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Nuclear Black Markets: A Challenge to the Non-Proliferation Regime

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Copyright © 2006 by the Office of Strategic and Special Studies, AFP.

Office of Strategic and Special Studies, AFP2nd Floor, Bulwagang MabiniCamp General Emilio AguinaldoQuezon City, Philippines

All rights reserved. No part of this monograph may be reprinted or reproduced without permission in writing from the publisher.

The views and opinions expressed in this volume are of the authorand do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies, AFP or the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Cover Concept by Edna R. Escasinas Design & Printing by AM Cleofe PrintsQuezon City, Philippines

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Weapons ofMass Destruction

Raymund Jose G. Quilop

A Challenge to Global and Regional Security

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Contents

Foreword

A Regime on Non-Proliferationof WMD in the Asia-Pacific:Challenges and Prospects

The Proliferation Security Initiative: Searching for Mechanismsto Counter Proliferation

Finding Synergy among Instruments: Thoughts on WMD Proliferationin the Philippine Context

Nuclear Black Markets: A Challengeto the Non-Proliferation Regime

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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), specifically nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, has once more come to the fore for several reasons. First, there is a growing concern over the possibility of these weapons being used by non-state actors such as terrorist groups to inflict harm and fear among states and people. Second, the nuclear program by Iran as well as missile tests by North Korea have shown that there remain states perceived to be keen on developing their nuclear capacity which impact on their capabilities to develop WMDs, specifically nuclear weapons.

This compilation of essays on the issue of WMD proliferation is therefore timely. Written by Prof. Raymund Jose G. Quilop, the articles in this collection focus on the challenges posed by WMD proliferation as well as the prospects of addressing this issue through various international and regional instruments. As they have been prepared for various audiences and forums, portions of some of the essays may have been repeated in the others. Certain pieces in this collection have also been previously printed in conference proceedings or publications of other research institutes.

Nonetheless, by putting them together in one volume, the Office of Strategic and Special Studies, AFP hopes to provide defense policy makers as well as AFP officers and personnel the necessary background information on the issue of WMD proliferation. This could be useful in helping them craft the needed defense and security policy in relation to it. Hopefully too, this collection would make a modest contribution in enabling policy makers and military leaders to interact more fruitfully with their colleagues across the region in search for an effective mechanism of managing this issue.

Foreword

OSCAR RANDY S. DAUZBrigadier General AFPChief

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Introduction

Let me preface this essay with the point that I am more a student of regional institutions particularly their prospects in promoting regional stability and the challenges they face rather than a specialist on the

issue of weapons proliferation although this issue is also one of my research of interest. It is in this context that the focus of this paper would be more on the prospects and challenges faced by regional institutions, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the development of a regime on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Asia-Pacific.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) refers to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The term “weapon of mass destruction” was adopted in 1948 when the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments “had to decide which weapons” were to be included and excluded from its purview, with the term being used simply to refer to “that set of weapons that would not be called conventional”. The term WMD was subsequently dropped from common usage primarily because nuclear weapons “rapidly attained a political and strategic significance that towered that of the other weapons” including chemical and biological weapons. In the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, the three weapons were once again reconnected and today the term WMD is used as a “single undifferentiated category”.1 For this essay, however, the discussion of WMD and its proliferation would be limited to nuclear weapons. Thus, the terms WMD and nuclear weapons could at times be used interchangeably with WMD pertaining to nuclear weapons alone and vice-versa.

The production and proliferation of WMDs result from the security dilemma that states face in an international system characterized by anarchy or simply put an international environment without a world government. Unlike in the domestic setting where individual citizens are no longer responsible for their own security because national governments take care of it, in the international arena, individual states have to fend for themselves and secure

This essay is based on a paper presented at the 1st Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction held in Singapore on May 27-28, 2005.

A Regime on Non-Proliferation of WMD in the Asia-Pacific:Challenges and Prospects

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themselves against other sovereign states. And the best tools for achieving this are weapons; the more lethal the weaponry, the more effective it is in ensuring their security, so states believe.

Unfortunately, in their quest to enhance their security, they create insecurity for their neighbors, which in turn undertake measures to enhance their own security, through the production and acquisition of more lethal weapons and so on and so forth. Before these states realize it, they have already engaged in an arms race and contributed to the proliferation of weapons. And more recently, the possibility of these types of weapons being used by terrorist groups to pursue their aim of undermining governments and instilling fear among the civilian public has further complicated the problem of WMD proliferation.

The Challenge of Nuclear Proliferation

The issue of nuclear weapons proliferation is a complicated problem because proliferation does not only involve states that possess nuclear weapons but could also result from something that is seen as harmless – the use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes specifically the generation of electricity. The availability of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) as a consequence of nuclear energy generation could very well open up the possibility of proliferation of this type of WMD. Besides, according to technical specialists, the technology used in generating nuclear electricity could be easily used to produce nuclear bombs.

States in Southeast Asia do not possess nuclear weapons. Neither do they depend on nuclear energy. The Philippines for itself has had its own failed experiment with using nuclear energy. However, this is not the case for the wider Asia-Pacific region. The economic growth which Asia-Pacific countries have previously experienced increased the demand for energy and in spite of the Asian financial crisis, which to a certain extent slowed the pace of their economic growth, affected countries have since recovered from the crisis thereby fueling an increasing demand for energy and its sources. Along this line, nuclear energy may continue to be seen as an efficient alternative source of the much-needed energy to fuel the industrialization and growth of individual Asia-Pacific countries. Estimates indicate that nuclear energy-using countries in the region operate around 85 nuclear reactors, a figure that could increase to nearly 120 by the year 2020.2

As previously mentioned, using nuclear energy opens up the possibility for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power plants use fuel rods which contain uranium. At the end of the process, these rods end up with highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. The plutonium from the fuel

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rods can be extracted and reprocessed so as to be used again as fuel either in its pure form or in a form mixed with uranium (mixed oxide form). More critically, the plutonium extracted from the fuel rods as well as HEU could be used for producing nuclear weapons.3

Interestingly, the greater the capacity of a country to utilize nuclear energy, the greater are its chances of becoming a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). This is particularly true if a country has developed the capability to reprocess its plutonium stockpiles. It has actually been acknowledged that “the acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities constitutes a ‘loophole’ in the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] as it provides states with the ability to produce nuclear weapons in a short period of time after the decision to do so is taken”.4 Along this line, the apprehension over the possibility of nuclear energy users turning into NWS is not without basis. China, for example, plans to build a 400-800-ton reprocessing plant by 2010. 5 Increases in plutonium stockpiles, therefore, cause anxiety as regards their future uses. Today, the increase in the supply of plutonium results not only from an increase in the number of nuclear energy users but also from the partial dismantling of the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United States.6

In addition, there are anxieties as to the possibility of these fissile materials being stolen and used for terrorist activities.7 Previously, such possibility was considered remote. But more recently, this scenario has been taken seriously for it is indeed possible for non-state actors particularly terrorist groups to have access to fissile materials and develop nuclear weapons; crude they may be but lethal nonetheless. As Walker puts it, “WMD … have not been regarded as weapons of choice for non-state actors, as they require a high level of technological expertise”, which was previously seen as available only to states.8 Developing a “nuclear weapon from plutonium requires the construction of an implosion-type device, which is more technically difficult”.9 However, as the US National Research Council has warned in 2002, crude nuclear weapons (gun-type weapons) using highly enriched uranium “could be fabricated without state assistance” and “as little as 25kg [of HEU is] needed to produce a nuclear weapon.”10 Thus, the widespread “distribution of and international commerce in HEU” even for peaceful purposes “poses serious risks in the age of global terror”.11

In this regard, it becomes clear that the only impediment preventing states or technically competent terrorist groups from having their own nuclear materials is the unavailability of fissile materials, particularly HEU. Thus, “securing and eliminating stocks of HEU is the surest way to decrease the risk that terrorist groups use this material to create a nuclear explosion”.12

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Considering therefore that HEU could be the preferred choice of terrorists, it is important that everything should be done to “secure, consolidate, reduce and ultimately eliminate this material” as soon as possible.13

It is alarming to note, however, that estimates indicate that around 1,900 tons of HEU, spread over hundreds of sites, are available in global stockpiles as of the end of 2003 and they continue to grow each year.14 Worse, it appears that states may not be willing to give up their stocks of HEU, arguing that “it is necessary for scientific work or, as is more typically the case, because of a political view that holding on to HEU is in some way prestigious”.15

WMD was also previously considered as not a choice for non-state actors because their use could “cause a level of damage that might seriously endanger support for whichever group attempted to use them. In the late 1990s, however, a debate emerged over the possibility that terrorist groups might shed this restraint and perpetrate acts of ‘catastrophic terrorism’ using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons”.16 The attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in 1992 and the release of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway in 1995 are but a few of the examples that indicate “an increasing willingness among some terrorist groups to cause mass casualties in service of political, ideological or religious ends”.17

Institutions and Non-Proliferation

Given the state of anarchy that characterizes the international system, the problems brought about by the security dilemma states face, such as WMD proliferation, could nonetheless be mitigated through international institutions. Interestingly, international institutions have been created by states themselves, a de facto recognition that on their own, states could not handle or manage the complex problems that they face.

Broadly defined, institutions are “recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which expectations converge”18 or “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations”.19 They come either in the form of international organizations or their less structured counterparts – international regimes.

