woods - schizophrenics, cyborgs and the pitfalls of posthumanism

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In "Schizophrenics, Cyborgs and the Pitfalls of Posthumanism," Angela Woods invites us to revisit two canonical analyses of the postmodern: Fredric Jameson's "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" and Donna Haraway's "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s." Jameson and Haraway introduced to contemporary cultural criticism two posthumanist icons: the schizophrenic, a pathologized victim of postmodernity, and the cyborg, a vision of strategic posthuman subjectivity. In her timely and critical analysis of these articles, Woods challenges the established notion of an oppositional relationship between the schizophrenic and the cyborg. She turns to the "schizo-cyborgs" of cultural theory, psychiatry and psychoanalysis as evidence of the intimacy between the schizophrenic and the cyborg, an intimacy which deeply problematizes the uncritical celebration of Utopian cyborg subjectivity and raises significant questions about the capacity of either figure to account for posthuman embodiment.

Schizophrenics, Cyborgs and the Pitfalls of Posthumanism

Angela Woods

<1> The subject -- its construction and deconstruction, its importance to a radical politics, and its fate in postmodernity -- is an ongoing, central focus of contemporary critical theory. Unable to withstand the stringent critiques of feminist and postcolonial theorists, the universal subject of liberal humanism has, along with its Cartesian metaphysics, been catapulted into crisis. Postmodernity is now widely credited with imploding, or at least destabilizing, the binary oppositions that underpinned the intelligibility, autonomy and integrity of this so-called "master subject of modernism" [1]. Distinctions between culture and nature, cerebral and corporeal, human and machine, masculine and feminine, and reason and unreason are no longer perceived to provide an unproblematic foundation for identity or emancipatory politics. The mid 1980s saw the publication of two canonical Marxist/Socialist analyses of the postmodern which continue to influence debates about new forms of subjectivity peculiar to the late twentieth century. In "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" [2], Fredric Jameson deployed the term 'schizophrenia" to describe specific experiences of time and language in the postmodern dissolution of subjectivity. Donna Haraway, in "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s" [3], reconfigured the radically fragmented subject as a cyborg or cybernetic organism, a futuristic vision of posthuman hybridity. Since their debut in the Anglo-American academy, the schizophrenic has functioned to pathologize the decentred subject and the cyborg to denote a new strategic subjectivity, but should we be satisfied that these roles are as stable and as oppositional as they first appear? More importantly, should we be satisfied that these templates for contemporary subjectivity mark a significant departure from the conceptual framework of liberal humanism, and offer insight into the embodied experience of postmodernity?

<2> Twenty years later, there are compelling reasons for revisiting Jameson and Haraway's articles. Foremost among these is simply that despite being widely anthologized, Jameson and Haraway have not been construed as interlocutors, and their well-circulated concepts of the schizophrenic and the cyborg are seldom, if ever, critically compared. Considering the political

affinities and structural similarities of their projects, this is somewhat surprising. Writing at the height of the Cold War and the dawn of the digital revolution [4], Jameson and Haraway both provide compelling arguments for approaching postmodernity as an economically and technologically distinct historical period. Furthermore, for each theorist, coding or mapping the information age of multinational capitalism effectively requires an interdisciplinary approach [5] and a renewed commitment to analysing postmodernity as a dominant, global phenomenon. Reconceptualizing subjectivity is central to both their navigational projects, but from the outset it should be clear that while Jameson confines himself to diagnosing the "decentred subject" as the schizophrenic casualty of postmodernity, Haraway's aim is to sketch an ironic Utopian vision of a new late twentieth-century subject.

<3> This article confronts the conceptual boundary separating the schizophrenic and cyborg by first analysing the way in which "Cultural Logic" and "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" describe, situate and code these figures as responses to a perceived crisis of humanist subjectivity. Few critics have paused to examine the complexity of these subjective maps, and fewer still their interrelationship. Here, I offer a critical comparison of the schizophrenic and the cyborg and a critique of the widespread framing of these exemplary postmodern subjects as polar opposites. If taken at face value, the schizophrenic and the cyborg appear diametrically opposed, so much so as to signal a new constellation of binary oppositions: fragmentation and synthesis; isolation and collectivity; disembodied (non)subject and cybernetic organism; political dysfunctionality and oppositional agency. However, by pressing beyond Jameson and Haraway's claims and examining other theoretical fusions of the schizophrenic and cyborg, I will argue that the intimacy of their relationship complicates such neat binary coding. If schizophrenia can be seen as a distinctively cyborgian fear of subjective fragmentation, and the cyborg a schizophrenic delusion of unity, is any simple delineation between them possible? In collapsing the boundaries that have rendered lived experience intelligible, both these offspring of late capitalism risk becoming universal categories that cannot account for material differences of any kind. My suggestion, ultimately, is that the schizophrenic and cyborg are significant to critical theorists today not as models for postmodern or posthumanist subjectivity -- one symptomatic and the other strategic. Rather, as I will demonstrate, instead of resolving the question of how we might most usefully conceive of postmodern subjectivity, they serve as strategic reminders that questions of collectivity, communication, and embodiment are fundamental to its ongoing analysis.

