workshop 2 ethics & legal issues inventorymedia4sec.eu/downloads/d4-2.pdf · medi@4sec workshop...

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Co-funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the European Union

Workshop2Ethics&LegalIssuesInventory

Deliverable4.2

Authors:UniversityofWarwickandTNO

PLEASENOTETHATTHISREPORTISAFINALDRAFTANDISAWAITINGFINALACCEPTANCEBYTHEEUROPEANCOMMISSION.

Whencitingpleaseuse:MEDIA4SEC(2016)ReportonStateoftheArtReview

Authors:

KatHadjimatheou(UniversityofWarwick)andArnoldRoosendaal(TNO)

TheresearchleadingtotheseresultshasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020ResearchandInnovationProgramme,underGrantAgreementno700281.

Contents

ExecutiveSummary............................................................................................................................................i1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................11.1 MEDIA4SEC........................................................................................................................................11.2 WorkPackage4...............................................................................................................................11.3 Deliverable4.2(D4.2)...................................................................................................................1

2. Ethicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwiththeuseofsocialmediaforpublicsecurityinriotsandmassgatherings........................................................................................................22.1 EthicalIssues.....................................................................................................................................22.2 LegalIssues........................................................................................................................................72.3ConclusionsandRecommendations...........................................................................................11

3. Ethicaland legal issuesarising inconnectionwithspecific technologies/platforms 133.1 ECHOSECandCoosto..................................................................................................................133.2 Sukey.................................................................................................................................................153.3 Genymotion.....................................................................................................................................163.4 PeriscopemapliveandYoutubevideopostings............................................................17

MEDI@4SECTheEmergingRoleofNewSocialMediainEnhancingPublicSecurityGrantAgreementno700281

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ExecutiveSummary

Thisreportsummarisesethicalandlegalissuesraisedinconnectionwiththeuseofsocialmediaforpublicsecurityinriotsandmassgatherings.TheseissueswereraisedattheMEDI@4SECworkshopon"SocialMedia&PolicingofRiotsandMassGatherings",heldonMay9,2017,inAthens,Greece.Theworkshopbroughttogether57people,includingpolice officers, researchers and citizen activists, to discuss the potential benefits andthreats aswell as the future of the use of socialmedia before, during and aftermassgatheringeventssuchasriots,protestsanddemonstrations,large-scaleeventsandmassmigrationmovements.

Themainethicalissuesdiscussedinthisreportincludetheriskofprivacyintrusionsanda chilling effect on legitimate exercise of democratic rights to freedom of politicalexpression and association; the role of consent to interventions thatmay be privacy-intrusive; the role of trust and legitimacy in the provision of public security; theimportance of cultural awareness and language skills to effective communication andengagement and fair deployment of predictive and monitoring tools; and finally theimportanceofeffectiveliaisonandcooperationbetweenallstakeholdersincludingsocialmediaplatformsandprivatesecuritycompanies,whichmayhaveasignificantpresenceinrelevantlocations. Theethicalbenefitsofsocialmediauseinriots,massgatheringsandotherlarge-scaleeventsincludeeffectivecommunicationenablingtheprotectionofindividualsfromviolence,dangerandharm;thepredictionofandpreventionofdisorder;the facilitation of the peaceful exercise of important democratic freedoms of politicalexpressionandassociation.

Key legal risksofsocialmediause inrelation tomassgatheringsor largescaleeventsincludetheinfringementofprivacy,duetolargescaleprocessingofsocialmediacontent;risks of obstructing police work by mapping police presence and presenting escaperoutes;uncleardefinitionsofpolicetasksandcompetences(ifdifferentpartsofthepoliceorganisationare involvedandtheaimofoperationsshiftsbetweenmaintainingpublicordertowardsinvestigations);andthespreadingoffalseinformationthatthreatenstheexerciseof legalrightsbyrefugees(e.g.becauseofwrongor insufficientdocumentstocollect,falsecontactpoints,orfalsedirections).

Specific recommendations arising from the discussion in the workshop include thefollowing:

• In order to increase trust and effective communication, and to help preventdisorderlocal/cityauthoritiesshould:

a) developanoperational strategy inwhichall stakeholders (e.g. police, protestgroups, private security companieswith a professional presence in the area)participate.Thisstrategyshouldaddresstheroleanduseofsocialmediainriotsandmassgatherings.

b) gathertherelevantparticipantsofpre-plannedeventspriortosuchevents inorder to facilitate open communication, ensure clarity of roles and


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responsibilities and to develop mutual understanding of all concerns andinterests.

c) invest in improving language skills and cultural awareness amongstpolice inparticular so as to enable more effective and fair monitoring of andcommunicationwithminoritygroups

• Relevant authorities should invest in technological tools that can identify fakeinformationonlinetohelpauthoritiescounterit/debunkrumours.Thesewouldhelpauthoritiescombatthespreadofsuchinformation.

• Socialmediacompaniesshouldsetupin-housedepartmentswithwell-qualifiedindividuals who can liaise with police. Such departments should be better-resourcedandmoreresponsivetotheneedsofpolicethanatpresent.Thiswillassistpoliceinmaintainingorderandprotectingthepublic.

• Both police and social media companies should invest time and effort intodevelopinggoodrelationshipmanagementbetweentheseorganisations.

• Publicauthoritiesshouldpro-activelyprovideinformationtorefugeesviasocialmediatoensurethataccurateandup-to-dateinformationisavailableandused.

• Lawsorrulesshouldbedevelopedforauniformapproachtowardssocialmediacontentascreatedbyrefugees. Inparticular, insomecasesthiscanbeusedasevidenceandtherewithsupportrefugees.

• RulesshouldbedevelopedforLEAsonhowtointeractandcooperatewithkeystakeholdersorcontactpointsinorganisationsinthecontextoflargescaleeventsorriots.