Organizations refer to a “formal, intergovernmental [body] among geographically proximate states in a region that is internally and externally recognized as distinct”.20 Because an organization is supposed to be formalized, the presence of a bureaucracy supporting and managing its daily affairs is both a necessary and a defining characteristic of an organization.

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Regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.21 Regimes enhance cooperation among those involved by facilitating the forging and enforcement of agreements. They facilitate the forging of agreements by lowering the cost of transactions within the regime, by establishing the conditions for orderly negotiations, and by providing channels of communications and thereby improving the quality of information shared among those involved. They facilitate the enforcement of agreements by linking issues under one regime with those under other regimes; thereby reducing the incentives to cheat and at the same time enhancing the value of reputation. They also facilitate the enforcement of agreements by creating standards for legitimate action and providing mechanisms for monitoring compliance.22

Unlike other issue areas where there lack institutions either in the form of organizations or regimes to address them, the issue of WMD non-proliferation is something, which has the necessary institutions both at the global level and the regional level for addressing it.

At the global level, the non-proliferation regime is underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) providing the organizational infrastructure for ensuring that nuclear weapons and technology do not proliferate. The challenge therefore as regards non-proliferation is not the absence of institutions that are meant to address it but rather making these institutions work more effectively.

Concluded in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, the NPT was to be in force for 25 years although it was extended indefinitely in 1995. It has the objective of preventing “the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology”, promoting “cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and furthering “nuclear disarmament as well as general and complete disarmament”.23 Through the NPT, nuclear war was abhorred and the “universal validity of non-proliferation and disarmament policies” was adopted.24 A total of 188 states are party to the treaty including the five nuclear-weapon states (US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China) except Israel, India and Pakistan which remain as non-signatories. The IAEA, for its part, monitors and verifies through so-called inspections whether states party to the NPT are complying with the treaty particularly with regard to safeguard mechanisms to prevent the “diversion of fissile materials for weapons use”.25

But the NPT, just like any other international instrument, suffers from a fundamental constraint – that states being sovereign would ultimately have

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the final decision whether or not to become party to it as well as whether or not to comply with its provisions and principles. As Walker aptly puts it, a “proliferating state [could] stay outside the NPT to avoid safeguards and purchase whole facilities (reactors, reprocessing and/or enrichment plants) on the pretext that they were needed for civil purposes”.26 A state that is a party to the NPT could also withdraw from the NPT for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, such as the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This has subsequently raised the issue of how to prevent states “from withdrawing for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons”.27 This has prompted several states particularly France and the United Kingdom to propose that “a withdrawing state [should] remain responsible for previous violations committed while [being] under the NPT, and upon abrogating [it], cannot benefit from nuclear technology assistance and must freeze, dismantle, and return received nuclear materials”.28

It was also impossible for the IAEA to be able to monitor everything that needed to be monitored, particularly if states themselves deliberately undertake measures for their activities to go undetected. For example, “a state could [actually] purchase the required components and sub-systems through a disguised network of suppliers located in various countries and assemble them into complete facilities”.29 Before the IAEA and the international community, know about it, a nuclear weapons facility has already been established.

Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the NPT have recently been drawn and additional proposals towards this end continue to be formulated.30 For example, previously the IAEA inspections were limited to “facilities declared by the state” but with the Additional Protocol, “inspections could be mounted ‘anytime, any place’, monitoring instruments could be installed outside declared facilities, and states would have to provide the IAEA with design information before facilities were operated.” 31 The additional protocol is therefore seen as an important measure in enhancing the IAEA’s ability to provide verification by giving it greater access to a state’s nuclear infrastructure.32

Furthermore, “the Agency could in [the] future draw upon intelligence information provided by member-states”.33 Collaboration between the IAEA as a verification body and the intelligence services of states would become increasingly important if timely detection of proliferation-related activities were to be achieved.34 The question, however, is how willing and how far states would allow their intelligence agencies to cooperate with an international body like the IAEA.

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A more recent initiative to further the non-proliferation agenda is the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which has been seen as primarily meant to strengthen “norms and principles that hinder the acquisition of WMD capabilities by non-state actors”.35 It “implicitly acknowledges the state as sole legitimate holder of WMD-related materiel – non-state actors have no such rights and must be actively denied access” while it “calls on and obligates all states to strengthen their internal instruments of constraint [pertaining to] export controls, physical control, measures against trafficking and legal penalties”.36 As a political instrument, the resolution is a proclamation by the UN Security Council for all states to support the norm of non-proliferation as it notes that the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.37

Prospects and Challenges for a Regional Non-Proliferation Regime

In the Asia Pacific, there exist the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which could provide the necessary and initial avenues for the development of a non-proliferation regime in the region. It is always good to have something to start with. It must be recognized however that the presence of existing institutions could also be a constraint in developing a regime for non-proliferation particularly if existing institutions do not have this particular issue on their agenda when they were established or when this issue requires a re-examination of the principles and norms of existing institutions.

The relatively successful experience with institution building in Southeast Asia through ASEAN has helped Southeast Asian states manage their relations with each other and successfully helped prevent military conflict from arising among its members. With ASEAN, there emerged a regime characterized by the preference for dialogues and consultations in dealing with issues rather than deciding issues through military confrontation. Instead of putting emphasis on the production and acquisition of weapons, ASEAN members would rather deal with each other at the negotiating table.

With regard to having a Southeast Asia relatively free from the ill-effects of weapons proliferation, two instruments of ASEAN come to the fore. These are the concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. ZOPFAN was formulated by ASEAN in 1971 to crystallize its collective vision of insulating the region from great power competition for ideological-strategic advantage being played by the two superpowers during the period of the Cold War.

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The SEANWFZ treaty, signed in 1995 among the original six ASEAN members including Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia that were not yet members of ASEAN at that time, for its part, aims to make Southeast Asia a region free from nuclear weapons. Towards this end, it requires the accession to its protocol by the nuclear weapons states in the region such as the US and China.

Although the context where these instruments were developed may be different and the objectives they have may be unique to the exigencies of the times when they were crafted, these two instruments could still be used as take off points for the development of non-proliferation regime in the Southeast Asian sub-region and even in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, in the 2005 review conference of the NPT, many states have started to support “the role of nuclear weapons free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime”.38

Such a relatively successful experiment in sub-regional institution building is now also being applied to the wider Asia-Pacific through the ARF, with the forum being considered as useful in helping Asia-Pacific states manage their relations with each other and address issues that transcend their individual boundaries or issues that are regional in scope and character, including the proliferation of WMD.

Nonetheless, there are still doubts whether the norms and principles such as dialogues and consultations which have worked relatively well in Southeast Asia could work equally well in the wider Asia-Pacific. Analysts who have been critical of the ARF have pointed out that while most of the regional security concerns come from Northeast Asia, the “impetus and modalities for cooperation” come mainly from Southeast Asia. In spite of the fact that the ARF has a region-wide participation and agenda, it remains to be an “ASEAN creature in both substance and procedural terms”.39 This has apparently created a disconnect between what could be called institutional response and the issues that need to be acted upon.

In more specific terms, the issue of proliferation of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, is an issue that is more specific to Northeast Asia considering that almost all the states in Northeast Asia use nuclear technology for generating electricity (Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea) with some having nuclear weapons themselves (Russia, China) and one developing a nuclear weapons program covertly (North Korea). Thus, the ARF being driven by ASEAN whose members may not be directly interested in weapons proliferation for they neither possess these weapons nor use nuclear technology for electricity generation, may not put on its priority agenda the issue of WMD proliferation.

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One of the norms in ASEAN which may need to be re-examined if a regional non-proliferation regime were to be developed is the informality that the association including the ARF have become known for. This preference for informality or avoidance of excessive institutionalization means “avoiding the establishment of institutions and procedures that are too formal and legalistic and that require a degree of transparency and commitment…”40 ASEAN cooperation, particularly on security and political issues, is “unstructured with no clear format for decision-making or implementation, often lacks a formal agenda, [and] issues are negotiated on an ad hoc basis as and when they arise”.41 Addressing the issue of WMD proliferation, however, may require structures at the level of ASEAN and the ARF to be created; structures which would require transparency and a deeper sense of commitment among the members of the ARF as they evolve to be counterparts of the IAEA at the regional level.

Nonetheless, ASEAN and the ARF as regional institutions could provide the platform whereby states could share and exchange information. Information is very important particularly with regard to preventing the proliferation of weapons. With regard to WMD, a mechanism for exchanging information regarding these weapons would be most useful. Without such a mechanism, states would not be able to ascertain and verify various reports that get circulated say for example, the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs of other states. This results in speculation that could lead to instability in the region. Information is also necessary if arms control and disarmament programs were to be undertaken more effectively.

It is in this context of sharing crucial and necessary information that an ASEAN or even an ARF Arms Register may become useful. Previous proposals to develop an ASEAN Arms Register were limited to conventional weapons. Given the urgency of addressing the problem of proliferation of WMD, it would be useful if an ASEAN or an ARF Arms Register would include WMD-related materials as well.

