whose invisible religion? luckmann revisited

Whose Invisible Religion? Luckmann Revisited ~

A n d r e w J. Weige r t University of Notre Dame

An analysis of Thomas Luckmann's The Invisible Religion uncovers five meanings of the term "religion." The primary meaning refers to the process of socialization whereby man transcends his biological nature; the second and third denote universal functional meaning systems at the societal and personal levels; the fourth and fifth refer to specific substantive meaning systems at the societal and personal levels. From this schema, Luckmann proceeds to label "religion" any meaning system which in his judgment is a universal and functional or specific and substantive meaning system for a society oran individual. Thus, the invisible religion of modern man may be familism, careerism, sex, mobility, etc. A critique of Luckmann's 'functional ipsative" definition of religion indicates the tenuous nature of such apriorism for an empirical sociology of religion which needs to begin with the meanings action has f or the actors in the society.

I

Thomas Luckmann's persuasive functional presentation (The Invisible Religion, 1967) of the nature of religion has quickly become a near classic statement in contemporary sociology and even in socio-theology of religion. The reason may lie in the fact that I~uckmann's statement answers current needs of some sociologists and other students of religion: it puts religion, and thus the sociology ofreligion, at the center of the question o fman and his location in society; it offers an exciting alternative to the sociography of traditional religious institutions; and it leads to theoretical reflection which frees sociologists from the ethnocentric concern of Western institutional religion and may inspire more cross-cultural research (a definite gap at present, Buehler, et al., 1972). By legitimating the language of the sociology of religion for the investigation of all social phenomena, Luckmann's statement is a handy tool for those alienated from traditional religious institutions, but still religiously concerned. This paper, however, argues that Luckmann's approach is a theoretical cul de sac for the sociology of religion and may lead to excessive conceptual confusion.

Among the difficuhies in formulating a useful definition, there are two gener- ally accepted criteria for a successful concept: 1. at the level of theory, it should contain logical characteristics which distinguish it from other concepts; 2. at the level of observables, it should be operationalizable in such a way as to allow phenomena to be named and classified in an orderly and unambiguous manner.

11 would like to thank C. Lincoln Johnson , John C. Gessner, and the discussants at a 1972 roundtable of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion for critical and stimulating reactions to ara earlier version of this paper.

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Luckmann's approach to and definition of religion rail, in myjudgment , to meet these criteria. His analysis is formal (in a Simmelian sense) in a reductively functional way, and his application of the formal analysis to empirical data proceeds by intuitivefiat rather than by standard rules of correspondence o r a methodology of abstraction.

II

To situate these criticisms, let us review Luckmann's analysis. The central argument relevant here is his presentation of the "senses" of religion. Hisfirst assumption posits a universal anthropological condition of religion, viz., the social dialectical processes by which the individual transcends biological nature (49-51: all pagination refers to Luckmann, 1967). This condition repeats Durkheim's claim in the Elementary Forms of Religious Life that the original symbol system whereby man emerged from the animal world was religious. Furthermore, Luckmann totally identifies as religious the function of the dialectic of men and society, which he posited with Berger in the Social Construction of Reality (1966).

Reasoning from the religious nature of human socialization, Luckmann posits four derivative "forms" ofreligion. Thefirst is a universal and nonspecific elementary social forro which is an objective total worldview provŸ social meaning for a society's existence. This universal nonspecific social forro is based on the assumption that the worldview performs an essentially religious function and is part of an objectivated social reality (53-56). Second is the specific institutional social forro of religion constituted by configurations ofreligious representations form- ing a sacred cosmos which is part of the worldview (60-61). This specific institutional social form of religion may vary from a diffuse sacred cosmos in primitive societies to institutionallly specialized "church religion" in modern pluralistic societies. The third form of religion is a universal nonspecific form of individual religiosity which is an internalized subjective system of relevance reflecting the objectivated universal and nonspecific elementary social form of religion posited above (69-70). This subjective system of relevance performs the essentially religious function of giving meaning to individual existence. The fourth form of religion is a specific biographical forro ofreligiosity in individual consciousness. This individual religiosity is constituted by an internalized sacred cosmos or official church religion objectivated in the above-mentioned second form of specific institutional social religion (71-72).

