wittgenstein reads heidegger 4 - presentation 5-28-10

8/12/2019 Wittgenstein Reads Heidegger 4 - Presentation 5-28-10

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Dr. Paul M. Livingston

Department of Philosophy

University of New Mexico

May 15, !1!

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Wittgenstein reads Heidegger Heidegger reads Wittgenstein!

T"in#ing Lang$age %&$nding W&r'd

"his is a tale of two rea#ings, an# of a non$encounter, the misse# encounter %etween two

philosophers whose legacy, as has %een note#, might &ointly #efine the scope of pro%lems an#

'uestions left open, in the wa(e of the twentieth century, for philosophy to#ay. "here is, as far

as ) (now, exactly one recor#e# remar( %y *ittgenstein that #irectly a##resses +ei#egger an#

there is exactly one recor#e# remar( %y +ei#egger that refers to *ittgenstein. -s rea#ings, %oth

remar(s are, at %est, partial, elliptical, an# glancing. )nterestingly, as ) shall argue, each is

actually a profoun# misrea#ing of the one philosopher %y the other. y consi#ering these two

mis$rea#ings, ) shall argue, we can un#erstan# %etter the relationship %etween the two great

twentieth century investigators of the o%scure lin(ages among %eing, language an# truth. -n#

we can gain some insight into some of the many 'uestions still left open %y the many faile#

encounters of twentieth century philosophy, up to an# inclu#ing what might %e consi#ere# the

most #efinitive encounter that is still routinely misse#, miscarrie#, or misun#erstoo#, the

encounter %etween the /tra#itions0 of /analytic0 an# /continental0 philosophy, which are still

wi#ely suppose# to %e #is&oint.

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).

) %egin with the sole recor#e# remar( %y *ittgenstein on +ei#egger. )t comes in the course of a

series of #iscussions %etween *ittgenstein an# mem%ers of the ienna 2ircle hel# in the homes

of 3rie#rich *aissmann an# Morit4 chlic( an# later collecte# un#er the title Wittgenstein and

the Vienna Circle. "he remar( #ate# Decem%er 6!, 177, rea#s8

9n +ei#egger8

) can very well thin( what +ei#egger meant a%out eing an# -ngst. Man has the #rive to

run up against the %oun#aries of language. "hin(, for instance, of the astonishment that

anything exists. "his astonishment cannot %e expresse# in the form of a 'uestion, an#

there is also no answer to it. -ll that we can say can only, a priori, %e nonsense.

Nevertheless we run up against the %oun#aries of language. :ier(egaar# also saw this

running$up an# similarly pointe# it out ;as running up against the para#oxo ahea# an# spea( nonsense = it #oesn@t matterA01

1BCu +ei#egger8 )ch (ann mir wohl #en(en, was +ei#egger mit ein un# -ngst meint. Der Mensch hat

#en "rie%, gegen #ie >ren4en #er prache an4urennen. Den(en ie 4.. an #as rstaunen, #ass etwas

existiert.Das Erstaunen kann nicht in Form einer Frage ausgedrckt werden, un# es gi%t auch gar (eine

-ntwort. -lles, was wir sagen mEgen, (ann a priori nur Unsinn sein. "rot4#em rennen wir gegen #ie

>ren4e #er prache an. Dieses -nrennen hat auch :ier(egaar# gesehen un# es sogar gan4 Fhnlich ;als-nrennen gegen #as Para#oxon< %e4eichnet. Dieses -nrennen gegen #ie >ren4e #er prache ist #ie Ethik.

)ch halte es fGr sicher wichtig, #ass man all #em >eschwFt4 G%er thi( $ o% es eine r(enntnis ge%e, o% es

*erte ge%e, o% sich #as >ute #efinieren lasse etc. $ ein n#e macht. )n #er thi( macht man immer #en

ersuch, etwas 4u sagen, was #as *esen #er ache nicht %etrifft un# nie %etreffen (ann. s ist a priori

gewiss8 *as immer man fGr eine Definition 4um >uten ge%en mag $ es ist immer nur ein

MissverstFn#nis, #as igentliche, was man in *ir(lich(eit meint, entspreche sich im -us#ruc( ;Moore


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"he remar(, which has since %ecome somewhat notorious, was first pu%lishe# in the Hanuary,

17I5 issue of thePhilosophical Review, %oth in the original >erman an# in nglish translation.

