who makes weapons procurement decisions? : a test of the subsystem model of policymaking

Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4,1996 (607-624)

Who Makes Weapons ProcurementDeci s ions?: A Test of the Subsystem Modelof Policymaking

Lauren Holland

Despite the absence of scientific stipport for a tripartitealliance in defense poticymaking, political scientists and the generalpublic continue to subscribe to a subgovernment exptanation. Thisarticle addresses the subgovernment tUtemma as it appties to the area ofweapons procurement. More precisely, it asks whether thesubgovernment model accuratety describes and adequatety exptains thedecisions to devetop and buitd major weapons systems. In answeringthis question, the criticat assumptions or propositions that comprise themodel are tested, relying upon pubtished research and original data dramfrom 19 cases of military hardware decisions. The findings do lendsome qualified support for a military subgovernment.

Students of policymaking continue to rely upon some variant of asubsystem model to explain much of policy outcomes (McCool, 1990). Thepopularity of the model is evident particularly in the defense policy area,considered a classic case of subsystem politics (Mayer, 1991). Yet there is littleempirical evidence to support this conceptual framework (Hamm, 1983). Whatsupport there is for this popular model is generally descriptive, impressionistic,and anecdotal. Still, there is the sense that defense policymaking is, at its core, areciprocal dynamic involving the military services in the Pentagon, defensecontractors, and the congressional Armed Services committees, guided by personaland organizational benefits.

This article examines the subsystem model as it applies to the area ofweapons procurement. More precisely, it asks whether the model accuratelydescribes and adequately explains the decisions to develop and build major we^x>nssystems. In an effort to answer the question, the study begins with a review of theliterature from which the critical propositions that comprise the model aregleaned.' The article then develops indices for examining the framework. Thatsection also contains a description and brief discussion of the formal roles andpowers of each set of actors in the defense subsystem dynamic. The model then isevaluated with published research and original data drawn from 19 cases ofweapons decisions. The cases from which original data were drawn are highlyrepresentative of different services, mission areas, time frames, cost, technicalcomplexity, and visibility.^ The findings challenge the empirical accuracy ofsubsystem theory in the area of weapons procurement and reveal the theoreticallimitations of the model.

The Subsystem Model: Three Propositions

Proposition 1: Political power (the ability to convertpreferences into potiticat outcomes) is concentrated in the hands of a"tripartite alliance" ofmerr\bers of special interest groups, bureaucraticagencies or departments, and legislative committees or subcommitteeswhose interests reside in the same substantive policy area.

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In essence, although different alliances operate in different substantiveareas, within each policy area political power is concentrated in the hands of apolitical elite. To be effective politically, subsystems need autonomy (Heclo1978).

The key actors in the military hardware subsystem are said to come fromthe 10 to 20 defense companies that dominate the industry (most notably,McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, General Electric, Raytheon, GeneralMotors, Lockheed, United Technologies, Martin Marietta, Boeing, andGrumman),^ the military services (Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps),and the House and Senate Armed Services Commiuees (HASC—now the HouseNational Security Committee—and SASC) and the House and SenateAppropriations Defense Subcommittees (HADS and SADS). For much of thepost-World War II period, the autonomy of each set of actors both from within andoutside their arena has been considerable. Until the 1980s, the independence of themilitary services was secured by the inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)and its Chairman (CJCS) and by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) andthe Defense Secretary effectively to counteract service control over procurementmatters. Until the mid-1970s, the chairs of the defense authorizations committeesand appropriations subcommittees dominated military hardware decisions. A set ofinformal congressional norms advocating recipnxity, specialization, and seniorityensured that the decisions reached in committee/subcommittee would be validatedby the entire chamber. Similarly, a unique set of economic conditions (such asmonopsony) have operated consistently to give a few corporations significantinfiuence over weapons procurement decisions, and have allowed them to operatewith impunity (Adams, 1982, 1988; Art, 1974). Autonomy in all three arenas isadvanced by the specialized knowledge that (supposedly) is required to makemilitary hardware decisions.

During the 1980s, however, autonomy within all three aienas declined.The successful implementation of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 by thePentagon strengthened the hands of CJCS and OSD, giving both offices thestatutory means to override the military services. The democratization of theinstitution of Congress during the late 1970s, fragmenting power and increasingaccess to committee and floor debate, widened the scope of legislative participationon defense matters and challenged many of the practices essential to a viablesubsystem arrangement. More committees and subcommittees now can claimsome jurisdiction over defense issues. Since the mid-1970s, congressionalhearings and markup sessions have been opened to the public. Most recently, thedefense industry has been the object of legislative reform efforts in the aftermath ofthe 111 Wind procurement scandal."*

Proposition 2: Policymaking is nonconflictuat because actorsin the subsystem are in agreement on basic goats.

The subsystem model assumes that there is consensus rather than conflictamong the key actors. The absence of conflict reduces competition andcompromise (that create uncertainty) and strengthens the viability of thesubsystem (McCool, 1990).

