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C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348

Sipdis

E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkishp.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strongchallenges?

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus,economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turnhe will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe isthe formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2)concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG supportfor his government. While the Turkish side sees the visit as mainly aboutdeveloping our broad common strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a publicoutcome he can characterize as concrete results. At the same time, althoughErdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political figure inTurkey, he and his party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise tothem, will affect his longevity in government, Turkey's democraticdevelopment, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.

2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommonluck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopesto demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.

3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S.interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2)to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperateunreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamistones (he rejects the term Islamic terrorism ); (4) to cooperate onIraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and (6) to reopen the EcumenicalPatriarchate's Halki seminary in a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.

4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to

a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomaticactions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks ofall political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation ofa de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USGactions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USGsupport for the GOT's new Cyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possiblesignal that the U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.

Who are we dealing with?

5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory

for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country,Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away fromthe radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by
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his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has alsoled him to avoid precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as thewearing of Islamist headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skillsand persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment tomaintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious supporters.

6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and anability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of thecommon citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready totake on corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. Asa result his AK Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002national elections. Owing to AK's image as the party of change at thenational level, good record in providing services at the municipal level,and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of thevote in March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project thatsuch a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara andperhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of the

other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to try todiminish him whether by blocking legislation or attacking his motives cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the

Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various lociof the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible politicalopponent or party.

7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit wellbeyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, iffully implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. Hisgovernment's inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AKsupporters land registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform,

Koran course reform has not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment'sopposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one can attributeTurkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in 30 years to luck, CentralBank skill, and global emerging market trends rather than to the AKgovernment's actions, Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.

8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU candidacythrough direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being fetedby EU leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EUCommission President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washingtontrip and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor

Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not the) mostimportant leaders of the Muslim world. Erdogan's view of relations with theu.s.

9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey'seconomy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks'sambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeledpro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 hehas taken several supportive steps, while being careful not to be tooclosely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for the Iraq war.Erdogan agreed to a ground line of communication for Coalition forces inIraq. He pushed through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support

of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlikairbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step inNov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus
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and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than anyprevious Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate'sHalki seminary.

10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what

most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de factoindependent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. actionagainst the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicionsamong the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul toldus recently on the margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closedmeetings FonMin Gul continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003turndown of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreignpolicy orientation as a counter to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless,Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S.support for his government as essential to his survival, and he wants asuccessful visit.

The deeper challenges for erdogan

11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen seriousdomestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin toput a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his andour ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:

Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously

vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreignaffairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt hisequilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming

from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, aclose confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzedthis trait in a draft book on Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranicallusion in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the pointabout his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streakwhich prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful advisors, a broadflow of fresh information to him, or development of effectivecommunications among the party headquarters, government, and parliamentarygroup. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, anoverweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image, rendershim fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for swiftand resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itselfnot only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness

to give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.

Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft

of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, withthe latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. ParliamentarySpeaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AKM.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial questions likepushing the right to wear headscarves at State functions. Although Arinchas kept a low profile for the past seven months, he remains a locus oftroublemaking, especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., trooprotation through Incirlik).
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Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be

capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to bepursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing thebureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear constantanecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who havedeep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the right, that AK

appointees, at the national and provincial levels, are incompetent ornarrow-minded Islamists. AK officials from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across the country admit to us that the party'schoice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March localelections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of controversialor inept AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at thelocal and national level.

Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan

lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none ofhis advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military. Hisgovernment has failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to

prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms,or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment or trooprotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by theEstablishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda oris selling out the country, leading to Establishment (dis)informationcampaigns which cause the government to retreat.

Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion againstcorruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks asmayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now hear more and more frominsiders that close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk,Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influencepeddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited directly from the awardof the Tupras (state petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortiumincluding a Russian partner. Erdogan's direct acquisition of a significantinterest in a food distribution company has become a public controversy.

Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime

Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling intoquestion the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry UndersecretaryBirinci (who in the past called himself an ummetci , i.e., a followerof a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic), and head ofState-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who once paid homage toAfghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made the core of the StateEstablishment Armed Forces, Presidency, and Judiciary profoundly

uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn these positions, the question of thelevel of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including thefollowers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence ofTurkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in theSoutheast have also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassycontacts who themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes thepernicious effect of a closed brotherhood mentality (cemaatcilik) inpolitical affairs, as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium inIstanbul, but how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very openquestion.

Comment


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12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and forwider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved powerand wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a differentelite. While his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this

time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S.vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe. Edelman

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029

TAGS: PRELPGOVPINSECONTU

SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:

TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.

