with eyes wide shut

8/10/2019 With Eyes Wide Shut

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With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Heisei Militarization and the Bush

Doctrine

Richard Tanter

This essay appeared in Melvin Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (eds.),

Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacic

(New York Routled!e"ur#on, $%%&), pp. '&'*%.

Prologue

+n early $%%, two pro-inent and eperienced /apanese 0i1eral

2e-ocratic Party elder states-en o3 i-pecca1ly conservative

credentials spoke out in pu1lic in sharp criticis- o3 the dispatch o3

Ground 4el32e3ense 5orces to +ra6 and /apanese support 3or the

on!oin! 74 occupation o3 that country. Gotoda Masaharu, a 3or-er

2eputy Pri-e Minister, told theNihon Keizai Shinbunthat the

continued 74 occupation o3 +ra6 is 8a new type o3 colonialis-.

+-posin! one9s values on another country also constitutes a kind o3

i-perialis-. + don9t see how a country :+ra6; can 1e li1erated 1y1ypassin! the 7N.< =hile the 74>/apan security alliance was

1ene?cial 3or /apan durin! the "old =ar, Gotoda ar!ued, it should

then have 1een revised, and should now 1e replaced with 8a 1ilateral

3riendship treaty.< Gotoda then went to the heart o3 his warnin!,

characteri#in! the hi!h de!ree o3 risk he saw in the current policy in

ter-s no one 3a-iliar with @ast Asian history could i!nore

You can call any country a potential ene-y i3 you want to, 1ut itis illadvised to assu-e such a posture. The state o3 thin!s in

/apan see-s 6uite precarious, Bust as it was around 'C' :when

/apan invaded Manchuria;.'

'8425 2ispatch ($) 5or-er Vice Pre-ier Gotoda 2ou1ts "ause o3+ra6 =ar,


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A 3ew days 1e3ore, the 3or-er "hie3 "a1inet 4ecretary Nonaka

Diro-u, Bust retired 3ro- active political li3e, noted the al-ost daily

release o3 new -ilitaryrelated policies and initiatives, and critici#ed

what he called Pri-e Minister Eoi#u-i9s 8politics o3 dread/apan allianceunder the "linton ad-inistration. The power3ul currents and tectonic

pressures o3 the Kush 2octrine have intersected with, and 1een used

to 3urther, a preeistin! and essentially do-estically !enerated

restructurin! o3 /apanese security policy.

=hile the slow -arch towards epansion o3 /apanese -ilitary

capacity and re-oval o3 o1stacles to the use o3 -ilitary 3orce a1road

have a lon! history coverin! -ore than ?ve decades, the -ost

distinctive develop-ents have occurred in the last decade and a hal3,

rou!hly since the end o3 the "old =ar. 4ince the rei!n na-es o3

e-perors have 1een used to periodi#e /apanese history in the -odern

era, and since the start o3 the period under consideration al-ost

coincides with the accession o3 the current, Deisei, e-peror o3 /apan

&


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in 'C*C, it is convenient to re3er to a pattern o3 8Deisei

-ilitari#ation.


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with the capacity and predisposition to 8the use o3 3orce to settle its

international disputes.< That kind o3 hi!hly -ilitari#ed nor-ality

under such conditions carries hi!h risks, risks that the /apanese polity

-ay not 1e welle6uipped to deal with.

The Bush Doctrine and Japan

/apan has taken up the Kush 2octrine in the 3ollowin! -ain ways.

'. /apan has Boined the 1road 7N and 74auspiced -ultilateral

coalition to deal with terrorist !roups throu!h increased

international police and intelli!ence cooperation, 1order and

-ove-ent controls, and do-estic security.&

$. +n $%%$ /apan applied the Kush precedent to proclai- a ri!ht to

re!ional pree-ptive attack, in particular in relation to North

Eorean nuclear and -issile 3acilities.

. 5ollowin! the passa!e o3 the AntiTerroris- 4pecial Measures 0aw,

/apan deployed Air 4el32e3ense 5orce aircra3t and Mariti-e 4el3

2e3ense 5orce destroyers to support re3uelin! operations to the

+ndian Lcean re!ion in Lcto1er $%%' 3or the 74led invasion o3

A3!hanistan, and etended the deploy-ent repeatedly.O

. +n 4epte-1er $%%, /apan 3or-ally Boined eleven countries in theProli3eration 4ecurity +nitiative initiated 1y the 74 to esta1lish a

set o3 a!ree-ents and partnerships to esta1lish an eective le!al,

intelli!ence and intervention capacity 1y participatin! countries9

intelli!ence and naval and coast !uard 3orces in order to detect

and interdict the -ove-ent o3 ille!al or suspect weapons and

-issile technolo!ies.