The idea of a regional arms register is anchored on the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons (UNRCW) which became operational in 1992 after the UN General Assembly adopted unanimously UN Resolution 46/36 entitled “Transparency in Armaments”.42 The UN register asks all UN members including observers to “submit voluntarily [annually] to the Secretary-General data on imported and exported weapons and background information on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies from the previous calendar year”.43

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The UN Register although not an arms control mechanism per se is useful in building confidence among states and is considered as a tangible mechanism for transparency that could “lessen the causes of dangerous misperceptions of another country’s intentions and if possible to establish partnership and trust”.44

However, the UN Register has encountered several problems. First, the registry does not report all transfers of arms and arms-related materials, even those which the states have agreed to be included. Second is the inconsistency between entries emanating from suppliers and recipients with only around 25% of the entries actually matching. It is also difficult to cross-check entries particularly if one party did not participate or did not report certain transfers. Third, since the UN Registry utilizes delivery reports from the previous year, it could not be an instrument for arms control as the sale has already taken place prior to actual delivery. Fourth, the Registry records only transfers done by governments. Finally, the Registry does not include weapons of mass destruction and transfer or related technology, something which should be included if the Register were to oversee the build-up of arms and promote transparency among states.

These problems of the UN Registry necessitate a more region-specific arms register. In fact, the UN has acknowledged in Chapter VIII of its charter the utility of region-based instruments.45 It is a given fact that regional mechanisms have the advantage of being more familiar with the “specific political, strategic and normative conditions” of their respective regions thereby making them in a better position to make things work.46 Thus, a regional arms registry among ARF members which includes WMD and WMD-related material may be useful for the region.

Summary and Conclusion

The issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear proliferation may be something that the Southeast Asian region may not immediately and directly feel too-much attached to for the simple reason that Southeast Asian states do not possess WMD nor do they even depend on nuclear technology for generating electricity. However, as part of the wider Asia-Pacific, which includes states that either possess WMD, are developing WMD specifically nuclear weapons, or utilize nuclear technology for civilian use, it would do well for Southeast Asia to examine the gravity of this issue. Hopefully, regional states would take the necessary steps to address or manage this security challenge, primarily by establishing or developing a regional regime on non-proliferation.

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This is particularly important considering the fact that WMD and its proliferation is a key issue with regard to the relations among the great or major powers of the region. But what is more disturbing is the possibility, something which has previously been seen as remote but has recently been acknowledged as being likely, of WMD becoming accessible to non-state actors, particularly the terrorists, who may use these destructive weapons, even at their most crude form, to undermine governments and inflict harm on civilians.

At the global level, the issue of WMD proliferation is an area where the necessary institutional infrastructure for addressing it, is available what with the NPT and the IAEA being two of the many institutions that are meant to ensure that nuclear weapons and technology do not proliferate. And more recently, the adoption of the UN Security Council 1540, which has been seen as primarily meant to strengthen “norms and principles that hinder the acquisition of WMD capabilities by non-state actors”, is another initiative for the non-proliferation agenda of the global community.

In the Asia-Pacific, while the issue of non-proliferation may not have been in the main agenda of ASEAN and the ARF, these regional institutions could still provide the necessary and initial avenues for the development of a non-proliferation regime. After all, in the case of ASEAN, it has developed the concept of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) way back in 1971 and has the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ZEANFWZ) Treaty in 1995. Although the context where these instruments were developed may be different and the objectives they have may be unique to the exigencies of the times when they were crafted, these two instruments could still be used as take off points for the development of non-proliferation regime in the Southeast Asian sub-region and in the Asia-Pacific region.

It must be recognized though that the presence of existing institutions could also be a constraint in developing a regime particularly if the existing institutions do not have this particular issue on their agenda when they were established or when a particular issue requires a re-examination of the norms and principles held sacred by these institutions. Specifically, will ASEAN and the ARF be able to move beyond their current institutional state of being informal, emphasizing more the process of interaction, rather than structures that deal with specific issues such as WMD proliferation? This is a key issue that must be addressed as dealing with the problem of WMD proliferation may require formal structures.

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NoTeS:

1 “William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order (Adelphi Paper 370) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 23.

2 Kaoru Kikuyama, “Asia-Pacific Regional Nuclear Framework - Requirements and Effects” (Paper presented during the eight meeting of CSCAP’s International Working on Confidence and Security Building Measures, Washington, D.C., U.S.A, May 7-9, 1998), p. 1.

3 The above information has been culled from the author’s notes during the meeting of CSCAP International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures held in Tokyo and Fukushima, Japan on October 30-31, 1997.

4 Peter Crail and James McMonigle, “Stalemate in the Diplomatic Trenches: An Overview of the Diverging Positions at the 2005 NPT Review Conference” found at http://cns.miis.edu, p. 3.

5 Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Lessons from EURATOM for Possible Regional Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region” in Ralph A. Cossa (ed.), Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-pro-liferation: Exploring the Possibilities (Hawaii: Pacific Forum/CSIS, [1996]), p. 19.

6 Brad Roberts and Zachary Davis, “Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: A Survey of Propos-als” in Ralph A. Cossa (ed.), Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-proliferation: Exploring the Possibilities (Hawaii: Pacific Forum CSIS [1996]), p. 5.

7 Ibid., p. 5.

8 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 53.

9 Cristina Chuen, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism: Decreasing the Availability of HEU” found at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050506.htm.

10 Ibid., p. 1.

11 Ibid. , p. 9.

12 Ibid., p. 1.

13 Ibid., p. 8.

14 Ibid., p. 1.

15 Ibid., p. 6.

16 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 53.

17 Ibid.

18 Oran R. Young, “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 93.

19 Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal (Autumn 1990): 731 as cited in John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in Helen Milner and John Gerard Ruggie (eds.), Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 10.

20 Muthiah Alagappa, “Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs Vol 46 No 2 (Winter 1993) : 442.

21 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” in Krasner (ed.), Interna-tional Regimes, p.2.

22 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 244-45.

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23 See http://disarmament.un.org.8080/wmd/npt.

24 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 28.

25 See http://disarmament.un.org.8080/wmd/npt.

26 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 43.

27 Crail and McMonigle, “Stalemate in the Diplomatic Trenches”, p. 4.

28 Ibid., p. 5.

29 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 43.

30 A relatively comprehensive list of proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the NPT could be found in the Rapporteur’s Report on the Workshop on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty held in New York on October 30, 2004. The report is found at http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/workshop_041030.htm.

31 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 36.

32 Crail and McMonigle, “Stalemate in the Diplomatic Trenches,” p. 2.

33 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 36.

34 Ibid., p. 43.

35 Ibid., p 74.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., p. 75.

38 Crail and McMonigle, “Stalemate in the Diplomatic Trenches”, p. 7.

39 Desmond Ball, “A Critical Review of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Re-gion,” (Paper prepared for the inaugural conference of the Asia-Pacific Security Forum on The Impetus of Change in the Asia-Pacific Security Environment, Taipei, Taiwan, September 1-3, 1997, pp. 29.)

40 Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security,” in Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs (eds.), New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), p. 188.

41 Idem., Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific Way’?,” Pacific Review Vol 10 No 3 (1997), p. 329.

42 See “The ASEAN Arms Register: A Mechanism for Transparency”, Digest, August 1994, p. 2.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Simon SC Tay, Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: Principles and Possibilities (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 128.

46 Amitav Acharya, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Concept Paper”, (Paper prepared for the Workshop on Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Singapore, October 30-31, 1996), p. 5.

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While the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has confronted the global community for a long time, the challenge posed by this problem has in recent time times rightfully taken the

world’s attention once again. The issue of WMD proliferation has once more taken the limelight primarily because of the possibility of fissile materials being stolen and used for terrorist activities. Although previously considered remote, this scenario is now considered a possibility.

Walker correctly points out that “WMD … have not been regarded as weapons of choice for non-state actors, as they require a high level of technological expertise”, which was previously seen as available only to states.1 Developing a “nuclear weapon from plutonium requires the construction of an implosion-type device, which is more technically difficult”.2 But the US National Research Council has already warned in 2002, that crude nuclear weapons (gun-type weapons) using highly enriched uranium (HEU) “could be fabricated without state assistance” and “as little as 25kg [of HEU is] needed to produce a nuclear weapon.3 Thus, the widespread “distribution of and international commerce in HEU” even for peaceful purposes “poses serious risks in the age of global terror”.4

It therefore becomes clear that the only impediment preventing states or technically competent terrorist groups from having their own nuclear materials is the unavailability of fissile materials, particularly HEU. Thus, “securing and eliminating stocks of HEU is the surest way to decrease the risk that terrorist groups use this material to create a nuclear explosion”.5

Given this scenario, it is therefore expected that states in the global community will search for additional mechanisms to address the issue of proliferation of fissile and other materials related to weapons production whether nuclear, chemical or biological. Currently, the global non-proliferation regime is primarily anchored on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Concluded in 1968

The Proliferation Security Initiative: Searching for Mechanisms to Counter

Proliferation

This essay was presented at the 2nd Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction held in Manila on December 1-3, 2005. A more concise version is printed in Brad Glosserman (ed.), Fighting the Spread of WMD: Views from the Next Generation (Issues and Insights Volume 6 Number 4), (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum, January 2006), pp. 41-45.

