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Why do Political Elites like Participatory Democracy?

The Beliefs of Constituency Candidates in German State Elections1

Thomas Zittel, Goethe University Frankfurt2

Olga Herzog, Goethe University Frankfurt3

Abstract

Representative institutions are in the defensive in many Western democracies. Opinion

polls demonstrate wide spread demands for greater public involvement in politics.

Surprisingly, political elites are all too ready to join these battle cries for participatory

democracy. This paper asks, why those that benefit most in representative settings tend to

support alternative participatory modes of politics. It portrays this phenomenon as an

emotional reaction in the electoral game. We envision electoral defeat to translate in a sense

of frustration about the current state of democracy. Furthermore, we envision this frustration

to affect elites’ preferences for participatory institutions. In this paper, we test this argument

on the basis of data resulting from two new German candidate studies conducted at the state

level and in light of alternative theories on democratic reform.

Keywords

Representative democracy, political elites, constituency candidates, political beliefs,

political psychology

1 Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference 2014, Glasgow/Scotland, 3-6

September. We thank Annika Hennl for helpful comments on a first draft of the paper. 2 Thomas Zittel is Professor for Comparative Politics at Goethe-University Frankfurt,

zittel@soz.uni-frankfurt.de 3 Olga Herzog is Lecturer at Goethe-University Frankfurt, herzog@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

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The new politics of participatory democracy

Representative institutions are in the defensive in many Western democracies. Opinion

polls demonstrate wide spread demands for greater public involvement in political decision-

making (Dalton 2007; Dalton, Bürklin, and Drummond 2001; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995;

Norris 1999). Governments face increasing levels of public protest in their efforts to

implement public policies (Brettschneider and Schuster 2013). New parties, political

organizations, and social movements actively promote new modes of participatory decision-

making (della Porta 2013).

Impressionistic evidence suggests that political elites are all too ready to join these

battle cries for participatory democracy. This is true at the rhetorical level and concerns floor

speeches, party convention addresses, and media announcements. For example, Thomas

Oppermann, current Speaker of the Social Democratic party group in the German Bundestag,

just recently declared in a floor speech the time ripe for bringing citizens back in by opening

up representative processes to public participation.4 Elite support for participatory instruments

of democracy also manifests itself in concrete policy initiatives across Western democracies

(Cain, Scarrow, and Dalton 2003; Geissel and Newton 2011; Saward 2006; Smith 2009; Zittel

2010; Zittel and Fuchs 2006). For example, in Germany the red-green government of

chancellor Schröder introduced a bill to complement the country’s staunchly representative

federal system of government with direct forms of decision-making. In the UK, the House of

Commons experimented with citizen consultations aimed at opening up committee processes

to the public.

At face value, this support for participatory politics from above is counter-intuitive and

most puzzling. Technically, from the perspective of elites, representative institutions secure

privileged access to public policies and thus from a strategic perspective should be viewed in

4 See Drs. 17/13873; http://www.spdfraktion.de/themen/mehr-bürgerbeteiligung-auf-

bundesebene (accessed 23.2.14)

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most positive ways (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2002). Furthermore, technically, any

increase in opportunities to participate in public policy making functions as a constraint on

political elites that should be by definition in command of decision making powers and

authority (Bachrach 1971). On this basis, Gordon Smith (1976, p. 7) characterized for

example the referendum as an anti-hegemonic device. This counter-intuitive observation

raises the question this paper is concerned with: Why do political elites support institutions

that they benefit least from?

This paper proposes to perceive the support of political elites for participatory

democracy as the result of emotional reactions in the context of the electoral game. The main

argument of the paper is that political elites support participatory politics as a reaction to

electoral hazards and resulting frustrations. Elites experiencing electoral defeat out of

frustration will be most likely to develop critical stances about representative institutions.

Furthermore, we envision dissatisfaction with representative institutions to translate into

support for participatory instruments of democracy.

With this argument, this paper firstly contributes to debates on the reform of

representative institutions. In this context, it aims to highlight the underlying emotional

factors driving the policy choices of elites. Secondly, the paper aims to contribute to the

broader literature on the beliefs of political elites and their consequences and sources. Thirdly,

with the argument made, the paper contributes to the debate on the winner-loser gap in

electoral studies. This debate predominantly focuses on the mass level and the effects of

losing in elections on voters’ support for democracy. This paper suggests applying it to the

elite level and to test an established and much debated hypothesis in light of a new empirical

phenomenon and new data.

To test its main argument, the paper is structured in five parts. In a first part, it briefly

surveys the literature on democratic reform to identify relevant answers to the question raised.

In a second part, it explains and models the genuine argument made in this introduction

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drawing from the winner-loser literature in electoral studies. In a third part, it introduces our

data and the research design adopted in our analysis that focuses on two constituency

candidate surveys at the German state level. In a fourth part, it tests the argument made on the

basis of these data and in light alternative explanations for the politics of participatory reform.

A fifth part briefly summarizes the main findings of the analysis.