In the case of the defense policy subsystem, while a considerable degreeof consensus traditionally has characterized the relations among the three sets ofactors, confiict has been evidenced within each sector of the tripartite alliance,

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Holland: Who Makes Weapons Procurement Decisions?

providing the conditions for multiple subsystems rather than a dominant one(Hamm, 1983). Most notably, conflict has prevailed and continues to prevailbetween the military authorizations committees (HASC and SASC) and the^propriations subcommittees (HADS and SADS) (Mayer, 1991; Rohde, 1994).The military services have engaged in intraservice rivalry, but interservice"collusion," at least since the tenure of Robert McNamara in the 1960s. Thedefense industry has found it expedient to coalesce with at least one other majormanufacturer at the preliminary contract stages, and to spread subcontractsextensively at the production stage, in order to mitigate rivalry. Nonetheless, theenormous fiscal stakes involved in defense contract decisions ensure that intensecompetition will prevail (Mayer, 1991).

Proposition 3: The coalition of interests is secured andsustained through a series of exchanges and compromises that benefit aOactors in the alliance.

In essence, the cement that binds the triangle is mutual advantage. Theability of each set of actors to influence the goal attainment of other actorsprovides an incentive for mutually beneficial exchanges to occur (Hamm, 1983).The exchange usually consists of the transference of money, information,personnel (as in the "revolving door"), and assistance in the formulation andimplementation of policy decisions (Hamm, 1983; McCool, 1990; Ogul, 1976).Special interest groups seek to influence legislative behavior through campaigncontributions; credible, dependable information; lobbying; drafting bills; and soon. Legislators benefit from both the campaign funds generated and (in the case ofdefense decisions) the more immediate financial benefit to their constituents thattranslates as electoral support. Legislators reciprocate by sponsoring legislationthat advances the interests of these special groups. Since the success of any pieceof legislation is contingent upon its effective implementation, the support of thebureaucracy is imperative. Legislators seek to secure this support through theirpower of the purse, to which an agency responds with the requisite enforcement.The third leg of the exchange takes piace between federal agencies and specialinterest groups. In the defense area, procurement personnel within the militaryservices come to rely upon the technical and scientific advances in weaponstechnology that interest groups often provide, offering strong incentive andultimately a rationale for the development of new or improved military hardware.Since each service's reputation is in part a product of iu budget shares and howcentral to national security its mission is perceived to be, acquiring expensivemilitary hardware enhances organizational stature. Finally, subsystemrelationships are reinforced by a revolving door system through which retiredmembers of Congress and the military move to a lobbying career (United StatesCongress, General Accounting Office, 1989).

According to the conventional wisdom, defense policy, because it isdistributive, is ideally suited to a subsystem arrangement since there areconsiderable opportunities for tangible benefits to be generated and distributed(McCool, 1990). Of course, defense policy is distributive only if you discount thebroader national security benefits derived from workable military hardware.Narrowly construed, though, a weapons procurement decision concentrates benefits(to one subgroup in one of the four military services, a primary defense contractorand several subcontractors, and a special group of congressional constituencies),and distributes costs (since weapons are funded publicly). The incentive for

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collaboration among the actors is clear. Subsystem autonomy is furthered whenmembers control both policy formulation and policy implementation, a situationevident in military policy. The military services, together with govemmentscientists and technicians and the defense industry, are responsible both for theconception of weapons systems and their development and production. Stages Vand VI of the Milestone {vocess guarantee s^^ice input during the implementationstage, when weapons are evaluated 1 or 2 and then S to 10 years after deployment^

The Subsystem Model: Methodological and EmpiricalConcerns

To answer the question whether the subsystem model has explanatoryvalue for defense policy, the available data are analyzed for each of the threepropositions.

Proposition OneProposition one requires at a minimum that we identify a political elite

that dominates military hardware decisions. Hamm (1986, p. 324) states that adescription of the participants in each subsystem must address the question of"overrepresentation of interested legislators on substantive committees as well asthe number and type of interest groups and [bureaucratic] agencies which testifybefore these committees."

In the defense area, overrepresentation is presumed to manifest itself aslegislators whose districts benefit disproportionately from military spending, inparticular those whose constituents are employed by the defense industry.Members of the defense industry and military services are those who would providea disproportionate share of the congressional testimony.

Numerous studies have attempted to verify the overrepresentation offriendly legislators on key military hardware committees. As yet, "no studies havefound a significant correlation between membership on HASC and private defenseplant employment or contracts" (Lindsay, 1991, p. 25). Rather, the correlationthat exists is between membership and military installations. Similar findingsexist for studies of HADS (Amold, 1979; Goss, 1972; Ray, 1981; Ritt, 1976). Infurther support of the assertion that legislators seek seats on the defensecommittees/subcommittees primarily because of their jurisdiction over defensemilitary installations, rather than defense contracts, Lindsay presents interview datafor HASC, HADS, and SASC.

To test the second assertion, that "friendly" interest groups and agencieswill be overrepresented, a selected sample of the open public hearings on theannual defense authorization and appropriations bills for the years 1970-1993 wereanalyzed.* According to Hamm (1986), by identifying interest group and servicetestimony, a pattern of regular contact can be established. If contact isintermittent, then evidence of a subsystem may be absenL The available evidencecan be seen in Tables 1 through 5.

The findings are obvious. In the majority of cases, the witnessesappearing before the defense committees and subcommittees are from theDepartment of Defense (DoD). Moreover, 90% of these witnesses represent aspeciflc service. All of the witnesses are speaking in support of a weaponssystem. The appearance of witnesses from defense-related interest groups is moreintermittent, constituting no more than 9% of the total (HASC and SASC), and as

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Table 1HADS Witnesses/Procurement 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,1993

Type of WitnessDepartment of Defenseodisr Federal AgenciesMembers of CongressInterest GroupsTotal

Number176

45

101%

Percentage*90

236

Note. Does not equal 100% due to rounding.Source. Data compiled by Doug Goodman.

