word pics - northwestern 2013 6weekseniors

8/13/2019 Word PICs - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/word-pics-northwestern-2013-6weekseniors 1/34

Critical Neglect Negative



‘Substantial increase’ PIC



1NC Substantially increase pic

[COUNTERPLAN TEXT: Vote Negative to endorse radical forms of engagement andopenness.]

‘Substantial’ refers to a large, quantifiable valueWatson 2kJames L, Senior Judge, UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, May 23,http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/SlipOpinions/Slip_op00/00-57.pdfIn T.D. 92-108, Customs notes: “*n+one of the efinitions *submitte to Customs+ actually quantify‘substantial.’ It is always expresse in other terms which clearly convey the meaning. Certainly, a 40%encirclement is a substantial encirclement of the perimeter of the shoe in that it conforms exactly tothe dictionary definitions of ‘substantial’ by being ample, considerable in quantity, significantly largeand largely, but not wholly that which is specified .” 26 Cust. Bull. at 366. When the term

“substantially” is used as an adverb preceding a verb, the term means “in a substantial manner: so as

to be substantial.” Webster’s Thir New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged(1968).

That means the aff places a limit on openness towards the other and calculates levelsof engagement; this makes exclusion of the other inevitable and turns the case. Onlyan ethic of unconditional, unbounded hospitality can solve.Paul Corey-Voegelin Institute- 9-[2-5]-20 04 , Humber College, McMaster University, member of the EricVoegelin Institute, a humanities and social sciences research institute devoted to the revitalization ofteaching a n un erstan ing of the “great books” of Western civilization in comparison with othertradition , “Totality an Ambivalence: Postmo ern Responses to Globalization an the American Empire,”http://www.lsu.edu/artsci/groups/voegelin/society/2004%20Papers/Corey2004.shtml

To clarify what he means by absolute hospitality, Derrida distinguishes it from "tolerance." For many in the

West, "tolerance" is the ultimate ground of ethics, or the basis of human rights , but Derrida argues that this

is not the case. Tolerance is the limited form of hospitality. If we are tolerant, we "accept the foreigner, theother, the foreign body up to a certain point, and so not without restrictions. Tolerance is a

conditional , circumspect, careful hospitality " (PT 128). Derrida points out that tolerance is always on the side of the strongest. It is

the stronger power that agrees to "tolerate," " put up with ," or "suffer" a weaker power that it thinks

is inferior or wrong, and which it could oppress , exclude or destroy . Instead, the stronger power

decides to let a weaker power s live , and perhaps even thrive, but only under certain conditions (see PT 127). As

such, tolerance is accompanied by a certain degree of arrogance, which implicitly says: "We are right , you are wrong ,we are superior , you are inferior , but you are not insufferable." There are various connotations to tolerance;

religious, ethnic, nationalistic, ideological, racial, and biological. But in every case, the acceptance of the other is limited,regardless of whether we are "suffering" the presence of a different race or a different religion.Tolerance easily becomes intolerance once the tolerated group is believed to have broken the

conditions it was supposed to live under. For this reason, "tolerance" cannot be the measure of ethics or

human rights. " Unconditional hospitality " is the standard , so to speak, by which we measure our actions. However, as



Derrida recognizes, "unconditional hospitality is practically impossible to live; one cannot in any case, and by definition, organize it" (PT 129). All

political, legal, and religious forms of organization must, by necessity, be inhospitable to some. But, insofar as we are conscious ofunconditional hospitality, we are acutely aware of the extent to which these forms are limited andexclusive. They are, to greater and lesser extents, unjust. Thus, Derrida says we must live in constant tension betweenthe conditional forms of tolerance and practice found in politics, law and religion, and theunconditional imperative of absolute hospitality. This is Derrida's way of speaking about the metaxy: he encourages us to

live in a perpetual state of critical reflection, of continual unease with our worldly systems of politics and law. The moment that weforget about the transcendent pole in this tension, the moment we try to relieve the tension andabolish the notion of unconditional hospitality, that is the moment when we will become enmeshedin what Derrida calls "theologico-political" forms; that is, in thoroughly immanent metanarratives that claim to be

absolute but are , in fact, partial, exclusionary , and imperfectly hospitable. All thought , all law , and all politics are , for

the deconstructionist, never complete; they are always provisional, and always in need of revision. Derrida speaks ofunconditional hospitality as a "messianic promise" – a promise of, what he calls, a "democracy to come" in which absolute hospitality is grantedto every "other." However, the "democracy to come" is not an actual event in the future, or, as Derrida puts it, it is not a "future present." [20]

Derrida's "messianic" is structured by the general expectation of a "democracy to come" that is always expected but never arrives. Nomessiah, human or divine, will ever bring us "absolute hospitality." Nevertheless, Derrida advises usto adopt a paradoxical faith – a "quasi-messianism" [21] – that retains the messianic orientation while remaining acutely aware that the

"democracy to come" will never actually come. This faith encourages "new effective forms of action, practice,organization, and so forth," because it reveals how far the present falls short promised messianic age.However, it prohibits us from accepting a vehement fundamentalism or a genocidal solution. [22]

Calculations create vast biological divisions to be exterminated in the name ofimperial destinymbembe 2003 —Achille,, Senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at theUniversity of the Witwatersrand, Necropolitics, Public Culture 15.1, Translated by Libby Meintjes

In this essay I have argued that contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death (necropolitics) profoundly reconfigure the relations amongresistance, sacrifice, and terror. I have demonstrated that the notion of biopower is insufficient to account for contemporary forms of subjugation of life to thepower [End Page 39] of death. Moreover I have put forward t he notion of necropolitics and necropower to account for the various ways in which, in ou r

contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creationof death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected toconditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead. The essay has also outlined some of the repressedtopographies of cruelty (the plantation and the colony in particular) and has suggested t hat under conditions of necropower, the lines between resistance andsuicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom are blurred. Continues. Biopower and the Relation of Enmity Having presented a reading of politics asthe work of death, I turn now to sovereignty, expressed predominantly as the right to kill. For the purpose of my argument, I relate Foucault’s notion of biopower totwo other concepts: the state of exception and the state of siege.16 I examine those trajectories by which the state of exception and the relation of enmity have

become the normative basis of the right to kill. In such instances , power (and not necessarily state power) continuously refersand appeals to exception, emergency, and a fictionalized notion of the enemy. It also labors to producethat same exception, emergency, and fictionalized enemy. In other words, the question is: What is therelationship between politics and death in those systems that can function only in a state of emergency?In Foucault's formulation of it, biopower appears to function through dividing [End Page 16] people intothose who must live and those who must die. Operating on the basis of a split between the living andthe dead, such a power defines itself in relation to a biological field —which it takes control of and vestsitself in. This control presupposes the distribution of human species into groups, the subdivision of thepopulation into subgroups, and the establishment of a biological caesura between the ones and theothers. This is what Foucault labels with the (at first sight familiar) term racism. 17 That race (or for thatmatter racism) figures so prominently in the calculus of biopower is entirely justifiable. After all, more sothan class-thinking (the ideology that defines history as an economic struggle of classes), race has beenthe ever present shadow in Western political thought and practice, especially when it comes to

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/public_culture/v015/15.1mbembe.html#FOOT17




imagining the inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples. Referring to both this ever-presence and thephantomlike world of race in general, Arendt locates their roots in the shattering experience ofotherness and suggests that the politics of race is ultimately linked to the politics of death. 18 Indeed, inFoucault's terms, racism is above all a technology aimed at permitting the exercise of biopower, "thatold sovereign right of death." 19 In the economy of biopower, the function of racism is to regulate thedistribution of death and to make possible the murderous functions of the state. It is, he says, "the condition for theacceptability of putting to death." 20 Foucault states clearly that the sovereign right to kill (droit de glaive) and the mechanisms of biopower are inscribed in theway all modern states function ; 21 indeed, they can be seen as constitutive elements of state power in modernity. According to Foucault, the Nazi state was themost complete example of a state exercising the right to kill. This state, he claims, made the management, protection, and cultivation of life coextensive with thesovereign right to kill. By biological extrapolation on the theme of the political enemy, in organizing the war against its adversaries and, at the same time, exposingits own citizens to war, the Nazi state is seen as having opened the way for a formidable consolidation of the right to kill, which culminated in the project of the"final solution." In doing so, it became the archetype of a power formation that combined the characteristics of the racist state, the murderous state, and thesuicidal state. [End Page 17] It has been argued that the complete conflation of war and politics (and racism, homicide, and suicide), until they are indistinguishable

from one another, is unique to the Nazi state . The perception of the existence of the Other as an attempt on my life, as amortal threat or absolute danger whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my potential to lifeand security —this, I suggest, is one of the many imaginaries of sovereignty characteristic of both early and late modernity itself. Recognition of thisperception to a large extent underpins most traditional critiques of modernity, whether they are dealing with nihilism and its proclamation of the will for power as

the essence of the being; with reification understood as the becoming-object of the human being; or the subordination of everything toimpersonal logic and to the reign of calculability and instrumental rationality. 22 Indeed, from an anthropologicalperspective, what these critiques implicitly contest is a definition of politics as the warlike relation par excellence. They also challenge the idea that, of necessity,