In summarizing his senses of religion, Luckmann insists on the universality both of the anthropological condition of religion, viz., t ranscending biological nature, a n d o f the two nonspecific forms of social and individual religion, viz., worldview and identity. He concludes:

The statement that religion is present in nonspecific forro in all societies and all "normal" (socialized) individuals is therefore axiomatic. It specifies a religious dimen- sion in the "definition" of individual and society but is empty of specific empirical content (78).

What has Luckmann accomplished by this argument? ~ It seems that his main

2Luckmann (1971) repeats his argument in a slightly different and summary fashion in his position paper in Caporale and Grurnelli.


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thrust is to locate the primary predicative meaning of religion in the social process whereby man becomes human, i.e., in the emergence of the self, or in socialization. Socialization in both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic sense is the anthropologically necessary and essentially religious process which grounds human existence. An immediate deduction from this assumption is that the socially objectivated meaning system, or worldview (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), which is constitutive of the socialization process, and the individually internalized relevance system which is constitutive of personal identity, are, anthropologically, both derivatively and necessarily religious. But worldview and identity are sociologically the elementary, universal, and nonspecific forms of religion which are taken as axiomatic. The sociologically derivative forms of religion, then, are the specific, empirical, and non-universal contents of particular historical or biographical religions. This schema is summarized in Figure 1,

FIGURE 1

Sense and Forms of " R e l i g i o n " A c c o r d i n g to L u c k m a n n ( I 9 6 7 )

Universal Anthropological Condition of Religion

Primary Sense: The socialization process by which mala transcends biological nature

Sociological Forms of Religion

Social (Objective)

Secondary Sense: Universal, functional 1) Worldview

Tertiary Sense: Specific, substantive 3)

3) From Sacred Cosmoi to Institutionally Specialized Religion

4) From Internalized Sacred Cosmoi to Internalized Official Institutional Religiosity

Individual (Subjective)

2) Identity

4)

With these senses of religion, Luckmann can complete his critique of contemporary work in the sociology of religion. Sociologists mainly study the tertiary senses of religion, viz., specific and substantive forms such as the "Church." This undue restriction of the form of religion according to Luckmann, leads to eth- nocentrism, mere sociography, and erroneously formulated debates, e.g., the issue of secularization (23). Since, for Luckmann, it is axiomatic that man is everywhere and always religious to the extent that he is human (i.e., socialized and normal), the question, "Is man religious?" and the myriad questions from history and quantitative research such as, "Is man or society more or less religious now than in the past?," or "Is the disinherited class more or less religious than the white collar class?," are otiose or even erroneous. Luckmann insists that the only real question is a qualitative one, viz., "How is man religious?" (cf. Yinger, 1970:33, for a similar functional question), since the "Is" question is answered axiomatically, and the comparative, substantive questions are in principle unaskable, because by definition all normal functioning societies and socialized individuals are essentially religious. Thus, the central empirical task is the search for qualitative themes which constitute the universal and necessary anthropological process of socializa-


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tion, and which p e r f o r m the universal and e lementary functions of supplying socially objectivated mean ing systems and individually "subjectivated" internalized identities. L u c k m a n n under takes this enterpr ise toward the end of the book by classifying such themes as personal autonomy, familism, sex, mobility, etc., as representa t ions of a dominan t m o d e r n and "invisible religion" (109; passim).

I I I

Let me begin where Luckmann ends. Nowhere in bis discussion of mode rn invisible religion does L u c k m a n n suggest a methodology for knowing whether a part icular qualitative theme per forms the religious functions o f a worldview or identity. Quest ion: What is religion? Funct ional answer: T h e funct ions of worldview or identity are religion. Yes, but what is religion in this society or for this individual? No society and no individual have a universal and nonspecific functional form of religion empty of all content, but always a specific and substantive "form" of religion. A n d this substantive forro is that which functions a s a social worldview or a personal identity. Who decides which specific and substantive form functions as religion? In a sociology of religion built on Luckmann ' s approach, it is the sociologist who a priori predicates the te rm religion, and who labels specific social and individual mean ing systems as religion. T h e risks of such an approach are evident in the absence o f a discussion ofdysfunct ions ofrel igion.

An empirical discipline cannot be constructed, we submit, on a model which axiomatically assumes tha t all societies and individuals have religion in nonspecific form, and that the specific and substantive fo rm is known by what may be t e rmed a "functional ipsative definit ion ''3 posited by the investigator according to his own intuition. A functional ipsative definition is one in which the specificity, substantive content, and label for a social p h e n o m e n o n are predicated on the basis o f a func t ion ident i f ied a n d ca tegor ized by the invest igator . T h e inves t iga tor categorizes and labels a function, and the funct ion "ipsatizes" the labeling of the phenomenon . Thus , for Luckmann , a funct ion of religion is to enable man to t ranscend biological na ture by providing a socially objectivated worldview and a personally subjectivated identity. Thus, whatever spedfic substantive content the investigator locates as pe r fo rming that funct ion is religion.