Table 2HASC Witnesses/Procurement 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,1993

Type of WitnessDepartment of DefenseOther Federal AgenciesMembers of CongressInterest GroupsCongressional StaffTotal

Number196

28

211

228

Percentage86

1490

Note. Does not equal 100 due to rounding.Source. Data compiled by Doug Goodman.

Table 3SADS Witnesses/Procurement 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,1993

Type of Witness Number Percentage*Department of Defense 78 89Other Federal Agencies 2 2Members of Congress 2 2Interest Groups 7 7Total 88

Note. Does not equal 100 due to rounding.Source. Dau compiled by Doug Goodman.

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Table 4SASC Witnesses/Procurement 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,1993

Type of WitnessDepartment of DefenseOther Federal AgenciesMembers of CongressInterest GroupsOutside ExpertTotal

Number147

33

161

170

Percentage*862291


Table 5Congressional Military Committee Witnesses/Procurement 1970,1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1993

Type of WitnessDepartment of DefenseOther Fedo^ AgenciesMembers of CongressInterest GroupsOtherTotal

Number597

1118542

682

Percentage882380


little as 6% (HADS). What the aggregate data disguise is a pattem of increasedinterest group participation over time. On the basis of these data, the regularappearance of bureaucratic (although not of industry) witnesses is confirmed.These fmdings do not preclude private interest influence over legislation. Specialinterest groups are involved in formal and informal lobbying activities that publichearings do not reflect. Since informal activities (such as private negotiations) aredifficult to validate even with personal interviews, many researchers continue torely upon public hearings (Hamm, 1986; King, 1994; Smith & Deering, 1990).^

Since autonomy is central to proposition one, an attempt to verify thiscondition was made as well (Davidson, 1975). For the Pentagon, it is presumedthat the military services originate and control military hardware decisions. Theassertion of service autonomy was examined in 19 randomly selected cases ofweapons procurement The data are presented in Table 6.

According to the data, a military service was the originating agency for amajor weapons system in 68% of the cases in this study. Also, the servicesprevailed in all but four cases in which the Secretary of Defense, at the request of

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Table 6Structure of

Name ofWeaponSkyboltThor-JupiterTFXPolarisMXB-1CheyenneC-5AM16TridentBradleyA-10F-16M-lAegisCruiseDIVADF/A-18Skipper

the Pentagon:

OriginatingAgencySCTviceServiceOSDSwviceServiceServiceSCTviceSCTviceSubgroup*SCTviceServiceServiceOSDSCTviceSCTviceOSDSCTviceDDR&E OSDSubgroup*

Who Rules?

Concessions?Yes/No

NoNoYesNoMinorMinorYesNoYesYesYesNoYesYesMinorNoNoYesNo

Position ofAdministration

OpposedSupportSupportSupportSupportSupport (Carter-oppose)SupportSupportSupportSupportOpposeSupportSupportSupportSupportSupportSupportSupport (Carter-oppose)Support

N o t e s . In both cases, the weapon originated outside the normal service channels for initiatingmajor weapons systems. Engineers at the China Lake Weapon Center developed the Skipper. TheM-16 was the product of the Anny Infantry Board and the defense industiy.OSD = Office of the Secretary of Defense.DDR&E = Director of Defense Research and Engineering.Source. Data compiled by the author.

the President, sought to counter a military request.* These include Kennedy'sdecision to cancel the Skybolt missile program, Carter's decision to cancelproduction of the B-1 bomber and to accelerate production of cruise missiles, andReagan's decision to cancel DIVAD. It is interesting to note that Carter's B-1bomber decision effectively was forestalled by the Air Force and reversed byReagan, and that the Air Force was compensated for the Skybolt cancellation withadditional ICBMs.

In the majority of the remaining cases in which the Defense Secretary"forced" a weapon on a service, OSD conceded ultimate decisionmaking authorityto an originally reluctant military service to secure the support necessary to propelthe weapon through the procurement process. The classic example is the TFX air-superiority fighter-bomber, conceived by McNamara as a joint program that theAir Force and Navy managed in ways that produced two separate planes. Anotherexample is the F-16 fighter plane, which the Air Force originally resisted becauseof concems that it would be competitive with its preferred twin-engine F-15. TheAir Force was allowed to redesign the plane to incorporate features consideredindispensable to perform the air-to-air combat mission. The important exception

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is the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) program, which the Air Forceeventually embraced after it realized it could lose its manned strategic bomberprogram.

Other measures of autonomy include whether concessions were made bythe services to other key actors in the Pentagon during the development andproduction stages, and whether the original design of the weapon was modifiedaccordingly. (Other actors include another unit within the service, another militaryservice, OSD, JCS, a govemment research group. Congress, the President, and/ora defense contracts.)

In only 30% of the cases in this study did the military services makeconcessions in the design of a weapon (other than minor ones) to other groupswithin the Pentagon to win support for their preferred weapon. Of particularinterest are the two cases in which a "maverick" subgroup within the service defiedtradition and originated a rival weapon, which then was modified by the"mainstream" group. In the case of the M-l6 rifle, which was conceived by theArmy Infantry Board ("maverick" group), the Army Ordinance Department("mainstream" group) was allowed to reformulate the performance specificationsand redesign the rifle so it would conform to Army standards. In sum, the dataseem to confirm the autonomy of the military services and the reluctance orinability of other actors to challenge that autonomy.

