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TRANSCRIPT
Co-funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the
European Union
Workshop1EthicsandLegalIssuesInventory
Deliverable4.1
Authors:UniversityofWarwick&TNO
PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS REPORT IS A FINAL DRAFT AND IS AWAITING FINALACCEPTANCEBYTHEEUROPEANCOMMISSION.
Whencitingpleaseuse:MEDIA4SEC(2016)ReportonStateoftheArtReview
Reportleadauthors:
KatHadjimatheou(UniversityofWarwick)andArnoldRoosendaal(TNO)
Contents
ExecutiveSummary............................................................................................................................................i
1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................1
1.1 MEDI@4SEC......................................................................................................................................1
1.2 WorkPackage4...............................................................................................................................1
1.3 Deliverable4.1(D4.1)...................................................................................................................1
2. EthicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwithDIYpolicinginitiatives...................2
2.1 EthicalIssues.....................................................................................................................................2
2.2 LegalIssues........................................................................................................................................4
3. EthicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwithspecificDIYpolicingplatforms...8
3.1 Vigilante,Open112........................................................................................................................9
3.2 Self-Evident.....................................................................................................................................11
3.3 TrafficDroid/PrivateDashcam..............................................................................................12
3.4 DigitalPillories..............................................................................................................................13
3.5 MafiaMapping...............................................................................................................................14
3.6 Neighbourhoodwatch................................................................................................................15
3.7 Bellingcat.........................................................................................................................................16
3.8 Reddit................................................................................................................................................17
3.9 Opit,Stinson,Websleuthsetc..................................................................................................18
3.10 Doxing...............................................................................................................................................19
3.11 Crowd-sourcedmissingpersonsidentificationplatforms.........................................20
3.12 Prey,FindmySmartphone…...................................................................................................21
3.13 PolicingthePoliceApps............................................................................................................22
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ExecutiveSummary
This report summarises ethical and legal issues raised in connection with citizen-ledpolicingandsecurityplatformsthatmakeuseofsocialmedia.Theseissueswereraisedat theMEDI@4SEC ‘DIYPolicing’Workshop that tookplace on9th Jan2017 inBerlin,Germany. The workshop brought together 58 people, including police officers,researchers and citizen activists, to discuss digital citizen-led and citizen-influencedsecurityinitiatives.
The main ethical risks of DIY policing platforms identified in this report include:unjustified citizen interventions (vigilantism); overburdening of police with data;overburdening police with data whose utility is burdensome to verify; anddisproportionate visitation of suspicion on individuals from certain social/ethnicgroups. Benefits include: creation of a new model of ‘active citizenship’ and socialresponsibility; greater security for the public via preventive measures and betteridentificationofcriminals;and increasedtrust inpolicegeneratedthroughco-creationof security.Key legal risksofDIYpolicingplatforms include:disproportionateprivacyintrusions;dataprotectionviolations;andvigilantismleadingtoillegalacts.
Specific recommendations arising from the discussion in the workshop include thefollowing:
• Initiatives to educate people and enable cross-sector discussion and debateabouttheethicalandlegalrisksandbenefitsofDIYpolicingplatformsshouldbepursued.
• Relevantauthorities/collectiveorganisationsshouldseektocreateandenforceaglobaldigitalpolicy
• ThevisibilityofLEAsinthevirtualworldshouldbeincreased• Bestpracticesamongstsocialmediaplatformsinreactiontogrooming,bullying,
etc.shouldbeidentified.• Citizen perceptions and norms of self-regulation - their role and the role of
platforms–shouldbestudiedtoidentifywhatisseenaslegitimate.
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1. Introduction
1.1 MEDI@4SEC
MEDI@4SEC focuses upon enhancing understanding of the opportunities, challengesandethicalconsiderationofsocialmediauseforpublicsecurity:thegood,thebadandthe ugly. The good comprises using social media for problem solving, fighting crime,decreasing fear of crime and increasing the quality of life. The bad is the increase ofdigitisedcriminalityand terrorismwithnewphenomenaemerging through theuseofsocialmedia.Theuglycomprisesthegreyareaswheretrolling,cyberbullying,threats,orlive video-sharing of tactical security operations are phenomena to deal with duringincidents.Makinguseofthepossibilitiesthatsocialmediaoffer,includingsmart‘work-arounds’iskey,whilerespectingprivacy,legislation,andethics.Thischangingsituationraisesaseriesofchallengesandpossibilities forpublicsecurityplanners.MEDI@4SECwill explore this through a series of communication and dissemination activities thatengageextensivelywith a rangeof end-users tobetterunderstand theusageof socialmediaforsecurityactivities.MEDI@4SECwillseekabetterunderstandingofhowsocialmedia can, and how social media cannot be used for public security purposes andhighlight ethical, legal and data-protection-related issues and implications. Activitiescentre around six relevant themes: DIY Policing; Everyday security; Riots and massgatherings:Thedarkweb;Trolling;andInnovativemarketsolutions.MEDI@4SECwillfeedinto,supportandinfluencechangesinpolicy-makingandpolicyimplementationinpublic security that can be used by end-users to improve their decision making. Bystructuring our understanding of the impact of social media on public securityapproaches in a user-friendly way MEDI@4SEC will provide an evidence-base androadmapforbetterpolicymaking including:bestpracticereports;acatalogueofsocialmedia technologies; recommendations for EU standards; future training options; and,ethicalawarenessraising.