12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).

1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to

have a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that

there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs

heavily in politics. Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party

face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace

core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization,

and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with

core U.S. interests. End summary.

2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power

Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and

phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong

candidate for European leader of the year. A regional leader

to be reckoned with for a decade to come. The man who won

Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU.

Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on

Cyprus. Who drove major human rights reforms throughparliament and through constitutional amendments. Whose
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rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is

redolent with traditional and religious allusions that

resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous

exurban sprawls. Who remains the highly popular tribune of

the people, without a viable or discernible political

rival...outside his own ruling AKP.

3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable. But is he? And

is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership

and momentum they need from the Turkish side?

4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament. Main

opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch

of elitist ankle-biters. There is currently no serious,

broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's

rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social

questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in

Turkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the

stultifying effect of current party and election laws on

entry for younger, untainted political aspirants. AKP argues

that the economy, at least from the perspective of macroindicators and continued willingness of emerging-market

portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the

facts, appears to have stabilized. Moreover, the authority

of AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the

Turkish State's executive power at the provincial and

district level and with municipal functions to an extent not

seen since the days of the one-party state. These factors

seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.

5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful

challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus);

quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and

resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open,

prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place

of religion; identity and history; rule of law).

EU

--
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6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a

negotiation date from the EU. He achieved that goal. The

Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have

opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process

leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus

on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the

question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.

7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on

the ground here is not so neat. With euphoria at getting a

date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival

and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become

substantially clearer. Nationalists on right and left have

resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national

interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions. Core institutions

of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have

once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed

insinuations into the press in parallel with the

nationalists' assertions. In the face of this Euro-aversion,

neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimalsteps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin

tackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious --

legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must

occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform. The

road ahead will surely be hard.

8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP

chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and

political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan.

But theirs is a routine whine. More significant for us is

that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence

at Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that

the EU will let Turkey in. And there is parallel widespread

skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in

ten years.

9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin

Gul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how


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bruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the

final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara

have given us the other side of the story). Gul was

noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the

lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit

negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor.

There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in

Brussels according to "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray

Basaran. She also noted to us that when negotiations seemed

to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone

calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk. Basaran

says that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do

so.

10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of

openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky,

muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have

encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing

membership...or at least the process. Some see the process

as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what

remains of the arid "secularism" of Kemalism. We have alsorun into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief

among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's

role is to spread Islam in Europe, "to take back Andalusia

and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683" as one

participant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put

it. This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of

FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime

Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the

Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for

one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU.

11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP

whinge that the EU is a Christian club. While some assert

that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of

Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of

civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others

express concern that harmonization and membership will water

down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey. Indeed, as


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AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, "If the EU

says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while. Then

the real difficulties will start for AKP. If the EU says no,

it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long

run."

12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to

prepare for harmonization. In choosing a chief negotiator

Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he

taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh

the political challenge his choice will face since it will be

the Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU

position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet. It is because

the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU

demands and a prickly domestic environment that some

observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief

internal rival Gul.

13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire

a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU

languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacingwith the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization

starts. If the government continues to hire on the basis of

"one of us", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge

milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil

service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem. If the

government hires on the base of competence, its new hires

will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous

hires at all levels.

Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance

---------------------------------------------

14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's

and AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to

take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to

the U.S.

15. (C) First is Erdogan's character.


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16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected

that Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material

benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots

popularity. Others disagree. Pollster and political analyst

Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us

late in Dec. that the erosion has started. We note that (1)

Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership

did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy

services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream

opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory

web site. So we treat his view cautiously. However, judging

by his references and past experience in the Turkish State,

he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State

apparatus and to have a network of observers and data

collectors in all 81 provinces.

17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals

itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of

others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife

Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trusthim." In surrounding himself with an iron ring of

sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated

himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially

explains his failure to understand the context -- or real

facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and

elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With

regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who

is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul

associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous."

Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen

Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de

cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of

touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to

MPs and party intellectuals.

18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks

vision. He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin

Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic


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depth. He relies on poor-quality intel and on media

disinformation. With the narrow world-view and wariness that

lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he

ducks his public relations responsibilities. He (and those

around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced

pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent

the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign

policies.

19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly

traveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past

two years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to

Russia, "Eurasia", the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, his

staff says 2005 is the "year of Africa", but they provide no

coherent reason why. This grueling cycle of travel has

exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep

his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and

government. He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary

group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs. Moreover, we

understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen

influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan keyfinancial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002

elections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability.

Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential

Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist

Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads

into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and

Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to

the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it

initially had toward Erdogan and AKP.

20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited

number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of

some -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek --

to undermine Erdogan. No one else in AKP comes close to

Erdogan in grassroots popularity. However, Gul's readiness

to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors

(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduce

Erdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S.


12/41

policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan

constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his

credentials by making statements inimical to good

U.S.-Turkish relations. We expect Erdogan to carry out a

partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be

unable to remove the influence of Gul.

21. (S) Third is corruption. AKP swept to power by promising

to root out corruption. However, in increasing numbers

AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party,

are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption

in the party at the national, provincial and local level and

among close family members of ministers. We have heard from

two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks;

his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding

presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman

is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan

children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame.

22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently

involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu,Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial

chairman Muezzinoglu. As we understand it from a contact in

the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a

continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket

and other activities has already produced evidence

incriminating Erdogan. In our contacts across Anatolia we

have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to

look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the

trend is a time bomb.

23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's

appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party

headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates. A broad range

of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul,

former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former

Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has

expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence,

prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer,


13/41


14/41

anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly

educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,

anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.

Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to

challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,

verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so

long been used to justify violence against "infidels".

26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of

politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized

Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in

Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,

defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and

unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society.

27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its

citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens'

individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,

and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and

practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind

one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chiefassembles his party cadres and, warning against various

ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain. It's

only that damned past that keeps changing."

28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,

including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free

and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the

concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will

it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate

policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are

joining what is still only a handful of others to take

tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.

However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of

education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,

and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between

citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi)

Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate

road."


15/41

29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

EDELMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015

TAGS: PRELPGOVPINSMARRTU

SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT

REF: A. ANKARA 1074

B. ANKARA 1231

C. ANKARA 1275

D. ANKARA 1511

E. ANKARA 1342

F. ANKARA 944

G. ANKARA 1102

(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign policy driftstemming from leadership and structural problems in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy debate over Turkey's identity and AKP, including itshandling of relations with the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddleis leaving a vacuum that resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. Thisperiod of drift could be extended, making EU reforms and bilateralcooperation more difficult. The drift may well continue until the nextcrisis creates new political alternatives in a day of reckoning. End

Summary.

AKP Government Adrift

-----------------------

2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EUharmonization, it is manifestly adrift on domestic political and economicreform. Implementation of reform legislation passed in 2003-2004 isseriously deficient (refs A and B). The AKP government has a poor workingrelationship with the military, the Presidency and the largely-secular

state bureaucracy. It is failing to control corruption in the AK party. Ithas been slow to introduce the banking, tax administration and socialsecurity legislation required by the IMF as a pre-condition for a new
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stand-by program. It is neglecting relations with the EU. Erdogan hasdelayed appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations; bothErdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have disturbed EU officialsand politicians. Erdogan has still not decided on a much-anticipatedcabinet reshuffle.

3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's obvious drift andwe see no sign it has yet begun to undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP'sability to get back on track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottomanreflexes and single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this governmentwill be able to refocus or move our bilateral relationship which remainsstrong in some areas back to a more strategic level.

4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his Cabinet andparliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers alike, xxxxx who is close toErdogan, complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel obligedto kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath. Business associations,

strong advocates of AKP economic policies, tell us they feel they have lostthe PM's ear. Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritualadvisors in the Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which he grew up,as we have heard directly from xxxxx.

5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan readsminimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press. According to others withbroad and deep contacts throughout the establishment, Erdogan refuses todraw on the analyses of the MFA, and the military and National IntelligenceOrganization have cut him off from their reports. He never had a realisticworld view, but one key touchstone is a fear of being outmaneuvered on theIslamist side by Hoca Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his

charisma, instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracytheories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies, e.g.,Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally Ahmet Davutoglu.

6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin Gul continuesbehind-the-scenes machinations, especially during Erdogan's foreignjunkets. Gul seems to be trying to undermine Erdogan and take on more partycontrol. He may hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forcedto cede to Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power. With hisrelatively good English, Gul works to project an image of being moderate,

or modern. In fact, Gul's peers say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than Erdogan. Gul, reflecting his pragmatic streak, has

made some constructive statements on bilateral relations and on Turkey'sIraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we understand that Gul anda group of like-minded MPs and journalists continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes as one way to get at Erdogan while also being moved byemotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.

