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Winstanley College

History Magazine Easter (REVISION!) Edition

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Contents:

Please note that any views or opinions expressed in this magazine are the views of

the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Winstanley College, or its

History Society.

Editorial ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..3

The Undoing of the Crusader States …………….…………………………………………………………………………….4-6

Winstanley visits the People’s History Museum………………………………… ……………………………………….7

The consequences of the death of Thomas Becket…………………………………………………………………….8-12

Wealth and the First Crusade…………………………………………………………………………………………………….13-16

Byzantine Aid in the First Crusade ……………………………………………………………………………………...…..17-19

The She-Wolf of France ……………………………………………………………………………………...……………………...20-22

Don’t call me a Celt, you Eejit!…………………………………………………………………………………………………….23-25

British Railways 1939-92……………………………………………………………………………………………………………26-27

Henry II’s victory over the Great Rebellion ………………………………………………….…………………………28-31

Meet the History Society……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………32

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Editorial: “History is philosophy teaching by examples”-Thucydides

Hello and welcome to the

Easter edition of the Winstan-

ley History Society Magazine!

As all of us students know, ex-

ams are looming and ap-

proaching fast, so this edition

is primarily to help prepare

you for these exams; whether

it be AS or A-Level! This edi-

tion will include articles of in-

terest and most importantly,

high mark essays that will help

you revise!

With the general election also

nearing we should all remem-

ber to register and vote; our

vote could change the country

and impact on the history fu-

ture A-level students will

study.

In this issue we also have a re-

view of the People’s History

Museum (which we recom-

mend you go and visit!)

All there is left to say is thank

you for participating and sup-

porting the History Magazine

over the past academic year

and good luck in all exams…

Editors;

Madeleine McDonagh &

Sally Dickens

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Weak Kingship: The

Undoing of the Crusad-

er States

In 1187, Jerusalem fell to Saladin. In response, a new crusade, the Third Crusade, was called and preached, led by the Kings of France and England. But why did the Cru-sader States fall? After the death of Amalric in 1174, Jerusalem was ruled by a succession of weak kings: Baldwin IV; Baldwin V; and Guy of Lusignan. Weak kingship, here, means an inability to rule effectively by uniting the subjects and the nobility against the common enemy and as a corol-lary an inability to ensure the defence of the kingdom against this common enemy. In the case of the crusader states, the common enemy was Saladin and the three above kings failed to defend the kingdom against him. Baldwin IV suffered from leprosy which had the effect of rendering him progressively more disabled as his reign continued and thus, as Jonathan Phillips argues, the longer he reigned the weaker Jerusalem became. As-bridge seems to concur with this viewpoint when he says that Baldwin’s rule was “precarious” and that it left Jerusalem in a “state of limbo.” While Baldwin IV may have been a brave man, Phillips says that his reign lead to “serious inconsistencies” within the kingdom. Thus, because of his leprosy, Baldwin IV at times had to rely on regents to rule for him, such as Raymond III of Tripoli. As Baldwin IV would not produce any heirs, this also meant that the succession was in doubt, thus leading to specu-lation over who would marry his sister, Sibylla. As a result, in a way not seen before in Jerusalem, the

aristocracy was often divided not only over who would succeed the king as the future ruler, but also who would act as the present ruler in the form of a regent. This al-lowed for the growth of rival court factions, one led by Raymond III of Tripoli, known as the ‘doves’, and anoth-er led by Baldwin’s mother, Agnes, known as the ‘hawks’. This pitted the more recently arrived Franks with the long established aristocracy. Had Baldwin not been incapacitated, without a male heir, and in need of regents, then these factions would not have developed since there would have been clearly laid down rules as to who would rule Jerusalem and what course of action would be taken. With the death of Baldwin IV came Baldwin V, during whose reign Raymond was also regent and during whose reign a truce was signed with Saladin. It was because this truce was only arranged by a regent that the raids perpetrated by Reynald of Chatillon in 1186, in contra-vention of the truce, went ahead, since, in the absence of a strong king with a clear course of action, each fac-tion could disregard the other’s rulings. In 1186, Baldwin V died and was succeeded by Guy of Lusignan who ruled as king consort through his marriage to Sibylla. Guy had previously been regent under Bald-win IV but had been removed from the post after pursu-ing ‘Fabian tactics’ instead of attacking Saladin when he had the chance. Already then, coupled with the fact that Guy was only king through marriage and not by heredi-tary right, Guy had a reputation for weakness and an

Weak Kingship: The

Undoing of the Cru-

sader States

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inability to act, which, of course, only added to his weak-ness. Certainly, as a weak king Guy had no control over the events at the Springs of Cresson: rather, the Military Orders acted of their own accord and thus the kingdom of Jerusalem lost over 100 of its elite knights. Further, at the Battle of Hattin, while his men questioned him, they did as he commanded; it was, in fact, Guy who listened to Gerard de Ridefort and Reynald of Chatillon and then, acquiescing to their request, decided to march on Tiberi-as. A strong king would have held firm and stuck to the plan already made, but, as a weak king, Guy made the fateful decision to march east from Saffuria based on a personal grievance held against Raymond of Tripoli and out of a desire for vengeance over the events of the Battle of Cresson. Guy, according to Phillips, simply had a “lack of leadership ability” and thus it was his inability to lead which led to the defeat of the Franks at Hattin and the subsequent Muslim conquest of Jerusalem. It is often said that the fall of Jerusalem was the inevita-ble result of Christian disunity. There is nothing wrong with this claim, yet the disunity itself has a cause and it is the lack of strong kingship since at least the death of Amalric. This disunity is exemplified in the rise of rival factions, the hawks on the one hand and the doves on the other, which meant that the Franks were divided over how to deal with the threat posed by Saladin. The hawks, who tended to be newly arrived fanatical crusad-ers, favoured open confrontation with Saladin whereas the doves, who tended to be the long-established fami-lies in the kingdom, favoured peace treaties and other methods of diplomacy. For instance, it was Raymond III of Tripoli, who was a dove, who agreed to the truce with Saladin in 1185 and it was Reynald of Chatillon, who was a hawk, who carried out the raids on Muslim caravans travelling between Cairo and Damascus. As another instance of Christian disunity stemming from the rivalry between the hawks and the doves, Raymond of Tripoli actually made a deal with Saladin which al-lowed the latter to travel through his Galilean lands if he would help him to remove the hawkish king Guy of Lusignan from power. In the view of Ibn al-Athir, this deal with Saladin made by Raymond meant that “their unity was disrupted”, and al-Athir believes that this was a very important factor in the fall of Jerusalem. However, it must be noted that there was always a po-tential for disunity among the Franks. Even on the First Crusade, Tancred de Hauteville and Baldwin of Boulogne become embroiled in a conflict with one another during their Cilician expedition, prompting Baldwin to actually leave the main crusader army and take Edessa. Even so, the First Crusade was a success, demonstrating that

Christian unity itself was not paramount. During the reign of Baldwin III, there was also enormous potential for Christian disunity; for much of his early reign, his mother, Queen Melisende, refused to give up the regency and tried to prevent her son from ruling independently and yet Baldwin did succeed wresting power from his mother and there was no fragmentation of the aristocracy of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Also, when Prince Raymond of Antioch died, his widow, Con-stance, refused to remarry because she would not ac-cept the candidates offered to her by Baldwin. And yet, even though there was the potential for Christian disuni-ty, Baldwin simply assumed the regency of Antioch and, when the count of Tripoli died, Tripoli also. What do these examples show? The show that the king-dom of Jerusalem had encountered potential Christian disunity before, but encountered it while under a strong king hence no fracturing of the crusader states ensued. While the case might be made that Raymond III of Tripo-li’s deal with Saladin was an example of Christian disuni-ty, it must be remembered that the tensions and the rivalry of the hawks and the doves first surfaced during, and due to, the necessarily weak reign of the leper king, Baldwin IV. A reasonable case may also be made for the proposition that the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 was mainly due to the lack of aid provided by both the Byzantine Empire and the west. While the Byzantine Empire had provided some aid to the Franks in the past, their defeat at Myrio-cephalum in 1176 meant that they could no longer feasi-bly provide the crusader states with troops and also pro-tect their own borders against Kilij Arslan II and the Sel-juk Turks. Further to this, while it had indeed been the case that Manuel Comnenus had provided aid to the crusader states and that King Amalric of Jerusalem had paid homage to the Emperor, the latter’s death in 1180 hailed the end of positive crusader-Byzantine relations as far as Phillips is concerned. Under Andronicus Comne-nus, the Byzantines were markedly anti-Catholic. In-deed, in 1182, a group of Andronicus’ supporters had carried out a slaughter of the Catholic population of Constantinople. However, it must be remembered that King Amalric managed to obtain aid from Byzantium after a period of strained crusader-Byzantine relations, albeit under a different Emperor. Amalric was prepared to submit him-self to the Byzantines by paying homage to Manuel Comnenus 1161 and by allowing him to marry Maria of Antioch. If aid from the Byzantines was necessary, then more ought to have been done by Baldwin IV, Baldwin V, and Guy of Lusignan to improve relations.