The sources of participatory democracy in representative systems

Since the early beginnings of Representative Democracy, the role of participation has

been a contested issue. The literatures dealing with these contests unveil the key factors that

are said to explain democratic reform in representative settings. Empirical research on the

extension of the franchise is of particular concern in this regard (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011;

Leyenaar and Hazan 2011). This research highlights two paradigmatic perspectives on the

politics of democratic reforms that we shall briefly summarize in this section.

Research on the extension of the franchise highlights two different types of behavior

political elites might adapt in their choices on electoral rules. A first type is said to be

rationalistic or strategic. From this point of view, political elites are expected to choose those

electoral rules that are most likely to maximize their political gains and/or minimize their

political losses (Benoit 2004). In contrast, a second type of behavior is said to be driven by

learned values and genuine preferences. From this perspective, political elites are expected to

choose those electoral rules that are closest to their basic values and norms. They are assumed

to behave in non-strategic ways.

The first rationalistic perspective on democratic reform stresses constituency demands,

the role of contentious politics, and related vote seeking concerns of elites as key factors

explaining franchise extensions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Tarrow 2011). From this

perspective, the greater the ‘threat of revolution’ and the more pressing public demands are,

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the more likely it is that the franchise is extended and that elites thus allow for more

participation in representative settings. Lehoucque (2000, p. 469) for example stresses for the

Costa Rican case that elites in the 1920s remained unreceptive to extending the franchise to

women because of the lack of a broad based women’s movement (For a similar argument on

European democracies see Conley and Temini 2001; Freeman and Snidal 1982). In turn, the

de facto inclusion of racial minorities into the North American electorate in the 1960s has

been seen as a result of the pressures originating from a strengthening civil rights movement

(Lee 2002). By making concessions to pressures, elites might aim to secure votes and to

prevent losing political control (Cain, Scarrow, and Dalton 2003). A similar line of argument

can be found in debates on the origins of proportional electoral systems that are viewed as a

response of ruling elites to the introduction of the mass franchise and to strong labor

movements at the turn of the 19th century in most Western European democracies (e.g. Boix

1999).

A revised version of this first rationalistic perspective on democratic reform emphasizes

the context dependency of the relationship between external demands and the strategic

reactions of political elites. One related model stresses the impact of socio-structural contexts

in this regard, particularly the level of inequality, mediating between the demands of citizens

and the reactions of political elites. Paradoxically, greater social inequalities are said to

decrease the likelihood for democratic reform due to greater costs to pre reform elites

(Engerman and Sokoloff 2001; Ziblatt 2008). Other rationalistic models focusing on the role

of context highlight external crisis such as wars or recessions that might stimulate elites to

offer democratic reforms as bargaining chips while asking constituents for sacrifices such as

military services or cut-backs in social services (Przeworski 2009).

The second perspective on democratic reform in representative settings emphasizes the

values and ideas of elites in explaining the likelihood of reform. From this perspective, elites

are said to be able to set aside their own or their parties’ strategic interests to support distinct

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reform policies that they passionately believe in. For example, Lehoucque (2000, p. 469) on

the Costa Rican case highlights the patriarchal attitudes of many deputies as a main reason for

their opposition to extending the franchise to women in the 1920s, independent of the lack of

external pressures and demands. The broader literature on electoral reform stressed the

willingness of elites to turn to citizen assemblies as a signal that elites are motivated by

ideological and ethical concerns rather than short-term political interests (Bowler, Donovan,

and Karp 2006; Fournier et al. 2010).

Both of these two paradigmatic approaches to the politics of democratic reform suffer

from unresolved questions and issues. Rational models of electoral reform overestimate the

level of information actors possess on the consequences of their actions and the particular

social demands that they face. Models that emphasize values and ideas are based upon over

deterministic assumptions and thus are unable to explain short-term differences and

developments. In light of existing information deficits and human spontaneity, we would

expect emotional factors to significantly bias the support of political elites for increasing the

role of participation in representative setting. With few exceptions (Pilet and Bol 2011), the

electoral reform literature and also the broader literature on the reform of representative

democracy so far downplays this factor in explaining the politics of electoral institutions. This

is where our paper aims to contribute to and where it turns to in the next section.

Before we turn to discussing the emotional dimension of participatory democracy, we

briefly need to touch upon a third standard factor that is said to explain the beliefs of elites

and that features in most prominent ways in the literature on political elites and their beliefs.

This factor concerns political socialization in institutional contexts that results in a theory of

democratic elitism (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2007). In line with our previous discussion on

the role of values and ideas, elites are assumed to be particularly ideologically involved and

thus carry quite stable beliefs towards institutions (Eldersveld 1989; Putnam 1976). On the

other hand, political elites frequently are in a most direct relationship to these very institutions

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and thus are subject to processes to political socialization in institutional contexts. As a result

political elites function as guardians of democracy in general and particularly of particular

types of democracy related to particular institutional contexts they were socialized in

(McClosky 1964; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2007).