To expand the options, let us suggest that there are three sources 4 for the predication, labeling and def ining of a p h e n o m e n o n as religion: thefunctional ipsative procedure of the investigator; the social objectivated meanings of the society; the personal subjectivated meanings of the actor (see Berger and Luck- mann, 1966; Schutz, 1962). For example, L u c k m a n n may define wife-swapping as a modern invisible religion theme; the societal carriers of the socially objectivated

3Th phrase, "functional ipsative definition" is coined by analogy with ipsative procedures in measure- ment, viz., measures which are not independent within individual respondents (cf. Rokeach, 1973:42-3). Functional ipsative procedures construct definitions in a way which is not independent within the investigator, i.e., the investigator decides what phenomena belong in which category with only one criterion: bis perception of its function. Contrast this with an investigator who first categorizes phenomena according to substantive c¡ and subsequenfly analyzes the functions of these phenomena. 4We are excluding purely operational "definitions" from the discussion. Operationalism presents us with another set of issues.


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meanings may define it as immoral, criminal, swinging, or avant-garde secularity; and the individuals involved may define it as an anti-religious search for sexual liberation from restrictive religious norms, o ran amoral escape from intolerable ennui. In this situation how does the sociologist proceed? What theoretical model can legitimately warrant an empirical sociologist defining a phenomenon contrary both to socially objectivated meaning and to personally subjectivated meaning? If, furthermore, an individual or society defines action, e.g., personal autonomy or social revolution, not only as not rbligion but in addition as precisely the deliber- ate overthrow ofwhat is understood by the actors as religion, by whatjustification is this action transmogrified into a representation of a religious universal? The logical application of Luckmann's model would seem to contradict the definition of socially constructed reality as objectivated and realized knowledge which he espoused with Berger (1966). In a word, if in society a socio-cultural object is now known as religion, or if in personal identity a psychobiographical object is now known as religion, how may the sociologist define the phenomenon as religion? In our view, the only empirical sources of the predication of the term religion are the socially objectivated meanings of a society or the personally subjectivated meanings of an actor--but not the apriorism of the investigator.

This critique does not deny that a sociologist may adopt models from the study of religion and fruitfully apply them to other substantive areas. Such heuristic and often illuminating application is legitimate as long as Ÿ remains self conscious, i.e., the investigator is aware that he is engaging in analogy and simile. Thus, the prophet may assert that man's bel!y is his god, and business his religion. So too a social scientist may assert that baseball is an American religion, and the flag is America's god. In the latter case, however, the analyst is speaking in the mode of "as if," i.e., by analogy and simile. I f the analyst goes further and says that baseball /s religion for this society or individual, contrary to the social and personal definitions, and in the same sense in which Baha'i/s religion, then he is going beyond the predication of "as if," and from our perspective he is in error.

Functional ipsative definitions of the primary subject matter of sociology may lead to confusion in both cross-sectional and longitudinal comparative analysis. Consider the issue of secularization. Luckmann argues that modern man is not becoming less religious, but is merely changing the specific substantive content of religion to "invisible religion" themes like autonomy, familism, etc. Thus an interpretation of secularization using a definition of religion which would lead to the possible conclusion that there is an historical process of change in, usually a lessening of, the influence of religion in society, is a priori and axiomatically inadmissable (cf. the inclination ofother functionists such as Bellah and Parsons to argue this way in Caporale and Grumelli, 1971). Luckmann would argue that even if religion asa socio-cultural or psychological substantive object ceased to be part of the constructed reality of society or the individual, yet the society and the individual remain formally and functionally religious. Such reasoning and con- clusions can be labeled sociological only by defining sociology as a reductively formal and ahistorical metaphysic, and by making the object of sociology a set of a priori philosophical constructs (cf. Dewey's similar argument, 1934). Sociology would cease to be an empirical discipline. In this philosophical sense, Luckmann may correctly argue that secularization cannot mean the demise of religion, since religion is an axiomatic, socio,psychological universal.


