Worksheet #2: Brian Davies

A Paper Submitted to Dr. Robert Stewart of the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Course Philosophy of Religion: PHIL5300RS in the Division of Philosophy

Matthew C. Jolley B.S., Shorter College, 2007 April 28, 2011

RESEARCH Question 1 When J.L Mackie proposes the idea that evil shows that there is no God, he brings several good points, but his basic issue is the contrast of God being wholly good and omnipotent, while there is evil in the world (this is the basic problem of evil). He believes that if a good and omnipotent God exists, evil would be done away with. He writes, From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible (582). Mackies observance of a few adequate solutions (such as denying Gods omnipotence or goodness) by various thinkers is what makes Swinburnes argument strong. Swinburne does not go the route of stripping God of his omnipotence or goodness, but rather supports and uplifts his sovereignty and divine right to allowing what He will allow, for His sovereign purposes- for good purposes. Also within this line or argument lies the question of Who decided that God is liable? This comes as a blow to the one who would argue that God has responsibility to quell suffering and evil. Swinburne tells the story of his responsibility for his own children. Since he is a Father, he has the right to let his children suffer somewhat for the good of their souls. So then, if indeed God is creator, He too has the right to allow suffering for a purpose. Swinburne writes, I have this right because in a small part I am responsible for his existence, its beginning and continuance. If this is correct, then a fortiori, God who is ex hypothesi, so much more the author of our being than are our parents, has so many more rights in this respect. (607). For the theodicist, Swinburnes argument is helpful. From the standpoint of belief in a divine sovereign God, there is no logical fallacy with Swinburnes argument, and this makes it strong. Swinburne definitely supports a free-will defense, and one could purport that he may even support a soulbuilding theodicy. So, another strength for Swinburne is his reasoning for evil. Right out of the

box he assigns evil a purpose. This is Swinburnes basic position- God is using evil for a greater good, saying, Hence a God who sees far more clearly than we do the consequences of quarrels may have duties very different from ours with respect to particular such quarrels. He may know that the suffering that A will cause B is not nearly as great as Bs screams might suggest to us and will provide (unknown to us) an opportunity to C to help B recover and will thus give C a deep responsibility which he would not otherwise have (606). This ties in with Swinburnes other basic remarks that ask the questions, of is it better to live free or as robots? To Swinburne, it is a much greater good that a Creator would create a half finished universe and create immature creatures, who are humanly free agentsthat he should allow them to exercise some choice over what kind of creatures they are to become (611). One sees the soul-building theodicy and free-will defense all wrapped up within this statement. What evils may occur not only provides for the completion of a greater good, but also gives purpose, meaning, and motivation to the lives of those living on the earth. A clear weakness may be seen in the location of the good that has come from evil. One may ask, Where is the good of a Tsunami in Japan to be seen? Where is the good in my daughter committing suicide? Theodicists and anti-theodicists alike may struggle with these questions. Swinburnes biblical defense is based in faith that Gods goodness, faithfulness, and plan remain intact, despite suffering (see Romans 5:1-6). This is the central thread that runs through the kind of theodicy that Swinburne presents, that there is a greater good in Gods mind when it pertains to the creation of a place where there are free agents and sufferings. McCabes argument of lions, lambs, and washing machines makes for a very readable and understandable dealing with the problem of evil, and his basic strength in addressing the problems lies (like Swinburne) in his interesting angle on what good is, and the value to be found in that good. He also finds good and value in what could be considered evil, especially in the

recurring example of the lion and the lamb example. A lamb may consider being eaten by a lion to be a bad or evil thing. However, to the lion, there is much good in eating a lamb. From a creative standpoint (that is, from Gods creation standpoint), making a good lion necessarily means that a lamb will be eaten. Thinking on Swinburnes early comment that God has created an immature world that matures through choice (and some of those choices being bad), one may see the link here. In the lion and lamb scenario, both the lion and the lamb (not the lamb being eaten, but perhaps the nearby watching lambs) experience some sort of learning. The lion learns that the lamb is good for food and for being full. The lambs nearby learn to run away from the lion. Their lifespan may experience an extension. McCabe writes, But in creating good lions we can certainly say that God brings it about indirectly that there shall be evil suffered. He brings it about because it is not possible to bring about this good without allowing for the concomitant defects (619). One may say in response to this (which may be a seemingly inherent weakness), Why Lions?! This seems to be the natural question, to which McCabes argument comes to a point. In McCabes view, suffering, evil, pain, etc. are necessary for survival. Take for example this scenario: To have a world with no lions at all would mean to have a world with no growth, no forward movement at all. What he means is that in almost every situation of life, pain (some may say conflicts of sorts) is a catalyst for future good as a result of learning a response to said pain. God could have certainly created a world where the lion is fed, ones two year old is never burned by a hot stove, and a world where there is no consequence for action. But this would be to have no material world at all. There would be no law in this world, no order, no reasons. In the common thread of reason for evil, sufferings, or pain, Swinburne and McCabe could be used together as a common theodicy. These two together could effectively give at least

