wittgenstein and the open concept of art joe dobzynski jr

8/13/2019 Wittgenstein and the Open Concept of Art Joe Dobzynski Jr.

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Wittgenstein and the Open Concept of Art

Joe Dobzynski jr .

The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning ofa general term one had to find the common element in allits applications has shackled philosophical investigation.

Wittgenstein[1]

The foregoing quote shows the main problem withphilosophical investigation to the present day.Philosophers have been concerned with finding theessence of things, a set of necessary and sufficientconditions in defining the terms we use in everyday life.Good, bad, beauty, truth, virtue, etc have all beenhopelessly pursued within the confines of our language todiscover the common elements of a term in order toproperly dispense in using it. Wittgenstein is best knownfor challenging this particular desire, moving past findingthe commonalities between uses of a concept, and movingforward into a new way of looking at concepts in our lives -as family resemblances. The influence of this concept isseen in all aspects of philosophy, from the philosophy oflanguage, it's obvious correlation to postmodernism, andthe focus of this paper: aesthetics.

Morris Weitz, a prominent aesthetic philosopher, utilizedthis concept of family resemblances in his work "The Roleof Theory in Aesthetics" to create the open concept of art.This open concept of art led to quite a stir in aesthetictheory from which it seemed that no recovery waspossible. Maurice Mandelbaum, an opponent to the openconcept of art, formed a defense against the open conceptin his work "Family Resemblances and Generalization

Concerning the Arts", in which he strikes at the nature ofWittgenstein's development of family resemblances toshow that something is missing. Weitz formed a counter-criticism against Mandelbaum in his work The OpeningMind to show that family resemblances does succeed, andthat this open concept of art moves forward past a relianceon family resemblances.

The goal of this paper is to show that the concept of familyresemblances ultimately succeeds as an adequaterepresentation of art in lieu of Mandelbaum's criticism ofWeitz's theory. It will start by defining the nature of familyresemblances, move on the Weitz's open concept of art,

and end with a critique of Mandelbaum's criticism fromWeitz's standpoint and my own. It will further go to showthat while art remains an open concept, there is hope forart evaluation and art criticism, and that aesthetics canpursue into many different areas.

Wittgenstein's Doctrine of Family ResemblancesThe first mention of family resemblances appears in TheBlue and Brown Books after a discussion on the conceptof language-games. A language-game is the use of simpleconcepts that have diverse meanings in the highlycomplex language that we use.[2] For instance, those thatbelieve in some higher deity attribute the term, and

therefore concept, of God. The use of the word God ismulti-faceted in our language. We can refer to God as thehead of any of the three major monotheistic faiths(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). We can use it to refer toa mythological deity, such as Apollo, a god. We can use itas a qualifier for things that appear super-human, such asthe god-like strength of someone. All of these meaningsfor the concept of God are summed up in a single word:God. The usage of that term by every individual isassumed to be common to everyone else, though in realitythe concept that we have formed in our minds as to whatGod is varies from person to person. Yet, we still persist inusing the simple term, God. This is an example of alanguage-game.

Wittgenstein examines why we use language-games bystating four tendencies in human nature. First, we tend tolook for something in common in items under a generalterm or concept. Second, we tend to assume that once aperson has the concept of a general term that a generalpicture is formed in their mind of that term. Third, weconfuse the term with a mental state of usage andconsciousness. Fourth, we are preoccupied with the

scientific method[3]. These four tendencies lead us toconstantly persist in language-games, and leads toconfusion in the usage of terms. Thus, because weconstantly seek necessary and sufficient conditions indefining a term, we fail to see the doctrine of familyresemblances.