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1. Introduction

1.1 MEDIA4SEC

MEDI@4SECfocusesuponenhancingunderstandingoftheopportunities,challengesandethicalconsiderationofsocialmediause forpublicsecurity: thegood, thebadandtheugly. The good comprises using social media for problem solving, fighting crime,decreasing fear of crime and increasing the quality of life. The bad is the increase ofdigitisedcriminalityand terrorismwithnewphenomenaemerging through theuseofsocialmedia.Theuglycomprisesthegreyareaswheretrolling,cyberbullying,threats,orlive video-sharing of tactical security operations are phenomena to deal with duringincidents.Makinguseofthepossibilitiesthatsocialmediaoffer,includingsmart‘work-arounds’iskey,whilerespectingprivacy,legislation,andethics.Thischangingsituationraisesaseriesofchallengesandpossibilities forpublicsecurityplanners.MEDI@4SECwill explore this through a series of communication and dissemination activities thatengageextensivelywith a rangeof end-users tobetterunderstand theusageof socialmediaforsecurityactivities.MEDI@4SECwillseekabetterunderstandingofhowsocialmedia can, and how social media cannot be used for public security purposes andhighlight ethical, legal and data-protection-related issues and implications. Activitiescentre around six relevant themes: DIY Policing; Everyday security; Riots and massgatherings:Thedarkweb;Trolling;andInnovativemarketsolutions.MEDI@4SECwillfeedinto,supportandinfluencechangesinpolicy-makingandpolicyimplementationinpublic security that can be used by end-users to improve their decision making. Bystructuring our understanding of the impact of social media on public securityapproaches in a user-friendly way MEDI@4SEC will provide an evidence-base androadmapforbetterpolicymaking including:bestpracticereports;acatalogueofsocialmedia technologies; recommendations for EU standards; future training options; andethicalawarenessraising.

1.2 WorkPackage4

TheroleofWorkPackage4(WP4)istoidentifyethicalandlegalissuesarisingfromtheuseofsocialmediaforpublicsecurityandpolicingpurposesaswellastofacilitateethicsprocedureswithintheproject.Ethicsandlegalissueswillbereportedforeachofthemedworkshops.

1.3 Deliverable4.2(D4.2)

D4.2Reportsethicsandlegalissuesidentifiedinthemeeting:‘Riots&MassGatherings’.Section 2 summarises themain issues that arose in the workshop presentations anddiscussions, while Section 3 identifies issues arising in connection with the keytechnologiesandsocialmediaplatformsthatwerepresentedduringtheworkshop.


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2. Ethicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwiththeuseofsocialmediaforpublicsecurityinriotsandmassgatherings

Inthissectionwereportthecross-cuttingethicalandlegalissuesthataroseinthetablediscussionsthroughouttheday.

2.1 EthicalIssues

2.1.1 Consent,privacy,andchillTheconsentofmembersofthepublictothekindsofsocialmediamonitoringengagedinbypublicauthoritiesdealingwithmassgatheringsisimportantforanumberofreasons.First,muchoftheinformationpostedonsocialmedia,includingopensourcematerial,ispersonalinnature.Thismakesmonitoringofitintrusive,evenwhensuchmonitoringislegitimate and justified overall. Second, evenwhen individual posts are not personal,monitoring of activity online can be very fine-grained, combining posts with otherinformationsuchaslocation,gender,age,personalinterestsetc;thecombinationofsuchmaterialcanrevealagreatdealaboutaperson,andthereforecanalsobeintrusive.Third,inthecontextoflargeevents,socialmediaactivitycaninvolvepoliticalexpression,thefreedom of which is essential to a well-functioning democratic society. Fourth, andrelatedly, non-consensual monitoring of political groups can have a chilling effect onfreedom of political expression, including by pushing it underground to encryptedplatforms.1For these reasons, someapproximationofpublic consent to suchactivitiesshouldbesoughtbypublicauthorities.Opencommunicationwiththepublic,withcivilliberties and privacy groups, and with groups likely to be monitored about suchtechniques is an essential step towards gaining anything approximating consent. Inpractice ‘consent’ might be active and strong- e.g. if there is active agreement fromconsultedgroups-ormerelytacit,implied,andweak–e.g.ifthereisalackofsignificantoppositionfromthepublicandsuchgroups.Thereisboundtobepersistentdisagreementon themonitoringof socialmedia,but thisdoesnotabsolvepublic securityprovidersfromattemptingtogainacceptancetoit.

Finally,theissueofconsentarisesinrelationtosocialmediausebyindividualsseekingrefugeintheEU.Manysocialmediasitesandappsnowexistwhosepurposeistoassistmigrantstomaketheirjourneyssaferandsmoother.Whileitisethicallyunproblematicfor thoseapplying for refugee status to supplydata fromsocialmediaandotherappsvoluntarilyasevidenceoftheiroriginandrouteintotheirdestinationcountry,adebateshouldbehadaboutwhetherauthoritiesshouldbepermittedtorequestoreven(andfarmorecontroversially)demandthisinformationfromthem.IntheNetherlands,a‘quickscan’ ofmobile devices is already standard procedure and in some cases all data areextracted and analyzed. But even if a power to make such demands is neverinstitutionalized,changesinexpectationsofofficersassessingrefugeeapplicationsmaycreateade-factoassumptionthatsuchinformationshouldbeavailableinthefuture.

1 ‘Chill’ of this kind refers to self-censorship, the avoidance of expressing certain or indeed any political views, or of associating even online with certain groups, prompted by apprehensiveness about the potential for suspicion from security authorities.


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2.1.2 Publicsharingofimages:criminalstigmatisationandthepresumptionofinnocenceTheissueofconsentbyindividualstothepublicsharing(byauthoritiesandespeciallypolice) of photographs of people involved in events arose a number of times in theworkshopdiscussions.Yet,ethicallyspeaking,thereislittlethatisproblematicaboutthesharingof imagesofpeople inpublicplacesper se. Forone thing, expectationsof andrightstoprivacyaremuchdiminishedinsuchplaces.Foranother,individualssuspectedofcommittingcrimesrenderthemselvesliabletosuchintrusionsbyengagingincriminalactivity.Morallyspeaking, it is irrelevantwhetherornottheyconsenttosuchsharing,becausetheyhavenorightagainstsuchinformationbeingshared.