Committee/subcommittee autonomy is gauged by whether the full Houseor Senate significantly changes the recommendations of HADS, SADS, SASC,and HASC. The source of this information was the Congressional QuarterlyAlmanac, examined over a 23-year period. The data from fiscal year (FY) 1975support HASC and SASC autonomy. According to the 1974 Almanac (pp. 579-580),

passage of the [SASC and House recommendations] gave the Pentagon anearly complete victory in beating back amendments it consideredobjectionable and winning Senate supfWTt for the bill as recommended bythe Anned Services Committee. Although the bill placed some newlimitations on the Defense Department, it left intact the costly weaponshardware items that provide the foundation of the United States defensestrategy.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from House and Senate action on the FY 1980defense appropriations bill. One important caveat is that the data are aggregatedfor all major weapons systems, which disguises separate action taken on individualprograms. For example, during Senate debate on the MX missile, the basingmode issue generated considerable controversy (1979 Almanac).

The MX dominated debate during House and Senate consideration of theFY 1985 defense authorization bill as well (1984 Almanac). According toCongressional Quarterly (1984 Almanac, p. 42), "proportionately modestreductions were made in hundreds of programs, but very few of the cuts posedsubstantial challenges to defense policy." In the House, "floor action on the billwas marked by cliffhanger votes on the MX missile, resulting in new controls onthe weapon that represented a dramatic setback for Reagan [and challenged HouseCommittee action]." Senate action on its version of the defense authorization billalso was dominated by floor consideration of MX. In the end, "the Senateauthorized 21 of the 40 missiles the president had requested for fiscal 1985, but

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only on the strength of Vice President George Bush's tie-breaking vote" (1984Almanac, p. 48).

Senate and House action on the FY 1990 defense authorizations bill wasdominated by discussions of four nuclear weapons systems (the Stealth bomber,SDI, MX, and Midgetman) and two conventional programs (the Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey plane and the Navy's F-14D fighter jet). On Stealth, the House "madeonly minor changes in the position taken by [HASC supporting the plane]" (1989Almanac, p. 416). The Senate supported SASC's conditional position of supportfor Stealth. While the House endorsed HASC's positions on SDI, albeit cuttingmore funds than the committee reported, the Senate "took a sharply differentapproach to SDI, narrowly turning back a proposal [from SASC] to cut theprogram ..." (1989 Almanac, p. 421). (HASC and SASC both cut theadministration's requests.) Although the House and Senate ultimately endorsedtheir committees' positions of support for continued development of the MX andMidgetman missiles, both programs were altered significantly on the House fioor.The Senate, on the other hand, adopted SASC's recommendation to supportBush's request for funding for both missile programs. A conference committeeversion eventually restored money for Midgetman, while retaining the 50-missilecap, and reduced funding for MX. HASC voted to restore funds for the Osprey andF-14D programs cut by Defense Secretary Cheney, and the full House complied.In contrast, both SASC and the full Senate voted to uphold Cheney's proposed"procurement kills." Conferees voted to keep both systems alive. While theHouse and Senate have demonstrated increasing interest in military policy andwillingness to challenge committee recommendations, floor action has focusedalmost exclusively on a few highly visible weapons, reaffirming committeeautonomy in the majority of cases. One final important finding that emerges froman analysis of the Almanac data is that amending activity is more prominentduring the production stage than the research and development stage, suggestingonce more that if a subsystem dynamic is operating, its influence is notcomprehensive but selective. These findings complement those of Lindsay (1991)and Rohde (1994).

In some ways, establishing the autonomy of the defense industry iseasier. As a private institution, not subject to the same institutional, legal, andconstitutional constraints of the Pentagon and Congress, the defense industry couldbe presumed to be quasi-independent. On the other hand, there is little by way of apublic record to use to gauge autonomy in the private sector. One is left,therefore, with the strategy of elaborating the legal scope of the defense industry'sauthority. According to most studies (Gansler, 1989; Gregory, 1989; Hampson,1989), the defense industry is overregulated. Characteristic of this sentiment arethe findings of the president's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management(Packard Commission), which in a report issued in April 1986 stated that "all ofour analysis leads us unequivocally to the conclusion that the defense acquisitionsystem has basic problems [that are a result of] an increasingly bureaucratic andoverregulated process." Since that time. Congress has passed a number ofacquisition laws to implement the Packard Commission's recommendations.According to Hampson (1989, p. 288), one recommendation that has yet to beimplemented is the "removal of DoD barriers to contractors self-governance andimproved industrial self-govemance." While it appears that the defense industry'sautonomy is greatly circumscribed, the view from the subsystem model suggeststhat Congress and the Pentagon intentionally have regulated the industry to ensurethat it serves their interests.

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One final condition, the stability or continuity of actors, could strengthenthe case for the existence of a military procurement subsystem. There is evidenceof such stability in all three sectors. Numerous studies have documented thestaying power of the major defense firms. According to Hampson (1989), Boeing,Generai Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop,Rockwell, and United Technologies have been dominant since the 1970s. Kurth(1989, p. 1987) asserts that "the top fifteen defense contractors [have] shownremarkable continuity over the years. [This] pattem of continuity is mostpronounced with the corporations producing aircraft or jet engines," and merely isenhanced by the mergers and acquisitions of the 1990s.

