and“affective.”Incontrast,supportforthepoliticalregimeandtheauthorities

ismore“specific”and“evaluative”(Easton,1965;Norris,1999).Affectivepolitical

beliefsapplytotheacceptanceoforidentificationwithapoliticalentity,while

evaluativebeliefsarejudgmentsabouttheperformanceorappropriatenessofthe

9

object.Putdifferently,diffusesupportdescribesadeep‐seatedsetofattitudestowards

politicsandthepoliticalsystem.Theseattitudesarerelativelyresistanttochangeand

canbeinterpretedasmeasuringthelegitimacyofapoliticalsystemorpolitical

institutions(Dalton,1999,58).Specificsupport,ontheotherhand,iscloselyrelatedto

actionsandperformancesofthegovernmentorthepoliticalelites.“Democraticpolitical

systemsmustkeepthesupportoftheircitizensiftheyaretoremainviable”(Dalton,

1999,59).Inparticular,areservoirofdiffusesupport,likesupportforthepolitical

community,iscrucialtoendureperiodsofpoliticaldiscontent.Diffusesupportfora

EuropeanpoliticalcommunityisagoodmeasureforthelegitimacyoftheEU.As

comparedtosupportforthepoliticalregimeandtheauthorities,itisrelativelystable

andresistanttoperformance‐basedfluctuations.

Centraltotheconceptofpoliticalcommunityistheideathatthemembersofa

politicalsystemparticipateina“divisionofpoliticallabour,”whichformsthestructural

connectionamongthem.However,“theremustbesomecohesivecement—asenseor

feelingofcommunityamongstthemembers.Unlesssuchsentimentemerges,the

politicalsystemitselfmaynevertakeshapeorifitdoes,itmaynotsurvive”(Easton,

1965,176).Thiscollectiveidentityorfeelingsofcommunityindicatetheextenttowhich

thememberssupportthecontinuationoftheexistingpoliticalcommunity.Atfirst,a

politicalsystemcanemergeandexistwithoutasharedsenseofpoliticalcommunity.It

isevenconceivablethatforconsiderableperiodsoftime,thesenseofpolitical

communitymaybelowornon‐existent.Infact,asenseofcommunitymaydevelop

afterthesystemhasbeenfounded,andaworkingsystemmighthelpestablishaffective

10

tiesamongmembers(Deutschetal.,1957;Haas,1958).“Butifasenseofcommunity

failstoemergeanddeepenovertime,asasourceofsupport,itmayleaveasystem

extremelyvulnerabletostress”(Easton,1965,187).

Easton’sconceptillustrateswhyaEuropeancommunity,andasenseof

Europeanidentityasthebindinggluebetweenitsmembers,isvitalforthepersistence

oftheEuropeanUnion.ItalsoilluminateswhystudyingEuropeanidentity,asacivicor

politicalidentity,isvaluableforourunderstandingofEuropeanintegrationandthe

futureoftheEU.First,acivicEuropeanidentityisameasureofdiffusesupportfora

politicalcommunityontheEuropeanlevel.OperationalizingEuropeanidentityinthis

way,wecanmeasurethelevelofdiffusesupportforEuropeanintegration.Second,

publicopinionisincreasinglydecisiveforthedirectionandspeedoftheintegration

process.ThepublicrejectionoftheConstitutionalTreatyinFranceandtheNetherlands

isanexampleofhowinfluentialpublicopinionhasbecome.Inordertomake

predictionsaboutthedynamicsoftheintegrationprocess,itisthusimportanttoknow

whetherEuropeancitizensaresupportiveoforopposedtoaunifiedEuropebasedon

economicreasoning,attachmenttotheirnation,politicalvalues,or“ageneralgoodwill

intheformofwhathasbeentermedapermissiveconsensus”(Anderson,1998,570).

Theimplicationsofthisconceptareimportant.Europeanidentityisanindicator

ofthestrengthofpoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity.However,sincesupport

canvarybetweenthethreepoliticalobjects,Europeanidentityshouldnotpersebe

mistakenforanindicatorofsupportfortheEUingeneral.Thesupportforcertain

policiesanddecisionsregardingtheEuropeanintegrationprocessmightvary.Inthat

11

sense,Europeanidentityisanecessarybutnotasufficientconditionforasuccessful

integrationprocessandthefutureoftheEuropeanUnion.

12

THEORIESOFEUROPEANIDENTITYANDEUROPEANINTEGRATION

Overthelastdecades,thevividinterestinEuropeanidentityandpublicsupport

forEuropeanintegrationhasproducedanextensiveliteraturethatoffersinteresting

explanationsforwhyorwhynotpeoplemightsupportEuropeanintegrationandforma

senseofbelongingtotheEU.Withinthisliterature,twodominantperspectiveshave

emerged:theutilitarianself‐interestapproach,emphasizingeconomicmotives,andthe

nationalidentityperspective,whichstressestheimportanceofattachmenttoone’s

nation(HoogheandMarks,2005).

Theutilitarianperspective

Utilitariantheoriesarelargelydeductedfromliberaltradeandneofunctionalist

theories.Theypositthatcitizensevaluatetheintegrationprocessintermsofcostsand

benefits.Citizensaremorelikelytosupportintegrationifitresultsinanetbenefitto

theirpersonaleconomicsituationortheircountry’snationaleconomy(Eichenbergand

Dalton,1993;AndersonandReichert,1995;GabelandPalmer,1995;Gabel,1998).In

otherwords,citizenssupportEuropeanintegrationiftheyfeelthatEUmembershipisin

harmonywiththeireconomicinterest.Thislogicappliestoboththeirpersonal(micro‐

level)andtheircountry’scollectiveeconomicsituation(macro‐level).

13

Micro‐leveltheories

TheTreatyofRomesettheconstitutionalframeworkforacommonmarket,and

accordingtotheEU’swebsite,“thesinglemarketisoneoftheEuropeanUnion’s

greatestachievements”(EuropeanUnion).Fromthebeginning,theEuropeanUnionhas

focusedoncreatingasingleEuropeanmarket,andtradebarriersbetweenmember

countrieshavegraduallybeeneliminatedoverthelast50years.Asaresult,average

standardsoflivinghaveincreased.Still,noteveryonebenefits,andtheintegration

processsystematicallyproduceseconomicwinnersandlosers.

EuropeanintegrationcreatesdifferentialeconomicbenefitsforEuropean

citizensandimposesnewformsofcompetitionforjobsandcapital(Andersonand

Reichert,1995;GabelandPalmer,1995;Gabel,1998).“Citizensderivevaryingeconomic

benefitsandlossesfromEUmembershipdependingontheirabilitytoexploiteconomic

opportunitiescreatedbymarketliberalization”(Gabel,1998,938).AsingleEuropean

marketenforcesinternationalexchangeandallowsinternationalfirmstoshift

productionacrossbordersinordertofindthemostprofitablelocationwiththebest

locationfactors.Thisdevelopmentgenerallyadvantagescitizenswithrelativelyhigh

levelsofhumancapital(Fligstein,2008;HoogheandMarks,2005).Atthesametime,it

isincreasinglydifficultforgovernmentstoprotectnationalcompanies.Thisincreases

jobinsecurityespeciallyforworkersandputspressureonnationalwelfaresystems

(Gabel,1998;Inglehart,1970).

FortheEUfifteen,thereisevidencethathigherlevelsofhumancapitaland

socio‐economicstatusfacilitateEuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegration

14

(Gabel,1998;Anderson,1998;AndersonandReichert,1995;Fligstein,2008;Hooghe

andMarks,2004,2005).Peoplewithhighereducation,white‐collarworkers,managers

andprofessionalsidentifywiththeEuropeanUnionmoreoftenthanblue‐collarand

serviceworkers.However,thepositiverelationshipbetweeneducation,professionand

incomeasfoundintheEUfifteendoesnotinevitablyapplytonewmembersor

countriesoutsideoftheEU.Comparedtothenewmembers,theEUfifteenarewealthy,

capital‐richcountries.ManagersandprofessionalsaremostsupportiveofEuropean

integrationbecausetheyaretheeconomicwinners.Theeffectmaybereversedin

poorer,labour‐richcountries,whereworkersaretheonesbenefitingfromeconomic

integration.Itisthereforelikelythatworkersinnewandfuturemembercountriesare

moresupportivetowardsEuropeanintegrationthanworkersinthe“old”EUmember

states.Forthesamereasons,theymaywellbemoresupportivethanmanagersand

professionalsandthusshowhigherlevelsofidentification(HoogheandMarks,2004,

2005).

Fromapolicyperspective,thebasiclineofconflictwithregardtoeconomic

integrationis:tradeliberalizationandcreationofamarketeconomyversusprotection

ofthesocialwelfarestate.Economicintegrationintermsoftradeliberalizationis

advanced,whileotherareaslikesocialsecurity,healthandworkersafety,educationand

culturearelessintegrated.“Attitudestoward‘policyintegration’suggestthattheseare

thepolicyareasthatcitizenswishtoprotectfromUnioncontrol”(Eichenbergand

Dalton,2007,144).Accordingly,proponentsofamarketeconomyarelikelytosupport

Europeanintegration,whileadvocatesofthewelfarestatearemorelikelytoopposeto

15

it.ThisshouldleadtohigherlevelsofEuropeanidentityfortheformerandlowerlevels

forthelattergroup.Whatismore,itisplausiblethatthereisalinkbetweenaperson’s

attitudetowardsmarketeconomyandwelfarestateandherpersonaleconomic

situation.Peoplelocatedtowardsthelowerendoftheeconomicspectrumareexpected

tobeadvocatesofthewelfarestateastheyarethemostlikelybeneficiaries.The

oppositeappliestosupportforamarketeconomy.