Nevertheless, such sharing may become ethically problematic if the purpose is tocrowdsource identifications of those suspected of involvement in crime. Here, thereremainsapotentialconflictbetweenthepresumptionofinnocence(naming-andshamingwithoutdueprocess)andtheidentificationofcriminals.Thereisariskofpeoplebeingmistakenlyidentified,whichcouldleadtopublicstigmatisation,onlineabuse,andotherkidsofunjustpublicretaliation.Thisriskisaveryrealone,asthemuch-citedcaseofthe2013USBostonMarathonBombers,inwhichanindividualwaswronglyidentifiedasthebomber,illustrates.

Therisksbecomemoreseriouswhenitcomestothepostingofimagesofchildrenaccusedofcriminalactivity,asthereareparticularrisksforlong-termreputationaldamageandself-identificationas criminal.Yet theseneed tobebalancedagainst the imperativeofidentifying persistent criminals and, especially in the case of children, intervening toprevent further criminal activity and to divert them from incurring more seriouspenalties.ThisconflicthasariseninpracticeinrelationtothePoliceServiceofNorthernIreland’songoingOperationExposure,whichinvolvesthecirculationofimagesofyouthscommittingcrimestothecommunityforidentification.Inresponsetolitigationfromoneof the youths thus identified, a senior officer reported that themeasurewas justifiedbecause itwas takenonlyafterextensivealternativeefforts to identify the individualsconcernedhadfailed.In2013,theHighCourtinBelfastagreed2.

The question remains whether the publication of such images is justified after theparticularindividualhasbeensubjecttocriminaljusticeprocedures.Suchexposurecouldnolongerbejustifiedonthegroundofcrime-preventioncitedbytheofficerabove.Anditis highly questionablewhether it could be justified as a punitivemeasure, given thatpolicehaveneitherthemoralnorindeedthelegalauthoritytopunishcriminals.Shouldsuchexposurepersist,othermoraljustificationswouldneedtobeprovidedinordertodemonstrateitslegitimacy.Finally,decisionsaboutwhethertopubliciseanimageshouldtakeintoaccountthefactthatitwouldbeverydifficulttoremovefrompublicfora,onceithasbeenpublishedandsharedmanytimes.

2.1.3 FakeinformationandrumourTheneed to findmeansboth technological andoperational to combatand correct thespreadoffalseinformationandrumourrelatingtolargeeventsandmassgatheringswasakeythemeof theworkshop.Fromtheperspectiveof thepoliceand localauthorities, 2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-21880564


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reliable,accurate,secureandtrustedchannelsofcommunicationbetweentheauthoritiesandmembersofthepublicwereanessentialfactorintheirabilitytokeeppeoplesafeandpreventarangeofthreatstosecurity,fromtheneedtoavoidbottlenecksofpeopleorthemovementintothepathofviolentorclashinggroupstotheneedtoavoidmassflowsofrefugeestoimpassablebordersininhospitableareas.

Therelativeanonymityofmanysocialmediasites,andtheeasewithwhichfalseidentitiescanbecreatedandrealoneshackediswhatmakesfakeinformationandrumoursuchaseriousproblemontheseplatforms.Yetthepossibilityofanonymityisoneofthereasonsopen socialmedia sites are still used by groups policemaywant tomonitor. A drivetowardsgreateridentifiabilityofsocialmediauserscouldfueltheincreasingtendencyofgroups tocommunicateonencryptedplatformssuchasWhatsApp.Ahighriskof fakeinformationandrumourmaybeaninevitablecostofbeingabletomonitorsocialmediaactivityonanonymousplatforms.

While there was a widely acknowledged imperative to counter fake information andrumour at the workshop, it was pointed out that it is currently unclear whoseresponsibility it is to do this. Participants in the workshop called for technologycompanies towork to develop technologies capable of identifying fake information inreal-time(an‘automaticrumourdebunker’)sothatitcanbecorrected.However,evenifreliable identification of such information were perfectly achievable, a challenge stillremains for authorities, namely how to make their own voice trusted enough to cutthrough the ‘noise’ and get to the right people, especiallywhen thesepeoplemaynotperceivethepoliceasfriendlyorevenlegitimate.

2.1.4 LegitimacyandtrustOne message that emerged strongly from discussions in the workshop is thatcommunicationisineffectivewithouttrustinboththespeakerandthemessenger.Ifstateauthorities are not perceived as legitimate or trusted to act in the interests andwithrespectfortherightsofpeopleinvolvedinmasseventsandgatherings,thentheireffortstocommunicateinwaysthatprotectpublicsecuritywillfallondeafears.

Thestoryofthestart-upplatformSukeyprovidesanillustrativecasestudyofthis.ThissocialmediaplatformwasdevelopedbystudentsintheUKin2011.Itfollowedaseriesofstudentdemonstrations,whichendedinangerandviolencefollowingpolice‘kettling’ofdemonstrators.Kettlinginvolvesenclosingpeopleincrowdedtightareaswithoutfood,water,ortoiletfacilitiesforlongperiodsoftime.Kettlingiscontroversialnotonlybecauseitsubjectspeopletodiscomfortandstressandmayevenaggravateotherwisepeacefulprotesters,butalsobecauseitinterfereswiththepeacefulexerciseofthedemocraticrighttofreedomofpoliticalexpression.

The perceived lack of legitimacy of kettling, and a corresponding mistrust in policeinstructions to protesters created a gap, which Sukey aimed to fill. Called ‘computer-supportedcooperativeworkfordemonstrations’byitsdevelopers,Sukeyaimedtohelpdemonstratorskeepthemselves‘safe,mobile,andinformed’byenablingthemtosharereal-time‘verified’locationdataabouttheirownwhereaboutsandthatofpoliceofficers(The Guardian, 2011). In other words, Sukey aimed to provide a trusted source of


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informationforprotesterstoenablethemtoexercisetheirrighttoprotestwithoutbeingsubjecttorestrictionstotheirmovement,whichtheyperceivedasillegitimate.Sukeywaspubliclyaccessibleandnotencrypted.Itwasthereforepotentiallyvisibletopolice.Thiscompromised its trustworthiness from the perspective of users and itwas ultimatelydiscontinuedasaresult.