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The Proliferation Security Initiative: Searching for Mechanisms to Counter Proliferation

and entered into force in 1970, the NPT was to be in force for 25 years although it was extended indefinitely in 1995. It has the objective of preventing “the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology”, promoting “cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and furthering “nuclear disarmament [as well as] general and complete disarmament”.6 Through the NPT, nuclear war was abhorred and the “universal validity of non-proliferation and disarmament policies” was adopted.7 A total of 188 states are party to the treaty including the five nuclear-weapon states (US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China) except Israel, India and Pakistan which remain as non-signatories. In spite of the criticisms regarding the inability of the NPT to prevent the proliferation of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, it has nonetheless served as the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Recently, there were efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the NPT.8 For example, previously inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors and verifies through so-called inspections whether states party to the NPT are complying with the treaty particularly with regard to safeguard mechanisms to prevent the “diversion of fissile materials for weapons use”9 were limited to facilities declared by a state. But with the NPT’s Additional Protocol, “inspections could be mounted ‘anytime, any place’, monitoring instruments could be installed outside declared facilities, states would have to provide the IAEA with design information before facilities were operated.”10

Also recently, the global community through the United Nations has also adopted UN Security Council 1540. This resolution is meant to strengthen “norms and principles that hinder the acquisition of WMD capabilities by non-state actors”.11 It “implicitly acknowledges the state as sole legitimate holder of WMD-related materiel – non-state actors have no such rights and must be actively denied access” while it “calls on and obligates all states to strengthen their internal instruments of constraint [pertaining to] export controls, physical control, measures against trafficking and legal penalties”.12 As a political instrument, the resolution is a proclamation by the UN Security Council for all states to support the norm of non-proliferation as it notes that the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.13

There are other global instruments and mechanisms that are meant to address, whether directly or indirectly, weapons proliferation. These include, for example, the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and Fissile Material Control Treaty, among others. But in spite of the presence of these mechanisms, the international community as well as states, whether unilaterally or in coalition with other states willing to join them, continue to develop other mechanisms which they

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see as useful instruments in addressing the issue of proliferation.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) put forward by the United States of America (USA) is one such example. First announced by US President George W. Bush in May 2003 in Poland, the PSI is considered as providing a multilateral framework for “prevent[ing] the transportation and export of materials related to WMD and missiles”.14 In the words of a US Defense Attache in Japan, the PSI “is an effort to enhance our ability to stop the illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors…”15

Subsequently in September 2003, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States adopted a Statement of Interdiction Principles.16 Four specific policies have been prescribed by this document. These are, according to Cotton, to wit:17

• Measures to interdict the transport or transfer of WMD and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern;

• Procedures for information exchange in such cases;• Commitments to strengthen applicable legal measures;• And undertakings by member states to board ships or require aircraft

in transit to land and have suspect cargoes searched and/or seized.

According to Cotton, it is important to realize that the PSI is “restricted in the following respects”, to wit:

• The ships or aircraft concerned must be within the territorial seas or airspace of member states or

• Be flagged or registered by a member state or• Be flagged or registered by a state willing to cooperate in a specific

case or on an ad hoc basis.

Some commentators see the PSI as something that is grounded on international legal instruments. For example, the US points out that the PSI is “a positive way to take …cooperative action” with respect to the UN Resolution 1540 which admonishes and makes it the responsibility of states to strengthen mechanisms to “prevent transfers of WMD-related items” to states and other entities.18 There is also the argument that it is anchored on the interdiction principles set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).

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The Proliferation Security Initiative: Searching for Mechanisms to Counter Proliferation

However, other analysts believe otherwise pointing to the inherent limitations of the PSI and sometimes apparent contradiction with existing legal norms and principles. Take for example the principle of “freedom of navigation of the high seas”. Except on issues pertaining to “pollution, fisheries and seabed resource extraction”, UNCLOS provides only three grounds where states could interfere with the right for flagged ships to navigate in the high seas, namely: (1) ships are suspected of being involved in piracy or slave trade, (2) vessels are in unlawful broadcasting, and (3) there is a need to determine the nationality of the ship. According to Cotton, there is “no general right to interfere with vessels suspected of carrying arms…”19 Thus, the idea of interdicting ships or vessels believed to be transporting WMD-related materials could become a contentious issue.

There is also the fundamental problem of non-members of regimes being not subject to the regime itself, a basic principle in international relations. For example, non-members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) when they export missiles to states that are also non-members to the MTCR do not violate any international agreement.20

A great number of states (around 60) have expressed support for the PSI.21 The Philippines has also expressed support for the initiative. In September 2005 at the United Nations Summit, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has endorsed the PSI and announced that the Philippines is positively supporting the initiative. The Aide Memoire which was prepared by the Philippine foreign affairs department publicly acknowledges Philippine support to the PSI. According to the document, the support of the Philippine government to the initiative “reflects the country’s willingness to cooperate in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials”. Thus, the country supports the Statement of Interdiction Principles “in consonance with generally accepted principles of international law and consistent with the Philippine Constitution and national laws”. The Philippines also gave the commitment to participate in future PSI-related activities but “within its capabilities and resources”. Through this document, the Philippine government has also made it clear that it “reserves the right to guarantee that the rights and welfare of Filipino nationals shall be respected on board vehicles, vessels and aircraft”. Considering that there is a great number of Filipinos working abroad in ships or aircrafts, this may be in apparent reference to Filipino nationals who may be physically present in ships suspected of transporting WMD-related materials.

At the moment, the Philippine government, through its foreign affairs and defense departments are further examining the PSI to flesh out the details of the Philippine participation in the initiative. According to the Center for

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International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute, the think tank arm of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, the department is still in the process of studying the initiative and hopes to formulate a more detailed Philippine position on the PSI, something which was subsequently confirmed by officials of the National Security Council during a roundtable discussion on Philippine Political and Security Situation. 22

The Armed Forces of the Philippines, for its part, has recently submitted to the Department of National Defense its own position on this matter. A look at the draft position paper of the AFP reveals that while the Philippine military is supportive of the PSI. It acknowledges that the Philippines “has a stake in preventing the spread of WMD” and sees the initiative as “one of the means through which [the Philippines] could express its support to the prevention of proliferation of WMD”.

The draft position paper enumerates certain advantages and disadvantages of Philippine participation in the PSI. The perceived advantages are:

• promotes international cooperation on interdicting transshipment of WMD-related materials;

• provides assistance from other countries’ armed forces for the development of the AFP’s own capability to respond to WMD threats;

• facilitates exchange of relevant information among participating countries and their respective armed forces;

• contributes to the prevention of the spread of WMDs to terrorist groups

What may be instructive is how the PSI is seen, based on the list of perceived advantages, as another opportunity for the Philippine armed forces to receive assistance from other countries for improving its own capability. Instead of what it could actually contribute to the PSI, what it could receive as assistance in terms of enhancing its capability, de facto becomes the primary consideration, some commentators observe. But given the sad and sorry state the Philippine military is in at the moment, the armed forces could not be totally blamed for putting emphasis on the assistance for improving its capabilities it could get by being involved in the PSI.

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The Proliferation Security Initiative: Searching for Mechanisms to Counter Proliferation

The identified disadvantages are:

• active participation in the PSI may result to severing of ties with and retaliation from countries suspected of producing and transferring WMDs;

• the weakness of the AFP may hamper it from effectively undertaking interdiction operations;

• the conduct of interdiction operations strains the already limited resources of the AFP and would consequently affect the other operations of the armed forces and its current priority which is to address internal threats to its security.

Indeed, the capability of the AFP to conduct interdiction operations would be a primary consideration if the Philippines were to be able to substantively participate in the PSI beyond the political declaration of support made by the Philippine president. Citing the results of the 2003 Philippine-US Joint Assessment, the AFP’s draft position report notes that the Philippine Air Force has “limited on-board avionics and sensors, [no] precision-guided munitions, limited number of platforms and low-mission capability”. Likewise, the Philippine Navy lacks ships for “open ocean operations” and has “limited surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities”. The current state of Air Force and Navy capabilities therefore limit their ability to conduct air and maritime patrols as well as air and maritime interdiction operations.

Declaring support and desire to participate is one thing; being able to actually take part in the operations related to the PSI is another thing. The Philippines, has in fact, been characterized as naturally supportive of various international and regional instruments but is found wanting in terms of being capable in fulfilling its commitments.

While states that have expressed support to the PSI, the Philippines included, are trying to determine and spell out their actual involvement in the initiative, questions pertaining whether the PSI is anchored on international law, norms and principles need to be addressed. These questions, if left unanswered, could make the PSI simply share the criticism of being ineffective, an indictment usually made against other existing mechanisms for addressing the challenge of WMD proliferation.

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NoTeS:

1 William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order (Adelphi Paper 370) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 53.

2 Cristina Chuen, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism: Decreasing the Availability of HEU” found at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050506.htm.

3 Ibid., p. 1.

4 Ibid., p. 9.

5 Ibid., p. 1.

6 See http://disarmament.un.org.8080/wmd/npt.

7 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 28.

8 A relatively comprehensive list of proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the NPT could be found in the Rapporteur’s Report on the Workshop on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty held in New York on October 30, 2004. The report is found at http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/workshop_041030.htm.

9 See http://disarmament.un.org.8080/wmd/npt.

10 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 36.

11 Ibid., p 74.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., p. 75.

14 Takehiko Yamamoto, “Growing Threats of WMD Proliferation in East Asia and Active Engage-ment of Japan in the Proliferation Security Initiative” (Paper presented at the 10th United Nations Symposium on Northeast Asia in Kanazawa held in Kanazawa City, Japan on June 7-9, 2004), p. 1.

