G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,respondents.D E C I S I O NPURISIMA,J.:This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees(including herein petitioner),asheirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.The antecedent facts are as follows:In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:"FIRSTI give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.xxxFOURTH(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.FIFTH(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.SIXTHI command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister."4Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff(private respondent)and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; andFor 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."5However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.SO ORDERED."6On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.SO ORDERED."7Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Courtviathe present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.The petition is not impressed with merit.Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution -i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 8438and 8459of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent10and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.11Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.Again, the contention is without merit.Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,12or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve theproperty and to transmitthe same later to the second heir.15In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."16Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.17In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as aninstitucion sub modoor a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.18A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.19On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.21From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.22Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.23Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.24Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.25Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.WHEREFORE,the petition is hereby DISMISSEDand the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costsG.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002TERESITA P. BORDALBA,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME,namely,CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY,namely,ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY,respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals1in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with modification the Decision2of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386.The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial partition,3written in the Spanish language was executed, describing said parcel of land as 2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al N. con la Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS ------------------------------------------------ P1,050.00.4and disposing,inter alia,the same parcel of land as follows:1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Agelio Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jaymes house, which his family occupied since 1945.Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioners mother, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registration5of the lot described with the following boundaries:N - Fruelana Jayme & RoadS - Felicitas de LatonioE - Agustin de JaymeW - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio AbellanaElena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition6contending that said application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application7dated January 10, 1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as follows:North: Froilan Jayme and RoadEast: Agustin JaymeSouth: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario GandecilaWest: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa8On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.9Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision and titling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,10as well as the disposition of two parcels thereof, thus:1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom petitioner sold said lot;2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Mandaue;3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba;4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the name of Teresita Bordalba;5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba;6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba.Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving the lot subject of the controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Private respondents also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that spouses Genaro V. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith, respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them actual, compensatory, and moral damages plus attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00.Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through purchase from her mother,11who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. In her answer, petitioner traced her mothers ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial partition presented by private respondents,12and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother. On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her mother.13On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale of Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) to spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor of the Rural Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs by:1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-57 (FP) and all subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of Lot No. 1242 except TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in good faith and are the legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT No. 22771 (FP);3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the mortgage lien in its favor be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate of title to be issued under the names of the plaintiffs;4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering the issuance of the certificate of title in their names;5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the defendant Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and,7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.SO ORDERED.14Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of the respondent court's decision states:WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of one-third of the subject land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of Title issued and their declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMEDintoto.SO ORDERED.15Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.16The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioners application, insofar as her declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is belied by the extra-judicial partition which she acknowledged, her mothers aborted attempt to have the lot registered, private respondents predecessors-in-interests opposition thereto, and by the occupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to enrich oneself at the expense of others.17As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute,18suffice it to state that said rule finds no application in the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.19Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based,inter