<4> Fredric Jameson has been hailed as "America's leading Marxist critic and as theorist supreme of the postmodern" [6]. "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," his major statement on the postmodern [7], is said to be the most quoted and discussed article of the 1980s [8]. For Jameson, postmodernism signals, above all, a loss of depth. The waning of affect, the eclipse of parody by pastiche, the loss of the historical referent, the flattening of space into surfaces, the abandonment of theoretical depth models, and the schizophrenic aesthetic are all symptomatic of "a new kind of superficiality" that Jameson argues is the 'supreme formal feature" of the postmodern [9]. Only when postmodernism is interpreted as an integrated expression of historically specific economic conditions can the logic of this aesthetic inventory be "properly" gauged: it must be understood, according to Jameson, as "the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world" [10]. Jameson defends [11] his reading of postmodernism as cultural hegemony as a

strategic one, arguing that we must approach it as "a new systemic cultural norm…in order to reflect more adequately on the most effective forms of any radical politics today" [12]. His commitment to totalizing analysis derives from a classical Marxism "decidedly unpopular with the contemporary left" [13] because it ignores gender, race, and ethnicity -- in short, heterogeneity and hierarchy. Indeed, although Jameson later concedes that postmodernism serves the interests of a white, male-dominated elite, he all but dismisses what he calls non-class micropolitics as a "profoundly postmodern phenomenon" [14]. Marxism is Jameson's privileged hermeneutic by virtue of its breadth and its resolute exteriority to postmodernism.

<5> Jameson identifies the decentred subject as the causal link between late capitalism and the postmodern aesthetic. Despite being initially suspicious of the all-too fashionable "death" of the subject [15], Jameson's entire thesis depends upon the assumption that the subject is no longer bounded, centred or possessed of psychic depth. Exactly which economic, technological or political manifestations of late capitalism are implicated in the postmodern shift from an alienated to a fragmented subject remains unclear [16], but through it, time, language and subjectivity are thrown into crisis. Jameson's sudden introduction of the term schizophrenia to explain these interrelated crises is therefore potentially misleading, as it creates the impression that schizophrenia is just a new symptom of the postmodern, as many critics have concluded. As discussed below, recasting the decentred subject as schizophrenic enables Jameson to explore specific aspects of the postmodern dissolution of self, but the reconfiguration also serves a doubly strategic function. Firstly, it detracts attention from the fact that for Jameson, the schizophrenic, as the decentred subject, precipitates postmodernism's major aesthetic trends. Secondly, despite Jameson's explicit disavowal of any association with the morbid psychiatric reality of schizophrenia, and his assurances that he is not offering a "culture-and-personality diagnosis" of contemporary society [17], the substitution of schizophrenic for decentred subject functions precisely as a diagnosis, if not a pathologization, of the postmodern self. As several theorists have noted, it would be disingenuous indeed to imagine that the term floats free of any clinical connotations of psychic suffering as well as dysfunction [18].

<6> Postmodern schizophrenia is not to be confused, however, with the high-modernist experiences of "radical isolation and solitude, anomie, private revolt [and] Van Gogh-type madness" [19], as the decentred subject can no longer project the drama of inner feeling [20]. For Jameson (loosely following Lacan) subjectivity is a function of language, where identity is created and sustained through the temporal organization of linguistic signifiers. Schizophrenia is the disintegration of this "objective mirage of signification," such that "when the links of that signifying chain snap, then we have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of distinct and unrelated signifiers" [21]. Again, Jameson seems typically disinterested in causally linking this 'snap" to a specific aspect of late capitalism, focussing instead on its consequences. "If we are unable to unify the past, present and future of the sentence," Jameson argues, "then we are similarly unable to unify the past, present and future of our own biographical experience or psychic life" [22]. Identity and intentionality are thus abolished in the schizophrenic surrender to the mysterious affective charge and dazzling materiality of the isolated signifier [23]; "action, project, and orientation collapse in the literal, nauseous, and real present" [24]

<7> Jacqueline Rose asks an extremely pertinent question of Jameson's totalizing account of postmodern schizophrenic subjectivity:

What dramatization, sanitization, and desexualization follow from this general inflation of psychic economies across the whole of social space? Dramatization because it becomes precisely the drama of all modern subjects; sanitization since, despite the idea of a crisis, the model seems to become strangely divested of some of the most difficult aspects of the psychic itself; desexualization perhaps most oddly of all…because of the glaring omission of any question of sexual difference… [25]

Anthony Elliott goes on to suggest that the question of sexual difference is simply displaced onto the all-purpose category of fragmentation [26]. Most troubling, I would argue, is the schizophrenic transcendence or erasure of the body and its social inscriptions. Despite these serious shortcomings, which I discuss in more detail later, the idea of a symbiotic relationship between schizophrenia and postmodernism has strong support in contemporary literary and cultural theory [27], and some even suggest the connection is more than allegorical [28]. While Jameson's is by no means the first or the most psychologically sophisticated analysis of postmodernism and schizophrenia [29], his boundary-dwelling schizophrenic is a vivid symbol of the perceived loss of subjective depth in postmodernity. Stranded in the perpetual present with no border between the self and the stimuli of the external world [30], the schizophrenic is incapable of achieving critical distance, representing the "technological sublime," and cognitive mapping -- projects of subjective orientation that Jameson argues are essential if we are to navigate the unrepresentable totality of capital [31]. In summary, schizophrenia is for Jameson "a challenge to overcome and surmount" [32].