a logical explanation of why evil. What they both also (importantly) do is establish a difference between passive evils (that is, evils experienced) and active evils (McCable calls these morally evil acts). The explanation given of the difference between the two redeems Gods character. Though it need no redemption to Christians, it needs defending to unbelievers. Where Swinburne talks of passive and active evils, McCabe talks about them practically. Basically, there are sorts of evils which God can use directly. Natural disasters, sicknesses, etc. can be used for God as they are being felt, not inflicted by an individual. The moral evils that McCabe describes (murder, rape, etc.) are evils that not only defile and cause suffering and pain to the one receiving, but also to the one doing. If the definition means that evil is more the lack of a key element that makes something fully itself, one may easily see that (by some standard derived somewhere) that these moral acts are devoid of good at all, seeing that their conception and execution hurt people on both ends. McCabe writes, I mean that acting unjustly is a bad effect on me, it is a diminishment of me, just as not being able to rinse the clothes is a diminishment of the washing machine. And the point is that the diminishment is brought about by me. So there is no separate agent to achieve something by diminishing me, as the lion achieves something by diminishing the lamb; evil done is evil to the perpetrator himself. It is a dead loss with no good aspect to it (622). Though this argument lays a burden (at least partially) on human shoulders, the weakness here is that there is still no argument here from McCabe (or Swinburne) for the present conflict with omnipotence, that is, if God has omnipotence, why didnt he stop said wicked actions? Is he a careless helmsman who fails to steer the ship clear of the rocks (624)? But the bottom line for McCabe, as with Swinburne, is that for one to blame God for evil, that person will have to prove that the Almighty has a obligation to relieve evil. However, there can be no rule for God, for if He is the highest, and omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and as the Bible describes him, there is no one above him. Thus there can be no sense in the idea that God has any job or is

under any obligation; if he were, there would be something greater than God which constrained him. And this does not fit the picture of the God of the bible, who is mostly the One who receives the blame for evil. Based on Romans 11:33-35, and particularly the story of Joseph, I like Swinburnes argument the most. If one finds themselves in a conversation about God and evil, at least Swinburnes argument gives a possible and logical reason why God might allow evil to occur. Freedom and a greater good are what people are fighting for anyway (well, for the most part). To me this argument not only rings true to scripture, but to the hearts of every altruistic person desiring to find good in the bad. It also points logically to the human situation of being finite and self-absorbed. So what if there is NO God? What then? The problem of evil is not solved because evil would still be in the equation, and then this argument begins to ask the question, What then is the source of this evil? One would quickly discover his or her hearts intentions. To give a reason for suffering, whether it be Gods greater good, soul building, or even looking forward to an eschatological redemption not only seems logically possible, but provides hope. Question 2 Wolsterstorffs basic argument for God being everlasting and not eternal clearly hinges on his definition of what eternality is. And his view is very narrow. In Wolsterstorffs estimation, the definition of eternality is a being who is not at all temporal. This being would not be aware of my actions, any temporal event, nor have any knowledge that said event was occurring. This being could also not remember that it had occurred, nor could be plan to bring these events about for any reason at all. The reason that I feel his definition is weak is that he leans too much on Gods actions in the world. His whole position doesnt really rest on Gods everlasting nature, but rather on the everlasting nature of his actions. To Wolsterstorff, God is

everlasting because his actions have a past, a present, and a future. Since his definition of being eternal looks more like deism, his position is wobbly. He points to two major themes. (1) Gods actions are temporal, and they take place in our world. God is also changed by our actions (thus he is changed by temporal things). He knows what is happening in our history, what has happened, and what will happen. Hence, some of Gods actions are temporal events (499). Using the language of non-occurrence, occurrence, and then non-occurrence, he posits that God must be everlasting (that is, a part of our world) because the nonoccurrence followed be the occurrence followed by the nonoccurrence of such knowing constitutes a change on Gods timestrand. Accordingly, God is fundamentally noneternal (499). The change in Gods time-strand is something that he keys in on a lot, and it manifests itself in his belief in Gods change-ability. He writes of Gods actions being infected by temporality: they are infected by the temporality of the events or for some other reason. One way of developing this latter alternative would be to show that some of Gods actions must be understood as a response to the free actions of human beings-that what God does he sometimes does in response to what some human being does (499). His basic idea is that for God to be eternal, God would operate on some timeline that is other than ours. But since, Wolsterstorff would say, Gods actions have a beginning and end, a nonoccurrence, occurrence, and nonoccurrence, and sometimes these actions are affected by men, that he must indeed operate within a timeline, even a human timeline, and so it follows that he must not be eternal. Wolsterstorffs arguments are logically sound. His argument is very interesting because he upholds Gods absolute fidelity and faithfulness while saying that The theological tradition of Gods ontological immutability has no explicit biblical foundation (503). But is mutability really a reason to say that God is simply everlasting? I think not. Perhaps on the scale of acting within the world God seems mutable to us. The bottom line for Wolsterstorff is that God is not outside our timeline (his definition of eternal), but rather that

God is inside our time and we share time with God. This is based in his summation of Gods mutability and change based on human interjections, as well as his actions taking place in our realm and being infected by mutability. But how could God even remain everlasting if this were the case? This is the part of the argument that to me, Wolsterstoff seems to miss. God obviously does not simply exist in our timeline. To say that he simply existed within our timeline (which seems to be what he means by everlasting), perhaps heaven would be in the universe someplace? If this is not the case, then what timeline is heaven on? Also ours? In a different realm? Wolsterstoffs argument seems incomplete. While God does indeed work within our timeline, He is also outside our timeline. Though there are some comparisons between Stump/Kretzmann and Wolsterstorff, the contrast in the two positions comes out quite strongly (or rather, S&K complete Wolsterstorff). This misunderstanding of eternality is what Stump and Kretzmann address right away saying that eternality is sometimes construed simply as atemporality, eternity being understood in that case as roughly analogous to an isolated, static instant (505). In this first instant, there is a contrast rather than a comparison. However, S&K do acknowledge that God isnt simply atemporal, but that although He is eternal (that is, possessing his life all at once (508)), it is in his eternality that He is able to have present existence, a touch of temporality. And by touch I mean to say that S&K combine the two terms everlasting and eternal to come out with a definition of what God actually is: transcendent yet immanent. S&K use the example of God being atemporal to show how he can be outside of time yet operate within our time as well. Jeremiah 23:23-24 show us that God is a God near, yet a God who fills the earth. But his ability of knowing all is severely limited by Wolsterstorff, as he changes based on something that occurred to him in time, potentially through a person or event. What S&K make clear is that God knows. God does not