alia,on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.20Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C)vis--visthe boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioners mother, second, to the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein was the lot found on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City. As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to their predecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioners mother acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private respondents predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private respondents predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so because private respondents did not show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242 (799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, to wit:North:Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. JaymeEast:Propiodades de Fernando AntiguaSouth:Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano JaymeWest:Calle Plaridelthey did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, which they claim Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the extent to which the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of Froilan Jaime and Mabini Street) is similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed. With only one reference point, however, the south, east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be established with certainty to be within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.InBeo v. Court of Appeals,21the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So that when the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action has been exactly determined, the action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the extent of their 1/3pro indivisoright over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established their claim over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case ofLaluan v. Malpaya,22the prudent recourse would be to remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share of private respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) isAFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court in order to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO CARLOS A. SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO,respondents.BELLOSILLO,J.:This petition for review oncertiorariseeks to reverse the 30 March 1994. Decision and 21 December 1994 Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the right of private respondents as heirs of Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition under Art. 494 of the Civil Code.Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuado, were the co-owners of the property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T-15374, with a house erected thereon.1On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue.2Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S. Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico A. SAMPAYO, Carlos A. Sampayo, Gelleroso C. Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia. A. Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo acting also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before RTC-Br. 54, Lucena City.3The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that private respondents failed to produce any document to produce that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.4On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was substituted as party-defendant by his children Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.5At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they were the collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the original copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her father was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Sampayo,6Lydia Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios J. Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings of Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel Sampayo were offered in evidence. These documents showed that their father and mother, like Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampavo and Brigida Jaraza.The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia Sampayo Reyes were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all data therein written were in accordance with the church records, hence, the lower left portion of the documents bearing the seal of the church with the notation as to where the documents were logged in particular.7The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the birth certificates because the repository of those documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lucena City, had been razed by fire On two separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, thus all civil registration records were totally burned.8On the other hand, a photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate dated 25 October 1919 (Exh. "I")9showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her husband Manuel was the brother of the deceased Lourdes, and with the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the only living sibling of Lourdes was Josefina.10To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosal Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject property since 1937.11In fact, she said that her late husband Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate taxes12and spent for the necessary repairs and improvements thereon13because by agreement Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them.14However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented by petitioners to substantiate this claim.15Rosario also disclosed that when Lourdes died her remains were taken by her-relatives from their house.16When cross examined on who those relatives were, she replied that the only one she remembered was Josefina since there were many relatives who came. When asked who Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall. Likewise, when asked who the parents of Lourdes were, Rosario denied having ever known them.17Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she used to be the neighbor and hairdresser of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who told her that upon her death her share would go to Ignacio Conti whom she considered as her brother since both of them were "adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord,18although she admitted that she did not know whether Lourdes had other relatives.19According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures of the tombs bearing the tombstones of Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as well as that of Lourdes Sampayo who was supposed to have been interred beside her "adoptive" parents. However, as revealed by Rosario during her direct examination, Lourdes was not in fact interred there because her relatives took her remains.20On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respodents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the court.21Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in finding that private respondents were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were entitled to the partition of the lot and the improvements thereon.22On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC decision and held23In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and establish by preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore the lower court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] and defendants [now petitioners] to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot owned in common