the calculus of life passes through the death of the Other; or that sovereignty consists of the will and the capacity to kill in order tolive. Taking a historical perspective, a number of analysts have argued that the material premises of Nazi extermination are to befound in colonial imperialism on the one hand and, on the other, in the serialization of technical mechanisms for putting people to death —

mechanisms developed between the Industrial Revolution and the First World War. According to Enzo Traverso, the gas chambers and the ovenswere the culmination of a long process of dehumanizing and industrializing death, one of the original features ofwhich was to integrate instrumental rationality with the productive and administrative rationality of the modern Western world (the factory, the bureaucracy, theprison, the army). Having become mechanized, serialized execution was transformed into a purely technical, impersonal, silent, and rapid procedure. This

development was aided in part by racist stereotypes and the flourishing of a class-based racism that, in translating the social conflicts of the

industrial world in racial terms, ended up comparing the working classes and "stateless people" of the industrial world to the"savages" of the colonial world . 23 In reality, the links between modernity and terror spring from multiple sources. Some are to be found in t he politicalpractices of the ancien régime. From this perspective, the tension between the public's passion for blood and notions of justice [End Page 18] and revenge is critical.Foucault shows in Discipline and Punish how the execution of the would-be regicide Damiens went on for hours, much to the satisfaction of the crowd. 24 Wellknown is the long procession of the condemned through t he streets prior to execution, the parade of body parts —a ritual that became a standard feature ofpopular violence —and the final display of a severed head mounted on a pike. In France, the advent of the guillotine marks a new phase in the "democratization" ofthe means of disposing of the enemies of the state. Indeed, this form of execution that had once been the prerogative of the nobility is extended to all citizens. In acontext in which decapitation is viewed as less demeaning than hanging, innovations in the technologies of murder aim not only at "civilizing" the ways of killing.

They also aim at disposing of a large number of victims in a relatively short span of time. At the same time , a new cultural sensibility emergesin which killing the enemy of the state is an extension of play. More intimate, lurid, and leisurely formsof cruelty appear.


















2NC Top level

The counter-advocacy solves the case and is net beneficial – the aff has not read adefense of a “substantial increase” in engagement . This means the core question of

the debate is which advocacy most authentically engages the other – our calculationbad arguments are a reason why the neg does this best.

The inclusion of the wor s ‘substantially increase’ in the plan text is bad – that’s WATSON – they attempt to quantify engagement with the Other which not only limitsour ability to engage them reinscribing the us-them dichotomies they criticize, but alsodenies the intrinsic value of the Other by ignoring our infinite ethical obligationtowards them and attempting to quantify their worth.

Two impacts –

FIRST – it turns the case – limited forms of tolerance and practice only put up with theother to a certain point, inevitably excluding those deemed unworthy – it places theUnited States as an all-powerful entity which has the power over other countries tomake live and let die – this ignores the unconditional imperative towards the Other ofuncon itional hospitality which enies the fun amental metho of ethics; that’sDERRIDA.

SECOND – calculability results in mass violence – quantifying the value of Others laysthe foundation for ‘kill-to- save’ mentality by allowing justification of mass atrocity inthe name of the ‘majority’ – devalues other countries and the people within them byproclaiming them as only deserving of openness to a certain extent ; that’s MBEMBE.

our response to the call of the other is a priori —we must reject totalizing theories thatrecourse to appropriative thinkingGrob 1999 —Leonard, professor of philosophy at Farleigh Dickinson University, Ethics After the Holocaust, p. 8 -11

This face-to-face encounter is thus no cognitive event. As we have seen, I cannot know the Other as Other without diminishing his or herotherness. I can, however, encounter that Other in what Levinas terms an ethical event. Indeed, it is only with the rending of the ontologicalschema that ethics first becomes possible. Prior to my meeting with the Other, there is no ethics as such. Within the totality of being, I amlimited in my egoist ambition only by a lack of power. The Other who meets me face-to-face challenges my very right to exercise power. In sodoing, ethics is born. Cognition no longer represents the highest activity of which a human is capable; it is replaced by "revelation" of the Otheras an ethical event in which, for the first time, I come to realize the arbitrariness of my egoist ambitions. The thematizing of the cognitivesubject is replaced by nothing short of an act of witness on the part of a being who now becomes an ethical subject. The Other who contestsme is an Other truly independent of my appropriative powers and thus one to whom I can have, for the first time, ethical obligations. As Levinasputs it, this Other is the first being whom I can wish to murder. Before the totality is rent by the manifestation of the face, there can be no willto act immorally, as there can be no will to act morally, in any ultimate sense of that word. If one begins with the "imperial I" appropriating itsworld, ethics as such can never be founded. The other with whom I inter- act is simply a datum, an aspect of my universe. Morality makes its

first appearance when I confront the Other who is truly Other. Although the Other appears to me now, on principle, assomeone I could wish to kill, he or she in fact summons me to respond with nonviolence: I am called towillingly renounce my power to act immorally. What I hear from the Other, Levinas claims, are thewords "Thou shalt not kill." Harkening to this injunction constitutes my inaugural act as an ethical being .In Levinas's words, "Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent." Addressing the face of the Other Ibecome ethical. In a turnabout from what has been the norm in the history of Western thought, ethics now is seen, by Levinas, t o constitute the essence of



philosophy. Ethics is now "first philosophy," a position usurped un til now by the ontological enterprise. The meeting with the Other -who-is-truly-Other is aprimordial event: "Since the Other looks at me," Levinas exclaims, "I am responsible for him, without even having taken on responsibilities in his regard " In

encountering the Other, I assume responsibility for him. "Responsibility," Levinas proclaims, "is the essential, primary andfundamental structure of subjectivity.... Responsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already existed in itself,before the ethical relationship."'" In other words, my structure as a human being, in any significant sense of that word, is to be responsible to the Other. Mypersonhood is not to be identified with t hat of the solitary ego appropriating its world; it is rather a personhood fundamentally oriented toward the Other. Ethics,for Levinas, is thus not to be identified with any ethical or even meta-ethical position. Levinas speaks neither as deontologist nor consequentialist. He does not

attempt to articulate any list of rights or obligations , or even the principles on which the latter would be based. All ethical theories, he implies,are secondary to, or derivative from, a primordial or founding moment: the encounter with the face ofthe Other. It is this moment-of-all-moments which institutes the very possibility of the "ethical" systemsso hotly debated within the history of Western thought. Before there can be any ethical positioning —before there can be discussions of virtue, happiness, duties —there is the meeting with the Other. Ethicsis no set of directives; rather, in Levinas's wor s, “Alrea y of itselfethics is an 'optics,'” a way of seeingwhich precedes —and founds —all that has heretofore been identified as ethical philosophy. The importof this notion of the primacy of ethics for a rethinking of philosophy in the post-Holocaust age cannot beemphasized strongly enough. For Levinas, philosophy-as-ontology reveals being as nothing short of"war": The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality which dominatesWestern philosophy. Individuals are reduced to being bearers offerees that command them unbeknownto themselves. The meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is derived from the totality.Individuals within the "being" constructed by philosophers are merely creatures of the schematizingmind. Such a concept of philosophy is ill-equipped to address the great ethical issues which arise in thestudy of the Holocaust. Indeed, for Levinas, "War is not only one of the ordeals —the greatest —of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory."Within the terms of warfare, lying, stealing —even killing —lose whatever ethical import they might have. I simply engage in these acts as "necessary" within theuniverse created by war. If the being studied by traditional philosophy is conceived of as war, morality loses its core meaning. Not only is no fundamental ethical

critique of the events of the Holocaust possible within the terms of philosophy-as-ontology, but, as I have noted above, it can be argued that the mode ofappropriative thinking of philosophers in our Western tradition has contributed to the creation of aclimate in which genocide can flourish. If, in ontological terms, individual beings are said to have theirmeaning solely within the totality in which they find themselves, totalizing thinking may well becometotalitarian. Jews and other victims of Nazi oppression were dehumanized precisely by being viewed in terms of racial categories applied to them as a whole.If philosophy is a mere egology, as Levinas claims, the totalizing cognitive subject can, at the far end of a continuum, be seen to pass over into the autocratic "I" of

the leaders of the Third Reich . In contrast to that appropriative thinking which can lead to the brutal

dehumanization of the kind present in war, the face-to-face relationship is a pacific one. It is arelationship which establishes a peace which is no mere truce, no temporary cessation of inevitablehostilities. For traditional philosophy, knowledge is power, a power capable of harnessing technology to evil ends. Theabsolute end of philosophy is its goal of achieving total mastery of being; it is thus not at all illogical to foresee a progression from conceptualto physical mastery of one's world. Once the locus of an "absolute" is placed in the powers of the "I," the other person cannot fail to becomemerely another datum in a world whose meaning derives itself entirely from me. Often I may treat her or him in terms of what in the West hasbeen called "goodness." Yet such goodness, for Levinas, is accidental, the product of a determination on my part that it is in my self-interest toact in a given manner in a given situation. The fundamental reference point remains the "I." Goodness thus established, I argue, along withLevinas, is a goodness which is simply not good enough!