While there is regular, administratively dictated turnover among militarypersonnel, there is continuity among the civilian staff who comprise as much as60%-70% of weapons acquisition employees.' Stability also is secured throughthe esprit de corps into which every member of the armed services is indoctrinatedand which serves to promote support for weapons systems deemed central to themission of a particular military service. Regardless of who is in charge of theprocurement of major weapons systems for the Air Force, for example, he or sheis likely to support the continued production of fighter planes, manned strategicbombers, and (until recently) intercontinental ballistic missiles (McNaugher,1984, pp. 145-146).

As expected, there has been considerable continuity of membership on thecongressional defense commiuees and subcommittees, a pattem challenged onlyrecently by the large tumover in the aftermath of the 1992 and 1994 congressionalelections.'" In short, there is support for the condition of continuity.

Proposition TwoCentral to proposition two is the condition of consensus and

collaboration. "A key question is whether on most legislation the environment isnonconflictual, with the major actors in the subsystem agreeing" (Hamm, 1986,p. 327). This can be calibrated, drawing upon the positions taken on weaponsdecisions by principal actors and agencies, to see whether they are in conflict. Toestablish agreement between the executive and legislative bodies, the best measureis an evaluation of the committee/subcommittee response to the Pentagon'srequest for funding.

The data for this analysis were drawn from commiuee and subcommitteeaction on the defense authorizations and appropriations bills for fiscal years 1966,1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, and 1991. Overall, there is considerable evidence ofcommittee and subcommittee interest in weapons policy and attention to thedetails of weapons procurement. One indication is the willingness of the defensecommittees to modify requests for funding. Until the 1970s, the changes that thedefense committees made to DoD's requests were minor, within the +/- 5% citedas significant. However, beginning in the 1970s, the committees began makingchanges to the Pentagon's budget requests that exceeded 5% and denying or addingfunds. During the Nixon administration, SASC rejected or cut funds for a numberof programs requested by the Pentagon, including a nationwide antiballisticmissile defense. Army tank program, new intemational fighter, and nuclear aircraftcarrier. HASC denied the Carter administration's request to fund the Army's Towmissiles. HASC also authorized the largest increase over an executive branchrequest that the committee ever voted on, $6.2 billion more than the $49.9 billionrequested by the Carter administration. Similarly, SASC authorized an additional

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$5 biUion and added 30 F/A-18 and F-15 fighters. HADS made history in 1980with its military procurement supplement to the executive budget.

During the Reagan administration, SASC denied the request for 48 newMX missile systems, cut by 10% the administration's Strategic Defense Initiativerequests, and added restrictive language to the bill conceming shipbuilding funds.HASC followed suit with similar cuts. HADS denied all funds for binarymunitions, advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM), and theSergeant York division air defense (DIVAD) antiaircraft gun during the sameperiod. SADS also cut many procurement items, but not as deeply. In 1990 and1991, HASC slashed funds for strategic programs (such as SDI, B-2, and MX) andallocated the money to conventional systems. Lindsay (1991) complements thesefindings with data on the percentage of line-item entries actually changed by thedefense committees.

Legislative/executive confiict also has increased over policy issues. Asearly as the 1960s, the defense committees refused to fund two main battle tankprograms—the MBT-70 and the XM-803—because of the excessive costs andtechnical risks involved. Such legislative action had the effect of dictating the costand technical parameters of the M-l tank, which ultimately was approved. Duringthe early 1970s, the committees cut Army research and development funds for theDIVAD until the Army agreed to incorporate already proven technologies andcomponents into the air defense gun and pressured the military to adopt aconcurrent production and testing schedule (Center for Strategic and IntemationalStudies, 1987). Infiuence over the F/A-18 (Homet) program was sought with arequest that the Navy choose a derivative of the F-16 rather than develop a newfighter plane—a request the Navy ignored. The Air Force also was compelled toabandon several basing modes for the MX missile system, altering considerablythe final design of the military program. Additional examples that originated incommittee include the requirement in the 1987 authorization act that the Bradleyundergo live operational tests, a legislative mandate that the Skipper and Triple Lprototypes undergo a "live" competition, and the provision in the FY 1984Defense Authorization Bill that the Army "not make a contract for the purpose ofestablishing a second source for the production of the engine for the M-l tank"(United States Congress, 1983, p. 30675). In sum, the evidence supports anincreasing pattem of conflict between the defense committees and subcommitteesand the Pentagon.

Conflict also is manifest in the increased efforts by the defensecommittees, beginning in the 1970s, to use report language to require thePentagon to take designated action, and, beginning in the 1980s, to challenge thetestimony of administrative witnesses, pattems that have continued into the1990s. However, despite a more interrogatory legislative approach, relationsamong committee members and witnesses continue to be predominantly friendly."