15 David P. Rann, “Role of the US Military and Proliferation Security Initiative” (Paper presented at the 10th United Nations Symposium on Northeast Asia in Kanazawa held in Kanazawa City, Japan on June 7-9, 2004), p. 5.

16 See “The Proliferation Security Initiative” found at www.state/gov/t/np/ris/other/34726.thm.

17 James Cotton, “The PSI and Northeast Asia” (Paper presented at the 10th United Nations Sym-posium on Northeast Asia in Kanazawa held in Kanazawa City, Japan on June 7-9, 2004),

p. 2.

18 See “The Proliferation Security Initiative” found at www.state/gov/t/np/ris/other/34726.thm.

19 See Cotton, “The PSI and Northeast Asia”, p. 3.

20 Cotton, “The PSI and Northeast Asia”, p. 2.

21 The figure is found at www.proliferationsecurity.info.

22 This point was raised during the roundtable discussion on Philippine Political and Security Situation held at the National Security Council on December 1, 2005.

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A Regime on Non-Proliferation of WMD in the Asia-Pacific: Challenges & Prospects

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains one of the key challenges confronting states in the Asia-Pacific. WMD, particularly the proliferation of related materials and technology is no

longer simply a concern of the bigger powers. The issue has also become a concern for smaller states, the Philippines included, because fissile materials and the related technology could be made accessible to non-state groups, specifically terrorists. Once accessed and made available to such groups, these materials could be used to inflict harm and damage to citizens of any state. The increased possibility of access to WMD materials and technology by non-state actors has, therefore, made this issue a concern for big and small states alike.

To develop a nuclear weapon from plutonium requiring the “construction of an implosion-type device” as well as the relevant missile system for delivering the weapon to intended targets may be technically difficult and financially costly.1 These constraints previously made nuclear weapon development simply a business of states. The large-scale production of both biological and chemical weapons was also considered as being the sole business of states because of the resources required in developing these weapons.

However, creating crude nuclear explosives, small-scale biological and chemical weapons is more technically feasible and not as financially costly as previously thought, thereby making it possible for even non-state actors, which do not have the resources available to states, to produce such weapons; crude and small they may be but lethal nonetheless.

For countries like the Philippines which have domestic terrorist groups, specifically the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the possibility of these groups having access to related technology, producing such types of weapons and actually using them against the civilian public, could not be discounted.

Founded in 1991 by Ustadh Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a veteran of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, the ASG had an initial membership of 200. The group’s membership reached its peak in 2000 when its members totaled to about 1,270. Their number decreased to around 425 by the end of 2004 perhaps

Finding Synergy among Instruments: Thoughts on WMD Proliferation in the

Philippine Context

This essay was previously printed in Brad Glosserman (ed.), Strengthening the Global Non-Proliferation Regime: Views from the Next Generation (Issues and Insights Volume 6 Number 7), (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum, May 2006), pp. 41-44.

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Raymund Jose G. Quilop

because of continuous military operations against the group.2 Waging terrorist and criminal activities, ASG members attach the organization’s existence on the struggle for Muslim identity and self-determination.3 To show this, the ASG changed its name to Al-harakatul Islamiya (Islamic Movement) soon after the killing of its original leader, Janjalani and the taking over of his bother, Kaddhaffy Janjalani, in 1998.4

The ASG is composed of various factions which have become known for their ruthlessness in bombing public places and kidnap-for-ransom activities. For example, in 1993, the group killed seven people when it tossed grenades inside a Catholic Cathedral in Davao. In 1995, it invaded the Christian village of Ipil in Mindanao and left fifty-three people dead.5

A Philippine ship MV Our Lady of Mediatrix in Ozamis City and the Sasa Wharf passenger terminal in Davao City were blown off in February and April 2002, respectively. And in 2003, Superferry 14, a private inter-island passenger vessel was burned. Philippine authorities have tagged the ASG as the one behind these incidents although the group only claimed responsibility for the burning of the Superferry 14.6

The Abu Sayyaf is also believed to have maintained links with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is closely affiliated with the Al-Qaeda network and whose members have been reportedly operating in Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. JI members have allegedly been in the Philippines with estimates indicating that around 36 JI members, mostly Indonesians equipped with 27 assorted firearms, are in Philippine territory.7 Given the archipelagic nature of the Philippine territory, it relatively easy for JI members to enter the country through Mindanao, the so-called Southern backdoor of the Philippines.

In this context, it is important for the Philippines to cooperate with Malaysia and Indonesia. Towards this end, several mechanisms come to the fore. These are the border patrol agreements and an agreement on information exchange which the Philippines has concluded with its two Southern neighbors. The border patrol agreements provide for a system of control regarding the entry of vessels in the three states’ maritime borders and prevent their border areas from being used for smuggling, piracy and other criminal activities. With the border patrol agreements providing the legal parameters, the navies of the three states are able to conduct joint patrols along their borders.

The “Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures” signed in 2002 for its part provides the framework for cooperation as regards information exchange among the three parties. It also provides for the establishment of communication procedures between them specifically in relation to terrorism and related transnational crimes to include money laundering, smuggling, piracy/robbery at sea, hijacking, illegal entry, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in arms.8

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A Regime on Non-Proliferation of WMD in the Asia-Pacific: Challenges & Prospects

Forms of cooperation that could be carried out through this agreement include the following, to wit:

1. facilitating proper coordination and collaboration during border and/or security incident, transnational crimes and other illegal activities where individual resources of a party may be inadequate;

2. establishing common understanding and approaches in managing the multiple and complex issues arising from transnational crimes;

3. strengthening national and sub-regional capacities to manage border and/or security incidents and transnational crimes through information exchanges, agreed communication procedures and training;

4. reviewing and enhancing internal rules and regulations, both legal and administrative, to ensure proper, effective, and timely collaboration and response to border and/or security incidents and in times of operational constraints in the implementation of defense, border and security arrangements;

5. providing opportunities for the Parties’ duly authorized representatives to establish linkages to facilitate cooperation;

6. facilitating dialogue among the Parties on criminal and crime-related activities committed within their respective territories which may adversely affect the interest of any or all of the other Parties; and

7. establishing mechanisms for immediate response and assistance among the Parties.

These agreements could therefore be used by the three states to prevent the proliferation of WMD related technology and materials across their borders and within their territories. Through the border patrol agreements, the navies of the three states could jointly ensure that WMD materials are prevented from entering their respective borders. By providing a legal basis for conducting joint border patrol, these agreements could serve as important instruments in curbing illicit activities along the Philippine-Malaysia-Indonesia maritime border including the transfer of WMD related materials along these areas. According to Philippine Navy authorities, naval patrols jointly conducted with Malaysian and Indonesian navies have apprehended smugglers and other criminals. What remains to be seen is whether similar patrols in the future would be able to interdict WMD-related materials if these materials were to be shipped along the borders of the three neighboring countries.

The agreement on information exchange allows the three states to share intelligence and other relevant information regarding WMD materials being produced in their territories and technology being shared by terrorists operating within their territories as well as necessary intelligence information

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Raymund Jose G. Quilop

regarding the possible transfer of materials and technology across the borders of the three neighbors. However, similar to the border patrol agreements, it remains to be seen whether the sharing of intelligence information facilitated by the agreement on information exchange would actually be translated into actual apprehension or interdiction of WMD materials if terrorist groups would attempt to move these materials from the territory of either of the three states to the other two countries in Southeast Asia.

Given these considerations, what needs to be done is for these agreements to be linked to other mechanisms in order that the problem of proliferation of WMD-related materials and technology is addressed. An example could be how to search for ways to tie these agreements with the Proliferation Security Initiative, which provides a multilateral framework for “prevent[ing] the transportation and export of materials related to WMD and missiles”.9

Indeed, states across the region to include these three Southeast Asian neighbors may have adopted various instruments for addressing the problems posed by terrorists. But there remains one key challenge: how to find the synergy among all these instruments so that they could effectively enable states to prevent WMD, the attendant delivery systems and related materials and technology in being illicitly transferred from states to non-state actors or from non-state groups to fellow non-state actors particularly terrorist groups.

NoTeS:

1 Cristina Chuen, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism: Decreasing the Availability of HEU” found at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050506.htm.

2 The figures are culled from Carolina G. Hernandez, “Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the Philippines” (Background Paper submitted to the Human Develop-ment Network Foundation Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005), p. 26.

3 Richard W. Baker and Charles E. Morrison (eds.), Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2000 (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 130.

4 Time Magazine, May 8, 2000, p. 17.

5 Ibid.

6 Reynaldo P. Lopez, “Multinational Cooperation Against Security Threats: A Philippine Perspec-tive” (Paper delivered at the 8th Asia-Pacific Naval College Seminar on 08-16 February 2005 at the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College in Tokyo, Japan), p. 2.

7 Ibid., p. 3.

8 See Raymund Jose G. Quilop, “Defending Homeland: Prospects and Challenges for the Philip-pines” (Paper presented at the 8th Kanazawa Symposium on Northeast Asia on “Security Outlook in Northeast Asia and New Agenda for the Kanazawa Process” held in Kanazawa City, Japan on June 4 to 6, 2002), p 9.

9 Takehiko Yamamoto, “Growing Threats of WMD Proliferation in East Asia and Active Engage-ment of Japan in the Proliferation Security Initiative” (Paper presented at the 10th United Nations Symposium on Northeast Asia in Kanazawa held in Kanazawa City, Japan on June 7-9, 2004), p. 1.