7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal unease from thosewho support Erdogan, but also from some of the other tendencies forming AK.xxxxx that Erdogan does not know how to proceed, either on domestic policyor on rebuilding relations with the U.S. xxxxx, a bellwether of Islamistsentiment, has told two of our insider contacts that he is about to resignin disgust at the party's rampant corruption. xxxxx one of Erdogan's

closest business and brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, sayshe sees no future for this government and thinks it is time for a more


17/41

flexible and open leader. Leading member xxxxx has expressed to us theGulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it. Long Overdue Healthy Debate

-----------------------------

8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force some toquestion the real roots of inertia and stasis in a Turkey that needs to

accelerate its transition. We are encouraged by the determination of someto open a long-overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of Turkey'srelations with the U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6 visit and subsequentU.S. media coverage helped ignite the debate. Another catalyst was DeputyCHOD Basbug's January 26 press briefing, in which he coolly analyzedTurkish concerns about Iraq and repeatedly emphasized that one cannotreduce broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations to a single issue. Itwas not until late February, that Erdogan albeit without conviction inhis voice expressed anything similar to Basbug's assessment of theimportance of bilateral relations.

9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant criticism of

AKP's domestic and foreign policies from several insightful mainstreamcommentators. However, mainstream commentators are seen as too pro-American to be persuasive among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps moreimportant have been the decisions of some pro-AKP Islamist columnists towrite unusually blunt warnings that the AKP government must pull itselftogether or risk a fall. The Parliamentary opposition has continued itsanti-American 60's leftist rhetoric as it winds its merry way toirrelevance.

Resurgent Nationalism

----------------------

10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's weakness:resurgent nationalism. Two of the hottest selling books in Turkey areMetal Storm, a conspiracy novel that feeds the worst instincts of Turks

with its tale of a U.S. invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclearcounter-strike with the help of the Russians; and Mein Kampf (ref C).Under instructions from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, imams acrossTurkey delivered a March 11 sermon against Christian missionaries (ref D),claiming they aim to steal the beliefs of our young people and children.

We are receiving increased reports of anti-Christian activity in differentregions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank Governor told us thatnationalist/isolationist forces are behind the problems with the IMF (refF). An attempt to burn the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration inMersin has drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the spectrum,including a statement from the General Staff that the Turkish nation and

the Turkish armed forces are ready to sacrifice their blood to protecttheir country and their flag. The decision to memorialize, after a 47-yearhiatus, the killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers duringthe Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks the national mood.

11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to what appears tobe a growth in street crime and to a parallel refusal of the police, angryat limitations on their operational abilities under the new EU-inspiredcriminal code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, ErtugrulOzkok, managing editor of Turkey's leading newspaper Hurriyet and one of

the most authoritative press voices of the Establishment, noted that theTurkish public is deeply disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of


18/41

law and order. Ozkok, in what would appear to be an overstatement, closedwith a warning to Erdogan that, when democratic forces cannot ensure safetyin the streets (sic), then the public and political space is left to otherforces. In a March 4 column, Umit Ozdag, now in the running forchairmanship of the right-wing nationalist MHP, cited increased crime asone reason for the current popularity of Mein Kampf.

12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played a role in thepress and government reactions to comments from EU Ambassador Kretschmerabout the government's loss of momentum and EU accession, to the EUTroika's worry about the police violence against a March 6 Istanbuldemonstration, and the press feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman'sinnocent remarks on Syria.

Comment

------

13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals a date to begin EUaccession negotiations Erdogan's AKP government is out of ideas andenergy. For now, EU- and IMF-required reforms will face tougher oppositionfrom re-energized nationalists, the government will be tempted to delaydifficult decisions in any realm, and resistance to change will be thedefault mode. Bilateral cooperation will be more difficult, more vulnerableto characterization as unreasonable U.S. demands that infringe uponTurkish sovereignty.

14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's Parliamentary

majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G). Despite the unhappinessinside AKP, there is currently no political alternative and there are risksto anyone who actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a nuclear option

in hand early elections. The danger is that tough decisions and thesettling out of the political system will be put off until a real newcrisis emerges which will either energize the AKP or bring new politicalalternatives. Waiting bears a real cost, since Turkey needs to be morenimble in pursuing the political, economic, social and foreign policyagendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S., have been supporting, than thistype of static drift will permit.

DEUTSCH

2005-06-08 15:03

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003199

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2025

TAGS: PRELPGOVPINSPHUMTU
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SUBJECT: CABINET SHUFFLES AND THE LONG SQUEEZE: PM ERDOGAN

SETS HIS SIGHTS ON FONMIN GUL

(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 12958 1.4(b,d).