Macro‐leveltheories

Inadditiontotheirpersonaleconomicsituation,Europeancitizensmayalsobe

sensitivetotheircollectiveeconomicsituation—theircountry’snationaleconomy.

PreviousworkshaveshownthatsupportforEuropeanintegrationvariesinaccordance

withpatternsofmacroeconomicperformance:levelsofsupportfortheintegration

processarehigherwhendomesticeconomicconditionsaregood(Eichenbergand

Dalton,1993;AndersonandKaltenthaler,1996;GabelandWhitten,1997).

TheEUactivelypromoteseconomicprosperityand,toputitinAndersonand

Kaltenthaler’swords,“[o]neoftheprimesellingpointsofEuropeanintegrationhas

beenthatmembershipwillmakethememberstatesbetteroffeconomically”(Anderson

andKaltenthaler,1996,176).Basedontheperceivedbenefitsofacommonmarket,

citizensexpecttheircountry’snationaleconomytoimproveonceitbecomesamember

oftheEU.Consequently,EUcitizensframetheirsupportforintegrationinreferenceto

howthenationaleconomyisperforming.

16

Furthermore,economicallyadvancedcountriesmightbenefitmorefrom

economicintegrationthanlessdevelopedcountries.Theservicessectoristhemost

importantsectorintheEU,accountingfor71.9percentoftheUnion’sGDP,compared

tothemanufacturingindustry(25.9percent)andagriculture(2.1percent)(CIAWorld

FactBook).Acountry’slevelofeconomicdevelopmentisareflectionofitslevelof

industrialization,andeconomicallyadvancedcountrieswithhighlydevelopedservice

sectorsmightbebetterabletoexploittheeconomicpossibilitiesofferedbytheEU’s

singlemarketthanotherlessdevelopedcountries.

Moreover,theEUpromiseseconomicprosperityandincreasedstandardsof

living(AndersonandKaltenthaler,1996).PrecedingstudieshaveshownthatEuropean

citizensaretypicallynotwellinformedaboutEuropeanintegration(Janssen,1991;

Anderson,1998).Withregardtoeconomicintegration,theyknowlittleabouttheir

country’sactualeconomicbenefitsfromEuropeanintegration.Theydo,however,feel

theabsolutestateoftheeconomy,whichisreflectedinthestandardofliving.Citizens

ofeconomicallyadvancedcountriesmightattributetheircountry’swealthtotheEU.

TheyidentifywiththeEU’sclaimsbecausetheircountryiswelloff.Thatmakesthem

feellikeapartoftheproject.

Contrarytothishypothesisistheexpectationthatfiscaltransfershavethe

oppositeeffect.Thelevelofeconomicdevelopmentdeterminesacountry’sroleinthe

EUasanetcontributorornetrecipient.WithintheEU—notunlikemanyfederal

states—fundsareredistributedfromrichtopoorcountries.Itisreasonabletoexpect

thatcitizensofnetrecipientcountrieswouldsupportEuropeanintegration,while

17

residentsofdonorcountriesopposetoit(AndersonandReichert,1996;DiezMedrano,

2003).

Asmyfirstsetofhypotheses,Iproposeeconomicfactorsareimportant

predictorsforEuropeanidentityandpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration.Onthe

individuallevel,IexpectEuropeanidentitytoincreasewithaperson’slevelofhuman

capitalandeconomicstatus(H1).Theeffectmightbestrongerineconomicallymore

advancedcountries.Positiveattitudestowardmarketeconomyarepositivelycorrelated

withsupportfortheEU,whiletherelationshipisreversedforEuropeanidentityand

attitudestowardsthewelfarestate(H2).Onthecountrylevel,Europeanidentity

increaseswiththelevelofnationaleconomicdevelopment(H3).

Thenationalidentityperspective

Theutilitarianapproachischallengedbytheoriesthathighlighttheimportance

offeelingsofidentityinshapingsupportforEuropeanintegration(Carey,2002;

McLaren,2002;Luedtke,2005).Whilethesetheoriesagreethattheattachmenttoone’s

nationplaysanimportantrolefortheformationofEuropeanidentityandsupportfor

Europeanintegration,thedirectionoftheeffectiscontested.

Micro‐leveltheories

Thefundamentalquestioninregardstonationalidentityvis‐à‐visEuropean

identityis:IsnationalidentityanobstacleorcatalystofEuropeanidentity?Whereas

somestudiesarguethatregionalornationalidentityisconsistentwithEuropean

identityandsupportforEuropeanintegration(DuchesneandFrognier,1995;Marinotti

18

andSteffanizzi,1995;Marks,1999;CitrinandSides,2004;Castano,2004),other

researchassertsthatnationalattachmentcombinedwithnationalpridehasasignificant

negativeeffectonsupportforEuropeanintegration(Carey,2002).Howcanthatbe,and

whoisright?

CareyarguesstrongnationalidentityisanobstacleforEuropeanintegration

basedonconflictsoverpowerandsovereignty.“Thestrongerthebondthatan

individualfeelstowardthenation,thelesslikelythatindividualwillapproveof

measuresthatdecreasenationalinfluenceovereconomicsandpolitics”(Carey,2002,

391).Otherstudiesconfirmthatnationalidentityisthestrongesttypeofgeographical

identityandcanbeextremelypowerfulinshapingviewstowardspoliticalobjects(Sears,

1993;HoogheandMarks,2004,2005).

However,moreimportantthanthestrengthofnationalattachmentisthe

definitionofnationalidentityanditsrelationtoothergeographicalandpolitical

identities(HerrmannandBrewer,2004).Previousresearchhasshownthataperson’s

attachmenttotheEUdependsonherunderstandingofEuropeanandnationalloyalties,

as“compatible”or“conflicting”,“inclusive”or“exclusive”ofothergeographical

identities(CitrinandSides,2004;HoogheandMarks,2005,2008;Risse,2005).While

nationalidentitythatisinclusiveofothertypesofgeographicalandpoliticalidentitiesis

positivelycorrelatedwithEuropeanidentity,theoppositeistrueforexclusivenational

identity.IndividualsexclusivelyattachedtotheirnationfearalossofidentityintheEU’s

multi‐levelgovernancesystem.Thus,whetherornotnationalidentityisanobstaclefor

19

theformationofEuropeanidentitydependsonhowindividualsfillanddefineeach

concept.

UnderwhatconditionsdoEuropeancitizensperceivetheirnationalidentityas

compatiblewithEuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegration?Basedon

findingsthattheEuropeanpublicisfairlyignorantaboutissuesofEuropeanUnion

politicsandEuropeanintegration,Anderson(1998)argues,“attitudesaboutthe

advantagesanddisadvantagesofintegrationarelikelytoreflectother,morefirmlyheld

andextensivelydeveloped,politicalbeliefsthataretheresultofcitizens’experiences

withdomesticpoliticalreality”(Anderson,1998,573).Inotherwords,citizensusethe

contextofdomesticpoliticstoformopinionsabouttheEuropeanintegrationprocess.If

thenationalcontextandthevaluespromotedwithinitcorrespondtoEuropeanvalues,

citizensshouldnotfeelthreatenedbytheEuropeanintegrationprocess.Infact,ifthese

valuesarecongruent,theEuropeanintegrationwillstrengthenthesevalues.Inthis

constellation,nationalandEuropeanidentityarecompatibleinsteadofconflicting.

Whatarethesevalues?Inordertoattaindemocraticlegitimacyandovercome

thediscussionabouttheEU’sdemocraticdeficitaEuropeandemoswithacollective

identityneedstotakeshape.AnecessaryconditionforsuchaEuropeancommunityis

thesharedsupportfordemocraticrulesandprinciples(FuchsandKlingemann,2002).

Europeaninstitutionsandelitesaimtoconstructsuchapost‐nationalcivicidentityby

promotingliberalvaluessuchasdemocracy,humanrights,commitmenttotheruleof

law,marketeconomy,andculturaldiversity(Habermas,1994;Laffan,2004;Katzenstein

andCheckel,2009).ThesevalueshavebecomeconstitutivefortheEUsincecountries

20

cannotbecomememberswithoutsubscribingtothem.Byembeddingthesevaluesin

thepracticeofpolitics,theEUactsasaculturalforceinpromotingcivicstatehoodin

Europe.Citizenswhovalueprincipleslikedemocracyandculturaldiversityshould

thereforebemorelikelytoidentifywiththeEUthanothers.

AccordingtoRonaldInglehart(1977),anothersetofpoliticalvalues,namely

postmaterialvalueorientations,islikelytoincreasesupportforEuropeanintegration.