AT: P/ both

1.) WHOOPS – the text of the counter-advocacy includes voting negative, only oneteam can win the debate; this makes the permutation nonsensical which means it

can’t solve. 2.) THEY STILL LINK – they attempt to capture our ethic of hospitality towards theother and assimilate into what is ultimately a calculative and limited gesture towardsLatin America; that inevitably fails because our ethic of care lies in directcontradistinction to our ethic of tolerance. The permutation inevitably results in theerasure of our ethic through attempts to legislate and bracket off hospitality.

3.) INCOMPATIBILITY – the alt an the aff can’t happen at the same time;unconditional h ospitality cannot be legislate , that’s COREY – law is by definition aform of conditional engagement which is unable to accommodate all difference, thisprecludes the ability for them to ever solve because of their arguments about howacademic discussions stimulate legislative changes.

4.) Increase requires pre-existance

Buckley 6Jeremiah, Attorney, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al,http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf

First, the court said that the or inary meaning of the wor “increase” is “to make something greater,”

which it believe shoul not “be limite to cases in which a company raises the rate that an in ivi ualhas previously been charge .” 435 F.3 at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compelsthe opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must

necessarily have been an existing premium , to which E o’s actual premium may be compare , todetermine w hether an “increase” occurre . Congress coul have provi e that “a -verse action” in theinsurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to

efine a verse action in terms of an “increase.” That ef -initional choice must be respected, notignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392- 93 n.10 (1979) (“*a+ efin-ition which declares whata term ‘means’ . . . exclu es any meaning that is not state ”). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasone thatbecause the In surance Prong inclu es the wor s “existing or applie for,” Congress inten e that an“increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions – from an initial policy of

insurance to a renewal of a long- hel policy.” 435 F.3 at1091. This interpretation reads the words“exist-ing or applie for” in isolation. Other types of a verse action escribe in the Insurance Prongapply only to situations where a consumer ha an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,”“re uction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an

already-existing policy , and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” alsoshould be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy . See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S.88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the wor s aroun it”) (citation omitte ).



This makes the aff mutually exclusive with the counter-advocacy because theynecessarily foreclose the possibility of radically new and unthought of ways ofengaging with Latin America – also means the aff oesn’t o anything because pre -existing policies towards LA are inhospitable and attempt to instrumentalize theother, vote neg on presumption



Engagement k



1NC Engagement k

The affirmative’s stance of ra ical engagement is re -appropriated by the forces theycriticize; perceptions of American ‘economic openness’ towar s ifference are

empirically used to advance imperialist goals of Manifest Destiny.

Steven G. Calabresi , 4-22-20 06 , Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University , “‘A Shining City on aHill’: American Exceptionalism an the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law,”http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume86n5/documents/CALABRESIv.2.pdf

The most striking example of nineteenth century American exceptionalism is found in the concept of Manifest

Destiny. The phrase originated in an essay written by John L. O’Sullivan in 1845, in which he escribe “our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free 177 See MADSEN, supra note 12, at 70-71.Bercovitch notes that one Melville novel “opens with a eulogy to the American Way (‘Out of some past Egypt we have come to th is newCanaan; and fr om this new Canaan we press on to some Circassia’).” BERCOVITCH, supra note 18, at 28. 178 MADSEN, supra note 12, at 71. 179See BERCOVITCH, supra note 18, at 176-77 (second and third alterations in original). 180 Daniel Webster, Fourth of July Oration (July 4, 1802),

in 15 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 513, 520 (1903). 2006]development of our yearly multiplyingmillions.”181 “ A SHINING CITY ON A HILL” 1361 Ma sen argues that the concept of Manifest Destiny required the

U nited S tates to fight the Mexican War and acquire ever larger parts of the American West , because “*t+he

acquisition of more land , then, was necessary to keep the American experiment in democracy going. This wasthe visible or ‘manifest’ estiny of the Unite States . . . . ”182 It appeared to mid-nineteenth century AmericanProtestants that just as God had made the promised land of New England available to the Puritans, he was now signaling that the nascentUnited States should settle the North American continent from sea to shining sea.183 This ideology had mixed consequences for those NativeAmericans, Mexicans, and bison that stood in the way. Madsen notes that Senator John Dix of New York described the process as follows: [T]heaboriginal races, which occupy and overrun a portion of California and New Mexico, must there, as everywhere else, give way before theadvancing wave of civilization, either to be overwhelmed by it, or to be driven upon perpetually contracting areas, where, from a diminution oftheir accustomed sources of subsistence, they must ultimately become extinct by force of an invincible law. We see the operation of this law inevery portion of this continent. We have no power to control it, if we would. It is the behest of Providence that idleness, and ignorance, andbarbarism, shall give way to industry, and knowledge, and civilization.184 Anders Stephanson offers a similar account, arguing that

American nationalism in the early nineteenth century “share . . . a sense of an entirely new kind ofcountry, uniquely marked by social, economic , and spatial openness. ”185 He adds that the U nited S tates was

viewe as “a sacred-secular project, a mission of world-historical significance in a designated

continental setting of no determinate limits. ”186 Stephanson notes t hat O’Sullivan specifically warne against the

“ten ency to ape European mo els.”187 Instea , “*t+he nation . . . was boun by nothing except its foun ingprinciples, the eternal and universal principles .”188

This is especially true in the context of Latin America; rhetoric of openness towardsthe region obscures the reality of US domination.

Sarah Hines , 7-22-20 09 , writer for Socialist Worker, “Obama's not -so-new Latin America policy,”http://socialistworker.org/2009/07/22/obamas-latin-america-policy

Sarah Hines writes from Bolivia on the gap between Barack Obama's rhetoric about a more cooperative LatinAmerican policy and the reality of continued U.S. domination. July 22, 2009 Bolivian President Evo Morales (Sebastian

Baryli) Bolivian President Evo Morales (Sebastian Baryli) PRESIDENT BARACK Obama declared at the Summit of the Americas meeting in

Trinidad and Tobago in April that there would no longer be junior and senior partners in the Americas--but hisactions are sending a different message. The most egregious case is Honduras , where the U.S. has played ball



with the coup-makers who overthrew democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya earlier this month. The Obama administration also

failed to speak out against last month's Peruvian police massacre of more than 50 indigenous people in the Peruvian

Amazon who were protesting the incursion of petroleum transnational corporations into their territory. In Bolivia, too, Obamafailed another important test. On June 30, the Obama administration rejected renewal of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug

Eradication Act (ATPDEA) for Bolivia, citing the country's alleged failure to cooperate in drug eradication efforts. With this pronouncement, theadministration ratified George W. Bush's decision last November to suspend the trade agreementwith Bolivia on the basis of supposed non-cooperation in counter-narcotics operations. In reality, thesuspension was one of a series of tit-for-tat moves that began when Bolivian President Evo Morales declared U.S.Ambassador Philip Goldberg persona non grata after he advised opposition politicians plotting a coup last September. Bush overrode thedecision of Congress to extend the agreement for six months just a few weeks after Morales announced that the Drug Enforcement Agency wasno longer welcome in Bolivia. A few months earlier, Morales had supported the decision of coca growers in the Chapare region, where Moraleswas a union leader before becoming president, to expel the United States Agency for International Development from the area. - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - THE U.S. allegation that Bolivia has failed to cooperate in the "drug war" carries serious economic penalties under the terms of the 1991Andean Trade Preference Act. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the law was intended to help Colombia, Ecuador, Peruand Bolivia "in their fight against drug production and trafficking by expanding their economic alternatives. To this end, the ATPA providedreduced-duty or duty-free treatment to most of these countries' exports to the United States." It was renewed in 2002 under the ATPDEAname. The criteria for continued participation fall into four categories: investment policies, trade policies, counter-narcotics operations andworkers' rights. While the decision cited Bolivia's supposed failure to meet its counter-narcotics commitments as the reason for non-renewal, itis clear from the text of the U.S. Trade Representative's report that Bolivia had offended the U.S. in other areas as well. The report cites Bolivia'snationalization of hydrocarbons, the country's withdrawal from the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, a "difficult

investment climate," and increased tariffs. These are described in matter-of-fact language--but it's clear that the U.S. is none too pleased. In thearea of counter-narcotics, the trade representative's report claims that the "loss of the DEA presence and its information network has severelydiminished Bolivia's interdiction capacity in both the short and the long term." The report concedes that the Bolivian government has"maintained its support for interdiction efforts" and that "interdiction of drugs and precursor chemicals continues to rise," and that "theBolivian counter-narcotics police and other CN [counter-narcotics] units have improved coordination effectiveness." Yet even Bolivia's successin these efforts is seen as a problem--the U.S. report concludes that Bolivia's increased drug interdiction is evidence of "increased cocaineproduction and transshipment." While it appears that cocaine production has, in fact, increased in Bolivia, this is being used as an excuse for

the U.S. to punish a government that is challenging American interference within its borders. If the U.S. government was trulyconcerned with stopping the production and distribution of illegal drugs, and believed that endingtrade preference agreements could have such an effect, it would refuse to extend trade preferencesto U.S. ally Colombia, a country at the heart of cocaine production. According to the Andean Information Network,coca production has risen in three of the four Andean countries participating in the ATPDEA: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The United NationsOffice on Drugs and Crime reported that land area under coca cultivation in the region grew by 16 percent from 2006 to 2007. Colombia led theway with a 27 percent increase, while growth in Bolivia was 5 percent and in Peru 4 percent. "Overall, Colombia accounted for 85 percent of the