The doctrine of family resemblances states that, in short,general terms do not possess necessary and sufficientconditions to define them. Instead, the items that we placeunder the heading of a general term are related to oneanother by characteristics they possess[4]. To illustrate, Iwill use Wittgenstein's own concept of 'games'. He statesthat if you look at all the totality of what we call games inthe world, we find that there are no universally commonthreads that form necessary and sufficient conditions fordefining a term. Card games are similar to ball games, yetalso very different. The same is true comparing either oneto board games or children's games. What we do find isthat there are similar characteristics threaded througheach concept. For example, while board games and cardgames may involve the use of cards, card games do notrequire a board to play upon. Or while ball games andchildren's games may be amusing, chess is notnecessarily an amusing game. Therefore, the concept ofgames illustrates a family resemblance.

Does this mean that we cannot use the concept of gamessince we cannot define it? As Wittgenstein would answer,"Not at all!"[5] In fact, it is clear that we do use the conceptof game to describe things in the world, even though it is aconcept not framed by necessary and sufficient conditions.When we use the concept of a game, we employ it for aspecial purpose, and because of that, we draw aboundary, closing the concept. When I speak of a game, Imay be referring to a card game, which would limit theconcept for that special purpose. So, even with conceptscategorized by family resemblances, we can still use theconcept.


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Wittgenstein's two-fold plan with the family resemblancesis to first state that we engage in language games ineveryday discourse, using simple concepts in order toemploy them in complex language. Because of this andour tendency to seek commonality in concepts, we areunable to see the idea of family resemblances. Familyresemblances are a way of construing a concept notbased on universal characteristics that form necessaryand sufficient conditions, but a way of grouping thingstogether by looking at threads of commonality betweensome items underneath a concept, but not all. Thus, familyresemblances give us an adequate means of determiningthe definition of a concept.

Weitz's Open Concept of ArtWeitz drew heavily on Wittgenstein's family resemblancesin his development on the open concept of art. Much likeWittgenstein saw the need for commonality amongmembers of a class as a shackle of philosophicalinvestigation, Weitz saw this same idea as the barrier fordefining a concept of art. In the introduction to "The Roleof Theory in Aesthetics", Morris Weitz states his purpose:

I want to show that theory - in the requisite classicalsense - is never forthcoming in aesthetics, and that wewould do much better as philosophers to supplant thequestion, "What is the nature of art?," by other questions,the answers to which will provide us with all theunderstanding of the arts there can be [6].

Weitz is rejecting any form of closed concept concerningart. He states this in three ways. First, he moves to showthat traditional theorists are misconstruing the logic of theconcept of art [7] Second, he uses a historical argumentthat throughout history we have yet to find a theory that issufficient to encapsulate the whole of the concept of art[8].Finally, he wants to show that the definitions of art comefirst from recognizing items categorized as art, thendefining a concept to explain art, and finally using thatconcept to evaluate art [9}

The first form of evidence against a closed concept of artis that the logic of art demands that the concept remainopen. He does this by instead of asking, "What is art?" toasking, "What sort of concept is art?"[10] It is at this pointthat Weitz uses Wittgenstein's idea of familyresemblances to discern why the concept is to remainopen. In trying to define art, Weitz maintains that thenature of art is one of family resemblances, in which thereare no necessary and sufficient conditions that exist todefine art, and thus cannot be closed. Art is an empiricallydescriptive concept, and as such can only be arbitrarilyclosed in order to use the concept [11]

The second form of evidence is a historical argument. Heshows the inadequacies of all the prior theories as theoriesthat either emphasizes too few properties, neglectimportant concepts, or are too general so as to includeobjects that we would not consider art [12] It must benoted that this criticism alone does not justify keeping theconcept open as there is a possibility of a theory arising, aholy grail of aesthetics, that would encompass all artworkscorrectly. However, this historical criticism, combined with

understanding the nature of art as an open concept, leadsto show that the historical search for necessary andsufficient conditions is flawed in many ways.

