why russia wants lebanon · 9/17/2018 · however, moscow’s ambition to draw lebanon into its...

MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Winter 2020 Melamedov: Russia into Lebanon / 1

Why Russia Wants Lebanon

by Grigory Melamedov

ussia’s attempts to draw Lebanon into its sphere of in-

fluence by placing it under Moscow’s air defense umbrella and selling weap-ons to Beirut have been discussed by American ex-perts for years. Some analysts argue that Washington should not try to compete with the Krem-lin there while others maintain that any con-cession is unacceptable. Russian arms sales to Lebanon would likely not affect the region’s balance of power, but Moscow’s expansion of its Syrian air defense umbrella could tip the balance of forces in the Arab-Israeli and Iranian-Israeli conflicts and create a serious challenge for the United States in the near future.

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Dmitry TerekhovDuring the Syrian war, Jerusalem used Lebanese air space to foilweapon transfers from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. But inSeptember 2018, Syrian air defenses shot down a Russianmilitary aircraft during an Israeli operation. Moscow blamedIsrael and deployed air defense systems to Syria, limiting theIsraeli air force’s freedom of movement and ability to preventsuch transfers.


Moscow on the Mediterranean During the first half of 2018, Russia

increasingly expressed unhappiness with Israeli air strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. On September 17, 2018, Syrian air defenses shot down a Russian Ilyushin IL-20 military aircraft, supposedly by accident, during an Israeli operation. Moscow blamed Israel for the incident and immediately deployed S-300 air defense systems to Syria, significantly limiting the Israeli air force’s freedom of movement. Russian military and civilian experts openly insisted that now was the time to show Israel that the Kremlin dictated the rules in Syria. Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy stated: “If Israel were to defy Russia’s dominant role, Russia would react and take a stand. This is unlikely to happen because Israel knows Russia defines the rules in Syria.”1

The main Israeli objective in Syria was to prevent weapons transfers from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Jerusalem used Lebanese air space to foil such transfers. In November 2018, Lebanese president Michel Aoun asked Moscow to protect Lebanon’s air space. Russian media reports that the defense ministry was favorably considering the idea alarmed the Israelis.2

Earlier, in February 2018, Russian natural gas producer Novatek obtained permission from the Lebanese government to develop natural gas fields in territorial waters in the Mediterranean Sea disputed by Lebanon and Israel. This action signaled that Moscow unambiguously sided with Lebanon and claimed the right to protect its natural gas investments during a military crisis.

1 The Times of Israel (Jerusalem), May 10, 2018.

2 See, for example, Russkiye Vesti (Moscow), Nov. 22, 2018.

The Russians remained neutral during Operation Northern Shield (December 2018–January 2019) when the Israel Defense Forces destroyed Hezbollah tunnels that crossed the Lebanese-Israeli border into northern Israel. However, Moscow’s ambition to draw Lebanon into its sphere of influence predates its intervention in Syria and persists to this day. Tensions could rise again at any time.

Russia and Lebanon Lebanon is the only Middle Eastern

country where Moscow can rely on a substantial Christian community. Its natural ally is the Orthodox Church, subordinated to the Patriarchate of Antioch. Currently, the Orthodox community comprises about 8 percent of Lebanon’s population. In the Lebanese government formed in January 2019, four ministers represent the Orthodox community politically, including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health Ghassan Hasbani and Defense Minister Elias Abu Saab. Former minister of defense, Yaacoub Sarraf, whom Russian media had reported as favoring Russian arms sales to Lebanon, is also a member of the Orthodox Church.

Since the Stalin era, Soviet diplomats in Lebanon and Syria have been tasked with holding the Antioch Patriarch within the sphere of influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. Under Putin, contacts with the Orthodox Christians have tremendously increased, and Moscow has also sought to ally with the Maronites—Lebanon’s largest Christian community. Historically, the Maronites’ main international partner was France, but this relationship significantly weakened when the Maronite Patriarch of Antioch, Bechara Boutros Rahi, refused to support the “Arab Spring” and welcomed Russian troops in Syria. Because Rahi is subordinate to the Vatican, he tries to maintain a balance between Russia and the


West, but his position seems closer to Putin’s than to the West’s. As he stated on Vatican Radio:

So, if you want democracy, apply it and listen to what the people say. Want to know what the fate of Assad is? Let the Syrian people decide! It is not your place to decide the president of Syria, of Iraq, of Lebanon.3

