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Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00002228
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-46790 IDA-49490 TF-11094)
ON
CREDIT IDA-46790
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 120 MILLION
(US$190 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
CREDIT IDA 49490
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 47.4 MILLION
(US$75 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
AND
GRANT TF-11094
IN THE AMOUNT OF £6.05 MILLION
(US$ 8.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
FOR A
TRANSPORT SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
June 5, 2017
Transport and ICT Global Practice
Africa Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Effective Rate December 2015)
Currency Unit = Uganda Schilling (UGX)
US$ 1.00 = UGX 3335
UK£ 1.00 = US$ 1.48
US$ 1.00 = SDR 0.6307
FISCAL YEAR
July 1 – June 30
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AF Additional Financing
AfDB African Development Bank
APL Adaptable Program Loan
BRT Bus Rapid Transit
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DBST Double Bituminous Surface Treatment
DFID U.K. Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DRS Department of Road Safety
DP Development Partner
DUCAR District, Urban, and Community Access Roads
EAC East African Community
EC European Commission
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return
ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIS Geographic Information System
GKMA Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area
GoU Government of Uganda
GRC Grievance Redress Committee
HDM-4 Highway Development and Management Model, version 4
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA International Development Association
ISR Implementation Status and Results Report
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KCCA Kampala Capital City Authority
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MATA Metropolitan Area Transport Authority
MIS Management Information System
MoFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development
MoWT Ministry of Works and Transport
MTR Midterm Review
MTRA Multi-sector Transport Regulatory Authority
NEMA National Environmental Management Authority
NERAMP North Eastern Road Corridor Asset Management Project
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
NPV Net Present Value
NRSC National Road Safety Council
NRSA National Road Safety Authority
NTPS National Transport Policy and Strategy
OPRC Output-and Performance-based Road Contract
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PAP Project-Affected Person
PDO Project Development Objective
PDU Procurement and Disposal Unit (UNRA)
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PPIAF Public-private Infrastructure Advisory Facility Trust Fund
RAP Resettlement Action Plan
RCDS Road Crash Database
RMS Road Management System
RSDP Road Sector Development Program
SIL Specific Investment Loan
TMT Top Management Team
TSDP Transport Sector Development Project
TSDMS Transport Sector Data Management System
UNRA Uganda National Roads Authority
URF Uganda Road Fund
URURA Urban and Rural Roads Authority
Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen
Practice Manager: Aurelio Menendez
Project Team Leader: Negede Lewi
ICR Team Leader: Richard Martin Humphreys/Stephen Muzira
ICR Author: Peter Freeman
UGANDA
Transport Sector Development Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet A. Basic Information .................................................................................................................. i
B. Key Dates ............................................................................................................................... i C. Ratings Summary ................................................................................................................... i D. Sector and Theme Codes ...................................................................................................... ii E. Bank Staff ............................................................................................................................ iii
F. Results Framework Analysis ................................................................................................ iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ............................................................................ viii
H. Restructuring (if any) ........................................................................................................... ix 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ......................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ......................................................... 7
3. Assessment of Outcomes ..................................................................................................... 16 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ................................................................ 24
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrow/Implementing Agencies/Partners ........................ 33 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .................................................................................... 34 Annex 2a. TSDP Outputs by Component ................................................................................ 35 Annex 2b. Operational Risk Assessment Framework ............................................................. 41 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ............................................................................ 47 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ....................... 53
Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ................................ 55
Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents ................................................................................. 71 MAP ........................................................................................................................................ 73
i
A. Basic Information
Country: Uganda Project Name:
UGANDA
TRANSPORT
SECTOR
DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT
Project ID: P092837 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-46790, IDA-
49490, TF-11094
ICR Date: 6/5/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: Specific Investment
Loan Borrower:
GOVERNMENT OF
UGANDA
Original Total
Commitment: XDR 120.00 million Disbursed Amount: XDR 106.96 million
Revised Amount: XDR 106.96 million
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies:
Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA)
Co-financiers and Other External Partners: United Kingdom Department for International Development; Japanese International
Cooperation Agency
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 02/05/2008 Effectiveness: 08/05/2010 07/15/2010
Appraisal: 09/30/2009 Restructuring(s): 06/16/2011
05/31/2013
Approval: 12/10/2009 Midterm Review: 06/10/2012 05/10/2013
Closing: 06/30/2014 01/31/2016
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial
Bank Performance: Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory
ii
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Unsatisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Unsatisfactory Implementing
Agency/Agencies: Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance: Unsatisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance: Unsatisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem
Project at any time
(Yes/No):
No Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status: Unsatisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Major Sector/Sector
Public Administration
Public administration - Transportation 11 11
Transportation
Roads and highways 89 89
Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme
Economic Policy
Trade 4 4
Trade Facilitation 4 4
Private Sector Development
ICT 14 14
ICT Solutions 14 14
Urban and Rural Development
Rural Development 45 45
Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 45 45
Urban Development 37 37
Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 37 37
iii
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director: Diarietou Gaye John McIntire
Practice
Manager/Manager: Aurelio Menendez C. Sanjivi Rajasingham
Project Team Leader: Negede Lewi Dieter E. Schelling
ICR Team Leader: Richard Martin
Humphreys/Stephen Muzira
ICR Primary Author: Peter Nigel Freeman
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to improve the connectivity and efficiency of the transport
sector through: (i) improved condition of national road network; (ii) improved capacity for road
safety management; and (iii) improved transport sector and national road management.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) Not applicable.
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1:
Average vehicle operating costs (US$ per vehicle-km) reduced on the Gulu-
Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads.
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
US$0.352
US$0.224
US$0.224
Date achieved 07/15/2010 06/30/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Fully achieved by 2014. Data based on Highway Development and Management
Model, version 4 manual (HDM-4). Note: Kamwenge-Fort Portal added at AF.
Indicator 2:
Travel time on Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads reduced from 2 hours (2009)
to 1 hour (2014).
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
2 hours
1 hour
1 hour
iv
Date achieved 07/15/2010 06/30/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Fully achieved by 2014. Data based on survey by UNRA Directorate of
Planning
Indicator 3: National roads in poor condition reduced from 36% to 15%
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
36%
15%
22%
Date achieved 07/15/2010 06/30/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Not achieved; target of 15% not reached. Indicator was reworded at AF
“Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads (percent)”
Indicator 4:
Access of rural population to all season roads in the target areas increased from
64% to 90%
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
64%
90%
84%
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Partially achieved. Some 4.95 million people to be provided with access to an
all-season access road. The final beneficiary estimate was 4.17 million. This
indicator was reworded at AF to “Share of rural population with access to an all-
season road (percent)”
Indicator 5:
Annual rate of growth of road accident fatalities declines after the National Road
Safety Agency (NRSA) becomes operational
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
7%
Less than 7%
4%
-3.2%
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 05/14/2011 01/31/2016
Comments
including %
achievement
Though technically achieved, this was not due to the project. The NRSA was
turned down by the Cabinet. Road safety campaigns by the police were likely
responsible for the decline in road fatalities. Indicator was changed at AF to
“Annual rate of road accident fatalities (7 percent)”
v
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1: Km of road rehabilitated/upgraded
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
0 km
159 km
225 km
166 km
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 05/14/2011 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Not achieved at closure. Original target of 159 km exceeded with additional 7
km of road through Arua town. However, works on the 66 km Kamwenge to
Fort Portal road only 49% complete when the Credit was cancelled. Since then
the road has been completed and the target met, using Government of Uganda
funding.
Indicator 2: National Road Safety Authority (NRSA) created and operational
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
Road Safety managed by
Government Department
NRSA established
and operational
NRSA creation
turned down by
Cabinet
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Not achieved. Although the road safety policy statement was agreed, Cabinet
turned down the creation of NRSA in November 2014 due to insufficient
information.
Indicator 3: Crash database established and operational
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
Crash database not yet
established
Database
established and
fully operational
Database
established
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Achieved. Database established, made functional and tested in the pilot regions.
Data collected from other regions still to be put in system manually
Indicator 4:
Detailed design and bidding documents for phase 1 bus rapid transit system
prepared
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
Design and bidding
documents not prepared
Documents
completed and
approved
Documents
completed and
approved
vi
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Achieved. Designs and reports approved by a technical committee and by
stakeholders at a workshop.
Indicator 5: Framework for Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (MATA) prepared
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
No framework in place
Framework
drafted and
approved
Framework drafted,
but not yet
approved
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Partially achieved. Framework drafted and received financial clearance, but yet
to be approved by Cabinet.
Indicator 6: Transport Policy Updated
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
Policy not updated
Policy updated
and approved
Policy drafted, but
not yet approved
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Partially achieved. Revised policy drafted and amended, but financial clearance
requested before presentation to the Cabinet.
Indicator 7: Traffic and Road Safety Act Legal framework updated
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
Legal framework not
updated
Legal framework
amendment agreed
by management
Legal framework
drafted, but yet to
be legislated
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Partially achieved. Work done by consultant deemed unsatisfactory and
amendment drafted in-house.