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In addition to a lack of aid from Byzantium, the west was not willing or able to provide very much by way of military aid either. One important reason for this was that the ruling houses of England and France, the Ange-vins and the Capetians respectively, were distrustful of one another such that neither Henry II nor Louis VII would leave their lands for fear of the other invading them. They were, to quote Phillips, “locked in decades of feuding.” Neither of the two kingdoms was in a par-ticularly strong position during the appeals for aid from the east. For example, from 1162-72, Henry II was tan-gled up in the Beckett affair while Louis VII’s death in 1180 meant the rise to power of a teenage king. Furthermore, the notion of crusading fell out of favour with the west after the failure of the Second Crusade and the failure itself was explained by stating that the crusader states had lost God’s support. Also, many in the west, when they heard of Baldwin IV’s capture of Ascalon and of his victory at Montgisard in 1177 and at Le Forbelet in 1182, simply did not think that the cru-sader states were in any need of aid at all. However, it is telling that during the reign of Baldwin IV it was decided by the nobles that if his successor Bald-win V died then the succession would be decided by the pope and the rulers of England, France, and Germany. Phillips says that this shows that by now the crusader states were totally bereft of self-regulation. Further-more, during the appeal of Patriarch Heraclius of Jerusa-lem from 1184-5, the keys to the city of Jerusalem and to the Tower of David were offered both to Philip II of France and to Henry II of England. What these examples of appeals for aid show is that the kind of aid that the Franks required was not simply added manpower, but the strong leadership they were not getting from Bald-win IV. To conclude, then, the most important factor which

contributed to the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 was weak

leadership which led to Christian disunity through the

growth of rival court factions, i.e. the hawks and the

doves. The weaknesses of Baldwin IV, Baldwin V, and

Guy of Lusignan only made the need for aid from the

west and Byzantium more pressing as demonstrated by

the offer to give the kingdom of Jerusalem to Philip II

and then to Henry II in 1184-5. While it is true that the

Muslims were becoming stronger and more unified, first

under the Zengids and then under Saladin, there are

examples of battles where the Franks were victorious

over Saladin, suggesting that in spite of their political

difficulties and their lack of manpower they could still

defeat him. Rather, the poor judgement and resolve of

Guy of Lusignan in his decision to march on Tiberias was

partly due to his own weak kingship and also due to the

growth of rival factions under his predecessors which

meant that Guy had to choose whether to follow the

strategy of the dove or the strategy of the hawk.

By Keir Martland

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Trip t

Winstanley visits the People’s History Museum…

I really enjoyed the trip as a whole. I felt that the staff were friendly and the two guides we had were very informative with-out being boring, and were con-cise. Thought the exhibitions themselves were well presented and clear, and the museum itself was a modern, clean centre that was spacious and well laid out.

Archives were extremely intri-guing, and the strong left wing views of the archive man provid-ed interesting debate.

Elections since 1900 was well presented and very interesting, not too many facts and writing on the wall which made the tour

guide more useful and engaging - I didn't feel distracted.

Background on elections and voting rights was again well laid out and very interesting.

I felt that the exhibition down-stairs was a bit cold in terms of room temperature! (Maybe it was just me!)

Other than that, no reason to complain. Exceeded expecta-tions, I'd encourage anyone do-ing the Britain exam to attend the trip next year if you are to run it again (which I strongly ad-vise!)

By Harry Griffiths

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Aiden the Oxford chronicler

The argument that the church is the outright

victor after the Becket affair is supported by Guy

who argues that the church wins through the rise of

the Cult of Becket and that Henry ‘had no choice’

but to bend to the church’s whim whilst his ene-

mies simultaneously called for his excommunica-

tion. However, this view is misguided as the

church’s victory was never outright. In the short

term, the church was victorious as it gained appeals

to Rome and effectively challenged Clause 3 of the

Constitutions- Henry’s ambitions to try criminous

clerks; however, Henry is the victor in the long term

as he was able to gain the Church’s support and

cooperation in the Great Rebellion of 1173-74 and

maintained some of his Constitutions of Clarendon.

Ultimately, he upheld his royal authority and there-

fore his reputation as King of England.

The church being the outright victor is also

supported by Carpenter who argues that ‘the king-

dom was thus fully within the compass of papal

government’. This was achieved by the church as

Henry’s continental lands were placed under inter-

dict and Henry himself was subjected to personal

interdict by Pope Alexander III, and thus the church

was effectively controlling the monarch. They

knew, as Guy argues, that Henry had to accept their

decisions as Henry was ‘forced to compromise’.

Furthermore, the realm became further under Pa-

pal jurisdiction as Clause 4 of the constitutions was

reverted and freedom of appeals to the church was

reinstated, which in turn increased papal influence

in England; by 1234, 180 of 470 decrees issued by

the papacy were addressed to England. This in-

crease in papal influence reinstates the idea that

the church is the victor as it causes problems for

John’s reign; the church are still extremely powerful

in the era due to the errors of Henry’s appointment

of Becket. Moreover, the terms with which Henry

had to comply with to receive forgiveness from the

“The consequences of Thomas Becket’s death were an out-

right victory for the church.” Assess the validity of this view.

(45 marks)

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church meant that ‘all hostile customs’ toward the

church were to be abolished. The greatest victory

for the church came from this condition; the abol-

ishment of Clause 3 of the Constitutions of Claren-

don that were first set out in January 1164. In 1176

a definitive agreement was reached between Henry

and the church which identified that criminals

clerks should not be brought before a secular judge

for any crime; the church were victorious in their

forcible rejection of this Clause that went against

Canon Law which stated that no man should be

tried twice for the same offence as this was ‘double

jeopardy’. However, this cannot be seen as an out-

right victory for the church as the said criminals

clerks were still obliged to be tried by a secular

judge if they committed a Forest offence, and

therefore Henry maintained some royal authority

over the clergy.

The church can also be seen as the winner in

the short term as Henry was forced to compromise

and reconcile with the church on the 21st May

1172 in the cathedral of Avranches. The terms of

this truce benefitted the church greatly; Henry was

to provide 200 knights in the Holy Land for the de-

fense of Jerusalem for one year, and he himself had

to take the Crusading cross for three years unless

excused by the Pope. This forced penance upon

Henry benefitted the church as it aided the defense

of the Holy Land and further rallied support for the

crusading movement; supporters of the monarch

would thus support the crusade. Also, Henry had to

restore the possessions of Canterbury to what they

were one year before Becket’s exile and rehabili-

tate all those who were exiled because of their sup-

port of Becket, at great expense to the King. Henry

also made Becket’ sister, Mary, abbess of Barking

Abbey to gain forgiveness for the death of her

brother, which damaged his reputation. In the short

term, the church was victorious over Henry who

had his pride and reputation damaged severely; his

sometimes despotic personality meant that he

wanted to maintain royal authority over all parts of

his realm; religion and secular, but was not able to

do this through his concessions to the church. How-

ever, the penance was not as detrimental to Hen-

ry’s position as it seems, as Duggan argues, Henry

cooperated with the church’s demands as he need-

ed to restore his position ‘as quickly as he could’,

and through accepting the church’s demands, he

was able to salvage his relations with the church

and therefore ensure their support in future, which

we can see in the church’s support of Henry II in the

Great Rebellion of 1173-74.

The church gained their finances and spiritual

status significantly through the Cult of Saint Thom-

as Becket, thus increasing papal influence in Eng-

land and Europe. Becket was canonized by Pope

Alexander III on 21st February 1173, and soon after,

the Cult of Becket grew and prospered; miracles

were attributed to him and Canterbury became a

place of pilgrimage that people regarded with the

same awe they related to Jerusalem. This Cult of

Becket can be seen all throughout Europe as repre-

sentations of Becket can be seen in every age up

until the Reformation; the martyrdom of Thomas

becket reinvigorated Christendom in England and

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all throughout Europe. This dissemination of the

Cult of Becket was encouraged by Henry through

his daughters in the dominions of their respective

husbands; a mosaic in the Cathedral of Monreale

was encouraged by Joan who was married to Wil-

liam the Good King. The church’s victory in spread-

ing of the Cult of Becket and therefore increasing

the influence of the papacy in Europe can further

be seen through the rich iconography of St. Thomas

Becket in countries such as Scandinavia and Iceland

promoting pilgrimage to Canterbury. The increase

of pilgrimage to the tomb of St. Thomas increased

the church’s financial gains densely; every inn and

tavern was used to house pilgrims, thus increasing

the revenue of Canterbury for the church. Also, the

sale of relics such as the blood of Becket increased

the profit for the church; these relics were thought

to have miraculous properties such as curing lame-

ness. Although the church was victorious in the

short term, they failed to revert all the constitu-

tions of Clarendon and therefore, their victory can-

not be described as outright. Furthermore, the poor

decision to elect Richard of Dover as the Archbish-

op of Canterbury in 1174 after Becket’s death con-

tributed to the church failing to be the outright vic-

tor in the long term. Poole describes Richard of Do-

ver as a ‘feeble and ineffective person’ and the

view, shared by Richard of Ilchester, is that this

weakness was why the church failed to profit from

the martyrdom of Becket. Henry’s ability to main-

tain his royal authority and uphold some of his con-

stitutions shows that in the long term, he was ulti-

mately the victor.