As a final consideration, the scope of jurisdiction of the key committeesand subcommittees was considered on the assumption that the narrower thejurisdiction, the more likely there is to be consensus rather than conflict amongsubsystem actors (McCool, 1990). According to Smith and Deering (1990), thejurisdiction of both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees is "narrow"when measured by the range of administrative agencies over which they haveoversight. The committees received a "medium" ranking in an examination ofjurisdictional fragmentation that combined a measure of oversight jurisdiction withformal jurisdiction (Smith & Deering, 1990). On the other hand, jurisdiction overmajor weapons systems is confined to a few subcommittees, and each weapons

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system is a separate line item. In sum, while the overall jurisdiction of theauthorization committees is medium (including base installation, personnelmatters, and procurement issues, for example), decisionmaking is circumscribednanowly by the rule of separate line items for all weapons systems and bydelegation to a subcommittee.

Proposition ThreeThe key to proposition three is demonstrating that the tripartite

relationship is characterized by reciprocity. This requires establishing that therehas been an allocation of benefits and that these benefits might not have accruedhad not the beneficiaries participated in the alliance. Most of the subsystem anddefense policy literature has focused on this exchange of benefits by examininglegislative voting behavior and linking it to parochialism, political actioncommittee contributions, and subcontract decisions. The assumption is thatlegislators will vote in favor of weapons systems that will bring benefits to theirconstituents and that are built by a defense contractor who has contributed funds totheir election/reelection campaigns. Reciprocity would mean that legislators getreelected, defense companies get their contracts, and the military gets its preferredweapons systems.

The plethora of studies determining the factors influencing legislativevoting behavior on military hardware decisions (although not on military bases)have reached the same definitive conclusion that ideology has more explanatoryvalue than parochialism, PAC funds, or subcontract decisions. In other words, theideological predispositions (conservative, moderate, liberal) of members ofCongress better predict their votes on major weapons systems than do whethertheir constituents will benefit from the employment opportunities of a defensecontract, whether they received PAC contributions from a defense contractor, orwhether a subcontractor resides in their district. For example, Mayer (1991, pp.8-9), in his study of the 50 top defense companies, found that PAC contributions"do not appear to purchase votes; careful analysis shows that nearly all defensecontractor PAC money fiows to members who are predisposed [by party, ideology,and committee/subcommittee assignment] to support defense programs—theirvoting behavior would have been the same even if contributions had stopped."Mayer suggests that if defense companies really wanted to purchase votes throughPAC funds, they would give more liberally to defense moderates or to undecidedmembers.

Mayer (1991, pp. 134, 210-211) also examines subcontract decisions forevidence of infiuence on legislative voting behavior. He does find support for theassertion that prime contractors intentionally distribute subcontracts in order "tomaximize regional economic and political effects" towards building politicalsupport. However, legislators themselves are not infiuenced by these decisions.In fact, subcontract decisions "have very little substantive effect on defense policy,in terms either of how much the United States spends on defense or of whichweapons it purchases." According to Mayer, the major reason is that primecontractors are limited in how widely they can spread subcontracts, sinceexperienced companies are concentrated in certain regions of the country. Insupport of these findings, Mayer presents data from a comprehensive analysis ofthe B-1 bomber, F-15A fighter plane, DIVAD, F-14 fighter plane, AH-64AApache attack helicopter, nuclear aircraft carrier, V-22 (Osprey) plane, and B-2(Stealth) plane programs.

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Similarly, Lindsay (1991) found that most weapons decisions are decidedon ideological grounds. That is, the majority of legislators, those COTStituting thewinning coalition, are guided by policy and not parochial considerations. Thisdoes not discount that on any given vote there are kwmakers who find themselvestom between their conscience and their constituents. (These few cases constitutethe anecdotal evidence generally cited by advocates of the parochial argument.)When push comes to shove, however, the legislator will vote his constituents ifthe political risks of doing otherwise are too great. It is because most legislatorsdo not find themselves in this position on major weapons systems (either nuclearor conventional) that policy considerations prevail. In the end, Lindsay's work onCongress does lend some limited support for the subsystem dynamic. Lindsaydemonstrates a contingency relationship between ideological/strategicconsiderations and economic concems that cause a legislator's ideologicalpreference to be ignored when the policy under consideration crosses a minimumeconomic threshold.

According to both McCool and Mayer, the more important variable maybe the perception of key actors that their participation in the subsystem benefitsthem. What is important is not whether legislators actually benefit from servingon HASC or SADS, but that they perceive that they benefit. Similarly, thedefense industry believes that PAC funds, lobbying, and subcontract decisions domake a difference, and this is what guides their behavior. Clearly, the defenseindustry is so motivated; otherwise, as Mayer suggests, they would allocate theirPAC funds differently. Since it is the Pentagon and not Congress that makescontract decisions, what PAC funds are perceived to buy is protection for existingcontracts. Congress can either shorten or extend the life of a contract decision bydecreasing or increasing the number of weapons to be funded in a given year.Congress also can establish requirements that condition the contract in a way thatsends a clear message to the Pentagon. One way to do this is by writingrestrictive language into the authorizations bill prohibiting the DefenseDepartment from taking certain prescribed actions (such as second-sourcecontracting for the M-l tank engine) or by adding funds that were not requested.