The final form of evidence is the way in which we identifyconcepts, which is also drawn from Wittgenstein. Weitzstated that "[in] effect, this whole procedure, subtlydescriptive as it is, amounts to a transformation of correctcriteria for recognizing members of certain legitimatelyclosed classes of works of art into recommended criteriafor evaluating any putative member of the class."[13]Wittgenstein states that in order to begin using a conceptdefined as a family resemblance, we simply give examplesto be viewed and labeled as games. Once enoughexamples are given, we can assume that the personunderstand the concept of games, even though thebreadth that we give examples is an initial closing of theconcept. The concept later opens when more examplesare presented outside that closed concept[14]

Building on Wittgenstein's method for defining familyresemblance concepts, we see that the problem of art liesin taking a concept of a closed set of artworks, discerning

some common characteristics among them, and using thisdata to declare that all art must have these characteristics.These criteria are then used in evaluating the artwork totell whether it is (1) an artwork and (2) the quality of theartwork. This whole method, given art as a conceptdefined as a family resemblance, is faulty. It starts to meldthe concept of a classificatory and evaluative use of theconcept of art. Weitz is looking for a distinction betweenthe classificatory and the evaluative, and rightly so. Hewants to show that even with an open concept of art, artcriticism and art evaluation can still persist and flourish.Further argumentation will occur after we analyze thecriticism of the open concept of art.

Mandelbaum's Criticism of the Open Concept of ArtMandelbaum criticized the open concept of art in his article"Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the

Arts" in three parts. First, he offered criticism aboutWittgenstein's use of family resemblances. Second, hecriticized Paul Ziff's work on the open concept of art.Lastly, he critiqued Weitz's open concept of art. A reviewof all three criticisms and counter-criticism will reveal howthe open concept of art truly works, and howMandelbaum's criticism ultimately fails.

(1) Mandelbaum's Criticism of Family ResemblancesMandelbaum is highly critical of Wittgenstein's method fordiscovering family resemblances. He states thatWittgenstein missed something in his analysis by notlooking for "genetic connections" between members of aclass under a family resemblance[15]. He uses twoexamples of seeing someone using cards as fortunetelling that resembles a card game or a scuffle betweentwo boys on a playground as a similarity to wrestling tostate that something is missing in the conception of what isa game and what is not. It would appear that because thedirectly exhibited traits of what is considered a card gameand what is fortune telling would allow us to place fortune


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telling as a game and solitaire as a form of divination all atonce.

However, there are two major problems with this criticism.First, Mandelbaum is only centering in on one directlyexhibited trait show an indistinguishable relationshipbetween fortune telling and a card game. This disregardsthe criss-crossing of Wittgenstein's concept of familyresemblances in that it's not a single trait that overlaps, butmany. Second, his desire to look for a "genetic connection"between all games immediately presupposes that there issuch a concept underlying the concept of games. Hestates that because Wittgenstein failed to take this intoaccount, which I would argue Wittgenstein did not fail to doas such, he is lacking something that exists betweengames and hence for a definition of family resemblance.Mandelbaum proposes that games could be determinedas "absorbing non-practical interest to either participantsor spectators". I would argue that the same could be saidof reading a book, in which I would be placing non-practical interest in the activity as the sole participant. Thecriterion that Mandelbaum is putting forth is neithernecessary (playing a game for money, say poker or

professional sports, is putting a practical interest at stake),nor hence not sufficient to classify something as a game. Ifanything, Mandelbaum's criticism only reinforces the openconcept of a game, and thus strengthens the concept of afamily resemblance.

It is also worth nothing that Mandelbaum is addressing theessence of art whereas Weitz is discussing how theconcept is used. Weitz argues that the way in which weuse the concept is based on family resemblance, but that itisn't necessary in defining art as a class of items [16]. Thequestion was really "Do we need a theory of art to talkabout art intelligibly?" and the answer is no. This was theuse of family resemblances. Weitz states that the conceptis necessarily open in order to accommodate newpractices and new view of art. The nature of art demands itto be open, and does not rest on family resemblances perse. In fact, Mandelbaum's criticism fails of familyresemblances.