Indicator 8: Transport Sector Data Management System (TSDMS) established
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
No TSDMS
TDMS established
TDMS established
and operational
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
vii
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Achieved. System is operational and Ministry now produces an Annual Sector
Performance Review
Indicator 9:
Multisector Transport Regulatory Authority (MTRA) established
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
No MTRA
MTRA established
and functioning
Cabinet did not
approve
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Not achieved. The draft Bill was not approved. The Cabinet was reluctant to
create new institutions and MoWT determined it would only prioritize the
establishment of NRSA and MATA
Indicator 10: District, Urban and Community Access Roads (DUCAR) agency established
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
No DUCAR agency
DUCAR agency
established and
operational
DUCAR not
established
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Not achieved. Despite agreement from stakeholders in districts, municipalities
and town councils, the request to clear the financial implications of the agency
has not been responded to and it has not been submitted to Cabinet.
Indicator 11: UNRA share of administrative costs as part of overall budget is less than 5%
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
Not available
less than 5%
Less than 5 percent
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Achieved. After the restructuring of UNRA by the Board, Ministry of Finance,
Planning and Economic Development accepted an increase in the wage
bill starting July 2015
Indicator 12:
UNRA Management Information System (MIS) established including red flag
system
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
No system
System in place
System in place
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
viii
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Partially achieved. A Contract Management System is in place, but not yet fully
functional. A review to improve functionality is ongoing.
Indicator 13: Average time deviation from procurement plan
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
Not done
Less than 10%
Not available
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Not achieved. UNRA could not provide this information, due to the
restructuring of the institution.
Indicator 14: Annual Customer Satisfaction Survey to be instituted
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
Not done
Done
Done
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Achieved. Carried out by the Uganda Road Fund
Indicator 15: Capacity (number of staff) of Internal Audit Unit of UNRA increased to carry
out technical audits
Value
quantitative or
qualitative)
6
14
7
Date achieved 07/15/2010 12/31/2014 01/31/2016
Comments
(including %
achievement)
This indicator was added when the AF was approved. It was not achieved during
the life of the project.
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(US$, millions)
1 04/30/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00
2 12/12/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00
3 07/27/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.00
4 02/05/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.09
5 07/07/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 31.93
6 01/03/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 31.93
ix
7 07/21/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory 67.53
8 01/28/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory 100.57
9 08/04/2014 Moderately
Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 113.09
10 02/24/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory 123.25
11 08/17/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory 175.92
12 02/18/2016 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 175.92
H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructuring
Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in US$,
millions
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made DO IP
06/16/2011 S MS 4.00
Additional Financing: Inclusion
of Kamwenge - Fort Portal
Road, strengthening of UNRA
Internal Audit Unit and
extension of closing date by one
year to 01/31/2016.
05/31/2013 S MS 44.27 Reallocation of amounts
I. Disbursement Profile
x
1
This Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for the Uganda Transport Sector
Development Project has a unique significance in that it highlights issues where an overly
complex project was designed in a manner that was incompatible with the available capacity in
Government. The project was restructured, and additional finance provided, to add a road
section that was not initially identified as challenging from a safeguards point of view, despite
the fact that it presaged a considerable influx of labor to a poor rural area, where there were
also some systemic social issues, without any attempt to appropriately manage the adverse
impacts on the affected communities. This resulted in a complaint to the Inspection Panel and
acknowledgement by World Bank management that there were serious weaknesses in the
preparation, implementation and supervision of the project. The contractor failed to rectify
shortcomings on a range of issues that impacted the communities, and the World Bank first
suspended disbursements and then took the exceptional step of cancelling the Credits. Following
these events, the World Bank carefully reviewed its entire portfolio of similar projects, the way it
considers environmental and social issues in project design and implementation, and its
Standard Bidding Documents to improve environmental and social provisions in contracts for
both civil contractors and supervising engineers. It also issued guidelines for staff on managing
the risks of adverse impacts on communities from a temporary project-induced influx of labor.
Particular attention has been given in this ICR to the lessons learned from these events.
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Country Context
1. Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa bordered by the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Tanzania. It has a rapidly growing population
of 34.6 million people, with 55 percent under 18 years of age.1 Uganda is classified as a low-
income country and in 2015 had a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$670.2
However, the country has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall
and sizeable mineral deposits of copper and cobalt. More recently, reserves of both crude oil and
natural gas have been discovered. Coffee is an important export commodity, but over 80 percent
of the population live in rural areas and are reliant on subsistence agriculture.
2. Following independence from Britain in 1962, Uganda sporadically experienced unrest
and conflict. Corruption and human rights issues have also caused concern among development
partners (DPs), and this has hampered the investment climate. On the other hand, the United
Nations Refugee Agency reported that in 2015 Uganda was hosting over half a million refugees
mostly from South Sudan, Burundi and the DRC. It recognized that Uganda has a progressive
policy toward such people, providing land, protection and the right to be employed or run a
business.3
3. Beginning around 2009, exogenous shocks, including the global economic crisis and
surges in international commodity prices, negatively affected the country’s growth rate. Other
1 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, Census 2014 Final Results.
2 World Bank data
3 United Nations Refugee Agency, 2005, Uganda Hosts Record 500,000 Refugees and Asylum Seekers. (Accessed
September 7, 2016), www.unhcr.org
2
issues reinforced this situation—primarily a lower export performance, adverse weather
conditions, declining development aid, as well as high inflation. A subsequent tightening of
monetary policy reduced GDP growth to 3.4 percent in 2012, down from the 7 to 8 percent range
in 2008 and the earlier years in the decade.4 Nevertheless, Uganda was able to surpass the 2015
Millennium Development Goal of halving the poverty rate.5 The share of the population living
below the poverty line declined from 35 percent in 2001 to 22 percent by 2013. This trend has
been attributed in part to a diversification of economic activity away from an over-reliance on
farm activities in favor of nonfarm household enterprises.6
1.2 Sector Context
4. In Uganda, road transport is the dominant mode and plays a pivotal role in supporting the
economic and social development of the country. Road transport carries over 90 percent of the
country’s passenger and freight traffic and provides the only means of access for much of the
rural population. The road infrastructure also serves the primary mode on the key transit corridor
linking Uganda and the neighboring land-locked countries, to the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa
in Kenya. The classified road network length is about 66,000 km and consists of 21,000 km of
national, 32,000 km of district and 13,000 km of urban roads, while the community access road
network is estimated to be in the order of 85,000 km. Other modes of transport are a railway
system with a network of 1,260 km of track, (of which only 320 km are functioning), water
transport—mainly wagon and stage ferries on Lake Victoria and the Nile River - and air
transport facilities, including an international airport at Entebbe, and 13 domestic air fields.7
5. National roads, of which 3,490 km are paved, connect districts and cities with one
another and with neighboring countries. These roads account for only 30 percent of the network,
but carry 80 percent of the total road traffic. The Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA)
created in 2008 is responsible for managing the national road network. District roads provide
access from rural areas to markets, health centers, educational institutions, administrative centers
and other services and are managed by district governments, while local governments manage
urban roads and sub-county local governments manage community roads. An Act of Parliament
established the Uganda Road Fund (URF) in 2008 with the objective of financing routine and
periodic maintenance of public roads in Uganda mainly from road user charges. The URF
became operational in 2010. It was intended to have been a second-generation road fund, but still
receives its funds from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
(MoFPED) and is subject to budgetary fluctuations and political priorities.4
1.3 National Transport Policy and Strategy
6. The National Transport Policy and Strategy (NTPS), adopted in 2002, promotes less
4 Uganda Economic Update: Bridges Across Borders – Unleashing Uganda’s regional trade Potential, February
2013 – First Edition, World Bank 5 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were the world’s time bound and quantified targets for addressing
extreme poverty in its many dimensions 6 Poverty head count ratio at national poverty line (% of population). Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Estimates
are consistent with the World Bank’s Global Poverty Working Group data. 7 Ministry of Works and Transport.2015, Annual Sector Performance Report Financial Year 2014/15
4 A second-generation road fund is financed by fuel levies and other user charges and is managed by a board
representing the interests of the road users.
3
costly, efficient, and reliable transport services. To carry out this strategy, the Government of
Uganda (GoU) has received substantial support from its DPs. The first 10-year Road Sector
Development Program (RSDP) Phase 1 covered the period from FY 1996/97 to 2005/06. In April
2002, the RSDP was updated and rolled over for a further 10 years as RSDP Phase 2 (FY2001/02
to FY2010/11) at an estimated cost of US$2.3 billion. District roads were included for the first
time. Based on the lessons learned from implementation of the first two phases, the GoU then
developed RSDP Phase 3, including some urban roads. To adequately respond to the growing
transport demand, provide support for national economic development, and expand competitive
regional trade, RSDP Phase 3 prioritized the rehabilitation and maintenance of the major road
corridors. The volume of trade with neighboring states was and still is rapidly increasing,
especially trade with South Sudan. This strategy was also intended to address infrastructure
bottlenecks and non-physical trade barriers (such as border controls) that hampered the smooth
flow of traffic for both people and goods. The planned investment requirement for RSDP Phase 3
was US$10.36 billion over the 10-year period from FY 2009/10 to 2018/19.5
7. The Bank has supported transport projects such as RSDP Phase 1 in Uganda since the
early nineties. RSDP Phase 2 was still active when the Transport Sector Development Project
(TSDP) was appraised. Adaptable Program Loans (APLs) had been implemented under the
previous road projects as part of RSDP Phases 1 and 2. However, the World Bank proposed a
Specific Investment Loan (SIL) rather than an APL for the TSDP. This was mainly because of
difficulties in predicting the timetable and costs of APLs over a long investment period. By using
a SIL with a short-term focus, results were expected to be better defined and achievable within a
shorter time period.