learn, He cannot reason, or infer. To do these means that something would have to occur to God, and within the understanding of Gods omniscience, this cannot be. However, supporting the fact that God is Spirit and (from what Aquinas says) is a mind, his life as an eternal entity and as a mind does in fact mean that he is alive, and so his mind does things that make a difference in a temporal world, although he is atemporal. S&K write, We do not see that anything prevents such an entity from being angry, a state the components of which might be, for instance, being aware of an injustice, disapproving of it, and willing its punishment. It seems then that ht enotion of an atemporal mind is not incoherent, but that, on the contrary, it is possible that such a mind might have a variety of faculties or activities (517). So the comparisons between Wolsterstorff, Stump, and Kretzmann lie in the fact that they both, without a doubt, agree that God works within our timeline. However, the major difference lies in their definition of eternality. Paul Helm takes what feels like the most biblical argument when he boils everything with three statements: 1) Either there was a time when God began to exist, which is impossible (See Genesis 1:1, Ps 41:13, Ps. 90:2, Ps. 106:48). Therefore, God exists timelessly (529). He explains himself well by using the example of Gods existence in our lifetimes as humans. He writes, It makes sense to say that God endures all through my life and the history of the universeas regards individuals in time it makes no sense to say, at any time in their lives, that God does not exist. But to license such expressions is not to imply that God exists in time (528). 2) His writing, being in time, is simultaneous with what he writes, but the act of writing is not simultaneous with any of the events that occur in the work, not even if the author writes himself into the story. Since God is time-less in the sense of being time-free (529), it follows logically that one may talk of times as they relate to when God created the heavens and the

earth. That is, this time is put into human framework for understanding, just as Ezekiel described the four living creatures as having the likeness of a human, or Daniel who described what he saw as one like a Son of Man. Their understandings of what they wrote down (though inspired) were perceived from a human framework. However, this time as persons would consider it cannot be thought to be simultaneous with how God though of time to be when he (from HIS framework) was creating the heavens and the earth, or even men and women. Helm writes, In other words, the analogies indicate how it is possible and natural to talk of two different times, but not how it is possible to talk of the relation between timelessness and time, the timelessness of Gods eternity and the time of His creation (524). The frameworks are completely different. This is how there are no temporal relations (that is, relating to a time, or a tense of when). And so the final point is: 3) Gods eternal existence has no temporal relations whatever to any particular thing which He creates (that is, He exists outside of our framework). This does not mean that there are no relations at all between the eternal God and his creation, only no temporal relations. Compared to Wolsterstoff, Helm gives a much fuller definition of what eternality means, because of the fact that Wolsterstoff gives such a narrow definition of eternality. This is why Im sticking with Helm. He paints the best picture of the always-existing God and also puts a nice touch on helping the reader to think about timelines more through the lens of whose framework one may be thinking through. This will help to consider the difference between the timeless reality of God and the timed reality of man.

Question 3 Swinburne and Hume both agree that there is at least a logical possibility of miracles (that is, a violation of the law of nature, according to Hume). Hume more than once comments on the sheer plausibility of things happening that are not bound by the laws of nature. He writes, Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknoldged that this guide is not altogether infallibleone who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of Decemberbut it is certain that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken (430). Swinburne writes, All claims about what are the laws of nature are corrigible. However much support any purported law has at the moment, one day it may prove to be no true law (428). If this is the case, and corrigibility is really on the table, no law can really be taken to be sure. It can be reasonably relied upon based on past experience. What the reader may find in their contrast is that Hume unabashedly sticks to empiricism. To Hume, miracles simply cannot happen because there is not a proof that can reasonably show that said miracle really happened. He comments that there is no real way a miracle can be confirmed or established, for sheer lack of testimony in a way that to not believe it would actually be the miracle. This is logically fallible. C.S. Lewis writes of a man like this. He says, The man I have in view believes that mere experience (and specially those artificially contrived experinces which we call Experiments) can tell us what regularly happens in Nature. And he thinks that what we have discovered excludes the possibility of miracles. This is a confusion of mind. 1 For Hume, miracles are simply contrary to what we know empirically,

1

C.S. Lewis, Miracles.

though he does assert that logically there could be a black swan out there, even if all we have observed are white swans. As said earlier, the two compare here. However, for Swinburne, miracles (if one were to occur) are not necessarily a breaker of the laws of nature. He astutely points out that the laws of nature are merely place holders, not true laws. He says, When an event apparently violates such laws, the appearance may arise simply because no one has thoughts of the true law which could explain the event. In this sense, Swinburne is not as rigid as Hume on the laws of nature. He is more willing to bend in lieu of the fact that all the laws are corrigible, that is, capable of being corrected or reformed. In this, he addresses the physical improbability of said occurrences, believing, I think, that most laws are merely purported and that we may be reasonably sure that such things as levitation, resurrection, turning water into wine without the assistance of a chemical apparatus or catalyst (429) are physically impossible. Hume calls upon testimony and evidence, while Swinburne more or less relies on physical possibility while not being certain that our laws of nature would really be violated. Rather, they would be newly informed. Both agree that there could be a black swan. What I consider to be two of the most dangerous objection to miracles are twofold. If one were to take the principle logic that miracles can happen and turn it around on its head, the argument is just as strong as the one of corrigibility. If all we know about the physical world is corrigible, then what we know about a supernatural world is certainly corrigible. And if thoughts about this world are corrigible, it is completely reasonable to say that said world (and the God who rules it) are also corrigible ideas. This is a logically sound argument. Alongside that is the development issue--that is, one may say "this is not a miracle; it is merely an instance of happenings that we cannot yet explain, much like medical advances that have been made over