&5or details o3 /apanese actions re!ardin! 7N and otherreco--endations on ?nancin!, visas, and other 3or-s o3 cooperationre!ardin! terroris- a3ter 4epte-1er '', see the Ministry o3 5orei!nAairs,$a%anese *e%ort on !m%lementation of the AP+C ,ea&ersStatement on Counter-terrorism, May, $%%$, at www.-o3a.!o.Bp.OGavan Mc"or-ack, 8/apan9s A3!han @pedition,


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&. +n 2ece-1er $%% /apan dispatched O%% heavily ar-ed G425

troops to the south o3 +ra6 to support 74 occupation and

reconstruction activities, as well as epandin! its -ariti-e and air

presence in the +ndian Lcean and Gul3 re!ions.

O. +n 2ece-1er $%% the Eoi#u-i ca1inet announced its intention to

deploy 741uilt lower and uppertier -issile de3enses, allocatin!

'%% 1illion yen in 5iscal Year $%%.

. /apan Boined the 7nited 4tates in its de-ands that North Eorea

a1andon all aspects o3 its nuclear weapons pro!ra-s co-pletely

and irreversi1ly, passed le!islation in $%% to control the very lar!e

re-ittances 3ro- /apanese1orn Eoreans that provide crucial

3orei!n echan!e 3or North Eorea, and introduced 1ills to re3use

North Eorean ships entry to /apanese ports and to revise the

residency ri!hts o3 /apanese1orn North Eoreans.*

8A state-ent o3 interdiction principles was released in Paris4epte-1er , $%% 1y eleven nations that are participatin! in theProli3eration 4ecurity +nitiative. IP4+ participants are co--itted to the3ollowin! interdiction principles to esta1lish a -ore coordinated andeective 1asis throu!h which to i-pede and stop ship-ents o3 =M2,

delivery syste-s, and related -aterials Howin! to and 3ro- states andnonstate actors o3 proli3eration concern, consistent with nationalle!al authorities and relevant international law and 3ra-eworks,includin! the 7nited Nations 4ecurity "ouncil.9 < 4ee 8Proli3eration4ecurity +nitiative, (lobal Securit, at www.!lo1alsecurity.or!. As o3March $%%, the total nu-1er o3 participatin! countries was '&. Kothparticipatin! and nonparticipatin! countries, especially "hina, raisedserious and su1stantive 6uestions a1out the le!ality o3 the proposedinterdiction re!i-e under current international and national law. +nMarch $%% the /apanese !overn-ent introduced a 1ill into the 2ietthat would authori#e -arine 4el32e3ense 5orce vessels to halt and

attack on the hi!h seas 3orei!n ships suspected o3 carryin! -ilitarye6uip-ent to an ene-y country.*+n addition to the le!islative chan!es, eistin! re!ulations wereutili#ed to harass Eorean ships enterin! /apanese ports. +n /une $%%8nearly $,%%% inspectors went to the port o3 Nii!ata to check 3orcusto-s and i--i!ration violations, in3ectious diseases, and sa3etyviolations on the North Eorean vessel Man Gyon! Kon!C$.


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L3 these -easures in support o3 the Kush ad-inistration9s policies

the -ost politically si!ni?cant have 1een the dispatch o3 -ilitary

3orces to the +ndian Lcean and +ra6, the decision to Boin the 74

-issile de3ense syste- and deploy upper and lowertier -issile

de3ense syste-s, and the announce-ent o3 a re!ional doctrine o3 ri!ht

o3 pree-ptive attack. All three o3 these initiatives 1rin! very

si!ni?cant lon!ter- costs and risks (not least, ?nancial in the case o3

-issile de3ense), as well as increased rather than decreased strate!ic

uncertainty.

