whose shoes? - hrfd.hr · pdf fileaims at discussing the identity of the work of art. the...

OriginalPaperUDC111.821:7.01 7.01:7.038.6

ReceivedNovember23rd,2010

Gizela HorvathPartiumChristianUniversity,stradaPrimariei36,RO–410209Oradea

[email protected]

Whose Shoes?

Identity in Works of Art

AbstractThe problem of identity in the world of art is relevant from many perspectives. This paper aims at discussing the identity of the work of art. The discussion is built in three steps: the problem of identification of an object as work of art, the problem of the relevant properties of a work of art and the question of the author of the work of art as decisive (or not) for the identification of a work of art. These issues are raised with the evolution of artistic practice and art theory in the last century. The appearing of the “ready-made” destabilized the firm identity of a work of art and now we have to decide what the difference is between a work of art and its perceptually identical pair. Traditionally relevant perceptual features lost their importance in conceptual art, so we have to decide what relevant properties belong, even today, to works of art. Finally, the practice of appropriation in postmodern art challenges the notion of the artist and of the meaning of genuine creation.

Key wordsidentityofworksofart,definitionsofart,uniquenessofworksofart,authorship

Introduction

Weseeworksofartasspecialobjects1relatedtowhichthefeaturesoforigi-nalityanduniquenessspringintomindinstantly.Thus,theestablishingofaworkofart’sidentity(“whatisthis?”)happensintwosteps:ontheonehand,theidentificationoftheobjectasaworkofart(genericthesis),ontheotherhand,theidentificationoftheobject’suniqueness(specificthesis).

1. The generic thesis: “This is a work of art”

Tobeabletoidentifyanobjectasaworkofart,2anobviousstartingpointisadefinitionofartoratheoryofartwhichdeterminestherealmoftheartistic,andsowecandecidewhether theobject inquestionbelongsornot to this

1

Iusetheconceptof‘object’intentionallyam-biguously as an object itself and as the ob-jectifiedsubjectofthinking.Worksofartaretraditionally objects, but in the 20th centurytheworkofartisnotunambiguouslyanob-ject,however,itisstilltheobjectifiedobjectofthinking.

2

In the present paper I generally deal withvisualarts;sincetherearesignificantdiffer-encesbetweenformsofart,thedifferentiatedanalysisbyartformswouldhavesupersededtheframeworkofpresentpaper.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA52(2/2011)pp.(283–297)

G.Horvath,WhoseShoes?284

realm.Wecandefinethegenericaspectofaworkofartifweknowwhat art isintherealmofwhichthe“workofart”iscreated.Thelateappearanceoftheconceptof‘art’alsoindicatesthatthequestionaim-ingattheidentityofartisnoteasytoanswer.ThenotionusedbytheGreeks–techne (inLatinars)–broughtaboutamomentumwhichimpactedthefur-therhistoryoftheconceptofart.Technemeantknowledge,competencebasedonrules,thusitwasrelevanttoeverycraftthathadrulesandcouldbelearnt.ThustheGreco-Romanworld,themiddleagesandearlymodernityheldartasanactivitythatcanbegovernedbyrationalprinciples.Sincetechneisaverywidenotion,includingmostskillsfrommechaniccraftstorhetoric,theGreeksdefinedtherealmwecallartasimitative or mimetic art.Thisideade-finedthinkingaboutartandartisticpracticeuntilthe19thcentury.AsconvincinglyprovenbyTatarkiewicz’sanalysis,3theinclusionofdifferentartformsintooneconceptwasnotaneasytask.Inthemedievalsystemofknowledgepainting, sculpture, andarchitecturebelonged tomechanicalorvulgararts,musictoliberalarts.Poetrydidnotfigureatallamongthearts–owingtothefactthatPlato’sdialogueentitledIonwasknownintheMiddleAges,whileAristotle’sPoetics wasnot.4FromPlato’sdialoguewefindoutthatpoetryisnotamatterofskillbutofinspiration,5thuspoetrycanbynomeansbeart.Aristotle’sauthorityhadtocomplementPlato’storaisepoetryamongtheartsbasedonPoetics, whichwasinterpretednormatively.Thesetheoreticboundarieshadtobepushedtocreateaninclusiveconceptofartthatarrangedsuchdifferentactivitiesontooneplane.This theoreticachievementcanbefoundinCharlesBatteux’swritingpub-lishedin1746,entitledLes Beaux-Arts réduits à un même principe. Thetitleofthetextalsoreflectsthisunifyingtendency.Fromthiswritingwecanfindout thatwhatunifies thearts is thecommonlysharedgoal(pleasure), theirprincipalproperty(imitation),andtheirtheme(beautifulnature).Wecanseethatimitationcontinuestobeageneralfeatureofthedefinitionofart.Whatisnew,atthesametime,isthatthevalueofthebeautifulisasubstantialpartofart:wedonotonlyspeakofimitativeartsbutfine arts(andinBatteuxthetermreferstopainting,sculpture,poetry,aswellasmusicanddance).Thedefinition of art,whichwas the result of a difficult labour, proved tobeinadequatehalfacenturylater.TheRomanticswentbacktotheelementwhichwasthoughttobeirreconcilablewithtechne:inspiration,theingenium.Theemphasiswasshiftedtotheprocessofcreation;fineart–usingKant’sexpression–istheartofthegenius.6Inthisnewperspectivethefaithfulimi-tationofnatureceasestobeagoalfortheartistcreatinginthespiritoforigi-nality.Theconsiderationsofphilosophyofartandartisticpracticebothfoundthetheoryofmimesisoutdated,andcalledforalternativetheoriesofart.Thuswerebornthealsopopulardefinitionsattheendofthe19thandbeginningof20thcenturiesaccordingtowhichart isexpression (LevTolstoy,BenedettoCroce),orsignificant form(CliveBell).Consequently,arttheorybythe20thcenturyramifiedtosuchsuggestionsthatwereirreconcilablewitheachother.PerhapsitisCliveBell’sdefinitionthatisthemostlikelytobeuniversalised.However,severalresearchershaveindicatedthathisdefinitionofartiscir-cular:significantformevokesaestheticemotion,whileaestheticemotionisanemotionalreaction,whichspringsfromtheencounterwiththesignificantform.Ontheotherhand,evenCliveBell’sdefinitionisnotuniversalenoughtoholdsuchphenomenaasDuchamp’sFountain orRomanOndak’sLoop.7