1.2 WorkPackage4
TheroleofWorkPackage4(WP4)istoidentifyethicalandlegalissuesarisingfromtheuse of social media for public security and policing purposes as well as to facilitateethicsprocedureswithintheproject.Ethicsandlegalissueswillbereportedforeachofthemedworkshops.1.3 Deliverable4.1(D4.1)
D4.1 Reports ethics and legal issues identified in the meeting: ‘DIY Policing - TheModern Sherlock’. Section 2 summarises themain issues that arose in the workshopdiscussion, while section 3 identifies issues arising in connection with the key DIYplatformsthatwerepresentedduringtheworkshop.
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2. Ethical and legal issues arising in connection with DIY policinginitiatives
Inthissectionwereportthecross-cuttingethicalandlegalissuesthataroseinthegroupdiscussionthroughouttheday.
2.1 EthicalIssues
2.1.1Therisksandpotentialbenefitsofareinvigorated‘activecitizenship’
DIY policing initiatives were recognised in discussions as encouraging and enablingcitizenstoparticipatemoreactivelyinthemaintenanceofpublicsecurityandthatthisis, on thewhole, apositivedevelopment. For example, itwas recognised that in somejurisdictionscitizensarereluctanttoengageinanywaywithpolice,mainlyduetoalackof trust in policing. In places such as this, inwhich reporting rates are very low, DIYplatforms cangive citizens theoptionof reporting crimes fast andanonymously, thusencouraging increased cooperation with police. Similarly, on social media platforms,initiativessuchascodesofconduct, reportingbuttons,blocking featuresand ‘counter-speak’ can help discourage what was referred to in discussion as ‘voyeuristicparticipation’ - a type of participation where citizens observe certain forms ofundesirablebehaviourbuttheydon’tact.ItwasrecognisedthatDIYpolicingplatformscanhelptoencourage-butalsorelyfortheireffectivenesson-aculturalchangeamongplatformsandtheirusers.Inparticular,itwasfeltbysomethatthelibertarianInternetculture should be replaced by a culture of active but responsible citizenship. DIYinitiativeswere seenashaving thepotential to extend trust in fellowcitizens and theintrinsic drive to act that appears to exist in groups of citizens at a local level. In sodoing, they can harness the (often detailed) knowledge citizens have of their localsituation forpublicsecurityends.Moreactivecitizenparticipation inpolicingwas feltlikely to lead to citizen empowerment and eventually to a senseof improved securityamongst citizens. Further expected benefits include the development of a sense ofresponsibility among citizens to abide by the law, as well a sense of value andconnectedness among individuals within a society, adding to social capital. Greatereducation and awareness of as well as active involvement in generating ethicalstandardswith respect to such initiativeswereseenasvital to theireffectivenessandtheirlegitimacy.
On the other hand, concerns were expressed that enabling and even encouragingcitizens to intervene in matters of crime and security via DIY platforms can riskfostering the notion that privacy is something that can be bypassed in the fight forcriminal justice- for example, while searching for people involved in illegality,paedophile hunters “phish” sensitive information about people who are not doinganything illegal. Concerns were also expressed that widespread use of DIY platformsmay increasesuspiciousnessandharmtrust relationsamongcitizensaspeopleworrytheyarebeingmistakenlysuspectedofcrimesorevenmaliciouslyidentifiedascriminalsuspects by other citizens. An increased risk of litigiousness among citizenswas alsocited as a concern. Finally, risks arising from discrimination-driven crime reporting
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targetselectionbasedonsocialprejudicewerecitedasanareaofconcern,especiallyifplatformsareusedmorefrequentlybymembersofcertainsocialgroups.Specificsocialgroupsmaybeoverrepresentedininteractionsthroughsocialmediawhileothersmaynottakepartatallorneedfurtherencouragement.Itwasfeltthatcitygovernmentandpolicesshouldpromoteparticipationofminoritiesontheplatform.
2.1.2Risksandbenefitstothelegitimacyofpoliceandlocalauthorities
Itwasproposedindiscussionthatbyenablingcitizenstomakeasocialcontributiontopolicing,DIYplatformscanbridgethegapbetweenthepoliceandthecitizensandhelpprovidemore “legitimation”ofpoliceactivities andpractices in societies.Thismaybeespeciallybeneficialinjurisdictionsinwhichthereismistrusttowardsauthorities.Thepromiseof improvedtransparencyofgovernmentandpoliceservicesofferedbysomeplatformscouldalsocontributetoimprovementsintrust.Platformsdesignedtoenablecitizenstopolicethepolicearecontroversial,especiallyamongstLEAs,buteventhoseparticipantsfeltthatthesewerelikelytoleadtoimprovedqualityofpolicingandamorelegitimatepoliceforceoverall.Forexample,insteadofpushingouttheirownstoryofadebatable police intervention, the police could pro-actively ask the public to uploadtheirvideosof the intervention, andmakeuseofbodycams to find facts and supporttheirownstory.
2.1.3Overburdeningofpolicewithdata
ItwaswidelyrecognisedthatDIYplatformscanhelprelievesometheworkburdenofLEAsbya)crowdsourcingintelligenceandevidencefromindividuals,b)raisingoverallawareness on relevant issues (safety, privacy, etc.) among citizens and c) enablingcitizens todealwithpublicsecurity issuesbefore theyescalate to theextent that theyrequirepoliceintervention.However,worriesaboutthepotentialforoverburdeningofpolicewithdataanddemandsforinterventionbothatalocalandanationallevelwereexpressed,especiallybypoliceparticipants.Therewasasharedobservation that localpolice work currently comprises a large variety of activities andmultiplicity of tasksrelated to themaintenance of public order. In jurisdictions inwhich trust in police ishigh, civilians turn to them for support regarding all kinds of issues and incidentshappening in public space, many of them unrelated to crime, because of the greatvisibility and popularity of the police forces. This was considered unfortunate, as itburdenspoliceforceswithpettyincidentsandamultiplicityofrequeststhatcouldoftenbe dealt with better by other public services. By making crime reporting easier andfaster, DIY platforms might encourage even more over-reporting, or over-sharing ofdatawithpolice.Atthesametime,theymayencourageanexpectationthatreportswillbedealtwithbypolice;whenthatexpectationisnotfulfilled,thismayunderminetrustin and discourage use of the platform. As far as possible, DIY platforms should bedesignedwiththeneedforinformationtriageinmind.