<8> The move from the schizophrenic disintegration of subjective boundaries to a cyborg identity "predicated on transgressed boundaries" [33] brings us to the work of Donna Haraway. Haraway is without doubt the most important theorist of "cyborgology," an interdisciplinary critical field that is as much an "academic attitude" [34] as a fertile territory where science, feminism, and cultural studies converge. For Haraway, the cyborg is an ontological solution to an epistemological problem: a new mode of postmodern being and a strategic intervention in 1980s feminism. Haraway's founding premise is that "There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds women. There is not even such a state as "being" female, itself a highly complex category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices" [35]. By claiming to speak for all women, socialist, radical, liberal and ecofeminists effect, in Haraway's view, an "unintended erasure of polyvocal, unassimilable, radical difference" [36]. Victimhood, innocence, pre-Oedipal desire, and pseudo-divine feminine intuition are, she argues, neither grounds for insight, nor suitable bases for a responsible feminist politics [37]. For Haraway, postmodernity's new biotechnologies, proliferating communication systems, and exploitative "homework economy" are key markers of the transition from older hierarchical social structures into 'scary new networks" she terms the "informatics of domination" [38]. The challenge for feminists is to map the informatics of domination without recourse to metanarratives, 'salvation history" or the phallogocentric master code [39]. Rejecting the essential innocence of unity, origin and nature, Haraway calls for a politics that would "embrace partial, contradictory, permanently unclosed constructions of personal and collective selves and still be faithful, effective -- and, ironically, socialist feminist" [40].

<9> The cyborg myth attempts to reconcile these contradictory political imperatives. Heralded as "the postmodern icon" [41], the cyborg is every inch a late twentieth century being born from the breakdown of three key boundaries -- those separating human from animal, organism from machine, and physical from non-physical [42]. Haraway's cyborg is a synthetic figure and a figure of synthesis, a cybernetic organism that incorporates the "other" into the "human" and captures the tensions between them. Neither bounded nor autonomous, it is a function of multiple, intersecting communication networks. Consequently, Haraway pays little attention to psychic interiority in her account of cyborg identity, instead privileging bodies, texts, and labor as its key construction sites. "A cyborg body," she insists, "is not innocent; it was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity" [43]. With "an intimate experience of boundaries, their construction and deconstruction" [44], and a penchant for fusing, coupling and (re)assembling parts, the cyborg is both a material being in constant flux, and a framework through which to imagine new collaborative and collective identities.

<10> Unlike Jameson, who situates himself outside postmodernism in order to diagnose its symptoms, Haraway foregrounds her own situatedness, writing from "the belly of the monster" [45] with a sense of urgency, frustration and excitement befitting a manifesto. Haraway's passionate investment in the cyborg does not, however, make it an unproblematic ontological model. As Rosemary Hennessy points out, Haraway does not escape feminist standpoint theory's difficulty in adequately explaining the relationship between the discursive (the cyborg as a new feminist mode of subjectivity) and the presumably non-discursive (the changing material reality of women's lives) [46]. While explicitly rejecting totalizing theory [47], Haraway's postmodern manifesto paradoxically constructs cyborg identity as a global phenomenon that is the only viable mode of subjectivity in postmodernity. Her famous parting shot, "I"d rather be a cyborg than a goddess" [48], has therefore attracted responses both petulant ("Why not explore the potential of cybergoddesses?" [49]) pertinent ("Is it better to be a cyborg than a woman?" [50]) and political ("If I"m a cyborg rather than a goddess will patriarchy go away?" [51]). Haraway's subsequent description of her 1985 cyborg as "a girl who's trying not to become Woman, but remain responsible to women of many colors and positions" [52] encapsulates the feminist impulse of the manifesto, but is incommensurable with her claim that she sought to dismiss "the fetishized perfect subject of oppositional history" [53] in favor of a frequently ambiguous and permanently incomplete cyborg. How the cyborg can sustain such openness and an allegiance to socialist feminism is a central, unresolved problem.

<11> What makes Haraway's cyborg so attractive to its supporters is that it participates in "a decentring of traditional subjectivity" while offering "a physical and bodily experience of…strategic subjectivities" [54]. She insists upon a subject who can be 'something other than a shroud for the day after the apocalypse" [55]. But while cyborg subjectivity-as-collage is distinctly un-funereal, is it necessarily revolutionary? Can we, with Chela Sandoval, confidently claim that it offers hope to "Jameson's lost subject"? [56] The cyborg certainly appears more savvy than the schizophrenic, but Haraway's unmistakable Utopianism does not in itself ensure its political efficacy. The cyborg's extreme dependence on and proximity to postmodern communication networks renders it particularly susceptible to information overload, and even subjective disintegration [57]. When the "privileged pathology" of postmodernity is communications breakdown [58], how can we differentiate cyborg heteroglossia from the schizophrenic's "rubble of distinct and

unrelated signifiers"? Cyborg integrity and oppositionality, which I am suggesting is as much about resisting schizophrenic disintegration as it is about outmanoeuvring the goddess, hinges upon a strategic commitment Haraway promises but cannot guarantee.