the past 100 years. Some may have been considered miracles then, when we know now that apparent healings, etc. could have been simply explained by the removal of a toxic or infectious element accidentally or otherwise. But it is precisely the lack of supernatural speak that causes me to form my definition of miracles, and thus deals with what I consider to be some of the most dangerous arguments against. I define miracles as supernatural events brought about by supernatural beings imposing their power on a certain situation in order to alter the situation and thus the perceived understanding of the laws of nature. I believe this deals with the problems in the only way that I can combat the problems, and that is by operating under the biblical truths of how God performed miracles in the OT and the NT. The defense I would have to make could start logically by positing that there could be black swans (miracles) because it is simply logical to say that something might be there, since we have no proof to say otherwise. The defense I would have to make would inevitably end with faith in a supernatural God, and a supernatural Enemy, both who are shown in the bible to bring about miracles (i.e. Jobs sores, the temptation of Jesus by the enemy, and various healings, multiplying food, and raising the dead to life by Jesus). This stands in harmony with my definition that miracles are supernatural events. Our natural understandings are just that-natural. Question 4 Davis concludes that the mind and the body are not separate, and that in order for the mind to function, there must be a body, for the mind is part of the body, and to have true and genuine life after death, there must be a resurrection of the body. Davis writes that when the body dies, I no longer exist (704). This is because he sees validity in the mind-body unity argument, save the fact that the issue of the immortality of the soul being unresolved. Though I do not find that Davis really settles on a belief, he does seem to give a lot of thought to the

immortality of the soul, referencing the thought that if there is something that lives despite the death of the body (mind, soul, spirit, or whatever), then it must survive death and carry on to somewhere. The problem lies in personal identity i.e. who am I? A body, or the soul that is within me? Death ends all theorists say that all which we are is wrapped up in our bodies, and that death ends everything. Davis believes (I think) that life after death is possible, but only with a bodily resurrection. How that happens (say, for a man ripped to shreds and eaten by sharks) remains a mystery to Davis, though He does posit that perhaps God will use them (atoms) as building blocks around which to reconstruct the rest of Joness body out of new atoms (707). He concludes, Genuine and true human life, to the extent that it is possible after bodily death, is only possible via resurrection of the body (707). Bertrand Russell completely ignores resurrection, and honestly equates belief in life after death with a human attempt to cope with fear. To him, there is no self besides a series of memories, feelings, or experiences. He writes, ..I regard as myself of yesterday; but, in fact, myself of yesterday was only certain mental occurrences which are now remembered and are regarded as a part of the person.all that constitutes a person is a series of experiences connected by memory...and habit (721). It does not seem that Russell carries any belief of life after death. And so this muddled mess that we are in really provides no evidence of a incorporeal soul that would carry on. Russell would posit that the end of our existence bodily is just that. Peter Geach basically argues that there cannot be existence apart from some sort of living body. The body and the spirit complete the human person, and so it would be impossible to be

something while being disembodied. Disembodiment is non-existence to Geach, and so he fights against the Platonic view that the makeup of a person is immaterial, since there seems to be no

precedent for understanding how an immaterial being would see, hear, think, etc. For life after death to occur (in Geachs summation), there must be at least a persistent possibility of the souls again entering into the make-up of a man who is identifiably Peter Geach (728). To Geach, without a body recognizable as me, there can be no sameness between me now and me after death, as me isnt complete without the material conditions of identity being fulfilled. So what I believe Geach to be saying is that if there is life after death, it must be a resurrection life, in order to have life at all. Geach writes, So the upshot of our whole argument is that unless a man comes to life again by resurrection, he does not live again after death. At best some mental remnant of him would survive death; and I should hold that the possibility even of such survival involves at least a permanent capacity for resurrection (731).

Further, he writes, ..Apart from the possibility of resurrection, it seems to me a mere illusion to have any hope for life after death. Geach touches on some biblical truth here, and so it is with him that I find to be the most insightful/compelling because he sees that there must be a recognizable me to have life after death. For who else would be existing if it wasnt me, who else would be thinking, experiencing, or feeling? And what body would said mind have to do such? Perhaps the most crucial question is: how is a body resurrected from a pile of ashes, or reconstructed from particles of dust, or put back together after being cremated? And how is said consciousness reunited as a mind to that body? On a naturalistic level, and even on a philosophical level, there is no reason to expect that from a human corpse there will arise at some future date a new human body, continuous in some way with the corpse (731). My response is what Paul writes to the Corinthians in 1 Cor 15:35-37, 42-44, and 50.

But someone will ask, How are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they come? You foolish person! What you sow does not come to life unless it dies. And what

you sow is not the body that is to be, but a bare kernel, perhaps of wheat or of some other grain So is it with the resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable; what is raised is imperishable. It is sown in dishonor; it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness; it is raised in power. It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body I tell you this, brothers: flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable. When addressing life after death, these philosophers do not address the power of an eternal God promises in his word that we will receive new bodies, that is, heavenly bodies. The picture given in Luke 9:30-33 says that Moses and Elijah stood with Jesus on the mount of transfiguration. These men were recognizable, as was Jesus, even in his transfigured state. They had received the imperishable body, but it was not an unrecognizable body. Also I believe that there is too much quibbling over what constitutes identity. Even in the language of the perishable putting on the imperishable, one may not fully understand this, for the secret things belong to the Lord our God.2 The Spirit gives life, the flesh is no help at all. The picture of the resurrection body should be one of a mind settled upon the fact that God will give a new body, however he chooses to do so. BIBLE INVESTIGATION Question 1 The free will defense comes in basically two threads, 1) God did not make people to be robots, but he made them free to live freely. Since people are free, what they do is up to them. 2) Considering that much evil is explicable by human actions, it is possible to think of evil in terms of God allowing for the possible consequences of him willing a great good (574). Alvin Plantinga writes, If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions an/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he wont.3 He further goes on to explain that in