What lessonscanwelearnfromthestoryofSukey?First, that ifpublicauthoritiesareperceivedasillegitimateandor/untrustworthy,alternativesourcesof informationandchannelsof communicationwillbesoughtanddeveloped.Second, that thesechannelsmust themselves be trusted, or they toowill be shunned (as the developers of Sukeydiscovered).Andthird,thatencryptionmaywellbeusedincreasinglytoestablishtrustinalternative channels,which is itself a further challenge for public security authorities.Finally,thatthisspiralingtowardsdisaffectionandalienationofpartsofthepublicfrompublic security providers could be prevented by much more open, effectivecommunicationbetweenauthoritiesandprotestgroupspriortoandafterevents.

TrustinpublicsecurityauthoritieswasalsoconspicuouslyabsentamongstTurkishpro-governmentprotestersintheDutchtownofRotterdamin2017,butfordifferentreasons.TheseprotestsfollowedtherefusalinMarch2017oftheDutchauthoritiestograntentryintotheNetherlandstoaseniorTurkishpolitician.3Despite this, thepoliticiancrossedthe border into the country and travelled in a convoy of cars to the Turkish consul’slocationinRotterdam,wheretheyremainedbarricadedintheirarmouredministerialcarforhoursbeforebeingescortedtotheborder.Theprotestdescendedintodisorderandviolence.Membersofthepublicalsobecameinvolved,throwingobjectsontoprotestersfrom thewindows and balconies of their homes. Throughout the incident, Rotterdampublicauthoritiesandpolicewerecommunicatingwithprotestersface-to-face.However,theseeffortstopersuadeprotesterstodoastheyinstructedwereineffective;protestersweremorestronglymotivatedbycommunicationfromtheministerinquestion,whowastweetingtothemfromwithinherarmouredcar.Incontrast,Rotterdamlocalauthoritiesandpolicedidnotengagewiththeministerontwitter.

AnumberoflessonscanbelearnedfromtheTurkishprotestsinRotterdam.Thefirstisthatapolicyofnon-engagement(i.e. silence)onsocialmediawill inevitablybecomeamissedopportunitytoleadthekindofcommunicationthatisnecessarytotheeffectivemaintenanceofpublicsecurity.Second,thatpublicsecurityauthoritieswillremainveryfar from gaining the kind of trust and legitimacy necessary for peaceful, trustinginteractionsunless theymakeefforts toobtain thekindof languageskillsandculturalinsight necessary for understanding of and effective communication with culturalminorities.This latter issuegoesbeyondquestionsof trust and legitimacyand isnowconsideredinmoredetail.

3 BBC News ‘Turkey referendum: Clashes as Dutch expel minister’. 12 March 2017. At: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39246392


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2.1.5 TheimportancetopublicsecurityofculturalinsightandlanguageskillsAllEUcountriesarenowmulticultural,multilingualsocieties,albeitofvaryingdegrees.Mass gatherings, large events, and migration flows sometimes have a cultural andlinguistic slant. Sometimes, an understanding of these factors is essential to gaining asoundandreliablepictureofsuchevents.

Participantsintheworkshopexpressedconcernthatpublicsecurityauthoritieslackthelanguage skills and cultural insight necessary for the effective use of social mediamonitoringandcommunicationinthecontextofsuchhappenings.Withouttheseskillsand insights,heavyrelianceon, forexample, sentimentanalysisboth forplanningandreal-time response risks misjudging the situation and responding in ways that areinsufficientordisproportionatelyheavy-handed.Thiscouldnotonly interferewiththerightsofgroupstoassociateandexpresstheirviews,itcouldalsounderminerelationswithcommunitiesinwaysthataredamagingtopublicsecurityinthelongerterm.Forthisreason,theuseoftechnologiessuchassentimentanalysisshouldbesupplementedbyconstantdirectcommunicationwithpeoplewithintherelevantcommunities.

Theimportanceofculturalinsightandlanguageskillsarisesalsoinrelationtotheuseofpredictivepolicingplatforms.Morespecifically,alackofsuchawarenessrisksleadingtothe development of cultural or ethnic bias in such platforms. For this reason, suchplatforms should be reviewed for bias and adding cultural parameters to account forculturalidiosyncrasiesshouldbeconsideredwhererelevant.

Finally,culturalinsightandlanguageskillsarevitaltothedevelopmentofplatformsforcommunicationwithandbetweenmigrants,apointwhichwasunderlinedinworkshopdiscussion.Thisrequiresimprovinglanguageskillsandculturalawarenesssoastoenablemoreeffectiveandfairmonitoringofandcommunicationwithminoritygroups.Awidevariety of apps now exist exclusively for refugeesmaking their way into the EU andadjustingtotheirnewsurroundings4.

2.1.6 Effective liaising, communication, and cooperation between public authorities,socialmediaplatforms,andprivatesecuritycompanies

Aneffectivepublic security communication strategy for largeevents,massgatherings,and riots would need to engage all relevant stakeholders, including social mediacompaniesandprivatesecuritycompanies,manyofwhichhavealargepresenceinspacesinwhichsuchhappeningsoccur.Duringtheworkshoptheconcernwasraisedthatsocialmediacompaniesdonotcollaboratesufficientlywithpublicsecurityauthoritiesandareverydifficulttocontact,eveninanemergency.Itwasfeltthatmoreinvestmentinliaisonand more proactive engagement with public security authorities would improve theabilityofthelattertorespondeffectivelytosuchchallenges.

Inmanylargeevents,organisershireprivatesecuritycompanies,whosestaffmaynotbeinformed about or trained in the use of social media, even in the rudiments ofcommunicationandmonitoring.Forthisreasonaneffectivecommunicationstrategyfor

4 ‘Apps that help refugees’. May 2017 Issue. At: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/05/apps-for-refugees/521466/


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large events by public authorities must also include active engagement with suchcompanies.

2.2 LegalIssues

2.2.1.Socialmediamonitoring:PrivacyandstigmatizationInlargescaleevents,socialmediacanbeavaluablesourceofinformationforLEAs.LargeamountsofinformationaresharedbyparticipantsandthisinformationcanbeusedbyLEAs.LEAactivitiesrangefrommerelymonitoringsocialmediamessagestokeepaneyeonwhatishappeninginrealtimetotheautomatedscanningofsocialmediacontentwiththehelpofcommercialtoolssuchas,forinstance,Echosec(Echosec.net)forsentimentanalysis.Suchmonitoringpredictswhetherthereisathreatofviolenceorotherformsofescalation. After and during an event, social media can also be used as a source ofmaterialsforevidenceorinvestigations.