Poole argues that ‘royal authority was exer-

cised in much the same way as before’, hence Hen-

ry can be seen as the ultimate, if not outright, victor

regarding the consequences of the death of Thom-

as Becket as he maintained to keep some of his

constitutions of Clarendon. Henry maintained con-

trol over papal legate’s entry to the kingdom - they

could not enter without the king’s permission - and

also he maintained control over bishops leaving the

country; these could not leave to attend ecclesiasti-

cal councils abroad without the king’s license. This

proves that Henry was the victor as the church was

unable to release all royal authority and control

that the king held over the church; the rise of Chris-

tianity could not deter Henry from endorsing secu-

lar laws that promoted secular power over ecclesi-

astical power and then extending this power; for

example Henry maintained secular jurisdiction over

church property which he extended to almost all

the land held in Frankalmoign. Furthermore, Henry

maintained clause 9 of the constitutions, which

meant that any conflicts relating to lay fee were

settled in the secular court. This limiting of the

church power was openly accepted by Pope Alexan-

der III in his Papal Bull of 1178 which was in turn

incorporated into canon law. Henry was victorious

as the church accepted his royal authority over the

law and justice of the realm.

Moreover, Henry is victorious over the church

in the long term as he is able to manipulate the

concessions he originally gives to them. Henry ac-

cepted that there should be free elections of bish-

oprics and churchmen, however he controlled

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these and ensured that the men appointed were

always the men he favored. This was exposed in a

memorandum sent by Henry the Young King to

Pope Alexander III in 1173 which read ‘I order you

to hold a free election, but nevertheless, I forbid

you to elect anyone except Richard my clerk, the

archbishop of Poitiers’, referring to the vacancy at

Winchester. He also appointed men such as

Geoffrey Ridel who was a supporter of the king

throughout the Becket crisis. This ability to appoint

those who supported him into positions of power

increased his control over the church and makes

him victorious in the long term as his churchmen

remain loyal to the king throughout the rebellion in

1173-74. Another clause that Henry gave to the

church but was able to manipulate was Clause 11 of

the constitutions; in 1176 Henry promised to the

papal legate, Hugh Pierleone, that he would not

keep churches vacant for beyond a year unless

there was ‘urgent and evident necessity’. However,

Henry manipulated this to his benefit; in 1172 there

were 7 vacant sees, and 8 years later, in 1184, 5 of

these were still vacant and simultaneously gener-

ating huge amounts of revenue for the crown. This

is seen by Henry gaining a net annual profit of

£1000 from York alone in the last 8 years of his

reign, totaling to £8000. Poole argues that this huge

financial profit was too tempting for Henry, an

‘avaricious’ king. Henry’s ability to claw back the

concessions he made to the church immediately

after the Becket crisis proves that the church’s vic-

tory cannot be argued as ‘outright’, and the king

still was able to control the church and benefit from

it financially.

Henry is ultimately the victor in the long term

because he got the church back on-side and re-

formed the alliance between church and crown.

Primarily, Henry won back the support of the

church soon after the death of Becket by going on

the Irish crusade of 1171-72. This invasion of Ire-

land that was supported by Pope Alexander III

made it so that Ireland was brought back under the

jurisdiction of Canterbury, and therefore the Pope.

He was able to gain forgiveness further by his per-

sonal penance at Canterbury during the rebellion of

1173-74 where he allowed every monk in the cathe-

dral to whip him as he lay in clothes unworthy of a

king. This personal penance was not just a political

stunt by Henry, as Duggan argues, Henry truly felt

‘remorse’, and this can be seen as Henry visited the

tomb at Canterbury every time he visited England.

Henry’s willingness to pay penance for his part in

Becket’s death gained the support of the church

throughout and after the Great Rebellion and there-

fore ensured Henry was victorious over the church

in the long term.

Although in the short term, the veneer of Hen-

ry’s royal authority can be seen to crack because of

the pressures of the church to grant concessions

and compromise at Avranches, 1172, we can see

Henry as the long term winner through his ability to

claw back these concessions and regain the support

of the church. Henry ultimately gains control over

the English church through only appointing the men

who were beneficial to his reign such as Richard of

Ilchester who supported the crown; this control en-

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ables him to maintain his Royal Authority over Eng-

land. The church’s victory cannot be described as

‘outright’ because they compromise with Henry.

Barlow argues that the alliance between church

and state was ‘always desired’ and so the church

was prepared to accept Henry’s long term victori-

ous control over the church if it meant that they

could reinstate their alliance.

By Sally Dickens

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The desire for wealth in the First Crusade is unreal-

istic. Not only is it far more believable within a me-

dieval mindset for religion to be the driving motive

behind many of the leaders, but social reasons also

come into consideration too.

It cannot be denied that, for some Crusaders, the

prospect of potential wealth and lands were an im-

portant factor as to why some knights went. For

example, in the case of Bohemond of Taranto. Due

to his father’s death, Bohemond had inherited

Guiscard’s conquered lands within the Adriatic

[modern day Albania] and due to partible inher-

itance, his younger brother Roger received lands in

Apulia, Southern Italy. However, due to the weak

grip which the Southern Normans had on the Adri-

atic Territories, they were quickly lost to Byzantine

influences with the area, leaving Bohemond land-

less. The First Crusade gave Bohemond the oppor-

tunity to seek new land ventures to the East, espe-

cially considering his past success in warfare, such

as the Battle of Durazzo in 1081. Another knight

who could arguably said to have set out for purely

monetary reasons would be Baldwin of Boulogne.

The youngest of the Boulogne Brothers, due to the

system of primogeniture [the inheritance of all land

by the oldest son] was incredibly poor, considering

he was disinherited due to refusing a life in the

Church. One of the major signs that Baldwin de-

sired wealth was the fact that he took his wife and

children along with him on the journey. Despite

marrying a very wealthy wife in Godehilde de Toe-

ni, she died on the journey to the Holy Land along

with his son, further cutting his chances of immedi-

ate wealth. However, he was described as being an

“intelligent, calculating and ruthless man” by Riley-

Smith, Baldwin continued on, taking a shortcut

with another knight called Tancred across the lands

of Cicilia, where they skirmished and fought over

the town of Tarsus, in the area of Mamistra. Bald-

win took over Tarsus from Tancred, leaving the

latter to continue forth towards the other crusad-

ers at Antioch and later, Jerusalem. Not only did

Baldwin refrain from continuing towards the Holy

Land, instead ending up in the city of Edessa,

where he is adopted by Thoros, Count of Edessa in

a rather eccentric ritual, and marries his daughter,

Arda. To further increase his own personal power,

How important was the desire for wealth

to participants in the First Crusade?

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Baldwin then has Thoros executed. Not only does

he become Count of Edessa, ruling for two years,

but the first time he actually sets foot in the Holy

Land is when he is proclaimed as the king after his

brother Godfrey’s death. Both of these examples

highlight the lack of religious intention when setting

off towards the Holy Land, especially as neither of

the two leaders were present at the Siege of Jerusa-

lem itself, preoccupied with their own lands.

However, in reality, this is not the case. Whilst

there are isolated cases such as Bohemond and

Baldwin whose main focus was to increase their

affluence, there are far more examples to support

an opposing point. For the historian Ali to proclaim

“they wanted the money, it’s as simple as that,” not

only ignores starch evidence such as contemporary

charters, as well as other knights who weren’t so

fortunate. For instance, many knights had to mort-

gage off their land to even consider participating

within the Crusade, mostly to the Church. Take Rob-

ert of Normandy, son of William the Conqueror for

example. In order for him to venture out on Cru-

sade, he had to mortgage off the entirety of Nor-

mandy to his younger brother, William II of Eng-

land, the county holding a net worth of £10,000. It

has been estimated that, in order for a knight to

take the cross and join the Crusade, it cost four

times a knight’s yearly income, especially when fac-

toring in the need for armour, a sword, supplies,

and any extra amenities. In many cases, it simply

wasn’t financially viable for the knights to head out

on Crusade with the sole purpose of returning with

vast amounts of booty. Furthermore, when the Cru-

saders returned to the west after Jerusalem was

taken in 1099, booty wasn’t what they returned

with, bringing back relics with them instead, such as

the arm of St. George. This further shows that mon-

etary gain was not the main reason why Crusaders

chose to fight.

