witt rules

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Reduction, Description and Understanding

Warwick ID number: 1056384

8/4/2019 Witt Rules


§1

A what-is question can have several forms. What does δ consist in? What constitutes δ? Or

a simpler one: What is δ? ey are all inquiries on the nature of a particular phenomenon δ,

and typically have also general kind of answer. What is δ? Well, δ is β. ese questions might

have several interpretations but it all boils down to what is understood to be the nature of things

considered. It depends on the kinds of δ and the kinds of β that are going to be accepted. I am

interested in inquiring what kind of phenomena are proper of philosophical answers to what-

is questions. I think that rather than philosophical questions, there are philosophical ways of

answering questions. My interest then is to try to understand what is a philosophical answer

to a what-is question, and I think that Wittgenstein’s remarks about philosophy are of great

use in trying to achieve this understanding —though his exact positive position regarding the

kind of answers that philosophy should set forward is not easy to pin point. Most of the work

advanced here will aim to try to narrow down Wittgenstein’s position but in the end I am not as

interested in determining exactly what philosophical position did he have regarding this issue,

as I am interested in the kind of distinctions that can be made based upon his remarks.

§2

A good starting point for the present task is Wittgenstein’s negative characterization of philo-

sophical answers. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical answers, whatever they might be,are certainly not like scientific answers. I take this to mean that the kind of β used to answer

what-is questions in a philosophical manner will not be the kind of β typically used in scien-

tific explanations. So if science appeals to phenomena of one kind, philosophy cannot appeal to

the same kind of phenomena; and the other way around: the kind of phenomena adequate in

philosophy are not adequate on science. is negative reaction against the desire to put philo-

sophical answers at the same level as scientific answers can be seen in a very well-known passage

of PI :¹

109. It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. e feel-ing ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’

—whatever that may mean— could be of no interest to us. (e pneumatic con-

ception of thinking.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. ere must not

be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear,

and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light —that

is to say, its purpose— from the philosophical problems. ese are, of course, not

¹ In what follows, I will use ‘PI ’ to refer to Philosophical Investigations, ‘OC’ to refer to On Certainty. In some

occasions I will complement the translation with the original german word in the attempt to point out whatmay seem relevant connections.

8/4/2019 Witt Rules


Reduction, Description and Understanding 3

empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of

our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized —despite

an urge to misunderstand them. e problems are solved, not by coming up with

new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philos-ophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understandingt by the resources

of our language.

I consider these remarks to be roughly correct, though misleading. We should be careful

in the way we understand them because they seem to propose a very restricted view of what

philosophy should do. “All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its

place”. is might be taken to say that explanation must be vanished and description should

take its place in the philosophical domains; that we should avoid the corrupt temptation to

explain. We should restrain ourselves and aim only to offer descriptions of phenomena. We are

not to philosophically explain, we should not try to answer questions, clear things out, analyze

or give reasons. Rather we should stick to a plain description of the phenomena. –What is

thought? –It is what we do when we think. –What is meaning? What we do when we mean

something. What is to follow a rule? – It is what we do when we follow rules.

Taken in isolation, the quote does not seems to specify clearly what kind of answers should

philosophy provide to why-questions.

this seems to lead one to think that there are no authentic philosophical answers to why-

questions.Claiming that description should reign over explanation might be taken as meaning that we

cannot answer

this take on philosophy On possible stance towards the characterization

Taken in isolation, this characterization of what corresponds to philosophical answers to

why-questions is deeply unsatisfying. Rejecting every kind of explanation seems to leave one

with a very meagre view and philosophy. ere does seem to be a way in that answering philo-

sophically to a why-question explains something.

and considering that philosophy should stick only to mere description makes

February 22, 2011

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