by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the court . . . . Considering our earlier finding that the lower court did not err in declaring herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and therefore entitled to inherit her property, the argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now private respondents] are not entitled, to partition is devoid of merit (insertions in 11 supplied).Respondent court also ruled,citingHernandez v. Padua24andMarabilles v. Quito,25that a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary26and that private respondents became the co-owners of the portion of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law, including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code,27andIlustre v. Alaras Frondosa28holding that the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, as completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the probative value of the documentary and testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted petitioners for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she was a vital witness in the case.29Hence, petitioners pursued this case arguing that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance with all legal requirements especially publication, and private respondents were not able to prove by competent evidence their relationship with the deceased.30There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained inQuison v. Salud31Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison; and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the; plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 49432of the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small value.33But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited; from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rules 69 of the Rules of Court Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property.A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required as erroneously maintained by petitioners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, andsecond, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property,i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.34Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of filiation because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not prove filiation of alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter of Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was made to testify on events which happened before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters merely narrated to her.35We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted that private respondents are competent and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private respondents assert that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2)pro-indivisoshare of the subject property by way of legal or intestate succession.Succession is a mode of acquisition by vietue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.36Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity.37If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spuoses, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.38It was established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and without issues. Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,39the filiation of ligitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.40By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official act of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country.41The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein.42The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled inPeople v. Ritter, citingU.S. v. de Vera(28 Phil.105 [1914],43thus.. . . the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during this course of its business.It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly discarded by the courta quoand respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself except when the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the original certificate of birth of Manuel T. Sampayo was duly established by the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to the effect that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence thereof, all civil registration records were totally burned.Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners' contention that the testimony of Adelaida Sampayo cannot prove filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no declarationante litem motamas required by the rules,i.e., that the declaration relating to pedigree was made before the controversy occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no move to dispute her testimony in open court when she was mentioning who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly observed by the trial court in explicit terms, "the documentary and testimonial evidence not were not disputed by defendants" (now petitioners).44Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took the witness stand, she admitted that she was not aware of the identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs, counter to the relationship akin to filial bonding which she professed she had enjoyed with the decedent. As wife of Ignacio Contil, she was supposedly a "sister-in-law" of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who regarded Ignacio as a brother. However, in sum, we rule that all the pieces of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right of private respondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent any reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, this petition for review oncertiorariwill not lie.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 March 1994 and Resolution dated 21 December 1994 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174077 November 21, 2012ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, represented by its Chairman of the Board of Directors and President, RAUL E. GALA,Petitioner,vs.RODEL T. YOUNG, DELFIN CHAN, JIM WEE, and GUIA G. DOMINGO,***Respondents.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the July 1, 2003 Decision1and the August 8, 2006 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 64421, dismissing the petition and upholding the November 11, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 60 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 96-177, entitled "Rodel T. Young, Delfin Chan and Jim Wee v. Ellice Agro Industrial Corporation, represented by Guia G. Domingo."The FactsOn July 24, 1995, Rodel T. Young, Delfin Chan and Jim Wee (respondents) and Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation (EAIC), represented by its alleged corporate secretary and attorney-in-fact, Guia G. Domingo (Domingo), entered into a Contract to Sell, under certain terms and conditions, wherein EAIC agreed to sell to the respondents a 30,000 square-meter portion of a parcel of land located in Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon and registered under EAICs name and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-157038 in consideration of One Million and Fifty Thousand (P1,050,000.00) Pesos.Pursuant to the Contract to Sell,3respondents paid EAIC, through Domingo, the aggregate amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Thousand (P545,000.00) Pesos as partial payment for the acquisition of the subject property. Despite such payment, EAIC failed to deliver to respondents the owners duplicate certificate of title of the subject property and the corresponding deed of sale as required under the Contract to Sell.On November 8, 1996, prompted by the failure of EAIC to comply with its obligation, respondents had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated in TCT No. T-157038.4On November 14, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint5for specific performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-177, against EAIC and Domingo before the RTC.Consequently, on November 18, 1996, respondents caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens involving Civil Case No. 96-177 in TCT No. T-157038.6The initial attempt to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint and its annexes on EAIC, through Domingo, on Rizal Street, Sariaya, Quezon, was unsuccessful as EAIC could not be located in the said address.Another attempt was made to serve the alias summons on EAIC at 996 Maligaya Street, Singalong, Manila, the residence of Domingo. The second attempt to serve the alias summons to Domingo was, this time, successful.On March 21, 1997, EAIC, represented by Domingo, filed its Answer with Counterclaim.7Meanwhile, respondent Jim Wee (Wee) sent Raul E. Gala (Gala), EAICs Chairman and President, a letter,8dated July 9, 1997, seeking a conference with the latter relating to the execution of an absolute deed of sale pursuant to the Contract to Sell entered into between EAIC and respondents.In response, the Robles Ricafrente Aguirre Sanvicente & Cacho Law Firm, introducing itself to be the counsel of EAIC, sent Wee a letter,9dated July 18, 1997, informing him of Domingos lack of authority to represent EAIC.On the scheduled pre-trial conference on January 27, 1998, neither Domingo nor her counsel appeared. As a result of EAICs failure to appear in the pre-trial conference, respondents were allowed to present their evidence ex parte, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 1810of the Rules of Court.Following the presentation of evidence ex parte, the RTC rendered its November 11, 1999 Decision ordering EAIC to deliver the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-157038 and to execute a final deed of sale in favor of respondents.No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by EAIC, hence, the said RTC decision became final and executory on December 8, 1999.11On July 10, 2000 (roughly seven months after the finality of the RTC Decision), EAIC, represented by Gala, filed its Petition for Relief from Judgment12under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court of the November 11, 1999 RTC Decision before the same court. The petition for relief from judgment was premised on the alleged fraud committed by Domingo in concealing the existence of both the Contract to Sell and Civil Case No. 96-177 from EAIC.In its July 12, 2000 Order,13the RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment for being clearly filed out of time under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.14On April 24, 2001, EAIC, represented by Gala, initiated the Petition for Annulment of Judgment15under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court of the November 11, 1999 RTC Decision before the CA. The petition was grounded on the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over EAIC and the extrinsic fraud committed by Domingo. EAIC discarded any knowledge of the said sale and the suit filed by respondents against it. According to EAIC, it could not be bound by the assailed RTC Decision pursuant to Section 13, Rule 1416of the 1964 Rules of Court which was, the applicable rule then. Domingo was not its President, Manager, Secretary, Cashier, Agent or Director, as evidenced by the General Information Sheets17 (GIS) it filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), at the time the summons was served upon her and she did not possess the requisite authorization to represent EAIC in the subject transaction. Furthermore, her misrepresentation that she was EAICs corporate secretary who was properly authorized to sell and receive payment for the subject property, defrauded EAIC of the potential gains it should have realized from the proceeds of the sale.In their Answer with Counterclaim18filed before the CA, respondents countered that considering EAICs petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 grounded on extrinsic fraud, had already been rejected with finality, EAIC could not be permitted to invoke the same ground in a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47. Further, EAIC could not feign ignorance of Civil Case No. 96-177 because of the November 8, 1996 Adverse Claim and the November 18, 1996 Notice of Lis Pendens annotated at the back of TCT No. T-157038. Respondents insisted that the mentioned annotations in TCT No. T-157038 should be deemed constructive notices to the world of the pending litigation referred to therein and, therefore, bound EAIC to Civil Case No. 96-177. Moreover, with the exchange of letters, dated July 9, 199719and July 18, 1997,20between Wee and EAIC, through Gala, EAIC was informed of the pending civil case against it.In its Reply21filed before the CA, EAIC explained that the RTC did not touch upon the issue of fraud in the petition for relief from judgment as it was dismissed for being filed out of time. In addition, EAIC claimed that the exchange of letters between Wee and EAIC never stated anything whatsoever of any pending suit between them.In its July 1, 2003 Decision, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. In its decision, the CA ratiocinated:x x x x.The corporation, at the inception of Civil Case No. 96-177 on November 14, 1996, already had constructive notice of the three (3) businessmens herein respondents adverse claim to a 30,000square-meter portion of the land covered by TCT No. T-157038 because this claim was duly registered and annotated on the said title even before this date. Moreover, four (4) days after the inception of the civil case, room was provided for on the same title for the annotation of a notice of lis pendens.These constructive notices ought to have spurred the corporation into action by filing an answer in Civil Case No. 96-177 through proper or legitimate representations, for instance. But the corporation chose to keep quiet, thus, making the trial court and everyone else concerned with said civil case believe that Guia G. Domingo is its proper or legitimate representative. It even appears that she was, after all, a proper or legitimate representative of the corporation because in the decision, dated November 3, 1998, rendered in SEC Cases Nos. 3747 and 4027, the corporations board headed by Raul E. Gala since August 24, 1990 was held to be illegitimate.Even without the constructive notices, the businessmen herein respondents, through a letter signed by one of them, apprised the corporation, through Raul E. Gala, of their contract to sell. This was in July, 1997. The letter was duly acknowledged and the parties thereafter even tried to settle among themselves the consideration and conveyance of the 30,000 square-meter portion.When this failed, there was no reason why the corporation could not have proceeded with the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 96-177. It did not.The corporations reticence in view of the constructive notices and its then incumbent boards personal knowledge of the case had, in effect, amounted to a waiver of its right to actively participate in the proper disposition of Civil Case No. 96-177, to move for a new trial therein and to appeal from the decision rendered therein. Certainly, these remedies no longer are available, but only the corporation should be faulted for this.Be that as it may, the corporation had availed of the remedy of relief from the judgment in Civil Case No. 96-177. The fact that it was not able to prove that it was entitled thereto does not mean that it can now avail of the instant remedy.It would serve no useful purpose then to delve into the issues of jurisdiction and fraud raised in the petition as the petition itself is unavailing under the circumstances.x x x x.EAICs motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution, dated August 8, 2006.Hence, this petition for review.The IssuesNot in conformity with the ruling of the CA, EAIC seeks relief from this Court raising the following errors:THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON PETITIONER CORPORATION.