/0 SD1 &e%loments to the Afghanistan an& !ra2 wars

The passa!e o3 the AntiTerroris- 4pecial Measures 0aw in the

i--ediate a3ter-ath o3 the 4epte-1er ''thattacks on New York and

=ashin!ton was a -aBor victory 3or 1oth 74 and /apanese proponents

o3 the use o3 /apanese -ilitary 3orces outside the country. Althou!h

li-ited to duties in 8nonco-1at #ones,< two contin!ents o3 M425

ships were sent to the +ndian Lcean, with authori#ation to support 74

3orces in lo!istical and re3uelin! operations in the sealanes 1etween

/apan and the Persian Gul3, includin! the 74 1ase o3 2ie!o Garcia.C

Althou!h a !overn-ent pre3erence to include aKongoclass destroyer

e6uipped with an Ae!is air de3ense syste- in the Hotilla was initially

thwarted 1y pu1lic opposition (includin! 3ro- within the rulin!

coalition parties), 425 ships and aircra3t were 3or the ?rst ti-e

en!a!ed thousands o3 -iles 3ro- /apan, and in support o3 74

operations outside o3 a 7nited Nations peacekeepin!3orce

CThe AntiTerroris- 4pecial Measures 0aw also authori#ed such 425activities within 8Australian territory< presu-a1ly re3errin! to theAustralian @@Q around "hrist-as and "ocos +slands. 4eeBasic Planregar&ing *es%onse 'easures Base& on the Anti-)errorism S%ecial'easures ,aw3 Cabinet Decision of No"ember /43 566/, atwww.kantei.!o.BpJ3orei!n.

C


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structure.'%Moreover, -ultiple etensions o3 the initial, 1rie3,

speci?ed period o3 duty proved politically strai!ht3orward in the

3ollowin! year.''

2iplo-atic activities apart, Pri-e Minister Eoi#u-i announced

three 3or-s o3 support 3or the A-erican eort in +ra6. 5irstly, /apan

would send !round, air and -ariti-e 3orces to the Gul3 theatre,

includin! the deploy-ent o3 -ore than O%% G425 personnel to a 8non

co-1at #one< in southern +ra6 to assist with reconstruction. 4econd,

/apan would provide '.&1n in direct reconstruction aid to occupied

+ra6. Thirdly, /apan would 3or!ive its portion o3 +ra69s hu!e 3orei!n

de1t i3 other -aBor creditors would 3ollow suit.'$

A year a3ter the A3!hanistan dispatch, the Eoi#u-i ca1inet

3orced the passa!e o3 the +ra6 Reconstruction 4pecial Measures 0aw

in -id$%%. This was a -o-entous step in several ways. 5or the ?rst

ti-e since 'C&, heavily ar-ed /apanese !round troops were

dispatched a1road with rules o3 en!a!e-ent that reco!ni#ed the

stron! possi1ility o3 a re6uire-ent 3or lethal de3ense. Pu1lic opinion

was heavily a!ainst the +ra6 co--it-ent as a whole and the dispatch

o3 the !round troops in particular 1ut, as with other allies o3 the 74,this 3act was i!nored 1y /apanese political leaders. And perhaps -ost

i-portantly, !iven the very stron! and sustained support at 1oth

'%The Ae!ise6uippedKirishimawas eventually dispatched in2ece-1er $%%$, a3ter the !overn-ent dis-issed concerns that thecapacities o3 its &%%k- radius air de3ense syste- would -ean theM425 would eectively participate in collective de3ense with the 74.8Ae!is ship leaves on security -ission,


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pu1lic and elite level 3or a 7nited Nations 3ocus 3or 3orei!n policy

activities, the +ra6 dispatch was the ?rst /apanese peacekeepin!

-ission conducted outside 7nited Nations auspices, 1ein!, in eect,

part o3 a syste- o3 collective de3ense with the 7nited 4tates.

There was al-ost a hal3year delay 1etween the passa!e o3 the

+ra6 Reconstruction 4pecial Measures 0aw and the ?rst deploy-ents

o3 !round troops in late 2ece-1er $%%, principally 1ecause o3 the

diiculty in locatin! an appropriate 8co-1at3ree #one< in occupied

+ra6.'=ithin ten weeks o3 the esta1lish-ent o3 G425 1ase at

4a-awah in late $%%, the illusion o3 a 8nonco-1at #one< dissolved

in a -i o3 3arce and horror. AntiA-erican !uerrilla activity in the

re!ion escalated soon a3ter the arrival o3 the G425 troops. +n March

and April the /apanese 1ase itsel3 1e!an to 1e a tar!et 3or -ortar and

rocket attacks. These develop-ents led to the con?nin! o3 all G425

troops to 1ase 3or an etended period, with all o1ase reconstruction

activities suspended. +n early April, the whole /apanese -ission in

+ra6 was thrown into 6uestion when !uerrillas kidnapped three

/apanese civilians (all without any -ilitary or even !overn-ent

involve-ent) and announced that they would 1e 1urned alive unlessthe /apanese !overn-ent announced the withdrawal o3 troops