2 3

Deut. 29:29 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil.

order for there to be moral good, there must be moral evil, that is, one doing something that offends someone else, and also creates a situation in which he or she is made to be sub-human. The heart of the free-will defense then, is that it is indeed possible that God could not have created a world with moral good unless he created one that also contained moral evil. And so it follows (if indeed God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good) that He may very well have a good reason for creating a world containing evil. Two passages for supporting this free-will defense are Genesis 2:15-17 and 3:15. The story shows all the elements of the Free will defense. 1) God gave Adam a commandment not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. As it were, he did not force Adam (or Eve) to obey (which can be clearly seen in chapter 3). The two chose to eat the fruit. They were not robots, but were in relationship and exercised a will. Secondly, considering the above argument, the evil that came about (and the subsequent curse) was brought about by mens choosing. But it was because of this moral evil that moral good could exist, and God could use this good to restore sub-humanity to perfect humanity. In the mind of God, being omniscient, He had well considered the consequences of this, but had a greater good planned which the reader will find in 3:15: I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and her offspring; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel. This protoevangelium was the prophetic voice of God speaking of the greater good to come in Christ. It is through this greater good that God could look forward to and pass over former sins (Rom. 3:25), and through which men could find redemption from the curse found in Genesis 3. This paints the picture of a greater good that God would accomplish through the evil done by men and women. This good found in Christ is not only for the spiritual good of peoples souls, but also for the good of the creation that would also be redeemed. Romans 8:18-20 points this out, and

also provides more grounds for the coming of Gods greater good, which leads into defense of eschatological theodicy, but this will come later. Question 2 John Hick writes, And so man, created as a personal being in the image of God, is only the raw material for a further and more difficult stage of Gods created work.4 1 Peter 2:2-3, 10 and Romans 5:3-5 strongly show that the soul-building theodicy is scripturally credible. Romans 5:3-5 shows that sufferings (evil) are actual occurrences, but one should not simply sit down in ashes and wish that said suffering was over. For it may be that God has an intention of building that person up into something stronger and better for His glory, and for their good. Paul makes it overtly clear in 5:3-4 by suggesting that one should dare to rejoice in sufferings knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope. It can be clearly seen here that this person is moving forward in growth, gaining something (or more of something) that was not there before. This paints a clear picture of Gods intentions of soul-building in the face of evil. 1 Peter 2:2-3 describes the believers as newborn babies. These babies were ready only for pure spiritual milk in order to grow up to salvation. This is also seen when Paul, in a very frustrating way, berates the Corinthian church for not growing like they should, that is, to spiritual solid food (see 1 Cor 3:1-2). Both instances, both Timothy and 1 Corinthians insist that there are those Christians who are infants, and those who are not (or who should be growing out of infancy). 1 Peter 2:10 describes the process even more so, giving the result of Gods work of grace in the lives of people, Once you were not a people, but now you are Gods people; once you had not received mercy, but now you have received mercy. There

4

John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 290.

is a growth of the spiritual self taking place (even in the face of sufferings and evils) in all of these examples, which provide a rich explanation for the soul-building theodicy. Question 3 2 Corinthians 4:7-18 is a section of 2 Corinthians that deals with the New Covenant power of the resurrection. And since the resurrection is the conduit through which Christians will be brought into realization of hope, this passage deals an eschatological theodicy. In 7-14, Paul paints a picture of the initial results of the sufferings that the church is experiencing (being afflicted, perplexed, persecuted, and struck down). He also shows what this hope in Christ delivers (not being crushed, driven to despair, forsaken, or destroyed). This hope is described in v. 14, knowing that he who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus and bring us with you into his presence. The eschatological hope found here is that though the church suffers now, it may look forward to the day when the church will be raised to new life with Jesus Christ (into his presence). 7-14 show that they not only have reason for persevering now, but look to this power in the face of adversity as a sure sign that they will experience resurrection life at the end of the age (v. 16-18). The theodicy comes through here and reflects all three (Gods greater good, soul-building, and eschatological) theodicies. They are suffering, but are not crushed, and so press forward for the kingdom (they are living for a greater good). All the while they are growing in hope and being renewed day by day (soul-building), as well as looking forward to the end of the age where the same power that raised Jesus Christ from the grave will raise them also, and bring them into His presence. There is a point to the evil that is being experienced. Secondly, 2 Cor 5:1-5 speaks more clearly about the heavenly home that believers in Christ are looking forward to going home to the heavenly dwelling, after getting out of the tent of a body in which they now dwell. While tent paints the picture of moveable, temporary, put up