A more realistic focus of why so many people took

the cross would be for religious reasons. As As-

bridge states, “A vast majority were driven by

faith,” and for many reasons, most depending on

social class and the issues each faced. The wide-

spread panic over the upcoming apocalypse in 1100

incited the need for Christians, especially peasants,

to be closer to Jerusalem, as it is God’s link to earth.

Within the Bible, it states not only that Jesus will

return to Jerusalem to separate the ‘sheep’ [good

christians] from the ‘goats’ [bad christians], but as

quoted from Luke 6:20, “Blessed be the Poor, for

theirs is the kingdom of Heaven”. This was especial-

ly key as to understanding why masses of peasant

men, women and children accompanied the main

armies in taking the cross, as they believed that the

closer to Jerusalem they were, the better; they all

wanted front-row seats for their audience with

God.

Knights too, were fuelled by religious reasoning,

although for alternate matters. For many years,

those who had taken up knighthood as a profession

were stuck with an issue known as ‘the Knightly

Dilemma’. A prominent example of this is Tancred,

nephew of Bohemond. For years, the young Tan-

cred had faced this dilemma, over whether to fol-

low his religious convictions, which state it is wrong

to kill other human beings, as they are our brothers

and sisters, or whether to follow the ways of the

world, in which knights killed as they pleased, and

when they were ordered to. However, Urban II

solved this dilemma, by decreeing that it was only

wrong for a knight to kill other Christians. Not only

did this solve the Knightly Dilemma, but, due to the

promised, as Asbridge describes, “redemption in the

fire of Holy War,” by Urban II for all those who took

part in the First Crusade for the Holy Land, knights

could now atone for their past sins by taking the

cross, and by slaughtering both Muslims and Jews

by the masses. It is also obvious that many took the

cross for their religious convictions due to the fact

that, after the success of the siege of Jerusalem in

June 1099, many of the Crusaders returned home

15

to the West, instead of settling within the new Le-

vantine lands of the Latin East. Even poorer nobles

such as the aforementioned Robert of Normandy

returned home to the west, proving that there was

little desire within many to gain land. Furthermore,

once Jerusalem has been conquered, the council of

Princes tried to elect a new king for Jerusalem. First

offering it to Raymond of Toulouse, one of the

wealthiest lords in Southern France, he turned

down the chance to rule over the newly-taken Holy

Land. Also, when the kingship was offered to God-

frey de Bouillon, whilst he accepted the offer to be

ruler, he turned down the title of ‘King’, proclaim-

ing that only Jesus could be considered king within

the Holy City, for it was there where he was

crowned with thorns.

An alternate view as to why some dared to take the

cross and venture forth into lands unknown could

be the prospect of an increase in social promi-

nence. Despite illiteracy being widespread during

the Medieval period, stories of myth and legend

were often preserved via the media of oration. The

idea of being preserved within memories of gener-

ations to come could have been a major driving fac-

tor to the Crusaders. For instance, a contemporary

book of songs known as the ‘Chanson de Geste’

which convey the tales of the Emperor Charle-

magne were incredibly popular, and well-versed by

a majority of knights. The prospect of being immor-

talized within their own volume would no doubt be a

potential motive for knights to take the cross, albeit

a secondary motive. Arguably, this as one of the

few motives which was noticeably realised and

achieved, considering how we still study and hear

tales of Crusading Knights to this day, otherwise we

wouldn’t be studying the topic in such depth. We

still hear about Jakelin du Mailley, who was such a

revered knight that after his death, he was torn to

pieces by his own men, each hoping to claim a relic.

We still hear about Peter the Hermit, the preacher

who was arguably ultra vires, or too big for his

boots in attempting to commandeer the People’s

Crusade, which was ultimately a failure. We still

hear of Tancred slipping across the Bosphorus un-

noticed in order to avoid swearing an allegiance

with Alexios I. Their stories have remained, several

centuries later as legends, exaggerated in modern

media, passed on from person to person as one of

our defining moments in History. A knight might

not have necessarily been extraordinarily wealthy

or affluent, but at least he had the hope of being

remembered for an eternity.

A further reason why some may have taken the

cross might be to prove their own social resonance,

to assert their dominance within the European the-

atre of political and social events. Robert of Nor-

mandy is a mentionable figure, considering how

many of the time viewed him as being weak, in-

competent, or lazy [including his father, William the

Conqueror, whom purposefully dictated that it was

not his firstborn who would inherit the title of king

of England, but his second born]. The Crusade not

only offered him a chance of redemption for the sin

of adultery [having fathered countless illegitimate

children] but offered him the option to become one

of the members of the Council of Princes. This al-

lowed Robert to prove to his fellow Western Euro-

peans that he was a strong military leader, which

he had the opportunity to do at the Battle of

Dorylaeum, where he took charge of the weaker of

the two armies.This again ties in slightly with reli-

gion; the connotations of being one of the leaders

on the Crusade would no doubt leave certain ties

to your name, such as, in the example of Godfrey

de Bouillon, “Defender of the Holy Sepulchre”.

Western Europe, being noticeably Catholic during

this time period, would no doubt revere these re-

turning Crusaders, these defenders of the holy

faith, these brave men who have fought the foreign

bodies occupying the centre of their faith. No

doubt perks would be associated.

To conclude, in certain isolated cases, such as Bo-

hemond of Taranto, wealth was an important fac-

16

tor as to why they took the cross, however it was

only a minority whom held this as their primary

focus, their primary mission for the First Crusade.

Many factors, including the fact that many Crusad-

ers returned to the West once Jerusalem was tak-

en, the retrieval of holy relics rather than vast

quantities of Gold, and the promise of eternal sal-

vation for all sins by Urban II was no doubt the

main reason why so many thousands took the

cross and journeyed to the Holy Land; because

they believed in their cause, that they were being

led in the name of God,to fight for their faith which

was paramount to them in their everyday lives.

Whilst increased social prospects might have had a

say, it is again a secondary motive, the majority

driven to avenge Christ and his Holy City.

By Kelly Campbell

17

In the short term, Byzantine aid was massively im-

portant to the success of the First Crusade, as the

Greeks provided the Crusaders with vital supplies

and knowledge of the terrain and tactics of the

Muslim forces which dominated the East. However,

their assistance ended at Antioch, meaning that in

the long term the most important factor in the Cru-

sade’s success was Muslim disunity, which was a

constant presence throughout the expedition and

ensured that rival war lords were more focused on

each other than defeating the Crusade. Less im-

portant but still notable was the role of intelligent

tactics employed by the leaders of the Crusade, alt-

hough these would have been useless in the face of

a united and organised Muslim resistance.

At the beginning of the First Crusade, the cru-

sading armies were heavily reliant on Byzantium.

The Byzantine Emperor, Alexius Comnenus, provid-

ed the Crusaders with guides to help them navigate

their way to Nicaea, the capital of Anatolia and the

first agreed city to besiege. The joint army of the

Crusaders and the Byzantines besieged the city in

May 1097, and it is highly unlikely that without

Greek aid the Crusaders would have been able to

sustain themselves. The Byzantines kept them sup-

plied through setting up markets at nearby Cibotos

and providing poorer Franks with money to buy

supplies. Alexius also provided two of his generals,

Tatikios and Manuel Boutemites, to accompany the

armies and educate the Crusaders on Seljuk tactics.

This education was massively important when two

weeks into the siege, the absent leader of the city,

Kilij Arslan, attacked the Crusaders outside the

walls. As instructed, instead of following the fa-

voured feint tactic of the Turks, Godfrey de Bouillon

and his men flanked Arslan’s army, allowing Bohe-

mond of Taranto to lead a cavalry charge from the

East, overwhelming Arslan’s troops and forcing

them to retreat. Defeating Arslan relieved the im-

mediate danger of the siege, although the battle

could have ended disastrously without the advice of

Boutemites and Tatikios. Furthermore, when it be-

came evident that supplies were still getting into

the city via the Ascanian Lake, the Byzantines block-

aded it on the 18th June, leading to the Turks in the

city suing for peace. Boutemites and Tatikios also

negotiated the peace, providing the Crusaders with

their first victory, an idea supported by Asbridge

18

who claims that “the Franks would probably have

had little success without Greek aid.” However,

whilst the Crusaders had their first success of the

expedition, the victory for them was pyrrhic as

they felt betrayed by the Byzantines, who under

the terms of the oath made by the Crusading lead-

ers to Alexius, took back Nicaea and did not allow

the Crusaders to plunder it. This created distrust

between the allies, which meant that there was

much less reliance upon Byzantium in later battles.