Afurthersourceofburdenforpolicearisesfromthedifficultyofvalidatingsomekindsofcitizen-generateddata.
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2.1.4 Need for education and new cross-sector forums in which ethical issues can bediscussedandnewstandardsaccepted
Nearly all discussion groups cited the need for education on ethics online in order todevelop the kind of culture in which DIY policing initiatives can pursue securityeffectivelywithoutunderminingrightsandvalues.Proposalsrangedfromeducationinschoolsandpolicerecruitmentcollegestotheestablishmentofcommittees,roundtablesand other kinds of forums involving local elected officials, police representatives,researchers, NGOs, community leaders etc. to discuss ethical and legal challengespertainingtotheuseofsocialmediainpolicingactivities.
2.2 LegalIssues
As discussed in D1.3, DIY Policing raises a number of legal issues, depending on thetechnologyortypeofplatformused.DiscussionattheDIYPolicingworkshopinBerlinidentifiedlegalissuesatstakeandchallengesandopportunities.Discussionswerelivelyand diverse. Interestingly, the main issues were mentioned several times across thevariousroundtables.However,atsomepointsopinionsdiverged.Thispartofthereportstartswithageneraloverviewofthelegalissuesandthenconnectsthesetoanumberoftechnologiesthathavebeendiscussedduringtheworkshop.
2.2.1Abilityofthelawtokeepupwithtechnicalchange
Oneofthemainissuesraisedinrelationtotheinterplaybetweenlawandtechnologyisthat lawmaking is behind the facts. Technology moves fast and it would be of greatbenefit to all stakeholders if lawswere able to keepup, bothdomestically and acrossjurisdictions.Thisdoesnotmeanthatlawsandregulationsneedtochangeeverytimeanewappcomesout.Itdoesmeantheyneedtobeabletorecognizethecommonculturesand features across apps and regulate those. For example, all apps harvest massiveamounts of data (features); all apps that involve text boxes invite the same kind ofcommunication(cultures).Policeshouldrecognizethistoo,andshouldbetrainednottobecomeconfusedbyeachnewbitoftechnology.Eventhoughthis isadifficult issue, itwasgenerallyrecognizedthatthereisaneedformoretech-savvystaffatLEAs,whoareabletokeepupwithtechnologicaldevelopmentsandcancreateabridgebetweenLEAsandDIYPolicing initiatives. LEApresence andparticipation in socialmedia platformsdedicated to DIY Policing is essential for good collaboration. And only with goodcollaborationcanpoliceensurethatDIYPolicinginitiativesenhanceusualpolicework.
2.2.2Legalclarityandunderstandingofthelaw
Itwasacknowledged that there isaneed forproperknowledgeof the lawsrelated topolicing and the use of socialmedia in general. It is not always clearwhat exactly isallowed with regard to, for instance, the processing of personal data. The lack ofknowledge or proper understanding has a few different undesirable effects. Forexample, in some cases, people working at LEAs are hesitant to share information,becausetheyareafraidthat it isnotpermittedinthe law.Thisresults in lesseffectiveuse by LEAs of DIY Policing initiatives. Strikingly, during the workshop there weredifferent viewpoints on this. Some argued that privacy laws make it very difficult to
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shareinformationandtheselawsshouldbechanged,i.e.privacyconcernsshouldbesetasideincasesofinformationsharingaboutcriminalsorcrimes.Others,however,arguedthat current laws are very well suited to protect the fundamental rights of everyoneinvolved and still allow for enough options to share the necessary information. Theyindicatedthattheproblemsaremorerelatedtoeducationandknowingwhatisallowedandwhatispossible,andnotthatthelawsassucharetoostrict.
Manyappdevelopersorprovidersareunawareofthelegalrequirementsforlegitimatedataprocessing.Inaddition,manyoftheusersofappsareunawareaswell,andinsomecasesitiseasyandevenencouragedtoshareasmuchinformationaspossible.Thelackof legal safeguards and professional oversight becomes problematic here. Since theprofessionals involved are not trained in the requirements for legitimate dataprocessing,thereisariskthatmoreinformationwillbesharedthanislegallypermitted.Dataaboutpeople’ssuspectedinvolvementincrimeiscategorizedassensitivedataandtheirprocessing isessentiallyprohibited.Onlyunderspecificcircumstances, suchasalegalprovisionallowinganentitytoprocessthesedata,orwiththeconsentofthedatasubject,isprocessingallowed.Becauseoftheapplications,itcannotalwaysbeexpectedthat there will be consent of the data subject, and non-professionals will not usuallyhaveanotherlegalbasisfortheprocessing.
Withregardtoprivacy,thereisinfactagreatopportunityathandwiththeGeneralDataProtection Regulation (GDPR), which will be effective fromMay 25th 2017 on. In theGDPR,present rightswith regard to theprotectionofpersonaldataare strengthened,and some new requirements are added. Particularly relevant in the context of socialmediause isthemandatoryapplicationofDataProtectionbyDesign(DPbD)andDataProtection by Default. This means that all new forms of personal data processingactivitieshavetobedesignedinawaythatensurestheprotectionofprivacyrights.Newappsor informationexchangesystemsthataredevelopedhave to takeaccountof thisprinciple. If DPbD is implemented properly, the risks of unlawful personal dataprocessingarereduced.