3or reasons that have never %een explaine#, in %oth the >erman an# nglish texts, *aissman@s

title, the first sentence, an# the last sentence were there omitte#, so that the remar( as a whole

appeare# to ma(e no reference either to +ei#egger or to -ugustine. ;Jou can come to your own

conclusions a%out why this might have %een, an# what it might show a%out the extent an# nature

of the analyticKcontinental #ivi#e, at least at that time


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philosophical metho#s coul# har#ly %e more #ifferent8 >.. Moore an# t. -ugustine. "he

concern that lin(s -ugustine, :ier(egaar#, Moore an# +ei#egger, across centuries of

philosophical history an# #espite o%viously #eep #ifferences is something that *ittgenstein #oes

not hesitate to call /thics,0 although his own elliptical #iscussions of the status of ethics an# its

theory are certainly anything %ut tra#itional. ome years earlier, in the ractatus, *ittgenstein

ha# #escri%e# /ethics0 very %riefly an# elliptically as /transcen#ental,0 hol#ing simply that /it is

impossi%le for there to %e propositions of ethics0 an# that / ethics cannot %e put into wor#s.0

"he position expresse# in this %rief passage is, however, further spelle# out in the %rief /Lecture

on thics0 that *ittgenstein ha# #elivere# to the /+eretics ociety0 in 2am%ri#ge &ust six wee(s

earlier, on Novem%er 1O, 177. )n the /Lecture,0 *ittgenstein consi#ers the status of what he

calls /a%solute &u#gments of value,0 &u#gments that something simply is valua%le, o%ligatory or

goo# in itself, without reference to anything else that it is valua%le for. +is thesis is that /no

statement of fact can ever %e, or imply, a &u#gment of a%solute value.0 ;p. 67


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not have %een, or might have %een otherwise, it ma(es no sense to won#er a%out the worl#@s

existing at all. )t is thus exclu#e# at the outset that the /experience0 that one is tempte# to put as

the e"perienceof such won#er can %e meaningfully expresse#, an# it is a (in# of para#ox that

any factual or psychological experience shoul# even so much asseemto have this significance.

-n# if someone were to o%&ect that the existence of an experience of a%solute value might in#ee#

%e &ust a fact among others, for which we have as yet not foun# the proper analysis, *ittgenstein

suggests that it woul# %e possi%le to respon# with a (in# of imme#iate universal insight that, /as

it were in a flash of light,0 illuminates the essential connection of this experience to the reality of

language itself, which shows up in the failure of any attempt to express it.

eturning to the remar( of Decem%er 6!, *ittgenstein@s remar(a%le suggestion here is, then, that

all of the philosophers he mentions ;Moore, -ugustine, an# :ier(egaar# as much as +ei#eggerreece such a presencing

leaps into view. )%pokeimenonis in fact the %eing as it lets itself %e seen, an# this

means8 that which is there %efore the eyes, as it %rings itself forth from itself. "hus the

mountain lies on the lan# an# the islan# in the sea.

uch is the >ree( experience of %eings.