The emotional sources of participatory democracy

Skeptics might second-guess the possibility to model and systematically trace the

effects of emotions as a factor in political life. However, this paper points to particular

emotions related to particular recurrent events in politics, namely frustrations resulting from

electoral setbacks. We envision electoral losers to be frustrated about the event of losing and

thus to develop feelings about dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy that

eventually translates in support for participatory forms of democracy.

The main argument in the paper is based upon assumptions on the structure of the

beliefs of elites that are rooted in previous research on belief systems and that we briefly need

to clarify (Aberbach, Rockam, and Putnam 1981; Almond and Verba 1963; Rohrschneider

2005; Rohrschneider and Peffley 2009). Drawing from previous research on belief systems,

we distinguish between three different types of orientation. These types are evaluative,

cognitive, and affective orientations. In this paper, we are solely interested in the evaluative

type of orientation, in whether elites consider something to be a “good” or “bad” thing.

Additionally, we distinguish between three different empirical objects that elites might

evaluate. The first object concerns the current state of democracy and whether political elites

are satisfied with or rather frustrated about it. The second object is more specific and concerns

the electoral process as a crucial instrument of democracy linking citizens and the state. We

are interested in whether political elites consider this a functionally satisfactory instrument of

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democracy that is able to secure the responsiveness of representatives. The third object

concerns specific policies/proposals designed to open up representative processes to public

participation. Thus, we are interested in whether political elites develop reformist beliefs

(Aberbach, Rockam, and Putnam 1981) actively supporting alternatives to established

representative processes. Particularly, we are interested in the support of political elites for

direct democracy, for using citizen consultation to give advice to legislatures, and for

increasing the transparency of legislative committees.

In this paper we consider this set of elite beliefs to stand in a distinct relationship to

each other. We envision a direct link between satisfaction with democracy in general and

elections as instruments of democracy on the one hand and support for any kind of

participatory reform on the other. The assumption in the paper is, that those elites that develop

frustrations about democracy and elections will in turn be positive about any participatory

reform out of frustration with the current state of democracy and particularly the electoral

process. Thus, passions for reform partly result from electoral frustrations and despair.

Our main argument draws from the winner-loser gap approach in electoral studies. This

approach aims to explain the attitudes of mass publics on democracy by pointing to individual

frustrations that result from the experience of voting for losing parties. Voters that voted for

losing parties are said to be more likely to dislike the democratic game and to develop

negative attitudes about democratic institutions (Anderson et al. 2007; Anderson and Guillory

1997; Bowler and Donovan 2007; Smith, Tolbert, and Keller 2010). We see no reason not to

adopt this argument to the elite level. After all, elites are human and thus should be subject to

emotional reactions similar to mass publics.

In this paper, following the winner-loser gap literature, we acknowledge the

differentiated nature of the incident of losing dependent upon the level of political

marginalization. For example, Anderson et. al (2007, p. 124) argue that the negative

attitudinal effects of losing in elections are muted when individuals encounter inclusive

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institutions that allow losers some kind of representation and thus prevent political

marginalization. Under these circumstances, the political concerns of those that were not able

to secure majorities are considered to somehow matter despite the incident of losing. Thus,

losing in elections might mean different things resulting in different emotional reactions.

In this paper, adopting the winner–loser gap argument to the elite level, we consider the

failure to individually secure a mandate to define the experience of losing. However,

following the winner–loser gap argument, we distinguish between three further forms of

losing distinguished by differences in the level of political marginalization.

The first form of losing concerns the failure to seriously compete for public office. It is

plausible to assume, that those trapped in hopeless contests defined by wide margins should

feel especially marginalized and thus should be frustrated in special ways. From the

perspective of competitors and bystanders, large margins might indicate a marginal relevance

of the political concerns of those losing. Also, from the perspective of competitors, large

margins indicate electoral safety. These perceptions should result in the fact that winners see

no need to listen to these types of losers and to acknowledge their positions. As a result, this

type of electoral loser faces utmost levels of political marginalization.

The second form of losing concerns the collective returns for a particular candidates’

party. After all, political parties are crucial players in electoral politics. From the perspective

of individual candidates, the question of whether his or her party is able to secure a majority

in the national electorate or at least participate in a coalition government should be of utmost

relevance for his or her perceptions. In cases in which candidates’ parties failed to secure

government participation, feelings of political marginalization should be particularly

pronounced compared to situations in which individual losers find themselves to be part of a

party in government.

The third form of losing again concerns candidates’ collective returns. Generally, we

suspect that individuals that lost collectively in addition to losing individually will feel

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especially marginalized and thus frustrated. Particularly, the incident of collectively failing to

win any mandate and thus representation should matter most. It is plausible to assume, that

candidates failing to collectively win mandates will most likely feel marginalized since they

lack any kind of ‘blackmailing potential’ (Sartori 1976). They will generally be perceived as a

marginal force in politics.