<12> Since their Anglo-American debut in the mid 1980s, the schizophrenic and the cyborg have been frequently interpreted as victim and visionary of the postmodern. So well entrenched are the perceived distinctions between them, it is tempting to suggest that Haraway and Jameson's border-subjects paradoxically offer us a new binary opposition with which to map contemporary subjectivity. However, like most boundaries in postmodern theory, this one is certainly permeable, contested and unstable. To explore in more depth the intersections (and indeed, intimacy) between the schizophrenic and the cyborg, I turn first to the 'schizo-cyborgs" of two post-Marxist texts -- Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's Anti-Oedipus [59] and Jean Baudrillard's The Ecstasy of Communication [60] -- and then to the cyborgian dimensions of schizophrenic delusions, as articulated within psychiatric and psychoanalytic discourse.

<13> For Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenia is a process of ego-loss; a de-Oedipalization of the subject reconceptualized as an endlessly reassembling desiring-machine. This schizophrenic process is emancipatory [61], for Deleuze and Guattari, because it liberates desire that is presumed to be subversive, revolutionary and true to itself [62]; and dismantles the insidious fiction of autonomous, bounded selfhood. Jameson's schizophrenic owes much to Deleuze and Guattari's schizo, but his stated affiliation with their project [63] is fraught, not least because

Deleuze and Guattari's whole view of history as an essentially aleatory, contingent, and heterogeneous series of intensive states experienced by partial, nomadic subjects secreted by schizophrenic desiring-production would seem to be completely incommensurable with Jameson's own conception of a single great adventure of class struggle [64].

Rather than interpret schizophrenia as a primarily linguistic or psychic phenomenon, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the materiality of fragmentation. Like Haraway, they valorize the cyborgian coupling, networking and fusion of human/nonhuman parts, but explicitly reject the idea of their integrated assembly. The notion of a single cybernetic organism is rejected in favor of a body-without-organs, "an imageless, organless body [which is] perpetually reinserted into the process of production" [65]. Here, Anti-Oedipus, I would argue, loosely equates the schizophrenic dissolution of subjectivity with the production of interminably dis/assembling cyborgs: both 'schizo" and cyborg are effective insofar as they remain partial and deterritorialized.

<14> Jean Baudrillard offers a very different, and markedly more frightening, view of the cyborgian schizophrenic as a "pure screen," an "immanent surface" across which communication networks simply flicker [66]. Like Jameson's schizophrenic, Baudrillard's schizo-cyborg is primarily described in terms of communicative dysfunction. Bereft of psychic depth and flattened into two dimensions, any distinction between interior and exterior is abolished, and along with it any notion of corporeality. This schizophrenic-as-terminal effectively signals a termination of political subjectivity. Interpenetrated by the communication apparatuses of a technologically manipulated world, Baudrillard's schizophrenic is characterized by a terrifying overexposure to

the hyperreal [67]. This is schizophrenia as cyborg reification, where the self, or any meaningful approximation of it, is utterly subsumed by the vast digital networks of late capitalism. More disturbing than the idea of an automaton invaded and controlled by technology, here the schizo-cyborg is simply its empty reflection.

<15> Schizo-cyborgs are not creatures confined to Marxist and post-Marxist imaginaries, but have long circulated in the annals of psychiatric and psychoanalytic accounts of psychosis. Experiencing the self as a machine, in whole or in part, or as cybernetically connected to external technological devices, is well documented as a staple schizophrenic delusion. Emil Kraepelin, the first psychiatrist to identify dementia praecox (schizophrenia) as a disease entity, remarked on the prevalence of delusions of technological persecution and bodily mutation [68]; Carl Jung analysed the role "the telephone" played in commenting on his schizophrenic patient's other delusions [69]; in 1919, Victor Tausk published his seminal analysis of the "influencing machine" in schizophrenia [70]; and today's diagnostic manuals still single out the reassembly of body organs as a typically "bizarre" delusion [71]. The delusional reconfiguration of bodies or body parts as independently mechanical and externally operated can be seen as a means of symbolically arresting the fragmentation or dissolution of self; as the schizophrenic stabilization of a perceived lack of autonomy and boundedness. As Avital Ronell suggests, "the schizophrenic gives us exemplary access to the fundamental shifts in affectivity and corporeal organization produced and commanded by technology, in part because the schizophrenic inhabits these other territorialities…" [72] While the schizophrenic only technically becomes cyborg, according to cyborgologists, when delusions are treated psychopharmacologically [73], from within the depth of a delusion acutely registered on the body, the schizophrenic can articulate what it feels like to be a cyborg, to be "produced" if not "commanded by technology." The schizo-cyborg can suggest possibilities for the romantic revisioning of subjectivity (Deleuze and Guattari) as well as its expiration (Baudrillard), but by raising the question of the delusion (as in "real-life" schizophrenia) it forces us to rethink the dualisms of mind/body and real/unreal in accounts of schizophrenic and cyborg subjectivity.