net 24,700 hectare increase region-wide, while Peru accounted for 9 percent and Bolivia for 6 percent," the UN agency reported. Despitethis region-wide spike in cocaine production, only Bolivia faces non-renewal of trade preferences. TheU.S. recently renewed the ATPDEA for Peru and Colombia, and renewed it for Ecuador the same day itdenied renewal to Bolivia. The suspension of preferred trade status as of December 2008 had already led to a 14 percent decline inBolivian sales to the U.S. and the loss of more than 2,000 jobs in the country's largest textile exporter. The textile industry had benefited themost from trade preference and is being hit the hardest by its suspension. According to AmericaEconomic.com, "Bolivian exports to the U.S., inlarge part due to the ATPDEA, reached $171,920,000 dollars in the first five months of 2008. In the same period in 2009, exports fell 19.5percent to $138,370,000. The textile industry has protested that the suspension of the ATPDEA will lose the sector close to 9,000 jobs." TheAgencia de Noticias Fides (ANF) estimates that 46,000 jobs will be lost nationally and between 5,000 and 7,000 businesses will be affected inthe department (region) of La Paz alone. The Santa Cruz Chamber of Exporters estimates that exports from its department to the U.S. willdecline 60 percent by the end of the year. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IN THE lead-up to the decision on ATPDEA, President Morales appealed to theU.S. to renew the agreement, even sending a delegation to the U.S. to make the case. "If President Obama wants to have good relations,"

Morales said, "I want to publicly tell h im that hopefully he can mend the ways of ex-President Bush." When Obama followed Bush'slead and refused to renew Bolivia's status as a cooperating government in anti-drug efforts , Morales said

the decision was "clearly political." "I feel deceived by the suspension of the ATPDEA because the Obama governmenthas lied and made slanderous and false accusations against the Bolivian government to suspend thetrade preferences, " he told reporters. So much for the Obama administration's stated aim of improving relationswith Latin America by establishing mutual respect and cooperation. Rather, recent events indicate thatObama is committed to re-establishing U.S. hegemony in the region in order to counter the "pinktide" of center-left governments that have been elected from Central America to the Southern Cone.Morales put it well: In the U.S., the appearance of the leaders has changed, but the politics of empire have not.When he told us in Trinidad and Tobago that they are no longer senior and junior partners, President Obama



lied to Latin America. Now there is not only a senior partner, there is a patron [boss], a policeman...They told me not to trust Obama--that the empire is the empire . To those who made this recommendation to me, I thank you. Truly,the empire is the empire. But thankfully, the battle will continue with the consciousness of not only the Bolivian people, but all of the peoplesof Latin America.

Their supposed ly ‘engaging’ academic discussion concerning Latin America is a form of

fetishism; the attempt to know the Latin American Other commodifies their identitiesand forecloses the possibility of authentic openness.

Sara Ahmed , 2-01-20 13 , Professor of Race and Cultural Studies @ Goldsmiths , “Strange Encounters: Embo ie Othersin Post- Coloniality,”http://books.google.com/books?id=Af0mtGfAv_gC&pg=PT177&lpg=PT177&dq=sara+ahmed+hospitality+forgetting+of+name&source=bl&ots=FGIcDZTbE8&sig=UcyVCC3PRI35meWFjzYkQhcoktQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NMztUcuWAsXCyAG7gIHICg&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=sara%20ahmed%20hospitality%20forgetting%20of%20name&f=false

The critical literature on Levinasian ethics has placed considerable emphasis on his model of hospitality towards strangers (Vasseleu 1998: 103).

Indeed, Jacques Derrida suggests , in his most recent and loving encounter with Levinas, that hospitality or ‘welcoming’ isthe ‘immense treatise’ of Totality an Infinity (1999: 21). In his rea ing of Levinas, ‘the stranger’ is the one who is loved, if

love is un erstoo as an opening which oes not reveal the presence or absence of the one who is love : ‘Who loves the strang er. Who lovesthe stranger? Whom else is there to love?’ (Derri a 1999: 105). Hospitality is also boun up with the figure of the stranger in Edith

Wyschogro ’s ethics of remembering. She suggests that hospitality is the act of welcoming in the absence ofcommonality; it establishes ‘a community of strangers’ (Wyschogrod 1998: xvi). However , as I have argued

throughout this book, the ‘stranger’ cannot be simply use as a wor to escribe the one who is istant, the one whom I o not yet know. Toname some-body as a stranger is already to recognise them, to know them again: the stranger

becomes a commodity fetish that is circulated and exchanged in order to define the borders and

boundaries of given communities. To welcome an other as a Stranger is to assimilate that whichcannot be assimilated : it is to establish a community based on a principle of uncommonality in whichtheir difference becomes ‘our own’ (see Chapter 5). The mo el of hospitality base on ‘welcoming the

stranger’ assumes that to welcome the stranger is to welcome the unassimilable : it hence concealshow that very act of welcoming already assimilates others into an economy of difference. In order to

problematise such a model of hospitality we need a double approach: first, we need an analysis of the economies ofdifferentiation that already assimilate others as the strangers (which is economic in the precise sense of involving

circuits of production, exchange and consumption); second, we need an analysis of how encounters with others whoare already differentiated in this way can move beyond the economic by welcoming, or being open or hospitableto, that which is yet to be assimilated.

This makes neoliberalism pre atory on their stance of ‘ra ical openness’ – hijacks andco-opts activist movements to hasten the spread of inequality.

Robert McRuer , Spring-xx-2012 , Professor of English @ George Washington University, Ph.D., University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign , “Cripping Queer Politics, or the Dangers of Neoliberalism,” http://sfonline.barnar .e u/a -new-queer-agenda/cripping-queer-politics-or-the-dangers-of-neoliberalism/2/

Neoliberalism is the dominant economic and cultural system of our time. It is a system that positions the

market as the answer to everything. Any problem is supposed to be best addressed —most effectively and efficiently —

through the market . Neoliberalism positions the move of previously public functions into the private sphere of the market as an

unequivocal good and unquestionable common sense. As a corollary, any barriers to the workings of that market (and



barriers to the flow of capital ) should be eliminated through various kinds of deregulation. Proponents of neoliberalism

advocate deregulation even if that deregulation requires (or has required in practice) an increasing regulation on the movement of peoples.

And neoliberalism, while promising unparalleled freedom and unstoppable growth , exacerbates all

kinds of inequalities around the globe. Neoliberal ideology displays a special genius at making lopsided

growth , wealth for a few, and immiseration for many more, seem sexy , progressive , an “ modern .” This positioningof neoliberalism as more progressive than conservative regulation, and as the wave of development and

the future , means that activist projects can become vehicles for neoliberal policies rather than forsocial change that will actually challenge the distribution of wealth and power in contemporary societies.“Neoliberalism is,” as Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy write, “a pre atory system:” it is predatory on the

liberatory energies our movements have generated, the resistant identifications we shape, the resources we might access, and theradical openness to alternative futures that (appears to be a common desire) across progressivemovements. [1]

The alternative is to get the hell out of Latin America.

Latin America is revolting against dominant Westernized paradigms now – the USshould give up the façade of openness towards the Other and allow for a delinking tooccur.

Sarah Hines , 7-22-20 09 , writer for Socialist Worker, “Obama's not -so-new Latin America policy,”http://socialistworker.org/2009/07/22/obamas-latin-america-policy

So much for the Obama administration's stated aim of improving relations with Latin America by establishingmutual respect and cooperation. Rather, recent events indicate that Obama is committed to re-establishing U.S. hegemony in the region in order to counter the "pink tide" of center-leftgovernments that have been elected from Central America to the Southern Cone. Morales put it well : In the

U.S., the appearance of the leaders has changed, but the politics of empire have not. When he told us in Trinidad and Tobago that they are no longer senior and junior partners, President Obama lied to LatinAmerica. Now there is not only a senior partner, there is a patron [boss], a policeman... They told menot to trust Obama--that the empire is the empire. To those who made this recommendation to me, I thank you. Truly,

the empire is the empire. But thankfully, the battle will continue with the consciousness of not only the Bolivian

people, but all of the peoples of Latin America. In a discussion with a New York audience in May, Uruguayan author Eduardo

Galleano urged Obama, instead of restoring U.S. "leadership" in the region , to leave Latin America alone. While

Obama would win a lot more favor with Latin American governments and populations were he to follow this advice , all signs pointto an empire that is gearing up to reassert control in what it has long considered its backyard. But the

increasing consciousness, organization and mobilization of Latin America's popular classes --there to see on

the streets of Honduras in recent weeks-- means that the U.S. won't be able to re-establish hegemony in Latin

America without a fight.

Their radical openness leaves us unable to cope with the hostile other – truerecognition of alterity necessarily must understand its inaccessibility. We shouldrecognize that we’ve messe up an that Latin America wants us gone.