8. At appraisal of the TSDP, Uganda was receiving finance for all sectors from more than
40 bilateral and multilateral organizations, which made it difficult for the Government to engage
with all of them effectively. The project approval occurred during a time when several financiers
were seeking ways to improve donor harmonization, based on a sector wide approach. The
Transport Sector Framework was the result of a joint institutional support initiative prepared
inter alia between the GoU, the European Commission (EC), the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID), the Danish International Development Agency
(DANIDA) and the World Bank (see Annex 2, Table 2.1). The GoU through an annual Joint
Transport Sector Review coordinated the mostly parallel funding from the DPs. This was based
on a Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy encompassing issues such as better economic
management, removal of infrastructure bottlenecks, and improved governance and human
resource development.
9. According to a stakeholder survey of the effectiveness of this sector approach, the
greatest benefits were perceived as sound economic advice and delivery of financial resources.
However, some responders criticized the approach for theoretical solutions that disregarded
political realities. In addition, a review funded by DFID found that although the strategy was
well intended, in retrospect it was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for more effective
aid and concluded that transaction costs were not reduced because lenders and donors had
5 UNRA. 2012. Preparation of Third Phase of Road Sector Development Program, Kagga and Mott Macdonald.
4
different agendas and rules.6 Consequently, though endorsing continued efforts to harmonize,
IDA returned to its earlier model of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and prepared a CAS
for 2011-2015 covering all World Bank support, which had as a strategic objective “enhancing
public infrastructure.” For the road sector, this included strengthening the impact of the roads
budget. A public expenditure review made detailed recommendations in relation to national
roads with respect to land issues as well as procurement; monitoring and evaluation (M&E); and
absorption capacity. Whilst these factors were taken into account in preparing the TSDP, some of
the mitigation measures proved inadequate.
1.4 Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
10. The PDO in both the original Financing Agreement and the Project Appraisal Document
(PAD) was to improve the connectivity and efficiency of the transport sector through (i)
improved condition of the national road network; (ii) improved capacity for road safety
management; and (iii) improved transport sector and national road management.
11. The original PDO indicators included the following:
Average vehicle operating costs on the Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads to reduce
from US$0.352 per vehicle-km in 2009 to US$0.224 per vehicle-km in 2014;
Travel time on the Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads to reduce from two hours
2009) to one hour (2014);
National roads in poor condition to reduce from 36 percent in FY2009/10 to 15
percent in FY2013/14;
Access of the rural population to all-season roads in the target area to increase from
64 percent to 90 percent; and
Annual rate of growth of road accident fatalities to decline after the National Road
Safety Authority (NRSA) becomes operational.
1.5 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification
12. The PDO remained unchanged throughout the life of the Project, but the Results
Framework was modified as follows:
The Kamwenge-Fort Portal road was added to the indicators of reductions in vehicle
operating costs and travel time with the same target values; and
A new indicator was added in respect of the capacity of the Internal Audit Unit in
UNRA to enable it to carry out technical audits. The staffing target was 14 persons
against a baseline of 6 persons.
1.6 Main Beneficiaries
13. The entire population of Uganda was expected to benefit indirectly from the project—
especially the policy, institutional and safety aspects—but national road users and communities
6 DFID. 2009. Review of the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy - Current and Future Prospects by the Overseas
Development Institute, London and the Centre for Performance Management, Kampala.
5
living near the roads selected for improvement were the direct beneficiaries. More specifically,
both local and long distance users would have improved access to markets and services and
transport would be facilitated to and from neighboring states to the north and west of Uganda.
Policy and institutional reforms were intended to lead to better integration and efficiency for a
number of Government departments and authorities especially UNRA, the Ministry of Works
and Transport (MoWT) including the Department of Road Safety, and affected local authorities,
including the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA).7
1.7 Original Components
14. The five original components were financed by means of an International Development
Association (IDA) Credit (4679-UG) of US$190 million equivalent, and DFID-recipient
executed Trust Fund grant (TF11094) of UK£ 6.05 million, US$8.0 million equivalent, that
contributed to some of the road safety and institutional subcomponents.
Component A: Road Investments: Upgrading and Rehabilitation of National Roads (IDA
financing US$162. 1 million)
15. This component was to be executed by UNRA. The component was to finance the paving
of the Gulu to Atiak and Vurra-Arua-Oraba roads (approximately 160 km), linking northern
Uganda with southern Sudan (now South Sudan) and northeastern DRC. Component A also
included the preparation of design and bidding documents for the reconstruction of the Tororo to
Soroti road (151 km) and the Lira-Kamdini-Gulu roads (148 km), in preparation for future
financing. This would help ensure that the entire northern corridor from Kenya to the South
Sudan and DRC borders would eventually be paved and in good condition.
Component B: Enhanced Road Safety: (IDA financing US$3.5 million, DFID US$1.0
million)
16. This component was to provide funding for the establishment and start-up funding of the
National Road Safety Authority (NRSA). MoWT was to execute this component, and a special
Stakeholder Committee was to be put in place to oversee its implementation. The project design
envisaged a consultant financed by the Global Road Safety Facility being employed from
October 2009 to January 2010 to prepare a draft road safety policy and strategy and a draft law
for the creation of the NRSA in consultation with stakeholders. It had been agreed with the GoU
that the creation of the NRSA was a priority and Government would endeavor to make it
operational at the beginning of FY20l1/12. NRSA was to be funded by the Road Fund (about
US$2 million per annum was envisaged). The component was also to provide financing for
making a police crash database operational.
Component C: Urban Transport Planning: Preparation of a Kampala Urban Transport
Project (IDA financing US$4.5 million)
17. MoWT was to implement this component, and a specific stakeholder committee was to
be put in place to oversee its implementation. The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
7 KCCA came into force on the March 1, 2011, by the Kampala Capital City Act 2010. It is supervised by the
Central Government.
6
Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank, had approved an allocation of US$267,000 to
finance a pre-feasibility study for the establishment of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in the
Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA). The study was to commence in November 2009
and was scheduled for completion in March 2010. The pre-feasibility study was intended to
prepare design and bidding documents for the BRT infrastructure in the selected corridor in
GKMA, as well as draft bidding documents for the bus operators, fare collectors, fund managers,
system financial models, the central business district traffic management and parking studies, a
bicycle path master plan, and draft legislation and support for a Metropolitan Area Transport
Authority (MATA).
Component D: Institutional Support (Government): Support to Ministry of Works and
Transport (IDA financing US$7.9 million, DFID US$3.0 million)
18. This component was to assist MoWT to focus on its core functions namely policy setting,
strategic planning, sector oversight and monitoring, and to spin off some of its responsibilities to
the newly created entities under its umbrella. There were four sub-components: (i) strengthening
of the policy and planning division through updating of the sector policy, review of the sector
legal framework and introduction of a Transport Sector Data Management System (TSDMS); (ii)
assistance to create the proposed Multi-sector Transport Regulatory Authority (MTRA); (iii)
assistance for the transformation of the management of district, urban and community access
roads (DUCAR) into an Agency; and (iv) other support through, technical assistance, equipment,
training and financing operating costs.
Component E: Institutional Support (UNRA): Support to Uganda National Roads
Authority (IDA financing US$12.0 million, DFID US$4.0 million)
19. This component included: (i) the improvements/refurbishment of regional offices of
UNRA; (ii) provision of additional technical assistance to the one provided under EC financing;
(iii) financing of various studies needed by UNRA to enhance its performance; (iv) provision of
training; (v) provision of office equipment and supervision vehicles; and (vi) financing of
incidental operating costs because of UNRA acting as the Project Implementation Unit of TSDP.
1.9 Revised Components
20. Additional financing. On June 16, 2011, less than a year after the effectiveness of the
original Credit and with an appropriate waiver from Bank management8 dated November 19,
2010, the Board approved a further IDA Credit (4949–UG) in the equivalent amount of US$75
million.9 This Additional Financing (AF) was primarily to cover the upgrading of the Kamwenge
to Fort Portal road (66 km) from gravel to bituminous standard. This would extend the length of
road improved under the project to 225 km. The request from the GoU to include the road in the
TSDP was received too late to allow the road to be included in the original appraisal because
there was insufficient time to undertake the necessary due diligence of its technical design and
safeguards related work. Additional provision was made in the Additional Financing to
strengthen the internal audit functions of UNRA to undertake technical audits of road projects,
8 A waiver was required from the Regional Vice President to proceed with the Additional Financing under
Operational Policy 13.20, as the TSDP had been under implementation for less than 12 months. 9 The Credit was denominated in SDR for an amount of 47.4 million.
7
and the closing date for the project was extended by one year to January 31, 2016 (see Table 1
below).
Project Component Original Cost Revised Cost at AF
IDA DFID TOTAL IDA DFID TOTAL
A: Road Investments 162.1 0.0 162.1 235.1 0.0 235.1
B: Road Safety 3.5 1.0 4.5 3.5 1.0 4.5
C: Urban Transport Planning 4.5 0.0 4.5 4.5 0.0 4.5
D: Institutional Support – Government 7.9 3.0 10.9 7.9 3.0 10.9
E: Institutional Support- UNRA 12.0 4.0 16.0 14.0 4.0 18.0
TOTAL 190.0 8.0 198.0 265.0 8.0 273.0
Note: The African Development Bank (AfDB) had earlier separately funded the preparation of Environmental and
Social Assessments, Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for the Kamwenge to Fort Portal road. The road designs for
the Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads were financed under an earlier Bank financed operation (RDPP3). It was also
involved through parallel financing in another section of the Ibanda-Fort Portal road. During implementation, the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) financed a condition survey of district and community access roads.
