why aren’t brazil and mexico rich? edmar bacha and regis bonelli course on "political,...
TRANSCRIPT
Why aren’t Brazil and Mexico rich?
Edmar Bacha and Regis Bonelli
Course on "Political, Social, and Economic Development in Brazil”
ILAS, Columbia University October 7, 2015
GDP per capita relative to US, 1950-2014 (convergence only through the early 1980s)
(2014 USD, PPPs)1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50BRA / US MEX / US
27%
32%
Brazil and Mexico: GDP growth 10y moving average, 1950-2014 (% p.y.)
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
MEXICO BRAZIL
What went wrong?
• Growth collapses: periodization and role of capital accumulation
• Decomposition of labor productivity growth: capital deepening and total factor productivity (TFP)
• (Terms of trade role in measured TFP growth)• Structural heterogeneity of labor productivity growth.
Decomposition according to: 1. Regions 2. Traded and nontraded sectors3. Firm size 4. Labor informality
Brazil’s and Mexico’s growth periodization 1950-2014 (% a.a.)
Periods Brazil Mexico
Brazil's average
GDP growth
Mexico's average
GDP growth
Post WW-II Golden Age 1950-1980 1950-1981 7.4% 6.8%
Post-1980 Near Stagnation 1981-2014 1982-2014 2.6% 2.2%
Lost Decade 1981-1992 1982-1993 1.4% 1.6%
Reforms w/Subpar Growth 1993-2003 1994-2001 2.8% 3.0%
China Syndrome 2004-2010 2002-2010 4.5% 1.9%Day after Great Recession 2011-2014 2011-2014 2.1% 2.9%
Brazil: Capital stock and GDP growth rates, 1950-2014 (% p.y.)
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
K' Y'
Mexico: Capital stock and GDP growth rates, 1950-2014 (% p.y.)
195
0195
2195
4195
6195
8196
0196
2196
4196
6196
8197
0197
2197
4197
6197
8198
0198
2198
4198
6198
8199
0199
2199
4199
6199
8200
0200
2200
4200
6200
8201
0201
2201
4
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
K' Y'
Decomposition of capital accumulation
Decomposition of the capital stock growth rate (K’)From the savings-investment identity in current prices, we derive:
K' = s(1/p)v – δwhere:
s = savings rate (includes foreign savings but excludes inventory changes) p = relative price of investment (ratio between the deflators of fixed investment and GDP)v = output-capital ratioδ = depreciation rateIn the following, the terms in the right-hand-side are taken as given parameters (per period). No independent investment function!
Brazil: decomposition of K’
Mexico: decomposition of K’
GDP per worker growth
• Neoclassical analysis of the contributions of the increase in the capital-labor ratio and of total factor productivity (TFP) for the growth of GDP per worker
Brazil: periodization of output per worker growth y' = αk' + TFP’
Mexico: periodization of output per worker growth y' = αk' + TFP’
Parentheses: TFP growth in Brazil in 2004-2010:reforms or economic cycle plus terms of trade?
• Lisboa and Pessoa (2013) conjecture that the acceleration of TFP’ in 2004-10 would have been a consequence of the maturation of the economic reforms during the Cardoso administration and the first two years of Lula’s first term
• But the rapid increase of TFP could also have been a consequence of the rise of China, which beneffited Brazil and hurt Mexico
• Economic literature documents association between changes in the terms of trade and in TFP
• It also documents procyclicality of TFP
Brazil: TFP and terms of trade (levels, 1980=1)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6TFP BRA nível ToT BRA nível
Mexico: TFP and terms of trade (levels, 1980=1)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.75
0.85
0.95
1.05
TFP MEX nível ToT MEX nível
OLS regressions of TFP’ on ToT’ and GAP’ confirm such relationships
Brazil and Mexico, 1981-2014Brazil and Mexico, 1981-2014 (34 observations) Dep. Var. Dep. Var. Dep.Var. Dep. Var.
Variable TFP' Brazil (1) TFP' Brazil (2) TFP' Mexico (3) TFP' Mexico (4)
Constant -0,073 0,098 -0,210 -0,449(t-ratio) (-0,26) (-0,42) (-0,76) (-2,18)Terms of trade rate of change 0,080 0,065 0,177 0,092(t-ratio) (-1,94) (-1,93) (-4,63) (-2,95)Utilization gap change (Brazil) -0,915 (t-ratio) (-5,66) Output gap change (Bra) HP filter -0,876 (t-ratio) (-7,80) Unemployment rate change (Mex) -1,604 (t-ratio) (-5,50) Output gap change (Mex) HP filter -0,712(t-ratio) (-8,96)Adjusted R2 0,671 0,775 0,669 0,818Standard error of regression 1,60 1,33 1,58 1,18DW 1,68 1,21 1,90 1,61F-ratio 34,68 57,68 34,29 75,02
TFP-Brazil (level): (1) technical progress equals to zero between 1980 and 2014: post-1992 growth only compensates for the initial loss; (2) regression
(eq. 1) understimates cycle, leaving space for other explanatory variables19
8019
8119
8219
8319
8419
8519
8619
8719
8819
8919
9019
9119
9219
9319
9419
9519
9619
9719
9819
9920
0020
0120
0220
0320
0420
0520
0620
0720
0820
0920
1020
1120
1220
1320
14
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
Observed Fitted
TFP-Mexico (level): (1) technical progress falls in the lost decade, and remains at a level 20% below its initial value afterwards; (2) regression (eq.