Naida Zukid, 11-xx-20 09 , assistant professor in BMCC’s Department of Speech, Communications anTheater Arts , “My Neighbor’s Face an Similar Vulgarities,” http://liminalities.net/5-4/neighbor.pdf



Derri a’s examination ofunconditional hospitality belongs to a discourse demanding that hospitality beextended —without anticipation, prejudice, or identification —to an unexpected visitor, foreigner,guest, immigrant, or stranger. This absolute openness to the newcomer on the principles of the heart, however,

involves ethical risks and limitations inherent in the neighbor. Žižek locates the neighbor in its violentbrutality over against Freu ’s traumatic intru er (a thing that hystericizes us and disturbs the balance of our way of life).

The presupposition to be resisted here, Žižek warns, is the ethical gentrification of the neighbor, “thereduction of the radically ambiguous monstrosity of the Neighbor-Thing into an Other as the abyssal

point from which the call of ethical responsibility emanates” (“Neighbors” 163). That one must be ra ical in offeringhospitality to the other stems from Derri a’s belief in overcoming violence an exclusion via pure openness and unconditional hospitality

toward the Other . I am opposed to this Derridean notion of ethical hospitality. Crucial here, however, is an

ideological shift from a neighbor in the simple sense, to the neighbor in its radical otherness. The neighbor in its radicalotherness isturbs; the neighbor “remains an inert, impenetrable, enigmatic presence thathystericizes” (Žižek, “Neighbors” 140-1). Therefore, my meditation on the figure of the neighbor is a corrective move against

unconditional hospitality that accentuates the limitation of ethical universality. This logic is implied in the critique of

Derri a’s “opening without horizon,” an contextualize in representations of the Bosnian genoci e in Peter Maass’s Love ThyNeighbor. 1

Ethnic cleansing, neighbor-on-neighbor violence, and dehumanization of the Other read as theportrayal of humankin at its worst. Complicating Derri a’s notion of ethical hospitality are narrativesof mass atrocities within which lurks the neighbor —the unfathomable abyss, the radical otherness in all

its intensity and inaccessibility . Against the Ethics of Unconditional Hospitality An act of hospitality can only be poetic. –

Derrida2 Stories orbiting the questions of ethics, violence, and the Bosnian war have faded from our public consciousness. Today, Bosnianpolitical evelopments an survivors’ accounts of the atrocities receive occasional press coverage, largely through reporting about war crimestrials at The Hague (i.e., Slobo an Miloševid an Ra ovan Kara žid’s trials for war crimes uring the wars in Kosovo, Bosnia, an Croatia). At themost basic level such questions about war and religious conflict highlight a revived sense of urgency within the context of ethics and violence.

Furthermore, breakdowns of economic and familial structures, systemic violence, and human rightsviolations reflect a distinct scene shift that characterizes modern wars; a politico/ideological movefrom inter to intra-national conflict. Chaos, violence, and death that ensued in Bosnia in 1992 add to the

complexity of intra-national conflicts, and more specifically highlight the atrociously orchestrated neighbor-to-neighbor

violence. These systemic implementations of violence are never ahistorical or abstract, but always already part of concrete intersubjective,

political, and ideological contexts within which they are mobilized. It is in this light that I revisit Derri a’s notion of ethicalhospitality —the ideology that teaches us not to objectify the Other —and the vulgarity of Slobodan

Miloševid and Radovan Kara žid, the traumatic intruders, the neighbors . Derri a’s incalculable hospitality, the

opening without horizon of expectation to the newcomer whoever that may be, is an aporia at best and an impossibledemand at worst. Conditional hospitality is inscribed in the very possibility of unconditional hospitalityand the opening to the “absolute arrivant,” the foreigner. He elaborates upon this newcomer who is not even a

guest, who: surprises the host —who is not yet a host or an inviting power —enough to call into question, to the pointof annihilating or rendering indeterminate, all the distinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning withthe very border that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and language, nations,

families and genealogies. The absolute arrivant does not yet have a name or an identity. (Aporias 34) It is preciselyDerri a’s uncon itional hospitality which remains con itione by the histories, languages, an “the con itional laws of the right to hospitality,”imposed on the newcomer (On Cosmopolitanism 22). The possibility of impossible hospitality is therefore, purely theoretical

and conceptual; conditioned by political inequalities, economic exploitation, injustice, war, homophobia,xenophobia, racism, and so on. Accordingly, the absolute arrivant without a name or identity , the foreigner,

can always violate and extinguish these laws of hospitality. Within the unconditional hospitality to otherness, inscribed

in the element of the foreigner are the unpredictable violent “visitations” that demonstrate the limit toincalculable hospitality. Although unconditional hospitality and exposure to the other requires the



suspension of all discrimination, there is always a possibility that the foreigner will be the enemy ofthe host. Because such possibility exists, unconditional hospitality remains merely conceptual; it is impossible to require that the host notdecide who does or does not enter the house. Unconditional hospitality is, therefore, a self-contradictory concept; it deconstructs itself

precisely by being put into practice (“Hospitality” 8).Unconditional hospitality requires a host to open the door to aforeigner who might bring harm. This aporia of hospitality is necessarily political. The laws of political (conditional and exclusive)hospitality refer to the cultural and ideological structures, which preexist the subject, and interrogate the event of the contact with the other,

the foreigner, the stranger. The premise of unconditional hospitality, however, is that the neighbor , someone

whom I know from within , cannot be my enemy. Nevertheless, gross violations of hospitality,including massive atrocities and human rights abuses are occurring not between strangers, butbetween neighbors .3 The neighbor is one such figure of the Other toward whom my relationship isthat of familiarity, common language, and proximity. Underlying Derri a’s uncon itional hospitality isfear of the Other —the fear of the unfathomable abyss of radical otherness that transgresses,compromises, and disturbs from within. The neighbor. Fear Thy Neighbor What’s the moral ifference between slitting a

man’s throat or slicing off his balls? – Maass 51 To recognize the Other is thus not primarily or ultimately to

recognize the Other in a certain well- efine capacity (“I recognize you as... rational , good ,

lovable ”), but to recognize you in the abyss of your very impenetrability and opacity. – Žižek,“Neighbors” 138-9



2NC Fetishization link

FETISHIZATION LINK – no new engagement with Latin America happens because of theebate roun , which means the affirmative’s obsessive econstruction of the topic

countries only serves to commodify the topic countries, viewing them as a group to beobserved and admired from afar, which forecloses the possibility of authenticopenness – that’s AHMED.

We shoul problematize the aff’s call to celebrate an engage the Other throughacademic spaces; their strategy leads to the fetishization of the stranger; onlyscrutinizing their supposedly cosmopolitan stance can result in authentic engagement.

Sara Ahmed , 9-21-2000, 2k , Professor of Race and Cultural Studies @ Goldsmiths , “Strange Encounters: Embo ie Others in Post- Coloniality,” http://nucat.library.northwestern.e u/cgi -bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v1=9&ti=1,9&SEQ=20130723114356&Search_Arg=Ahmed%2C%20Sara&SL=None&Search_Code=NAME&CNT=25&PID=YO7

qzJ90JWWkj33H9f_uMEmx3lr&SID=1

Examining the relationship between strangers, embodiment and community, Strange Encounters challenges theassumptions that the stranger is simply anybody we do not recognize and instead proposes that he or she issocially constructed as somebody we already know. Using feminist and postcolonial theory this book examine s theimpact of multiculturalism and globalization on embodiment and community whilst considering theethical and political implication of its critique for post-colonial feminism. A diverse range of texts are

analyzed which produce the figure of ’the stranger’ , showing that it has alternatively been expelled as the origin of danger

- such as in neighbourhood watch, or celebrated as the origin of difference - as in multiculturalism. The author argues that

both of these standpoints are problematic as they involve ’stranger fetishism’ ; they assume that the stranger

’has a life of its own’.



2NC City on a hill link

CITY ON A HILL link – the US constructs itself as a country open towards difference inorder to justify expansionism and control across the globe – that’s CALABRESI – the

aff’s esire for ra ical economic openness is re -appropriated by the state to cementthe view of the US as a country with universal principles, virtue and influence. This isthe same logic that justifies extreme American nationalism and the logic of ManifestDestiny.

Cosmopolitanism necessitates imperialism.

David Miller , 1-04-20 10 , “Cosmopolitanism: A Critique,”http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698230410001702662#.Ufv_r5Kkp8E

Cosmopolitanism , originally a doctrine of world citizenship, has come in recent political philosophy to mean simply an ethical

outlook in which every human being is equally an object of moral concern. However ethicalcosmopolitans slide from this moral truism to deny , controversially, that as agents we have special dutiesof limited scope. Political communities create relations of reciprocity between their citizens andpursue projects that reflect culturally specific values and beliefs, generating special duties amongfellow-members. Strong cosmopolitanism would require the creation of a world government, and this could only be animperialist project in which existing cultural differences were either nullified or privatised.



2NC Veiling link

VEILING link – the affirmative is a double turn – the first half of the 1AC is an analysisof how US policy towards Latin America has only been genocidal and harmful; then

the second half proposes increased academic engagement with the region in order toencourage expansion of government policy. Their arguments about how the US needsto invest in foreign aid and bilateral trade agreements on the first advantage are totalnon- starters, as those “ra ically open” policies are inevitably manipulate by elites t ofurther neoliberal an imperial control. That’s MCRUER an HINES. This is proven bypolicies like food aid, which often claim to be virtuous and radically open since theyprovide sustenance to regions experiencing famine and starvation, but end up causingthe target nation to be taken over by agribusinesses which uproot any chance ofsustainable growth and make developing countries totally dependent on capitalistinstitutions like the IMF and World Bank.