The World Bank diverted funds in 2015 to complete this initiative under component D when the amount made
available to the GoU by JICA was found to be insufficient.
1.10 Other significant changes
21. The project had a second restructuring on May 31, 2013, to reallocate amounts between
the Credit and Grant Agreements (see further details in paragraph 25).
22. On October 22, 2015, the Bank suspended disbursements under the Project due to the
Borrower’s non-compliance with its obligation to implement the Project in conformity with
environmental and social standards and practices, and on December 21, 2015, the Bank cancelled
the Project. See paragraphs 31–37 for more details.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation and Risk Assessment
23. Project preparation was largely based on previous projects and although concern was
expressed about the capacity of UNRA, the Bank team was confident that new staff would be
recruited to tackle the rapidly increasing workload. No cap on recruitment by the GoU was
foreseen. The PAD remarked on the weaknesses of technical assistance in the past and how there
had been some waste of resources due to a lack of capacity in Government. It is therefore
surprising that this project was designed with four new authorities to be established.10
The PAD
also indicated that there had been problems previously with reforms taking more time than had
been anticipated, but there was no plan to mitigate this. Project design was overly complex with
too many sub-components. The level of commitment to such major reform was relatively
untested. The capacity to ensure environmental and social safeguard compliance was not even
10
These included the Multi-Sectoral Transport Regulatory Agency (MTRA), the Metropolitan Area Transport
Authority (MATA), the National Road Safety Agency (NRSA), and the District, Urban and Community Road
Agency (DUCAR.
8
discussed. The resources provided to prepare the project were unreflective of the systemic risks.
24. The original risk assessment for the TSDP is summarized in Table 2. Among the lessons
learned from the implementation experience of earlier road projects in Uganda was the need to
have measurable outputs in a specified time period. This related to both technical assistances for
building local capacity and benchmarks for effecting policy and institutional reforms.11
In
general, capacity constraints were inadequately assessed and the overall rating of moderate was
an understatement.
Table 2. Risks and Mitigations Measures at Appraisal: Transport Sector Development Project
Risks Risk Mitigation Measures Risk Rating
with
Mitigation To Project Development Objectives
The URF does not provide a
consistent flow of finance for
road maintenance
Substantial technical assistance has been put in place for URF
under joint institutional support framework. The GoU Policy
Letter states that transfers will be made in accordance with the
law.
Low
UNRA has constrained
implementing capacity
UNRA is recruiting additional staff. Gaps have been identified
and a substantial technical assistance program will lessen the risk Moderate
To Component Results
Slow progress in phasing out
force account execution of works
Current force account constitutes only 10 percent of UNRA’s
overall maintenance expenditures and UNRA plans to reduce this
further to 5 percent by 2013–14
Low
Governance risks due to
corruption in the road sector
A Governance and Accountability Action Plan has been agreed
supported by a ‘red flag’ system Moderate
Financial management risks UNRA had substantial experience and a good record in this
regard Moderate
Procurement risks
Management oversight improved and hands-on coaching to be
provided by a consultant. Vacant positions to be filled and an
acceptable record keeping and tracking system to be kept.
Substantial
Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate.
11
Transport Sector Development Project, 2009, PAD, page 6, Report No 50977-UG.
9
2.2 Implementation Issues
Reduced value of Trust Fund Grant and IDA Credits
25. Although the Trust Fund Administrative Grant Agreement was approved on April 6,
2010, it was not signed until May 27, 2012, some 23 months later. DFID planned contribution of
US$8.0 million to the two institutional strengthening components had during this period reduced
to US$6.14 million due to negative fluctuations in the exchange rate. This resulted in changed
allocations for Component D, ‘Support to MoWT,’ (down from US$3.0 million to US$2.0
million) and Component E, ‘Support to UNRA,’ (down from US$4.0 million to US$3.1
million).12
The impact of the reduction in value of DFID contribution slightly weakened the
institutional support rendered and the delays introduced unnecessary complexity into the
administrative arrangements because funds were ‘loaned’ from the IDA Credit so that work
could begin.
Design of Institutional Support and Reforms
26. A design issue was the complexity of the reform and institutional support program that
had the challenge of creating a number of new authorities, updates of legislation, office
upgrading, training, and the introduction of new hardware and software. This “Christmas tree”
approach was comprehensive, but unrealistic given the capacity constraints evident in
Government.
Midterm Review
27. The Midterm Review (MTR) mission for the TSDP took place between April 22 and May
10, 2013. The mission expressed concern because both the construction and the institutional
development and reform activities were proceeding more slowly than anticipated. The Vurra-
Oraba road was reported to be behind schedule with 30.9 percent of the works completed in 52.7
percent of the contract period. The main reason was attributed to frequent equipment breakdowns
at one of the two crushing plants. A plan was devised accordingly to accelerate the progress on
the works. The Gulu-Atiak road was also delayed with 28.3 percent of the works completed in
47.0 percent of the contract period. Delays at this site were, amongst other reasons, due to design
problems, including a need to increase the thickness of the pavement structure and a haphazard
approach by the contractor. The discovery of a land mine also made it necessary to have the road
section checked for unexploded ordnance.
28. Progress with components B, C and D were also found to be well behind schedule.
MoWT had only recently prepared the policy for drafting the NRSA bill and received clearance
from the Ministry of Public Service to establish the authority. The preparatory studies to inform
the preparation of the Kampala Urban Transport Project started late. Nevertheless, the World
Bank, with support from the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), provided
technical support for the BRT study as well as a feasibility study for the proposed establishment
of MATA – a pivotal step in the process. Regarding support to MoWT, delays were affecting
12
Final Report on DFID Trust Fund Utilization in the Transport Sector Development Project, July 2015.
10
implementation and the MTR team considered progress to be unsatisfactory. Progress with
Component E, (support to UNRA), was deemed satisfactory. As a result of the findings from the
MTR, various proposals were made by the World Bank team to speed up construction progress
in general. However, the status of safeguard arrangements was not scrutinized to the same degree
as that for the civil works construction and social issues were not mentioned.
Additional Financing Risk Assessment
29. When Additional Financing was approved to scale up the project, the project results
framework was amended slightly to incorporate the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road and the
strengthening of the UNRA Internal Audit Unit to enable it to carry out technical audits. The
former was to be measured through reduced vehicle operating costs and time, while the latter
was specified as an output based on staff employed in the unit. The AF effectiveness took almost
16 months (October 22, 2012) because the GoU informed IDA that parliamentary approval
would be necessary first. A revised risk assessment framework was detailed in the Project Paper
requesting the Additional Credit.13
This is shown in full in Annex 2, table 2.3, but the main
points were:
An action plan was developed to enhance stakeholder awareness about land
compensation and to ensure that there were adequate resources to enable timely
compensation;
Although UNRA’s Board had given approval for 46 vacant positions to be filled (in
planning, project management, maintenance, internal audit, finance, and
administration, and legal), only 14 could be filled because of a wage cap imposed by
Government. A plan to lift the cap was to be pursued; and
The UNRA Procurement and Disposal Unit (PDU) was to report directly to the
Executive Director to increase management oversight.
Commission of Inquiry into Uganda National Roads Authority
30. Complaints from the public concerning the award of contracts, mismanagement, abuse of
office and corruption in UNRA led to the appointment of a new Executive Director, on April 27,
2015. On June 8, 2015, the President of Uganda appointed a Commission of Enquiry to look into
the affairs of UNRA. In September, nearly 900 employees were dismissed and a process was
launched to screen former employees who reapplied for their jobs and to recruit additional
personnel. Some former employees were not reappointed and some were recommended for
prosecution. This major disruption in UNRA constrained its operational capacity in the short to
medium term, which was reflected in its oversight of the Kamwenge-Fort Portal Road.
Inspection Panel
31. On December 19, 2014, the Inspection Panel14
(referred hereafter as the Panel) received a
Request for Inspection from community members of the Bigodi town in Uganda raising concerns
13
Transport Sector Development Project, 2011, Project Paper for Proposed Additional Credit, Report No. 59825. 14 The Inspection Panel is a three-member body created in 1993 by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors.
It provides an independent forum for project-affected persons (PAPs) who believe that they or their interests have
been or could be directly harmed by a project financed by the World Bank.
11
about the Uganda Transport Sector Development Project - Additional Financing (“the Project”).
The request raised a number of issues including lack of community participation, sexual violence
against children by road workers, increased child labor and school dropouts, increased number of
accidents on the road and as a result of the stone quarry, a rise in crime in the community, poor
compensation practices and unclear redress mechanism, among others.
32. A Non-Government Organization (NGO), ‘Joy for Children, Uganda’ represented the
communities. Because these concerns had not been raised previously with World Bank
management, the Panel following normal procedures gave management the opportunity to
address the problems. Several missions involving Bank management, specialists and the task
team reviewed the shortcomings in implementation and discussions were held with UNRA and
Government officials. On September 11, 2015, a second request from the same entities was
received restating earlier concerns and noting that management actions to address these problems
were in their view unsatisfactory−progress remained slow and many mitigation measures had not
been implemented. The Panel registered the Request on September 28, 2015, and requested Bank
management to respond to the registration. On October 13, 2015, a Notice to Correct was issued
to the Contractor, on behalf of the Employer, requiring the Contractor to undertake 36 remedial
actions to address non-compliance with the contract.15
33. Eventually, on October 21, 2015, the World Bank suspended disbursements under the
project due to the Borrower’s non-compliance with its obligation to implement the project in
conformity with the World Bank’s environmental and social standards and practices.