In all forms mentioned above, the use of social media information by LEAs serves apurpose that is distinct from the purpose for which users originally posted theinformation.Theoriginalpurposesrelate to thesharingof informationwith followers,friendsorpeers.Legallyspeaking,applicationsofthedatabyLEAsareaformoffurtherprocessing which, according to the Article 29 Working party indicates in its opinion(03/2013,WP203onpurpose limitation), is only allowed if specific requirements aremet.Legitimaterequirementsincludenationalsecurityand/orthepreventionofcrimes.LEAsneedtodemonstratealegitimategroundfortheprocessingofthiskindofpersonaldata.Inthecaseofmajorevents,suchagroundcanbefoundinthelegaldutiesofLEAstomaintainpublicorder.Nevertheless,accordingtotheGeneralDataProtectionRegulation(GDPR)(art.5(1)c),LEAsstillneedtoexplainwhytheprocessingofsocialmediadataisproportionateandnecessarytofulfillingtheirtask.

Apartfromthesituationsdescribedabove,theremaybeinstanceswherethepurposeisrelatedtogatheringintelligence,inparticularwhenselectedpersonsareacknowledgedformally as information suppliers for thepolice.This acknowledgement canbeby thepoliceorthepublic, for instance,whenorganizersofaproteststayincontactwiththepolice after having agreed on plans and restrictions beforehand. Orwhen someone isattributedtheroleofmoderatorinasocialmedianeighborhoodwatchgroup.Theroleofusersshouldthereforebeexplicitlyconsideredwhencollectinginformationfromsocialmedia. The further processing of the data in these cases is alsomore in linewith theoriginal purpose, so this can be less problematic from a legal privacy perspective.Nevertheless,ithastobetakenintoaccountthatthecontentsmayalsocontainorrelatetoinformationaboutothers(thatarepresentatanevent),sotheirprivacyneedstoberespected.Selectionsinaccountsandaccountnames,aswellasdeletionofirrelevantdataorpicturescanbehelpfulinthisrespect.Relevantactorsshouldrefrainwherepossiblefromprocessingdatathatarenotnecessaryforthepurposeoftheprocessing.Actinginaresponsiblemanneris,then,alsoataskforpeoplewhointeractwithLEAs.

Monitoring of activity at an individual level or attributing sentiments to posts can beprivacyinvasive.IntheGDPR,thiskindofactivityisindicatedasposingahighrisktotherightsandfreedomsofindividuals(art.35(3)a),sinceitrequiresasystematicevaluation


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ofpersonalaspects.Becausetheinformationcanbesensitive,real-time,andextensive,itinterfereswiththerighttoprivacyandfamilylife(Art.8ECHRandart.7EUCharterofFundamentalRights),even if theprocessing is lawful.Thisalsobecameclear fromthediscussion following the reveal of sentiment analysis asperformedbyFacebook in anexperiment. 5 Moreover, the (collection of) posts as such may disclose sensitiveinformationiftheycontainpictures,videosortypesofwritteninformation.Inaddition,thecontent,postscandiscloseinformationsuchasgeolocation.Ifanalysisormonitoringtakesplaceatanindividuallevel,theinfringementonprivacyisquitesevereandrequiresspecific attention under the GDPR (see above). Social media accounts can discloseextensiveinformationaboutanindividual’slife.

Thereuseofinformationfromsocialmediainordertofindorarrestpeopleisboundedbylegalrulesaswell.Disclosureofphotosofsuspects isoftennotallowedandshouldonly be done with great precaution. That is why this should not be done by citizensthemselvesandisoftenprohibited.Forinstance,postingpicturesofshopliftersisacaseinpoint, as is illustratedbya2004court case in theNetherlands. In that case, a shopownerpostedfootagefromsecuritycameraswiththe imageofashoplifter.Thecourtdecided that this was an infringement of the portrait rights and the privacy of theportrayed person 6 (Court Amsterdam). In the Netherlands, data relating to criminalactivity,belongstoaspecialcategorywhoseprocessingisinprincipleprohibited,unlessit is carried out by LEAs (Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, article 8(1) and 8(5).Nevertheless,thereisaso-calledhouseholdexception,sofilmingacrimeandholdingthevideoforyourselfdoesnotdirectlyimplythatyoucanbeprosecuted.

However, even for LEAs there are sometimes restrictions. In Northern Ireland, forinstance, a casewasbroughtagainst thepoliceafter theypublishedpicturesof youngpeoplethatweresuspectedofcrime.Theparentsofa14yearoldboywhosephotowaspublishedbroughtthiscasetothecourt.IttooksomeyearsbeforetheUKSupremeCourtdecidedthatanyinfringementontherighttoprivacyoftheboyinthiscasewasjustified7.Nevertheless, the fact that the case even came to the Supreme Court shows thatdisagreement ispossibleand the lawfulnessofpostingpicturesby thepolice isnotasstraightforwardamatterasonemightthink.Anaccusationthatispostedinpublicoronsocialmediaishighly intrusiveforthesuspect. Moreover,thereisoftenariskthatanaccusationisfalse.Regardlessofwhetheranaccusationiscorrectornot,theimpactonthe individual is significant and therewill alwaysbe a formof stigmatisation. In legalterms,thisiscaughtundertheflagofasignificantimpactontherightsandfreedomsofindividuals.Falseorinsufficientlysubstantiatedaccusationscannotbecorrectedeasily,inparticularinaninternetcontext,ascopiesandresponsesoftheaccusationwillremainfor a long time. There should, thus, be a clear demonstration of necessity in order tolegitimatethepostingofaccusations.

