wills digests - rabadilla, bordalba and heirs of conti

8/13/2019 Wills Digests - Rabadilla, Bordalba and Heirs of Conti

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ABADILLA v. CA.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000ACTS:

In a codicil appended to the last will and testament of testatrix Alleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was instituted as a de

a 511,855 sq meters parcel of land. The codicil was duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental.

The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be inherited by his chnd spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Marlina, and should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall late

ase, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the piculs.

Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children. In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint age heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. Maria Melena claimed

ot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's spstruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix. She also claims that defendant-

iled to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domugar) from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demand

ompliance. Lastly, she claims that the banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in cae sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 p

sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.The RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the action was prematurely filed as no cause of action agains

efendants. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court deciding that the testamentary institution of Dr. J

abadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.SUE:

Whether or not the testamentary institution of Rabadilla is a modal institution.ULING:

Petitioner theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because what the tes

tended was a substitution in which Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should the

oncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.The contention is without merit.Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instit

nder substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property ass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a si

ubstitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to anothhers, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecrenunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rab

efault due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the C

ovides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to

e seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substite first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case u

onsideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the

escendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this oblig

preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' righerit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulf

bligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir o

deicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiducia


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deicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case ucrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the natureodal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an instit

ub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpopplication of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" impose

bligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand,

onditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeestator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is sa resolutory condition.

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject pro

e inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said institutednd his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Be

uring the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity ostitution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation bomplied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rab

nder subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affee efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should n

onsidered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubstitution should be considered as modal and not conditional.ordalba v. CA (G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002)NARES-SANTIAGO, J:acts:

In 1980, herein petitioner was granted a Free Patent and was issued an Original Certificate of Title over the herein subject loaused the subdivision and titling of the said lot into 6 parcels, as well as the conveyance of the two parcels thereof. Private respondowever, claimed ownership over the same lot by virtue of an extrajudicial partition made as early as 1947. Hence, they filed a complaeclare void the Free Patent as well as the cancellation of the titles issued. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitiobtaining the Free Patent, declared said free patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, the purchaser and mortgage two parcels conveyed were declared in good faith, hence, upheld their rights over the property. Both petitioner and private respon

ppealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that private respondentntitled only to 1/3 portion of the lot and petitioner should be ordered to reconvey only 1/3 of the lot to the private respondents. Petitontends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death other should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man's statute. Likewise, petitioner questionght of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity betweesputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.sue:Whether or not there is a violation of dead mans statute?eld:No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge iher way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.nce the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed xtra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies

operly admitted by the trial court.kewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclather than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations.esides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessa

eirs of Conti v. CA (G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998)ELLOSILLO, J:acts:Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti were the co-owners of the property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot orner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City. After Lourdes Sampayo died, private respondents filed an action for partition


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amages before the RTC of Lucena City against Ignacio Conti. After trial on the merits, the court declared respondents as the rightfuLourdes Sampayo and ordered both parties to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot for confirmation by th

ourt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision ruling that a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship waecessary and that private respondents became co-owners of the portion of the property owned and registered in the name of Loampayo upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownershovided for by law including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code.sue/s:) WON a prior settlement of the entire estate is essential before heirs can commence any action in behalf of deceased.

WON private respondents could establish co-ownership by way of succession as collateral heirs of Sampayoeld:) No. prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased a

xplained in Quison v. Salud, Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, bsaid by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have beeken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action.here is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person wes intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and theoperty may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage e title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been appoinoceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

) Yes. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the pro

ought to be partitioned, and second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e., what portion shouwhich co-owner. Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have been astablish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, a sisephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.

wills digests - rabadilla, bordalba and heirs of conti

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