Individualswithmaterialistpriorities,whoareprimarilyconcernedwitheconomicand

physicalsecurity,mightperceiveEuropeanintegrationasathreattotheirpersonaland

theircountry’swellbeing.Postmaterialists,ontheotherhand,whogiveprioritytoself‐

expression,personalfreedom,humanism,andtheenvironment,tendtobemore

cosmopolitanandperceivethenationstateasconstrictingandtoomaterialist.

FollowingInglehart’sargument,Iexpectapositiverelationshipbetweenpostmaterial

valuesandapost‐nationalEuropeanidentity.

Macro‐leveltheories

Citizensacquirethesevaluesinthenationalcontext.Asaconsequence,the

nationalpoliticalcontexthasanimpactonanindividual’spoliticalvaluesandattitudes.

TheEUinturnshapesthisnationalcontext.Itisfoundedonasystemofvaluesand

beliefsabout“civicstatehood”,andofficialEUtreatiesstatetheimportanceofasetof

commonvalues:therespectforhumandignity,liberty,democracy,equality,theruleof

law,andhumanrights(Laffan,2004).EuropeancountrieswishingtojointheEUmust

respectthesevaluesinordertobeconsideredeligibleforadmission.However,the

21

commitmentdoesnotendatacountry’sadmissiontotheEU.Memberstatesare

expectedtorespectandpromotethesevalues,andfailuretodosomayleadtothe

suspensionofthatcountry’smembership(EuropeanConvention).Thus,theEUreflects

and,atthesametime,shapesthevaluesoftheparticipatingmembercountries.I

thereforeexpectapositiverelationshipbetweenacountry’slevelofdemocratic

developmentandthelevelofEuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegration.

Derivedfromthenationalidentityperspective,Iproposethefollowing

hypotheses.WhethernationalidentityisanobstacleorcatalystofEuropeanidentity

dependsonthedefinitionofbothconcepts.Iexpectapositiverelationshipbetween

nationalidentitythatisinclusiveofothergeographicalidentitiesandsupportfor

Europeanintegration(H4).Ontheindividuallevel,politicalattitudesandvaluesshapea

person’ssenseofEuropeanidentity.Supportfordemocraticprinciples,culturaldiversity,

andpostmaterialvaluesleadtohigherlevelsofEuropeanidentity(H5).Onthemacro‐

level,thelevelofEuropeanidentityincreaseswithacountry’slevelofdemocratic

development(H6).

Followingpreviousstudiesthattreatutilitarianandnationalidentity

explanationsascompatibleratherthancompetingtheories,Iexpecttofindthatboth

utilitarianreasoningandnationalidentityareimportantdeterminantsofEuropean

identityandpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration(Anderson,1998;Hoogheand

Marks,2005;deVriesandvanKeesbergen,2007).

22

METHODOLOGYANDDATA

Researchdesign

Theprevioussectionshaveestablishedthecontextandtheoreticalbackground

forthefollowingempiricalanalysisofEuropeanidentityandpoliticalsupportfora

Europeancommunity.Whilemyanalysisbuildsonpreviousworks,itdiffersfromearlier

studiesintwoways.

First,mosttheoreticalandempiricalworksonEuropeanidentityhave

concentratedontheEU’ssixfoundingmembersortheEUfifteen—thefifteenWestern

EuropeancountriesthatformedtheEuropeanUnionfrom1995to2004.However,

todaytheEUisnotwhatitusedtobe.RecentenlargementshavechangedtheEUas

wellasitspoliticalenvironment.Theseprocesseshavealteredtheobjectofanalysis,

andIbelieveitisimportanttoacknowledgethisinourresearch.Forthatreason,Igo

beyondtheEUfifteenandincludenewmembersaswellasfuturemembersandnon‐

membersinmyanalysisofEuropeanidentity.

Second,previousresearchhasexaminedEuropeanidentityonthebasisof

people’sattachmentto“Europe”—nottheEU.Asarguedearlierinthepaper,European

identityhasaculturalandacivicorpoliticalcomponent.InordertostudyEuropean

identityasanexpressionofsupportforaEuropeancommunity,oneneedstodistinguish

betweenattachmenttoEuropeandasenseofbelongingtotheEU.Feelinglikeapartof

theEUisanexpressionofcivicidentity,whileattachmenttoEuroperepresentsa

23

culturalidentity.Intheempiricalanalysis,Iexaminethecivicorpoliticalcomponentof

Europeanidentity.

Evenwhenfocusingexclusivelyonitspoliticalcomponent,Europeanidentity

remainsacomplexissue.Duetoitscomplexity,Iexpectanumberoffactorstohavean

effectonitsformation.Amultipleregressionmodelthereforeappearssuitableto

systematicallytestthehypotheseslaidoutintheprevioussectionsandsingleout

factorsandtheireffectsonEuropeanidentity.ThesurveydataIusefortheanalysisare

measuredattwolevels:thecountrylevelandtheindividuallevel,whichisembeddedin

thecountrylevel.Amulti‐levelmodelaccountsforthishierarchicalstructureofthedata

anddetermineshowbothlayersinteractandimpactthedependentvariable.Thistype

ofmodelthusallowsmetoanalyzemicroandmacro‐levelfactorsinonemodelandgain

comprehensiveunderstandingofwhichfactorsshapeEuropeanidentityonthecountry

andindividuallevel(RaudenbushandBryk,2002;SteenbergenandBradford,2002).i

Data

FortheempiricalanalysisIemploysurveydatafromtheWorldValuesSurvey

2005‐2006(wavefive).ThefifthwaveoftheWorldValuesSurvey(WVS)isauniquedata

setthatallowsmetoexamineEuropeanidentityasanexpressionofattachmenttothe

EU.Unlikeothersurveys,theWVSincludesaquestionthatasksrespondentswhetheror

nottheyseethemselvesaspartoftheEuropeanUnion.Othersurveysaskmore

generallyifrespondentsfeelanattachmenttoEurope.iiThus,formyresearchpurpose,

thequestionwordingintheWVSpresentsanadvantagetoothersurveys.

24

Moreover,itisoneofthefirstsurveysthatincludedataconcerningEuropean

identityfortheformerEasternbloccountries.Thequestion,whetherornotpeoplefeel

likecitizensoftheEU,hasbeenaskedinthreegroupsofcountries:(1)currentEU

memberstates,(2)candidatecountries(futuremembers),and(3)otherEuropean

countries(non‐members).Thisallowsmetosystematicallycompareamongmember

states(new/Eastvs.old/West)aswellasbetweencurrentEUmembers,future

membersandnon‐members.

OnelimitationofthedatasetistheincompletenumberofEuropeancountries

thatarecovered.Ofthe25EUmemberstatesonlyeighthaveansweredthequestion

aboutEuropeanidentity.Inaddition,BulgariaandRomania,whichwerefuture

membersatthetimeoftheinterviews,andsevennon‐membersansweredtheentire

survey.Asaresult,myanalysisislimitedto17countries—eightcurrentandtwofuture

membersoftheEuropeanUnionandsevennon‐members(seeTable1).

Table1:Countriesincludedintheanalysis

CurrentEUmembercountries(members)

Candidatecountries(futuremembers)

OtherEuropeancountries(non‐members)

Cyprus Bulgaria AndorraFinland Romania GeorgiaGermany MoldovaItaly NorwayPoland SerbiaSlovenia SwitzerlandSpain UkraineSweden

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,V2.

25

Variablesandmeasures

MydependentvariableisEuropeanidentity.Thequestioninthe2005‐2006WVS

thattapsintoasenseofEuropeanidentityis:“Peoplehavedifferentviewsabout

themselvesandhowtheyrelatetotheworld.Wouldyoutellmehowstronglyyouagree

ordisagreewitheachofthefollowingstatementsabouthowyouseeyourself?Isee

myselfaspartoftheEuropeanUnion.”Possibleanswercategoriesrangefrom“Strongly

disagree”to“Stronglyagree”andwerecodedasfollowstoformadiscretenumerical

variablewithatheoreticalmeanof0:“Stronglydisagree”(‐2),“Disagree”(‐1),“Agree”

(1),and“Stronglyagree”(2).

Inthebivariateandmultivariateanalyses,Itesttheeffectsof11independent

variables(seeTable2).Theyfallintotwocategories:economicorutilitarianandpolitical

ornationalidentityfactors.Bothcanbefoundontheindividualandthecountrylevel.

Economicfactorsareprimarilyconcernedwithaperson’ssocio‐economicsituation.On

theindividuallevel,thisappliestoincomeandhumancapital(educationand

profession);arelevantmacro‐levelfactorisacountry’slevelofeconomicdevelopment.

Otherutilitarianfactorsontheindividuallevelincludeaperson’sattitudetowards

marketeconomyandwelfarestate.

Politicalfactorsattheindividuallevelencompassaperson’sattachmenttoher

country(nationalidentity),aswellasattitudestowardsdemocracy,culturaldiversity,

andpostmaterialism.Onthecountrylevel,thelevelofdemocraticdevelopmentis

expectedtoshapeEuropeanidentityandpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration.