34. Over the period November 19-24, 2015, a high-level mission comprising, the World
Bank’s Country Manager, the Transport Practice Director, the Practice Manager and Task Team
Leader met with key officials in the GoU including the Minister of MoWT, and the Permanent
Secretaries of the MoFPED and the Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social Development to
discuss the situation, clarify outstanding obligations, and identify follow up actions. This
informed the preparation of the Bank’s Management Response16
to the registration of the
request, issued on December 17, 2015.
35. On December 21, 2015, the World Bank cancelled the Project due to the Contractor’s
repeated failure to remedy the instances of non-compliance, and the lack of demonstrated
willingness from UNRA to address the identified social risks. The World Bank also suspended
disbursements for civil works on two other World Bank financed projects implemented by
UNRA pending a review of that organization’s capacity and the need for UNRA to build its
capacity to engage and communicate with affected communities. These were the Albertine
Region Sustainable Development Project and the North Eastern Road Corridor Asset
Management Project (NERAMP).
36. The Panel commenced the investigation stage in January 2016, and carried out field
visits, interviews and focus group discussions with the requestors and community members and
confirmed many of the claims of harm in the request in the Investigation Report, issued on
15
The Notice to Correct specified a deadline for each remedial action to be implemented, reflecting the seriousness
of the issue, and/or the ease of corrective actions. 16
World Bank (2015) Management Response to the Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Uganda Transport
Sector Development Project - Additional Financing, Washington D.C.
12
August 4, 2016. In their formal response17
, World Bank management agreed with the Panel’s
findings that there were serious weaknesses in the preparation, implementation and supervision
of the project. It acknowledged that the World Bank failed to identify and mitigate risks
associated with a full range of social impacts that a project of this size and scope could have in a
poor, rural area with many pre-existing vulnerabilities. World Bank Management also issued a
report detailing the lessons learned from this project, together with an agenda for action, which
looked beyond project-level compliance and focused more broadly on the institutional level to
identify systemic changes to strengthen oversight of projects in high-risk environments.18
37. One year after it was issued, the number of remedial actions in the Notice to Correct that
were considered to be compliant had increased to 32, but the Contractor remained out of
compliance in respect of four: work permits for foreign personnel, blasting operations at the
quarry, workplace accidents, compensation and grievance redress. All the actions were
eventually complied with by end of April 2017.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
38. The design of the project’s Results Framework had some notable shortcomings. Although
the PDO and indicators largely reflected the project’s direct outcomes, there was a lack of
outcome indicators for the project objective of improved sector management. Causal linkages
between the PDO and the performance indicators for the physical infrastructure improvements
were fairly well aligned in that they measured the condition of the national road network and
reductions in travel time and operating costs for users of the upgraded roads under the project.
However, other key indicators, notably changes in the annual rate of road accidents and the
access of the rural population to all-season roads, posed problems of attribution to the project.
Progress with reform measures and capacity building, were only measured in terms of outputs.
39. At approval of the AF, some indicators covering the road section from Kamwenge to Fort
Portal were added as well as a new intermediate indicator in respect of an additional activity to
increase the capacity of UNRA’s Internal Audit Unit to be able to carry out technical audits. The
Database Section of MoWT was given overall responsibility for monitoring and reporting on the
performance of the transport sector. During implementation the capacity-building outputs
concerning UNRA were recorded as completed, but some of the benefits of this initiative may
have been reduced because of the disruptive re-organization within the authority.
40. An enduring aspect of the project was the strengthening of MoWT database and the
capacity to utilize it. A performance review of all transport sector modes is now produced
annually, which contains a wealth of useful information that is being used to assist decision-
making. This review has been regularly updated and is of high quality.
17
World Bank (2016a) Management Report and Recommendations in response to the Inspection Panel Investigation
Report of the Uganda: TSDP AF (P121097), Washington D.C. 18
World Bank (2016b) Uganda: TSDP AF: Lessons Learned and Agenda for Action, Washington D.C.
13
2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance
Safeguards Compliance: Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads
41. The TSDP was identified in the PAD as an environmental category B project requiring
partial assessment. Safeguards triggered at appraisal were Environmental Assessment (OP/BP
4.01), Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11), and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12).
Although compliance weaknesses were identified, the potential social impacts were not of the
magnitude experienced on the Kamwenge-Fort Portal Road.
Environmental and Social Impacts
42. Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) for both the Gulu-Atiak and
Vurra-Oraba roads were prepared and disclosed both in country and at the InfoShop. Compliance
weaknesses during implementation led to closer oversight by the supervision consultants and the
World Bank team. The original ESIA and RAP documents needed substantive revision and
updating in respect of the functioning and updating of records of PAPs; and the already
identified capacity constraints within UNRA had not been resolved. Continuing budget
constraints limited the number of vacant positions in UNRA that could be filled. The contractors
applied mitigation measures to ensure compliance with road safety measures and the health and
safety of workers including supply of protective equipment and provision of lunch, drinking
water and sanitary facilities for the workers. Regular sensitization of the workers about work
safety and HIV/AIDS also took place. Monitoring of the safeguard instruments was undertaken
by UNRA, and progress made available in quarterly reports to the World Bank.
Decommissioning and restoration plans were prepared and accepted by the National
Environmental Management Authority (NEMA). Borrow pits and quarries were restored except
in isolated cases where the quarries were needed for other projects. In these instances, formal
handover documentation was completed. Roundabouts were improved and the pavement
strengthened at busy intersections.
Physical and Cultural Resources
43. Several physical cultural resources were identified: the Vurra military graves, an old East
African community (EAC) border post building, former colonial buildings in Arua town, an iron
smelting site in Nyoro village, and a sacred area in the Koboko District, where the Buranga
community performed rituals. In all cases, except the last one, the project did not affect the sites.
For the Buranga community the road was realigned, and compensation was paid as well because
the site could not be completely avoided due to the proximity of the adjacent border with DRC.
Historic buildings in Atiak and a fort in Pabo were preserved.
Involuntary Resettlement
44. RAPs for both the Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads were prepared and disclosed. The
World Bank team reviewed these documents, but found them in need of improvement to comply
with the World Bank’s safeguard policies and standards. UNRA submitted revised documents,
which were further reviewed and considered satisfactory by the safeguards team. The number of
persons affected and compensated was as follows: (i) Gulu-Atiak: 1,884 out of 2,027 PAPs were
14
compensated (93 percent);19 (ii) Vurra-Oraba: 3,276 out of 3,935 PAPs compensated (83
percent).20 The reason for the shortfall in this case was that whilst additional PAPs were
identified, but there were no funds allocated for land acquisition in the financial year because
compensation was supposed to have been concluded. Special arrangements have been made by
GoU so that this backlog can be cleared as soon as new funds are available.
Safeguards Compliance: Kamwenge-Fort Portal Road
45. In addition to the safeguards triggered at appraisal, i.e. Environmental Assessment
(OP/BP 4.01), Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11), and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP
4.12), in the AF Paper two further safeguards were added: Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04) and
Forests (OP/BP 4.36). The 2011 ESIA for the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road proposed that it be a
category ‘A’ project (potentially significant adverse impacts), but during the preparation for
Additional Financing this was downgraded to category “B”. Given the complex and systemic
social issues which emerged during implementation (which were identified in the original ESIA,
but insufficiently considered and reflected in the ESMP) as well as the fact that the road ran
through a National Park, this change in the safeguard category was an error of judgment.
Forests and Natural Habitats
46. A 13.3 km section of the Kamwenge-Fort Portal Road traverses the Kibale National Park.
This park protects a large area of forest previously managed as a logged Forest Reserve; it
adjoins Queen Elizabeth National Park and is an important eco-tourism destination popular for
its population of chimpanzees and other primates. While the upgraded road generally has a 30m
reserve, the section through the park was originally proposed not to be widened to eliminate
impacts associated with land take and destruction of trees and their canopies. Non-destruction of
tree canopies was also expected to substantially reduce the frequency of road kills resulting from
primates crossing at road level. Further, to avoid undesired tree damage occasioned by the need
for turning space for heavy equipment, a gravel quarry was identified at either end of the park so
that haulage trucks did not have to turn. Moreover, the road designs provided for properly signed
speed humps at 200-500m intervals with the aim of reducing noise and road kill levels in the
park. However, on December 22, 2014 the Uganda Wildlife Authority approved the wider cross
section of the road through Kibale National Park, despite this alternative being rejected in the
ESIA, on condition that only a limited number compensation of trees would be removed during
the road upgrading, and that some additional speed reduction devices (speed humps) were
installed, as it was eventually complied with.
Physical and Cultural Resources
47. During the site inspection of the Kamangwe-Fort Portal road (June 2014) the World Bank
team identified a cultural site, the Lugard Camp site established in the late 19th century by
Captain Frederick Lugard as an administrative center in the Kabarole District and protected
under the Historical Monuments Act. The Museum authorities inspected the site, but it was
determined that it would be unaffected by the project.
19
Of the pending payments, 10 are court cases and the remaining are due for re-assessment 20
There were over 200 complaints of non-payment due to bounced payments and missing documentation. These
complaints are being resolved on a case-by-case basis.