5 See: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/29/facebook-users-emotions-news-feeds . In the experiment, Facebook also tried to influence emotions by showing or hiding specific news items. 6 Court Amsterdam, 26 August 2004, KG 04/1566 SR, available at: http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2004:AQ7877 7 https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2013-0181-judgment.pdf


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TheGDPRintroducestherighttobeforgotten(article17),whichmaybehelpfulforthesecases.Therightimpliesthatanindividualcanaskforhisorherdatatobeerasedbythedatacontroller.Theprocessingofthedatathenhastobebasedontheconsentofthedatasubject (and consent is, thus, withdrawn) and no other legitimate ground should beavailable.Thepracticaleffectoftherighttobeforgottenisstillunclear,however,anditremains tobe seenwhether this typeof information canproperlybe erased from theinternet.However,in2014theCostejacasefromtheEUCourtofJustice8ledtoGoogledeletinginformationfromsearchresults.Inthiscase,informationfromanoldnewspaperfrom1998wasmadeelectronicallyavailableontheweb.NewsabouttheforcedsaleofpropertiesarisingfromsocialsecuritydebtsincludedthenameofMr.Costeja.EnteringaGoogle search on his name brought the newspaper article to the front. The courtdeterminedthattheinformationwasnolongerrelevantin2009(whenthecasestarted),andthereforethatthelinkhadtobedeletedfromthesearchresults.

2.2.1 Socialmediamonitoring:RighttofreedomofassemblyandexpressionIndividualshavetherighttofreedomofassemblyandtherighttofreedomofexpression.These rightsmayonlybe infringedupon (limited)under specific circumstances. Eventhoughsocialmediamonitoringassuchmaynotlimittheserights,since,forinstance,aprotest isstillallowed,thechillingeffectthemonitoringmayhaveonparticipantsandtheir actual freedom to express themselvesmaybe significant. If individuals have thefeelingthattheyarebeingmonitored,theymay(unconsciously)changetheirbehaviorandbemorerestrictedintheinformationtheyshare.Furthermore,ifcriminalshavethefeelingofbeingwatched,theywillbeinclinedtotransfertheiractivitiestotheDarkWeb.In linewith this, it isnotalways clearwhat is allowedandunderwhat circumstancesconcerningLEAsparticipatinginsocialmedianetworks.

This issuerelatestotrustpeoplehave inLEAs.ParticipationofLEAs inamoreor lessvisiblemannercanbeperceivedasinfringingorinvasive,eventhoughitmaybemeanttobesupportive.Thetrustissueassuchismoreofanethicalnature.Theeffectitmayhaveonhowpeoplefeelintheirfreedomtoexercisetheirfundamentalrights,however,mayhavealegaleffect.

2.2.2 Communicationwiththepublic:UnclearroleforthepoliceTheroleofthepoliceisnotalwaysclear,oratleast,inpracticediscussionmayariseonthedivisionofrolesandtasksbetweenpartsofthepoliceorganization.Dependingonthetypeofevent,differentpartsofapoliceorganizationmaybeinvolved.Sometimes,thereis adistinctionbetweena federal anda localpolice force. Jurisdictionsor the scaleofeventscandeterminewhichpartofthepoliceisinvolved.Theremay,however,alsobeamixedinvolvement,likecommunitypoliceonlocationandonlineintelligenceteamsatadistance.Theroleofpreventionandinvestigationbecomesevenmoreblurredwhenitconcernsthemonitoringofonlineactivitiesinrelationtoaplannedoroccurringevent.Thelegalissuefollowingfromthisisthatcompetencesofthepolicedependontheirroleandthetypeofactivitytheyare involvedin.For investigationpurposes, thepoliceare

8 Costeja Case, Judgement from the Court (Grand Chamber), 13 May 2014, Case C-131/12, Costeja v. Google Spain


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allowedtocollectandprocessmoreinformationandsourcesthanmerelyintheeventofordinary activities. Themonitoring of online activity, including automated analysis ofsocialmedia content, impliesmore of an infringement on privacy of potentiallymanypeoplethanphysicalpresenceofpoliceatanevent.Theuseof technologicalmeansaswellasthescaleandadditionalprocessingmakethatthecompetencesusedareclosertoinvestigations. Depending on the country and the way police is organized within acountry,thiscanmakeitdifficulttoknowwithconfidencewhoisallowedtodowhatandunderwhatcircumstances.

ThereisalackofeffectiveandefficientcooperationlawsfortheexchangeofinformationbetweenLEAsandthe(re)sharingofintelligenceproducts.Intelligencetoolsforonlinesocial media are often used in a highly local or national manner. There is only littleexchangeofinformationandknowledgeorskills.Legalcompetencesonmonitoringsocialmediadiverge.Policinglawsarecreatedatanationallevel,includingtheaccompanyingcompetences.

Theuseofsocialmediainrelationtolargescaleeventscanalsoberelatedtothepurposeofcommunicatingwiththepublic.Inthesecases,theroleofthepoliceismorerelatedtoprevention andmaintaining public order and safety. In a sense, this seems to be theexceptionwheretheroleisveryclear.LEAscanusesocialmediaastheircommunicationchanneltowardsthepublic.Differentwaysofcommunicatingarepossiblehere,butaslongasitconcernsgeneralinformationonhowtoact,towarnpeople,oraboutplanningorinterventions,therearenolegalconcerns.Inthesecases,socialmediaareusedasanadditionalchannel.Specificpointsofcontactcanbeagreeduponbeforehandaswell,inordertochannelinformationproperlyandtohavemorecontroloverwhatinformationissharedandwithwhom.

Inthisrespect,theexampleofProjectXinHaren,theNetherlands,isillustrative.Thiscaseconcernedamassgathering–aparty-organisedviaFacebook.Policeandotherpublicauthoritiesdidnotknowhowtogetintouchwithkeyinitiatorsandimportantnetworkpointsofcontact,sothescaleofthegathering-andtheeventualriotsthatfollowed-wasverydifficulttoforesee.Intheend,thousandsofpeoplecametothesmallvillageandthe'party'endedupinmassiveriots.Withpropercommunicationstrategiestheimpactcouldhavebeenmuchlessdamaging.

2.2.3 LegalissuesspecificallyforthecontextofmigrationFormigration,somespecificlegalissuescameupduringtheworkshopdiscussion.Socialmedia is an important tool formigrants, in particular refugees, to stay in touchwithrelativesandtogatherimportantinformation.Theinformationmayconcerndocuments,directions, and people or organizations to contact. An example is Open Embassy9, anorganizationwithvolunteerswhohelprefugeesenteringthecountrywithinformationandansweringquestionsviaanonlineplatform.