This paper assumes that different levels of frustration resulting from these different

types of losing will matter for candidates’ attitudes towards representative institutions. Losers

will be less likely to be satisfied with the current state of democracy and also with elections as

instruments of democracy. The paper furthermore argues that this should be relevant for the

support of candidates for participatory democracy. Those candidates frustrated about

democracy and elections should be more likely to support any kind of alternative mode of

politics and thus also participatory forms of policy making. It is important to note that we

assume a mediating effect of critical beliefs about the current state of democracy and

elections. Support for participatory reforms should be explained by resentment resulting from

electoral setbacks and should not be directly related to any objective systemic factor in

electoral politics.

In this paper, we do not dispute the relevance of strategic concerns and values for the

choices of elites on democratic reform. We rather argue that emotional factors matter

independent of these other motivations. Therefore, in the proceeding analysis, we will test our

argument in light of the competing explanations that we discussed above. Thus, we follow a

y-centric research design aimed at explaining the policy beliefs of elites in most

comprehensive ways. However, this design aims to pave the way for future x-centric studies

on the issue to understand the emotional sources of democratic reform in greater depth.

Figure 1 summarizes the argument made in this section. It particularly emphasizes two

points. First, it stresses that we envision an indirect effect of the incident of losing on policy

beliefs mediated by critical beliefs on the state of democracy and elections as instruments of

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democracy. Second it emphasizes that, in contrast, we envision a direct effect of the values

and strategic concerns of elites on their beliefs on participatory democracy.

Fig. 1: The sources of elites’ beliefs on participatory democracy

Figure 1 implies the following specific hypotheses that we wish to test in our analysis

and that result from our previous theoretical considerations:

H1: Political elites that individually lost a bit for public office are more likely to be negative about democracy and the electoral process compared to winners.

H1a: Political elites that perceive themselves non-competitive in their

bit for public office are more likely to be negative about democracy and the electoral process.

H1b: Political elites that collectively failed to win participation in

government are more likely to be negative about democracy and the electoral process.

3.#Support#for#direct#democracy#

4.#Support#for#ci3zen#consulta3ons#5.#Support#for#greater#transperency#

Individual#failure#to#win#mandate#

Individual#failure#to#remain#compe33ve#

Collec3ve#failure#to#par3cipate#in#government#

Collec3ve#failure#to#secure#mandates#

1.#Dissa3sfac3on#with#dem

ocracy#2.#Dissa3sfac3on#w

ith#electoral#process#

Progressive#values#

Cons3tuency#demands#for#reform#

Democra3c#eli3sm#

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H1c: Political elites that collectively failed to win representation will

be more likely to be negative about democracy and the electoral process.

H2: Political elites that are dissatisfied with democracy and/or the electoral

process will be more likely to support participatory reforms complementing representative processes.

H3: Political elites that hold progressive values will be more likely to

support participatory reforms complementing representative processes. H4: Political elites that face constituency demands for participatory reforms

will be more likely to support participatory reforms complementing representative processes.

H5: Political elites that lack experiences of political socialization in

representative settings are more likely to support participatory reforms complementing representative processes

Research design, data, and empirical model

This paper tests our theoretical argument and the resulting hypotheses sketched above

on the basis of two pooled post-election candidate studies conducted in the German states of

Hesse and Bavaria in 2013. In these studies we contacted an overall number of 2091

candidates running for legislative offices (597 in Hesse and 1494 in Bavaria). Both elections

took place in September 2013. Candidates were able to respond between December 2013 and

April 2014 either in a pen and paper or an online format.5

Our overall universe of candidates represents 11 parties, six of them represented in one

or the other legislature (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, GRÜNE, LINKE, Freie Wähler).Additionally,

we contacted visible and much discussed fringe parties in German politics that competed in

one or the other electoral race (Piraten, AfD, ÖDP, NPD, Republikaner). The visibility of

these parties partly results from past electoral victories that secured them representation in

5 For further information see http://landtagskandidatenstudie.de

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other state parliaments (Piraten, NPD). Partly, it is the result of more recent debates which

consider the AfD a serious contender in future elections. We included the conservative-green

ÖDP and the right-wing Republikaner as interesting examples for conservative parties that

might challenge the CDU/CSU grip on the right party political spectrum in Germany.

Tab. 1: Response rate and representativeness of the two candidate studies

Hesse Bavaria Survey Population Survey Population Mode of Candidacy

List 32.4 38.4 41.8 43.0 Nominal 17.9 17.3 - - Dual 49.7 44.4 58.2 57.0

Incumbent (Prior to election)

Yes 6.2 7.7 7.1 9.2 No 93.8 92.3 92.9 90.8

Successful

Yes 19.3 18.4 10.6 12.1 No 80.7 81.6 89.4 88.0

Party

CDU/CSU 21.0 21.8 8.8 11.0 SPD 19.7 18.4 12.7 11.0 FDP 10.0 9.2 11.3 11.8 GRÜNE 12.1 11.6 14.5 12.1 Die Linke 12.4 10.4 9.6 10.5 Freie Wähler 9.3 10.6 10.6 9.9 Piraten 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.8 AfD 4.1 5.7 - - Republikaner 1.7 2.7 7.4 9.1 ÖDP - - 15.2 12.1 NPD 1.7 1.6 1.9 3.8

Gender

Female 23.8 29.3 25.8 26.24 Male 76.2 70.7 74.2 73.76

Age in Years (mean) 48.9 48.8 51.5 50.4 Share in per cent 48.6 100.0 39.7 100.0 N 290 597 593 1494

The response rates of both surveys are more than satisfactory compared to similar

candidate surveys (see Zittel 2014). In Hesse, 48.6 per cent of the contacted candidates

completed questionnaires, in Bavaria the respective rate was 39.7 per cent. Furthermore,

Table 1 demonstrates that the sample is highly representative of the whole (candidate)

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population. Most importantly, the party shares closely resemble those in the whole population

with only few incidents in which particular parties are slightly over- and underrepresented.