There is a need for legal clarity on the admissibility of digital evidence in court. Inparticular,thereshouldbegreaterclarityonhowtocollectandstoredigitalevidence.Ifevidence is collected and shared, but cannot be used as legal evidence due to poorprocessing,e.g.withrespecttothewayitisstored,thebenefitdisappears.Someoftheappsdescribedbelowcanhelpwiththisissue,butstillitisverydifficulttohaveacleartrailtoverifytheoriginsofdigitalevidence.
2.2.3Laxapproachestodataprotectionandprivacybyvigilantesandcitizengroups
Vigilantes tend to overlook or be unaware of legal provisions in place (they tend toknowwhat is illegalbutalso tendto ignore therightsof theperpetrators,or theycanhavepersonalbiasesor interests).DIYpolicingcanleadto intrusionsintheprivacyofsuspected criminals, but also victims of crime. From a legal perspective, the correctbalancebetweenprivacyandsecuritymustbemaintained.So,theremightbeaneedforeducation on legal aspects, perhaps by integrating legal and ethical training in schoolcurricula. Other methods of training and education identified included publiccampaigns,andinvolvinginfluentialpeoplewhoarepeersofsocialmediausers,sucha
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vloggers.EndUserLicenseAgreements(EULAs)canalsohelpinobtainingconsentandprovidingtherightinformationtoparticipantsinDIYPolicingplatforms.Lettingpeopleknow how to use the platform and what is allowed and what is not can be a majorimprovement. Without proper education and a good communication and interactionstrategy,DIYparadigms canbe a stepback in the legal standards andhow the law isappliedwithregardtoethicalandlegalissues.
TheprovidersofDIYPolicingappshaveaccesstoagreatdealofcontentandpersonaldata,andmayberesponsibleasdatacontrollers,inwhichcasetheymustbecompliantwith data protection laws. Yet itmay be difficult for them tomonitor effectively andguide the way users process personal data when using the app. The processing ofpersonal data by users includes processing of data about themselves, such asinformation on user profiles and account details, as well as data about (alleged)criminals. Currently, the processing of these personal data is not always arrangedproperlyandinaccordancewiththelaw.Fortheprocessingofdataoftheusers,thereisoftennoproperinformedconsent.Andfortheprocessingofpersonaldataaboutothers,suchas(alleged)criminals,theremaybenolegitimategroundasrequiredinArticle6oftheGeneralDataProtectionRegulation(GDPR)atall.Inasimilarway,itisnotevidentthat the basic principles fromArticle 5GDPR are reliably or even typically respected.These include fair and lawful processing, data minimization, purpose specification(whichcanbeanissueinindividualcases),andstoragelimitation.
Participants/users of socialmedia applications for DIY Policing do sometimes exposeother individuals, such as (alleged) criminals. This exposure involves the sharing ofpersonaldataabout thesepeople.This can fall foulofdataprotection laws,whichareintended to protect the fundamental rights of natural persons, notably their right toprivacy (cf. Preamble paragraph 1 and 2 of the GDPR), by providing control overinformationbeingdisclosedorotherwiseprocessed.Theimpactcanbesevere.Notonlycantheamountofinformationsharingresultinmanhuntswherepeopletakethelawintheirownhands,andsomeone’s identitybeingmadepublic,regardlessofwhethertheperson in question is really a criminal. Even if someone appears to be innocentafterwards,thedamagetotheirreputationisveryhardtoundoorevenlimit,giventhepersistenceonlineof accusations. It is stillnot clearwhether the right tobe forgotten(Article17oftheGDPR)canbehelpfulinthesecases,butitmightprovidetheindividualwiththemeanstohaveonlinematerialsremovedfromsearchresultsat least(SeetheGoogle v. Costeja case of the ECJ). Legal safeguards, such as limited disclosure andverifiedqualityandintegrityof information,asappliedbyprofessionalssuchaspolicearenotinplace.Besides,evenifthepersonwhoseprivacyisinfringeduponisindeedacriminal,thisdoesnotimplythattheindividualhasforfeitedallprivacyrights.
Information shared online remains in the digital archives forever and this is an issueworthy of attention. Once posted online, information can be copied and shared andspread over the Internet. This is particularly likely in the case of information about(alleged) criminals. As a result, the privacy rights of people are infringed over a longtimeperiodanditisextremelydifficulttogetinformationremovedtostartwithacleansheet,evenaftersomeonehas,forinstance,beeninjailafteraconviction.
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2.2.4Cross-jurisdictionalbarriers
Next to the general problems surrounding the collection and use of digital evidence,cross-jurisdictional barriers are a real challenge to the pursuit of cyber criminals.Evidence procedures are barriers to using open source and other digital data toprosecute criminals. Moreover, it can be problematic if the police and DIY Policingactors across jurisdictions try to capture the same digital evidence and end upinterferingwith eachother.The fact that someone is trying to collect digital evidencemayalsobedetectedby criminals,whomay thenblock collection. It is,however, alsopossiblethatevidencebecomeslessreliableifdifferentpolicingactorshaveaccesseditandthe logs indicatethat ithasbeeninterferedwith.Eventhoughtheseproblemsaremoreofa technicalnature, the result canbe that judgesconsidermaterialsunreliablebecause of this tampering (even if this is ultimately attributed to a lack of technicalknowledge).Thepursuitofcriminaljusticemayinthiswaybeundermined.
2.3ConclusionsandRecommendations
ThefollowingmaintakeawaysfromtheworkshopforfutureresearchandactivitiestoimprovethebenefitsofsocialmediaforDIYPolicing:
§ Initiativestoeducatepeopleandenablecross-sectordiscussionanddebateabouttheethicalandlegalrisksandbenefitsofDIYpolicingplatformsshouldbepursued.