Smartphones are essential for the contacts andpurposesmentioned above. Since thecurrent issueswith large amounts of refugees coming to the EU, there are additional

9 See: http://www.openembassy.nl/en/


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checkstoverifythe‘stories’ofrefugees.ClaimsmadeshouldnotbefalseandpeoplewithbadintentionsshouldnotbefacilitatedinenteringtheEUbytherefugeeprograms.Inordertoverifystories,smartphonesandsocialmediaaccountscanbeusedasevidence.Basedonlocationhistory,atrailcanbeshownwherearefugeeoriginatesfromandwhatroutewastaken.Obviously,thushastwosides:evidencecanbeusedinfavorofarefugeeoragainstarefugee.Moreover,lackofevidence,forinstanceincasesomeonedoesnothaveasmartphone,maybecomesuspicious.

Aconcerninthiscontextofadifferentkindistheriskofpeopleabusingtheinformationchannels to distribute false information. For instance, human traffickers can interferewith the informationprovidedandtherewith traprefugees.Thisconcern is taken intoaccount by Open Embassy, where there are anonymous reviews on responses toquestionsandwherevolunteersare screenedbefore theycan join the team.Foropenplatforms, such as Facebook, this is not an option. Correct information is of highimportancetoenablerefugeestoexercisetheirrightsproperlyandtogainaccesstotherelevant institutions to obtain asylum. A lack of clarity due to differences in legalframeworksconcerningasylumstrengthenstherisksmentionedabove,asforrefugeesitis difficult to determine what information is correct and what information is false.Moreover, inparticularincrisissituations,suchastherecentorcurrentrefugeecrisis,legislationchangesallthetime.Officialchannelsofinformation,providedandmaintainedbypublicauthorities,canbeofhelpinthesesituations.Socialmediacanbeatoolheretokeepinformationuptodate,butalsotorespondtofalseinformation.

2.3ConclusionsandRecommendations

Itisclearthatsocialmediacanbemined,monitored,andusedinwaysthatimprovethesafetyandsecurityofpeopleinvolvedinlargeeventsandmassgatherings.Whenitisusedeffectivelybypolice,localauthorities,andothersecurityproviders,itcanalsoincreasetrust intheseagencies,which inturn increasestheir legitimacyandtheirabilitytoacteffectively in the name and interests of the public. At a veryminimum, effective useimplies a willingness to engage proactively on social media. Too often we heard ofexamplesinwhichrisk-aversionandalackofconfidenceonthepartofsuchagenciesledtoapolicyofnon-engagementwithsocialmedia.Yetnon-engagementproducesasmanyifnotmorerisksthanitaverts:itallowsother,potentiallydisruptiveagentstodominatethesocialmediaairwaves,tosettheagenda,andtospreadfalseinformationandrumours.Socialmedia isnot going anywhere andpolice and local authoritiesneed to invest in,equipandupskill theirstaff inordertobeabletopursuetheiraimsinanincreasinglydigitally-definedworld.

The following are some key take-aways from the workshop for future research andactivities

Specific recommendations arising from the discussion in the workshop include thefollowing:

• In order to increase trust and effective communication, and to help preventdisorderlocal/cityauthoritiesshould:


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a) develop an operational strategy inwhich all stakeholders (e.g. police, protestgroups, private security companies with a professional presence in the area)participate.Thisstrategyshouldaddresstheroleanduseofsocialmediainriotsandmassgatherings.

b) gather the relevant participants of pre-planned events prior to such events inorder to facilitate open communication, ensure clarity of roles andresponsibilities and to develop mutual understanding of all concerns andinterests.

c) invest in improving language skills and cultural awareness amongst police inparticular so as to enable more effective and fair monitoring of andcommunicationwithminoritygroups

• Relevant authorities should invest in technological tools that can identify fakeinformationonlinetohelpauthoritiescounterit/debunkrumours.Thesewouldhelpauthoritiescombatthespreadofsuchinformation.

• Socialmediacompaniesshouldsetupin-housedepartmentswithwell-qualifiedindividuals who can liaise with police. Such departments should be better-resourcedandmoreresponsivetotheneedsofpolicethanatpresent.Thiswillassistpoliceinmaintainingorderandprotectingthepublic.

• Both police and social media companies should invest time and effort intodevelopinggoodrelationshipmanagementbetweentheseorganisations.

• Publicauthoritiesshouldpro-activelyprovideinformationtorefugeesviasocialmediatoensurethataccurateandup-to-dateinformationisavailableandused.

• Lawsorrulesshouldbedevelopedforauniformapproachtowardssocialmediacontentascreatedbyrefugees. Inparticular, insomecasesthiscanbeusedasevidenceandtherewithsupportrefugees.

• RulesshouldbedevelopedforLEAsonhowtointeractandcooperatewithkeystakeholdersorcontactpointsinorganisationsinthecontextoflargescaleeventsorriots.

MEDI@4SECTheEmergingRoleofNewSocialMediainEnhancingPublicSecurity

GrantAgreementno700281

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3. Ethicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwithspecifictechnologies/platforms

Thissectioncontainsanoverviewofacoupleoftechnologies/platformsthathavebeendiscussedduringtheworkshop.Foreachtechnology/platform

theethicalandlegalrisksandbenefitsarebrieflyoutlined.

3.1 ECHOSECandCoosto

https://www.echosec.net/sentiment-analysis-your-reputable-brand/

https://www.coosto.com/en/

Echosecprovidessophisticatedlocation-basedsentimentanalysis,offeringclientsbetterunderstandingofpublicorconsumeropinionviaanalysisof

‘text,imagery,time,place,andoverallcontext’.IthasbeenusedbyEuropeanpoliceforces.Coostoismarketedas‘sociallistening’,andprovidessocial

mediamonitoringservicesforclientslookingtomanagetheircorporatereputation.

EthicalRisks

• Consent of individuals to non-anonymised, fine-grained

monitoring of their social media activity by police and public

authoritiescannotbeassumedtobegivenbythefactthatposts

anddataarenotprotected.

• Fine-grained analysis of social media activity at an individual

levelcanrevealmanypersonaldetailsand is intrusive for that

reason. It should therefore be employed only forwell-defined,

legitimatepublicsecuritypurposesandonlytotheextentthatit

isnecessary.