(2) Mandelbaum's Criticism of Paul Ziff The second part of the article attacks Paul Ziff'sdescription of an artwork in that it necessitates that he isputting forth a theory concerning art. Ziff puts forwardseven criteria for describing Poussin's Rape of the SabineWomen in determining the value of a work of art. In listingthese characteristics, Mandelbaum sees Ziff puttingforward contains an implicit aesthetic theory because he isincluding certain characteristics, but not others [17]. Thus,even in stating what characteristics that Ziff is using toevaluate the artwork, Ziff is putting forward an aesthetictheory.

Again, two problems arise with this criticism. First,Mandelbaum is putting forth the characteristics necessaryfor evaluating an artwork, in this case a painting, arecharacteristics for all artwork. This is a clear fallacy ofcomposition. Because Ziff is pointing out features in Rapeof the Sabine Women in no way states that thosecharacteristics being put forward are in some ways

necessary and sufficient conditions of evaluation for allartwork. Ziff is picking and choosing those characteristicsare good for the evaluation of this artwork, not all artwork.

Second, Mandelbaum is doing exactly what Weitz warnedagainst in putting forward art as an open concept bycombining what makes art with what evaluate art. Ziff isusing the term work of art in an evaluative sense, and notin a classificatory sense. He is evaluating Rape of theSabine Women, not classifying it, which both Mandelbaumand Ziff agree is already a work of art. I would furtherargue that the criteria that Ziff is producing arecharacteristics that criss-cross and overlap in the familyresemblance of art as an open concept. That Ziff isfocusing on it being "made deliberately and self-consciously with obvious skill and care" and noting "theplay of light and color, to dissonances, contrasts, andharmonies of hues, values, and intensities" are picking outthose similar strands of characteristics to art, but areneither necessary nor sufficient for it being an artwork[17].Ziff is pointing out the family resemblances to evaluate theart, not implicitly classify it. He presupposes that it is an

artwork before evaluating it, and makes his evaluationbased upon those overlapping criterion. He is notgeneralizing art by discussing one painting.

(3) Mandelbaum's Criticism of Morris WeitzMandelbaum's aim is upset the historical argument putforth by Weitz for the open concept of art, and the natureof art throughout the ages. It would appear thatMandelbaum is trying to pigeonhole Weitz into saying thatall novelties brought into the concept of art necessitate astretching of the concept of art, and I would agree withWeitz on one level and disagree with Mandelbaum onanother. The quote that Mandelbaum uses as the basis forhis argument is the following:

What I am arguing, then, is that the very expansive,adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes andnovel creations, makes it logically impossible to ensureany set of defining properties. We can, of course, chooseto close the concept. But to do this with "art" or "tragedy"or portraiture, etc. is ludicrous since it forecloses the veryconditions of creativity in the arts [18].

Mandelbaum assumes that Weitz is trying to argue thatevery novelty that comes into trial as a work of artnecessarily involves a stretching of the concept. Thisseems to misinterpret what Weitz is getting at. Weitzdoesn't mean that every novelty that comes along (andnovelty is an open concept all by itself) is necessarily puton trial to stretch the definition of art. Mandelbaum usesthe example of a representational painting as the basis ofhis claim, and the advent of photography and motionpictures and forms of representational painting that neednot stretch the concept of art in new ways, but merely inthe practice of art [19]. However, there seems to be adifference in the meaning of novelty here. The practice ofart can change without affecting the current, acceptedtotality of art as relates to a specific form of art, mainlyrepresentational painting. Mandelbaum has alreadyqualified art in this case as representational, and any work


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that is representational, with the 'novelty' of a camera orcamcorder, is simply a different medium for the same typeof art. Mandelbaum is closing the concept of art (thoughnot completely) by limiting what art is to be reviewed. Inessence, anything that is representational has thepossibility of being considered art at this case, and sincephotography and movies have this representationalaspect, the actual practice of art has change, but theconcept of representational art has not.