<16> As I hope to have demonstrated, the appearance of multiple schizo-cyborgs suggests a theoretical intimacy between the schizophrenic and cyborg, rendering them a potentially dysfunctional or ineffectual binary opposition. Nothing beyond an imputed oppositionality guarantees that the cyborg will successfully negotiate the multiple networks of the information age, as schizophrenia's communicative breakdown -- isolation in a chaos of disassociated signifiers -- haunts Haraway's cyborg as its "privileged pathology." Equally, the integrity and agency of the cyborg body could be a delusion of Jameson's depthless and disoriented schizophrenic. Such confusions arise because Jameson and Haraway relocate the decentred subject in an unmapped territory, an area beyond the boundaries of gender, race, sexuality, class and even psychic structure; a conceptual space only tenuously, if at all, connected to the changed material and economic reality of postmodernity. The possibility -- or desirability -- of resurrecting liberal humanism or identity politics in order to map this space is rejected by both Jameson and Haraway; unlike some cyberfeminists, they refuse to valorize "the local" as the only contemporary guarantor of self-hood [74]. So the central question raised, and still unresolved, by the schizophrenic and cyborg is: how can we imagine posthumanist subjects capable of sustaining connection across time and in space? Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Grosz [75] and N Katherine Hayles

[76], I argue that the schizophrenic and cyborg call attention to the importance of the body, or more specifically, embodiment, as a precondition of orientation and participation in the communication networks of late capitalism.

<17> Despite acknowledging that culture today is "dominated by space and spatial logic" [77], Jameson portrays the fragmentation of subjectivity exclusively as a crisis of the temporal organization of language. For all his discussion of the quantifiable material markers of this new epoch, the arguably most basic material reference point -- the body -- is absent. As exemplary postmodern subject, the schizophrenic does not dismantle the Cartesian divide between mind and body that characterized its liberal humanist predecessor; on the contrary, it would appear that schizophrenia exacerbates the split, throwing the mind into crisis and signalling the disappearance of the body altogether. Although for Jameson it is class consciousness, rather than corporeality, which is essential to the cognitive mapping of the postmodern, he claims that postmodern hyperspace 'stands as something like an imperative to grow new organs, to expand our sensorium and our body to some new, as yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately impossible, dimensions" [78]. As "current fantasies about the salvational nature of high technology…entertained…by many intellectuals…are essentially of a piece with more vulgar apologies for postmodernism" [79], Jameson clearly refuses the proposition that cyborg modification would ensure effective corporeal reconfiguration. Constrained by a view of the body as "merely physical," Jameson refers only to its role in navigating physical space, overlooking its importance to subjective orientation in history and cultural space. As it is the disembodied schizophrenic who, for Jameson, is a symbol of temporal, linguistic and subjective disintegration, he seems implicitly to suggest that the successful negotiation of postmodernism requires a reconceptualization of embodiment.

<18> In seeking to move beyond a feminist valorization of nature or the female body as grounds for insight or resistance, Haraway locates cyborg corporeality at the intersection of fiction and reality. What is troubling about Haraway's account of the cyborg body is its singularity: disrupting the organic wholeness of "traditional bodies," it risks reinscribing their very real differences as an unending and unrepresentable proliferation of difference, or subsuming them within a new Platonic ideal. Promising an ironic ontology liberated from the hierarchical taxonomies of gender and race, the cyborg simultaneously threatens to liberate us from the materiality of embodiment, to become, as Haraway herself acknowledges, "the awful apocalyptic telosof the "West's" escalating dominations of abstract individuation" [80]. For Hayles, construing the cyborg body as an effect of communication networks continues, rather than disrupts, the liberal humanist erasure of embodiment [81]; privileging a normative ideal of "the body" which ignores its specific and messy instantiation. Grosz further argues that neutralizing or neutering the specificity of the body reinstates an entire matrix of binary oppositions in which women are assigned an inferior place [82]. The urgent task for feminists, she contends, is to provide an account of "embodied subjectivity" which "refuses reductionism, resists dualism, and remains suspicious of the holism and unity implied by monism," as there is "no one mode that is capable of representing the "human" in all its richness and variability" [83].

<19> In surrendering to the proliferation of difference (represented as linguistic chaos, or the endless refiguring of the cyborg body) both schizophrenic and cyborg effectively erase difference, becoming metaphors for

a universal subjectivity. As maps of the postmodern, singular icons for radical heterogeneity, neither the schizophrenic nor the cyborg can begin to account for a variety of lived experience in postmodernity, let alone the inequitable distribution of power and resources among global citizens. "Cultural Logic" and "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" are principally concerned with the subjective navigation of the postmodern, but as the schizophrenic and cyborg are both abstracted from the cultural specificity of embodiment upon which orientation depends, neither feminist coding nor cognitive mapping is logically possible, for successful cartography is surely a prerogative of political, geographical and ideological location. Embodiment is, as Grosz and Hayles make clear, essential to the remapping of subjectivity beyond the paradigm of liberal humanism, to the configuration of subjects in an epoch said to have imploded binary oppositions, but unable to abolish the material effects of their operation. It would therefore be a mistake to see Haraway's cyborg exclusively as a postmodern success story, because to be faithful to socialist feminism (and impervious to technofascism [84]) the cyborg must constantly return to material realities shaped by class and gender, to the very bodily boundaries it is deemed to have transgressed. Similarly, by "inflating" and "dramatising," to use Rose's terms, the collapse of a particular kind subject as a crisis ofall subjects, Jameson begs the question of whether those who were historically subordinated within the philosophical framework of liberal humanism on the basis of their bodies also have a schizophrenic experience of postmodernity [85]. Although the cyborg seems to foreclose the possibility of an appeal to different physical realities, in fact it joins Jameson's schizophrenic in implicitly calling attention to the importance of the body -- or rather, bodies -- in accounts of contemporary subjectivity. What both the schizophrenic and the cyborg do within the broader context of Jameson and Haraway's analyses is signal the urgent need for subjects to map and code postmodernity not from a disembodied vantage point, but from a corporeally-informed perspective, one which would see embodiment as a precondition of viable communication and collectivity.