This concerns for example the CSU, GRÜNE and the ÖDP in Bavaria. Candidates

representing the former party are slightly underrepresented while the opposite is true for

candidates representing the latter two parties. However, these deviations are small and also

few in numbers.

The shares of successful candidates also closely resemble the whole universe with 19.3

per cent in Hesse (compared to 18.4%) and 10.4 per cent in Bavaria (compared to 12.1%).

Last but not least, the shares of the different types of candidates (party list, dual and nominal)

closely resemble the whole candidate population. The only larger deviation that we are able to

detect concerns the issue of gender in the candidate survey on Hesse. In this survey, women

are underrepresented by about 6 per cent.

Candidate studies are a useful and most relevant data source to explore the issues this

paper is concerned with. First and foremost, they focus on the type of political elites our

model is most interested in, namely political elites that run for public office and that are thus

potentially subject to electoral setbacks and resulting disappointments and frustrations.

Furthermore, candidate studies provide data on the beliefs of elites that are hard to access in

other ways. Third, individuals running for public office are important players within party

organizational contexts and thus should exert significant influence on the positions and

institutional policies of their parties. Consequently, their beliefs should matter for the

positions and choices of their parties. Table 2 provides an overview of the variables that we

use to test our hypotheses:

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Tab. 2: Independent and dependent variables in our models

Dependent Variables Indicators N

Satisfaction with democracy in Germany 1 = Not satisfied (1 and 2) 0 = Satisfied (3 and 4) 879

Evaluation of state elections as instruments of democracy

1 = Not good (1 and 2) 0 = Good (3 and 4) 874

Direct democracy at federal level in Germany 1 = Support (5 and 4) 0 = Don’t support (1 thru 3) 877

Transparency of committee meetings through electronic media

1 = Support (1 thru 3) 0 = Don’t support (4 thru 7) 877

Parliaments should use citizen consultations to receive advice in decisions processes

1 = Support (1 thru 3) 0 = Don’t support (4 thru 7) 877

Independent Variables

Individual loser 1 = yes, 0 = no 884

Individual lack of competitiveness Subjective expectation ranging from certainty of losing (=4) to certainty of securing a seat (=0) 867

Member of party in opposition 1 = member of party in opposition 0 = member of party in government 884

Member of party not represented 1 = member of party not represented; 0 = member of party represented 884

Progressive values -5 = extreme left position thru +5 = extreme right position 870

Professionalism / Democratic elitism Summary Index of legislative and executive offices held previously ranging from 0 to 5 883

Constituency demands for more participation Proportion of young age cohorts in district6 884

Proportion of welfare recipients in district7 884

In Figure 1 we summarized our theoretical expectations that we aim to test in the

following analysis. In this analysis we perform a logistic-regression analysis that advances in

a two-step process. In a first step, we first regress the satisfaction of candidates with

6 Pure list candidates received in this measure the proportion of young population (age 15-40) in

their federal state (Hesse) or in the multimember-districts (Bavaria) as proxies for perceived public demands.

7 Pure list candidates received in this measure the proportion of welfare recipients in their federal state (Hesse) or in the multimember-districts (Bavaria) as proxies for perceived public demands.

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democracy and the electoral system on our main independent variables that we summarized in

Table 2. In a second step we regress candidates’ support for different participatory reforms on

our main independent variables, now including the satisfaction of candidates with democracy

in general and with the electoral process in particular.

In this paper, our focus is on candidates for federal state parliaments in Hesse and

Bavaria. Focusing on the subnational level has important advantages for the purpose of this

analysis. First, at the state level we are able to hold crucial social-cultural factors constant

such as overall socio-economic development and democratic experience in a country. Second,

at the same time, we are able to find variance regarding important contextual variables that

might affect candidates’ satisfaction with democracy such as party systems and the general

voting behavior of the population. While in Bavaria, the CSU is a dominant political force

that is usually able to win absolute majorities, in Hesse, coalition government and also

changing party political governments are more common. Third, at the subnational level we

are able to increase our N and to provide variance with regard to the variable we are most

concerned with, namely the difference between winners and losers and also between different

types of losers.