What about members of Congress? Do they seek membership on thedefense committees in order to perform constituent service? Yes and no. Theavailable interview data, referenced above, provide some qualified support for theassertion of parochialism. According to Smith and Deering (1984, pp. 106-107),of the legislators who were newly assigned to HASC and SASC during the 97thCongress, all eight "said that their primary interest in Armed Services rested onthe committee's jurisdiction over military installations in their districts," and three"mentioned the importance of defense contracts with industries in their districts."Most were found to have "strong, and, generally conservative, views aboutnational defense policy...." In interviews with members of HASC and HADSduring the 100th Congress, Lindsay (1991, p. 27) found that of first-termmembers who had sought a seat on the defense committees, the majority (11 outof 13 on HASC and 2 out of 3 on HADS) did cite constituency motivations, withthe primary interest, however, being the committee's jurisdiction over militaryinstallations. For example, only two HASC members serving on theprocurement, seapower, or research and development subcommittees cited defensecontracts. Of the two HADS members who cited constituency motives, only onementioned defense contracts.

Since contract decisions are made by the Pentagon, it is logical to assumethat a lot of defense industry lobbying is going on in DoD. In other words, it

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may be that different sides of the "iron triangle" are active at different stages in thepolicymaking process. The highly descriptive literature positions the defenseindustry at the center of the series of preliminary decisions (Milestone 0 and I)leading up to a contract decision (Milestone III). By providing crucial technicaland scientific information, it is argued, a defense contractor can predispose acontract decision by ensuring that a weapons system, at the design stage, issomething that contractor is ideally suited to build (Adams & Quinn, 1981-1982).According to Adams and Quinn, the defense industry provides further infiuenceduring early research and development (R&D) planning through their use of tradeassociations, representation on govemmental advisory committees, and transfer ofR&D personnel. "Major contractors are well represented on the roughly 50 mixedgovemment/nongovemment committees and hundreds of subcommittees thatadvise the Defense Department or NASA—most notably the Defense ScienceBoard and the scientific advisory groups of each branch of the military" (Adams,1988, pp. 74-75). As further evidence of infiuence, Adams points to the fact thatduring the 1980s "only 10% of all Pentagon contracts in dollar value [were]awarded as a result of public advertisement and sealed, competitive bids. The vastbulk of contracts are awarded as a result of negotiations, many of them with onesole-source contractor."

Kurth (1989) concentrates on the outcome of the presumed exchangebetween the defense industry and the Pentagon, and draws conclusions on the basisof a pattem of decisionmaking that conforms to the "follow-on imperative." Heconcludes that the follow-on imperative has explanatory value for the Tridentmissile (Trident I and Trident II), the C-5A, the F/A-18, the F-16, the F - l l l , andthe B-IA/B-IB. By his own admission, it cannot explain the contract decisionsfor the ALCM and Polaris missile programs. He also cites three cases in whichthe Source Selection Board's choice of a contractor other than the one predicted bythe follow-on imperative was overtumed by higher officials. In the cases of the F-111 fighter plane, the C-5A cargo transport plane, and the Apollo spacecraft, thecontracts became follow-ons "only when the board was overruled."

The evidence documenting the causal relationship between industryactivity and industry influence on defense policy is circumstantial, relying as itdoes upon a number of indirect measures, such as total number of employees whohave transferred between the defense industry and the executive branch, and thenumber of defense contractors receiving prime contracts who serve on govemmentadvisory bodies such as the Defense Science Board. The presumption is that if themilitary and defense industry share information, personnel, and advice, then theinfluence that the defense contractors exercise over military matters isunprofessional. Or, if only 10% of contracts are awarded competitively, then 90%are awarded for political reasons. Or, if a high percentage of govemment advisorsare receiving defense contracts, then they are the least qualified to receive them.Even Kurth admits that the data supporting the follow-on imperative may refiectan expertise phenomenon whereby firms tooled for manufacturing certain types ofmilitary hardware are selected over those with less experience. Clearly, the defenseindustry exerts considerable infiuence over military procurement mauers. Whetherthis influence is pemicious cannot be confirmed easily.

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Summary of Findings

The subsystem model suggests that weapons are built in response to thecollective influence of a tripartite alliance of autonomous legislative, executive,and private actors who act in concert and reciprocate to secure mutual advantages.This research has sought to determine whether the subsystem model hasexplanatory value for military hardware decisions. The findings support a morecomplex and multifaceted dynamic in which the military services predominate,particularly during the initial stages, interarena relations are characterized by amixture of consensus and confiict, and actors are motivated as much by policy asby parochial concems. The iHXx:ess of revealing the model's empirical limitationshas illuminated its theoretical shortcomings as well.

While proposition one correctly anticipates the types of actors mostinterested in framing military policy, it does not account for the asymmetry in theamount of power available to them, most notably the disproportionate infiuencethat the military services enjoy during the preliminary stages of the procurementprocess. Nor can the first proposition account for the fact that different sides ofthe "triangle" are operative at different stages. During the period of conception andresearch and development, the military services and (presumably) defensecontractors are preeminent. Once a weapon moves through to production,deployment, and operation, members of Congress become involved more visiblyin procurement matters, as decisionmaking shifts to the national legislature. Tobe truly explanatory, then, proposition one needs to link the identification of keyactors to the conditions of their policy control and account for the changing natureof the alliance. Better measures for locating and documenting defense industryinfiuence need to be developed as well.

The core assumption of consensus in proposition two is challengedpartially by the findings. There is evidence of "friendly" relations among industry,military witnesses, and committee members during public hearings. Cooperationis suggested further by the circumstantial evidence linking the defense industry andthe Pentagon. However, a pattem of increasing confiict between the legislativedefense committees and subcommittees and the Pentagon also is established by thedata, pointing up at least one weak link in the subsystem chain. Moreimportantly, legislative-executive confiict has significant policy consequences inmodifying the number of units procured and in the performance capabilities andtimely deployment of military hardware. To be truly explanatory, then,proposition two needs to consider the policy implications of conflict andconsensus and to redefine those consequences in nondichotomous, nonstatic ways.Moreover, there is a need for more accurate measures of committee-industry andindustry-military relations.