and taken down, a dwelling paints the picture of a house with a foundation that is lasting; a place to dwell long term (and as we understand, eternally). Paul writes of groaning and being burdened in this tent (body), but looking forward to the day when what is mortal may be swallowed up in life (an eternal body), something heavenly, eternal, something better to look forward to that is the next step after groaning and being burdened in the earthly tent. In this the eschatological theodicy is well represented, as John Hick writes, ..Christian theodicy must point forward to that final blessedness, and claim that this infinte future good will render worth while all the pain and travail and wickedness that has occurred on the way to it. Theodicy cannot be content to look to the past, seeking an explanation of evil in its origins, but must look towards the future, expecting a triumphant resolution in the eventual perfect fulfillment of Gods good purpose.5 Question 4 Biblical authors chiefly explains Gods power as Creator. Isaiah writes in 25-26, To whom then will you compare me, that I should be like him? says the Holy One. Lift up your eyes on high and see: who created these? He who brings out their host by number, calling them all by name, by the greatness of his might, and because he is strong in power not one is missing. Isaiah 40:25-26 allows the reader to understand that God is powerful (all powerful) over all that has been made, as He is Creator. Whats more, it shows his control over these things, a part of divine omnipotence by 1) Asking the question To whom then will you compare me, that I should be like him? The begged answer is nobody. God is most Holy. 2) Making creation into a wtiness: Lift up your eyes and see: who created these? The stars in the sky, some say, have been numbered at trillions upon trillions. But God has placed them there, and knows them by name. Indeed, who else could know this? Gods omnipotence is represented in creation, and

5

Hick, 376.

within His omnipotence, the ability to control that nature; because He is strong in power not one is missing. Job 26:7-14 also speaks of Gods omnipotence. The author of Job writes, He stretches out the north over the void and hangs the earth on nothingBehold these are but the outskirts of his ways, and how small a whisper do we hear of him! But the thunder of His power who can understand? If one were to take a moment to consider the intricacies of how our world is suspended in space hanging on nothing, it may be difficult to conceive how such a feat has been accomplished and remains stable. However, the bible sustains its argument to show the reader that he upholds the universe by the word of his power.6 It is only an omnipotent God who for him nothing will be impossible. 7 However, some scriptures do indicate that God is limited, but as as a precursor, I believe that omnipotence and Gods limits harmonize. In Hebrews 6:17-18 show that God cannot lie. This is not a strike against his power, but rather bolsters his good character. Not having the ability to lie does not weaken Gods power, nor does the biblical writer intend for this to be the case. In fact, it harmonizes with Gods omnipotence that he is able to uphold such a promise made to Abraham. If he was weakened by the ability to lie, his reliability and omnipotence could not be trusted. But it is the cosmic power of faithfulness that God has in order to keep such a promise to make a people his people in the face of disobedience and filth. What human could keep an oath so faithfully? None. Furthermore, James 1:17 states that Every good and perfect gift comes down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change. So secondly, God

6

Hebrews 1:3 (ESV) Luke 1:37

7

cannot change. Some may take this argument and run with it to say that this weakens Gods strength because humans have this power to learn and to grow and to become smarter over time. Seeing God as stuck may influence some to believe that he is somehow weaker because He cannot change. However, James is operating under perfect-being theology. That is, God is a perfect being. He knows all, he is fully aware, and he needs not learn anything because he already knows everything. Nothing occurs to him. If something did occur to God, the reader would find themselves in open theism. God would then be reduced to a divine creature who is waiting for the next thing to come so that He might decide what is best based on sociological and cultural events. This indeed limits God. To sum up, Aquinas writes, As we have shown , God is called omnipotent with regard to ative power, not passive power. That he cannot be in motion or undergo action does not disagree with omnipotence. To sin is to fall short of full activity. Hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall in doing, which cannot be reconciled with omnipotence. It is because God is omnipotent that he cannot sin. In Gods omnipotence he is unable to sin and change. Inability does not prove Gods omnipotence as it pertains to these two things. Rather, it proves his omnipotence since it is sin and change that mark humans as finite beings, broken from what they should really be. Question 5 As a buffer, it must be said that the passages described forthwith only seem to imply an intermediate state. 1 Peter 3:18-19 is perhaps one of the most complex passages to think about when it comes to where Jesus was when he was made alive in the spirit. Despite other interpretations of this passage, we will focus on a single interpretation, that there is a place of holding in between death and the final resurrection. Peter writes,

For Christ also suffered once for sins, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit, in which he went and proclaimed to the spirits in prison.. This passage may seem to imply an intermediate mainly because of the phrase being put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit, in which he went and proclaimed to the spirits in prison. The intermediate state shows that we could alternatively understand alive in the spirit to refer to the activity of the spirit of Jesus during the period between this bodily death and resurrection.8 Otherwise, the spirits who are in prison seem to be in some sort of holding place (i.e. prison) that is somewhat ambiguous, and if taken at face value, seems to be a place where these spirits are being preached to as a second chance to respond positively to the Gospel before the time when they will move from prison (perhaps this could be a translation of said passage). For the purposes of seems to imply, this translation could work. Secondly, Revelation 6:9-11 gives a pretty clear picture (not nearly as ambiguous as 1 Peter) that indeed there is a state of being with Christ before the final judgement. John writes, When he opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slain for the word of God and for the witness they had borne. They cried out with a loud voice, O Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long before you will judge and avenge our blood on those who dwell on the earth? Then they were each given a white robe and told to rest a little longer, until the number of their fellow servants and their brothers should be complete, who were to be killed as they themselves had been. One would observe here that these faithful martyrs are waiting upon the vindication of their martyrdom, and since there are more left to be martyred, this snapshot of heaven seems to be before the general resurrection. This implies an intermediary state with the Lord after death, but before the general resurrection. Looking at passages that might imply an unconscious existence, 1 Thess. 4:13-15 may be interpreted to this understanding. Paul writes, But we do not want you to be uninformed,8

D.A. Carson, New Bible Commentary, 1380.