3orthwith. A con3rontation 1etween a hardline !overn-ent 1ent on

displayin! 8resolve,< and a population shocked 1y the conse6uences

o3 its ac6uiescence to -ilitary adventure was averted 1y the release o3

the hosta!es throu!h the !ood oices o3 a network o3 +ra6i clerics,

reportedly 3acilitated 1y what was eectively a ranso- pay-ent.'

'This diiculty was ee-pli?ed early on 1y the killin! o3 two senior5orei!n Ministry oicials in Nove-1er $%%.'The /apanese !overn-ent stron!ly denied -oney was involved inthe release, 1ut the ta1loid and -a!a#ine press in /apan continued to-aintain that a ranso- had 1een paid. Given the ende-ic lack o3transparency in /apanese 5orei!n Ministry overseas operations, it isnot possi1le to dis-iss the -edia clai-s out o3 hand. 4ee, 3orea-ple, Shuan Posuto3April 'C>$&, $%% (at www.weeklypost.co-),

''


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2espite the 3ortunate outco-e o3 the April kidnappin! crisis, it was

clear that the /apanese deploy-ent in +ra6 was hosta!e to the Kush

ad-inistration9s capacity and will to hold its i-perial line. =hereas

the +ndian Lcean naval deploy-ent in support o3 the A3!hanistan =ar

had 1een politically success3ul, it was clear that the +ra6 deploy-ent

not only held the possi1ility o3 disaster 3or Pri-e Minister Eoi#u-i

personally 1ut, -ore i-portantly, it stood a !ood chance o3 providin!

the 1asis 3or widespread popular criticis- o3 sendin! /apanese 3orces

a1road in support o3 74 !lo1al intervention strate!y.

Moreover, the intentionally hi!hpro?le /apanese support o3 the

7nited 4tates in +ra6 could not 1ut chan!e the perception o3 /apan in

the Middle @ast as a whole. 7ntil the +ra6 deploy-ent, /apanese

policy in the Middle @ast had 1een lar!ely independent o3 that o3 the

74, concentratin! on co--ercial access to and invest-ent in sources

o3 oil supply, re!ardless o3 alliance politics, and distancin! /apan 3ro-

74 support 3or +srael. @ven as the Eoi#u-i ad-inistration was

searchin! 3or a sa3e haven 3or G425 troops in +ra6 in late $%%, it

de?ed lon!ter- and stron!ly epressed 74 displeasure and si!ned a

-aBor invest-ent deal with +ran to develop the A#ade!an oil ?eld. Yetthe essentially voluntary +ra6 deploy-ent held within it the seeds o3

the destruction o3 several decades o3 relatively independent /apanese

3orei!n policy in the Middle @ast. The kidnappin! crisis aside, would it

1e possi1le 3or /apan to avoid the diplo-atic conse6uences o3 re!ional

ali!n-ent with the 74 at a ti-e when 74 re!ional credi1ility was

collapsin!F The +ra6 adventure -ay have 1rou!ht kudos 3or /apan

3ro- the Kush ad-inistration, 1ut without any dou1t it also 1rou!ht

increased uncertainty and precious little epansion o3 /apan9s security.

50 )he missile &efense &ecision

and 8Aisawa 2enies Govt Paid Ranso- To @nd Dosta!e "risis,0 *ight to %re-em%ti"e attac

The -ost direct and least plausi1le o3 the echoes o3 the Kush2octrine was in the announce-ent 1y 2e3ense A!ency head +shi1a