15
Involuntary Resettlement and social issues
48. The number of persons affected and compensated was 2,246 out of 2,844 identified (79
percent). Originally, the number of expected beneficiaries was 2,430, but a further sweep by a
team of surveyors and valuation experts added another 414 PAPs eligible for compensation. This
was necessary because the original estimate was based on sampling and not a full census. The
World Bank and UNRA have continued to follow up on the completion of compensation even
after project cancellation. As of March 27, 2017, 94 percent of PAPs had received
compensation.21
49. However, the significant social concerns raised by the communities including sexual
violence against children by road workers, increased child labor and school dropouts, increased
number of accidents on the road and as a result of the stone quarry, a rise in crime in the
community, poor compensation practices and unclear redress mechanism, were not responded to
adequately in a timely manner. In addition to the action plan to mitigate these infractions, and
given the sensitivity of the gender-related matters, the World Bank undertook a diagnostic study
of gender-based violence in Uganda. The purpose was to make recommendations for how the
World Bank can in future better identify and address the potential impacts of gender-based
violence.22
Fiduciary Compliance
Financial Management
50. Pastel Accounting software was used to account for project funds. An assessment of
financial management practices carried out in December 2014 rated them only moderately
satisfactory because project accounts and World Bank reconciliations were not up-to-date,
withholding taxes deducted from contractors lacked receipts, and supporting documentation for
overseas trips was insufficient. These deficiencies were corrected and afterwards the financial
management aspects were rated as satisfactory with adequate financial systems in place,
qualified accountants deployed with knowledge of World Bank systems, and no ineligible
payments were recorded. UNRA and MoWT liaised with the Auditor General to have the
financial records reviewed in a single audit exercise. No irregularities were reported.
Procurement
51. Procurement commenced late in several cases such as purchase of equipment for pilot
phase of DUCAR and the review of engineering designs for future projects. At AF, three
measures were agreed to improve procurement capacity: the UNRA PDU was to report directly
to the Executive Director to increase management oversight; an outsourced independent
procurement evaluation was to be introduced to benchmark and validate UNRA’s procurement
actions and its management information system for procurement tracking, while the capacity of
UNRA’s Internal Audit Unit was to be strengthened to enable it to carry out technical audits. It
21
World Bank, 2017 First Progress Report of the Implementation of Management’s Action Plan in Response to the
Inspection Panel Report. 22
McLean, L and P. Bukuluki. 2016. Uganda Gender-based Violence Diagnostic. Washington, DC: World Bank.
16
took 26 months from Board presentation in June 2011 until the selected contractor was mobilized
in August 2013. During this time, two procurement specialists were employed (financed by the
World Bank) and ten staff put in place by the GoU (against a target of 14). During the UNRA
restructuring, however, some apparently competent procurement staffs were let go for reasons
not disclosed to the World Bank and at project closure only seven staff members were in place.
The new organizational structure has to implement a proposed program amounting to between
US$700 million to US$2 billion over a period of four years.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
52. Although, for reasons explained elsewhere in this report, the Credit to finance the
Kamwenge - Fort Portal road was cancelled with the works 49 percent completed, the contractor
continued with the project using the GoU’s own funds. At the time of cancellation of TSDP, the
World Bank also suspended funding of the civil works components under UNRA of the
Albertine Region Sustainable Development Project, 100 km, and the NERAMP, 340 km,
because of concerns about the capacity of UNRA to implement safeguards management and
community engagement in accordance with World Bank guidelines. UNRA proposes to utilize
its own resources to fund the recurrent maintenance costs of the road, from the resources
provided by the Road Fund. The World Bank's support for the NERAMP project is designed to
pilot output and performance-based road contracts (OPRC),23
which could be extended to the
remainder of the network, if the results are promising. The NERAMP project is also providing
additional support to ensure for the sustainability of reforms within UNRA, as well as
improvements in staffing and training. At the same the Bank will continue to advocate for
adequate levels and use of funds to ensure the sustainability of the road network at all levels
from the Road Fund.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
Relevance of Objective(s)
Rating: High
53. The TSDP supported a slice of the RSDP, based on priorities guided by the country’s
Poverty Eradication Action Plan and linked to the Government’s Medium Term Expenditure
Framework. Inadequate infrastructure especially roads and transport, was identified as a binding
constraint for growth and economic transformation. The transport sector operates within various
frameworks, the over-arching one being the Uganda Vision 2040 (launched in April 2013). In
2009, the Letter of Development Policy for the Transport Sector laid out the principles for the
environment in which TSDP would operate. The National Development Plan (2010/2011-
2014/2015) detailed the country’s development challenges and opportunities. Transport,
especially roads, was among the sectors given priority because of the strong link with rural
agricultural production and hence poverty reduction. These strategic objectives continue to remain key
priorities of the Government of Uganda.
23
Under OPRC contractors are not paid directly for “inputs” or physical works, but for maintaining specified
Service Levels (Road Conditions).
17
54. In addition, the Government’s NTPS hinged on the promotion of less costly, efficient and
reliable transport services as the means of providing effective support to increased agricultural
and industrial production, trade, tourism, social and administrative services. This was supported
through the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy, 2001-2007, and also in the immediate years
afterwards, until the CAS for 2011-2015. The CAS had a strategic objective of “enhancing
public infrastructure,” that for road sector included strengthening the impact of the roads budget,
strengthening accountability, and improving governance arrangements. The intention was to
facilitate trade with neighboring countries, increase the percentage of national roads in good
condition and increase the access of the rural population to all-season roads. The relevance of
these objectives were confirmed in the CAS Progress Report issued in July, 2013.24
IDA co-
financed the TSDP together with DFID in support of key priorities in the Uganda National
Transport Master plan by improving connectivity and efficiency The objectives were and remain
highly relevant.
Relevance of Design
Rating: Modest
55. The project’s objectives and its design were reasonably well aligned, but overly complex.
The sector-wide approach to comprehensively reform the sector had too many subcomponents
and was beyond the capacity of the GoU to implement. Although the weak organizational
structure of UNRA and serious understaffing were identified as risks both in the PAD and in the
Project Paper for AF, the implications of these risks were underestimated. In particular, the
failure to properly assess UNRA’s capacity to comply with World Bank’s safeguard
requirements. Strengthening measures were built into the project that included studies, training,
equipment and office refurbishment, but many posts in UNRA remained unfilled and, as
unfolding events made it clear, there was insufficient environmental and social specialist
capacity. The scope of institutional development, capacity-building and planning activities in the
project’s design proved far too ambitious, and eventually posed significant implementation
challenges.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
PDO: To improve the connectivity and efficiency of the transport sector through improved
condition of the National road network. Rating: Modest
Outcomes
56. The average vehicle operating cost per vehicle-km was reduced by a third from US$0.352
to 0.224 on the Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads by 2014. The target was fully achieved.
57. Travel time on the same roads reduced by half from two hours to one hour - also meeting
the target.
58. However, because the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road was not complete at project closing,
savings in either vehicle operating costs or time were not meaningfully calculable, although the
24
IDA/IFC and MIGA (2013) CAS Progress Report for the Republic of Uganda for the period FY11-FY15.
18
expected benefits were being realized on already completed sections.
59. Access of the rural population to all-season roads in the target areas improved from 64
percent of the population to 77 percent by June 2014 (the target was 90 percent).25
Under the AF
this indicator was slightly reworded as the share of the rural population with access to an all-
season road, with the same target of 90 percent. It was envisaged that 4,950,000 rural people
would achieve access under the project. The target was not met. In the final Implementation
Status Results report (ISR), actual beneficiaries were estimated at 4,172,614 and the ISR
indicates that the original target may have been over-estimated.
60. A further indicator in the original project was that National roads in poor condition be
reduced from 36 percent to 15 percent. This was changed at AF, to “roads in good and fair
condition” as a percentage of all classified roads, with a baseline value of 64 percent and a target
of 90 percent. Using the original definition, 22 percent of roads were in in poor condition at
closure; using the revised definition 64 percent of all classified roads in good/fair condition –
(the urban roads were generally in a poorer condition than the national roads). Neither target was
met.
Outputs
61. Road length constructed. The original target of 159 km of road was exceeded by seven
km due to the upgrading of the road through the town of Arua. At AF, the target was revised to
225 km. However, works on the 66 km of road from Kamwenge to Fort Portal were only 49
percent complete when the World Bank Credit was cancelled. According to the final ISR 166 km
in total had been completed under the project. The works in the meantime have continued funded
utilizing GoU own funds.
62. Engineering consultancy services. In preparation for four future road upgrades in the
RSDP, the project funded the consultancy services for feasibility studies, environmental and
social assessments and detailed engineering designs. The actual road sections were expanded as
circumstances changed. The final list of roads included was Tororo-Mbale-Soroti (340 km),
Kamdini-Nebbi-Goli-and Ayer-Bobi (230 km), Kafu-Karuma-Kamdini (104 km), and Zirobwe-
Wobulenzi (23 km). In the case of the Tororo road, the consultant prepared a long-term OPRC
contract as an input to the Northeastern Corridor Road Asset Management Project.
Rating: Negligible
Outcomes
63. The rate of growth of road accident fatalities in Uganda was seven percent per annum at
appraisal—a statistic of great concern. The original target was that with the establishment of the
25
Accessibility in the target areas is according to the Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR), sequence 10,
February 2015.