Putin has also revived a network of religious and secular organizations formed to lobby for Moscow’s interests in Lebanon, which went dormant after the Soviet collapse. The most noteworthy is the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS), which had created roughly a hundred Orthodox schools in the region since its foundation in 1872. Sergei Stepashin, former head of the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation, is the IOPS’s chairman, and Russia’s deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov is a member. During the Russian operation in Syria, Bogdanov, as a special presidential representative for the Middle East, tried to establish a dialogue between Assad and the moderate opposition. Another prominent IOPS member is Oleg Ozerov, deputy director of the Africa Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and former permanent representative to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The Association of Orthodox Families of Beirut also lobbies for Russian interests in Lebanon and maintains close links with the IOPS. The Lebanese Sursock family is one of its most influential and cooperated with the Russian consulate general in Beirut as early

3 Vatican News (Rome), Apr. 14, 2018.

as the nineteenth century.4 Robert Sursock, one of the family’s current representatives, served as chairman and chief executive officer of Gazprombank Invest Mena from 2009 to 2015.5

Lebanon is the only Arab country other than Syria where pro-Soviet leaders maintained power from the 1970s through the present. Nearly all of Lebanon’s most powerful elites, both pro- and anti-Russia, remained in place after the “Beirut Spring” in 2005. The Hariri, Aoun, and Jumblatt families are hardly Russian assets, but they still play major roles, and the Kremlin uses this to its benefit.

Leading Lebanese politicians have long sent lobbyists to Moscow who have strong ties with Russian big businesses established

4 See, for example, Po Priglasheniyu IPPO

Associaciya Pravoslavnyh Semey Beiruta Posetila Moskvu, The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society website, June 23, 2014.

5 “Robert K. Sursock, Executive Profile,” Bloomberg L.P., New York.

Lebanese president Michel Aoun (left) meets with Russian president Vladimir Putin, Moscow, March 26, 2019. The Aoun, Aoun, Hariri, and Jumblatt families play major roles in Lebanese politics, and the Kremlin uses these contacts to its benefit.

MIDDLE E

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between the Russians and Persians.”11 Despite such statements, Jumblatt and his son Taymour still frequently visit Moscow and maintain close contacts with Russian officials including deputy foreign minister Bogdanov.12

Antioch patriarch Ignatius IV (Hazim) opposed using the Orthodox Church for political purposes before he died in 2012.13 His successor, Patriarch John X, takes a pro-Russian stance on many key issues,14 making Moscow’s soft penetration into Lebanon easier than it otherwise would have been.

At the same time, some Orthodox Christians in Lebanon follow the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople—with which Moscow broke off relations—rather than the Antioch Patriarch. In October 2015, forty-six prominent leaders signed a petition de-nouncing the Russian Orthodox Church’s characterization of Moscow’s military intervention in Syria as a “holy war.” Russia’s claim that it is “protecting Christians,” they said, is a pretext for its nationalistic and political goals.15 They believe that Moscow is using the same ploy to seize a more active role in Lebanon. Bishop Elias Audi of Beirut told Russian ambassador Alexander Zasypkin that his congregation “never asked to be protected.”16

11 Mohanad Hage Ali, “Le Liban, Nouveau Banc

d’Essai des Ambitions Régionales Russes,” L’Orient Le Jour (Beirut), Feb. 23, 2019.

12 Ali, “Our Comrades in Beirut”; Rosanna Sands, “Hajj Lubnani Nahwa Musku?” al-Bina (Beirut), Aug. 21, 2018.

13 Al-Monitor (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 24, 2012.

14 Orthodoxie.com (Paris), June 8, 2018.

15 Ya Libnan (Beirut), Oct. 16, 2015.

16 Deutsche Welle, May 20, 2018.

Audi and his small group of supporters is the only organized political force in Lebanon attempting to prevent Russian interference in the country. The pro-Russian lobby is much better organized and more active.

Russian Objectives and Methods Russia has two primary goals in the

Middle East: to draw as many countries as possible from the U.S. sphere of influence into its own and to achieve a privileged position, if not a monopoly, in the regional weapons market. Both of these goals include Lebanon.

Ron Przysucha

Prominent Lebanese leaders signed a petition denouncing the Russian Orthodox Church’s character-ization of Moscow’s Syrian military intervention as a “holy war.”Bishop Elias Audi (above) of Beirut told Russian ambassador Alexander Zasypkin that his congregation “never asked to be protected.”

MIDDLE E

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that time: Washington’s reluctance to supply heavy weapons, and internal bureaucratic procedures that slowed the implementation of the agreements. Washington also self-imposed three constraints in order to manage the balance of power:

It would provide the LAF with

sufficient firepower to counteract Hezbollah and Sunni terrorist organizations.