Uptothe19thcentury, themaindifficultywastheintegratedinterpretationofthediversityofartisticactivities,buttherewasnoquestionastoanobject



beingartornot,orwhetherapaintingorasculpturewasindeedapaintingor a sculpture.Until the 20th century suchworks of artwere not commonwhere theviewerwouldbe tempted tomistake themforeverydayobjects.Thediscussionwasatmostaboutthequalityoftheworkofart:whethertherepresentationof thefemalenudewasacceptableifnotenvelopedinsomemythologicalreference(Manet’sOlympia),whetheratechniquewasaccept-ablethatgivesasenseofbeingunfinished(LouisLeroycommentedonMon-et’sImpression, Sunrisein1874:“Themostprimitivewallpaperismorecare-fullydeveloped than thatseascape”8),orwhether theuseof flashycolourswasacceptable(LeoSteinAmericancritic,whocollectedMatisse’spaintings,characterisedWoman with a Hat asbeing“themostrepulsiveblobofpaintIhaveeverseen”9).The20thcentury,however,givesusplentyofphenomenawherewefirsthavetodecidewhetherwearelookingatworksofartatall,andthenmaybeafter-wardscanweaskthequestionofwhatkindofartisticvaluetheyhold.ThebreakthroughcanbelinkedtoMarcelDuchamp’sname,whoin1917enteredaworkfortheexhibitionorganisedbytheSocietyofIndependentArtistsinNewYork,entitledFountain.Theworkofartisactuallyaurinal,boughtatashop,andsignedwithanalias.Itisobviousthatthisobjectdoesnotrepresentor express anything; furthermore, the theoryof significant formcannot beappliedtoit,especiallyifwenotethatDuchamphimselfstatedthathechosethisobjectbecauseof itsaestheticneutrality.10Thisobject,oneof thefirstready-mades,wasacceptedbytheartisticworld,eventhoughnotraditionalartisticdefinitionisapplicableforit.Subsequently,suchprocesseswerein-cludedintofineartsthatdidnotobjectifyintooneobject,oneartefactinthetraditionalsense:performanceisexpresslysuchagenre,whichconcentratesonthelivedmoment,andissurvivedatmostbyitsphotographed,filmed,ornarratedtrace.Thequestionofidentificationisstillveryrelevant:atthe2009VeniceBiennale,onecouldeasilywalkbyRomanOndak’sortheawardwin-ningTobiasRehberger’s11workswithoutnoticingthattheywerepartsoftheexhibition.

3

See: Wladislaw Tatarkiewicz, Az esztétika alapfogalmai. Hat fogalom története (A His-tory of Six Ideas. An Essay in Aesthetics),Kos-suthKiadó,Budapest2000.

4

The first humanist translation of Aristotle’sPoeticswasmadebyGiorgioVallain1498.Thefirstauthoritativetranslationforhuman-ism was Alessandro de’ Pazzi’s work from1536,andSegni’s1549Italiantranslation.

5

See:Platón,Ión. Menexenosz,AtlantiszKia-dó,Budapest2000.

6

See: Immanuel Kant, Az ítélőerő kritikája(Critique of Judgment),OsirisKiadó,Buda-pest2003.

7

RomanOndak:The Loop.Atthe2009VeniceBiennale Roman Ondak planted the Slovakpavilionwiththesamevegetationthatgrows

intheGiardini,sothepavilionitselfisamerecontinuationofthegardenoutside.

8

AmyDempsey,A modern művészet története (History of Modern Art), KépzőművészetiKiadó,Budapest2003,p.14.

9

Ibid., p. 69.

10

See:Arthur C. Danto,Hogyan semmizte ki a filozófia a művészetet?(The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art),Atlantisz,Buda-pest1997,p.29.

11

TobiasRehberger,Was du liebst, bringt dich auch zum Weinen (Cafeteria). The cafeteriadesignedbyTobiasRehbergerwasoperatedand visited as a real coffee house: coffee,drinksandpastriesweresoldandconsumedinitjustlikeinanyothercafe.



Developmentsintheartisticworldcreatedtheoriesofartwhichtriedtointe-grateJacksonPollock’sspottedcanvases,theready-made,performance,AndyWarhol’sBrillo boxesandconceptualart.Themostimportanttheoriesofartdevelopedinthesecondhalfofthe20thcenturywereClementGreenberg’sversionofformalism,GeorgeDickie’sinstitutionaltheoryandArthurDanto’scontextualtheorybuiltonthemetaphoricstructureofart.ClementGreenbergisknownbymanyasthePopeofabstractexpressionism.Just as some decades earlier inEnglandCliveBellwanted tomake roomwithhisformalisttheoryforthepost-impressionismoffensivetotraditionalisttastes,ClementGreenbergalsoworkedtosupportavant-gardeabstractioninAmericanculture.Itwasduetohisinfluencethatabstract expressionism,asaspecificallyAmericantrendwasinstitutionalisedafterWorldWarII.Hepub-lishedhisessayentitled“ModernistPainting”12in1960,inwhichheoutlinedatheoreticaltrainofthoughtwhichwouldconnectKant’scriticalworkwithavant-gardeartisticcreation.InthiswritingGreenbergdescribesModernismas taking further the Kantian form of self-criticism. He interpreted Kant’stheoreticalpracticeastheself-reflexivecriticismofphilosophy,i.e.theim-manentcriticismofthediscipline.Modernismisthereflexiveuseofthedis-cipline’sownmethodsintheinterestofsettingitsownboundaries,andthusbecomingstrongerwithinitsboundaries.Painting,forexample,hastoresistbecomingsculpture-like,ithastofinditsownlaws.AccordingtoGreenberg,themaincharacteristicofpaintingisitstwo-dimensionality,theflatsurface.Thisiswhyabstractpaintingisimportant,becauseitmakesitclearthatany-thingcanbenegligible–theme,theimitationofreality,perspective,shading,etc.–exceptforbidimensionalflatness.ClementGreenberg’sdescriptionisimportantfortheidentificationasartofsuchworksasJacksonPollock’spaintingsorFrankStella’sblackcanvases(towhichmanytendtoreactwithan“Icandothat!”,thusblockingitfromtherealmofart,whichisstillthe“workofgenius”).Greenberghoweverdoesnotdealwith,andisinnorelationwithDuchamp’sready-madesorpopart.NexttoDuchamp’sFountain,itisAndyWarhol’spopartwhichisachallengeforarttheory.Atthemiddleofthecenturyitseemedthatabstractexpression-ismwasthefinalstageofthedevelopmentofart,thatpaintinghasrevealedits ownessence, and there is no return (for example into figurativity), norpossibilityforrenewal.Inthesixties,though,popartdefiedtheneedformini-malismandabstraction.ThemodernistdemandforminimalismiscondensedintoMiesvanderRohe’sfamousmotto:“Lessismore”.However,theatmos-phereofthe60’sisexpressedbyRobertVenturi’sanswer:“Lessisabore”.ClementGreenbergmanagedtocomposeatheoreticalframeworkbaseduponwhichnon-representativeartwasacceptedintheartworld.However,forthereceptionofAndyWarhol(orTomWesselman,JeffKoons,JasperJohns)tobelegitimised,thearttheoriesofArthurC.DantoandGeorgeDickiewerenecessary.GeorgeDickie’sinstitutionaldefinitiondatesfrom1969.Thisshowsthattheagentsoftheartworldaretheonestoconfertheartisticattributetoartefacts,aswellaspersons(e.g.artists),onbehalfoftheartworld.