26

Table2:Microandmacro‐levelpredictorsofEuropeanidentity

Individual‐levelfactors Country‐levelfactorsEconomicfactors Education(H1) Economicdevelopment(H3) Income(H1) Profession(H1) MarketEconomy(H2) WelfareState(H2) Politicalfactors NationalIdentity(H4) Democraticdevelopment(H6) Democracy(H5) Multiculturalism(H5) Postmaterialism(H5)

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.Note:ForadetailedlistofvariablesandmeasuresseeAppendix.

27

RESULTSANDDISCUSSION

Inthefollowingsections,Ipresentanddiscusstheresultsoftheempirical

analysis.IbeginbymeasuringthelevelofEuropeanidentity.Ifirstdescribeifandto

whatextentEuropeansseethemselvesaspartoftheEUandpointoutinterestingcross‐

nationaldifferences.Secondly,IillustratetherelationshipbetweenEuropeanidentity

andtwomacro‐levelfactors:economicandpoliticaldevelopment.Finally,Ipresentthe

findingsaboutthecharacteristicsofEuropeanidentitybasedontheresultsofa

multiple,multi‐levelmodelofEuropeanidentity.

EuropeansidentifywiththeEU

PreviousresearchhasshownthatEuropeans—atleastcitizensoftheEU

fifteen—feelattachedtoEurope(CitrinandSides,2004;HoogheandMarks,2004,2005;

Fligstein,2008).Thenagain,identifyingwithEuropeisnotthesameasfeelingasenseof

belongingtotheEU.Themoreimportantquestionforthepurposeofthispaperis:do

EuropeansidentifywiththeEuropeanUnion?Intheinterviewsforthe2005‐2006World

ValuesSurvey(WVS)respondentswereaskedtoreacttothefollowingstatement:“Isee

myselfaspartoftheEuropeanUnion.”Twothirds(65.5percent)oftherespondentsin

thesampleagreed(44.6percent)orstronglyagreed(20.9percent)withthestatement.

OnlyaboutonethirdstatedtheydonotseethemselvesaspartoftheEU(24.3percent

disagreedand10.2percentstronglydisagreed)(seeFigure1foragraphicalillustration).

28

Figure1:BarplotofEuropeanidentity

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,V213C.

ThepercentageofpeoplewhoidentifywiththeEUroughlycorrespondstothe

shareofcurrentandfutureEUmemberstatesinthesample(10outof17).Citizensof

thesecountriesare—orsoonwillbe—EUcitizensandthuspartoftheUnion.However,

theyarenottheonlyonesidentifyingwiththeEU.Despitetheircountry’sofficialstatus,

citizensofnon‐membercountriesalsoexpressasenseofbelongingtotheEU.Infact,in

someofthenon‐membercountries,theshareofcitizenswhofeellikepartoftheEUis

higherthanincurrentorfuturemembercountries.

Table3presentstheshareofpeopleineachcountrywhoseethemselvesaspart

oftheEU.ThecountriesaregroupedaccordingtotheirstatusofEUmembership.On

average,theshareofcitizenswhoidentifywiththeEUishighestincurrentEUmember

countries(68.5percent).However,theshareofcitizensinnon‐membercountrieswho

29

identifywiththeEUispracticallyasbig(68.1percent).Incontrast,thepercentageofEU

identifiersinthetwocandidatecountriesissignificantlylower(46.3percent).

Table3:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinEuropeanidentity

EUmembercountries Candidatecountries OtherEuropeancountries % Strength % Strength % Strength

Cyprus 71.2 .64 Bulgaria 50.0 ‐.12 Andorra 77.4 .64Finland 74.6 .69 Romania 47.1 ‐.12 Georgia 51.2 .06Germany 41.0 ‐.31 Moldova 64.1 .43Italy 67.2 .49 Norway 93.9 1.43Poland 82.2 .85 Serbia 73.4 .70Slovenia 78.2 .70 Switzerland 72.6 .60Spain 85.8 .86 Ukraine 46.2 ‐.11Sweden 73.4 .56 Mean 68.5 .47 Mean 46.3 ‐.12 Mean 68.1 .53

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,V213C.Note:Europeanidentityisadiscretenumericalvariablethatrunsfrom‐2to2andhasatheoreticalmeanof0.

Thecategorizationinmembers,candidatesandnon‐membersdisguisesfurther

variationbetweenthecountriesineachgroup.Lookingateachcountryseparately,Ifind

interestingcross‐nationaldifferences.InspiteofbeingafoundingmemberoftheEU,

GermanyhasthelowestpercentageofEUidentifiersoverall.Lessthanhalfofthe

population(41percent)feelliketheyarepartoftheEU.Thereisalargegapbetween

GermanyandItaly(67.2percent),theEUmembercountrywiththesecondlowest

identificationrate.Theonlyothercountriesthatdisplayidentificationrateslowerthan

50percentare:Romania(47.1percent)andUkraine(46.2percent).Inallother

countries,themajorityofthepopulationfeelslikeapartoftheEU.Interestingly,

despitethefactthatitisnotamemberstate,Norwayisthecountrywiththehighest

percentageofcitizensidentifyingwiththeEU(93.9percent).Onlyintwoother

countriesistheshareofEUidentifiersabove80percent:Spain(85.8percent)and

30

Poland(82.2percent).BotharemembersoftheEU;Spainjoinedin1986andis

consideredan“old”member,whereasPolandbecamea“new”memberin2004.

InadditiontothepercentageofpeoplewhoidentifywithEurope,Table3also

showsthestrengthofthisattachment.Althoughtheexplanatorypowerofthefiguresis

limitedduetothesmallnumberofcategories,itnonethelessshowsinteresting

differences.Withascoreof0.42,theaveragestrengthispositiveandabovethe

theoreticalmeanof0.Infourcountries—Germany,Bulgaria,RomaniaandUkraine—the

averageattachmentisnegative.Thisispartlyduetothefactthatthemajorityof

residentsinthesecountriesdonotfeelliketheyarepartoftheEU.ThecaseofBulgaria

showsthateventhoughthecountryisevenlysplitintoidentifiersandnon‐identifiers,

theattachmenttoEuropeisnegative.Incontrast,Norwayshowsthestrongest

attachmenttoEurope.Anaverageof1.43indicatesthatafairshareofthepopulation

notjustagreesbutstronglyagreestobepartoftheEU.

Theseresults,especiallythecaseofNorway,arepuzzling.Norwayisnota

memberoftheEU,yetalmosttheentireNorwegianpopulationstatestheysee

themselvesaspartoftheEU.Howcanthatbe?ItisimportanttonotethatEuropean

integrationisnotlimitedtotheEuropeanUnion.Nevertheless,becausetheEUisthe

mainorganizationassociatedwiththeEuropeanintegrationprocess,peopleoftentalk

abouttheEuropeanUnionwhentheyarereallyreferringtoEuropeanintegration.iii

AlthoughnotaEUmemberstate,NorwayisapartofthesingleEuropeanmarket

throughitsmembershipintheEuropeanEconomicArea.Inaddition,itparticipatesin

theEuropeanFreeTradeAssociationandtheSchengenArea.BasedonNorway’s

31

involvementintheseinstitutions,NorwegiancitizensexperiencetheimpactofEuropean

integration.ThishelpsexplainwhyNorwayhassuchahighrateofEuropeanidentity.

ThefactthatEuropeanintegrationdoesnotendatthebordersoftheEUmight

alsohelpexplainwhyothernonmembercountriesidentifywiththeEU.Allcountries

includedintheanalysisaremembersoftheCouncilofEurope.Inaddition,Andorraand

Switzerland—bothcountrieswithaboveaveragesharesofEUidentifiers—havespecial

relationshipswiththeEU.AndorraisamemberintheEUCustomsUnionandusesthe

Euroasitsofficialnationalcurrency.ivLikeNorway,Switzerlandisamemberofthe

singleEuropeanmarketbasedonbilateraltreatieswiththeEUandpartoftheSchengen

Area.

Macro‐levelfactors:nationaleconomicandpoliticaldevelopment

ArethereotherfactorsthatcanhelpexplainthepeculiarcaseofNorwayaswell

asothercross‐nationaldifferences?Obviously,thecategorizationofcountriesaccording

totheirmembershipstatusintheEUonlyyieldslimitedexplanatorypower.Instead,

Table3providesevidencethatcountrieswithhighereconomicanddemocratic

developmentshowhigherratesofEuropeanidentity.Duetothecollinearityofboth

factors(r=0.94)IexaminetheireffectonEuropeanidentityseparately.

Figure2graphicallyillustratestherelationshipbetweenacountry’seconomic

developmentanditslevelofEuropeanidentity.Nationaleconomicdevelopmentis

measuredinGDPpercapitacalculatedaspurchasingpowerparity(PPP)inconstant

US$.Theslopeanddirectionoftheregressionlineindicatethatthereisapositive

32

relationshipbetweeneconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity(r=0.14).Thislends

supporttothehypothesisthatthelevelofEuropeanidentityincreaseswithacountry’s

levelofeconomicdevelopment(H3).

Figure2:RelationshipbetweennationaleconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,UNDPHumanDevelopmentReport.Note:GDPpercapita/PPPismeasuredinconstantUSD/1000.Thevariableislogged.