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT GUIA G. DOMINGO WAS A DIRECTOR OF PETITIONER CORPORATION AT THE TIME SUMMONS WAS SERVED UPON HER AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER CAN NO LONGER AVAIL OF THE PRESENT PETITION HAVING EARLIER FILED A PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.22The main issue for the Courts consideration is whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of EAIC, defendant in Civil Case No. 96-177.In their Memorandum,23respondents argue that at the time the summons was served upon Domingo, she was acting for and in behalf of EAIC. They further point out that, at any rate, EAICs filing of its Answer with Counterclaim and the petition for relief from judgment before the trial court constitutes voluntary appearance thereby submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Respondents stress that the extrinsic fraud claimed by EAIC is not a valid ground for a petition for annulment of judgment because the latter had already availed of the said ground in a petition from relief from judgment in contravention to Section 2, Rule 47.24In her Memorandum,25Domingo argues that EAIC, in filing its Answer with Counterclaim and Petition for Relief from Judgment, had invoked the jurisdiction of the same trial court that it now denies. Further, she claims that she acted in utmost good faith in receiving the summons and filing the Answer in Civil Case No. 96-177 for EAIC since she truly believed that she was authorized to do so.On the other hand, EAIC, in its Memorandum,26contends that there was no valid service of summons because Domingo, at the time summons was served, was not its president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director. The GIS filed with the SEC consistently showed that she never held any position with EAIC which could have authorized her to receive summons in behalf of EAIC. The CA erred in considering the Adverse Claim and Notice of Lis Pendens annotated in TCT No. T-157038 as constructive notice to EAIC of the pendency of Civil Case No. 96-177 and, therefore, clothed the RTC with jurisdiction over the person of EAIC. Those annotations in the TCT merely serve to apprise third persons of the controversy or pending litigation relating to the subject property but do not place a party under the jurisdiction of the court. Moreover, respondents duty to prosecute their case diligently includes ensuring that the proper parties are impleaded and properly served with summonses.The Courts RulingThe Court finds merit in the petition.It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.27The purpose of summons is not only to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to give notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against it and to afford it an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against it. The requirements of the rule on summons must be strictly followed, otherwise, the trial court will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.28Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure, the applicable rule on service of summons upon a private domestic corporation then, provides:Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. [Underscoring supplied]Based on the above-quoted provision, for service of summons upon a private domestic corporation, to be effective and valid, should be made on the persons enumerated in the rule. Conversely, service of summons on anyone other than the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director, is not valid. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.29In the present case, the 1996 GIS30of EAIC, the pertinent document showing EAICs composition at the time the summons was served upon it, through Domingo, will readily reveal that she was not its president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or director. Due to this fact, the Court is of the view that her honest belief that she was the authorized corporate secretary was clearly mistaken because she was evidently not the corporate secretary she claimed to be. In view of Domingos lack of authority to properly represent EAIC, the Court is constrained to rule that there was no valid service of summons binding on it.Granting arguendo that EAIC had actual knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No. 96-177 lodged against it, the RTC still failed to validly acquire jurisdiction over EAIC. In Cesar v. Ricafort-Bautista,31it was held that "x x x jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a case against him unless he was validly served with summons. Such is the important role a valid service of summons plays in court actions."The Court cannot likewise subscribe to respondents argument that by filing its answer with counterclaim, through Domingo, with the RTC, EAIC is deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. In Salenga v. Court of Appeals,32the Court stated:A corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through its board of directors and through its officers and agents when authorized by a board resolution or its bylaws. The power of a corporation to sue and be sued is exercised by the board of directors. The physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board.In this case, at the time she filed the Answer with Counterclaim, Domingo was clearly not an officer of EAIC, much less duly authorized by any board resolution or secretarys certificate from EAIC to file the said Answer with Counterclaim in behalf of EAIC. Undoubtedly, Domingo lacked the necessary authority to bind EAIC to Civil Case No. 96-177 before the RTC despite the filing of an Answer with Counterclaim. EAIC cannot be bound or deemed to have voluntarily appeared before the RTC by the act of an unauthorized stranger.Incidentally, Domingo alleged in her Answer with Counterclaim that "Alicia E. Gala is the real owner and possessor of all the real properties registered in the business name and style Ellice-Agro Industrial Corporation x x x."33In the same pleading, Domingo claimed that she was authorized by Alicia E. Gala, the purported beneficial owner of the subject property, to represent her in Civil Case No. 96-177 by virtue of a General Power of Attorney. In advancing the said allegations, among others, Domingo evidently acted in representation of Alicia E. Gala, not EAIC. Hence, her conduct in the filing of the Answer with Counterclaim cannot and should not be binding to EAIC.In view of the fact that EAIC was not validly served with summons and did not voluntarily appear in Civil Case No. 96-177, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of EAIC. Consequently, the proceedings had before the RTC and ultimately its November 11, 1999 Decision were null and void.1wphi1Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 4734of the Rules of Court, a judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 1, 2003 Decision and August 8, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64421, are hereby REVERSED. The November 11, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 96-177, is hereby declared VACATED and SET ASIDE.The records of the case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 60, for the proper service of summons to the petitioner and other parties, if any, and for other appropriate proceedings.SO ORDERED.