1. (C) Summary: Long rumored to be considering a cabinet re-shuffle, PMErdogan has made his first move suddenly and in limited fashion. However,more ministers in a cabinet which is still dominated by people loyal toErdogan's chief internal rival FonMin Gul may be in Erdogan's sights as hetries slowly but surely to whittle down Gul's influence. End summary.

2. (C) In a trademark sudden move, PM Erdogan announced the replacement of

three ministers in a mini-Cabinet shuffle June 4. Cabinet changes have beenan intense subject of debate and waiting-for-Godot expectation in rulingAKP since Erdogan inherited the Cabinet from his internal arch-rivalAbdullah Gul, now FonMin, in March 2003. Yet despite the heavy Gulinfluence (until this shuffle Erdogan could depend on only four of 22ministers for internal political support) and despite his overridingpopular support, Erdogan long appeared intimidated from making any changes.When Minister of Culture and Tourism Erkan Mumcu resigned in Feb. 2005,Erdogan remained in thrall to Gul for the abortive choice of current StateMinister Besir Atalay and eventual choice of Atilla Koc to replace Mumcu.

3. (C) Now Erdogan appears to have overcome his indecision, spurred in

part by what Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler told a close contact of oursJune 6 is Erdogan's realization of how much damage to his policies Gul andhis circle are wreaking. Finally dismissed are three prominentincompetents: Minister of Agriculture Sami Guclu, a barrier to progress onissues of concern to the U.S. and a Gul ally; Minister of Public Works ZekiErgezen, infamous for his scornful remarks about infidels (gavurlar),

surrounded by rumors of corruption, unable to finish Erdogan's 15,000kilometer divided highway project on time, an ally of Minister of theInterior Abdulkadir Aksu, and reportedly close to Gul; and State Ministerfor Women's Affairs Guldal Aksit, daughter of Galip Demirel, a prominentfollower of controversial Islamist sage Fethullah Gulen and a closeassociate of Aksu.

4. (U) Erdogan appointed as Minister of Agriculture Mehmet Mehdi 1), aDiyarbakir MP from a prominent local family with high status in theNaksibendi brotherhood. Born in Bismil (Diyarbakir province) 1956; graduateof Ankara U. veterinary faculty, MA in agricultural economics from AberdeenU, PhD from Ankara U.'s health sciences institute. Veterinarian. Worked inupper-mid-level positions in the Agriculture Ministry and as director ofveterinary affairs in the Greater Istanbul Municipality when Erdogan wasmayor. Married, three children. Speaks English, but we haven't yet testedhis level.

5. (C) An AKP xxxxx and two other long-term Embassy contacts with deep

relations in AKP describe Eker as a decent but passive man, close toErdogan. These contacts and Minister of Energy have described in detail howEker was deeply involved in a plan to remove former Minister Guclu by


20/41

concealing from him a Russian government note threatening six months ago tosuspend imports of Turkish fruits and vegetables for phytosanitary reasons;the ban recently went into effect with Guclu looking ineffectual anduninformed. Embassy Ag Counselor's contacts note that Eker is unlikely tobe able to override the Ministry's entrenched, protectionist bureaucracy.

6. (U) The new Minister of Public Works is Trabzon MP Faruk Nafiz 2)(umlaut over the O). Born Trabzon 1946. Civil engineering degree fromKaradeniz technical University in Trabzon. Senior civil engineer. Formercaptain of premier league Trabzonspor football team. Chairman of the boardof YAPISUN construction company. Chairman of the board of Trabzonspor. Afounder of the Trabzon development Foundation. Married, two children.Reportedly speaks English.

7. (C) A fellow Trabzon contractor and Trabzonspor board member describesOzak as coming from the Sufi (mystical) line of the Milli Gorus Islamistmovement; he is a quiet, reserved, obedient Erdogan man. As part of

Erdogan's strategy to use sports to maintain AKP's grassroots support, andin the wake of AKP's defeat in the Trabzon mayoral race in March 2004, theIstanbul-Black Sea axis which forms Erdogan's Istanbul power basereportedly subsequently succeeded in having Ozak appointed Trabzonsporchairman of the board. At the same time Erdogan reportedly agreed totransfer several million dollars from one of the Prime Ministry's hiddenreserves to permit Trabzonspor under Ozak to purchase better players. Ourcontacts expect Ozak to be relatively more upright than Ergezen was (not ahigh bar).

8. (U) Istanbul Second District MP Nimet 3) is the new State Minister forWomen's Affairs. Born Ayranci (Ankara) 1965. Grew up in relatively well-to-

do circumstances with a family summer home on Heybeliada, one of thePrinces' Islands off Istanbul. Law degree from Istanbul U. law faculty.Worked as an independent attorney, most recently representing the Islamistbusinessmen's association MUSIAD. A founding member of AKP. Married, onechild.