Victory at Doylaeum, whilst aided by Tatikios’ ad-

vice at Nicaea not to follow the feint, was largely

secured as a result of Muslim disunity and the inge-

nuity of Bohemond. Byzantine aid was then termi-

nated at Antioch in February 1098 when Tatikios

left in February 1098 to seek help and never re-

turned, and Alexius failed to provide reinforce-

ments after being convinced by Stephen of Blois

that the expedition was hopeless. Therefore, suc-

cess at Antioch and Jerusalem was secured without

any assistance from Byzantium and so aid cannot

have played a predominant part in the success of

the First Crusade in its entirety.

The most important factor in the success of

the First Crusade was Muslim disunity, an argu-

ment supported by Isiltan. Disunity was a continu-

ous theme throughout the First Crusade and con-

tributed to every victory. Whilst Byzantine aid

helped to secure victory at Nicaea, the main reason

the Crusaders were able to beat Kilij Arslan outside

the walls of the city was because when the city was

besieged, Arslan was away fighting the Damish-

mends. If he and his full forces had been inside the

city walls, they could have co-ordinated an astute

military response to the Crusaders as they would

have been able to use the walls of the city to their

advantage. Furthermore, if the garrison had been

manned by more than a few hundred men with a

strong leader in Arslan, instead of being virtually

empty as the army were away fighting other Mus-

lims, the city would have been more confident in

its ability to defend itself and probably would not

have sued for peace so easily. However, nowhere

was Muslim disunity more important than at Anti-

och, where the Crusaders did not at first face one

united army, but separate attacks by two brothers,

Duqaq of Damascus on the 31st December 1097,

and Ridwan of Aleppo on the 9th February 1098.

Both attacks failed due to poor planning and lack of

manpower, whereas if the two brothers had co-

ordinated and planned their attacks together, they

could have attacked the Crusaders on two sides

and overwhelmed them. However, they were too

focused on fighting each other over control of Syria

to take the threat of the Crusade seriously. In addi-

tion, whilst the siege was on going, the Fatimids

took Jerusalem from the Seljuk Turks, further

demonstrating the willingness of rival Muslim em-

pires to exploit each other’s weaknesses. Another

attack was led against the Crusaders at Antioch by

Kerbogha of Mosul, who had 40,000 strong coali-

tion of troops provided out of fear by leaders from

all over Syria, including men from Ridwan and Du-

qaq. This once again caused tensions and divisions

within the army. However, whilst Kerbogha’s forc-

es were travelling to Antioch, a Muslim convert and

gate keeper named Firuz, had let the Crusaders in-

to the first shell of Antioch’s walls, another show of

disunity which provided the Crusaders with vital

protection from Kerbogha’s superior numbers

whilst they planned their response to his besieging

army. Therefore, Kerbogha’s coalition had to wait

from the 5th of June to the 21st June 1098 until the

Crusaders engaged them in battle at the Bridge

Gate to the city. Unlike the Crusaders who were

united under the goal of defeating the Muslims in

order to stay alive, Kerbogha’s forces were only

held together by fear, and during the battle in the

face of Christian aggression certain factions began

retreating into oncoming forces, creating chaos in

which the Muslim army were colliding with and in

some cases fighting each other, making it much

easier for the Crusaders to attack and defeat them

despite their superior numbers. Such divisions

were again echoed with the Berber, Bedouin and

Ethiopian coalition at the concluding Battle of

19

Ascalon on the 12th August 1099, which contributed

once again to a lack of solidarity and a willingness

to retreat in the face of united opponents. All of

these examples paint a picture of a continuously

shambolic opposition to the First Crusade, with

Muslim leaders more focused on fighting each oth-

er than the Crusaders, a concept summed up by

Asbridge, who states that “Islam’s defense lay in a

disparate array of squabbling war lords.” Therefore,

even in cases such as Jerusalem, Ascalon and Anti-

och after the departure of Tatikios, where the Cru-

saders received no support from Byzantium, they

were able to take advantage of the inability of the

Muslim leaders to provide a co ordinated attack,

which is the most important reason for the success

of the First Crusade. If the Muslim world had been

united, the Crusaders would have faced co-

ordinated attacks from the Seljuks throughout Syria

and the Fatimid forces from Egypt, meaning that

they would have been constantly surrounded and

outnumbered, which would have made success ex-

tremely difficult.

However, tactics did also play a marginal part

in the success of the First Crusade. Bohemond’s cir-

cular defensive formation at Dorylaeum on the 1st

July 1099, ensured that his forces held out for eight

hours in the face of Turkish aggression until support

arrived from Godfrey de Bouillon and Raymond of

Toulouse. His skill in doing so was commended by

Jonathan Phillips who claimed that “it is much to

Bohemond and Robert’s credit that they managed

to remain calm in the face of such aggression.” If his

army had been slaughtered, the Crusade would

have lost vital numbers, and the leader who engi-

neered the taking of Antioch. His decision on the

21st June 1098 to attack from Bridge Gate to take

advantage of the narrow terrain from Kerbogha’s

base at St Paul’s gate created a bottleneck in which

the Muslim coalition could not spread out in full

formation. However, regardless of tactics, if the

Muslim forces had not been disunited and faction

ridden, with the attempts by some to retreat caus-

ing the chaos which the Crusaders took advantage

of to secure victory, their superior numbers of

40,000 to 25,000 would have most likely eventually

worn down the Crusading army until they were an-

nihilated or forced to surrender. Similarly at Jerusa-

lem in July 1099, Godfrey’s idea to move his army’s

siege tower from the New Gate to the Damascus

Gate overnight on the 15th of July allowed his men

to break into the city and take it. However, the Cru-

saders were only able conduct their siege and

attack on the city unhindered as the Fatimids had

alienated the Seljuk Turks by taking Jerusalem from

them at the siege of Antioch, and therefore no

Muslim ally came to try and defeat the siege. Tac-

tics therefore contributed to the success of the First

Crusade by intelligently taking advantage of Muslim

weaknesses; however they would have been use-

less in the face of a strong and united enemy.

To conclude, whilst Byzantine aid was mas-

sively important in supporting the First Crusade in

the short term by providing supplies, military advice

through Taktikios and Manuel Boutemites and as-

sistance in blockading the Ascanian lake at Nicaea,

the conflict of interests between the two allies led

to resentment which ended Byzantine contributions

too early in the Crusade for them to be considered

the most important factor in the success of the ex-

pedition. Muslim disunity on the other hand was a

constant factor throughout the First Crusade from

Nicaea to Ascalon. Disunity ensured that the Cru-

saders only ever faced divided or reduced armies

who were more focused on their suspicion and dis-

like of each other than a desire to defeat the Chris-

tian forces. If the Muslim world had been united,

they would have been able to overwhelm the Cru-

saders regardless of aid or tactics due to over-

whelming numbers and the ability to surround the

Crusading army from all sides.

By Madeline McDonagh

20

Isabella of France, a murderous adulteress or a pro-

to-feminist Queen?

As daughter of King Philip IV of France, Isabella was

married to Edward II of England in 1308, at just 12

years old. It was a match designed to secure the

political alliance of the two powerful monarchies.

It’s fair to say that the union did the exact opposite.

Isabella was trapped in a loveless marriage; this

was evident from the day of the wedding. The cele-

bratory feast was a complete disaster. It appeared

to be more of a party for Edwards’s closest friend,

advisor and probable lover Pier Gaveston, rather

than celebrating the marriage. Gaveston swanned

around head to toe in imperial purple, a colour only

Kings were supposed to wear. Even worse than

that, the banners Edward had decorating the hall,

were not that of his new bride and her household,

but of Gaveston’s. The lack of representation led to

angered French nobles storming out. Even English

nobles were peeved at the King’s lack of respect for

his new French relatives. One thing you should

know about Edward is that he wasn’t very bright, in

that he was never able to see the result of his ac-

tions, quite a bad trait for a King to have.

Isabella and Gaveston had a difficult relationship.

Isabella had gravely disliked him, due to the fact he

stole and wore her jewellery publically, he had a

higher position than her at court and encouraged

the king to deny her of her lands. Most English bar-

ons hated Gaveston, in particular Thomas of Lan-

caster, together they joined forces and demanded

Gaveston be exiled. Edward had no choice,

Gaveston had to go in order to prevent a civil war.