Furthermore, the affirmative’s call to ra ical enga gement with Latin America is a wayof obscuring the ways in which economic ties with Latin America exist to promote USimperialist interests. This is proven by recent Obama rhetoric towards Latin Americawhich promises to treat the region as an equal and e ngage with both countries’interests in mind; this type of language is used to lull the general populous into asense of false safety and drive up support for the empire while failing to changepolicies whatsoever. The affirmative becomes the textbook example of an emptygesture; a non-performative promise given to the people of Latin America whichassuages concerns and quells revolutions, but never really changes anything. That’sHINES.



2NC Alternative

The alternative is to GTFO – Latin America is delinking from us and there is no goodreason to stop them – this solves best for several reasons –

REVOLUTION NOW – ideological consensus is growing in Latin America that Westerninfluence sucks, and the region is making a transition to self- sustainability, that’ sHINES – the affirmative’s speech act only reinstates ideological blindness by pullingthe wool over the eyes of the Latin American people and perpetuating the view thatthe US is virtuous – ending the continual attempt to frame the US as an actor whichcan engage Latin America virtuously allows for a political and ideological delinking ofthe two regions which allows for Latin American independence and curtails USimperialism, that’s HARRIS.

This is proven by the 1AC Wiarda evidence, which indicates that we are entering aperiod of benign neglect towards Latin America now and the nations in the region willbe left to solve their own problems; they have absolutely no reason why this policy ofneglect is bad, and the belief that the US needs to be engaged for Latin America toremain stable is simply indicative of the aff’s implicit belief in the primacy of the West.

…especially since Wiar a flows neg. Wiarda, their card rehighlighted, 1999 (Howar J., “Unite States Policy Towar Latin America: A New Era of BenignNeglect”, in Neighborly A versaries: Rea ings in U.S.-Latin American Relations, Ed Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora, p.257-263)

Like Falcoff, Howard Wiarda, a well-known Latin Americanist and foreign policy expert who has taught at National Defense University, and the

Center for Strategic and International Studies and currently works at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, isdoubtful thatWashington will pay much attention to Latin America with the end of the Cold War. He suggests the

historically low priority of Latin America within the U.S. foreign policy community would again be thecase with the end of the Cold War. At best, we are entering an era of " benign neglect ." Latin America would be

left to solve its own problems with only scant encouragement from Washington, according to Wiarda. Public opinion polls in the

United States have shown a low level of empathy for or patience with Latin America. Wiarda states that US. policy interests are"likely to be sporadic and episodic rather than sustained" and that relations will be driven by domesticpolitical considerations . This last point, as it relates to issues such as immigration and drug trafficking, has proven prophetic. Inhindsight, however, the level of engagement since 1990 has been much more intense than Wiarda suggested in 1990, particularly as it relates

to trade, drug trafficking, and summitry. Interestingly, Wiarda states here that benign neglect , rather than sparking

concern or criticism in Latin America, would be welcomed because of the absence of

interventionism.

This uniqueness argument also turns their ‘ra ical openness’ args because a pplyinguniversal hospitality to politics is silly if the Other rejects your hospitality – causes netmore suffering.



Gilbert Leung 1 and Matthew Stone 2, 4-1-20 09 , Birkbeck, University of London 1, London MetropolitanUniversity 2, “Otherwise than Hospitality: A Disputation on the Relation of Ethics to Law an Politics,”http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4465/1/Otherwise_than_Hospitality.pdf

In this essay, we would like to consi er a potential critique of Derri a’s application of an ethics of hospitality toa politics. Given that this project s tarted as a debate between the authors at the 2007 Critical Legal Conference, it seemed appropriate that

the style of the essay should follow the excitement of a dialectic that is quasi-Socratic in form. In section one, we give an overview of Derri a’s

notion of hospitality and then proceed in section two to critique the ontological violence in hospitality through thepositing of an other who rejects hospitality. For this other , we ask why we should pursue hospitality on apolitical level when it would be far less violent to not offer hospitality in the first place. The third section

serves as a counter-critique or self-critique which focuses on the nature of the relation between ethics and politics and the distinction betweenconceiving the other as either transcendent or transimmanent. The concluding section tangentially expands on this by looking at the violenceendured and the kind of hospitality proffered * G. Leung, Birkbeck, University of London; M. Stone, London Metropolitan University.2 Law andCritique (2009) vol. 20 no. 2, 193 –206. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com in order for this essay to come before you as a joint collaboration between two authors using the first person plural an which en s with one ‘ issensual’ signature.

ISOLATION OVER ENGAGEMENT – we disagree with the fundamental thesis of theirethic. The aff is constantly assuming that the Other behaves like a scared little child,looking for someone to help them and tell their secrets to, constantly desiringengagement; this way of viewing the world forecloses the possibility of authenticrelationship towards the hostile other. Latin America hates us and does not want toengage with us – to truly respect them is to honor their inaccessibility and opacity. Thealternative solves by calling for a severance of bonds; it is a refusal of both theconstant attempts of the US to engage with Latin America, and of the similar attemptsof US aca emics to know the Latin American Other. That’s ZUKIC an HINES.



2NC Solves case

THEIR HARMS ARE ALL SOLVED BY ENDING ALL ENGAGEMENT – their internal link intoall of their arguments about neoliberalism and colonialism is the fact that the US

chooses to engage only when it benefits them; ending all engagement would endthose destructive policies and allow for Latin Ame rican autonomy, that’s HINES.

An embarrassing number of their authors all conclude that US engagement is the rootof their impacts –

--- Their HATTINGH neoliberalism internal link; neoliberalism was imposed on LatinAmerica through US engagement.

Hattingh, their card rehighlighted, 2008 (Shawn, International Labour Research and InformationGroup, “ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neoliberalism?”, Monthly Review,http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2008/hattingh070208.html, 7/2/8)

ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neo-liberalism? by Shawn Hattingh Latin America was the first place where the US imposed

the most callous economic system ever seen: neo-liberal capitalism. Starting in Chile in 1973, the US used its power, along

with its control over the IMF and the World Bank, to force governments across Latin America toadopt neo-liberal economic policies. This has seen Latin American countries embrace tradeliberalization, financial liberalization, privatization, and labor market flexibility. Of course, US multinationalsbenefited from this. They have snapped up ex-state owned assets throughout Latin America at bargain basement prices. With the reduction oftariffs and the advent of "free" trade, US multinationals have also flooded Latin America with cheap exports. This has seen US multinationalsmaking massive profits. The people of Latin America have paid for this. Since the advent of neo-liberalism, inequality in Latin America hasgrown, and millions of people have lost their jobs along with their access to healthcare and education.1

--- Their GROSFOGUEL colonialism evidence; US presence in Latin America and heavyWestern influence is the root of subjugation of the region.

Grosfoguel, their card rehighlighted, 2000 (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at theUniversity of Califnornia Berkeley, “Developmentalism, Mo ernity, an Depen ency Theory in LatinAmerica”, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347-374)

Agrarian and mining capitalists profited from selling raw materials or crops to, and buying man- ufactured products from, the British, ratherthan attempting to compete with them through industrialization. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spencerian evolutionism and Comtian

scientism joined forces to form the Latin American version of positivism , which provided the ideological justification for both the economic subor ination to the “empire of free tra e” an the politicaldomination o f the ictatorships of “or er an progress.” Scientism, progress, truth, property, evolutionary stagism, and

order were all Enlightenment themes repro uce in Auguste Comte’s positivist an Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary doctrines. They

were both used in the Latin American periphery to justify the penetration of foreign capital investmentsan to promote economic liberalism against “backwar ness” an “feu alism.” Evolutionary stagism, inevitableprogress, and optimism in science and technology combined to form a teleological view of human history that strengthened the basis of

developmentalist ideology. As a result of the U.S. military invasions in the region , the Mexican revolution in 1910, and the

disillusionment with liberalism during the First World War, a new wave of nationalism emerged among Latin American

http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2008/hattingh070208.html

http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2008/hattingh070208.html



elites. Once again, after the First World War, there was a radical questioning of economic liberalism, this time focused against the new

hegemon in the region, the United States of America.



AT: P/ both

Permutation fails – all of our links are reasons it either oesn’t solve or severs out ofthe 1AC speech act. Severance is a voting issue; it makes the aff a moving target which

means the negative never has stable ground for offense; it also causes argumentativeirresponsibility by allowing the aff to shift out of their advocacy instead of defendingit.

This is ridiculous – if the affirmative does anything, it calls for increased radicalengagement with Latin America – both at an academic and government policy level.The alternative to the critique is for both scholars and the USFG to stop constantlyforcing our engagement strategies own the region’s thro at. We are literally impactturning their entire affirmative – the permutation can’t solve any of our linkarguments.