19
NRSA this rate of growth would decline, but no specific numerical target was set. At AF
approval, the indicator target was revised to a rate of growth not exceeding four percent growth
in fatalities when compared to the previous year—a very modest target. Actual figures were
much better than this with traffic fatalities peaking in 2012 at 3,343, then falling to 3,124 in
2013, 2,937 in 2014 and 2,845 in 2015, (see annex 2, table 2.2). However, these achievements
were not attributable to the project. The decline may have been due to the traffic police
introducing dedicated enforcement teams targeting major causes of accidents such as speeding,
drunk driving and incompetent drivers.26
Increased traffic congestion in the cities of Kampala
and Entebbe may also have reduced the severity of accidents due to lower speeds.
64. Expressed another way, in 2013 the death rate per 10,000 vehicles was 45 and this
declined to 26 by project closure despite the increasing vehicle population. The death rate per
100,000 people was 30, which is close to the World Health Organization estimate of 27.8.27
Notwithstanding, this remains one of the highest rates in Africa, even though rates in some
neighboring states are worse (Kenya 29.1, Rwanda 32.1 and Tanzania 32.9). The TSDP was
instrumental in supporting the formulation of the new road safety policy and created awareness
of good practice with the Uganda Police. However, since both the crash data base and the
establishment of the NRSA are still pending there is no convincing evidence that the reduction in
fatalities was attributable to the project’s interventions.
Outputs
65. NRSA created and operational. Although it approved the Road Safety Policy28
in
November 2014, Cabinet was reluctant to create new institutions and did not approve the
establishment of the NRSA. The objective in establishing the NRSA was to strengthen
institutional capacity in achieving national road safety objectives. The NRSA was envisioned to
be a central government authority that would coordinate all efforts of all stakeholders with
differing road safety activities and initiatives. It would be an autonomous, self-accounting
institution. MoWT made a strategic decision in 2015 to re-submit a request to Cabinet for the
establishment of the NRSA with stronger justification based on empirical evidence. In the
interim, road safety matters remain in the Ministry with support from underfunded advisory
National Road Safety Council (NRSC).29
66. Establishment of Road Crash Database. The overall objective of the database was to
enable the establishment of a well-functioning reliable road crash data system. This was
structured in three phases: Phase 1 was dedicated to a needs assessment; Phase 2 was for
ensuring the system was functional and piloting the project in specific districts; and Phase 3 (an
additional activity) was for the roll out. The Implementation Completion and Results Report
(ICR) mission confirmed that the system was functional and that data collected from non-pilot
regions can be put in the system manually. Equipment was procured and delivered to the
Ministry in December 2015.
67. Consultancy to update the Traffic and Road Safety Act of 1998. A consultant was hired to
26
Uganda Police. 2013. Annual Crime and Traffic Road Safety Report. Kampala. 27
World Health Organization.,2015. Road Safety Report. Geneva: World Health Organization. 28
A strategy to deal with ‘bodaboda’ motorbikes was added by MoWT 29
Ministry of Works and Transport, 2015. Annual Sector Performance Report Financial Year 2014/15.
20
review the Act and prepare revised legislation, however, the final report produced was deemed
unsatisfactory by the Ministry technical team. Nevertheless, in view of the approved road safety
policy and emerging need for tighter Axle Load Control, the Ministry decided to finalize
amendments to the Traffic and Road Safety Act in-house. The principles for drafting the
amendment have been finalized, but the legislation has yet to be enacted.
Rating: Modest
Outputs
Ministry of Works and Transport
68. Preparation of Kampala Urban Transport Project. This subcomponent comprised
support to introduce a BRT system in the GKMA and the establishment of a Metropolitan Area
Transport Authority (MATA). The final draft design, procurement strategy, operating conditions
and taxi transformation strategy have been discussed with stakeholders and technical committee
members. The duration of the contract was also extended to cater for a BRT route extension from
20 km to 25 km. Regarding the establishment of MATA, a study was carried out to advise
Government on establishing such an authority. This was completed in April 2014. The MoFPED
has issued a Certificate of Financial Clearance and Cabinet approved the principles for a Bill to
establish MATA. The First Parliamentary Council, however, is still drafting the detailed Bill and
an action plan for implementation remains under discussion.
69. Establishment of Multi-Sectoral Transport Regulatory Authority (MTRA). Cabinet did not
approve the establishment of a MTRA and MoWT have not pushed this proposal any further to
date.
70. Establishment of the District, Urban, Community Road Agency (DUCAR) agency. In
1998 policy matters related to district and urban roads were transferred from the Ministry of
Local Government to MoWT, which established a division for DUCAR. It had proved very
difficult to build and maintain sufficient capacity at district level. In 2004 a ten-year investment
plan was developed covering the maintenance and upgrading of 16,372 km of roads. MoWT
decided to enhance the status and performance of DUCAR by establishing an agency under its
oversight. To this end TSDP funds were allocated to assist with the drafting of an appropriate
Bill and consultation with local communities. MoWT opted to prepare the draft Bill in-house and
held consultations with 111 districts, 12 municipalities and 198 town councils. It obtained their
consent to create an authority to manage the roads, with the exception of community access
roads. At a stakeholder’s workshop it was formally agreed that the agency should be established,
but re-named the Urban and Rural Roads Authority (URURA). However, MoWT decided that
the NRSA and MATA were the priority new authorities and URURA may only be supported at a
later date.
71. Support for the development of software for TSDMS. After a needs assessment,
diagnostics and specifications report, the work proceeded with equipment procured under TSDP.
21
The system was launched at the transport sector review workshop in 2014. As a result of this
work, the Ministry now produces an annual sector performance review. This report contains
considerable useful information including key indicators to track performance.
72. Updating of NTPS. The policy has been updated and reviewed by the Sector Working
Group. It provides for the establishment of the NRSA and MATA, but has yet to be cleared by
the MoFPED pending greater clarity on the financial implications. Further consultation is taking
place before resubmitting the draft for financial clearance.
73. Consultancy Services for the preparation of a strategic implementation plan for the
National Transport Master Plan. The Strategic Implementation Plan for the National Transport
Master Plan including a Master Plan for the GKMA was completed during FY 2014/15.
74. Consultancy Services for Updating Inland Water Transport Legislation. A study was
commissioned in 2014 to review inland water transport laws, harmonize legislation within the
region and update them to international standards. A Cabinet Memorandum seeking approval of
the principles is being finalized, but as yet parliamentary approval has not yet been given.
75. Condition Survey for District and Urban Roads. This item was partly funded by JICA
support to MoWT. The task was to prepare a condition survey for the URURA network,
comprising 30,000 km of district roads and 85,000 km of community access roads. JICA had
covered about half of this network. A request was made for the balance to be funded from TSDP.
This has been done and the database has been completed and is in use. Information technology
equipment has been procured and delivered.
76. Transport Sector Capacity Development. Six staff members completed Masters degrees
in Transport Economics and Planning at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom. Other
staff received training in professional management skills in Israel and South Africa.
Uganda National Roads Authority
77. Upgrading of UNRA regional offices. Five regional offices were to be upgraded. The
designs have been completed, but the cancellation of the Credit affected the procurement of the
works contract and also the construction.
78. UNRA: Road Inventory and Mapping. Some 10,000 km of district roads were reclassified
to become part of the national road network and transferred to UNRA’s management. The data
collection (including mapping, an inventory of road assets, condition assessment and traffic
census have been completed. Quality assurance and uploading of the data in the Road
Management System (RMS) was completed in May 2012. The project was successfully
completed with the commissioning of the RMS in June 2012.
79. Development of a Geographic Information System (GIS) based Rights-of-Way
Management Information System. The system was to support RAP preparation, land acquisition,
registration and land administration. In addition, it would respond to queries and complaints as
well as M&E. System development was completed and the system was installed on the UNRA
server. GIS officers were given training to provide technical and helpdesk support.
22
80. Procurement of equipment for UNRA. This included the procurement of heavy-duty
scanners, and 15 double cabin pickup vehicles.
81. Technical assistance: communications. The outputs under this support were a perception
survey, communications strategy, monthly media analysis reports, designing communication
materials, website management, social media, operational templates, social intermediation,
community relations and training.
82. Technical assistance: procurement. A procurement consultant with skills in roads and
contract management joined the PDU in August 2010
83. Ferry Services Advisor for UNRA. At the close of Financial Year 2014/15, UNRA had
eight operational ferries linking national roads. A ninth Ferry at Bukakata/Luuku was provided
and operated by Kalangala Infrastructure Services contracted by the GoU to provide
infrastructure services in Kalangala under a Public Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement. An
advisor was appointed for 12 months to review the current system and make recommendations
for future operation.
84. Axle Load Control Advisor. The draft policy was completed in 2010, but the process was
dragged out by harmonization efforts at the EAC level, which resulted in the enactment of the
EAC Vehicle Load Control Bill by the East African Legislative Assembly. However, due to
delays in assent to the Bill by some Heads of State within EAC, the policy is now going to be
reviewed and forwarded to Cabinet for final approval.
85. Internal Audit Unit. A consultant commenced services in September 2013 for a period of
two years. In addition, consultancy services were procured for establishing and developing a
Technical Audit Unit in the Directorate of Internal Audit. It was intended that 14 staff would be
employed in this unit, but at project closure there were only seven staffs.