§ Relevantauthorities/collectiveorganisationsshouldseektocreateandenforceaglobaldigitalpolicy
§ ThevisibilityofLEAsinthevirtualworldshouldbeincreased§ Bestpracticesamongstsocialmediaplatformsinreactiontogrooming,bullying,
etc.shouldbeidentified.§ Citizenperceptionsandnormsofself-regulation-theirroleandtheroleof
platforms–shouldbestudiedtoidentifywhatisseenaslegitimate.
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3. Ethical and legal issues arising in connection with specific DIYpolicingplatforms
Inthissectionweidentifyethicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwiththespecificplatforms presented to the group at the start of themeeting. These are presented inbulletforminatabletoenableeasyreferenceforinterestedreaders.
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3.1 Vigilante,O
pen112
http://www.vigilante.live/#
Appsenablinglivelocation-traceableem
ergencycallstobesenttomem
bersofthepublicaswellaspoliceandfollow
eduponsocialmedia.
Vigilantehasmetw
ithcontroversy1andw
asremovedfrom
theAppleA
ppStore.
EthicalRisks• Canprom
ptdangerousinterventions(onesthatmultiplyvictim
s);• Leavesittopossiblyattention-seeking,excitem
entseekinguserstodecidew
hat’sasignificantincident;• Canencouragevoyeurism
compoundingvictim
ization;• Couldencouragepeopletocutoutpolice;
• Licensesover-film
ingandfilmingthatm
ightnotbeuseful/admissible
evidence;• Can
overburdenpolice
communications
channels,making
triageharder;
• May
beused
inways
thatreflect
preconceptionsabout
who
issuspiciousandhascrim
inalintent,causingwrongfulsuspiciontofall
morefrequentlyoncertaingroups.
LegalRisks• Them
ostobviouslegalissuewiththesekindoftechnologiesis
peopletaking
thelaw
in
theirow
nhands
without
beingprofessionallytrained.Thereisaneedforclearrulesofengagem
enthere.H
owever,theserulesofengagem
ent,oracodeofconduct,arenot
legallybinding
rules.The
lackof
legalrules
might
seem
problematicastherulesm
aynotbeenforceable,butparticipantsinthew
orkshopindicatedthatthereisusuallyaclearmechanism
ofself-correction
insocial
media
groupswhere
mem
berscorrect
misbehaviorofothers.Som
isbehaviorwillbecorrectedorpunished
bythegroupmem
bersthemselves.Ifm
embersinsistinnotabiding
therulesofengagementorim
plicitsociallyacceptablenorms,they
willbeexcludedfrom
thegroup.• Besidestherulesofengagem
entwithinthegroup,thereisthe
broaderlegalperspective.AppslikeVigilanteencouragepeopleto
makevideosofcrim
esorthreatshappening.Therisksthatoccurrelateto(incidentally)film
inginnocentpeopleandtheunlawful
streamingandsharingofvideofootage.Thism
ayviolatetheprivacyrightsofthepeoplew
hoarefilmed,eitherasacrim
inalorsupposedcrim
inal,orasavictimorw
itness.Sharingofpicturesorvideosof
1 https://w
ww
.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/01/vigilante-app-rem
oved-apple-store
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(alleged)criminalsisnotsim
plylegallyallowed.Them
erefactthatsom
ethingishappeninginapublicplacedoesnotimplythatsharing
isallowedeither.Thereasonableexpectationofprivacyonehasin
suchacasemaybelow
erthaninaclosed(home)environm
ent,butthisdoesnotleadtotheconclusionthatthereisnorighttoprivacyatall.Eventhepolice,w
hoareallowedtoprocessm
oreinformation
oncriminalactsthanordinarycitizens,areobligedtom
akeacarefulweighingofinterestsbeforem
akingapictureorvideopublic.Thepublicaccesstothesetypesofplatform
sandthewaythevideosare
storedneedtobeconsideredcarefully,takingthelegalrulesandrequirem
entsasguidance.
EthicalBenefits• Canrescuepeople;
• Canprovideevidentiallyusefulfilm
.
LegalBenefits
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3.2 Self-Evident
https://www.witnessconfident.org/self-evident-app
Appenablinguserstorecord,store,andshareevidenceandstatementsreliablyandtofileapolicereportfrom
theirsmartphone.Self-evidenthasbeen
developedincollaborationwithLondon’sM
ayorandSussexpoliceforce.
EthicalRisks• Needstrainingtobeusedeffectivelyandproportionately,w
hichusersmaynotbew
illingorabletoget(e.g.someonecouldw
ronglybelievetheyarecollectingcourt-subm
issibleevidence)• Couldcreateunrealisticexpectationsofpoliceintervention;
• Couldencouragesom
epeopletoreportinsteadofintervening,tothedetrim
entofvictims;
• Couldindirectlyencouragetheassum
ptionthatifacrimeexists,there
willbevideoofit–and,conversely,thannovideofootageofacrim
eisevidenceofitsnon-occurrence-
LegalRisks• Inordertobeadm
issibleaslegalevidence,thefootagehastomeet
certaincriteria,suchasatimestam
ptoindicatethemom
entofrecordingandaneditinglog.Inpracticeitseem
sdifficultforjudgestodeterm
inethe
reliabilityof
video.Technological
toolsallow
for
manipulationofthevideoitself.M
oreover,itisentirelypossibletorecordpartsofaview
oronlyrecordspecificscenesofanevent,which
canleadtoerroneousinterpretationofthefacts.
EthicalBenefits• Within-builttraining,couldbeusedeffectivelyandproportionately
• Caninprincipleprovideadm
issibleevidence;• Ifreportingisanonym
ous,canencouragepeopletoreportcrimethey
wouldnototherw
isereport,especiallyincountriesorcommunities
wheretrustinpoliceandcrim
inaljusticesystemislow
;• Canencourageinteractionw
ithpolicefromyoungtech-savvypeople.