The 'novelty' used by Weitz is that art which comesforward as a challenging all norms of art whatsoever. Forexample, Duchamp's Fountain. Duchamp was known forhis readymade art, or found art. This novelty of found art issomething that challenges the concept of art previous to it,and requires that art broaden its definition in order toinclude it. The same could be said of accidental art. Thesedifferent types of art are the novelties that force art toexpand its boundaries, not merely using a new medium.This keeps the concept of art necessarily open.

Thus, I see Mandelbaum and Weitz with a divergence onthe meaning of novelty in bringing in new forms of art.

Dissolving a Universal Definition of ArtMandelbaum's criticisms ultimately fail in some way oranother of the three arguments he puts forth against anopen concept of art. The greater concern is whethercriticism or appreciation can take place without a standardboundary of what counts as art and what does not. I wouldargue that both could take place without a traditionaltheory of art.

With regards to appreciating a work of art, the conceptionof appreciation needs to move away from art having setcharacteristics in all art to make it worthy of appreciation.Because art does not have necessary and sufficientconditions in defining an artwork, we can nonetheless stillappreciate art based upon those criss-crossing andoverlapping similarities. Wittgenstein asks "[for] whyshould what [concepts] have in common be moreinteresting to use than what distinguishes them?"[20]There is a lot to be said from this statement. The subjectof appreciation such become those characteristics thatsome artworks share, and even in how artworks utilizethose characteristics as a whole. It leads to appreciate ofthe differences of artworks, and their relationship to otherartworks, which I do not seem to find the least bitdissatisfying.

With regards to evaluating a work of art, we can movealong the same lines. The theories that have come before(Formalist, Organicist, Expressionist, Intentionalist, etc...)need not be thrown out, but recycled into forms ofcriticism. We throw out the concept of art criticism beingwholly objective to artworks based upon sharedcharacteristics and create kinds of criticism. For example,one could perform a Formalist criticism of an artwork todiscuss how well its form or structure relates without theartwork in criticizing it. This leads to some artworks havepositive Formalist criticism and negative Formalist

criticisms. However, they are all artworks, which the openconcept of art will allow.

Thus, I argue that Wittgenstein's concept of familyresemblances opens up new avenues of sub-classification(for instance, Formalist art), appreciation (Formalistappreciation), and criticism (Formalist criticism) thatintensify the relationship of the appreciator and critic ofartworks. We are now able to develop new forms of thethree avenues to further explore and examine the natureof art given its station as an open concept. Wittgenstein'sconcept of family resemblances did help generate Weitz'sopen concept of art, and stands against the criticism madeby Mandelbaum.

Endnotes1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books. (NewYork: Barnes & Noble, 1969), 19.2 Ibid. 17.3 Ibid. 17-8.4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans.G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Company,

1953), 65, 31.5 Ibid. 69, 33.6 Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (1953): 27.7 Ibid. 28.8 Ibid. 30.9 Ibid. 33.10 Ibid. 30.11 Ibid. 31.

12 Ibid. 29.13 Ibid. 33.14 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 71, 34.15 Maurice Mandelbaum, "Family Resemblances andGeneralization Concerning the Arts", Aesthetics: A Critical

Anthology, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 140.Originally published in The American PhilosophicalQuarterly, vol. 2 no. 3 (1965).16 Morris Weitz, The Opening Mind, (Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1977), 58.17 Mandelbaum, 147.18 Weitz, "Role of Theory", 32.19 Mandelbaum, 148-9.20 Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, 19.

ReferencesMandelbaum, Maurice. "Family Resemblances andGeneralization Concerning the Arts." Aesthetics: A Critical

Anthology, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). Originallypublished in The American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2no. 3 (1965).Weitz, Morris. The Opening Mind. (Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1977).Weitz, Morris. "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics." Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 62 (1953).Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. (NewYork: Barnes & Noble, 1969).Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, trans.G. E. M. Anscombe. (New York: The Macmillan Company,1953).

wittgenstein and the open concept of art joe dobzynski jr

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