Atfirstglance,economicdevelopmentappearstodisguisestatusandlengthof

EUmembership.AllcurrentEUmemberstatesareontherightsideofthegraph;they

allhavereachedcomparativelyhighlevelsofeconomicdevelopment.However,the

countrieswiththehighestGDPpercapitaareNorway(36,6000)andSwitzerland

(30,010)—twonon‐members.Whiletheireconomicdevelopmentisfairlysimilar,there

33

isasignificantgapbetweentheirlevelsofEuropeanidentification.Othercountrieswith

similarGDPspercapitaareFinland(26,190),Germany(27,100),Italy(26,430)and

Sweden(26,050)—allEUmemberstates.WhileFinland,Italy,SwedenandSwitzerland

fallclosetotheline,NorwayandGermanyareinterestingoutliers.Bothcountries

produceahighGDPpercapita,buttheyrankatoppositeendsoftheEuropeanidentity

spectrum.Moldova,Georgia,Ukraine,BulgariaandRomaniaaresomewhatseparate

fromtheothercountries.Nevertheless,thereisadifferencebetweenthesecountries.

WhileGeorgiafallsrightontotheline,Moldovaisclearlyabove.Althoughitisthe

economicallyleastdevelopedcountryinthesample,itshowsaveragelevelsof

Europeanidentity.Whileeconomicallymoreadvanced,Ukraine,RomaniaandBulgaria

haveidentificationratesthatarebelowaverage.

Figure3illustratestherelationshipofacountry’slevelofdemocratic

developmentinrelationtoitslevelofEuropeanidentity.Itpaintsapicturethatisvery

similartotherelationshipbetweeneconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity.A

country’sdemocraticdevelopmentanditslevelofEuropeanidentificationarepositively

related(r=0.12).Onaverage,moredemocraticcountriesshowhigherlevelsof

identificationwiththeEU.Thisaffirmsthehypothesisthatdemocraticdevelopmentand

Europeanidentityarepositivelycorrelated(H6).

34

Figure3:RelationshipbetweennationaldemocraticdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,WorldBankRuleofLawEstimate.

Again,allEUmemberstatesarelocatedontherightsideofthegraphandhave

positivescoresontheWorldBank’sRuleofLawEstimate.Thisisnottoosurprising;

beingademocracyandrespectingdemocraticvaluesisaconditionformembershipin

theEU.However,SwitzerlandandAndorraarenotmembersoftheEUbutscorehighon

theRuleofLawindex.Whatismore,theyidentifywiththeEUonasimilarlevelas

Sweden,Finland,andCyprus.Again,NorwayandGermanyareoutliers.Alongwith

Georgia,Ukraine,RomaniaandBulgaria,Germanyfallsbelowtheline.Inrelationto

theirdemocraticdevelopment,allfivecountriesshowcomparativelylowlevelsof

Europeanidentity.

35

Amulti‐levelmodelofEuropeanidentity

Theprevioussectionshowsthat,onthemacro‐level,economicanddemocratic

developmentcanexplainpartofthecross‐nationalvariance.Still,howcanweexplain

whysomepeoplewithinacountryidentifywiththeEUwhileothersdonot?Inorderto

evaluatetheireffectsonEuropeanidentity,Iincorporatethemacroandmicro‐level

predictorsdescribedearlierintoasinglemultilevelanalysis(hierarchicallinearmodel).I

aminterestedinexaminingvariationattheindividualandthecountrylevel,anda

multilevelmodelprovidesatestforthegeneralizabilityofindividual‐levelfindings

acrossdifferentnationalcontexts.Italsoaccountsforthehierarchicalstructureofthe

data.TheWVSsampleincludesresponsesfromindividualsin17differentcountries;

individualresponsesthataresampledfromthesamecontextshouldnotbetreatedas

independentobservations.

Inthefirststep,Iestimateabaselinemodelthatincludesonlytheindividual‐

levelpredictors(Model1).Thefirstfourvariablesmeasureeconomicfactorslike

attitudestowardsthewelfarestateandmarketeconomyaswellasfactorsindicativeof

aperson’slevelofsocio‐economicstatusandhumancapital.Thesecondsetof

predictorsincludespoliticalfactorsthatcaptureaperson’sattachmenttohernationas

wellaspoliticalattitudeandvalues.Inthenextsteps,Iaddthecountrylevelvariables.

Becauseofthehighcollinearitybetweeneconomicanddemocraticdevelopment,Irun

twoseparatemodelstoevaluatetheeffectofeconomicdevelopment(Model2)and

democraticdevelopment(Model3)individually.

36

Asexplainedinthetheoreticalpart,Iexpectsomeindividualleveleffects—

namelyeducation,profession,andincome—tovarybetweencountries.Iexpect

educationandincometobepositivelycorrelatedwithEuropeanidentityin“old”EU

memberstatesandothercountrieswithhighlevelsofeconomicdevelopment.The

effectmightbeweakerorevenreversedin“new”andnon‐memberstatesand

countrieswithlowerGDPs.Theeffectofone’sprofessionmightalsovarybetween

countries.Whilemanagersandprofessionalsareexpectedtoexpressrelativelyhigher

levelsofEuropeanidentityinrichcountries,thesameappliestoworkersinpoor

countries.v

Inordertobetterevaluatethecross‐nationalvarianceofindividual‐level

predictors,Irunbivariatecorrelationanalyses(Pearson’sr)separatelyforeachofthe17

countriesinthesampleinadditiontothemultilevelanalysis.Foreverycountry,Table5

showswhetherornotthereisarelationshipbetweenEuropeanidentityandthe

individuallevelvariablesaswellasthedirectionoftheeffect.vi

Economicfactors

Utilitariantheoriesproposethatpeoplewithhigherlevelsofhumancapitalare

theoneswhobenefiteconomicallyfromEuropeanintegration.Europeanidentityis

expectedtoincreasewiththelevelofeducationandincome.Theresultspresentedin

Table4lendsupporttothisclaim.Inallthreemodels,educationandincomeare

positivelyrelatedtoEuropeanidentity.Althoughtherelationshipdoesnotturnout

statisticallysignificantineachcountrytheeffectisalwayspositive.vii

37

Table4:Amultiple,multi‐levellinearregressionmodelofEuropeanidentity

Model1 Model2 Model3Intercept ‐1.133**(.229) ‐2.235**(.262) ‐1.217**(.216)Mirco‐LevelEffects Education 0.035**(.012) 0.038**(.012) 0.034**(.011)Income 0.044**(.016) 0.046**(.017) 0.044**(.016)MarketEconomy 0.020**(.004) 0.019**(.004) 0.021**(.004)WelfareState ‐0.013*(.006) ‐0.014*(.007) ‐0.013*(.006)NationalID 0.330**(.020) 0.344**(.020) 0.330**(.020)Democracy 0.034**(.009) 0.035**(.007) 0.034**(.009)Multiculturalism 0.044**(0.11) 0.045**(.013) 0.044**(.011)Postmaterialism 0.031.(.017) 0.033.(.019) 0.031.(.017)Macro‐LevelEffects Economicdevelopment 0.407**(.058) Democraticdevelopment 0.117*(.050)VarianceComponents Education 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**Income 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**MarketEconomy 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**WelfareState 0.000** 0.001** 0.000**NationalID 0.004** 0.003** 0.004**Democracy 0.001** 0.000** 0.001**Multiculturalism 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**Postmaterialism 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**AIC 44550 39999 44555(N) 14106/17 12610/15 14106/17

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.Note:**indicatessignificanceat.01level,*indicatessignificanceat.05level,and.indicatesborderlinesignificanceat0.1level.ReportedNsareforthemicro‐andmacro‐levelsrespectively.MultilevelmodelinZeligdevelopedbyBaileyandAlimadhi(2007).

Athirdindicatorofhumancapitalisaperson’sprofession.viiiTheresultsofthe

bivariatecorrelationanalysisshowthat,overall,workersareslightlylesslikelyto

identifywiththeEUthanpeoplewithotherprofessions,whiletheoppositeistruefor

managersandprofessionals.Theresults,however,donotapplyineverycountryinthe

sample.Professionmattersonlyinabouthalfofthecountries.Interestinglythough,

beingaworkerispositivelyrelatedtoEuropeanidentityinCyprus,andSlovenia,while

theoppositeistrueforGermany,Italy,Sweden,GeorgiaandMoldova.Beingamanager

38

orprofessionalonlyappliestonineoutof17countries.Theeffectispositiveforall

countries.

Althoughpreviousresearchhasfocusedonsocio‐economicfactorsasthemain

predictorsforeconomicmotives,Ialsotestifandtowhatextentattitudestowards

marketeconomyandwelfarestatematter.Thereisalinkbetweenone’ssocio‐

economicstatusandherattitudestowardsintegrationpolicies.Peoplewithhighlevels

ofhumancapitalareexpectedtosupportamarketeconomy,whilepeoplewithlower

educationandincomearelikelytosupportthewelfarestate.Thisrelationship,

however,isonlymoderate.ixTheresultsinTable4showthatpeoplewhobelieveina

liberalmarketaremorelikelytoidentifywiththeEU.Supportforamarketeconomyhas

apositiveeffectonEuropeanidentityinallcurrentEUmemberstatesexceptone

(Spain).