• Monitoringofpoliticalgroupscanhaveachillingeffectandthus

interferewiththerighttofreedomofexpressionandassociation

LegalRisks

• The closemonitoringof content canbeprivacy invasive.More

informationisdisclosedthanjustthecontentsofamessage.Also

locationdataismonitored.Moreover,themessagesassuchcan

contain sensitive data, in particular when photos or video is

included.

• The monitoring can have a chilling effect on the exercise of

fundamentalrightssuchasfreedomofassemblyandfreedomof

expression. Even if events are allowed to take place, the way

peopleactmaychange.

• Thereisariskof(unintended)discriminationifspecificgroups

or individualsare filtered.Thesameholds forspecific typesof



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• Monitoringofspecificculturalorethnicgroupsmaybejustified

whentheseoverlapwithpoliticalmovementsorreligiousgroups

(e.g. inmass religious gatherings). But it should be usedwith

cautionandwiththeknowledgeofthosegroupsinordertoavoid

discrimination.

• Misuseofsuchtoolsbypublicsecurities(e.g.bytargetinggroups

critical of police activities) should be avoided via robust

accountabilityandoversightmechanisms.

• As groups becomemore sophisticated and sentiment analysis

technologies lag behind, some may seek to spread false

sentimentsonlineinordertodisrupttheactivitiesofauthorities.

content. This may depend on the algorithms used and biases

cannotalwaysbeexplained.

EthicalBenefits

• Can help authorities understand better when to intervene to

preventviolenceanddisorderbyhelpingthemgetasenseofthe

moodpriortoandduringlarge,volatilegatherings.Forexample,

it can help to gage the mood of opposing groups of fans at

sporting events, or of hostility amongst the wider public to

protesters(e.g.intheTurkishprotestcaseinRotterdam,inwhich

members of the public threw objects from windows onto

protesters).

LegalBenefits

• These tools can help prevent violence and better help people

getting toa safeenvironment ifnecessary.The legalbenefit is,

thus,moreofapreventivenature.



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3.2 Sukey

https://www.youtube.com/v/gk6en1GzPsc(overviewofpurposeofapp)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSltSvVeYHY(tutorial)

ThisplatformwasdevelopedbystudentsintheUKafteraseriesofstudentdemonstrationsendedinangerandviolencefollowingpolice‘kettling’

(enclosinginafenced-offareaforalongperiodoftime)ofdemonstrators.Called‘computer-supportedcooperativeworkfordemonstrations’byits

developersSukeyaimedtohelpdemonstratorskeepthemselves‘safe,mobile,andinformed’byenablingthemtosharereal-timelocationdataabout

theirownwhereaboutsandthatofpoliceofficers.Thesoftwarewasdiscontinuedafterproblemsachievingthekindoftrustbetweenusersnecessary

forsafeandeffectiveuseoftheapp.

EthicalRisks

• Canbesubvertedbyill-intentionedgroups,e.g.rivalorcounter-

protesters,orauthoritarianstateagents.

• Doesnotworkwithoutstrongtrust,whichisdifficulttoachieve

(aswasexplainedtousbyitsdevelopers)

LegalRisks

• Canbeusedby groupsof protesters to circumvent LEAsor to

increaserisksbyspreadingviolencetolocationsthatarenotyet

coveredbythepolice

• Mapping of police officers challenges balance between privacy

(ofpoliceofficer)andmonitoring EthicalBenefits

• Canpotentiallyprovideaccuratereal-timeinformationenabling

protesterstoavoiddangeroussituations

• Can help protect exercise of important democratic freedoms

(freedomof expressionandassociation) in situations inwhich

stateagentsaretryingtorestrictthese(e.g.viathecontroversial

techniqueofkettling)

LegalBenefits

• Canhelpprotecttheexerciseoffundamentalfreedomsincases

wherestateagentsaretryingtorestrictthese.



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3.3 Genymotion

https://www.genymotion.com/

AnAndriodemulatorenablingpolicetoadoptafakesocialmediaprofileandpretendtobeinacertainlocation.UsedbypolicetogatherOSINTand

doundercoverworkonline.

EthicalRisks

• Deceptionbypoliceofsocialmediausersnotsuspectedofany

crimemustbejustified,proportionateandsubjecttooversightto

ensureitisdonefairly.

• Surveillance of or infiltration of peaceful political groups can

haveachillingeffectontheexerciseofdemocraticfreedoms(of

thought,expressionandassociation)andthereforemustservea

legitimatepolicingpurpose.

• Easy surveillance of political groups should not substitute for

direct and open communication with them, especially when

thesearenotsuspectedofcrimes

LegalRisks

• Use by police in an 'undercover' way while there is no legal

groundtodoso.Facilitatesstructuralmonitoringandtakesaway

naturalbarriersagainstthis.

• Useofinformationcanbedisproportionate • Possibleusebypoliceofproprietarytoolsislimited

EthicalBenefits

• Can help police infiltrate or collect intelligence on groups that

pose a risk of violence or disorder and thus to prevent such

threatstosecurity

LegalBenefits

• Provides a means to facilitate infiltration or undercover

investigationsinsocialmediaenvironments,therewithbringing

thistoalevelplayingfieldwithofflineinfiltration.



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3.4 PeriscopemapliveandYoutubevideopostings

http://www.periscopemap.live/

EthicalRisks

• Canbeusedbypartisanactorstopresentonesideofastoryonly.

Authorities should take this into account when assessing the

valueasintelligenceorevidenceofsuchmaterial.

• Canbeusedto livestreamcrimeor inwaysthatexposepeople

unwillinglytothepublicandpolice.

LegalRisks

• Canbeprivacy infringingas the livevideosarenoteditedand

may include lots of people that are not involved in unlawful

activities.

EthicalBenefits

• Canhelpauthoritiesprotectpeople fromdanger,e.g inacrisis

situation, by enabling them to identify and communicatewith

peoplewhoarestrategicallyplacedorinharm’sway.

LegalBenefits

• Can generate evidence materials of events happening and

provideclarityonsourcesofviolenceorotherunlawfulactivities.


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