German candidates’ beliefs on democracy

In this section we provide some descriptive evidence on the core dependent variables

our analysis is concerned with. Table 3 demonstrates striking differences in this regard. A

majority of 59 per cent of all candidates claims to be quite or very satisfied with democracy in

Germany. However, a significant minority of 41 per cent is not much or not at all satisfied.

Our second dependent variable reveals an even more striking pattern. Table 3 shows a similar

divide between positive and negative perceptions. However, in this case, we see a reverse

distribution between supporters and critics of state elections as instruments of democracy. A

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majority of candidates (58%) considers the electoral process at the state level an insufficient

instrument of democracy.

Tab. 3: Candidates’ beliefs on democracy in Germany

Level of satisfaction in per cent Satisfaction with Democracy1

State Elections as Instruments of Democracy 2

Not satisfied at all (not well at all) 11.5 14.1

Not very much satisfied (not so well) 29.5 43.6

Quite satisfied (well) 47.6 38.3

Very satisfied (very well) 11.5 4.0

N 879 874

1 Original question: „Sind Sie mit der Art und Weise, wie die Demokratie in Deutschland funktioniert, alles

in allem gesehen…. „ 2 Original question: „Wie gut garantieren Ihrer Meinung nach die Landtagwahlen, dass die Ansichten der

Wähler/-innen von den gewählten Abgeordneten auch vertreten werden?“

According to Table 4, the beliefs of candidates on measures of participatory democracy

show similarly striking differences and also striking levels of support for reforming

representative institutions. A majority of 69 per cent welcomes the introduction of referenda

at the federal level compared to 31 per cent opposing this measure. Similarly, almost 62 per

cent of the surveyed candidates positively lean towards citizen consultations as a means to

give advice to legislatures and to thus improve their responsiveness. In contrast, only 38 per

cent lean towards an alternative statement emphasizing parties and legislators as sufficient

means to represent the interests of voters.

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Tab. 4: Candidates’ beliefs on institutional policies in Germany

Level of support in per cent Referenda at Federal Level Citizen Consultations Transparency of

Committees

Rather Yes 69.4 61.6 48.7

Rather No 30.6 38.4 51.3

N 877 877 877

The distribution of candidates’ support for increasing the transparency of legislative

committees stands out since it is strikingly polarized with no clear majority in either direction.

The particular question that was asked in our survey concerns the option to broadcast

committee meetings in real time via electronic media. Around 51 per cent reject this reform

option leaning towards the position that the legislative process should not be degraded to a

media spectacle.

The emotional sources of candidates’ beliefs on democracy from a bivariate perspective

Winning or losing an election does make a difference for candidates' satisfaction with

democracy in Germany and with state elections as instruments of democracy. This is the main

result of our bivariate analysis, which thus fully supports the first part of our theoretical

argument. Table 5 shows the different bivariate relationships between our two dependent

variables on the one hand and our main independent variable, namely the incident of losing,

on the other.

Table 5 shows in particular that compared to losers relatively small numbers of winners

are dissatisfied with democracy in Germany and the electoral process in their particular states.

This amounts to 10 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. In contrast, within the group of

losers, a striking majority of 64 per cent is dissatisfied with elections as instruments of

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democracy. Furthermore, a very significant minority of almost 46 per cent is dissatisfied with

the functioning of democracy in general. In both cases, Cramer’s V indicates moderate

relationships between our independent and dependent variables. Chi2 tests reveal that both

relationships are highly significant at the .001 level.

Tab. 5: Electoral success at the individual level and satisfaction with democracy

Loser in % Winner in % N Chi2* Cramer's V

Dissatisfied with democracy

Yes 45.7 10.2 360 53.42*** 0.25

No 54.3 89.8 519

Dissatisfied with elections

Yes 64.0 17.0 504 92.64*** 0.33

No 36.0 83.0 370

* Levels of significance of Chi2 values: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001

The level of satisfaction with democracy does make a difference for the policy beliefs

of our candidates. This is the result of a bivariate analysis documented in Table 6, which thus

fully supports our theoretical expectations. The support for reforms is around 30 percentage

points higher in the group of those dissatisfied with democracy in general compared to those

candidates that are satisfied.8 Particularly, the numbers in Table 6 show a striking pattern with

regard to the reform measure that received the most aggregate support among the surveyed

candidates, namely introducing referenda at the federal level. This measure is supported by

almost 90 per cent of all those dissatisfied with democracy in Germany. With 56 per cent, the

support for referenda is also strong among those satisfied with the functioning of democracy,

but the difference between the groups is still remarkable. Again, in all three cases, Cramer’s V 8 We find similar results for our second dependent variable that focuses on the dissatisfaction

with elections as an instrument of democracy. Detailed results are available upon request.

20

indicates moderate relationships between our independent and dependent variables. Chi2 tests

reveal that all three relationships are highly significant at the .001 level.