Thenextpredictor,welfarestate,yieldsinterestingresults.AlthoughtheEU

activelypromotesthewelfarestate,itseffectonEuropeanidentityisnegative.It

appearsthatEuropeansdonotrecognizetheEUandthewelfarestateascongruent

concepts.Instead,citizensseeEuropeanintegrationasathreattothenationalwelfare

stateandturntotheirnationalgovernmentstoprotectit(EichenbergandDalton,

2007).Table4showsthatsupportersofthewelfarestatearelesslikelytoidentifywith

theEU.Theeffect,however,issmallandappliesmoretocurrentandfuturemember

countriesthannon‐EUcountries.

39

Table5:Effectsofmicro‐levelpredictorsbycountry(bivariatecorrelations) Ed

ucation

Income

Worker

Man

ager

Market

Econ

omy

Welfare

State

Nationa

liden

tity

Dem

ocracy

Multi‐

culturalism

Postma‐

terialism

Cyprus + + + + + Finland + + + + + + Germany + + ‐ + + ‐ + + + Italy + + ‐ + + ‐ + + + +Poland + + + + ‐ + + + Slovenia + ‐ + + Spain + + NA NA + + + Sweden + + ‐ + + ‐ + + + ‐Bulgaria + + + ‐ + + + +Romania + + + ‐ + + + +Andorra + + + Georgia + + ‐ ‐ + + +Moldova + ‐ + + + +Norway + + ‐ + +Serbia + + + + + + + Switzerland NA NA + + + +Ukraine + + + + ‐ + + +

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.Note:Factorsincludedshowatleastborderlinesignificance(0.1).

InModel2,Iaddthefirstmacro‐levelfactor(levelofeconomicdevelopment)to

theindividual‐levelfactors.TheresultsinTable4showthattheeconomiccontexthasa

substantialimpactonEuropeanidentity.Thereisapositiverelationshipbetween

nationaleconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity:higherlevelsofeconomic

developmentleadtohigherlevelsofEuropeanidentity.Thisconfirmsthetrend

detectedfromthebivariateanalysisaspresentedgraphicallyintheprevioussection

(Figure2)andprovidesfurtherevidenceforthethirdhypothesis(H3).

Insummary,economicfactorsbothatthemacroandmicro‐levelshape

Europeanidentity.Ontheindividuallevel,aperson’ssocio‐economicstatusandlevelof

humancapitalmatter:higherincomeandhighereducationfacilitateEuropeanidentity.

40

Thesefindingsprovideempiricalevidenceformyfirsthypothesis(H1).Inaddition,

attitudestowardsthewelfarestateandmarketeconomyhaveaneffectonEuropean

identity.Asexpected,supportofthewelfarestateleadstolowerlevelsofEuropean

identity.Proponentsofamarketeconomy,ontheotherhand,aremorelikelytoidentify

withtheEU(H2).Onthecountrylevel,ahighlydevelopednationaleconomyisa

predictorforEuropeanidentity(H3).Whiletheseresultsgenerallyconfirmthefirstsetof

hypothesesandtheutilitariantheoriesitisbasedon,theyalsoattestcross‐national

differences.ThefitisbetterforcurrentandfutureEUmemberstates.Noneofthe

economicfactorsisrelevantinSwitzerland,andincomeistheonlyfactorthatturnsout

statisticallysignificantforNorway.

Politicalfactors

Oftheindividual‐levelvariablesincludedinthemodels,nationalidentityisthe

strongestpredictorforEuropeanidentity(seeTable4).Inaccordancewithprevious

research,thepositiveeffectconfirmsthatEuropeanandnationalidentityare

compatible.Infact,peoplewithastrongattachmenttotheirnationaremorelikelythan

otherstoidentifywiththeEU.Thisrelationshipispositiveeverywhere,butthestrength

variesamongcountries.Onaverage,thecorrelationisstrongerformembercountries

(r=0.29)thanforcandidate(r=0.26)andnon‐membercountries(r=0.16).x

Aspointedoutearlier,moreimportantthanthestrengthisthedefinitionof

nationalidentityanditsrelationshiptoothergeographicalandpoliticalidentities.The

overalleffectofnationalidentityonEuropeanidentityispositive,becausemostpeople

41

haveaninclusiveunderstandingoftheirnationalattachment;only3.5percentofall

respondentsinthesamplereportanexclusivenationalidentity.Anexclusive

understandingofnationalidentityisanindicatorofEuroscepticismandnegatively

correlatedwithEuropeanidentity.Figure4illustratesthedifferenteffectsofinclusive

andexclusivenationalidentityonEuropeanidentitygraphically.xiThenegative

correlationcoefficient(r=‐0.16)indicatesthatanexclusivenationalidentityleadsto

lowerlevelsofEuropeanidentity.Anincreaseininclusivenationalidentity,ontheother

hand,leadstoanincreaseinEuropeanidentity—orviceversa(r=0.24).

Figure4:RelationshipbetweenexclusiveandinclusivenationalidentityandEuropeanidentity

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,V212andV213C.

42

TheEUactivelypromotesvalueslikedemocracyandculturaldiversity.Iexpecta

EuropeanidentitythatcanbeinterpretedaspoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity

toreflectthesevalues.Thus,mythirdhypothesissuggeststhatsupportforbothshould

bepositivelyrelatedtoEuropeanidentity.Table4confirmsthatthereisinfacta

positiverelationship.Supportfordemocraticprinciplesleadstohigherlevelsof

Europeanidentity.Likewise,peoplewhobelievethatculturalandethnicdiversity

enrichestheirlivesaremorelikelytoidentifywiththeEUthanothers.Ialsoexpect

postmaterialvaluestoleadtohigherlevelsofEuropeanidentity.Thispredictor,

however,isnotstatisticallysignificant.

Model3teststheeffectofdemocraticdevelopmentinadditiontotheindividual

factors.Itshowsthatthedomesticpoliticalcontexthasaconsiderableimpacton

Europeanidentity.TherelationshipbetweendemocraticdevelopmentandEuropean

identityispositive.Overall,countriesthatscorehighontheRuleofLawindexshow

higherlevelsofEuropeanidentitythancountrieswithlowerscores.Thisfinding

providesfurtherempiricalevidenceforthelasthypothesis(H6).

Iconcludefromthemultilevelanalysisthatpoliticalfactorsontheindividualand

thecountrylevelshapeEuropeanidentity.Ontheindividuallevel,nationalidentityhas

astrongpositiveeffectonEuropeanidentity.Whilethisfindinginitselfdoesnotprovide

sufficientevidencetosupportmyfourthhypothesisabouttherelationshipbetween

nationalandEuropeanidentity,additionalanalysisshowsthataninclusive

understandingofnationalidentityfacilitatestheformationofEuropeanidentity,while

exclusivenationalidentityisanobstacle(H4).Twooutofthreepredictorsofpolitical

43

attitudes—democracy,andculturaldiversity—havestatisticallysignificantpositive

effectsonEuropeanidentity.Postmaterialismistheonlyfactorthatshowsonly

borderlinesignificance.Thesefindingspresentempiricalevidenceformyhypothesis

thatpoliticalattitudesandvaluesmatterfortheformationofEuropeanidentity.

CitizenswhosupportthevaluespromotedbytheEuropeanUnionanditsinstitutions

aremorelikelytofeellikeapartoftheEUthanothers(H5).Onthecountry‐level,these

resultsconfirmthatdemocraticdevelopmentispositivelyrelatedtoEuropeanidentity

(H6).

44

CONCLUSION:WHOIDENTIFIESWITHEUROPE?

AtthebeginningofthispaperIformulatedthreeresearchquestionsthatIset

outtoanswer.First,afterfiftyyearsofEuropeanintegration,isaEuropeanidentity

formingamongthecitizensofEuropethatcanbeinterpretedaspublicsupportfor

Europeanintegration?Fortheanalysis,IhavefocusedonEuropeanidentityasacivicor

politicalidentity.BasedonworksbyDavidEaston(1965)andPippaNorris(1999)Iuse

EuropeanidentityasameasureofdiffusepoliticalsupportforEuropeanintegration.My

empiricalresultsshowthatthemajorityofEuropeancitizensfeelasenseofbelonging

totheEU.Interestingly,thisappliestocitizensofEUmemberstatesaswellasto

residentsofcandidatecountriesandnon‐members.Inregardstothefirstquestion,I

conclude,withtwothirdsoftheEuropeanpopulationidentifyingwiththeEU,thereisa

solidbaseofdiffusesupportforaEuropeancommunity.

However,asEaston(1965)pointsout,anindividualcanexpresssupport

independentlyforthepoliticalcommunity,thepoliticalregime,andthepolitical

authorities.Thus,wehavetobecarefulwithgeneralizationsandpredictions.Whilethe

availabledatadoesnotallowmetosystematicallytesttherelationshipbetween

supportforthepoliticalcommunity,theregimeandtheauthorities,itenablesmeto

testtherelationshipbetweenEuropeanidentityandconfidenceintheEU.xiiBothfactors

shouldbepositivelycorrelatedifEuropeanidentitywasanindicatorofsupportnotonly

foraEuropeancommunitybuttheEUandtheintegrationprocessingeneral.