3) captures correctly the TFP movements in the period 19
8019
8119
8219
8319
8419
8519
8619
8719
8819
8919
9019
9119
9219
9319
9419
9519
9619
9719
9819
9920
0020
0120
0220
0320
0420
0520
0620
0720
0820
0920
1020
1120
1220
1320
14
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
Observed Fitted
Growth and structural heterogeinity in four dimensions
• Paralelism in the evolution of macro variables is not replicated when structural evolution is observed in more detail:– By states, according to their per capita incomes– By traded and nontraded sectors– By firm size– By labor informality
• Analysis of structural heterogeneity evolution makes it clear that Mexico and Brazil each became unhappy in its own way
Regional dimension: disparity in the dispersion of per capita income by states
(sigma:standard deviation/unweighted mean)
0.46
0.50
0.54
0.58
0.62
0.66
0.70
0.74
0.78Sigma Mexico 1990 - 2013
Sigma Brazil 1990-2012
Traded v. nontraded sectors, 1989-2009:evolution of relative labor productivities
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9Bra trade /nontrad Mex trade /nontrad
Mexico: establishment size and productivity gains (McKinsey; Ind, Com, Serv)
Productivity growth increases strongly with firm size
Firm size Employment share (%) Productivity growth (%)
1998 1998-2008
0 - 10 40 -6.5
11 -30 11 -2.2
30 - 100 12 0.2
101 - 250 10 2.9
251 - 500 8 2.4
501 + 20 5.9
Total 100 2.0
Brazil: establishment size and productivity gains in manufacturing, 1996-2013
Inverse relationship between size and productivity growth
Average Productivity Growth Rates (% p.a.)
Firm size Employment share (ave. 2007-13)
1996-2007
2007-2013
1996-2013
Less than 10 employees 9.5 -- 3.8 --
10 to 29 13.5 -- 1.5 --
30 - 99 16.4 -2.3 0.5 -0.7
100 - 249 11.1 -1.3 -0.2 -1.2
250 - 499 8.6 0.0 -3.2 -1.3
500 + 40.8 0.0 -2.8 -0.7
Total 100.0 -0.3 -1.6 -0.7
Brazil: Microdata analysis also finds negative relationship between firm size and productivity gains in 1997-2010 in 18 out of 20 manufacturing
sectors (firms with 30+ employees)
Informality (informal workers/total employment)
• Informality rates by states, Mexico and Brazil• Two exercises:– Relationship between informality and states’ per
capita income– Evolution of informality rates
Mexico, 2012Informality by states
Oxa
caG
uerr
ero
Chia
pas
Hid
algo
Tlax
cala
Pueb
laM
icho
acán
de
Oca
mpo
Vera
cruz
de
Igna
cio
de la
Lla
veN
ayar
itZa
cate
cas
Mor
elos
Yuca
tán
Gua
naju
ato
Taba
sco
Cam
pech
eN
acio
nal
San
Luis
Pot
osí
Méx
ico
Dur
ango
Jalis
coCo
lima
Sina
loa
Qui
ntan
a Ro
oTa
mau
lipas
Agu
asca
lient
esQ
ueré
taro
Dis
trit
o Fe
dera
lSo
nora
Baja
Cal
iforn
iaCo
ahui
la d
e Za
rago
zaCh
ihua
hua
Nue
vo L
eón
Baja
Cal
iforn
ia S
ur
020406080
10080.0
59.6
42.0
Informal employment rates in the federative unities. Mexico, 2012
Brazil, 2012:Informality by states
Mara
nh
ão
Pia
uí
Pará
Ceará
Para
íba
Bah
ia
Acre
Am
azo
nas
To
can
tin
s
Serg
ipe
Ala
go
as
Rio
Gra
nd
e d
o N
ort
e
Ro
raim
a
Pern
am
bu
co
Ro
nd
ôn
ia
Am
ap
á
Nacio
nal
Go
iás
Esp
írit
o S
an
to
Mato
Gro
sso
Min
as G
era
is
Rio
Gra
nd
e d
o S
ul
Mato
Gro
sso
do S
ul
Para
ná
Rio
de J
an
eir
o
San
ta C
ata
rin
a
São
Pau
lo
Dis
trit
o F
ed
era
l0
20
40
60
80
10076.5
47.6
30.0
Informal employment rates by states. Brazil, 2012
Inverse relationship between informality and states’ per capita incomeFor each 10% increase in Ypc informality declines 2.3pp
Mexico has more informality than Brazil, despite being 15% richerDummy Campeche: distorting effect of oil extraction on Ypc
Dep. Var.: informality rate
Adjusted R-squared 0.730Standard error 6.208Observations 59 states
Coefficients SError Stat t P-valueIntercept 266.8 17.8 15.0 0,000%log (PIB pc PPP) -22.8 1.9 -12.0 0,000%Dummy MEX 10.5 1.7 6.3 0,000%Dummy Campeche 50.0 7.4 6.7 0,000%
Brazil and Mexico: informality rates since the 1990s
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
Brazil - PNAD MEX: tasa de ocupación em el sector informalRate of informality - INEGI
Tentative conclusions
• Mexico opened up its economy and succeeding in developing a 1st class industrial sector in the rich North, but didn’t achieve domestic integration– Dynamism of the big exporting firms did not propagate to the small, informal,
nontraded producing firms in the poor South. The result was stagnation of aggregate labor productivity
• Brazil managed to reduce polarization in several dimensions– But in contrast to Mexico its big manufacturing firms did not integrate into the
international economy and thus showed no gains in productivity – This generated little impulse for the rest of the economy, leading the country to
craw along a low productivity path—except when the commodity lottery dictated otherwise
• Lessons of the two experiences: domestic and international integration have to be pursued both at the same time—which seems easier said than done for big middle-income countries!