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Jung, Carl. The Psychology of Dementia Praecox. Trans. A A Brill. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1944.

Kellner, Douglas. "Introduction: Jameson, Marxism, and Postmodernism." Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique. Ed. Douglas Kellner. Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989.

Kirby, Kathleen M. "Re: Mapping subjectivity: Cartographic Vision and the Limits of Politics." Bodyspace: Destabilizing Geographies of Gender and Sexuality. Ed. Nancy Duncan. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. Kirkup, Gill. "Introduction." The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader. Ed. Gill Kirkup, et al. London: Routledge, 2000.

Klein, Renate. "The Politics of Cyberfeminism: If I"m a Cyborg rather than a Goddess will Patriarchy go away?" CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and Creativity. Eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein. Melbourne: Spinifex, 1999.

Kovel, Joel. "Schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society." Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression. Ed. David Michael Levin. New York and London: New York University Press, 1987.

Kraepelin, Emil. Clinical Psychiatry. 1907. Trans. A R Diefendorf. Vol. 7. New York: Scholars" Facsimiles & Reprints, 1981.

Levin, David Michael, ed. Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression. New York and London: New York University Press, 1987.

Lykke, Nina. "Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist Confrontations with Science." The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader. Ed. Gill Kirkup, et al. London: Routledge, 2000.

O"Neill, John. "Religion and Postmodernism: The Durkheimian Bond in Bell and Jameson." Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique. Ed. Douglas Kellner. Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989.

Penley, Constance, and Andrew Ross. "Cyborgs at Large: Interview with Donna Haraway." Technoculture. Eds. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.

Pfeil, Fred. "'Makin' Flippy-Floppy': Postmodernism and the Baby-Boom PMC." Another Tale to Tell: Politics and Narrative in Postmodern Culture. London and New York: Verso, 1990.

Ritzer, George. Postmodern Social Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997.

Roberts, Adam. Frederic Jameson. London: Routledge, 2000.

Ronell, Avital. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.

Rose, Jacqueline. "'The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat' or 'A Wife is Like an Umbrella' -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern." Universal Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism. Ed. Andrew Ross. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. Sandoval, Chela. "New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the Oppressed." Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace. Ed. Jenny Wolmark. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999.

Sass, Louis A. "The Consciousness Machine: Self and Subjectivity in Schizophrenia and Modern Culture." The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-understanding. Eds. Ulric Neisser and David A Jopling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

---. Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Sofoulis, Zoë. "Cyberquake: Haraway's Manifesto." Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History. Eds. Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson and Alessio Carallaro. Sydney: Power Publications, 2002.

Stephanson, Anders. "Regarding Postmodernism -- A Conversation with Fredric Jameson." Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism. Ed. Andrew Ross. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.

Tausk, Victor. "On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in Schizophrenia (1919)." The Psycho-Analytic Reader: An Anthology of Essential Papers with

Critical Introductions. Ed. Robert Fliess. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Pyscho-Analysis, 1950. 31 - 64.

Wolmark, Jenny. "Introduction and Overview." Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace. Ed. Jenny Wolmark. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999.

Woods, Angela. "Subjectivity 'in crisis': Masculinity and Schizophrenia in David Fincher's Fight Club." antiTHESIS 13 (2002): 76-95.

Notes

[1] Fredric Jameson, quoted in Anders Stephanson, "Regarding Postmodernism - A Conversation with Fredric Jameson," Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 21. [^]

[2] Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," New Left Review 146 July/August (1984). [^]

[3] Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," Socialist Review 80 March/April (1985). [^]

[4] It is not unfitting that "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" was the first piece Haraway wrote on a computer. Donna Haraway, How Like a Leaf: an interview with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve (New York: Routledge, 2000) 39. [^]

[5] For an extensive discussion of the far-reaching interdisciplinary influence of "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," see Zoë Sofoulis, "Cyberquake: Haraway's Manifesto," Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History, eds. Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson and Alessio Carallaro (Sydney: Power Publications, 2002). [^]

[6] Michael Hardt and Kathi Weeks, eds., The Jameson Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) 1-2. [^]

[7] The article is an extended version of Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (Port Townsend: Bay Press, 1983). It is also reproduced as the first chapter of Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991). [^]

[8] Douglas Kellner, "Introduction: Jameson, Marxism, and Postmodernism," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner (Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 2. [^]