4hi!eru in early $%%$ that /apan has, under 1oth its constitution and

international law, a ri!ht to carry out a pree-ptive air attack on

North Eorean -issile sites, i3 the !overn-ent 1elieved that a -issile

attack on /apan was i--inent.$'0eavin! aside 6uestions o3 technical

-ilitary 3easi1ility, +shi1a9s announce-ent i--ediately escalated the

$%NieiNet !nteracti"e, 2ece-1er 'C, $%% at www.nni.nikkei.co.Bp.4ee also the Statement b the Chief Cabinet Secretar3 /? December566>, at www.kantei.!o.BpJ3orei!n.$''ainichi Shinbun, /anuary $, $%%, at www.-ainichi.co.Bp. Therewas an earlier 1ut less assertive clai- to the ri!ht to a pree-ptiveattack 1y one o3 +shi1a9s predecessors, Norota Dosei, in March 'CCC.4ee the eplanation 1y the Ministry o3 5orei!n Aairs,PressConference b the Press Secretar3 @ 'arch3 /???, at www.-o3a.!o.Bp.

'O


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rhetorical 3ra-ework e-ployed 1y /apan to that o3 "hina9s -ore

etre-e re-arks a1out Taiwan and North Eorea9s a1out 4outh Eorea

and the 7nited 4tates.$$4ince there was o1viously no chance

whatsoever o3 the threat 1ein! acted upon, and the !ap 1etween

apparent aspiration and reality was so !reat as to 1e al-ost

delusional, the i-a!e o3 a loose cannon in the tense Northeast Asian

security ?eld ca-e to -ind. +n this ?eld a!ain, the local application o3

the Kush 2octrine served to decrease rather increase the reality o3

/apanese security.

Interpreting Japan and the Bush Doctrine

Dow are we to interpret these shi3ts o3 /apanese policy in

support o3 the Kush 2octrineF Two characteristics o3 the application

o3 the doctrine are i--ediately evident. Lne is the way in which the

A-erican conHation o3 perceived threats that has evolved into the

Glo1al =ar on Terror (G=LT) has 1een echoed in the /apanese

response. As /erey Record ar!ues in the -ost sustained and co!ent

criti6ue o3 the G=LT

Sthe conHation o3 ro!ue states, terroris- and =M2, coupled

with the ad-inistration9s preventive war a!ainst 4adda-

$$Lne o3 the crucial issues is that o3 aircra3t ran!e. 7nder eistin!!overn-ent interpretations, Article C o3 the "onstitution, oensiveweapons are not per-itted in the 425. There3ore, the A425 has nolon!ran!e 1o-1ers. A secret 2e3ense A!ency study in 'CC& hadconsidered the technical 3easi1ility o3 such action, and deter-inedthat at that ti-e, it was 1eyond the capacity o3 A425 5' and 5'&aircra3t to carry &%%l1 1o-1s to North Eorea and return sa3ely. (4eeNAPS Net Dail *e%ort, Au!ust $, 'CCC, at www.nautilus.or!.)Koein! KO re3uelin! aircra3t have since 1een ac6uired. There are,

however, other unanswered technical o1stacles, -ost i-portantlyli-itations on /apan9s intelli!ence capacities, which re-ain dependenton access to 74 -aterial until such ti-e as all 3our /apanese i-a!eryintelli!ence satellites are launched (two were launched in $%% twowere destroyed when an D++A -issile launch 3ailed in Nove-1er$%%), are 3unctionin! ade6uately, and the 2e3ense +ntelli!enceDead6uarters i-a!ery analytical oice and the "a1inet 4atellite+ntelli!ence "entre are 3ully staed and 3unctionin!.

'


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Dussein9s +ra6 3or the purpose o3 disar-in! that country, -akes

the G=LT as -uch a war on nuclear proli3eratorsat least the

ones the 7nited 4tates does not likeas a war a!ainst terroris-

itsel3.$

0ike an echo across the Paci?c lake, /apan has e-1raced all the

rhetorical and policy aspects o3 the G=LT, with no -ore

discri-ination than the ori!inal loud voice 3ro- =ashin!ton, and with

even less capacity to reali#e the !oals without 3urther eacer1atin! its

security vulnera1ilities.

The second relevant characteristic is that, as Van Ness stresses,

S-ore i-portant than C'' have 1een the ideas that the Kush

leadership 1rou!ht into oice in /anuary $%%'. Those ideas,

which were reshaped into a Iwar on terror9 a3ter the attacks on

the =orld Trade "entre and the Penta!on, have -ost pro3oundly

chan!ed the world.