“Aworkofartinthedescriptivesenseis(1)anartifact(2)uponwhichsomesocietyorsomesub-groupofasocietyhasconferredthestatusofcandidateforappreciation.”13

Thistheorywascriticisedonthegroundsthatitiscircular:artefactsarede-finedbyartists,whiletheartististheonetocreateartefacts.Furthermore,it



isdifficulttodeterminewhothe“agent”oftheartworldmightbe,whocanappointanartefactaworkofartinalegitimateway.AccordingtoDickie:

“Theartworldcarriesonitsbusinessatthelevelofcustomarypractice.Stillthereisapracticeandthisdefinesasocialinstitution.”14

Apotentialconcernmayarisethatthe“appointment”ofworksofartimpliesagreatdealofarbitrarinessanddoesnotapplyforcriteriaofvalue.Suchanapproachdoeshaveitsadvantages,however.Itsfirstadvantageisthatitcanbemadeuniversal:sinceitiscompletelyindependentofthecontentsorformoftheworks,itcanbeusedforanykindofartefacts,thusforanyfutureformofartisticpractice.Moreover,Dickieinterpretstheexpression“artefact”inawaythatevenfoundobjectscancountasartefactsfromthemomentthattheartisthassetthemapartfromtheirenvironment.Dickie’stheoryalsodrawsattentiontothefactthattheworkofartisnotcreatedinanddoesnotexistin a vacuum, and it is insufficient to approach it starting merely from theworkitself:onehastotakeitssocio-historicalcontextintoaccountaswell.Inthislastpoint,DickiefollowsArthurC.Danto,whoin1964developedtheconceptofthe artworld,exactlytoemphasisetheindispensabilityofthecon-textualapproach.DantowasgreatlyinfluencedbytheworkofAndyWarhol,theexampleof theBrilloboxesor theCampbell soup,oftenappear inhiswritings.Tobeabletovoicethequestionoftheidentityofworksofartinallitsseriousness,Dantodevelopstheargumentoftheindistinguishablepairs.Letussupposethatastoragespaceexistswherewecanfindtheperceptuallyidenticalpairsofworksofart,whicharehowevernotworksofart.Dantoarguesthattheidentificationoftheworkdependsontheidentificationoftheauthor,inthecaseofworksindistinguishablefromtheirnaturalpairs.Whenachild,aforgerandanartistcreatesimilarobjects,thesewillhavetheirsepa-rateidentities,sincetheyareembeddedindifferentart-historicaltraditions.ArthurC.Dantoproposesaconceptionofartwhichtakesthesocio-historicalbackgroundintoaccount,andapproachestheworksbasedontheirmetaphor-icstructure:worksofarthavearhetoricalstructure,wedonothavetoreadthemliterally,andweusethemtochangepeople’sattitudestowardscertainthings.Theinterpretationofworkofartasmetaphorisaproposalthatcanactuallyworkinthecaseofanyobject.Theproblemisonlythatmetaphoricalstructurecanbethegenus proximumofworksofart,butwearestillmissingthedifferentia specifica.Aswehaveseen,inthequestionofidentityofworksofartwecannotrelyonauniversallyacknowledged,alwaysworkingdefinition.Butalltheabovelisted theoriesofartgraspsomethingof importance,andcanbeapplied tospecificterritoriesofartwithsuccess.Thus,thebestwecandoisconsiderWittgenstein’sproposal,according towhichwearenot to lookforonees-sentialtraitthatcanbefoundineveryitem,butabatchofpropertieswhichletusdiscoverfamilytraitsinworksofart.Basedonthesefamilytraitswecangenericallyconcludetheidentificationofworksofartasworksofart.Wealsohavetobepreparedthatthelistofthesetraitswillgrowlonger,parallelwithartisticpractice.

12

Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting”,http://www.sharecom.ca/greenberg/modern-ism.html.AccessedonJuly22nd,2010.

13

George Dickie, “Defining Art”, American Philosophical Quarterly,Vol. 6,No. 3 (Jul.1969),pp.253–256.

14

Ibid.,p.255.



2. The uniqueness of the work of art (the specific thesis)

Inthecaseofworksofart,identitytakestheformofuniqueness,whichinthecaseofobjectscreatedbyhumanityisnotarule,butanexception.Inthecaseoftools,oreverydayobjects(bed,table,car,toothbrush,shoes,etc.)wedonottalkaboutindividuals,butpieces,items.Worksofartarenotfurtherpiecesorcopiesbutvindicateakindofidentityforthemselveswhichismoresimilartotheidentityofpersonsthanofobjects.Iapproachtheidentityofworksofartinthreesteps.Thefirstpointofviewistheorganic thesiswherethequestionarises,inwhattheuniquenessoftheworkofartcanbegraspedfromamate-rialpointofview.Inthesecondstep,Iwillinvestigatewhatinfluenceontheidentityoftheworkthehermeneuticthesishas,accordingtowhichtheworkendsintherecipient.InthethirdstepIwillinvestigatewhethertheauthorisapartoftheidentityofthework.

2.1. The organic thesis

Worksofartaretraditionallyconsideredindissolubleunities.Thus,whileapaintingorsculptureisaphysical,inorganicobject,itworksmoreasalivingorganism:asystemwhichcannotbeaddedtonortakenfromwithoutitlosingitsidentity.Itisimpossibletocutoffa5cmwidestripwithoutchangingthepaintingitself:evenifthestripwereempty,itslackwouldchangethepropor-tionsofthepicture,i.e.thepictureitself.Inthissense,theidentityoftheworkmayevenbemoredefinedthanthatoflivingorganisms.Aworkisnotonlydifferentbecauseitdepictsashoeoraboat,butalsobecauseofformaltraitsthatarenotofarepresentativenature:line,form,drawing,proportions,linesofforce,composition,colour,etc.Thesepartsoftheworkareunchangeablebecausetheydefinetheaestheticpropertiesofthework.Inthesixties,FrankSibley,approachingfromanalyticalphilosophy,raisedthequestionofaestheticproperties.Ifaestheticpropertiesseparablefromotherproperties exist, thesewill obviously be relevant toworks of art. Sibley’spremiseisexactlythisdifference:

“Many judgments about the shape, color, sound,wording, subjectmatter, or compositionofthings,includingworksofart,aresuchthatitwouldbeludicroustosuggestthataestheticsen-sitivity,perceptiveness,ortastehadbeenexhibitedinmakingthem.(…)Bycontrast,thereareotherjudgmentsthemakingofwhichcouldbeclearlybesaidtoexhibitanexerciseofaestheticsensitivityorperceptiveness.”15

Sibleycallspropertiesbelongingto thefirstcategorynon-aestheticproper-ties(e.g.large,circular,green,slow,monosyllabic),whilethesecondgroupistheoneofaestheticproperties(e.g.graceful,dainty,garish,aworkofartisbalanced,moving,powerful).Non-aestheticpropertiescanbenoticedbyanybody,buttheperceptionofaestheticpropertiescommandaspecialskill–taste.Aestheticdebatesarenotstartedbecausepeoplecannotseenon-aes-theticproperties,butbecausetheycannotseetheaestheticpropertiesrisingabovethese.WemightnoticethatSibleydoesnotspeakofthetraditional“grand”aestheticcategoriessuchasthebeautifulorthemajestic.Hecallsthelatterverdictive aesthetic judgements,astheseestablishwhetheraworkisgoodornot:

“Icalledthem‘verdicts’.Iregardthemasverydifferentfromjudgmentsofthesecondtype–forexample, thatsomethingisgaudy,orgraceful,orbalanced–andasraisinglargelydifferent,thoughoccasionallyoverlapping,questions…NowhereinmypaperdidIdiscussjudgmentofthefirsttype”.16



Sibleyassumesacomplicatedrelationshipamongthethreetypesofproper-ties, aswell as the judgements based on these.Whilewe cannot logicallydeduce aesthetic properties from non-aesthetic properties, there is a closerrelationship between aesthetic judgments and verdicts.There are aestheticpropertiesthatcanbyallmeansbepositivelyassessed(e.g.balance,grace,wit).Basedontheorganicthesis,theaestheticpropertiesoftheworkcanbere-gardedasitsessentialproperties.Twoquestionsarise,however:thefirstoneiswhetherthe aesthetic properties of the work are enough to define its iden-tity.The secondone iswhether the aesthetic properties of the work are in every case the necessary elements of the work’s identity.The first question arises in the case of the “perceptually indistinguishablepairs”,dealtwithprominentlybyArthurC.Danto.LetusratherstartwithanexampleGarryHagbergdiscussesinoneofhisessays.Hagbergtalksabouttwocaseswhichseeminglysupportthetheoryofimitation,i.e.arerepresen-tationalworks,andhepointsoutthefactthattheessenceoftheworksisstillnottheirsimilaritywithoutsideobjects.ThediscussionofoneofWatteau’sworks is especially relevant fromourpointofview.Hagbergdescribes itsthemeinthefollowingway:

“Theladiesarebeingescortedbythegentlemenontotheshipwhichwillcarrythembackfromtheisland.Thegentlemenseemtohastenthedeparturefromtheisland,whiletheladies,reluc-tanttoleavethelovers’retreat,seemtohesitate.”17

The question becomes complicated becausewe knowof two titles for thepainting:The Departure from Cythera,andThe Departure to Cythera.Hag-bergnotes:

“IfWatteau’stitleincluded‘to’ratherthan‘from’,thereluctanceoftheladiestakesonadiffe-rentmeaning,asdotheirexpressions”18.

Theexampleaboveprovesquiteconvincinglythataworkofartbecomesdif-ferent(itexpressesdifferentthings,itistobereaddifferently,hasadifferenteffect)ifitgetsadifferenttitle.19

ArthurC.Danto’sthoughtexperimentpointsinthesamedirection.ItstartsoutfromapaintingKierkegaarddescribedinEither/Or: thereisananecdoteabouttheartistcommissionedtodoamuraloftheIsraelitespassingthroughtheRedSea–sohepaintedthewallred,explainingthattheyhadreachedtheotherside,andtheEgyptiansalldrowned.Dantolistsvariousall-redpaint-ingsthat lookexactlythesame:onedescribedbyKierkegaardofIsraelitescrossingtheRedSea,onebyaDanishportraitisttitledKierkegaard’s Mood,Red Square (realist),Red Square (minimalistversion),Nirvana,Red Table

15

FrankSibley, “Aesthetic andNonaesthetic”, The Philosophical Revue,Vol.74,No.2(Apr.1965),pp.135–159

16

FrankSibley,“AestheticConcepts:ARejoin-der”,The Philosophical Review,Vol.72,No.1(Jan.1963),pp.79–83.

17

Garry Hagberg, “Aristotle’s ‘Mimesis’ andAbstractArt”,Philosophy,Vol. 59,No. 229(Jul.1984),pp.365–371.

18

Ibid.,p.370.

19

Dantoalsonotesthiscase.ArthurC.Danto,The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork2005,p.49.



Cloth,canvasgroundedinredleadpreparedbyGiorgione(notanworkofart),asurfacepaintedbutnotgroundedinredlead(notanworkofart,justathingwithpaintonit).Thenhenotes:

“Withthismyexhibitioniscomplete.Itscataloguewouldberathermonotonoussinceallpic-tures look thesame–despite thefact that it ismadeupofreproductionsof themostvariedkinds:therearehistoricalpaintings,psychologicalportraits,landscapes,geometricabstractions,religious works and still lives. In addition, it shows pictures of something that comes fromGiorgione’sworkshop,aswellasofsomethingwhichisjustathinganddoesnotaspiretothesublimerankofworkofart.”20

DantoalsodiscussesthecaseofDuchamp’ssnowshovelandthesnowshovelindistinguishable from it: oneweaccept asworkof art,while theother is“justanobject”.Ifthereisadifference,Dantoconcludes,itisnotbasedonaestheticproperties,asSibleydescribed:

“Ifaestheticresponseisalwaysandonlytowhatmeetstheeye(orearorwhateverothersense),itisdifficulttoseewhereaestheticdifferencecanlie,giventheindiscriminabilityofoursnowshovels.Soifthereistobeadifference,itmustlielogicallyhiddenfromthesenses.”21

Thesecasespointattheinadequacyoftheorganicthesis:itisnotonlyaes-theticproperties thatcount inworksofart,mostof the timeothercircum-stancesarealsorelevantcomponentsoftheiridentity:thetitle,theauthor,thecircumstancesofthecreationofthework.Theseaspectsaredeterminedbyinterpretation,thusDantoclaimsthatitisinterpretationthattransformsmate-rialobjectsintoworksofart:

“Itwillhavebeenobservedthatindiscernibleobjectsbecome,quitedifferentanddistinctworksofartbydintofdistinctanddifferentinterpretations,soIshallthinkofinterpretationsasfuncti-onswhichtransformmaterialobjectsintoworksofart.Interpretationisineffecttheleverwithwhichanobjectisliftedoutoftherealworldandintotheartworld,whereitbecomesvestedinoftenunexpectedraiment.Onlyinrelationshiptoaninterpretationisamaterialobjectanworkofart.”22

Danto’sanalysisnotonlyshowsthataestheticpropertiesarenotsufficientfordeterminingtheidentityofaworkofart,butalsothatitisinterpretationthatdecideswhichaestheticandnon-aestheticpropertiesbelongtothework.Theuniversalityoftheorganicthesisisquestionablefromafurtherpointofview,whichistheaspectofopen works.ItwasUmbertoEcothatdrewatten-tiontotheontologicalspecificityofopenworksinhiswritingofthesametitlepublishedin1962.23HereEcoprimarilyreferstosuchmusicalworkswheretheauthordoesnotfullydeterminethework,i.e.heleavesittotheperformerwhichgroupofnotestostartwith,orinwhichorderhe/sheplaysthesections.However,amonghisexampleswecanfindtwoworksofartaswell:Calder’mobiles,whicharelightweightstructuresthatreacttothemovementofair,changingtheirownspaceandform,aswellastheobjectcreatedbyBrunoMunari,whichisacolourfulcollagethattherecipientcanwatchthroughalanterna magica,andcanactuallycontroltheimagebyrotatingthelens.Therecipient’sinclusionintothecompletionofthework,whichwastheex-ceptionfromtheruleinthemiddleofthetwentiethcentury,occursmoreandmorefrequentlyfromthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,when“unfin-ished”,interactiveworksareoftencreatedthatgaintheirfinalformthroughthe recipient’s activity (andnotmerely interpretation).Visualmediaoffersanexcellentmediumfor this,with itsown transitory imagenotoccupyingspace(notexistinginacertainplace).The“Aura”exhibitionwasopenedinBudapestin2003,whichshowedworksmadewithdigitaltechnology,wherehalf of theworkswere “interactive also in a physical sense”.24 Of these I



foundveryexcitingGeorgeLegrady’sworkentitledPockets Full of Memo-ries,madeupofaninstallationandawebsiterelatingtoit.Theworkaskedthevisitor to scan an arbitraryobject thatwas foundon their person rightthereandthen,andtofilloutadigitalformansweringquestionsrelatedtotheobject.Thentheobjectswereclassifiedinasystembasedontheirsimilarproperties,andgotaplaceonatwo-dimensionalmapwherethevisitor’sowncommentsrelatedtotheobjectwerealsoseen.Withtheagreementofthevisi-tors,acontinuallygrowingdatabaseand,basedonthat,arelationship-basedobject-mapwereborn.Theworkisalsointerestingbecause,althoughitincor-poratedrandomness,still,itseemedrigorous,duetoitstable-typenature,andtherhythmofrandomlyrepeatedobject-types:hands,keys,ID-s.The recipient’s activitywas also requested in the trick-table of thepair ofauthorsZoltánSzegedy-Maszák–MártonFernezelyientitledAURA,wherethepictureformedonthemirror-likeflatsurfaceofthecupchangedbybe-ingmovedbytherecipient.Inthecaseofsimilarworkstheorganicthesisisuseless:wecannotdeterminewithwhichphysicalstateofitselfistheworkidentical.Moreexactly, theworkhasareal,non-changingframework(e.g.technical infrastructure, programme) and a bunchof possibilities that con-tributemorespectacularlytothedeterminingoftheidentityoftheworkthanthestableparts.Tosumup,wecansaythatalthoughtheorganicthesisandtheaestheticprop-ertiesbasedonnon-aestheticpropertiesrelatedtoitarevalidforasubstantialpartofarthistory,andareusefulinthedeterminingoftheidentitiesofworksofart,wecanpointoutmanyworksintheartofthetwentiethcenturywhereperceptualpropertiesarenotnecessary,norsufficientfortheidentificationofspecificworksofart.

2.2. The hermeneutical thesis

Theaboveconclusionstillstandsifweacceptthethesisaccordingtowhich“thereaderistheonewhofinishesthework”,i.e.“onlyintheinteractionoftextandrecipientdoesthetextbecomeaworkofart”.25Thedialogicrecep-tion-modelofhermeneuticsconsidersthemomentumofinterpretationessen-tial,which it holds aspartof thework, andnot a consequencedetachablefromthework.Iftheinterpretationhappensbythemergingofthehorizonoftheworkandoftherecipient,obviouslytherewillbeasmanyinterpretationsasrecipients.Andiftheinterpretationispartofthework,thentheseemingidentityoftheworkwillbeendlesslyfragmented.TakeforexampleVanGogh’spaintingwhichdepictsshoes.Seeminglytheidentityoftheworkisnotatquestionhere,fixphysicalpropertiesensurethe

20

Arthur C. Danto, A közhely színeváltozása,(The Transfiguration of the Common Place)EnciklopédiaKiadó,Budapest2003,p.16.

21

A. C. Danto, The Philosophical Disenfran-chisement of Art, p.26.

22

Ibid.,p. 39.

23

Umberto Eco, Nyitott mű (Opera aperta),EurópaKönyvkiadó,Budapest2006.

24

Anikó Erdősi, Anyagtalan aura. AURA, a technikai reprodukálhatóság korszaka után.Médiaművészeti kiállítás a C3 és a Millenáris közös szervezésében, Millenáris, Budapest2003.október31–november30.http://www.balkon.hu/balkon03_12/02erdosi.html. Ac-cessedonJuly24th,2010.

25

PaulRicoeur,Válogatott irodalmi tanulmán-yok(Selected Literary Studies),Osiris,Buda-pest1999,p.294.



work’sidentityanduniqueness.ItisthepaintingHeideggerusesasastartingpointinhiswritingentitledThe Origin of the Work of Art toillustratehowaworkofartopensupaworld.AccordingtoHeidegger’sfamousanalysis,thepaintingdepictsapeasantwoman’sshoes,andthephilosophergivesatouch-ingdescriptionofthepainting:

“Fromthedarkopeningoftheworninsidesoftheshoesthetoilsometreadoftheworkerstandsforth.Inthestifflysolidheavinessoftheshoesthereistheaccumulatedtenacityofherslowtrudgethroughthefar-spreadingandever-uniformfurrowsofthefield,sweptbyarawwind.Ontheleatherthereliesthedampnessandsaturationofthesoil.Underthesolesthereslidesthelonelinessofthefield-pathastheeveningdeclines.Intheshoestherevibratesthesilentcalloftheearth,itsquietgiftoftheripeningcornanditsenigmaticself/refusalinthefallowdesolationofthewintryfield.Thisequipmentispervadedbyuncomplaininganxietyaboutthecertaintyofbread,thewordlessjoyofhavingoncemorewithstoodwant,thetremblingbeforetheadventofbirthandshiveringatthesurroundingmenaceofdeath.Thisequipmentbelongstotheearthanditisprotectedintheworldofthepeasantwoman.Fromoutofthisprotectedbelongingtheequipmentitselfrisestoitsresting-in-self.”26

ThetroublebeganwhenMeyerSchapiro,withtheaccuracytypicalofana-lyticphilosophers,identifiedthepaintingHeideggerwroteabout.Infact,VanGoghdoesnothaveone,buteightpaintingsthesubjectofwhichareshoesorboots,andHeidegger’sdescriptionfitsmost.ThusSchapiroaskedHeideggerwhichpaintinghemeant,andidentifiedan1886pictureofapairofbootsinthisway.27UsingVanGoghandGauguin’scorrespondence,healsofoundoutthatitwasmadeofVanGogh’sownshoesthathadspecialsignificancefortheirowner.Basedonthis,Schapiropresentstheshoesasametaphoroftheartist’slife,relyingonbothbiographicaldataandperceptualdescription.28

The above example shows that even in the case of a traditional painting,whereidentificationasaworkofartisbeyonddoubt,andwherethephysi-calpropertiesoftheworkarefixed,theidentityoftheworkdependsonwhothedepictedshoesbelongto,whichcannotbedecidedatallsolelybasedonperceptualproperties.Somuchso,thatwecanalmosttalkabouttwodifferentworks.Thusthehermeneuticperspectivealsoconfirmsthehypothesisthatinthecaseofworksofart,thenon-perceptualpropertiescontributesignificantlytothedeterminationofthework’sidentity.

2.3. The question of authorship

There isanon-perceptualproperty thatcontributes in thegreatestmeasuretothedefinitionofthework’sidentity:theauthorofthework.Somuchso,thatthenameofawell-knownauthorfunctionsasagenus(“thisisaRem-brandt!”).Theauthorweighssomuchinthevalueofaworkthatthenameofan“in”artistisguaranteeenoughforthequalityofthework.Thiswassonaturallyanormforafewhundredyearsthat,nextto“aestheticdistance”and“disinterestedpleasure”,“fineartistheartofthegenius”couldbebuiltintoKant’sCritique of Judgement.Ifweapproachthequestionhis-torically, the ideaof authorshipdoesnot seemsouniversal. In theMiddleAgesawayofthinkingprevailedthatheldtrueideastobecomingdirectlyfromGod,thusitcouldseemcompletelyincidentalwhoitwasthatGodusedasatooltorevealthetruth.Theauthor’sself-consciousnessisaproductofmodernity:itcamespectacu-larlyintotheforegroundduringtheRenaissance.Inthecaseofworksofartthe signatureof the authorbecomes akindof guarantee. It guarantees thework’s“authenticity”,thetruthofitsidentity.Theauthorisoneofthemaincomponentsofthework’sidentity–preciselybecauseofthis,theoriginalpic-



tureistobecarefullydistinguishedfromthecopy(thatismade,forexample,withthegoaloflearning),andfromtheforgedwork,whichwantstostealtheoriginal’sidentity.Theideaofauthorshipitselfisnotasobviousasitappears.Ontheonehand,itisnotquiteclearwhyacopythatisheldtobeoriginalshouldloseitsvalueonlybecauseitturnsoutthatsomebodyelseisitsauthor.Ontheotherhand,whyshouldasignatureautomaticallyconfervaluetoawork?Iwouldliketoevoketwocases.OneisthecaseofHanvanMeegeren,whopaintedVermeersinthethirties:i.e.veryauthenticcanvasesthatdealtwithnewthemesinVermeer’sstyle(e.g.religiousthemesthatarenottypicalofVermeer).ThebestcontemporarycriticsvouchedfortheauthenticityofthesecanvasesasVermeers,andChrist and the Disciples at Emmaus,whichwasaconvincingfake, wasdeemedtobemorevaluablethanthepreviouslyknownVermeers.HanvanMeegeren’sscamwasdiscoveredwhen theyfoundoutthatduringtheSecondWorldWarhesoldaVermeertoGöring,andafterthewartheDutchgovernmentchargedhimwithtreason.Thepunishmentwouldhavebeendeath.HanvanMeegerenhadahardtimeconvincingthejudgesthat the picturesweremade by himself: in jail hemade anotherVermeer,proving his innocence in the treason trial.The case raises the question ofwhyChrist and the Disciples at Emmaus,soadmiredbycritics,lostitsvaluewhenitturnedoutthatitwaspaintedbyvanMeegeren.WhywastheDutchgovernmentreadytoexecuteamanforsellingaVermeertoGöring,butdidnotcarethatavanMeegerenwassoldtotheenemy?Christ and the Disciples at Emmaus–althoughphysically,perceptuallyremainedthesameobject,itseems,changeditsidentitytogetherwithitsauthor.Thesecondcase isavaguerumouraboutDalísigningblankcanvasesandsheetsofpaper inhis lastyearsonwhich forgedworksappeared, thus themuseumsandgalleries treatworkscreated inDalí’s lastyearscarefully. Ifthisistrue,thenthequestioniswhetherherethesignatureworksasthees-sentialelementofthework’sidentity.Ifthesignaturedoesnotwork,wehavetodeterminebasedonmuchmoreuncertainandcontroversialstylistictraitswhetherapaintingis“aDalí”or“notaDalí”.AsimilarcaseisGiorgiodeChiricowho,ontheonehand,asafamousartist,forged“earlydeChiricos”,ontheotherhanddeniedauthorshipofworksthatwerehelddeChiricosbymuseumsandprivatecollections.InthecaseofVanMeegerenandDalí’ssignedcanvases,itisquiteeasytode-termine,startingfromthetraditionaltheoreticframeworkthatwearedealingwithforgedworks.Inthetwentiethcentury,however,wemeetphenomenathat strongly question the idea of authorship.RolandBarthes’smeme-sus-piciousexpression–thedeathoftheAuthor–pointsoutacomplexpheno-menon:theauthorsarestartingtoabandontheirworks.Theaestheticsofgen-iusisbeginningtobeexhaustedbythemiddleofthetwentiethcentury,andtheauthor(andtheirintention)isnotsurroundedbysuchrespectasinthe19thcentury.Wecanobserveseveralsignsofthisshift.

26

MartinHeidegger,A műalkotás eredete (The Origin of the Work of Art),EurópaKönyvki-adó,Budapest1988,pp.57–58.