Tab. 6: Satisfaction with democracy in general and support for participatory democracy

Dissatisfied in % Satisfied in % N Chi2* Cramer's V

Support for referenda at federal level

Yes 88.3 56.3 607 101.83*** 0.34

No 11.7 43.7 268

Support for citizen consultations

Yes 80.5 48.4 538 91.99*** 0.32

No 19.6 51.6 337

Support for greater transparency of committee process

Yes 64.7 37.8 427 61.06*** 0.26

No 35.3 62.2 448

* Levels of significance of Chi2 values: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001

In a next step we will test our argument on the basis of a multivariate logistic regression

model. In this step, we aim to test whether the relationships that we detected in our bivariate

analyses hold when we control for some of the alternative explanations sketched above. Also,

the aim is to gauge the effects of losing on candidates’ beliefs on democracy in more

differentiated ways by distinguishing between different types of losing and thus different

levels of frustration. This analysis proceeds in two steps. In a first step, we will estimate the

impact of losing on support for democracy and the electoral process. In a second step, we will

estimate the impact of the satisfaction with democracy on candidates’ support for different

types of participatory reforms. In this second step, we include all other independent variables

from our previous analysis. This two step process is in line with our theoretical argument that

losing in elections results in a feeling of frustration about the rules of the game. As a result,

21

those affected will support any proposal towards changing these rules including proposals for

implementing measures of participatory democracy.

The emotional sources of candidates’ beliefs on democracy from a multivariate perspective

The results of our analysis that are shown in Table 7 support our main argument in

impressive ways. Those candidates that lost their bid for public office are more likely to be

dissatisfied with democracy in Germany and also to consider the electoral regimes in their

states as unsuited instruments for democracy (H1). Both relationships are significant at the

.001 level. With regard to our more differentiated measures on the incident of losing, the

collective failure to secure mandates (fringe party) clearly matters independent from the

simple incident of losing individually. Candidates representing fringe parties are more likely

to be dissatisfied with the current state of democracy and with state elections as instrument of

democracy. The relationship is significant at the .001 level (H1c). Similarly, failing

collectively to secure participation in government significantly influences the dissatisfaction

with the democratic system in general and even more so with candidates’ satisfaction with the

electoral system (H1b).

Table 7 does not show any support for hypothesis 1a. Losing by wide margins does not

provide an additional explanation for candidates’ beliefs on democracy. One plausible ad hoc

explanation concerns the vote seeking assumption that underlies our analysis. Obviously,

candidates differ in this regard and some of those losing by wide margins actually do not seek

votes and thus should not be frustrated losing big. However, this does not contradict the

impact of failing individually and collectively to secure representation on candidates’ beliefs

on democracy. Those failing to win mandates are more likely to be frustrated about the state

of democracy and elections as instrument of democracy.

22

Tab. 7: Explaining dissatisfaction with democracy and state elections

Democracy (1 =yes)

Elections (1 = yes)

Loser (=1) 1.195*** (.414)

1.211*** (.348)

Wide margins (=4) .106 (.087)

-.010 (.087)

Opposition (=1) .508* (.308)

1.334*** (.278)

Fringe party (=1) 1.684*** (.193)

1.141*** (.196)

Progressive values (=-5) -.173*** (.036)

-.142*** (.037)

Professionalism (=5) -.256*** (.080)

-.214** (.079)

District_proportion of young -.089** (.036)

-.106** (.036)

District_welfare recipients .133** (.068)

.088 (.068)

Constant -.257 (1.084)

.799 (1.050)

Pseudo R2 0.20 0.20

N 851 846

Note: Multivariate logistic regression model. Entries are non standardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; *p < .1; ** < .05; *** < .001.

The effect of losing on candidates’ satisfaction with democracy clearly holds

independent from other effects that we are able to witness in Table 7. Most prominently,

candidates with progressive values are more likely to express dissatisfaction with the state of

democracy. This is plausible since progressives by definition are critical about the status quo

and wish for social and political change. Furthermore, as we would expect, candidates defined

by a high level of professionalism are less likely to express dissatisfaction with democracy

and elections. However, the incidents of losing individually and collectively show effects

independent of the values of candidates and thus impressively support our main theoretical

argument. The fit of both models with r2 values of .20 is satisfactory.

23

Tab. 8: Explaining support for participatory democracy

Referenda (1=yes)

Consultations (1=yes)

Transparency (1=yes)

Dissatisfied with democracy (=1) 1.075***

(.227) .786***

(.198) .751***

(.180) Dissatisfied with elections (=1) .523**

(.200) .476**

(.187) .262

(.180) Loser (=1) -.189

(.329) .116

(.315) .575*

(.311) Wide Margins (=4) .0004

(.093) -.078 (.086)

.089 (.081)

Opposition (=1) .538** (.251)

.343 (.253)

.221 (.249)

Fringeparty (=1) .806*** (.237)

.618** (.214)

.326* (.192)

Progressive values (=-5) -.243*** (.044)

-.232*** (.040)

-.189*** (.035)

Professionalism (=5) -.066 (.084)

-.212** (.079)

.133* (.074)

District_proportion of young .042 (.037)

.006 (.035)

.092** (.033)

District_welfare recipients -.112 (.068)

-.056 (.065)

-.081 (.061)

Constant -1.290 (1.113)

-.439 (1.039)

-4.298*** (.998)

Pseudo R2 0.20 0.18 0.10

N 841 843 842

Note: Multivariate logistic regression model. Entries are non standardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; *p < .1; ** < .05; *** < .001.