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Nuclear Black Markets: A Challenge to the Non-Proliferation Regime

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Nuclear Black Markets:A Challenge to the

Non-Proliferation Regime

This essay is based on a paper presented at the 18th United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues on the theme “Alarming Nuclear Proliferation Crisis and Regional and International Peace and Security” held in Yokohama, Japan on August 21-24, 2006.

Introduction

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) refer to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The term “weapon of mass destruction” was adopted in 1948 when the UN Commission for Conventional

Armaments “had to decide which weapons” were to be included and excluded from its purview, with the term being used simply to refer to “that set of weapons that would not be called conventional”. The term WMD was subsequently dropped from common usage primarily because nuclear weapons “rapidly attained a political and strategic significance that towered that of the other weapons” including chemical and biological weapons. In the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, the three weapons were once again reconnected and today the term WMD is used as a “single undifferentiated category”1. In broad terms, WMD is “any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; radiation or radioactivity”.2 For this essay, however, the discussion of WMD and its proliferation is limited to nuclear weapons. Thus, the terms WMD and nuclear weapons could at times be used interchangeably with WMD pertaining to nuclear weapons alone and vice-versa.

The use of nuclear energy opens up the possibility for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power plants use fuel rods which contain uranium. At the end of the process, these rods end up with highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. The plutonium from the fuel rods can be extracted and reprocessed so as to be used again as fuel either in its pure form or in a form mixed with uranium (mixed oxide form). More critically, the plutonium extracted from the fuel rods as well as HEU could be used for producing nuclear weapons.

The greater the capacity of a country to utilize nuclear energy, the greater are its chances of becoming a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), particularly if it has

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32

developed the capability to reprocess its plutonium stockpiles. It has actually been acknowledged that “the acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities constitutes a ‘loophole’ in the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] as it provides states with the ability to produce nuclear weapons in a short period of time after the decision to do so is taken”.3

Increases in plutonium stockpiles, therefore, cause anxiety as regards their future uses. Today, the increase in the supply of plutonium results not only from an increase in the number of nuclear energy users but also from the partial dismantling of the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United States.4

In addition, there are anxieties as to the possibility of these fissile materials being stolen and used for terrorist activities.5 Previously, such possibility was considered remote. But more recently, this scenario has been taken seriously for it is possible for non-state actors particularly terrorist groups to have access to fissile materials and develop nuclear weapons; crude they may be but lethal nonetheless. As Walker puts it, “WMD … have not been regarded as weapons of choice for non-state actors, as they require a high level of technological expertise”, which was previously seen as available only to states.6 Developing a “nuclear weapon from plutonium requires the construction of an implosion-type device, which is more technically difficult”.7 However, as the US National Research Council warned in 2002, crude nuclear weapons (gun-type weapons) using highly enriched uranium “could be fabricated without state assistance” and “as little as 25kg [of HEU is] needed to produce a nuclear weapon”.8 Thus, the widespread “distribution of and international commerce in HEU” even for peaceful purposes “poses serious risks in the age of global terror”.9

In this regard, it becomes clear that the only impediment preventing states or technically competent terrorist groups from having their own nuclear materials is the unavailability of fissile materials, particularly HEU. thus “securing and eliminating stocks of HEU is the surest way to decrease the risk that terrorist groups use this material to create a nuclear explosion”.10

Considering therefore that HEU could be the preferred choice of terrorists, it is important that everything should be done to “secure, consolidate, reduce and ultimately eliminate this material” as soon as possible.11

It is alarming to note, however, that estimates indicate that around 1,900 tons of HEU, spread over hundreds of sites, are available in global stockpiles as of the end of 2003 and they continue to grow each year.12 Worse, it appears that states may not be willing to give up their stocks of HEU, arguing that “it is necessary for scientific work or, as is more typically the case, because of a political view that holding on to HEU is in some way prestigious”.13

WMD was also previously considered as not a choice for non-state actors because their use could “cause a level of damage that might seriously endanger

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33

support for whichever group attempted to use them. In the late 1990s, however, a debate emerged over the possibility that terrorist groups might shed this restraint and perpetrate acts of ‘catastrophic terrorism’ using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons”.14

In fact, there are reports alleging that the Al Qaeda group has been searching for nuclear weapons since the 1990s with its leader Osama bin Laden reportedly believing that it is his “religious duty” to possess them.15 Another group called the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan has reportedly tried but failed to purchase nuclear weapons from Russia, apparently has its own WMD program and has millions of dollars for it. In 1995, the group released sarin gas in a Tokyo subway.16

The attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in 1992 and the release of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway in 1995 are but a few of the examples that indicate “an increasing willingness among some terrorist groups to cause mass casualties in service of political, ideological or religious ends”.17

Black Market Trading and WMDs*

What compounds the problem of nuclear proliferation today is the recent disclosure that WMD-related materials and technology are being traded in what are considered as international black markets or the place “where products are bought and sold illegally”.18 This makes it relatively easy for international terrorists to have access to these materials and technology.

The admission in 2004 of Abdul Qadeer Khan of having transferred nuclear technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea provided the impetus for the unraveling of a secret network of illegal traders of nuclear technology. His operation included the sale of designs for making nuclear materials and finished parts of nuclear weapons as well as provision of a “sophisticated transportation system to move the goods from the supplier to the buyer”.19

His blackmarket network apparently involves a Dubai-based company (SMB Computers) owned by a certain BSA Tahir who serves as a middleman in transporting materials to Libya, Iran and North Korea.20 Upon receipt of materials from Malaysia, Tahir transfers them to a German ship which transports them to Libya via Italy.21

Consequently the US, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other stakeholders started investigating deeply the involvement of individuals, companies and states as well as the technology involved. Unfortunately, this clandestine network involves a big number of sellers, middlemen and manufacturers making it difficult to dismantle the said network.22

* The author acknowledges the research assistance of Ms. Marie May Serrano and Athanasia Zoe Gonzales in gathering data for this essay’s section on black market trading and WMDs.

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What is disturbing is that Khan is a private individual who acquired his expertise on nuclear weapons production while working for a Dutch company (Physics Dynamic Research Laboratory) in the 1970s. The company incidentally worked for a group called Urenco interested in uranium development and formed by the British, Dutch and German governments. Bringing with him upon his return to Pakistan a design for making centrifuge, “a metal tube which spins uranium haxaflouride gas in order to separate out the uranium 235 which is needed to make a nuclear reaction”, he put up his AQ Khan Research Laboratories which developed Pakistan’s nuclear bomb and subsequently serviced other countries.23

Libya’s Muanmar Gadafy has been reportedly importing “complete sets of enrichment centrifuges on the international black market as the central element in his secret nuclear bomb programme”, a UN investigating team reported in 2004. Later on, around 1,000 centrifuges, believed to have been made in Malaysia and on board a German ship headed for Libya was intercepted by Italian authorities.24 Malaysia denied allegations that it has factories involved in producing WMD-related materials and supplying them at the international black market while Khadaffy eventually gave up Libya’s nuclear program.

Khan’s transactions with Iran are seen to be less complicated as it involves acquisition of surplus equipment such as centrifuges “contaminated with enriched uranium.” Iran claims it has not reprocessed the uranium after it got it by accidentally purchasing the centrifuge from Khan.25 Likewise, North Korea is believed to have transacted with Khan. While North Korea has denied having a clandestine uranium enrichment program, states around the region think North Korea does have such a program which could pose risk to the region. There is a possibility that North Korea will sell the weapon it could develop from such program to terrorist groups.26

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s government claims it is not involved in Khan’s activities. Others, however, are skeptical about it pointing to the fact that a military-run government would be expected to be closely monitoring activities of private individuals particularly those that involve sensitive issues such as nuclear material and technology.

Pakistan, however, is not the only potential source of WMD-related materials and technology in the blackmarket. There could be other sources as well. These include Russia and Ukraine “where nuclear materials could be stolen”.27 It is believed that numerous nuclear materials found in the former Soviet Union could be sold to other states or terrorist groups by some quarters in the area.28 In addition, India has “insufficient security for its nuclear program” while there is the possibility of China and North Korea selling nuclear materials.29

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Responding to the Challenge of Nuclear Proliferation

Unlike other issue areas where there lack institutions either in the form of organizations or regimes to address them, the issue of WMD non-proliferation is something, which has the necessary institutions particularly at the global level and to a certain extent at the regional level as well for addressing it.

The non-proliferation regime is underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) providing the organizational infrastructure for ensuring that nuclear weapons and technology do not proliferate. The challenge therefore as regards non-proliferation is not the absence of institutions that are meant to address it but rather making these institutions work more effectively.