27

MeyerSchapiro,“FurtherNotesonHeideggerandvanGogh”, in:MeyerSchapiro, Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and So-

ciety(Selected Papers,vol.4),Braziller,NewYork1994.

28

MeyerSchapiro,“TheStillLifeasaPersonalObject”(1968),in:M.Schapiro, Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society.



Onesuchsign is the ideapromotedby surrealistsofautomaticwriting (ordrawing),throughwhichthesubconsciousspeaksdirectly,withoutthecontroloftheego.Thetheoryofgeniusalwaysemphasisedthatremainderthroughwhich the workings of genius differs from the usual, rational workings ofpeople,thatirrationalremainderthatisneededforageniustocreateamaster-piece.Fromthesurrealistpointofview,however,theirrational,subconsciouselementisnotaremainder,butthefirstmotorofcreation,andtheprocessofcreationputstheartist’spersonalitywithinbrackets.Althoughitwascharac-teristicofsurrealistartiststohaveastrongartisticconsciousnessandtoworkconsciouslyontheirgeniusimage(e.g.thefollowingsentenceofDalíisoftenquoted:“Everymorninguponawakening,Iexperienceasupremepleasure:thatofbeingSalvadorDalí”), regardless, theuseofautomaticwritinganddrawingindicatestheauthor’swithdrawalfrombehindtheirwork.Thegenreof the ready-madepoints in the samedirection:here theauthordoesnotcreateanobject,butliftsitfromitssurroundings,andthismaybetheminimalgesturethatwecancallcreation–theminimalityofauthorship.Traditionallytheauthorlefttheir“mark”ontheworkofart:e.g.itishardtoconfuseRembrandt’sstylewithGauguin’s.Inready-madetheauthordoesnotwanttoseehis“mark”ontheworkofart.Thesituationisoftenthesamewithsomeworksofconceptualart:JosephKossuth’sOne and Three Chairsdoesnotcarryanyspecificperceptualproperties,RobertBarry’sAll the Things I Know but of Which I am not at the Moment Thinking – 1:36 PM June 15. 1969alsolacksthemarkoftheauthor’shands–whatMarcelDuchampmockinglycalled“lapate”(paws).Wecaninterpretsimilarlythestructurallyunfinished(usingUmbertoEco’sexpression–“worksinmovement”29)orinteractiveworks:heretheauthordenounces their privilege to decidewhatwill be thework’s final and un-changeableform,moreover,thefinalformoftheworkwillremainamysterytothem.Theworkcomesoutoftheauthor’shandsasapossibility,andlivesitsownlifeindependentoftheauthor.Inthecasesdiscussedsofar,theauthorvoluntarilyretiresfrombehindtheirwork.Theactionofappropriation,however,happenswithoutconsultingtheauthor,andtheidentityoftheworkisdefinedbytwokindsofauthorship:thatoftheoriginalcreator,andthatoftheartistappropriatingit.ElaineSturtevant,knownasthe“copyingartist”exclusivelycreatedprecisecopiesofotherartists’works,what’smore,ofsuchartiststhatshestartedcop-yingevenbefore theybecamefamous:AndyWarhol,JosephBeuys,FrankStella.ItisratherdifficulttoestablishtheidentityofaworkElaineSturtevantpaintedofAndyWarhol’sserigraphydepictingaflowerwhereheusedPa-triciaCaulfieldphotographer’swork (withoutasking thepermissionof thephotographer–thisresultedinacopyrightlawsuit).Also,itisquitedifficulttodistinguishbetweenFrankStella’spaintingofstrictlygeometric,parallelblackstripsdatingfromhisblackperiod,andElaineSturtevant’scopymadeofit.Theyarenotdifferentinaperceptuallyrelevantway;still,oneisapaint-ingbyStella,theotherbyElaineSturtevant.The oeuvre of appropriating artist Sherrie Levine is worrying in the sameway,especiallyher“AfterWalkerEvans”series.WalkerEvanswasafamousphotographerwhotravelledAmericainthethirtiesandtookverywell-knownsociophotos.SherrieLevinephotographedthesefromcataloguesinthesev-enties, andexhibited themunderherownnamewith theabovementionedtitle.Hereagainwemeettwoworksthatareperceptuallyonlyslightlydif-ferent,butthatarestilldifferent,namely,onthebasisofauthorship.Sherrie



Levine’sworksareofteninterpretedascriticismoftheconceptsofauthorshipandauthenticity.WhileSturtevanttruly,physicallyrecreatestheworks,andheroeuvrecanbeinterpretedashomagetoothers’works,aswellascontri-butiontotheirfurtherexistenceintheiroriginalityanduniqueness,SherrieLevine’sandtheappropriatingartists’workscanbereadascritiquesoftheconceptsworking in theartisticworld. It ishard tosurpassSherrieLevineinthequestioningofauthorship–theAmericaninternetartistbornin1977,MichaelMandiberg,managedtodothis.HecreatedanonlineshopwhereyoucangetoriginalMandibergcopiesofSherrieLevine’s“AfterWalkerEvans”series,completewithcertificateoforiginality.30

Conclusion

Althoughitwouldbeusefultohaveatheorythatwouldestablishtheproper-tiesthatdefineworksofart,andmaketheiridentitiesunquestionable–unfor-tunatelywedonothavesuchatheory.Forthegenericthesis–i.e.thedecisionof“whataworkofartis”,thatwecouldboildowntoonedefinitionorarttheory–wecannotfindatheorythatisacceptablefromeverypointofview.Wecanconcludethatthecenturylongmonopolyofthemimetictheorywasoverbythe19thcentury,andcompetingtheorieshaveappeared(artisexpression,artisaform,theworkofartisanartefactthatisworthassessing,etc.).Itseemsitisimpossibletodefineart,wecanonlyestablishfamilyresemblancesbetweenworksofart.Maybewehavetoacceptthatindifferentareas(artforms,genres,worksofart)differentvo-cabulariescanmoreorlessbeapplied,butthereisnouniversalvocabulary.In the case of the specific thesis the situation is just as colourful and un-settling.Inthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcenturywecouldlearnthatinthecaseofworksofartthenon-aestheticpropertiesgivethebasisforaestheticproperties,andtheseformtheessenceofworksofart.Atthesametime,criti-cismbrokewithauthor-centredness,andtheideaofthe“intentionalfallacy”31becamewidelyaccepted.Thiskindofapproach,whichreduces thework’sidentitytoitsstructuralproperties,andseestheauthor’sidentityirrelevant,seemstobewithdrawingtothebenefitofwidercontextualism.Fromthecaseofperceptuallyindistinguishablepairswefindoutthatperceptualpropertiesarenotenoughtodefinetheidentityofworksofart,andwealsoneedtotakenon-perceptualpropertiesintoaccount,forexampletheauthor,orthehistori-cal,culturalcontext.Artists themselvesquestiononeof themost indisputable traitsofworksofart–thefactthatitisthecreationofanauthor–byusingthemethodof“ap-propriation”,andthewaytheydealwiththeideaofauthorshipintheirworks,andtheirartisticattitudes.Lookingattheproblemsraisedbythequestionoftheidentityofworksofart,itmayseemthatwehavereachedaporia.Ithinkwecanstillstatesometheses:

29

Suchworks that “are able to assumediffer-ent,unforeseeableandphysicallynotrealisedstructures”.UmbertoEco,Nyitott mű.EurópaKiadó,Budapest2006,p.87.