9. (C) Cubukcu is focused, highly ambitious, and months ago made clear tous she sought the state minister position. She has ensured that she staysclose to Erdogan's wife Emine, which appears to have been a major factor inher selection, according to what party deputy chairman Saban Disli told usJune 7. Her businesslike approach and relative openness in private aboutproblems in AKP brought her to our attention early in AKP's tenure; she

participated in Embassy's NATO tour for MPs in Feb. 2004 and in the NDI-sponsored democracy commission trip to Washington in Spring 2005.Responding to the bitter complaints of many women from AKP's grassroots inthe northeast Black Sea region who have seen their husbands take Russianand other Black Sea-littoral women as second wives, Cubukcu vigorouslyargued for criminalization of adultery during a controversy over adulteryin autumn 2004. On the other hand, although she talks about her son, sherarely mentions her husband and there are persistent questions among someobservers of AKP about her attitude toward her own marriage.

10. (C) With the dismissal of Guclu and these appointments Erdogan hasshown more clearly that he intends to whittle down Gul's influence. By

dismissing Aksit and Ergezen and appointing Eker, whose family status inDiyarbakir makes him a powerful rival to Interior Minister Aksu, Erdoganhas also drawn the noose around Aksu. Aksu has most recently served


21/41

Erdogan's purposes by dismissing Hanefi Avci, an leading Gulenist who asNational Police (TNP) department head for organized crime was starting topush corruption investigations that were leading to the heart of AKP.However, Erdogan has long been troubled by Aksu, whom he suspects of beingready to bolt from AKP with a number of disgruntled MPs. Aksu's Kurdishfavoritism, reported ties to the heroin trade, well-known predilection for

teenage girls, and his son's open Mafia links make him a weak link in theCabinet, one Erdogan knows the core institutions of the Turkish State couldexploit at any time.

11. (C) Contacts such as Prime Ministry advisor xxxxx who has provided awealth of accurate insights into AKP, foresee a high possibility thatErdogan will continue to shuffle his cabinet in stages. In addition toAksu, those who appear to be most in his sights are Minister of Labor MuratBasesgioglu, a former ANAPer who has a poor record of responding to AKPMPs' queries and requests; Minister of Trade and Industry Ali Coskun, whoappears to be deeply implicated in a major corruption scandal at theTurkish Standards Institute (TSE) involving payoffs of $500 million for

certifications, according to the TSE director's statement in the June 7press; and State Minister for Foreign Trade Kursad Tuzmen, a former (ultra-nationalist) MHPer who was implicated in the Iraq oil for food payoffs andis described by multiple contacts as open to every type of kickback.

12. (C) Erdogan may also be aiming over time to remove Gul's closeassociate State Minister Atalay and Minister of Justice and governmentspokesman Cemil Cicek, who has not bothered to hide his prime ministerialand presidential ambitions and his disrespect for Erdogan. MOORE

Reference ID Date Classification Origin

05ANKARA7215 2005-12-08 15:03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text ofthe original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007215

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015

TAGS: ECONPGOVPINRTUPOLITICALPARTIES

SUBJECT: NO SPLITS IN TURKEY'S GOVERNING AKP PARLIAMENTARY

GROUP -- FOR NOW
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REF: A. ANKARA 6543

B. ANKARA 6251

C. ANKARA 6337

Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, E.O. 12958, reasons

1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Despite media reports and opposition rumors

of splits among PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's

(AKP) 357 parliamentarians, the group remains intact )- for

now. Among AKP MPs, there are distinctive pious, pragmatic

and nationalist currents, with crosscutting personal

loyalties. Recent events in Turkey's heavily-Kurdish

southeast have heightened tensions between AKP,s

Kurdish-origin MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group.

While AKP MPs, numbers may slowly erode over the next year

(ref A), a major split is unlikely as long as AKP -- and in

particular PM Erdogan -- retain power and popularity. End

Summary.

Despite Wishful Thinking, AKP Not Crumbling Yet

--------------------------------------------- --

2. (C) Over the past year, the Turkish press has repeatedly

predicted open splits in the 357-member AKP parliamentary

group. While AKP has ideological and personality-based fault

lines, there appears to be little chance of a major split

while AKP remains Turkey,s number one party and Erdogan the

country,s most popular politician. Even Ankara AKP MP

Ersonmez Yarbay, a maverick frequently openly critical of his

own party, downplayed to us the rumors of party splits,

saying they have been fueled by the opposition to force early

elections.