LegalBenefits• Videoandaudiorecordingscanhelpinreconstructingw
hathashappened;
• Canhelpinidentifyingthecrim
inalsorvictims.
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3.3 TrafficDroid/PrivateDashcam
Someroadusersareproactivelyrecordingbehaviourontheroadsviacam
erasandotherrecordingequipment,inordertodeterandcaptureevidenceof
trafficinfringements.Thisarticledescribesanextrem
eexampleofaLondoncyclist‘droid’:http://w
ww.telegraph.co.uk/m
en/active/10851988/Traffic-Droid-the-cyclist-fighting-for-justice-on-our-roads.htm
l
EthicalRisks• Cangeneratem
oreinfothanisusablebypolice;• Morejustifiablyusedbyprofessionaldrivers,forw
homaccusationsof
illegaldrivingmaybeaprofessionalhazard;
• Duringthew
orkshopitwasstatedthatw
iththeuseofdashcams,the
publiciscontributingtobuildingapolicestate(i.e.akindofsocietyinwhichordinarycitizenstakeonaproactiveroleasinform
erstotheauthorities,
thuspotentially
creatingan
atmosphere
ofmistrust
betweencitizens).
LegalRisks• There
isaprivacy
riskin
theperm
anentrecording
bythese
applications,regardlessofwhetherthereisacrim
inalacttakingplaceornot,sincem
anyindividualscanbefilmedandhavetheirdatabeing
processedwithoutthem
knowingit.
EthicalBenefits• Alternativetoroadrage;
• Canincentivizedriverstobem
oreawareofcyclistsandthusdrive
lessdangerously.
LegalBenefits• Reduction
ofhit-and-run
accidentswhere
theperpetrator
couldalternativelyescapepunishm
entorcompensationtothevictim
.
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3.4 DigitalPillories
Thistermreferstom
easurestonameandsham
elawbreakersonlineoronsocialm
edia,asameanstodeterringandpunishingcrim
esfelttobeinsufficientlyw
elladdressedbypolice.Forexample,theow
nerofapetrolstationusesCCTV,Facebook,andwarningsignstonam
e-and-shameand
therebydiscouragepetrolthieves,whoappearedtobetargetinghisstationduetoitsproxim
itytoanationalborder,overwhichtheycanescape:
http://www.dichtbij.nl/den-bosch/112/artikel/4024142/eigenaar-pom
pstation-shell-nagelt-opnieuw-een-brandstofdief-publiekelijk-aan-de-
schandpaal-.aspx
EthicalRisks• Punishes(bysham
ing)ratherthandetects.
LegalRisks• Courtsusuallyconsideradigitalpillorydisproportionatetoitsgoals.Forinstance,theD
utchDataProtectionA
uthorityhasprohibitedthepublicationofphotosofthievesandgivesfinesifpublicationstilltakesplace
2;• Sincetheinfringem
entonprivacyrightsissignificant,thesekindofapplicationsareoftenprohibitedbydataprotectionauthorities.
• Couldprejudicetrials-e.g.byprom
ptingmistakenidentity.
EthicalBenefits• Apparentlyeffectivedeterrenttocrim
e(accordingtoreportsfromthe
specificcasepresentedattheworkshop-seelinkabove);
• Potentiallyjustifiableifpolicearetoobusyw
ithmoreseriouscrim
etoactonevidence.
LegalBenefits• CanaidinvestigationsifCCTVm
aterialsimplypassedtopolicerather
thanbeingposted.
2 https://tw
eakers.net/nieuws/75941/cbp-digitale-schandpaal-w
ordt-in-de-toekomst-zw
aar-beboet.html
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3.5 MafiaM
apping
MafiaM
apswasacrow
dfundedapplicationenablinganonymoussharingofinform
ationaboutmafialocationsinacity.Itsdevelopm
entiscurrentlyonholdduetoadisputew
iththesoftwaredevelopers.
EthicalRisks• Thereisariskoferroneousreportingoflocations.Sinceanyonecanindicatelocationsofthem
afia,itisfairlyeasytoindicatewrong
locations.Basically,thesuspicionsm
aybewrong,buttheuseofanapp
toreportremovesthenaturalbarrieroftakingactionandgoingtothe
police.So,reportingismadeeasier,butthism
ayalsoresultintooeasilyreporting
whatever
suspiciousaspect
without
furthercare
andresponsibility.Theanonym
ousaspectcontributestothis.Opento
malicious,inaccuratereporting;
• Mightattractinfiltrationand/orinvestigationsbym
afia.
LegalRisks• Mistakenorm
aliciousreportingmayleadtofalseaccusationsifpeople
areclearlyconnectedtoindicatedlocations;• Canbeinfiltratedbym
afiaparticipatingintheappthemselves.The
targetsareabletolookwhethertheyaretargeted.A
ndtheymayalso
intentionallyreporttheirrivals,leadingtopotentiallymorerisksfor
publicsecurityifviolenceincreasesasaresultoftheseprovocativeactions.O
rinnocentpeopleorlocationscanbereportedtoblurreallocationsandtom
akethetoollessvaluable,becausethedataispolluted;
• Thelaw
fulnessofthedataprocessingbytheprovidersoftheappisquestionable;
• IMEInum
bersorotherphoneidentifierscaneasilybeusedtoidentifyindividualsw
housedtheapp,soeventhoughthedatamightappear
anonymous,itstillqualifiesaspersonaldataandisthereforesubjectto
anddataprotectionlaws.