Concluded in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, the NPT was to be in force for 25 years although it was extended indefinitely in 1995. It has the objective of preventing “the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology”, promoting “cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and furthering “nuclear disarmament [as well as] general and complete disarmament”.30 Through the NPT, nuclear war was abhorred and the “universal validity of non-proliferation and disarmament policies” was adopted.31 A total of 188 states are party to the treaty including the five nuclear weapon states (US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China) except Israel, India and Pakistan which remain as non-signatories. The IAEA, for its part, monitors and verifies through so-called inspections whether states party to the NPT are complying with the treaty particularly with regard to safeguard mechanisms to prevent the “diversion of fissile materials for weapons use”.32

But the NPT, just like any other international instrument, suffers from a fundamental constraint – that states being sovereign ultimately have the final decision whether or not to become party to it as well as whether or not to comply with its provisions and principles. As Walker aptly puts it, a “proliferating state [could] stay outside the NPT to avoid safeguards and purchase whole facilities (reactors, reprocessing and/or enrichment plants) on the pretext that they were needed for civil purposes”.33 A state that is a party to the NPT could also withdraw from the NPT for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, such as the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This has subsequently raised the issue of how to prevent states “from withdrawing for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons”.34 This has prompted several states particularly France and the United Kingdom to propose that “a withdrawing state [should] remain responsible for previous violations committed while [being] under the NPT, and upon abrogating [it], cannot benefit from nuclear technology assistance and must freeze, dismantle, and return received nuclear materials”.35

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It is also impossible for the IAEA to be able to monitor everything that needed to be monitored, particularly if states themselves deliberately undertake measures for their activities to go undetected. For example, “a state could [actually] purchase the required components and sub-systems through a disguised network of suppliers located in various countries and assemble them into complete facilities”.36 Before the IAEA and the international community, a nuclear weapons facility has already been established.

Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the NPT have recently been drawn and additional proposals towards this end continue to be formulated.37 For example, previously the IAEA inspections were limited to “facilities declared by the state” but with the Additional Protocol, “inspections could be mounted ‘anytime, any place’, monitoring instruments could be installed outside declared facilities, states would have to provide the IAEA with design information before facilities were operated.”38 The additional protocol is therefore seen as an important measure in enhancing the IAEA’s ability to provide verification by giving it greater access to a state’s nuclear infrastructure.39

Furthermore, “the Agency could in [the] future draw upon intelligence information provided by member-states”.40 Collaboration between the IAEA as a verification body and the intelligence services of states would become increasingly important if timely detection of proliferation-related activities were to be achieved.41 The question, however, is how willing and how far states would allow their intelligence agencies to cooperate with an international body like the IAEA.

The United Nations (UN) also provides additional institutional infrastructure concerning non-proliferation. Three of its six principal organs deal the issue of WMD proliferation. These are the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

The strength of the General Assembly lies on the fact that it “brings together delegates from all member states to discuss and make recommendations on a wide range of issues pertaining to the mandate of the United Nations” with the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security being the most relevant as regards the issue of non-proliferation. Yet, its weakness results from the fact that its resolutions are voluntary in nature.42

In contrast, the Security Council directly mandated to undertake actions to preserve global peace and security, has the power to “call upon states to apply economic sanctions and other non-proliferation measures or take military action against an aggressor in either a reactive or a preventive manner”.43 Once Chapter VII of the UN Charter is invoked, its resolutions become mandatory for the members of the UN.44 As regards the non-proliferation agenda, it has recently adopted Resolution 1540, which has been seen as primarily meant

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to strengthen “norms and principles that hinder the acquisition of WMD capabilities by non-state actors”.45

This resolution “implicitly acknowledges the state as sole legitimate holder of WMD-related material – non-state actors have no such rights and must be actively denied access” while it “calls on and obligates all states to strengthen their internal instruments of constraint [pertaining to] export controls, physical control, measures against trafficking and legal penalties”.46

As a political instrument, the resolution is a proclamation by the UN Security Council for all states to support the norm of non-proliferation as it notes that the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.47

The Secretariat for its part finds strength in the fact that it has an established body, the Department for Disarmament Affairs with two branches dealing directly with conventional arms and WMD, respectively.48

There are other global instruments and mechanisms that are meant to address, whether directly or indirectly, weapons proliferation. These include, for example, the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and Fissile Material Control Treaty, among others.

There are also various initiatives by individual states that aim to contribute to the non-proliferation agenda, the most recent of which is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of the US. First announced by US President George W. Bush in May 2003 in Poland, the PSI is considered as providing a multilateral framework for “prevent[ing] the transportation and export of materials related to WMD and missiles”.49 In the words of a US Defense Attache in Japan, the PSI “is an effort to enhance our ability to stop the illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors…”50 Subsequently in September 2003, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States adopted a Statement of Interdiction Principles.51

Some commentators see the PSI as something that is grounded on international legal instruments. For example, the US points out that the PSI is “a positive way to take …cooperative action” with respect to the UN Resolution 1540 which admonishes and makes it the responsibility of states to strengthen mechanisms to “prevent transfers of WMD-related items” to states and other entities.52 There is also the argument that it is anchored on the interdiction principles set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).

However, other analysts believe otherwise pointing to the inherent limitations of the PSI and sometimes apparent contradiction with existing legal

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norms and principles. Take for example the principle of “freedom of navigation of the high seas”. Except on issues pertaining to “pollution, fisheries and seabed resource extraction”, UNCLOS provides only three grounds where states could interfere with the right for flagged ships to navigate in the high seas, namely: (1) ships are suspected of being involved in piracy or slave trade, (2) vessels are in unlawful broadcasting, and (3) there is a need to determine the nationality of the ship. According to Cotton, there is “no general right to interfere with vessels suspected of carrying arms…”53 Thus, the idea of interdicting ships or vessels believed to be transporting WMD-related materials could become a contentious issue.

The debate whether or not the PSI is grounded on international law remains. Nonetheless, some analysts believe that this issue should not be used to prevent the PSI from being used by states as mechanism to counter the proliferation of WMD-related materials. Some commentators note how some states, probably referring to North Korea, could profess support for countering proliferation and yet are unsupportive of the PSI considering that the initiative is meant to be a counter-proliferation measure.54 Yet, as a practical measure, proponents of the PSI may point to how the initiative has resulted in the “centrifuge components on the BBC China” being captured and has contributed in the embargo of weapons of mass destruction.55

There is also the fundamental problem of non-members of regimes being not subject to the regime itself, a basic principle in international relations. For example, non-members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) when they export missiles to states that are also non-members to the MTCR do not violate any international agreement.56

Addressing the Challenge of Nuclear Black Market Trading

enhancing Coordination among Institutions

As noted in the preceding discussion, there abound various international and regional institutions which promote non-proliferation. Yet, “the influence and effectiveness of [these bodies] depend on their ability to interact with other stakeholders and on their success in building a normative framework that guides behavior”.57 It is important that they share information and coordinate with each other if they were to be effective in curbing the illicit trading and transfer of nuclear related materials and technology.

Enhancing coordination among various bodies concerned with non-proliferation in general and in countering the illicit trade of WMD-related materials in particular highlights the need to find nexus between the United Nations and various regional bodies that share a similar agenda. Each of them has the potential, although they are also faced with certain constraints, of

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promoting non-proliferation of WMD in general and the illicit trade of related materials and technology in particular.58

In spite of the presence of a global body dealing with the issue of non-proliferation, regional institutions that share the similar agendum or bodies that could include in their mandates the prevention of proliferation of WMD are important. The United Nations itself through Chapter VIII of its Charter has recognized the important role regional institutions play in maintaining peace and stability.59 Regional institutions are also in a better position to promote non-proliferation because they are more familiar with the “specific political, strategic and normative conditions” of their respective regions.60 Thus, they may be in a position to know better what may or may not work in their particular regions.

enhancing export Controls

Another mechanism that could contribute in preventing the illicit trade of WMD-related materials and technology is the enhancement of export controls. Export controls pertains to the...

...web of international treaties, national laws and national regulations that monitor and restrict the traffic not only in dangerous weapons and WMD-related materials, but also in the host of ‘dual-use’ components, materials, and technologies that have legitimate non-military uses but could also be used to build WMD or delivery systems.61

Enhancing export controls is important as trends indicate that “transnational criminal organizations … are becoming increasingly sophisticated in exploiting the global networks of information, finance and transportation.”62

Enhancing export controls would necessitate closer coordination among states considering that “the production of … dual-use items is no longer confined to the boundaries of a few states”.63 With the design of these products coming from one state, the parts from another state and the production taking place somewhere else, it becomes doubly difficult to monitor them.

In addition, a great number of weapons-related material and technology that are currently “subject to export control emerge from the civilian sector rather than from government-funded military research” making traders, specifically those new to the field, unaware that these products could not just be easily exported like ordinary consumer goods.64

There is, however, the opinion that what is needed is a treaty-based institution which would ensure the implementation of “nuclear-related export control laws and criminalization procedures”.65 Being based on a treaty which gives it more binding powers over signatories, this agency could

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undertake “aggressive, intrusive verification and investigation that can provide greater confidence that states are implementing effective export controls, flag deficiencies in the export control practices, and detect illicit nuclear and nuclear-related procurements”.66

The enhancement of export controls is therefore a crucial area which needs to be further examined. The newly formed International Exports Control Association through the initiative of the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security has specifically stated that its mission is to “serve as a network for parties worldwide that are committed to strengthening the international non-proliferation through controls on exports of arms and dual-use technology.”67

Developing early Warning Systems

Developing an early warning system of sort as regards the illicit trading of WMD-related materials and technology is also useful. Such a system actually impacts on how coordination among various bodies trying to address the non-proliferation issue could be enhanced. It also contributes towards the enhancement of export controls system.

In developing an early warning system and making that system work, various players perform important roles. These include citizens, experts, states and their governments, and other regional institutions.