Regarding the third proposition, there does appear to be support for apattem of reciprocity among the three sets of actors. The defense industry doesprovide PAC funds to legislators who support their cause, make subcontractdecisions to reward congressional supporters, and regularly exchange personnel andinformation with the military. Members of Congress do support theirconstituents when there is a political risk in doing otherwise. The militaryservices do make contract decisions that conform to the "follow-on imperative."There is the pereeption on the part of subsystem actors that reciprocity works. Onthe other hand, voting pattems rarely are altered by either PAC funds or

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subcontract decisions, and legislators rarely are forced into a choice betweenideology and constituent benefits. While contract decisions rarely are competitive,few companies are tooled to compete for them. In short, the evidence that isavailable supports reciprocity, but exchange operations that may be fueled as muchby expertise as by politics. To be truly explanatory, proposition three needs toaccount for the variety of motives that influence policy behavior, and theconditions under which different motives are operative.

In an effort to determine whether the subsystem model (as currentlyconceptualized) has explanatory value, it has been examined in an area traditionallyconsidered to be an easy case. This examination has revealed certain empirical andtheoretical shortcomings that recommend a reformulation of the model'spropositions. As part of this reformulation, a key goal should be to provide adescription of military policymaking that accurately c^tures the broader dynamicprocess that goes into making weapons decisions. In the end, the model willsurvive only if its theoretical integrity and empirical utility can be strengthened.Otherwise, the model, like many of Uie weapons decisions it is used to explain,may become another casualty of the Cold War period.

Lauren Holland is associate professor of political science at theUniversity of Utah. She is the author of a number of articles and co-author of abook on defense policymaking. A second book, entitled Weapons Under Fire:Risk and Uncertainty in Military Hardware Development, will be published in1997. She also has published articles on Native Americans and natural resoureelitigation, and women and politics.

Notes

Data will be archived with the Inter-university Consortium for Political and SocialResearch, at the University of Michigan.

I would like to thank Matt Burbank, David Kiefer, Susan Olson, Dan McCool, and threeanonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The recommendations of the reviewers contributed amore viable definition of political power and inspired the discussion of the theoretical limitations of diesubsystem model.

The tenn "proposition" rather than "hypothesis" is used to remain true to the literature,which works with empirical assertions rather than theoretical statements. This points up thetheoretical shortcomings of the model itself, an issue addressed later in the conclusion.

^ All of the weapons considered in this study predate the end of the Cold War, althoughsome are still being produced. The lengthy process from conception to deployment (S to IS yeais)precludes consideration of the few current systems that are being considered.

^ During the 1990s, many of the defense companies mentioned in this study have merged orbeen acquired by lai:ger conglomerates. Examples include the mergers of Northrop. Grumman, andGeneral Dynamics Space Division, Raytheon and E-Systems, and Martin Marietta and Lockheed; theacquisition of Telectyne by Litton, Unisys by Loral (then purchased by Lockheed-Martin Marietta),Magnavox by Hughes Aireraft, and Westinghouse's Electronic Systems by Northrop-Grumman; andthe fomiation of Alliant (fomieily Hercules).

* These pattems would be reversed if Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA) is successful inreorganization efforts in the House to strengthen the party leadership and weaken the committee andsubcommittee system, and with more attempts to deregulate private industries.

^ See Hampscn (1989, chap. 2) for a complete discussion c^ the Milestone process.^ The dau are from the hearing abstraas (Congressional Information Service/Annual:

Abstracts of Congressional Publications), for selected years, 1970,1975,1980,1985, 1990, 1991, and1993. The data were edlected and compiled by Doug Goodman.

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In other areas such as environmental pc^cy, interest group participation has been welldocumented in public hearings. In many ai these cases, hearings have been found to be skewed by thecommittee or subcommittee to favor the interests of certain economic concems. See Jones,Baumgaitner, and Talbeit (1993).

' In few cases does a miliury service experience total victory in its efforts to secure apreferred weapcms system, nor do the services get every weapon they wanL The weapons thateventually are deployed reflect technological, fiscal, and political constraints. In some importantinstances, such as the B-1 bomber and MX missile system, limits on unit amounts or basing modedesign can compromise the strategic viability of the program. While weapons systems are modifiedconstantly, once they receive Milestone II approval they are rarely terminated.

^ The standard tour length is 3 years. Interview with Captain Julia Huni, AssistantProfessor, Aerospace Studies, University of Utah. May 30, 1996.

^ Nekon Pobby (1968, p. 18) operationalizes stability of membership as "mean temis ofmembers (total number of terms served divided by total number of Representatives...." Using thisdefinition, Hampson (1989) finds stability of membership among the defense committees andsubcommittees. This finding was corroborated by a separate examination of the CongressionalDirectory for the years 1960, 1965,1970,1975, 1980,1985, and 1990.

This conclusion is based on a cursory examination of the hearings for selected years (seefootnote 6) using the typology developed by Del Sesto (1980).

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who makes weapons procurement decisions? : a test of the subsystem model of policymaking

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