If Gaveston was to return it would be on the pun-

ishment of death. What did he do? He returned to

England in 1309 provoking a huge civil war. Eventu-

ally Gaveston was captured at Scarborough castle

by a group of Barons. Thomas of Lancaster oversaw

Gaveston’s trial, which was basically a kangaroo

court. He was sentenced to death by people who

hated him, for returning to England. Isabella may

not have been directly involved in his murder but

she would have greatly approved of it, if not en-

couraged it, out of her pure, vitriolic, hatred to-

wards the man who replaced her in Edward’s eyes.

In 1321, however, Isabella showed her loyalty to

Edward at Leeds castle, putting her life on the line

to bring down one of her husband’s rivals. Barthol-

omew (who was given Leeds castle by Edward in

21

1317) was supposed to be a loyal subject of the

King, but when Isabella demanded shelter in the

castle he fired arrows on the Queens escorts. This

gave Edward a reason to lay siege to the castle,

capturing the garrison and Bartholomew, who was

beheaded. Thirteen members of the garrison were

hanged on the spot. Isabella was well aware of the

rivalry between certain barons and her husband.

Did she assume that she would be denied entrance

to the castle, thus giving Edward a reason to inter-

vene? If this is the case, it proves how great Isabella

was at being a Queen. Defeating his enemy barons

(with his wife doing all the hard work for him) was

the apogee of Edwards reign; it goes quite downhill

from this point... to say the least.

Isabella used her political cunning to play the role

of the middle ground between her husband and the

Barons for years. She constantly dissolved feuds for

the sake of the kingdom. To the poor she was kind

and charitable; this made her very popular among

the lower classes. To anyone who dared to cross

her, she would stop at nothing to have her way. In

1312 Edward’s inner circle at the English court

made way for her biggest rival yet.

Isabella’s next target came from the ‘wild west’ of

medieval Britain…Wales. As Edward was incapable

of finding allies elsewhere, he turned to Wales and

the unruly, notorious Hugh Despenser, who be-

came his next Gaveston... Despenser would prove a

difficult challenge for Isabella, but nothing she

couldn’t handle. Very quickly Despenser learned

how to manipulate the King into doing what he

wanted, imprisoning or exiled anyone that ques-

tioned him. Isabella hated Hugh Despenser bitterly.

He had fired her French staff, publicly insulted her,

stole her money and property and even took her

children away from her. It was only a matter of

time before the she-wolf got her revenge.

Rodger Mortimer of Wigmore was part of Isabella’s

group of nobles who wanted Despenser gone. He

was imprisoned in the Tower of London in 1322 for

opposing Hugh Despenser, but he managed to es-

cape by 1323, possibly with the help of Isabella. It is

suggested they met and started their affair when

Isabella was living in the Tower during the civil war,

but this is very unlikely. Isabella and Mortimer had

to look for allies further afield who would support

their opposition to Edward. This didn’t prove diffi-

cult as the majority of the people hated Edward’s

guts! Isabella’s son, heir to the throne of England,

Edward III had been sent to France to take part in

negotiations. Originally King Edward was supposed

to have gone himself, but without the king in Eng-

land Despenser was nothing, he persuaded Edward

to ‘ring in sick’ to get out of travelling to France.

Isabella and Mortimer set out on a secret mission

across the channel to France before Edward’s men

could stop them. This is when the couple most like-

ly started their affair. Isabella was well received in

France, as the King was her brother. She reunited

with her son Edward III at the French court. When

Edward II heard of his wife’s disloyalty he was sur-

prised and ordered for her immediate return. She

refused, making a huge speech in front of the

French nobles, promising she would not return until

he banished Despenser. Edwards’s refusal of her

request was the biggest mistake of his life.

Raising an army in France, she and Mortimer

crossed the channel ‘William the Conqueror style’,

ready to take on the King. Disgruntled Barons

flocked to her side on her arrival, creating a mas-

sive force against Edward. When Edward heard of

his wife’s approaching army, his Plantagenet rage

took over and he swore he would personally slay

the she-wolf. Not exactly how it played out: Ed-

wards’s army was demolished by Isabella’s forces.

Edward and Despenser were captured fleeing on

foot through a nearby forest.

Edward got off lightly… for now. Despenser on the

other hand met a gruesome end. He was led

through the streets to his trial and execution while

peasants threw rubbish at him. This trial wasn’t ex-

actly going to be a fair one. Despenser had attempt-

ed to starve himself in prison beforehand because

he realised the Queen wasn’t going to let him off

22

easy. Throughout his trial he could see a 50ft gal-

lows being built. Without the right to speak Des-

penser was publically executed in a shockingly ruth-

less manner. Let’s just say he took a short walk off

a long cliff. As for Edward he was forced to abdicate

the throne to Edward III and spent the rest of his

life imprisoned. Until, Isabella decided to have him

burned to death with red-hot pokers. Or did she?

It’s more likely he was suffocated in his cell. Either

way he met a disturbing end.

So basically… Don’t mess with Queen Isabella.

23

Yes, I’m here to thrill you out of you narrow mod-

ern history outlook and into the wondrous, mind-

boggling, stupendous world of the ancient Celts.

You might learn about the significance of the caul-

dron, the oral tradition of storytelling, the myriad

of magical mythical creatures represented in their

vivid culture…

Or you could.

If we knew who we’re talking about.

Therein lays the problem some historians (like little

annoying me) like to nit-pick and twinge and poke

and prod from a little molehill into a mountain. I

know, aren’t I just the fun-est dull person you’ve

ever read?

The majority of people, I think, would use the term

‘Celtic’ to define the ancient people of the British

Isles, from Ireland... Wales...Cornwall... (Apologies

if you think they’re the inhabitants of Mars), but, is

it the correct way to refer to them?

‘Cause the contemporary writer’s didn’t.

The term was first used by the Greeks as a general

term for the ‘barbarians’ in North West Europe,

and they didn’t even know we existed. We were

just a tiny myth that bobbed along in tribes in our

own happy way. It was a collective term for the

people, but, in the Celtic societies, they were or-

ganised into many different tribes, and weren’t a

collective group.

Caesar also used the word ‘Celts’ in his writings

about his exploits in Gaul, and he explained that

the tribes in Gaul used the word ‘Celts’ to describe

themselves. But he never used it in a way that it

referred to the areas of Wales, Ireland, any of the

ancient British tribes. They were just called Britons.

Professor Miranda Aldhouse-Green, from Cardiff

University, says that the use of the blanket term

‘Celts’ can be seen as “academically suspect”, es-

pecially if you don’t know what you’re referring to.

Don’t Call Me a Celt, You Eejit!

24

(I know my argument basically boils down to childish

‘they didn’t so why should you’, but wait. That’s not

what I’m going into. You’ll see!)

The term has become so mixed now, if you don’t

have a firm grasp on what exactly you're trying to

say, your tongue will twist and turn and your mind

will boggle and you’ll completely miss the mark. You

can try to mean the ancient people of Ireland, the

ancient people of Wales, the ancient people of

Cornwall and the North West, the society that con-

nects these people, the rugby clubs, the blahdy

blahdy blah…

So what should you use it for?

Well, in my humble, non-graduate, non-intellectual

opinion, I think it should be used for the society and

culture which connects the ancient people of Gaul,

Wales, Ireland, Cornwall etc. etc. that puzzled histo-

rians for ages, and, this is the biggie, with no impli-

cation that these people are a genetic race.

Because they’re not.

Well, not according to University College London’s

latest DNA testing of the populous.

It’s actually quite intriguing when you look at it.

Well, I think so. Let’s get you to agree with me.

(I know, bringing in Science to back me argument,

aren’t I naughty?)

The study is one of the most extensive ever done on

our Great Isles, with over 2,000 people’s genetics

being tested, the people all having their grandpar-

ents on both sides coming from the same area, to

be assured that there will be no discrepancies.

(Although there’s always that one mistake isn’t

there? Like, not noticing that one of your sample

people has their grandparents harking from Lanca-

shire and Aberdeenshire and nor Lancashire and

Blackburn. Bloomin’ heck!)

So, the results:

Northern English people are more genetically

similar to the Scots than the Southern Eng-

lish people (*blows raspberry* DOWN WITH

SOUTHERN RULE!!!)

North and South Wales have two genetically dis-

tinct groups, not unifying CELTIC Deoxyribo-

nucleic Acid (DNA) and are more different

than the English and the Scots.

There are clear distinct subtle differences be-

tween the populations of Cornwall and Dev-

on (catfight!)

Archaeologist Mark Robinson from Oxford Uni said

he was “very surprised” by these results.

(Very surprised, very surprised indeed, you know)

He had assumed there would be a “uniform Celtic

fringe” in the West. This was not so. Most astonish-

ing, don’t you know?