EthicalBenefits• Givesup-to-datelocationinform
ationtopolice;• Anonym
ityoftheappallowspeopletocom
municatew
hat‘everyoneknow
sbutcannotsay’,thusprovidingsomeforum
forcommunity
solidarityandresistance.
LegalBenefits• Theanonym
itywithintheapplication(oratleastthevisiblem
apsgenerated)
protectsthose
who
shareinform
ationand
therewith
providessafeguardsfortheirfundamentalrights,suchastherightto
privacyandtherighttobeprotectedagainstviolence.
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oleofNewSocialM
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3.6 Neighbourhoodw
atch
Inneighbourhoodwatchapplications,peoplelivinginaneighbourhoodareencouragedtobealerttocrim
inalorsuspiciousactivityandreportittoothersonthenetw
ork.
EthicalRisks• Canleadtoinform
ation-sharingwaybeyondsecuritypurposes;
• Possiblepressureforpeopletojoinorseem
suspect;• Canleadtosuspicionbeingvisitedonpeopleofcertainsocialorethnicbackgrounds,reflectinglocalprejudicesandpreconceptions;
• Canbeusedtofurtherpersonalvendettas.
LegalRisks• Surveillanceofpeoplew
hoarenotsuspectsbutmerelyhappentobe
inthe
vicinityof
recordinginfringes
onthe
privacyand
dataprotectionrightsofthosepeopleinw
aysthatmightbeillegal(thisis
knownas‘collateralintrusion’intheU
K);
• Peoplew
hoarenottrainedprofessionallyinrecognizingcrimecan
misinterpret
situationsin
theirneighbourhood,
therebyunintentionallyleadingtow
rongfulaccusations.Thechallengeliesindeterm
iningwhetherasituationissuspectornot.Peoplehavetobe
awareofw
hattopayattentionto.
EthicalBenefits• Proven
toreduce
certainkinds
ofcrim
e(e.g.
burglariesin
theNetherlands,
seehttp://nltim
es.nl/2015/10/06/burglars-avoid-areas-w
hatsapp-neighbourhood-watch).
LegalBenefits• More(social)resourcesarem
adeavailableforcrimeprevention.
MEDI@4SEC
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oleofNewSocialM
ediainEnhancingPublicSecurityGrantA
greementno700281
16
3.7 Bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com
/
Thisisaprivate,crowdfundedinitiativeperform
ingcitizenjournalistinvestigationsinparallelwithLEA
s.Itmakesuseofalargenetw
orkofpeopleinvolvedandcrow
dsourcingtosolvepartsofthe‘puzzle’.
EthicalRisks• Ifinvestigationschosenbynew
s-worthinessratherthanharm
,thenthebenefitstosecuritym
ightbelesser;• Publicnatureofinvestigationscanleadtoevasionbycrim
inals;• Can
provokemisleading
orunderm
iningcounter-speech
(e.g.by
RussiaintheM
alaysianAirlinesshoot-dow
n,seeanexamplefrom
Russia
Today:https://w
ww.rt.com
/news/360056-m
h17-crash-bellingcat-bloggers/);
• Canleadtom
isidentificationsandinformalpunishm
entratherthanpoliceapprehension.
LegalRisks• PossiblereductionoftrustinpoliceifB
ellingcatpublishestheirresults,w
hileLEAsarestillsearchingorintentionallydonotshare
theirresults,becausetheyhavereasonstokeepthingsforthemselves
forthebenefitofthecase.Forinstance,theycanhaveindicationsforfurther
investigations,and
thesharing
ofresults
might
alarm
criminalsthattheyareinsight.Insum
,whilethew
orkmaynotbe
unlawfulitm
ayhaveunintendedsideeffectsthatcanhaveanegativeimpactonthecapacityofLEA
stoenforcethelaw.
EthicalBenefits• Canprovidereliablescrutinyoftheaccuracyofclaim
smadebystates
andotheragentsinthemedia,identifyingandexposingfakenew
s;• Transparentm
ethodsenablecounter-scrutinyandtherebylegitimacy.
LegalBenefits• Thereiscooperationw
ithLEAsandevidenceandm
aterialsarehandedovertoLEA
s,helpinginvestigations.
MEDI@4SEC
TheEmergingR
oleofNewSocialM
ediainEnhancingPublicSecurityGrantA
greementno700281
17
3.8 Reddit
Aplatform
foruser-generatedcontent,wherepeoplecanchatandsharevideoandim
age.
EthicalRisks• Canleadtom
isidentificationsandinformalpunishm
entratherthanpoliceapprehension.
LegalRisks• privacyofpeoplebeingexposedinthecontent;
• therem
aybeariskofpeopletakingthelawintheirow
nhandswhen
triggeredbythecontentsthathavebeenuploaded.
EthicalBenefits
LegalBenefits
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oleofNewSocialM
ediainEnhancingPublicSecurityGrantA
greementno700281
18
3.9 Opit,Stinson,W
ebsleuthsetc.
Theseplatformsareusedtocatchchildsexoffendersonline,usuallyviatheuseof‘honeypots’orothertechniquesofentrapm
ent.
EthicalRisks• Nam
ingandshamingistoolim
itedagoalofsecurityinterventions,giventheseriousnessofgroom
ingforchildabuse;• Insteadofdirectnam
ingandshaming,itw
ouldbebettertocooperatewiththepolice,sharerelevantinform
ationandidentifyingdetailsofgroom
ers,andhavethepolicecatchthem.H
owever,thisw
ouldrequirem
oretrustinthepoliceandcasesbeingtakenupseriously,witheventuallythecrim
inalsbeingbroughtbeforethecourt;• Publicityhasunw
antedconsequenceofeducatinggroomers/alerting
themtom
ethodsofdetection;• Regardlessofw
hetherthe‘target’isindeedthecriminal,theim
pactonprivacyrightscanbesevere.M
oreover,ithastobetakenintoaccountthatoncethereisanim
pactonprivacybecausedefamatory
contentispostedonline,therearehardlyanyoptionstorepairthedam
ageoccurringfromthis.O
nlinecontentremainsonlineforever,
canbecopiedandshared,andwillbespreadovertheinternetand
storedinseverallocations.