45

Theresultsofthebivariateanalysisshowthatthereisinfactapositive

relationshipbetweenEuropeanidentityandconfidenceintheEU.Thus,anincreasein

EuropeanidentityleadstoanincreaseinconfidenceintheEU—orviceversa.The

relationshipismoderate(r=0.24)anddiffersinstrengthbetweenmembercountries

(r=0.32),candidatecountries(r=0.25)andnon‐members(r=0.19).xiiiIhavepreviously

arguedthatEuropeanidentityshouldnotpersebemistakenforsupportfortheEU.This

fairlyweakrelationshipunderpinsmyargument.

Second,ifEuropeansfeelanattachmenttotheEU,whatarethecharacteristics

ofthisEuropeanidentityandhowcanweexplaininter‐andintra‐countrydifferences?

Theresultsofthemultilevelanalysisconfirmthateconomicandpoliticalfactorsonthe

macroandmicro‐leveldeterminewhetherornotindividualsdevelopasenseof

Europeanidentity.NationallevelsofEuropeanidentityincreasewithacountry’s

economicanddemocraticdevelopment.EconomicfactorsthatfacilitateEuropean

identityontheindividuallevelarehigherincome,highereducationandsupportfora

marketeconomy.PoliticalfactorsthatarepositivelycorrelatedwithEuropeanidentity

aredemocracyandculturaldiversity.WithregardtoEuropeanidentityvis‐à‐visnational

identity,theresultsverifythatformostpeople,nationalandEuropeanidentityare

compatible.Thus,thiscivicorpoliticalEuropeanidentityreflectsthevaluespromoted

bytheEuropeanUnionanditsinstitutions.

Third,aretheresystematicdifferencesinthestrengthandnatureofEuropean

identitybetweenEUcitizensandresidentsofnon‐EUcountries?Thestrengthof

attachmenttotheEUdoesnotdiffersystematicallybetweenEUcitizensandresidents

46

ofothernon‐EUcountries.Nevertheless,therearesomeinterestingcross‐national

differences.Althoughmyresultsconfirmtheimportanceofbotheconomicandpolitical

factors,economicfactorsaremorerelevantinEUmemberstatesandcandidate

countriesthaninnon‐membercountries.InNorwayandSwitzerlandeconomicmotives

arepracticallyirrelevant.Forpoliticalfactorsthedifferencesarelessclear‐cut.

WhatdotheseresultstellusabouttheEUanditsfuture?Europeansdoidentify

withtheEUandexpressasenseofbelongingtoaEuropeancommunity.More

importantly,notonlypeoplelivinginEUmemberstatesfeelthatway,alsopeople

outsideoftheEUseethemselvesaspartoftheEU.ThatmeansEuropeanintegration

affectsEuropeasawhole,notjustitsmembers.Putdifferently,Europeanintegration

hasspreadbeyondthebordersoftheEU.Theempiricalresultsderivedfromthe

multilevelanalysisareareflectionofthecomplicatedstructureofEuropeanintegration

andsupporttheclaimthatatleastonthemacro‐level,theidentity‐buildingmeasuresof

theEUhavebeensuccessful,asEurope“increasinglydenotesthepoliticalandsocial

spaceoccupiedbytheEU”(Risse,2004,255;Laffan,2004).

Furthermore,thissenseofEuropeanidentityisnotlimitedtoelites;thepublic

alsoidentifieswiththeEUasitmoreandmorenoticestheconsequencesofeconomic,

political,andsocialintegration.Asaresult,Europeancitizenshavebecomemorealert

andcriticaltowardscertainpoliciesrelatedtoEuropeanintegrationandincreasingly

expressthiscriticism.TouseHoogheandMarksformulation,publicopinionon

Europeanintegrationhasshiftedfroma“permissiveconsensus”toa“constraining

dissensus”(HoogheandMarks,2005,2008;EichenbergandDalton,2007).This,

47

however,doesnotnecessarilymeanthatEuropeancitizensarenotsupportiveof

Europeanintegration;theyjustwishtohaveasayinmattersofEuropeanUnionpolitics.

ThisdevelopmentmaybeinterpretedasanindicationthattheEUisbecomingmore

democratic.

IbelievemyanalysisbringsaboutnewandinterestinginsightsaboutEuropean

identityamongoldandnewmembers,futuremembersandnon‐members.

Nonetheless,Ileaveanumberofquestionsunanswered.Europeanidentityisacomplex

issueandIconcentrateonlyonthecivicorpoliticalcomponentofit.Yet,European

identityalsohasaculturalcomponentthatmayverywellinteractwiththecivic

component.Myanalysis,however,doesnotrevealanythingaboutthecharacteristicsof

theculturalpart.Furthermore,mymodelcanonlyexplainpartoftheinter‐andintra‐

nationalvariance.Thus,futureresearchshouldincludeadditionalpredictorstoexplain

Europeanidentity.Myanalysisisalsolimitedto17Europeancountries.Theinclusionof

additionalcountriesmightleadtobetterandmoresignificantresults.Atimeseries

analysiswouldbebetterabletodocumentchangesanddevelopmentovertime.

48

APPENDICES

AppendixA:Listofvariables

Dependentvariable

Europeanidentity:“Peoplehavedifferentviewsaboutthemselvesandhowtheyrelatetotheworld.Wouldyoutellmehowstronglyyouagreeordisagreewitheachofthefollowingstatementsabouthowyouseeyourself?”Iseemyselfaspartofthe[EuropeanUnion].Thevariablerunsfrom‐2(“Stronglydisagree”)to2(“Stronglyagree”).Source:WVS2005‐2006,V213C.

Independentvariables:Country‐levelfactors

Economicdevelopment(GDP/PPP):GDPpercapitaatpurchasingpowerparity(constantUSD).Forthecountriesincludedintheanalysis,itrunsfrom1,470forMoldovato36,600forNorway.Source:QualityofGovernmentcross‐sectiondata(version17June2009),UNDP–HumanDevelopmentReport(undp_gdp).Politicaldevelopment(Ruleoflaw):TheWorldBank’s“RuleofLaw–Estimate”includesseveralindicators,measurethesuccessofasocietyindevelopinganenvironmentinwhichfairandpredictablerulesformthebasisforeconomicandsocialinteractionsandtheextenttowhichpropertyrightsareprotected.TheWorldBank’s“ruleoflaw”indexisastandardizedcontinuousvariablewithatheoreticalmeanof0.Forthecountriesincludedintheanalysis,itrunsfrom‐1.24forGeorgiato1.94forSwitzerland.Source:QualityofGovernmentcross‐sectiondata(version17June2009),WorldBankRuleofLaw–Estimate(wbgi_rle).

Independentvariables:Individual‐levelfactors

Education:Thevariablemeasuresagewhencompletedfull‐timeeducationona6‐pointscale.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V239.Income:Measuredona10‐pointscale:1=“Lowestdecile”to10=“highestdecile”.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V263.

49

Worker:Dummyvariable:1=worker(Agriculturalworker,Unskilledmanualworker,Skilledmanualworker,Semi‐skilledmanualworker),0=otherprofession.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V242.Manager:Dummyvariable:1=managerorprofessional(Employer/managerofestablishmentwith10ormoreemployees,Employer/managerofestablishmentwithlessthan10employees,Professionalworkerlawyer,accountant,teacheretc.),0=otherprofession.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V242.Marketeconomy:Indexvariablecombiningquestionsaboutprivatizationandcompetition.20‐pointscalerangingfrom0=“Governmentownershipofbusinessandindustryshouldbeincreased/Competitionisharmful.Itbringsouttheworstinpeople”to20=“Privateownershipofbusinessandindustryshouldbeincreased/Competitionisgood.Itstimulatespeopletoworkhardanddevelopnewideas.”Source:WVS2005‐2006,V117andV119.Welfarestate:Variablemeasuringanindividual’sattitudetowardsthewelfarestate.10‐pointscalerangingfrom1=“Peopleshouldtakemoreresponsibilitytoprovideforthemselves”to10=“Thegovernmentshouldtakemoreresponsibilitytoensurethateveryoneisprovidedfor.”Source:WVS2005‐2006,V118.Nationalidentity:“Peoplehavedifferentviewsaboutthemselvesandhowtheyrelatetotheworld.Wouldyoutellmehowstronglyyouagreeordisagreewitheachofthefollowingstatementsabouthowyouseeyourself?Iseemyselfaspartofthe[country]nation.”Source:WVS2005‐2006,V212.Democracy:Variablemeasuringanindividual’sattitudetowardsdemocraticprinciples.12‐pointscalerangingfrom1=democracyisverybad/notatallimportantto12=democracyisverygood/absolutelyimportant.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V151andV162.Multiculturalism:“Withwhichofthefollowingviewsdoyouagree?”“Ethnicdiversityerodesacountry’sunity–Ethnicdiversityenricheslife”.10‐pointscale.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V221.Postmaterialism:Measurespostmaterialvalueorientationsona6‐pointscale,rangingfromMaterialist(1)toPostmaterialist(6).Source:WVS2005‐2006,Y001.