AKP,s Ideological Currents

--------------------------

3. (C) AKP,s parliamentary group is composed of politicians
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with widely differing viewpoints. There are three main

ideological currents: pious, nationalist and pragmatic.

Most AKP MPs do not fall neatly into any one category, and

personal loyalties crosscut ideology, mostly among pious MPs.

Pious

-----

4. (C) Almost all AKP MPs are religiously observant to some

degree; for example, the vast majority fast during Ramadan.

However, there is a large and distinctively more pious group

of MPs, comprising former members of the banned Islamist

Virtue (Fazilet) Party, former members of the National View

Islamist youth group, and members of a wide range of

(officially banned) Muslim brotherhoods. Most of AKP,s top

leaders fall into this group: PM Erdogan, DPM/FM Abdullah

Gul, parliament Speaker Arinc, Vice Speaker Alptekin (former

PM and Islamic Saadet Party head Erbakan's right-hand man)

and all five of AKP,s parliamentary whips. Pious MPs

generally represent the central Anatolian heartland, speak no

English, and have traveled little.

5. (C) While most Turkish Islamists oppose the EU, AKP,s

Islamist MPs toe the AKP line and support it, albeit less

enthusiastically since October 3. Typical of Turkish

Islamists, they dislike Turkey,s military and have no ties

to it other than their required military service. Attitudes

about the U.S. vary widely, from friendly to suspicious, but

most favor better ties with the Muslim world. Although the

GOT, under Erdogan,s leadership, has taken a politically

courageous public stand favoring privatization and foreign

investment, many pious MPs oppose both.

6. (C) AKP,s pious MPs are widely rumored to be deeply

unhappy about PM Erdogan,s inability to ease restrictions on

the wearing of headscarves and on religious schools.

However, since AKP came to power in November 2002, no AKP MP

has resigned and gone over to the Happiness (Saadet) Party,

on AKP's Islamist flank.


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Nationalists

------------

7. (C) It is hard to find a Turk who is not nationalistic.

Yet a significant number of AKP MPs (as many as 50, according

to one former MP), many of them former members of the

ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP) or center-right

True Path Party (DYP), are strong nationalists, even by

Turkish standards. This group includes Justice Minister and

party spokesman Cemil Cicek, Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener,

State Minister Kursad Tuzmen, and parliament Vice Speaker

Sadik Yakut.

8. (C) Among AKP MPs, nationalists take the hardest line

against &concessions8 to the EU and on Cyprus. MFA

officials have told us on several occasions that the GOT is

delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement extension protocol to

parliament for ratification out of concern for the reaction

of nationalist AKP MPs (ref B). Nationalist AKP MPs are

deeply suspicious about the motives of Turkey,s ethnic Kurdsand were vocal critics of PM Erdogan,s August declaration in

Diyarbakir that Turkey has a &Kurdish problem.8 Like their

pious colleagues, nationalists, attitudes about the U.S.

vary widely, from friendly to suspicious. However, even

pro-U.S. nationalists become extremely prickly at any

perceived U.S. slight to Turkish national honor.

Pragmatists

-----------

9. (C) AKP,s pragmatic MPs generally speak English, are

foreign-educated, and tend to be better-traveled than their

colleagues. They often come from large cosmopolitan areas,

particularly Ankara or Istanbul; some were previously members

of the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP). Three of AKP,s

five vice chairs, who frequently deal with foreigners, are

from the pragmatic wing: Bulent Gedikli, Reha Denemec and

Saban Disli. All are U.S-educated and represent either


25/41

Istanbul or Ankara. The same is true for pragmatic Erdogan

translator and foreign policy advisor Egemen Bagis, who

accompanies the PM on his trips to Europe and the U.S.

10. (C) Although the pragmatic MPs are often AKP,s most

visible face to foreigners, they have less influence inside

AKP than their pious and nationalist colleagues. In early

2005, there were signs of frustration among AKP,s moderates,

when a spate of AKP MP resignations went mostly to ANAP.

Culture Minister Mumcu, AKP,s highest-profile resignation

who went on become ANAP,s Chairman, said publicly he had

only felt like a &guest8 in AKP (ref C).

11. (C) Erdogan can ill afford to lose the pragmatists. In

addition to giving AKP a reasonable, big-tent image that

plays well in the U.S. and Europe, AKP,s pragmatists are

links to Istanbul and Ankara elites. These MPs are AKP,s

friendliest face toward the U.S. (Bagis heads parliament,s

Turkey/U.S Friendship Committee), and most receptive to

liberal political and open market economic reforms needed for

EU accession.