The permutation is what we're critiquing – the whole point of the critique is that theattempt to accommodate difference inevitably results in assimilation and eradicationof those who on’t want to engage. That’s AHMED an ZUKIC. We o not like youraffirmative an we on’t want to engage in your politics of “ra ical openness” – thatenough is a reason why any permutation just magnifies the link tenfold because itproves that your politics denies autonomy to the hostile other.



Latin america pic



1NC Latin America PIC

*CP TEXT: We en orse the entirety of the 1AC sans the use of the term “LatinAmerica .”+

The term “Latin America” is inaccurate; it homogenizes the countries in the region andspreads cultural imperialism; their use of the term turns the case and should berejected.

Donald J. Mabry , 10-15-20 09 , Professor of History @ Mississippi State University, and The Historical TextArchive, “Colonial Latin America,” http://historicaltextarchive.com/latin/colonial.p f

Colonial Latin America , which lasted for about 300 years for most of the region, was extraordinarily complex and rich in

texture. There are enormous differences between Mexico , on the one hand, and Brazil , on the other. The term

“Latin America” is not only shorthand but also a bit of a misnomer , for much of it was not Latin. It was Indian ormestizo or African , often with little more than a veneer of Iberian culture. The degree to which it was any of these are Spanish,

Portuguese, African, Indian, or some combination thereof varies according to place and time. We have trouble deciding what tocall other humans. Some terms are inaccurate; some are invented to satisfy the politics of the day.Some are acceptable in one era and unacceptable in another. In modern parlance, the earlier immigrants are often called "Native

Americans," a term as inaccurate as the term "Indian" or indio as the Iberians called them. They immigrated just like everyone else but not all atthe same time. Nor have we wanted to see the coming of the Europeans and Africans to the Western Hemisphere as just another ep isode in themany thousand years of its immigration history. One is at a loss to decide what terminology would be accurate and inoffensive. Equally serious,is that most people, even scholars, ignore the DNA evidence and the reasonable conclusions that are drawn from it. We do not want to think ofall human beings as cousins, which they are, because it forces us to reconsider all kinds of cherished beliefs. We prefer to be inaccurate because

it is easier and feels better. Similarly, we refer to some people as Spaniards when, in 1500, there was no Spain. Some Latin Americans

today point out that it is politically incorrect for citizens of the U nited States to expropriate the name“American” for themselves. They see it as sheer arrogance , which it is. On the other hand, we see the Mexican people

called Aztecs when, in fact, only a fraction were in 1519; that they are called thusly is imperialism on the part of those who

rule Mexico. We do not have to look very hard in this part of the world to f ind other examples.



2NC “LA” Ba – Compartmentalization

‘Latin America’ is a term use to compartmentalize races, regions and cultures tocement European hegemony; it’s a pro uct of European consciousness.

Thomas H. Holloway , xx-xx-2008 , University of California, Davis , “Latin America: What’s in a Name?”http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1405131616.html

What constitutes “Latin America” an its “history”? All three of these wor s merit some consideration, to trace parameters for both the place(Latin America), and the topic (history). It is not the result of some teleological process by which what is today commonly termed Latin Americacame to be, for which we can identify a starting point and visualize a neat and discreet evolutionary trajectory. And history itself needs to bedistinguished from other fields of scholarly inquiry. To begin such a discussion, it is as useful as it is obvious to recall that these and similar

descriptive labels are the products of human mental activity, and did not emerge from naturalphenomena or processes. The region of the world now commonly referred to as Latin America existedlong before the term emerged as the mental construct that it is. And in the recent past the validity of thelabel has come under fundamental question (Mignolo 2005), despite the fact that it continues in academicand public discourse as a shorthand label of convenience. It is thus appropriate to sketch both theorigin and evolution of the label, and what constitutes the history of the region of the world sodesignated. We can assume that the indigenous peoples who lived in what is now called Latin America in

ancient times, whatever cosmological and descriptive notions they developed to locate themselves in timeand space, probably did not have a conception of territory and peoples stretching from what we nowcall Mexico to the southern tip of South America. They located themselves in relation to other culturegroups they were aware of and the landforms and bodies of water they were familiar with, as well asin relation to how they explained how they came to be —their origin myths, in the condescendingterms of Western anthropology. Indeed, the same could be said for other peoples of the ancient world, including those who livedin what is now called Europe, right through to the Age of Discovery roughly in the century from 1420 to 1520, the external manifestation of the

European Renaissance. In the imagination of Europe, people and places in the rest of the world only began toexist when they entered the European consciousness. That consciousness then proceeded tocategorize and compartmentalize regions, “races,” an cultures in ways convenient for the purposesof European hegemony (Wolf 1982). One of those compartments has become Latin America , which we need to definemore explicitly. Following the informal consensus among most historians, and most of the historiography they have produced, there are

several parts of the Western Hemisphere which are not normally included in the rubric Latin America. Most obviously, these are Canada and the United States, despite the fact that a considerable proportion of the population of the former speaksFrench, a neo- Latin language; an espite the relevance of the latter in iscussions of Latin America’s international relations, particularly in the

20 th century. Through the colonial era and up through the taking of about one third of Mexico by the U.S.as of 1848, what is now Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California, plus some territorybeyond, figured on maps as part of we now call Latin America. The European-descended populationsin those regions spoke primarily Spanish. In the more recent past immigration and cultural assertionby people who trace their origins to former Spanish- or Mexican-held territories makes the U.S.-Mexican border less relevant in distinguishing Anglo America from Latin America (Acuña1972).



2NC “LA” Ba – Homogenization

Their description of Latin America denies cultural difference and enforcesgeneralizations which are essentially racism in disguise---not only is it historicallyinaccurate, but it also denies political independence by pinning the country with theirEuropean and American imperialist heritageGran e ’05 (Michael Grande is a graduate student of Literature and Culture. In addition to English, he also speaks Italian, Spanish, Frenchan basic Latin. In the past, he's been publishe in Manchester Times; “Latino & Hispanic? It’s Time to Rethink these Terms!”; 7/5/2005;http://www.globalpolitician.com/default.asp?2946-hispanic-latin-america-south-america/)The words Latino and Hispanic have been so carelessly thrown around, used to label individuals, taken advantage of by some of the popularme ia (ie: Latin Grammy’s, AOL Latino, an the Hispanic Heritage Awar s), an even use by some unknowing people as a tool to define their

heritage. Yet do we really know what these words mean? There are over 25 countries where Spanish is either the official, ora commonly spoken language (inclu ing areas of the worl that people on’t often associate with Spanish, like An orra or the Philippines), andSpanish is the second most spoken language in the world. Additionally there are myriad regional dialects; some examples are the originalCastilian Spanish of Spain (directly descended from the Latin language), Argentinean Spanish with its distinctive Italian flair, and Mexican

Spanish with its characteristic blend of indigenous (Native American) words. There is no “typical” skin color for Spanish

speakers - they range from the lightest whites to Mediterranean breeds, from those of Indian (Native Central/South American andCaribbean) heritage to black. All of the Spanish-speaking countries have their own unique peoples and their own

distinctive cultures – they cannot be broa ly an irresponsibly categorize into a “Latino” grouping . Itis entirely imprecise to use such broad, vague, inaccurate terminology to categorize people basedupon their language (whatever ialect it may be). O ly enough, the term “Latino(a)” is never (or rarely) use in the USA to refer toWestern Europeans such as Spaniards and Italians, when in fact the original Latin cultures lie within Italy, Spain, Portugal, Romania, Andorra,and France. Furthermore, when students arrive at college or pick up a book on European history, they will find that the term Latin, when usedto refer to a monolithic culture, will speak of the Ancient Roman society, which is contrary to the ambiguous terminology employed by

American media. The term Latin America first came into use in the late 1860’s an was use to escribethe French presence in Mexico. This term was later shortened to refer to peop le from “LatinAmerican” countries; thus soli ifying the American misperception of the term . I have many Spanish-speakingfriends, all of whom hail from different countries. My ex-college Professor is from Argentina and has almost nothing culturally in common withmy friend from Mexico. As a matter of fact they too hate the use of the term Latino; they demand to be referred to according to their country

of heritage, and rightly so! Furthermore, the terms Latino and Hispanic have been irresponsibly used as a “minority labeling system.” I fin thisto be even more reckless because any and all racism boils down to that which it always has: color. Another of my friends hailsfrom Chile and has red hair and blue eyes, but according to popular media, a job application, or a government form,she is Latina or Hispanic, two terms that she earnestly hates because they pay no credence to herunique culture. Somehow I on’t think she was the minority prototype that they were looking for, but possibly that’s because theterminology is so rampantly and incorrectly used. Racism is despicable in any form, but if these silly questions are still going to be asked on

government forms and job applications then they should address that which is truly in question: race. Anyone who hails fromCentral/South America or the Caribbean who is dark-skinned is likely to be either in part or fully ofIndian heritage. Instead of making tons of superfluous categories on forms, why not just leave twoboxes: Native American (North/Central/South/Caribbean) and African American? The other day I heardsomeone say, “Di you know that Latinos constitute the secon largest minority population in America?” I thought to myself, “This isri iculous.” Nobo y nee s to be force into an inappropriate minority mentality; how has American cultural ignorance become so pervasive?Who are the minorities? The indigenous (native) population or the mestizo (mixed) population? Who exactly does this refer to? It’s soconfusing. I am 100% Italian American. I speak both Spanish and Italian fluently. Since Italy is the patriarch of the Latin Culture, am I a minoritytoo? This has become a very perplexing issue indeed. In Western Europe the term Latin(o)(a) is commonly used to refer the cultures of Italy,Spain, Portugal, Romania, and France. Additionally Europeans are shocked at how the term is used in America and who the term has been used

to label. The term Latino(a) refers to the Latin culture, a culture that originally flourished in Italy duringRoman times. It was during that time that the Romans spread the Latin language throughout WesternEurope; the language then morphed into the modern Romance Languages such as Italian, Spanish,Portuguese, and French . In essence, the Italians are the original Latinos , and the only people who should be termed