Table 8 documents the second step in our multivariate analysis. It demonstrates the

expected relationship between candidates’ dissatisfaction with democracy on the one hand

and their support for different reform options on the other (H2). Candidates that are

dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to support introducing referenda, citizen

consultations, and greater transparency of legislative committees. Five of the six relationships

are significant at the .05 or lower level. The sixth relationship points into the right direction

24

but fails to show significance. This solid pattern across different reform options impressively

supports our theoretical assumptions on the impact of emotions on candidates’ support for

participatory democracy.

The results in Table 8 further support our theoretical considerations because they

demonstrate almost no effect of the incident of losing individually on candidates’ support for

institutional reforms. Clearly, the relationship between the electoral fortunes of candidates

and their beliefs on democratic reform is mediated by their beliefs on the current state of

democracy. Candidates that lost are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy in Germany

and the electoral process in their states; candidates that are more dissatisfied are more likely

to support democratic reforms. The only effect of the incident of losing individually that we

see in Table 8 concerns candidates’ support for greater transparency of legislative

committees. In this case, individual losers are more likely to support this measure independent

of their dissatisfaction with democracy. However, the relationship is only significant at the .1

level. Furthermore, this is theoretically plausible because it is the most ‘technical’ reform

option that we test for and thus less likely to be solely driven by emotional factors.

Table 8 does show that the effect of failing collectively to secure mandates remains in

place independent of the level of satisfaction with democracy. Members of parties without

legislative representation are more likely to support proposals for participatory reforms. Two

relationships documented in Table 7 are significant at least at the .05 level, one is significant

at the .1 level. Additionally, we observe a positive effect of the opposition status, that is in the

expected direction, and also significant at the .05 level. However, the important finding is that

candidates’ dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy has an independent and

impressive effect on candidates’ support for participatory reforms.

The expected direct relationship between candidates’ values and their support for

participatory reforms (H3) is clearly demonstrated in Table 8. Candidates with progressive

values that place themselves to the left of the political spectrum are more likely to support

25

participatory democracy independent of their dissatisfaction with democracy. This

relationship holds for all three dependent variables and is significant at the .001 level.

Table 8 also supports the expectations resulting from a rationalistic perspective on

reform politics, but only in selective and weak ways (H4). According to the results

demonstrated in this table, candidates representing districts with greater proportions of young

voters are more likely to support policies aimed at increasing the transparency of legislative

committees via the Internet. The relationship is significant at the .05 level. The effects of this

variable on the other two policy related variables point into the same direction but fail to show

significance. In addition, candidates representing more well-to-do districts with lower

proportions of welfare recipients are more likely to support democratic reforms. However,

these relationships fail to show significance, though some only narrowly.

Our results also show selective support for theories of democratic elitism emphasizing

the professional experience of candidates (H5). Candidates with greater experiences in elected

and administrative offices are less likely to support introducing referenda at the federal level

and to support citizen consultations. The latter relationship is significant at the .05 level.

However, candidates’ attitudes on legislative transparency do not meet our theoretical

expectations. The relationship points into a different direction and even is significant at the .1

level.

The important point of our analysis documented in Table 8 is that, independent of

rationalistic, value-based and elitist explanations that we control for and that are party

confirmed, emotions resulting from the incident of losing and mediated by individual

frustration on the state of democracy matter for the support of candidates for participatory

democracy; the experience of losing results in greater dissatisfaction with the current state of

democracy. Dissatisfaction with democracy in turn results in support for participatory

alternatives independent of alternative well established explanations.

26

Summary and discussion

This paper is a first effort to gauge the emotional sources of democratic reform aimed at

increasing opportunities for political participation. It shows that emotions do matter

independent from strategic, value driven and elitist motivations. It shows that negative

emotions about the current state of democracy indicated by dissatisfaction and disappointment

result from electoral setbacks at the individual and collective levels and directly affect the

beliefs of elites on the need for participatory reforms. Elites that are subject to electoral

setbacks are more likely to turn their back on representative democracy and to support

introducing participatory add-ons. Clearly, losing elections hurts and hardens feelings with

regard to the rules of the game.

Our results are promising and suggest paying further attention to the effects of affects.

Uncovering the emotional basis of participatory democracy strikes us as relevant for three

reasons. First, it helps to gauge the limits of strategic and value-based behavior and also of

theories of democratic elitism and thus contributes to behavioral theories of politics. Second,

it fosters our understanding on practical reform debates and on the how they need to be

perceived. Clearly, with regard to long-term institutional developments we would wish to

minimize the role of emotional factors and to ensure that regimes are rooted in the interests

and values of those they ought to govern. Third, focusing on the electoral sources of emotions

helps us understand what electoral rules might be most problematic at that level and might

raise problems for the need to mobilize broad based consensus on the institutional bases of

democracy in given contexts.

27

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