Crosscutting Personal Loyalties

-------------------------------

12. (C) AKP MPS are as divided by personality as by

politics, but personality-based fault lines crosscut

ideological ones. PM Erdogan is the glue that holds AKP

together; a chunk of AKP MPs were part of Erdogan,s team

when he was Istanbul mayor and have followed him onto the

national stage. They include Finance Minister Unakitan,

Transportation Minister Yildirim, State Minister Cubukcu, AKP

whip Irfan Gunduz, and Erdogan speechwriter Huseyin Besli.

All are personally pious or, in Cubukcu,s case, at least

have consistently supported positions of the party,s pious

wing. Cubukcu, a female, was one of the few MPs who publicly

supported Erdogan,s 2004 proposal to re-criminalize adultery.

13. (C) Erdogan has consistently protected all three


26/41

"Istanbul" Ministers despite repeated calls for their

resignation. Many other AKP MPs profess staunch loyalty to

&Tayyip Bey8 and seek to stay close to him. One contact

suggests that Erdogan's strategy is to keep subordinates

competing with each other for his attention so they are too

busy to be a threat to him.

14. (C) DPM/FM Gul remains Erdogan,s chief political rival

within AKP. Their differences are not ideological ) Gul and

Erdogan are both pious ) but spring from Gul,s ambitions

for greater power. Gul, who represents the parliamentary

faction of the banned Virtue Party, has a small, quiet

following among AK MPs that includes whip Salih Kapusuz (from

Gul,s home town of Kayseri), former AKP public relations

vice chair Murat Mercan (sacked for incompetence by Erdogan

earlier this year) and Taner Yildiz (also from Kayseri).

15. (C) Parliament Speaker Arinc is AKP,s third leading

personality and potential future rival to Erdogan. However,

Arinc is well behind Gul in influence and, according to our

contacts, currently without a significant group of MPloyalists.

AKP's Kurdish MPs

-----------------

16. (C) About 60 AKP MPs, mostly from Turkey,s southeast,

are of Kurdish origin; Political and Legal Affairs Vice Chair

Dengir Mir Firat is AKP's most visible Kurdish MP. The Kurds

who joined AKP and were elected to parliament tend to be

pious, stressing the common bonds among all Muslims over

Kurdish nationalism. (The strongest Kurdish nationalists ran

from the pro-Kurdish Democratic People,s Party (DEHAP) in

2002 elections and failed to enter parliament because DEHAP

did not cross the ten percent electoral threshold.) One

former Kurdish-origin MP, himself pious, has consistently

told us even he considers AKP,s Kurdish MPs extraordinarily

passive on Kurdish issues.


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17. (C) Yet recent events in the southeast, including AKP

nationalists' reaction against PM Erdogan,s August &Kurdish

problem8 speech in Diyarbakir and alleged Jandarma

involvement in a November bombing in the southeastern town of

Semdinli, have created tension between AKP,s Kurdish-origin

MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group. An Ankara

provincial AKP official told us recently that tension with

AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs has infected AKP's pious wing,

weakening it relative to other AKP factions.

18. (C) Comment: AKP's parliamentary strength, so far,

springs from Erdogan's ability to keep such a diverse group

of MPs united, and the lack of any viable opposition. The

question is whether Erdogan can continue to keep the

parliamentary group together without turning AKP into an

internally-undemocratic, personality-based party in the

classic Turkish tradition. AKP,s opposition will eventually

come from inside AKP itself. However, for now, Erodgan

appears well in control and there is no viable political

alternative for dissatisfied AKP MPs. End Comment.

WILSON

Reference ID Date Classification Origin

06ANKARA4688 2006-08-11 14:02 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXYZ0015

PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #4688/01 2231453

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 111453Z AUG 06

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7906

INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 5386
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RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0316

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1549

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3053

RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5290

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0075

RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1083

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004688

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2021

TAGS: PGOVPINRPRELTU

SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO

THE FORE

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) The long-standing split between the professional MFA

diplomats and the tight circle of advisers around PM Erdogan

has widened noticeably in recent weeks. This gap has existed

under Erdogan,s Justice and Development Party (AKP)

government, largely because of the close links that both PM

Erdogan and FM Gul have with PM adviser Davutoglu, who has

been willing to undertake numerous initiatives. Until

recently, however, such strains have usually been more

effectively papered over. This internal debate now affects

every step the GOT takes on the international stage.

2.(C) The Turkish diplomatic corps is highly educated and

well attuned to what will sell in the U.S. or Europe; less so

on the domestic political front. PM Erdogan,s core of AKP

advisers, including Davutoglu and the AKP vice chairs,

understand what will play well with their constituencies.

Their sense of how policy will play outside of Ankara is
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