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=e are tryin! to develop a kind o3 relationship with /apan that

we enBoy with Great Kritain, on the other side o3 the world.$O

Al-ost all o3 the responses o3 the Eoi#u-i ad-inistration to the

Kush 2octrine ee-pli3y Ar-ita!e9s hopes that /apan will assu-e a

place in the 74 alliance structure co-para1le to that o3 Kritain

undou1tedly the -ost loyal and active o3 74 allies. @specially in the

case o3 -issile de3ense and the +ra6 epedition, /apan has 1een

aspirin! to Kritish status in the 74 syste-. =hile the eects o3 the

4epte-1er '' attacks have indeed 1een strikin! in /apan, especially

coupled with the eects o3 anieties a1out North Eorea, all o3 the

crucial initiatives reali#e plans drawn up lon! 1e3ore $%%'.

Ar-ita!e9s allusion to Kritain9s role within the syste- o3

A-erican he!e-ony as a -odel 3or /apan carries one 3urther

i-plication, intentionally or not. 7nlike /apan, Kritain is a nuclear

ar-ed A-erican allylike +srael, and like Pakistan. Ar-ita!e9s

re-ark raises the thou!ht that the Kush 2octrine could result in a

-ove towards a nuclearar-ed /apan withinthe A-erican alliance

the su1Bect o3 the penulti-ate section o3 this chapter. 0on!standin!

/apanese latentnuclear weapons proli3eration capacity has 1eensupple-ented 1y 1oth a weakenin! o3 do-estic cultural and

institutional restraints, includin! a -uch di-inished peace -ove-ent,

and dra-atic chan!es in the eternal environ-ent o3 1oth perceived

security threats includin! North Eorea and an apparent 74 dri3t

towards acceptance o3 /apanese nuclear weapons.

Yet there is a 6uite dierent set o3 analytical pro1le-s to 1e

considered in thinkin! a1out the responses o3 the Eoi#u-i

ad-inistration to the policies o3 the Kush ad-inistration. The ?rst set

o3 6uestions concerns whether the /apanese responses to the Kush

2octrine are si-ply a 3unction o3 wellknown and lon!standin!

$O8@cerpts 3ro- Ar-ita!e +nterview with Nikkei,


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pressures 3ro- the 7nited 4tates or whether they are arise 3ro-

do-estic /apanese sources. And either way, what has chan!ed 1oth

do-estically and eternally to per-it these and other ele-ents o3

/apanese -ilitary epansionF Lr, as it -ay 1e -ore 3ruit3ully

understood, what is the connection 1etween the Kush 2octrine and

the restructurin! o3 the eternal aspects o3 the /apanese stateF

The intersection of Heisei ilitarization and the Bush Doctrine

The /apanese !overn-ent response to the Kush 2octrine was

essentially an acceleration and a-pli?cation o3 chan!es already

underway 1e3ore Kush ca-e to power, and which have 1een

increasin!ly the result o3 /apanese as -uch as A-erican political

initiatives. These had 1e!un in the late 'C*%s, and especially

3ollowin! the end o3 the "old =ar. 2espite the re3erence in the current

rei!n na-e to peace and tran6uillity it is use3ul and accurate to !roup

these endo!enous chan!es in /apanese security policy and

or!ani#ation as 8Deisei -ilitari#ation


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As already ar!ued, these di-ensions o3 -ilitari#ation are not at

all unusual in the conte-porary world syste- they are, on the

contrary, the -arks o3 nor-ality. @6ually, they are 6uite dierent 3ro-

the distinctively /apanese -odel o3 'C%s -ilitaris- 1est understood

as 8e-peror3ascis-.


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li!htly ar-ed /apanese 425 personnel overseas under 7N

peacekeepin! auspices 3or nonco-1atant duties. 5or the ?rst ti-e

since 'C&, under this and related disasterrelie3 le!islation, /apanese

-ilitary personnel were dispatched a1road, and in the 3ollowin!

decade they took part in 7N peacekeepin! and disasterrelie3

operations in "a-1odia, Mo#a-1i6ue, @ast Ti-or and other

countries.