3or us, %eing as a whole = ta onta= is only an empty wor#. 3or us, there is no longer that

experience of %eings in the >ree( sense. 9n the contrary, as in *ittgenstein, /the real is

what is the case0 ;/Wirklich ist( was der Fall ist0< ;which means8 that which falls un#er a

#etermination, lets itself %e esta%lishe#, the #etermina%leree(s, on the contrary, this experience of %eings is so rich, so concrete an#

touches the >ree(s to such an extent that there are significant synonyms ;-ristotle,

Metaphysics -ree(s. )t is authentically8 ta alethea, what is reveale# in unconcealment,

what postpones concealment for a time it is ta phainomena, what here shows itself from

itself. ;p. 65ree( sense0

permits an# is permitte# %y, +ei#egger suggests, an experience of /what S %eing is0 for the

>ree(s, namely presencing an# #isclosure, the truth of what shows itself from itself as it itself is.

uch an experience of %eings not only remains faithful to their un#erlying character as it shows

itself %ut is also, +ei#egger says, /so rich0 an# /so concrete0 that its synonyms in >ree( connect

it to the un#erlying meanings of truth ;aletheia, or unconceale#ness< an# in#ee# to the very

meaning of what it is to %e aphenomenonat all. "his is the occasion for +ei#egger@s mention of

the mo#ern conception that he attri%utes to *ittgenstein, accor#ing to which all that exists is the

real in the sense of the /#etermina%le0 or /#etermine#0 an# there is no possi%ility any longer of

anything li(e a compara%le insight into the character of the ta onta, what #etermines %eings as a

whole.

+ei#egger@s rea#ing of *ittgenstein is a misrea#ing in an even more #irect an# o%vious sense

than is *ittgenstein@s rea#ing of +ei#egger, forty$two years earlier. 3or the sentence that

+ei#egger here attri%utes to *ittgenstein is a %latant an# #irect mis'uotation. "he first sentence

of the ractatusrea#s, /"he worl# is all that is the case0 ;Die Welt is !lles( das der Fall ist.ree( experience of ta onta, an experience to which, he

says, we #o not have access to#ay. Nevertheless we can still contemplate the >ree( experience

of the ta onta, which once allowe# %eings to show themselves /from themselves0 as the pure

%eings that they are. "his experience is an experience of won#er that connects the existence of

in#ivi#ual %eings with the experience of the whole, an experience of the con#itions of presence

that ma(e it possi%le for any %eing to %e. ecalling the earlier #iscussion, we might in#ee# call

this an /experience of won#er0 at the existence of the worl#, &ust the (in# of experience that

*ittgenstein #iscusse#, %oth in the %rief passage on +ei#egger an# in the /Lecture on thics.0

ut it was, of course, the whole point of *ittgenstein@s consi#eration of thics to #eny that the

content of such an experience coul# ever successfully %e expresse#. 3or the attempt to express

won#er at the existence of the worl# yiel#s rather, accor#ing to *ittgenstein, only the su##en

insight that there is no fact an# no collection of facts whose truth = nothing, then, withinthe

worl# = can suffice to capture the reality of the con#itions that prece#e all facts an# all truths.

ut at the same time, there is no position outside the worl# either, from which what one tries to

express %y means of an expression of won#er at the existence of the worl# = or what, we may

a##, one might try to express %y a #escription of the historical #etermination of %eing aspresence, even the #etermination of the %eing of %eings as such = coul# in#ee# %e (nown an#

asserte#.

III

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) have argue#, then, that loo(ing at the ways %oth +ei#egger an# *ittgenstein misun#erstoo#

each other can reveal the existence of profoun# an# foun#ational pro%lems that are still open

to#ay. "here are, in particular, two interrelate# pro%lems here that ) woul# li(e to emphasi4e as

profoun#, important, an# still lac(ing any o%vious solution. "he first is the ancient pro%lem of

the nature an# structure an# meaning of the logos, which su%sumes %oth the more local

twentieth$century philosophical in'uiry into language an# the metho#s of formal an# sym%olic

logic that have simultaneously #efine# many twentieth$century approaches. "he secon#, as we

have repeate#ly seen, is the pro%lem of the totality8 the pro%lem of our access ;if such there %eerman< as something which has e#ges, something which forms a %oun#e# whole an#

can thus %ecome a #istinct o%&ect of stu#y or of philosophical theori4ing. ;p. 5

wittgenstein reads heidegger 4 - presentation 5-28-10

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