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Luckmann rejects attempts to find a universal specific and substantive definition; since these definitions cannot be defined empirically, nor do they serve his theoretical purpose. Sociologists have not shown much interest in the question of the "universal essence" of religion, whether it be ultimacy, spiritual beings, or the sacred (see Yinger's discussion, 1970). If sociologists, however, reject the universality of any specific and substantive forro of religion, why risk introducing conceptual and terminological confusion by speaking of nonspecific andfunc- tional universalforms of religion? From the perspective of this paper, sociologists may legitimately address the question of the universality of empirical, socially constructed reality, social phenomena, or social action. Arguing from a voluntaristic model of sociaIaction and an interpretive sociology, the sociologist may, Ÿ fact, speak only of conditional universals (see Weigert and Thomas, 1971, for the issue of family as a universal). Even granting, ex hypothesi, adequate knowledge (diachronic and synchronic), were a sociologist to assert that an empirical form of religion is and has been universal, the propositi0n would be true only because of the voluntaristic social interaction of competent members of the society, not because of a formal axiomatic identification of religion with socialization, worldview, or identity. Furthermore, the argument for absolute universality w0uld have to project the necessity of religion into all future societies: a formida- ble task for any theoretical model, and one which is in principle illicit from a voluntaristic model of rnan.

A major theoretical question for a fuhctional ipsative definition, however, is posed by the realization that a function is a theoretical construct anchored in empirically substantive and historically specific structure. For example, how does an empirical discipline in the first instance apply a category or class name to a phenomenon which the investigator wishes to "know" asa function? We suggest this is done by first taking the name or label of the specific, historical, objectivated institution or structure which performs the function which the investigator wants to know, and then applying the specific name or label of the structure to the function. The investigator, in the first moment of theoretical development, de- scription, is bound inextricably by the socially constructed definitions of members of the society (Schutz, 1962). No society or individual lives in a nonspecific, formal,

functional ipsative reality. Thus, an investigator would have to assume that in the first instance, the function of worldvŸ identity, and the transcendence of biological nature was performed by the socially and/or personally defined institution or structure of religion. Therefore, these functions are labeled by the investigator as religious functions. Had they been performed in the first instance by kinship, economic, or political institutions, they would have been labeled family, economic, or political functions. The genetic fallacy of the functional ipsative definition is now clear. To assert that because the worldview is religious at time 1, then the function of worldview is a religious function at time 1, is now made roto a reversible ahistorical proposition. Its obverse is asserted to be true at any time. Thus, whatever institution or specific historical struCture performs the function which was labeled religious at time 1, is from a genetic argument axiomatically religion--even though the original epigonic institution may no longer exist (see Bellah and other's awareness of this illicit tautology in Caporale and Grumelli, 1971).

More specifically, the assertion that the "phylogenesis" of human beings oc-


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curred by means of symbols and processes which some theorists identify as religious does not just i fy the inference that the subsequent socialization or "ontogenesis" of each h u m a n also occurs by means of symbols, and processes which are "religious." Even if the origin of h u m a n identity was a religious p h e n o m e n o n (an untestable proposition), it does not follow that every subsequent acquisition of h u m a n identity is also a religious p h e n o m e n o n . Social ontogeny does not necessarily recapitulate assumed social phylogeny, in spite of Luckmann 's assertion that "soc ia l iza t ion . . . is fundamenta l ly religious" (51).

Fur the rmore , for comparat ive longi tudinal purposes, an investigator relies on the s t ructure or institution as the historical referent of predication, e.g., such statements as: religious institutions or the family are losing their functions to educational or political institutions. We do not ordinarily say, "The function is losing its s tructure," unless we are willing to hypostatize funct ion completely. We can conceive of s t ructure A losing funct ion Xa, but remain ing the "same" structure A,because the function is merely a consequence of that structure. We cannot in the same sense conceive o f a n outcome or function Xa losing its s t ructure A yet remain ing the "same" function Xa,i because it must b e c o m e the function of another s t ructure Xb, and the classification and naming of functions are derived f rom the s t ructure or carrying institution. Afunctional ipsative definition leads to the loss of empirical criteria for classifying and defining p h e n o m e n a by introducing equivocation in comparat ive longitudinal research t h rough the substitution of the investigator's own schema for that of the society or actors he is studying: Thus , for Luckmann, secularization is both occurr ing in an empirical sense and not occurr ing in an axiomatic sense; an individual or society may be both non- religious in their own appropr ia ted social or biographical sense, and religious in Luckmann 's formal sense.