brothers, about those who are asleep, that you may not grieve as others do who have no hope. For since we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have fallen asleep. This passage could be interpreted to understand those who have fallen asleep as dead physically, but consciously alive, though their soul be asleep and waiting for the day when God will bring them (at the coming of the Lord) with him to heaven. This passage insinuates a state of unconscious soul sleep, and also shows that the person (in some sense) will be brought to be with the Lord (in a recognizable fashion, hence those). Ecclesiastes 9:5-6 says, For the living know that they will die, but the dead know nothing, and they have no more reward, for the memory of them is forgotten. Their love and their hate and their envy have already perished, and forever they have no more share in all that is done under the sun. The phrasing but the dead know nothing may be interpreted to mean that the dead have no consciousness, but that they are rather in a state of non-consciousness or even non-existence [they have no more reward] (the only problem here is that there is not mention of whether or not the soul carries on at all, and to take this passage out of context is theologically unsound and does not line up with the whole counsel of scripture). The other problem with this passage is that it does not follow the testimony of scripture of a future judgment, dwelling with God, or separation from God. It simply addresses an unconscious or non-existence. Personally, I see Pauls writings in 2 Corinthians 5:6-8 to be compelling enough to convince me that after I die, I will immediately be with the Lord in an even more personal sense, as I am away from the Lord when I am in the body. He writes, So we are always of good courage. We know that while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, not by sight. Yes, we are of good courage, and we would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord.

The understanding that I glean here is logical. If one is away from the Lord while in the body, then it follows (and is actually said later in the passage) that to be apart from the body means to be with the Lord. And so there does seem to be an intermediate state before the resurrection when believers will be with the Lord. See also the fact that Jesus told the criminal in Luke 23:43 that he would be with him in paradise that day. Since Jesus second coming didnt happen during the day that Jesus body was in the ground, and since Jesus said that the criminal would be with him in paradise, it follows that 1) to be apart from the body means to be with the Lord or apart from him (see also Luke 16:23 as an example) and 2) Jesus himself went to be in paradise with the criminal, and it is not logically fallible to say that if the criminal went to be with Jesus in paradise, that one may reasonably say that paradise is heaven and 3) Going to be with the Lord (or not) is an intermediate state after death and before the general resurrection. INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION QUESTION 1 I might first make sure that the husband was in a place where he could have a really honest conversation about the suicide. I would perhaps first ask him what his thoughts on her suicide were, instead of just right away telling him my thoughts about the death of his sister. I would then perhaps ask if he thought that God has a plan for what happens on the earth, or if he believes that God has control. Perhaps his answer would be yes. Since he came asking about Gods involvement, I do not think that this would be going too far. We may visit the story of Job, and of Joseph in Genesis. In both cases, the main character of the story faces an unbelievable amount of suffering. Job faced the death of his children, the loss off all his material things, and even suffers personal affliction. Joseph is betrayed by his own brothers (despite his lofty dreams), sold into slavery, wrongfully accused by Potiphars wife, and thrown into prison. However, Joseph himself sees at the end of the day that you meant evil against me, but God

meant it for good Jobs story is not so clean. God never gives an answer. He simply outlines his power in creation and upholding the universe. Job simply replies with Behold I am of small account; what shall I answer you? I lay my hand on my mouth. I would encourage my friend to trust in Gods goodness, or else, trust in his sovereignty. If we believe and hold in faith that God is indeed wholly good (which may or may not be the case of our dear friend here), then we must believe that even if God allowed a suicide to happen, He had good in His mind all along. To challenge the Almighty is not healthy, and whats more, ..who has known the mind of the Lord, and who has been his counselor? I would not urge my friend to get over it, but to begin searching for Gods good plan revealed (theodicy), after a time of mourning the loss of a sister. It may be that God was preparing my friend to grow, preparing him for a future of ministry opportunities, or preparing him to cling closer to the goodness of God. The issue isnt really the fairness here, my friend is really wondering How could God let this happen IF.? Question 2 I might first tell my friend what I believe about God-that he is a perfect being and that there is none greater than Him. There is no way I could start this conversation without stating my presupposition about God. Logically it would follow that if God had a beginning, or a cause, there would be something greater than God, and my entire life would then be bent upon finding and worshipping that god who was ultimately the ruler and creator of all. And then if that creator had a creator and so on, my search would be infinite. I might also mention that in order for the world to exist, it is necessary that a Creator God exist because indeed, everything created must have a cause. I would tell my friend that it makes no logical sense for me to believe in something with no beginning. However, it would be inevitable for me to make any sort of argument with my friend apart from faith. It is by faith that I believe God exists. And if what

the bible says about this God is true, is it worth it for my friend to deny this God and his salvation? True, this is not fully answering his question, nor could it. However, it could be a good starting point for an apologetic. At this point, I would rather my friend to begin considering the existence of God as the bible portrays him. It would not be the time to launch out into a full philosophical discussion on the necessity of Gods existence (because there is really no explanation anyway). Question 3 To my instructor I might ask, Is science certainly not concerned with faith? Is any hypothesis that a scientist makes not a faithful conclusion? Is a hypothesis not based on faith when scientists have made such a proposed explanation (about whatever) that is not currently totally verifiable? Surely there is not a scientist anywhere who would say that there isnt at least a possibility that a law of nature could be suspended. I might say, Granted, experiments measure what goes on normally in nature. Insofar as science relies on experiments and experience (facts) to come to reasonable conclusions, so do the religious. Perhaps I would share with the professor about text criticism, social studies, or the great endeavor to uncover the original manuscripts of the bible, or documents citing Jesus resurrection. We too have a basis of what we believe to be fact on which we rest our faith in God and his ability to work miracles and suspend Nature. Does science not do the same thing when it comes down to natural law? Further, how could natural science, which measures the measurable, be able to measure whether or not the supernatural occurs? My professor may be a man that says that what can be measured by experiments (regularly occurring natural events) rule out miracles, but how can this be so if they only measure what regularly occurs? My instructor would have to rule out the logical possibility of natural law being suspended, and that is impossible to do. For even if every