You see, there had been a bit of mystery over how

the culture of the society had spread. People had

posited the idea that the genetic race, the ‘Celts’

had come over the areas and spread their culture.

But how? When they’re so distinct in genetics how

25

can this be?

Must be one of the other 589,012,523,101,758 the-

ories out there to debunk and ratify.

Donnelly said further “We did not find a single ge-

netic group corresponding to the Celtic traditions in

the western fringes of Britain.”

So that proves it, at least in my view.

Celtic people were connected by their views. End

of.

Done. Finished.

Yep. That’s me.

All out.

.

.

Ok, so maybe the difference in the Celtic groups of

Wales, Cornwall and Scotland can be explained

through time, since the groups are separated the

develop distinct differences, but really. Why spoil a

good theory? Plus, ancient tribal groups still seem

to exist today, according to this genetic research,

Cornwall and Devon split directly down the county

border, over the River Tamer, and a small genetic

cluster in West Yorkshire corresponds directly with

the ancient small kingdom of Elmet.

If they can do it, so can you! I again resort to child-

ishness to prove my point.

You should try it. Honestly. Try arguing with a 3-year

old.

I guarantee you, you’ll lose.

So, in conclusion, don’t use the word ‘Celtic to refer

to a race of ancient people with the same genetics,

but to a range of groups over many areas with the

same culture and traditions (or at least very similar

practices). That solves the modern day usage issue

as well, all wrapped in one package. Neat

And who knows?

Maybe the ancient ‘Celts’ will be so grateful, they’ll

invite you to their next human sacrifice!

They won’t invite you to the one after though.

.

.

(Also, P.S: Fun little titbit the research mentioned:

The Norman Conquest left little genetic footprint on

the English. Of all the pretentious, stuck- up, little

ba - No. I shouldn’t use that word, should I?

The Conqueror would blow his transcendental top)

By Emma Porter!

26

Before the Second World War, British railways con-

sisted of four huge corporations under indirect con-

trol of the government split up geographically into

the LMS (London, Midland, Scotland), GWR (great

western railway), LNER (London north eastern rail-

way) and SR (southern Railway). Although these

corporations were technically nationalised, they

were ran as private companies who

‘unprofitable’ (Sked and Cook) despite government

subsidies. Many like Bevin of the TGWU (transport

and general workers union) and the labour move-

ment saw the only viable option of securing the

longevity of the railways was its complete national-

isation. This was because the railways were a natu-

ral monopoly as companies were unable to service

the whole country making travel difficult over long

distances.

With the onset of the Second World War in 1939,

railways were brought under government supervi-

sion and control in an effective nationalisation as

they were in the First World War. Yet their role was

far more prevalent with the evacuation of children,

movement of goods and equipment across the

country and the threat to the lines by the Luft-

waffe, Railways were once again vital to the war

effort of Britain.

Following the war, Attlee’s government sought to

nationalise the railways alongside industries like

coal, iron and steel and bring it into the brand new

British Transport Commission which included rail,

road and civil aviation transport being nationalised.

In 1948 the newly formed British Rail included

632,000 staff managing 20,000 steam locomotives

and 4,000 electric trains (there also were 7,000

horses owned by BR for shunting around yards).

Following the 1951 election and conservative victo-

ry (in seats not votes), austerity measures to bal-

ance payments to suit the loan repayments to the

US meant that reforms were deemed necessary to

make the railways profitable. These came in two

ways: firstly modernisation. The old steam locomo-

tives would be replaced by electric and diesel trains

fulfilling the same roles as before but for cheaper.

This was seen by many railway workers as reaction-

ary to their jobs as electric and diesel trains re-

quired less maintenance and crew. Secondly, lines

that were deemed unnecessary as having fewer

than 16,000 passengers per week were to be de-

The Woodvilles

27

commissioned under the Beeching Report. Local

examples of these lost stations include Pennington

and Golborne stations and this trend continued

somewhat until 1969.

Under the governments of 1964-79, Britain’s need

for coal although diminishing was still crucial for

power stations and many trains like the ‘Class 58’

were used in loops known as the merry-go-round

system of bringing coal from pits to the power sta-

tions. However with the rise of motorways and the

growing numbers of car owners due to cheap man-

ufacturing of cars like the Mini, passenger traffic

was in a downward decline yet it was still necessary

for easy transport into London and across the coun-

try.

With Thatcher, the fights with the miners and

trades unions took a hard toll on the railways with

many lines closing including one of the oldest in the

country; the Bolton-Leigh railway. Yet thatcher re-

fused to privatise the railways calling it a possible

‘waterloo’ of her government telling Ridley the

transport secretary ‘never to mention railways’ to

her again.

John Major however did not share this same sense.

In 1992 following his narrow election victory major

privatised the railways in a way in which the tracks,

trains and stations were owned by separate compa-

nies. It was a ‘catastrophe’ (Marr). It coincided with

the closure of 31 pits in this last sweep of privatisa-

tion and consisted of 25 companies with huge gov-

ernment subsidies running the railways with a fran-

chise director deciding prices for the government.

Christian Wolmar described it as a ‘poll tax on

wheels’ with prices rising quickly and services being

cut dramatically. O’Farrell puts this down to Majors

vision of ‘romantic private companies’ but was a

‘ramshackle’ and in the end rather

‘pointless’ (MacGregor)

Overall, the changes it the trains saw lines lost, and

eventually more public money was spent on subsi-

dies than before. However the railways are a good

measure of the changing attitude to public services

in the UK over the 20th century with them being na-

tionalised and privatised along the trends of other

industries. Yet, they are also unique; people from

all classes react with the railways from MP’s and

Bankers to ordinary workers and students, trains

are still used by all. However its role has changed

beyond recognition; coal services have become oil

services, the routes of old steam trains now are

used by Pendlinos. Whether we like it or not the

way we use trains and the frequency of their use

has shrunk for many but we cannot forget the im-

portance of infrastructure and in the future, per-

haps renationalisation will be a solution to the over-

crowded and polluted motorways that have grown

from the neglect of the rails.

By Cameron Fleming

28

The Great Rebellion of 1173-4 was led by a coali-

tion of disillusioned nobles, the most notable being

Louis VII of France and Henry the Young King, both

of whom were fighting to advance their political

power, Louis by undermining the stability of the

growing Angevin empire and Henry by claiming the

territory and income which he felt his father was

depriving him of. Their coalition’s poor use of tac-

tics and inability to keep up with Henry II’s ener-

getic military strategy has led to historians such as

McLynn arguing that Henry II’s victory over the re-

bellion was a result of the weaknesses of the coali-

tion, which lacked a strong, decisive leader who

could overpower Henry on all frontiers of his em-

pire. However, whilst the weakness of the opposi-

tion made crushing the rebellion a much easier task

for Henry, his good management throughout the

rebellion and in the years before it played a much

larger role in his victory. Through his planning be-

fore 1173, Henry managed to ensure that key fig-

ures such as Richard de Lucy and Richard Fitz-Nigel

stayed loyal, along with the towns, the majority of

whom consistently rejected attempts by the rebels

to submit them, all of which contributed massively

to his success according to Tom Jones. Henry’s

good management in terms of military strategy

throughout the rebellion with his use of forced

marches and clever calculations on the speed of

the rebels also meant that he was constantly one

step ahead, an attribute which would have led him

to victory regardless of the strength of the opposi-

tion.

Militarily, poor planning and strategy by the oppo-

sition made Henry’s victory over the rebellion much

easier. The rebel strategy in 1173 was to open mul-

tiple fronts in an attempt to hit Henry when he was

absent. Louis and the Young King began an assault

on Eastern Normandy in May, whilst William the

Lion of Scotland attacked Northumbria in June.

However, these attacks were largely unsuccessful,

with William failing to capture castles at Wark and

Warkworth before retreating upon hearing about

Richard de Lucy’s advancing loyalist army, and the

continental forces despite capturing Aumale and

Driencourt pulled back in August on Louis’ orders in

the face of aggression from Henry. This was a fatal

decision which robbed the movement of the speed

and urgency it needed in order to keep up with

Henry and “exposed Louis as a dull and dreary gen-

“Victory over the Great Rebellion in 1173-4 owed more to

the weaknesses of the opposition than to Henry’s good man-

agement.” To what extent do you agree?