Individual citizens of states could serve as useful sources of information regarding the situation on the ground. The value of human-based information should not be overlooked. If citizens are provided with appropriate means of communicating with their governments, information coming from them could prove useful for their governments and even for regional institutions. For example, it was a Filipino fisherman who reported to the Philippine Navy the presence of Chinese-constructed structures in Mischief Reef in 1995. Thus, given the appropriate training from their governments, ordinary citizens could serve as effective eyes and ears for their governments.

The value of human sources of information is also highlighted by the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001. As the attacks showed, technical sophistication in gathering information, which the US apparently has an edge, is not sufficient. In fact, some commentators think that the decreasing reliance of the US government on its network of human informants deprived it from being early warned of the terrorist attacks. Human sources of information, therefore, remain to be important.

Experts on security issues abound in the region. These experts have specialized in examining these issues and are thus valuable sources of information that could enable states and regional bodies to identify areas where the illicit trading of WMD-related materials and technology is being or could

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be concluded or undertaken. Experts could also help identify materials and technology which have the potential of being diverted into WMD production. Their expertise therefore needs to be harnessed, primarily by institutionalizing their links with their governments.

Individual states also play an important role in the development of an early warning system. States have the capacity to gather, process and analyze information, although the capacity of some states to do so, may be limited. In this context, an information system within a state plays an important role. The establishment of an information system, however, necessitates both the availability of the technical infrastructure as well as the enhancement of a state’s manpower to operationally manage and control the infrastructure. Along with the establishment of an information system, therefore, is the preparation and training of the workforce to handle the facility.

Furthermore, there is also a need to have the information systems of states, particularly in the Asia-Pacific linked and interconnected with each other to maximize the potential benefits of a country’s information system. Information sharing is important in curbing the illicit trade and transfer of WMD-related materials and technology. This is because knowledge and understanding how equipment are bought and sold in the black market is crucial in identifying flaws of existing non-proliferation efforts as well as existing safeguards and export controls.68

Political leaders also play an important role in the development of a regional early warning system. They themselves could identify areas where the illicit trading of WMD-related materials and technology takes place or could take place and thus undertake measures to address the issue. Thus, the establishment of hotlines among the region’s top political leaders, which could allow them to communicate with each other, is an indispensable tool in the development of an early warning system.

Finally, the role of regional bodies particularly in the development of an early warning system should not be overlooked. The creation of an Asian Regional Risk Reduction Center (RRRC) could therefore play a pivotal role. As previously pointed out, preventing the illicit trade of WMD-related materials and technology requires close monitoring. Relatedly, the availability of special representatives could also be useful. The availability of a register of experts whose skills and expertise can be tapped could facilitate the appointment of SRs when there is a need to do so. The people included in the register of experts could also provide advice to their respective states, conduct fact-finding missions and identify which materials and technology, which are initially meant for civilian and peaceful uses, have potential of being diverted into WMD production.

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Conclusion

At the global level, the issue of WMD proliferation is an area where the necessary institutional infrastructure for addressing it, is available what with the NPT and the IAEA being two of the many institutions that are meant to ensure that nuclear weapons and technology do not proliferate. And more recently, the adoption of the UN Security Council 1540, which has been seen as primarily meant to strengthen “norms and principles that hinder the acquisition of WMD capabilities by non-state actors”, is another initiative for the non-proliferation agenda of the global community. Within the United Nations itself, three of its principal organs directly deal with WMD issues. These are the General Assembly, the UN Security Council and the Secretariat. Initiatives by some states, such as the PSI, are also present.

However, the complexity of WMD proliferation, which is made more complicated by the presence of a clandestine network of black market traders that allow states as well as other groups to have access to WMD materials and technology, means more needs to be done. As take off points, there is a need to enhance the coordinative capacity of international and regional bodies, enhance export controls, and develop an early warning system. Hopefully, these measures would allow for a more effective management of WMD proliferation as well as handling of black market trading of related materials and technology.

NoTeS:

1 William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order (Adelphi Paper 370) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 23.

2 See http://www.cfr.org/publication/7751/.

3 Peter Crail and James McMonigle, “Stalemate in the Diplomatic Trenches: An Overview of the Diverging Positions at the 2005 NPT Review Conference” found at http://cns.miis.edu, p. 3.

4 Brad Roberts and Zachary Davis, “Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: A Survey of Proposals” in Ralph A. Cossa (ed.), Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-proliferation: Exploring the Possibilities (Hawaii: Pacific Forum CSIS [1996] ), p. 5.

5 Ibid. 6 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 53. 7 Cristina Chuen, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism: Decreasing the Availability of HEU”

found at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050506.htm. 8 Ibid., p. 1. 9 Ibid. , p. 9.

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10 Ibid., p. 1. 11 Ibid., p. 8. 12 Ibid., p. 1. 13 Ibid., p. 6. 14 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 53.

15 See Charles Ferguson, “On the loose: The market for nuclear weapons,” Harvard International Review (Winter 2006), pp. 52-57.

16 See ibid. 17 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 53.

18 See http://www.investorwords.com/485/Black_Market.html

19 See http://www.cfr.org/publication/7751/

20 See http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2004/me_wmd_02_12.htm 21 See http://www.cfr.org/publication/7751/

22 See http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html

23 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/americas/3481499.stm

24 See http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1059676/posts and http://www.cfr.org/publication/7751/

25 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3481499.stm

26 See Ferguson, pp. 52-57.

27 See http://www.cfr.org/publication/7751/

28 See ibid.

29 See ibid.

30 See http://disarmament.un.org.8080/wmd/npt.

31 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 28.

32 See http://disarmament.un.org.8080/wmd/npt.

33 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 43.

34 Crail and McMonigle, “Stalemate in the Diplomatic Trenches”, p. 4. 35 Ibid., p. 5.

36 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 43.

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37 A relatively comprehensive list of proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the NPT could be found in the Rapporteur’s Report on the Workshop on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty held in New York on October 30, 2004. The report is found at http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/workshop_041030.htm.

38 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 36.

39 Crail and McMonigle, “Stalemate in the Diplomatic Trenches,” p. 2.

40 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 36. 41 Ibid., p. 43. 42 Louise Agersnap, Nonproliferation and the Coordination of International Efforts (Athens, Georgia:

Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia, 2004),., p. 3. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid.

45 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p 74. 46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 75. 48 Agersnap, Non Proliferation and the Coordination of International Efforts, p. 4. 49 Takehiko Yamamoto, “Growing Threats of WMD Proliferation in East Asia and Active

Engagement of Japan in the Proliferation Security Initiative” (Paper presented at the 10th United Nations Symposium on Northeast Asia in Kanazawa held in Kanazawa City, Japan on June 7-9, 2004), p. 1.

50 David P. Rann, “Role of the US Military and Proliferation Security Initiative” (Paper presented

at the 10th United Nations Symposium on Northeast Asia in Kanazawa held in Kanazawa City, Japan on June 7-9, 2004), p. 5.

51 See “The Proliferation Security Initiative” found at www.state/gov/t/np/ris/other/34726.thm. 52 See ibid. 53 See James Cotton, “The PSI and Northeast Asia” (Paper presented at the 10th United Nations

Symposium on Northeast Asia in Kanazawa held in Kanazawa City, Japan on June 7-9, 2004), p. 3.

54 This was raised by some participants of the meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation

in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction held in Manila on December 2-3, 2005.

55 See http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html. 56 Cotton, “The PSI and Northeast Asia”, p. 2. 57 Agersnap, Nonproliferation and the Coordination of International Efforts, p. 2.

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58 For a more detailed discussion of the potential and limitations of these bodies, see ibid., pp. 3-5. 59 Simon SC Tay, Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: Principles and Possibilities

(Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 128. 60 Amitav Acharya, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Concept Paper,” (Paper prepared for the Workshop

on Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Singapore, October 30-31, 1996), p. 5

61 Seema Gahlaut, Michael Beck, Scott Jones and Dan Joyner, Roadmap to Reform: Creating a New

Multilateral Export Control Regime (Athens, Georgia: Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia, 2004), p. 5.

62 Ibid., p. 7. 63 Ibid., p. 8.

64 Ibid., p. 9. 65 See http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html 66 Ibid. 67 See the Charter of the International Export Controls Association found at www.uga.edu/cits. 68 See http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html.

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Raymund Jose G. Quilop is an assistant professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines, a senior researcher/analyst of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (OSS, AFP) and a fellow of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), Inc.

He lectures in various Philippine Government institutions namely the Department of Foreign Affairs’ Foreign Service Institute, National Defense College of the Philippines, AFP’s Joint Command and Staff College (AFPCGSC) previously the AFP’s Staff College (JSC), Philippine Army’s Command and General Staff College, Philippine Air Force’s Air Staff College and Air Power Institute, and Philippine Navy’s Naval Education and Training Command.

Areas of his interest include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional security, preventive diplomacy, Philippine relations with the US and China, disarmament issues, democracy and the process of democratization, civil-military relations in the Philippines, and the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines. He regularly participates in international and local conferences where he presents papers on these topics. He has also published articles in both foreign and local publications pertaining to these issues.

He serves as an associate editor of the Philippine Political Science Journal, an internationally refereed journal published by the Philippine Political Science Association and editor-in-chief of OSS’ quarterly journal, the OSS Digest.

He holds a Master’s Degree in Political Science from the University of the Philippines – Diliman where he also finished his Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science (Summa cum Laude and Class Valedictorian) in 1995.

THE AUTHOR