swan he had ever seen was white, he has only seen what swans his eyes can behold, and it logically follows that there may be a black swan somewhere. What science has come to report certainly does not rule out the possibility of miracles which, being supernatural in essence, could not be measured nor disproved by a lonely experiment. Therefore, laws of nature merely report to us what occurs in nature. What of the chance that this something that occurs could change? It is possible, and the law would be re-written when A is no longer true and B is true. So, science has not disproved miracles, and cannot. However, I would agree with my professor that faith does absolutely play a role in what I believe, though my belief in impossible things is completely rational and logical. Faith cannot be flippantly regarded to be ridiculous. Religious people believe in the possibility of the impossible happening. We believe by faith alone, but with good logic as well. Question 4 I assume that my friend is a Christian if she is speaking about faith in scripture. So I might say, What do you have faith in? Words? Timothy Keller reminds us that weak faith in a strong branch is infinitely and eternally more significant than strong faith in a weak branch. If my friend is putting faith in her ability to have faith, she is mistaken. For it is Jesus who is a guarantor of a better covenant, and it is him who upholds our salvation, not our works. Besides, I might say, what do you think the resurrection was? Or what is your definition of a miracle? Was the Resurrection a normal everyday thing, or was it the supernatural power of God who raised Jesus from the grave? If miracles are supernatural events brought about by supernatural beings imposing their power on a certain situation in order to alter the situation and thus the perceived understanding of the laws of nature, then the resurrection must be a miracle. Even if that is not the definition, one cannot say definitively that the resurrection of

Christ from the dead was normal. Paul wrote, If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. If then the resurrection is a miracle (and it is), we believe nothing if we are putting our faith in nothing. And from that it follows that our faith is futile if this miracle didnt actually happen. Our entire faith hinges on the resurrection, and if it didnt happen (a miracle), we are utterly lost. And what of the Incarnation? I might ask my friend, Was the virgin birth of Christ a miracle? No doubt she would say yes. How could she disagree? The prophet Isaiah prophesied in Isaiah 7 that Christ would come, born of a virgin. It is by his unique birth that he is crowned the God-man. Is this a normal occurrence, or is this a miracle? If we do not put faith in this miracle, then we cannot effectively believe that Christ is God incarnate, we cannot believe that what he did in feeding 5,000, turning water into wine, or giving the blind sight to be true. If he did not do these things, he was nothing more than a man. And a mere man cannot bear the wrath of God on our behalf on the cross. It is by faith that we believe these things happened which are the basis for our belief that Christ is who He says he is. We must believe in the miracles. Question 5 Assuming that cloning could happen, I do not see a need of the mind or body for the soul to live on. Indeed we can see in scripture, that though the body dies, the soul carries on with eternal life or eternal death (See Luke 16:18-31). It would be impossible to say that there isnt a relationship between what one experiences spiritually or religiously and what they then decide to use their body for. I think Descartes has something interesting to consider in the Dualistic Theory. It does not seem too far of a stretch to say that there is an aspect of human beings that does the thinking, that is, the soul or mind (incorporeal) and a part of humans that is raw, mechanical, and driven by the senses or used to complete actions or mathematical equations

(corporeal). That part would also be controlled by the mind, not the brain. The brain would be the conduit through which the mind uses to complete physical activity. However, there is something deeper than just genetics and mechanics when it comes down to a human person, and what Isaiah 49:1 says about being called from the womb certainly rings in accordance with Psalm 139:13-18 when the psalmist speaks of God knowing the substance and form of a person before birth, and knitting them together in their mothers womb. So it does not seem that the biblical doctrine is dualistic, but that the whole person is comprised of both body and soul, however the two may work together, even though the example of the rich man in torment insinuates memories in the afterlife. In light of this, if a person is to carry on after death, it must be that the soul or the mind is what keeps the memories a person makes, though the mental (brain) faculties of a person were put into use during life to recall facts, memories, process mathematics, etc. Further, it does make sense of something immaterial or incorporeal relating to something material, as I have suggested above. 2 Tim 1:7 speaks of a spirit that God has given us that elicits power and self control over actions, and further John 16:13 tells that the Spirit (incorporeal) will guide us into all truth. This truth related through an immaterial Spirit guides our actions (into all truth) and makes us sow to the Spirit and not to the flesh; that is to turn from certain actions in the flesh (material) and obey the Spirit influence (immaterial). And so, an immaterial Spirit influences material (brain and body) actions. As it pertains to cloning then, we should consider the tower of Babel. Just as it wasnt a problem that the people at Babel made bricks, the problem isnt with biotechnology; it is with what people would do with said biotechnology. At Babel the people decided to build a city and a tower: it would be their prize and a great feat of human ingenuity and self-sufficiency apart from

God. They even went as far as to try and go against Gods will to disperse humans all across the face of the planet. This technology of the day would have given them supreme confidence in themselves, believing that they had no need for God. They could build a tower to Him! The situation with cloning/biotechnology is verily similar. Further, it wouldnt make sense, for example, to clone a loved one, hoping that they would be just like grandmother, or father, or brother. What constitutes a persons identity, reactions, etc. is what they have gone through in life. Their experiences with God, experiences on the earth, experiences elsewhere make up how they respond to family, friends, situations, and contexts. A newly cloned brain would not contain such content, and in that particular instance, would be just like an infant: tabula rasa. Genetic duplication could not reproduce grandmother in her fullness. To do so would be a major let down, and no help at all. I see the holes in my argument. One may say, So perhaps we shouldnt use medicine or go to hospitals, etc. I am not saying that this is an infallible, or that it is meant to be. It is merely an attempt to deal with the issue biblically, and provide some sort of response.