30

See:http://www.aftersherrielevine.com/imagesA.html.AccessedonJuly24,2010.

31

MonroeBeardsley’sthesis,accordingtowhichtheintentionoftheauthorisirrelevantfromthepointofviewofinterpretation.



1. Wehavetoresigntheideathattheworkofartcanbedefinedbasedonspe-cificproperties.IfindWittgenstein’sideaof“familyresemblances”moreuseful,basedonwhichworkofart-groupscanbeidentified.

2. Thenextchallengewehavetofaceisthemobilityofboundariesbetweenartandnon-art,whichalsomeansthattheidentityoftheworkofartisalsoinmotion.

3. Artisticattitudesofmodernityquestionboththeidentityoftheauthorandofthework,andwemustacknowledgethis.

4. However,theoldornewerexplanatorymodels(mimetic,expressionism,formalism,etc.)mustnotberejected:althoughnoneofthemcanbeuni-versalised,eachofthemfitssomegroupsofworksofart.

Asnotedabove,thequestionoftheidentityofworksofartincontemporaryartismorecomplicatedthanever.Theworkofartisnotastableobject;theauthorisnotasimplyidentifiablesubject.Thewholeart-historicalcontext,thesocialcontext,andtheprocessofreceptionareequallypartsoftheiden-tityofawork.Thefragmentationoftheidentityofaworkofartisparallelwiththedisplacementsinpersonalidentity,wellmirroredbythestatementofHungarianwriterPéterEsterházyaboutthe“I”: the“I”inthepost-modernis“afiction,wherewecanbeco-authorsatmost”.Similarly,theauthorofaworkofartisactuallynotthedefiningforceintheidentityofawork,onlythatidentity’sco-author.

Gizela Horvath

Čijecipele?Identitetuumjetničkimdjelima

SažetakProblem identiteta u svijetu umjetnosti je važan iz mnogih perspektiva. Ovaj rad ima namjeru raspraviti identitet umjetničkih djela. Rasprava je izvedena u tri koraka: problem identifikaci-je predmeta kao umjetničkog djela, problem relevantnih svojstava umjetničkog djela i pitanje autora kao odlučujuće (ili ne) za identifikaciju umjetničkog djela. Ova pitanja su se otvorila evolucijom umjetničke prakse i teorije u prošlom stoljeću. Pojava ready-madea destabilizirala je čvrsti identitet umjetničkog djela te nametnula zadatak odluke o razlici između umjetničkog djela i njegovog perceptivno identičnog para. Tradicionalna relevantna svojstva izgubila su svoj značaj u konceptualnoj umjetnosti, stoga moramo odlučiti koja se relevantna svojstva, čak i danas, pridaju umjetničkim djelima. Konačno, praksa posuđivanja u postmodernoj umjetnosti dovodi u pitanje pojam umjetnika i smisao izvornog stvaralaštva.

Ključneriječiidentitetumjetničkihdjela,definicijeumjetnosti,jedinstvenostumjetničkihdjela,autorstvo

Gizela Horvath

Wessen Schuhe?Identität der Kunstwerke

ZusammenfassungDie Problemstellung der Identität in der Welt der Kunst ist aus allerlei Perspektiven gewichtig. Dieser Artikel strebt eine Debatte über die Identität der Kunstwerke an. Die Diskussion wird in drei Schritten aufgebaut: die Frage der Identifizierung eines Objektes als Kunstwerk, das Problem der relevanten Eigenschaften eines Kunstwerks und letzten Endes die Frage des Autors



als ausschlaggebend (oder nicht) für die Identifizierung des Kunstwerks. Diese Thematik wurde aufgeworfen gleichlaufend mit der Evolution der Kunstpraxis samt – theorie im vergangenen Jahrhundert. Die Erscheinung des „Readymades“ hatte die feste Identität des Kunstwerks der Stabilität beraubt, und es gilt eben, die Kluft zwischen dem Kunstwerk und dessen perzeptiv identischem Paar zu detektieren. Traditionell bedeutsame perzeptive Charakteristika haben deren Tragweite in der konzeptuellen Kunst eingebüßt, sodass wir urteilen müssen, welch rele-vante Eigentümlichkeiten, sogar gegenwärtig, den Kunstwerken beizumessen sind. Im Endeffekt stellt die Praxis der Aneignung innerhalb der postmodernen Kunst den Begriff des Künstlers sowie des Sinns der authentischen Schaffung infrage.

SchlüsselwörterIdentitätderKunstwerke,DefinitionenderKunst,EinzigartigkeitderKunstwerke,Autorschaft

Gizela Horvath

Les chaussures de qui ?L’identité des oeuvres d’art

RésuméLe problème de l’identité dans le monde de l’art est pertinent sous de nombreux aspects. Cet article vise à examiner l’identité de l’oeuvre d’art. L’examen est construit en trois étapes : le problème d’identification d’un objet en tant qu’oeuvre d’art, le problème des propriétés perti-nentes d’une oeuvre d’art et la question de l’auteur de l’oeuvre comme décisive (ou pas) pour l’identification d’une oeuvre d’art. Ces questions se sont posées avec l’évolution de la pratique artistique et de la théorie de l’art au siècle dernier. L’apparition du “readymade” a déstabilisé l’identité solide de l’oeuvre d’art de sorte que nous devons maintenant déterminer quelle est la différence entre une oeuvre d’art et son pendant perceptuellement identique. Les caractéris-tiques traditionnellement pertinentes ayant perdu leur importance dans l’art conceptuel, nous devons déterminer quelles sont les caractéristiques pertinentes, même aujourd’hui, des oeuvres d’art. Enfin, la pratique de l’appropriation dans l’art post-moderne défie la notion d’artiste et celle du sens de la création authentique.

Mots-clésidentitédesoeuvresd’art,définitionsdel’art,unicitédesoeuvresd’art,paternité

whose shoes? - hrfd.hr · pdf fileaims at discussing the identity of the work of art. the...

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