29

eral” according to Dan Jones. The tactic of opening

multiple fronts was also counter productive as the

opposition played to Henry’s biggest strength, deci-

siveness and moving at pace, as he demonstrated

in marching around 190 miles from Rouen to Dol in

two days in the same August in order to defeat

Breton rebels under Hugh of Chester and Ralph de

Fougeres. Henry owed his military success to this

itinerancy; however it was his good management

which meant that he was able to defeat the rebels

as if he hadn’t set up the administration and supply

routes he needed to move so quickly he would not

have been able to combat a weak or strong opposi-

tion over such a large empire. Furthermore, the

rebels were not totally weak, as demonstrated in

the spring of 1174 when William the Lion defeated

loyalist forces in Northampton, Northumbria and

Leicester. Due to Henry’s ability to quickly make his

way to England, where he had both a loyal popula-

tion and loyal administrators, he was able to crush

the revolt in England in just under a month,

demonstrating that whilst the weakness of the op-

position had hindered the rebellion, Henry’s prepa-

rations meant that he was also able to quickly

counter real and immediate threats.

Henry’s military management played a massive

role in his victory. This point is supported by Barber

who claims that the most important factor in his

victory was that he “showed himself a confident,

able and energetic general, inspiring his followers

and dismaying his enemies.” Henry reacted quickly

to every threat he faced, as demonstrated when

Louis ordered pulling back in August 1173 and Hen-

ry made a lightening counter attack, routing Louis’

rearguard near Vernueil then turning Westwards to

deal with the Breton rebels. This meant that the

opposition were weak due to Henry’s tactics, as

individual threats were not able to flourish for long

enough to become serious causes for concern.

Henry also packed his forces with ruthless Bar-

banter mercenaries, funded by the treasury and

described by McLynn as his “secret weapon.”

These men were elite troops who were renowned

for their ferocity in battle, intimidating the Bretons

so much that they surrendered to Henry without a

fight. They were also more than capable of keeping

up with Henry’s punishing forced marches, mean-

ing that Henry had a highly skilled, mobile and vi-

cious force constantly at his command. Henry also

expertly manoeuvred the conclusion of the rebel-

lion. Whilst he was in England in July 1174, Henry

the Young King and Louis had besieged the capital

of Normandy, Rouen. Henry predicted that the city

would hold out and finished submitting England

before gathering a force and returning to the conti-

nent. When he did a month later, he found that as

he had predicted, the siege was still on-going, and

when the French heard Henry was preparing to

attack they fled, with Louis suing for peace not long

after. Whilst this victory could also be attributed to

good fortune, Henry’s excellent military knowledge

and management meant that he was able to suc-

cessfully predict outcomes of sieges and battles

and act accordingly, making him extremely difficult

to defeat regardless of the quality of his enemies.

The opposition were also weak due to Henry the

Young King’s inability to instil loyalty, although this

had very little to do with Henry II’s victory. The

Young King gained support from esteemed figures

such as Phillip of Flanders, Matthew of Boulogne

and Theobald of Blois on the continent, along with

Robert of Leicester and Hugh Bigod in England to

name a few. This support was ensured through

promises to give away lands such as Kent, Mortan

and Touraine to his supporters along with thou-

sands of pounds in revenue. Therefore the sup-

porters of the rebellion were more interested in

individual gain than in overthrowing the King, a

motivation Henry tapped into by choosing not to

punish the rebels after the rebellion. According to

Tom Jones this meant that the coalition was “never

more than a scattered alliance of ambitious dissi-

dents with no collective organisation.” This was

proven a number of times, firstly with Louis begin-

ning the rebellion with an attack on the Vexin,

lands that he wanted to regain from Henry, and

30

with Phillip of Flanders losing heart and retreating

from Driencourt in August 1173 without consulting

the rest of the alliance. This division meant Henry

was able to deal with each rebellious area individu-

ally, instead of facing one totally united enemy.

However, even if the Young King had managed to

inspire loyalty from the nobility, due to Henry’s

management of his territories, especially England,

before 1173, he was able to retain the loyalty of his

administrators, who had in his reign become more

important allies than the unreliable and self serving

nobility. In addition, the decision to deploy Flem-

mish mercenaries in England after their reputation

of ravaging England during the anarchy also turned

public opinion against Henry the Young King. How-

ever, the most important area of public opinion was

within towns, who would have declared for the

crown out of self interest regardless, the presence

of the Flemmish simply exacerbated their dislike of

the opposition.

Henry’s good management before 1173 was the

most important reason why he was victorious in

crushing the Great Rebellion, as he put into place all

of the resources he would need to successfully de-

feat the rebels. Through his legal reforms such as

the 1166 Cartae Baronum and Assize of Clarendon,

Henry reduced the power of the Baronage and

made the royal administration the chief authority in

England. This meant that during the rebellion, Hen-

ry was reliant on his administrators and not the re-

bellious Barons. According to Tom Jones, Henry’s

administrators “almost without exception owed

their advancement to the King’s recognition of their

talents rather than their lands or power.” This

meant that they stayed loyal to Henry throughout

the rebellion as they owed their positions and

wealth to Henry’s patronage. This can be seen with

Henry’s Chief Justicar Richard de Lucy, who led ar-

mies which kept William the Lion at bay until Henry

arrived in England to crush his forces, and with

Richard Fitz-Nigel as chief officer of the treasury

who provided Henry with the vital funds he needed

to pay his mercenaries and command his army,

“relieving his dependence on traditional feudal lev-

ies” paid by the Barons, according to Jones. The

Cartae Baronum had also increased royal revenue

with its introduction of scutage payments, which

paid for mercenaries and the naval fleet which al-

lowed Henry to travel throughout his empire so

quickly throughout the revolt. Also massively im-

portant was his securing of the loyalty of towns. In

the 15 years before the Great Rebellion, Henry had

granted charters to walled towns like Oxford,

Nottingham and Chester, which joined older char-

tered towns such as Rouen, Verneuil, Newcastle,

Norwich and Carlisle, which provided expansion of

trade agreements, grants and increased circulation

of currency, fostering a growing merchant class

who preferred the stability provided by Henry over

the uncertainty of a new leader. These towns were

important strategic strongholds and all of them re-

jected demands to surrender from rebel leaders

such as Louis at Rouen and Hugh Bigod at Norwich.

Whilst the inhabitants of these towns engaged in

active resistance, for example in Bury St Edmunds

where townsmen attacked the followers of the re-

bel Earl of Leicester, their most important role in

the rebellion was slowing down the advance of the

opposition, spreading their forces over different

areas and routing individual armies in one place so

it was easier for Henry to attack and defeat separat-

ed forces.

Less important but still notable was Henry’s good

management of the legacy of the Beckett affair in

1174. It was a widely held view throughout Europe

that the rebellion was God’s way of punishing Hen-

ry for Becket’s murder in 1170, and according to

Horspool when Henry came to England in July 1174

he “grasped the importance of the dead Archbishop

as a symbol of rebellion.” When he arrived in Can-

terbury he did penance at Becket’s tomb, and the

next day William the Lion was captured at Alnwick

by a group of Yorkshire knights. Whilst this should

probably be attributed to luck, to the deeply reli-

gious medieval mind it appeared that Becket had

forgiven Henry and was now backing his cause, and

31

as Jones says “with one fortuitous event, the heart

was ripped out of the rebellion.” Regardless of luck

or divine intervention, Henry’s decision to publicly

repent had been a politically astute decision, as

with God supposedly on his side, he gained both

popular approval and shot down the rebels’ most

voiced criticism of him. Henry probably would have

gone on to achieve victory over the rebels without

his visit to Becket’s tomb, however his manage-

ment of the Becket backlash provided him with the

divine approval his campaign had previously lacked.

To conclude, whilst the weakness of the opposition

in terms of the poor military leadership of Louis VII

and Henry the Young King’s inability to inspire loy-

alty contributed partly to Henry’s victory by making

it easier to achieve, Henry’s superior management

both during the rebellion and with the infrastruc-

ture he put into place before 1173, meant that vic-

tory would have been achievable even against a

much more organised and decisive opponent. The

main weakness of the rebels lay in Henry’s excel-

lent preparations, whether it was intentional or

not, for rebellion before 1173. Henry managed to

create a system in which he was no longer reliant

on the Baronial classes to fund him or supply

knights, and this along with the loyalty of his ad-

ministrators meant that he was able to fight, and

more importantly succeed, on all fronts.

By Madeline McDonagh

32

Winstanley College History Society

2014-2015…

PRESIDENTS Cameron Fleming & Zara An-

drews

VICE PRESIDENT Keir Martland

SOCIAL MEDIA Harry Griffiths & Mollie Williams

HISTORICAL DRAMA Vanessa Holt & Ruth Cambell

TOTAL WAR TOURNAMENTS Dominic Doran

HISTORY MAGAZINE CO-EDITORS Madeleine McDonagh & Sally

Dickens

MAGAZINE EDITORIAL TEAM Emma Porter, Keir Martland, Na-

thaniel Lamb & Elizabeth Cunliffe