[9] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 60. [^]


[11] Challenges to Jameson's totalizing analysis have come even from those most sympathetic to his account of postmodernism. See Fred Pfeil, "'Makin' Flippy-Floppy': Postmodernism and the Baby-Boom PMC," Another Tale to Tell: Politics and Narrative in Postmodern Culture (London and New York: Verso, 1990). [^]


[13] Hans Bertens, "Fredric Jameson: Fear and loathing in Los Angeles," The Idea of the Postmodern: A History (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) 165. See also Steven and Douglas Kellner Best, "Marxism, Feminism, and Political Postmodernism," Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York: Guilford, 1991) 188. [^]

[14] Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 318-9. [^]


[16] In an earlier essay, Jameson is equally vague on this point: "The immense culture of the simulacrum whose experience, whether we like it or not, constitutes a whole series of daily ecstasies and punctual fits of jouissance or schizophrenic dissolutions…may appropriately, one would think, be interpreted as so many unconscious points of contact with that equally unfigurable and unimaginable thing, the multinational apparatus, the great suprapersonal system of late capitalist technology." Fredric Jameson, "Pleasure: a Political Issue (1983)," The Ideologies of Theory, Essays 1971 - 1986, Volume 2: The Syntax of History (London: Routledge, 1988) 73. [^]


[18] Anthony Elliott, Subject to Ourselves: Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and Postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) 35. See also James M Glass, "Postmodernism and the Multiplicity of Self," Shattered Selves: Multiple Personality in a Postmodern World (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993) 7. [^]






[24] John O"Neill, "Religion and Postmodernism: The Durkheimian Bond in Bell and Jameson," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner (Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 148. [^]

[25] Jacqueline Rose, ""The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat" or "A Wife is Like an Umbrella" -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern," Universal Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 241. [^]

[26] Anthony Elliott, "The Dislocating World of Postmodernism," Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) 161. [^]

[27] See David Michael Levin, ed., Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression (New York and London: New York University Press, 1987);John Johnston, "Ideology, Representation, Schizophrenia: Toward a Theory of the Postmodern Subject," After the Future: Postmodern Times and Places, ed. Gary Shapiro (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis and the Self (London: Macmillan, 1991);Mark Currie, "Culture and Schizophrenia," Postmodern Narrative Theory (London: Macmillan, 1998). [^]

[28] Joel Kovel, 'schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society," Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression, ed. David Michael Levin (New York and London: New York University Press, 1987) 334;Louis A Sass, "The Consciousness Machine: Self and Subjectivity in Schizophrenia and Modern Culture," The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-understanding, eds. Ulric Neisser and David A Jopling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 217. [^]

[29] Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus was well known to Jameson, and his relatively brief account of schizophrenia in no way rivals the complexity of Sass" work. See Louis A Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature and Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992). [^]

[30] Klaus R. Scherpe, "Dramatization and De-dramatization of 'the End': The Apocalyptic Consciousness of Modernity and Post-Modernity," trans. Brent O. Peterson, Cultural Critique 5 (1986): 102. [^]

[31] We are using unfashionable here in the sense used by Geoffrey Bennington in Interrupting Derrida (New York: Routledge, 2000), 129-a sense to do with the hope of academic discourse that it will be able "to set the tone again."

[32] Bennington, 133. [^]

[33] See our "extroduction" to Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus, eds, Discipline and Practice: The (Ir)Resistibility of Theory (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press; forthcoming), and also our "What's Wrong with Posthumanism?" in Rhizomes 7 (2003). Available online: http://www.rhizomes.net/issue7/callus.htm [^]

[34] Bennington, 130. [^]

[35] See Jean-François Lyotard, "Unbeknownst," in Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges van der Abbeele (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 185-97. [^]





[24] John O"Neill, "Religion and Postmodernism: The Durkheimian Bond in Bell and Jameson," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner (Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 148. [^]

[25] Jacqueline Rose, ""The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat" or "A Wife is Like an Umbrella" -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern," Universal Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 241. [^]

[26] Anthony Elliott, "The Dislocating World of Postmodernism," Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) 161. [^]

[27] See David Michael Levin, ed., Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression (New York and London: New York University Press, 1987);John Johnston, "Ideology, Representation, Schizophrenia: Toward a Theory of the Postmodern Subject," After the Future: Postmodern Times and Places, ed. Gary Shapiro (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis and the Self (London: Macmillan, 1991);Mark Currie, "Culture and Schizophrenia," Postmodern Narrative Theory (London: Macmillan, 1998). [^]

[28] Joel Kovel, 'schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society," Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression, ed. David Michael Levin (New York and London: New York University Press, 1987) 334;Louis A Sass, "The Consciousness Machine: Self and Subjectivity in Schizophrenia and Modern Culture," The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-understanding, eds. Ulric Neisser and David A Jopling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 217. [^]

[29] Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus was well known to Jameson, and his relatively brief account of schizophrenia in no way rivals the complexity of Sass" work. See Louis A Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature and Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992). [^]