50

AppendixB:Additionaltables

Table6:Bivariatecorrelations:educationandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus 0.14** Bulgaria 0.12** Andorra ‐‐Finland 0.12** Romania 0.08** Georgia 0.07*Germany 0.14** Moldova 0.10**Italy 0.13** Norway ‐‐Poland 0.12* Serbia 0.12**Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland ‐‐Spain 0.09** Ukraine 0.11**Sweden 0.06.

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

Table7:Bivariatecorrelations:incomeandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus 0.22** Bulgaria 0.15** Andorra ‐‐Finland 0.13** Romania 0.08** Georgia 0.15**Germany 0.14** Moldova ‐‐Italy 0.17** Norway 0.08*Poland 0.07. Serbia 0.14**Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland ‐‐Spain 0.17** Ukraine 0.28**Sweden 0.09*

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

Table8:Bivariatecorrelations:profession(worker)andEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus 0.06* Bulgaria ‐‐ Andorra ‐‐Finland ‐‐ Romania ‐‐ Georgia ‐0.07*Germany ‐0.07** Moldova ‐0.10**Italy ‐0.06. Norway ‐‐Poland 0.08** Serbia ‐‐Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland ‐‐Spain ‐‐ Ukraine ‐‐Sweden ‐0.16**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

51

Table9:Bivariatecorrelations:profession(manager)andEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria ‐‐ Andorra ‐‐Finland 0.08* Romania ‐‐ Georgia ‐‐Germany 0.08** Moldova 0.09**Italy 0.12** Norway 0.09**Poland ‐‐ Serbia 0.08**Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland ‐‐Spain ‐‐ Ukraine 0.07*Sweden 0.13**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

Table10:Bivariatecorrelations:marketeconomyandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus 0.06. Bulgaria 0.10** Andorra 0.12**Finland 0.09** Romania 0.12** Georgia ‐‐Germany 0.10** Moldova ‐‐Italy 0.09** Norway ‐‐Poland 0.08* Serbia 0.21**Slovenia 0.13** Switzerland ‐‐Spain ‐‐ Ukraine 0.16**Sweden 0.22**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

Table11:Bivariatecorrelations:welfarestateandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria ‐0.08* Andorra ‐‐Finland ‐‐ Romania ‐0.09** Georgia ‐0.09**Germany ‐0.06* Moldova ‐‐Italy ‐0.10** Norway ‐0.06.Poland ‐0.14** Serbia ‐‐Slovenia ‐0.12** Switzerland ‐‐Spain ‐‐ Ukraine ‐0.16**Sweden ‐0.11**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

52

Table12:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinnationalidentity

EUmembers

% Strength Candidatecountries

% Strength OtherEuropeancountries

% Strength

Cyprus 95.7 1.51 Bulgaria 91.4 1.35 Andorra 85.2 0.91Finland 98.8 1.71 Romania 91.5 1.32 Georgia 99.5 1.80Germany 84.4 1.03 Moldova 96.6 1.45Italy 93.2 1.34 Norway 98.2 1.72Poland 98.4 1.54 Serbia 90.4 1.27Slovenia 95.9 1.35 Switzerland 89.3 1.41Spain 96.1 1.41 Ukraine 92.6 1.37Sweden 99.0 1.44 Mean 94.0 1.38 91.5 1.33 93.3 1.40

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

Table13:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinexclusivenationalidentity

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus 2.7 Bulgaria 7.6 Andorra 0.8Finland 2.0 Romania 5.4 Georgia 2.1Germany 4.4 Moldova 1.3Italy 2.8 Norway 0.4Poland 2.1 Serbia 3.4Slovenia 2.0 Switzerland 1.9Spain 2.5 Ukraine 16.6Sweden 0.7 Mean 2.6 6.2 3.6

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

Table14:Bivariatecorrelations:nationalandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus 0.13** Bulgaria 0.30** Andorra 0.22**Finland 0.18** Romania 0.23** Georgia 0.07**Germany 0.26* Moldova 0.19**Italy 0.33** Norway 0.25**Poland 0.24** Serbia 0.21**Slovenia 0.35** Switzerland 0.22**Spain 0.20** Ukraine 0.17**Sweden 0.18**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

53

Table15:Bivariatecorrelations:democracyandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria 0.11** Andorra 0.06.Finland ‐‐ Romania 0.16** Georgia 0.12**Germany 0.13** Moldova 0.23**Italy 0.22** Norway ‐‐Poland 0.14** Serbia 0.15**Slovenia 0.19** Switzerland 0.14**Spain 0.12** Ukraine 0.08*Sweden 0.09**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

Table16:Bivariatecorrelations:ethnicdiversityandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria 0.10** Andorra ‐‐Finland 0.18** Romania 0.18** Georgia ‐‐Germany 0.23** Moldova ‐‐Italy 0.21** Norway ‐‐Poland 0.10** Serbia 0.11**Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland 0.24**Spain 0.08* Ukraine ‐‐Sweden 0.15**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

Table17:Bivariatecorrelations:postmaterialismandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria 0.08* Andorra ‐‐Finland ‐‐ Romania 0.08** Georgia 0.12**Germany ‐‐ Moldova 0.09**Italy 0.11** Norway 0.06.Poland ‐‐ Serbia ‐‐Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland 0.12**Spain ‐‐ Ukraine 0.09**Sweden ‐0.11**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

54

Table18:Bivariatecorrelations:confidenceinEUandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences

EUmembers Candidatecountries

OtherEuropeancountries

Cyprus 0.23** Bulgaria 0.24** Andorra 0.27**Finland 0.34** Romania 0.25** Georgia 0.16**Germany 0.35** Moldova 0.18**Italy 0.35** Norway 0.13**Poland 0.26** Serbia 0.18**Slovenia 0.22** Switzerland 0.37**Spain 0.18** Ukraine 0.40**Sweden 0.47**

Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.

55

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NOTES

iMyanalysisisasnapshotofEuropeanidentityin2005asitislimitedtoonepointintime.Atime‐seriesanalysisincludingseveraltimepointswouldbethesuitableinstrumenttosystematicallystudyhowEuropeanidentityhaschangedovertime,thatis,sincethebeginningoftheintegrationprocess.Unfortunately,thedataforthiskindofanalysisisonlyavailablefor“old”EUmembercountries.Eurobarometersurveys,theEuropeanValuesStudyandtheWorldValuesSurveyhavejuststartedtoaskquestionsaboutEuropeanidentityinformerEasternbloccountriesandothercountriesoutsideoftheEU.Thus,atime‐seriesanalysis,whichcapturestheidentityformationprocessandchangesovertime,willbefeasibleoncethesenewdatasetsaremadeavailable.iiThemostcommonlyusedquestiontomeasureEuropeanidentityisfromEurobarometersurveys:From1982to1992thequestionasked:“Doyoueverthinkofyourselfnotonlyas(a)French/German(citizen)butalsoasEuropean(citizenofEurope)?”From1992to1999thequestionasked:“Inthenearfuturedoyouseeyourselfas…?1(Nationality)only,2(Nationality)andEuropean,3Europeanand(Nationality),4Europeanonly,5DK.”AsecondseriesofEurobarometerquestionsaskspeopleabouttheirattachmenttotheirtown,region,country,andEuropewithoutforcingthemtoprioritizeorordertheiridentities.However,theyaskaboutEuropeingeneralanddonotdistinguishbetweenEuropeandtheEU.iiiInascholarlycontextseeforexampleAnderson(1998).ivForadetailedaccountofhowtheEuroaffectsEuropeanidentityseeRisse(2003).vProfessionisnotincludedinthemulti‐levelmodelsincetheinformationismissingforrespondentsinSpainandSwitzerland.Ionlytestthisrelationshipfortheothercountriesbasedonbivariatecorrelationanalysis.viOnlyeffectswithatleastborderlinesignificance(0.1level)areshowninthetable.viiForcross‐nationalvariationofeconomicfactorsseeTable5andTables6–11intheAppendix.viiiInordertotestwhetherworkersarelesslikelytoidentifywiththeEUthanmanagersandprofessionalsIcreatedtwodummyvariables.Thevariablesarenotincludedinthemulti‐levelanalysisbecausedataforSpainandSwitzerlandaremissingfromthedataset.ixPearsoncorrelationsbetweenincomeandwelfarestate:r=‐0.19;incomeandmarketeconomy:r=0.14);educationandwelfarestate:r=‐0.11;educationandmarketeconomy:r=0.09.xForcross‐nationaldifferencesofpoliticalfactorsseeTable5andTables12–17intheAppendix.xiThecorrelationbetweennationalandEuropeanidentityissomewhatdifficultbecauseendogenous.xiiOverall,47.6percentoftherespondentsinthesamplesaytheyhave“quitealot”(40.6percent)or“agreatdeal”(7percent)ofconfidenceintheEU.38percenthave“notverymuch”confidenceand14.4percent“noneatall.”Perhapssurprisingly,onaverage,confidenceintheEU(1.4)ishigherthaninnationalgovernment(1.22)ornationalparliament(1.15).xiiiForadetailedlistandcross‐nationaldifferencesbycountryseeTable18intheAppendix.