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It would not provoke any escalations at the Lebanese-Israeli border. 20

These restrictions were clearly justified

from the U.S. and Israeli perspectives but were resented by many Lebanese journalists and politicians. In December 2008, Russia made the first attempt to exploit this dissatisfaction by offering to sell T-54/T-55 tanks for roughly $500 million during defense minister Elias Murr’s visit to Moscow. As the deal went nowhere, the Kremlin offered ten MiG-29 jet fighters for free, only to be told by the Lebanese government that its army needed helicopters rather than these fighting aircraft.21 Many experts in Russia and Arab countries claimed that U.S. and Israeli diplomats killed the deal,22 but Moscow should have known that

20 Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces:

Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Feb. 10, 2009.

21 See, for example, The Times (London), Dec. 18, 2008; Lenta.ru (Moscow), Mar. 1, 2010.

22 Nour Samaha, “Is Lebanon Embracing a Larger Russian Role in Its Country?” The Century Foundation, New York, Aug. 7, 2018; Tehran Times, Apr. 10, 2011.

Lebanon would not be able to stomach a $500 million price tag.

Either way, the offer sent an important message to Lebanon: If you can afford it, we will sell you heavy weapons without conditions. In addition, Putin had already demonstrated that he did not need approval from Russia’s Federal Assembly to sign international agreements. Lebanon could purchase weapons whenever it wanted.

Moscow made another attempt in early 2010 and offered six Mi-24 helicopters, thirty T-72 heavy battle tanks, thirty 130-mm artillery systems, and a significant quantity of ammunition. On February 25, 2010, Moscow and Beirut entered a formal agreement on military-technical cooperation but nothing came of it.

Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri (left) meets with Putin in Moscow, September 2017. Following a failed 2016 arms deal, Moscow banned Lebanese officials from Russia and refused to engage Beirut with similar initiatives. But the Russians relented as Lebanon is central to Moscow’s Middle East goals.

MIDDLE E

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Hezbollah members of parliament visited Moscow for the first time in 2011. The Russian media assumed they were probing the depth of Putin’s support for Assad.38 The Kremlin and Hezbollah cooperated substantially in Syria throughout the Russian intervention there.

Since then, Moscow has repeatedly insisted that Hezbollah fighters withdraw to Lebanon, for several reasons. First, Russia and Iran disagree about the future of Assad’s army. Tehran wants to maintain a Shiite military bloc in Syria led by Hezbollah that would be subordinate to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Moscow would rather restore the regular Syrian army and leave no place for Hezbollah. Second, some Sunni militias have refused to make agreements with the Assad regime, despite Russian efforts, because local civilians are

38 Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia in the Middle East:

Motives, Consequences, Prospects,” Policy Focus 142, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2016, p. 28.

afraid of Hezbollah. Third, Turkey and Israel have demanded that Hezbollah withdraw. Moscow cannot ignore these demands, especially since they align with its own pre-ferences. According to some reports, the Russian army has even tried to stop a critical source of income for Hezbollah: drug trafficking along the Lebanese-Syrian border.39

Hezbollah’s current posture toward Russia is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is incensed by its envisaged eviction from Syria. “The world is heading to a new achievement that Russia will cooperate with them to get Iran and Hezbollah out of Syria,” Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah complained in June 2018.40 On the other hand, Hezbollah suffered such heavy losses that it had no choice but to reduce its presence. Despite what the party has won, it

39 See, for example, Novaya Gazeta (Moscow), July

22, 2018.

40 Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, speech, reprinted in Alahed News (Beirut), June 8, 2018.

A political poster shows (left to right) Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah,Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, Syrian leader Bashar Assad, and Russianpresident Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin and Hezbollah cooperated substantiallyin Syria. As many as 2,000 Hezbollah fighters may have been killed in Syria.

MIDDLE E

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Washington takes action against Iran, Putin will support Tehran both vis-à-vis the United States and in the Iranian-Hezbollah-Israeli conflagration that will likely erupt in such circumstances. This will make Lebanon a major battleground. It is therefore critical for Washington to ensure that any U.S.-Russian agreement on Syria would prohibit an expansion of Russia’s defense system to Lebanon. Whether or not Washington and Moscow can agree, a comprehensive U.S. policy toward Lebanon and Syria would be best. The U.S. administration should also

focus on Christian communities in Lebanon to prevent them from irreversibly falling under the sway of Moscow, Hezbollah, and its Iranian patron.

Grigory Melamedov holds a doctorate from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and is a Moscow-based, independent researcher.

why russia wants lebanon · 9/17/2018 · however, moscow’s ambition to draw lebanon into its...

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