“Latino(a)” are those whose ancestry stems from Western Europe or those who have strong cultural ties to Latin Culture. Why wouldsomeone so irresponsibly refer to an in igenous Mexican as “Latino” when he has his own ancient,



Pre-Columbian Heritage, ie: Aztec, or Mayan? Why would someone use the term to refer to someoneof indigenous Peruvian heritage when he has his own Incan heritage? Why would someone label anindigenous- bloo e Puerto Rican as “Latino” when his bloo line l ies with the Borinquen Indians?People need to wake up and get educated on this issue. How many North Americans would like to bereferre to as “Norths” or “Anglos” base upon our geographical location or our mother tongue? I for

one, would not! The spread of such inaccurate terminology only helps to perpetuate myths that prevail inour society. Cultural ignorance seems to be a popular phenomenon in the U.S.A. Americans do nothave the right to irresponsibly use terminology that attempts to alter history. We have the resources to become

culturally e ucate ; let’s use them an begin to express our heritage by country, not vague, “me ia an commerce frien ly” generalities. Ifin ee we chose to speak of “Latinos,” using such a generalist quip, a quick referen ce term for allthose who trace their roots to Latin America., then we should include the maternal Latin countries inthat group: Italy, Spain, Portugal, even France. There is a pervasive Latin cultural flow that began inthose countries and spread to Lati n America. Latinos woul n’t be “Latinoamericano” without theEuropeans.

“Latin America” homogenizes important regional ifferences an cultures.

Santiago Colás , 11-07-19 94 , Professor @ UMich , “Postmo ernity in Latin America: The Argentine Para igm,”http://books.google.com/books?id=ajsDp8O3I-4C&pg=PA161&lpg=PA161&dq=%22Latin+America%22+Term+Homogenizing&source=bl&ots=nDycMOwZ4K&sig=ytg5R4ijZu81bZnQib0Y5k8yVs4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Xhb9UYTWFYiqyAGN1YH4AQ&ved=0CEkQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=%22Latin%20America%22%20Term%20Homogenizing&f=false

Let me also first elaborate on what I have already emphasized at various points throughout this book. The possibility of “LatinAmerica” as a con ceptual or political signifier with a real r eferent was a hallmark of the revolutionaryLeft during the period I have characterized as Latin Ameri can modernity. The subsequent shattering of this Left

in the seventies brought with it a crisis in the semantic validity of the term. Today, we are faced , on the onehand, with the bourgeois, free-marketeer attempt to re take the term as a signifier for a regionally unified market and, on the o ther hand,

with the progressive intellectual concern for homogenizing important intraregional differences underth e hea ing of “Latin America.”

http://books.google.com/books?id=ajsDp8O3I-4C&pg=PA161&lpg=PA161&dq=%22Latin+America%22+Term+Homogenizing&source=bl&ots=nDycMOwZ4K&sig=ytg5R4ijZu81bZnQib0Y5k8yVs4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Xhb9UYTWFYiqyAGN1YH4AQ&ved=0CEkQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=%22Latin%20America%22%20Term%20Homogenizing&f=false










2NC “LA” Ba – Identity Destruction

The term “Latin America” is an overarching claim that serves to marginalize andehumanize minorities---this strips them of their cultural identity and is a social

primer for exclusionRo riguez ’06 (Gregory Rodriguez- founding director of the Center for Social Cohesion, is a senior fellow at the New AmericaFoundation, and executive director of Zócalo Public Square. He has written widely on issues of social cohesion, civic engagement, nationalidentity, assimilation, race relations, religion, immigration, ethnicity, demographics and social and political trends in leading publications suchas The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Time, Newsweek, and the Los Angeles Times, where he is an op-ed columnist.The author of Mongrels, Bastards, Orphans and Vagabonds: Mexican Immigration and the Future of Race in America (Pantheon), which TheWashington Post liste among the “Best Books of 2007,” Ro riguez is at work on a book on the American cult of hope; “Look beyon the'Latino' label”; November 12, 2006; http://www.latimes.com/news/la -op-rodriguez12nov12,1,1839578.column)

HOMOGENIZING the image of the "other" has always been a way for groups to marginalizeundesirable minorities and foreigners . Two dozen centuries ago, Hippocrates wrote that the Scythians — nomadic people whomthe Greeks considered barbaric — all looked alike. By contrast, the good doctor could discern that his own people came in all shapes and sizes.

To refuse to make distinctions among members of any given group is the first step to stripping them of individuality.And depriving people of individuality is the first step to dehumanizing them . You know the drill: All Jews are alike.

Black people are all this. White people are all that. Last week, David Hiller, the new publisher of The Times, wrote a memoto his staff in which he expressed his belief that the newspaper needs to do a better job of reaching the readers he called "Hispanics" and theTimes prefers to call "Latinos." A flap ensued over which word was better suited to the task. Yet if the paper really wants to reach "Hispanics" or"Latinos," what it must do is stop overusing such generic terms and instead concentrate on discerning the distinctions they cover up. Consider

this: Two-thirds of U.S. Latinos are of Mexican origin. In California, that figure rises to 83%. It is oddthen that over the last three decades, as the Mexican presence in the United States has grownastronomically, the term "Mexican American" has all but disappeared in daily journalism, especially inThe Times. My concern is not a matter of ethnic pride. The use of the catchall term undermines the accuracy ofstories. A few years ago, a Times editorial referred to tacos as a "Latino favorite," which is a little like saying pasta is a "European favorite."

It's not untrue, but it makes you look silly. Likewise, a Los Angeles Times magazine story in the aftermath of theKobe Bryant rape accusation referred to Bryant's wife, Vanessa, as "Latina," and nothing more. Thattells me next to nothing about Mrs. Bryant. Does it mean she was born in Nicaragua or Uruguay? Or

that her parents are from rural Mexico? Or maybe that she is the granddaughter of a Dominicanplantation owner? There is no nation of Latinoland, and if her heritage is important to the story, then why notconnect her (or her family) to a country with a unique culture and tradition. It's not just national origin that theterm "Latino" masks. Times' reporters will refer to downtown Huntington Park, a heavily Mexican immigrant city, as a "Latino shoppingdistrict." Montebello, a town heavily populated by U.S.-born Mexican Americans, is also usually identified as "mostly Latino." By referring toboth as Latino, journalists ignore critical distinctions between foreign and U.S.-born ethnic Mexicans. I'm not arguing to get rid of the terms"Latino" or "Hispanic." There are many instances when the catchall ID applies. Nor am I arguing that a pan-Latino identity does not exist. Itdoes. But being Latino is a secondary — and oftentimes flimsy — identity in the same way that being European is. Just as Frenchmen and Poleswill tell you that they are French and Polish before they are Europeans, Cuban Americans and Salvadoran Americans tend to adhere to national-origin identity more strongly than to the generic one. Not surprisingly, the generic terms are the products of politics. They gained currency inthe 1970s as Mexican Americans in the Southwest decided to make common cause with Puerto Ricans in the Northeast, and they needed termsthat bridged regional and cultural distinctions. The advent of race-based policies and set-asides encouraged Latino subgroups to forge acommon front to position themselves to receive federal largesse. Old-fashioned partisan politics also played a role. The Nixon administrationfirst pushed for a recognition of a "Spanish-speaking" identity group, as the GOP actively sought a strategy to lure Mexican American voters.President Nixon also insisted on the addition of a Hispanic-origin question on the census form. Historian John D. Skrentny discovered a 1971

White House memo that points to the administration's ulterior motive: "Spanish-speaking Americans will take what they can get fromwhomever will give it…. Weshould exploit Spanish-speaking hostility to blacks by reminding Spanish groups of the Democrats' commitment to

blacks at their expense." But to do this, the government had to throw Mexican Americans into a single,overarching category that could be understood as analogous to blacks . In 1980, federal census demographersdiscovered that other than a handful of political elites who understood the advantages of becoming Latino, few Americans of Latin Americanorigin wanted a collective name that suggested a collective identity. But a generation of the government and the media using the generic terms

has changed all that. Today, "Latino" and "Hispanic" have way too much popular currency , and their overuse does

nothing to give us a greater understanding of our city, state or nation. The terms are too broad to give us an accurateportrayal of the dynamism of this vast and growing population. My modest proposal to employ more specific



descriptions is no panacea for this newspaper's outreach problems, but it could be a start. At least it'd make it more reflective of the complexethnic reality of Los Angeles.

word pics - northwestern 2013 6weekseniors

Documents