LegalRisks• Whenerroneousaccusationsarem
adeonlineitmaybeverydifficult
toretrospectively‘correct’thereputationaldamage,w
hichbringsabarrier
toproper
protectionof
privacyrights.
Fromalegal
perspective,theseriskshavebeenrecognizedandaretobemitigated
bythenewlyintroducedrighttobeforgotteninA
rticle17oftheGDPR;
• Onlinetechniquescanleadtoentrapm
ent;• Cancom
promiseprosecutions.
EthicalBenefits• Maydeterchildabusers.
LegalBenefits• Canleadtoprosecutionsw
hererelyingonpolicewouldnot(because,
forexample,policelackresourcesorbecausereasonablesuspicion
hasnotyetbeendemonstrated).
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oleofNewSocialM
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greementno700281
19
3.10 Doxing
Thisisthesharingofusuallyidentifiableinformation.Theaim
istofindindividualswhohavebeenaccusedofanythingunlaw
ful.
EthicalRisks• Efficientintrusionfortheaggressivehacker.
LegalRisks• Raisessignificantrisksforthosew
hohavebeenaccused,sinceitisnotrarethattheybecom
ethevictimofviolenceandm
anhunts;• Peopleattractedtothesekindofinitiativesareoftenthrillseekers;
• Legalsafeguards,suchasbalancingofinterestsandopportunitiestoobjecttodataprocessing,areusuallyabsent.
EthicalBenefits• Canbeusedasaform
ofself-protectionforthecyberstalked.LegalBenefits
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3.11 Crowd-sourcedm
issingpersonsidentificationplatforms
Theseinitiativesrecruitvolunteerstohelpidentifymissingpersonsorsolvecoldcases.A
nexampleistheD
oeNetw
ork-aUS-basedinitiativeto
identifyhistoricandrecentmissingpersonscasesviacrow
dsourcedinformation:http://w
ww.doenetw
ork.org/
EthicalRisks• Ifvolunteersdonotreceivetheguidanceandtrainingthatisneededtoreducerisksbothtothem
selvesandtothecriminaljusticeprocess,
harmmightresult;
• Itm
aynotalwaysbeclearw
hoisincharge,andthismayaffectthe
accountabilityof
measures
taken-from
minor
issuessuch
astrespassingtom
oreseriousonessuchascitizens’arrest;• Theneedforcoordinationofactivitiesm
ightconflictwiththeself-
organisingelementsinaw
aythatmakesitdifficultforsuchinitiatives
tobesuccessfulonawidescale.
LegalRisks
EthicalBenefits• Reducescostsandaddsm
anpowertoinvestigations;
• Verylow
-riskifrunbypoliceinaliberaljurisdiction(i.e.policewhose
roleistoprotectthehumanrightsofcitizensratherthanenforcethe
willofthestate).
LegalBenefits• Thesekindofapplicationscanbeusedinaproperm
annerwithout
toomanylegalissues.IfusedorcoordinatedbyLEA
s,theycangiveinform
ationandhintsaccordingtoprofessionalguidelinesandaskthepublicforhelp.Thehelpofthepublicm
aybeusefulincomingtoa
prosecutionofperpetrators,forinstancewhenvictim
sarefoundandbroughttogether.
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oleofNewSocialM
ediainEnhancingPublicSecurityGrantA
greementno700281
21
3.12 Prey,FindmySm
artphone…
https://www.preyproject.com
/
Thesearepiecesofsoftwarethathelppeoplefindalostlaptoporsm
artphone.Theappshowsthelocationofthestolenorlostdevice.
EthicalRisks• Invitesdangerousinterventions.
LegalRisks• Theriskisthatpeoplegoaftertheirdevicesthem
selves,whichcanbe
dangerous.Eithertheycanbeconfrontedwithcrim
inalswhoare
violent,ortheriskisthatpeopletakethelawintheirow
nhandsandexposesuspectedcrim
inalstoviolentbehaviororillegalnamingand
shaming.
EthicalBenefits• Efficientstolenphonerecoveryifusedfornotifyingpolice;
• Canbeam
eansofretrievingstolengoods(andthereforeaddressingacrim
e)thatpolicemaynotpursue;
• Ifusedw
idelyenoughmaydetercrim
inals.
LegalBenefits• Prosecutionofindividualsorgroupsofpettycrim
inalsthatsofarevadedcaptureduetolackofevidence.
MEDI@4SEC
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oleofNewSocialM
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greementno700281
22
3.13 PolicingthePoliceApps
Theseapps
enablecitizens
torecord
interactionswith
police.Exam
plesinclude
theAm
ericanCivil
LibertiesUnion
(ACLU)
PoliceTape:
https://www.aclu.org/feature/aclu-apps-record-police-conduct.
EthicalRisks• Hasthepotentialtoalienatethepolicefrom
thepublicandviceversa,furtherentrenchinginsidiousm
utualassumptionsoneitherside;
• Maycreateunrealisticallynegativeim
pressionofpolicing,harming
citizen-policetrust.
LegalRisks• Caninfringeprivacyrightsofthosebeingfilm
ed.
EthicalBenefits• Candeterpolicem
isconduct;• Canenhanceaccountability;
• Canim
proveaccesstojusticebyrecordingwrongdoingforpurposes
oflitigation.
LegalBenefits