IV

I f the cogency of this critique 5 of Luckmann ' s position is granted, what conclu- sions would be d rawn concerning his five forms (see Figure 1). From the perspective of an interpret ive sociology the universal process of socialization may be defined as a symbolic process investing value (worldvŸ and identity (Weigert and Thomas , 1971). T h e r e is no theoretical necessity or empi¡ for def ining socialization as an essentially "religious" process. Similarly, Luckmann ' s universal and nonspecific forms of religion, viz., worldview and identity, may be labeled with formal terms such as value orientations (Glock and Stark, 1965:7ff), or relevance structures (Schutz, 1970). T h e labe lof religion would be reserved for substantive types of religion (in Luckmann ' s ter t iary sense of the term), which are e i the r socially objec t iva ted or pe r sona l ly a p p r o p r i a t e d or bo th (Berger , 1967:175-177). Thus , such issues as secularization and comparat ive studies of religion re -emerge more clearly as empirical historical questions. Likewise, the universality ofre l ig ion is no longer axiomatic for society o r a n individual, but must be formula ted and a rgued empirically.

The sociologist of religion faces the possibility that in a part icular society or era

5Berger (1967:177-178) briefly adumbrates many of the points made here. We do not, however, agree with his dismissal of definitional issues as merely "de g~stibus," though it is possible to have too much of even a tasty issue.


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the subject matter of one's discipline may indeed be peripheral to the society and its members, and therefore to the profession of sociology which studies the society and its members. No axiomatic assertionsjustify locating religion as a central issue in society, in biography, or in the individual's place in society without regard to empirical evidence. To argue that the founders of sociology, Weber and Durk- heim, saw religion as central is not to say that were they alive today they would not be arguing for the centrality of ideology, nationalism, technocracy, science, etc., and for the peripherality of religion. The founders did not, it seems, deny the historicity of their subject matter, nor were they primarily interested in religion as a putative universal, but rather as an historically important creator and carrier of values.

The argument of the present paper suggests a label such as "Sociology of Values" as the axiomatically designated generic area for the study of value orientations, identity themes, relevance structures, and worldviews. Luckmann's (and perhaps Bellah, 1970; Geertz, 1966)functional ipsative definition could legitimately refer to values, and investigators may then study the themes, location, and hierarchy of values (Rokeach, 1973). Value would serve as an ultimate, content- free, formal and primitive (see Glock and Stark, 1965; Zetterberg, 1965) term for analytical purposes. Religious institutions would be studied as possible carriers of values in a society or biography. The centrality and viability of religion vis-�91 other value carriers can then be studied as an empirical question. In this way, we may perhaps speak of invisible values, but not of invisible religion.

REFERENCES

Bellah, Robert N. 1970. Beyond Belief. New York: Harper. Berger, Peter L. 1967. The Sacred Canopy. New York: Doubleday. Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. New York:

Doubleday. Buehler, C., G. Hesser, and A. J. Weigert. 1972. "A study of articles on religion in major sociology

journals: some preliminary findings." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 11:165-170.

Caporale, Rocco, and Antonio Grumelli (eds.). 1971. The Cuhure of Unbelief. Berkeiey: University of California

Dewey, John. 1934. A Common Faith. New Haven: Yale University. Geertz, Clifford. 1966. "Religion as a cultural system." Pp. 1-46 in Michael Banton (ed.)Anthropological

Approaches to the Study of Religion. London: Tavistock. Glock, Charles Y., and Rodney Stark. 1965. Religion and Society in Tension. Chicago; Rand McNally.

Luckmann, Thomas. 1967. The Invisible Religion. New York: Macmillan.

1971. "Belief, unbelief, and religion." Pp. 21-37 in-Rocco Caporale and Antonio Grumelli (eds.), The Culture of Unbelief. Berkeley: University of California.

Rokeach, Milton. 1973. The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press. Schutz, Alfred. 1962. The Problem of Social Reality. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

1970. Reflections on the Problem of Relevance. New Haven: Yale University. Weigert, A.J., and D. L. Thomas. 1971. "Family asa conditional universal."Journal ofMarriage and the

Family 33 (February): 188-194.

Yinger, J. Mihon. 1970. The Scientific Study of Religion. New York: Macmillan.

Zetterberg, Hans. 1965. On Theory and Verification in Sociology. Totowa: Bedminster.


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