+n 'CC, the 7nited 4tates and /apan a!reed on a new set o3

!uidelines 3or the i-ple-entation o3 the 74>/apan Mutual 4ecurity

Treaty. The result o3 74 pressure on /apan since the end o3 the "old

=ar to take a lar!er share o3 responsi1ility 3or @ast Asian security

under 74 auspices, the Guidelines were 1rou!ht into 3orce throu!h a

series o3 new laws and a!ree-ents, the -ost i-portant o3 which were

the 0aw "oncernin! Measures to @nsure the Peace and 4ecurity o3

/apan in 4ituations in Areas 4urroundin! /apan, the 0aw to A-end the

4el32e3ense 0aw, and the 'CCC A!ree-ent to A-end the Ac6uisition

and "ross4ervicin! (A"4A) A!ree-ent Ketween /apan and the 7nited

4tates. "o--only ter-ed a 8rede?nition< o3 the alliance, the

Guidelines ai-ed at esta1lishin! 3ull coordination and cooperation1etween the 425 and 74 3orces in /apan, even in ti-es o3 peace.

7nder the @-er!ency 4yste- esta1lished as a result o3 the

Guidelines, in the event o3 a !overn-ent certi?ed 8e-er!ency in the

area surroundin! /apan,< not only the 425 1ut also /apanese civilian

pre3ectural and local !overn-ent and in3rastructure authorities are

re6uired to cooperate in -ani3old speci?ed ways with 74 3orces.

Moreover, the esta1lish-ent o3 the @-er!ency 4yste- resulted in a

hei!htenin! o3 coordination 1etween the 425 and other parts o3 the

/apanese state, in -arked contrast to the previous intentional relative

isolation o3 the 425and hence, li-itation o3 its role in 1oth peace

and war.

$$


23/44

Page 23 of 44

The /apanese side a!reed to provide lo!istical support and

intelli!ence cooperation with 74 3orces in ti-e o3 crisis, and to

prepare 3or such crisis coordination 1y prior develop-ent o3

appropriate 3or-s o3 inte!ration in ti-e o3 peace. Most i-portant o3

all, the type o3 crisis that could invoke such re6uire-ents was no

lon!er, as in the ori!inal 'CO Guidelines and the Treaty itsel3, one

takin! place only within the territory o3 /apan, 1ut rather any security

e-er!ency in 8the areas surroundin! /apan


24/44

Page 24 of 44

de?nition o3 8areas surroundin! /apan< was stretched and rede?ned

8situationally rather than !eo!raphically< to allow deploy-ent in the

Persian Gul3 and +ra6. 0i-its on technolo!ies that i-plied 3or-s o3

collective de3ensesuch as the electronic intelli!ence!atherin!

capacities o3 Ae!ise6uipped destroyersdisappeared, to the deli!ht

o3 1oth the 74 and the M425. And li-its on the type o3 ar-s that

could 1e carried al-ost disappeared as deploy-ent in the 8non

co-1at #one< o3 southern +ra6 was reco!ni#ed to re6uire su1stantial

autono-ous capacity 3or protection in the event o3 attack. Ky the end

o3 $%%, 8de3ensive de3ense< within the territory o3 /apan was no

lon!er the actual practice o3 the /apanese 4el32e3ense 5orces.

Eoi#u-i, like Dashi-oto and Nakasone 1e3ore hi-, had lon! 1een

anta!onistic to Article + o3 the "onstitution, and sou!ht its

destructioneither 1y revision or erasure. The nationalist win! o3 the

02P had achieved a -aBor policy !oal in $%%% with the esta1lish-ent

o3 a 2iet co--ittee chaired 1y 3or-er 5orei!n Minister Nakaya-a

Taro to consider and canvass possi1le revisions to the "onstitution,

with Article + 1ein! a core concern o3 1oth the co--ittee and -ost

-akin! su1-issions to it. The co--ittee is to report to the 2iet in$%%&, whereupon an undou1tedly protracted and tu-ultuous process

o3 consideration o3 02Pinitiated proposals 3or constitutional revision

will co--ence.$*

Many other chan!es in !overn-ent security practice and policy

e-anated 3ro- these and the lesser pieces o3 le!islation passed

1etween 'CCC and $%%, and -ore still will 3ollow i3 the ei!ht 1ills

$*7nder Article CO o3 the present constitution, a-end-ent to the"onstitution shall 1e initiated 1y the 2iet 8throu!h a concurrin! voteo3 twothirds or -ore o3 all the -e-1ers o3 each house, and shallthereupon 1e su1-itted to the people 3or rati?cation, which shallre6uire the air-ative vote o3 a -aBority o3 all votes cast thereupon.

with eyes wide shut

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