[30] Adam Roberts, Frederic Jameson (London: Routledge, 2000) 123-4. Kathleen Kirby argues persuasively that as the postmodern subject has "lost its

traditional from of enclosed interiority encapsulated in a boundary," schizophrenia can be interpreted as much as a dysfunction of spatial as temporal existence. Kathleen M Kirby, "Re: Mapping subjectivity: Cartographic Vision and the Limits of Politics," Bodyspace: Destabilizing Geographies of Gender and Sexuality, ed. Nancy Duncan (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 51. [^]

[31] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 77-91.See also Fredric Jameson, "Cognitive Mapping," Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988) 347-57. [^]

[32] Kellner, "Introduction: Jameson, Marxism, and Postmodernism," 29. [^]

[33] Anne Balsamo, "Reading Cyborgs Writing Feminism," The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. Gill Kirkup, et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 155. [^]

[34] Chris Hables Gray, Steven Mentor and Heidi J Figueroa-Sarriera, "Cyborgology: Constructing the Knowledge of Cybernetic Organisms," The Cyborg Handbook, ed. Chris Hables Gray (New York: Routledge, 1995) 7-8. See also Jenny Wolmark, "Introduction and Overview," Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace, ed. Jenny Wolmark (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 3-4. [^]

[35] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 72. [^]


[37] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 75,96,101. [^]




[41] Balsamo, "Reading Cyborgs Writing Feminism," 149. Emphasis in the original. [^]

[42] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 68-71. [^]



[45] Donna Haraway quoted in Constance Penley, and Andrew Ross, "Cyborgs at Large: Interview with Donna Haraway," Technoculture, eds. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 6. Haraway's critique of viewpoints that "deny stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective [in order to] make it possible to see well" is elucidated in Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Association Books, 1991) 191. [^]

[46] Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) 67-9, 71-3. [^]



[49] Nina Lykke, "Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist Confrontations with Science," The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. Gill Kirkup, et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 85. [^]

[50] Gill Kirkup, "Introduction," The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. Gill Kirkup, et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 5. [^]

[51] Renate Klein, "The Politics of Cyberfeminism: If I'm a Cyborg rather than a Goddess will Patriarchy go away?," CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and Creativity, eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein (Melbourne: Spinifex, 1999). [^]

[52] Haraway, quoted in Penley, "Cyborgs at Large," 20. [^]

[53] Donna Haraway, "The actors are Cyborg, Nature is Coyote, and the Geography is Elsewhere: Postscript to 'Cyborgs at Large,'" Technoculture, eds. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 22. [^]

[54] Chris Hables Gray, and Steven Mentor, "The Cyborg Body Politic and the New World Order," Prosthetic Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies, eds. Gabriel Brahm Jr and Mark Driscoll (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995) 228-9. [^]


[56] Chela Sandoval, "New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the Oppressed," Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace, ed. Jenny Wolmark (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 249. [^]

[57] Wendy Brown, "Feminist Hesitations, Postmodern Exposures," Prosthetic Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies, eds. Gabriel Brahm Jr and Mark Driscoll (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995) 115. [^]


[59] Gilles and Félix Guattari Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. R Hurley, M Seem and H R Lane (New York: Viking Press, 1982). [^]

[60] Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, trans. Bernard and Caroline Shutze, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e) Columbia University, 1988). [^]

[61] George Ritzer, Postmodern Social Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997) 125-7. [^]

[62] Elliott, "The Dislocating World of Postmodernism," 148. [^]

[63] Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London: Methuen, 1981) 22. [^]

[64] Sean Homer, Fredric Jameson: Marxism, Hermeneutics, Postmodernism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) 79. [^]

[65] Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus 8. [^]

[66] Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication 27. [^]

[67] Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication 27. [^]

[68] Emil Kraepelin, Clinical Psychiatry, trans. A R Diefendorf, vol. 7 (New York: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1981). [^]

[69] Carl Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, trans. A A Brill (New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1944). [^]

[70] Victor Tausk, "On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in Schizophrenia (1919)," The Psycho-Analytic Reader: An Anthology of Essential Papers with Critical Introductions, ed. Robert Fliess (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Pyscho-Analysis, 1950). [^]

[71] American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Text Revision, 4th ed. (Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 324. [^]

[72] Avital Ronell, The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989) 109. [^]

[73] Hables Gray, "Cyborgology," 2. [^]

[74] See Susan Hawthorne, "Connectivity: Cultural Practices of the Powerful or Subversion from the Margins?," CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and Creativity, eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein (Melbourne: Spinifex, 1999). [^]

[75] Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (St Leornards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1994). [^]

[76] N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). [^]





[81] Hayles, How We Became Posthuman 4-5. [^]

[82] Grosz, Volatile Bodies ix. [^]

[83] Grosz, Volatile Bodies 22. [^]

[84] Andrew Ross, quoted in Penley, "Cyborgs at Large," 7. [^]

[85] I have argued elsewhere that the "crisis" figured by Jameson's schizophrenic might be best conceptualized as one besetting contemporary white masculinity, in which case his schizophrenic cannot be seen as the universal and disembodied casualty of the postmodern. See Angela Woods, "Subjectivity 'in crisis': Masculinity and Schizophrenia in David Fincher's Fight Club," antiTHESIS 13 (2002). [^]

woods - schizophrenics, cyborgs and the pitfalls of posthumanism

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