86. General capacity building (UNRA). A consulting firm provided this service from June
2014 to December 30, 2015, when it was terminated due to the restructuring of the organization.
87. Asset Management Support (UNRA). This service was to ensure that asset management
practices in the newly established asset management systems were fully mainstreamed in
UNRA’s business. The service will expire in February 2017.
3.3 Efficiency
Rating: Modest
88. Economic analyses for the upgrading of the Gulu-Atiak and the Vurra-Oraba roads were
undertaken at appraisal using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4).
The analyses in Table 3 were based on economic costs, excluding taxes and duties.
Table 3: Economic Analysis Results
Road Section Appraisal Completion
NPV@12% EIRR % NPV@12% EIRR %
23
discount rate discount rate
Gulu-Atiak $25.68m 18.1 $65.09m 28.3
Vurra-Oraba $53.96m 21.2 $22.51m 18.0
Kamwenge-Fort Portal $19.00m 18.0 Not completed Not completed
89. The Gulu-Atiak road gave a better return at completion due to higher than anticipated
traffic. The Kamwenge-Fort Portal road, representing a third of the road investment cost, had an
NPV of US$19 million and an EIRR of 16.8 percent at appraisal. Because the Credit was
cancelled and the road was unfinished at closure no further economic evaluation was undertaken.
90. Operational and administrative efficiency: The project has been characterized by
delays. The MTR reported most components were behind schedule and the completion date was
extended by 18 months. The Trust Fund Administrative Agreement (largely due to delays on the
Bank’s side) took 23 months before approval, by which time the value of DFID grant had shrunk
by 30 percent due to exchange rate fluctuations. At the time of approval of the AF steps were
taken to improve procurement capacity, but still by closure most of the reforms in the transport
sector had not been completed. There were savings due to exchange rate fluctuations that could
have been used had the project closing date been extended; the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road
construction continued after closure using GOU funding. The overall rating for efficiency was
downgraded to modest because prior to closure the Kamwenge-Fort Portal Road was unfinished
and because of the long delays during implementation.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
91. The overall project outcome rating is unsatisfactory.30
The project’s objectives remain
highly relevant to the Ugandan economy, reducing poverty, and the World Bank’s program in
Uganda. However, the relevance of design was modest. Establishing four new agencies was
ambitious and Government had misgivings about worsening the situation given the governance
issues in UNRA and elsewhere. The achievement of two project objectives (connectivity and
efficiency; transport sector and road management) is rated modest, and the achievement of the
secondary level objectives (road safety and transport sector road management) are rated
negligible and modest respectively. The AF Credit for the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road was
cancelled when only 49 percent of the construction was complete, although construction
continued using GoU funds. Efficiency was modest, given the delays that had occurred.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Significant
92. Although the overall project outcome is unsatisfactory, several components of the project
did achieve some useful results, and the risks to their sustainability are worth considering. One is
the sustained maintenance of the completed Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba road sections. The
URF remains underfunded and this matter requires urgent attention to avoid worsening the
30
This conforms with the standards of Appendix J, Table 1, of the ICR Guidelines.
24
maintenance backlog. This road will also add to the maintenance needs and not all PAPs had yet
been compensated by the time the ICR was being prepared. In regard to road safety, the project
supported the preparation and adoption of the National Road Safety Policy, but it remains
uncertain whether the Government will follow this up with appropriate legal, regulatory and
institutional measures, which were not taken up during the life of the project. Finally, there are
numerous pending risks to the sustainability of the project’s contributions to improved sector
management, including the preparation of the Kampala Urban Transport Project, the
establishment of MATA and the NRSA, the updating of NTPS and the finalizing of the Inland
Water Transport Bill.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance
Quality at Entry: Unsatisfactory 93. The TSDP appropriately supported a portion of the RSDP, based on priorities guided by
the country’s NTPS, Poverty Eradication Action Plan and the CAS of 2011/15. The project at
appraisal was classified as environmental category ‘B’ because the two road projects were more
or less on the same alignments and no significant adverse effects were anticipated. An
appropriate team was mobilized. Identified risks at appraisal related to the absorption of
technical assistance for building local capacity and benchmarks for effecting policy and
institutional reforms. Although the risks for financial management and procurement were rated
moderate and substantial, all other risks were questionably appraised as being low or moderate,
with an overall risk rating of moderate. It was assumed that because the World Bank and its DPs
had rendered considerable technical assistance to the sector over several years, the risk of
insufficient capacity was only moderate, but there were serious shortcomings in MoWT when it
came to the reform program, and in UNRA in ensuring there was sufficient capacity to review
the quality of documents submitted by the design consultants as well as to ensure safeguards
compliance. This was clearly exacerbated when UNRA was given another 10,000 km to manage
without a commensurate increase in staff.
94. The World Bank team was diligent in securing funding through DFID for road safety and
institutional support, while the AfDB had already funded the preparation of ESIAs, RAPs and
road designs. A Governance and Accountability Action Plan was drawn up to address
governance, but there were no specific risk measures associated with road safety. The
establishment of the four proposed new authorities supported by TSDP, was extremely
unrealistic, given the project complexity, staffing, budgetary and political implications of
establishing these new entities. The Cabinet clearly had misgivings about these proposals and in
the end MoWT decided to only press for consideration the two highest priority authorities,
namely, the NRSA and MATA—neither of which had materialized by preparation of this ICR.
Overall, the project design addressed many sector needs with numerous subcomponents covering
construction, road safety, urban transport and transport sector reform, posing a challenge for the
Government given its stretched operational capacity.
25
(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Unsatisfactory 95. Implementation support to the Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads, the implementation of
which were relatively straightforward, had a satisfactory outcome, despite some early
construction delays prior to the MTR. Supervision of the reform program was intensive with a
full-time Bank staff hired in the country office and working with the Ministry on a daily basis in
addition to support provided by DFID. Delays by the Borrower were a recurring feature,
however, characterized by late starts, a general lack of urgency, and the failure to succeed in
establishing any of the proposed authorities. By the time the Administrative Grant Agreement
with DFID was signed the planned contribution of US$8.0 million had reduced to US$6.14
million due to exchange rate fluctuations in the two years that had elapsed. The Bank team could
have pushed this trust fund contribution with more vigor. The time to gain support from
stakeholders, navigate the procedures to prepare a Bill to set up a new authority, and obtain a
Certificate of Financial Clearance from the MoFPED was generally underestimated by the World
Bank and impacted headway. Nevertheless, some progress was made in respect of formulating
road safety policy; setting up a pilot crash database, design of a BRT system in Kampala and in
establishing a TSDMS. It is difficult to evaluate the World Bank’s performance in respect of the
capacity-building subcomponents because no outcomes were specified or measured.
96. Turning to the supervision performance after approval of the AF, the findings of the
Inspection Panel (accepted by Management) are highly pertinent. Many have to do with
inadequate preparation of the AF proposal. In the updated draft 2011 ESIA for the Kamwenge-
Fort Portal road the project was proposed as a category “A” (potentially significant adverse
impacts), but in preparation for the AF this was downgraded to category “B”, as detailed under
section 2.4. As environmental category “B” the project was precluded from the benefits of
increased internal scrutiny and resources. The final ESIA made only brief references to the
systemic social impacts and risks. The Bank team made regular visits, but initially did not
include persons with a background in social safeguards, or the particular areas of concern.
97. Given the high prevalence of child abuse and child pregnancy in rural Uganda, these
matters deserved much more than cursory attention and the composition of the implementation
team should have reflected this. A major shortcoming was that the ESIA did not identify in
sufficient detail the key risks arising from the influx of a large number of construction workers
and therefore the potential impacts on the affected poor rural communities and subsequent
mitigation measures applied were inadequate and not properly addressed in the Environmental
and Social Management Plan (ESMP). The Panel observed that an adequate assessment of
UNRA’s environmental and social capacity had not been conducted; as a consequence, the
project’s technical assistance and capacity enhancement components tended to focus more on
procurement.
98. The site specific ESMP prepared by the contractor lacked information on how to mitigate
identified risks and was not shared in its revised form with the World Bank by the Employer
until at least two years into the civil works implementation. The World Bank was remiss in not
pursuing this and also assuring that activities and costs associated with social safeguards
26
mitigation were adequately reflected in the bidding documents or in the contract.31
The World
Bank also relied on figures for affected persons that were out-of-date; the 2,200 people identified
in the first RAP grew to 2,844 during supervision. Moreover, the focus in terms of social
safeguards was primarily on involuntary resettlement as opposed to social and environmental
issues for the re-aligned sections. The Bank should have been more stringent in ensuring
compliance on environmental and social issues and should have taken stronger action such as
proposing suspension of disbursements at an earlier stage. Implementation supervision ratings
tended to mask the true nature of the problems.
99. The Inspection Panel found that Management did not ensure the design or
implementation of appropriate mitigation measures to protect the community and workers
against construction impacts, thus seriously jeopardizing human health, safety, and livelihoods in
non-compliance with OP/BP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment. Further, it found that early and
ongoing consultations with community members would have raised sufficient warning signals to
address the problems raised in the Request. Project implementation continued despite the serious
compliance failures and harm repeatedly identified in supervision reports, and in the absence of
decisive action by Management. Consequently, the Panel found Management in non-compliance
with OP/BP 10.00 on Investment Project Financing.
100. There was over-reliance on verification sampling rather than a full census to identify
PAPs, despite the recognized weakness of the original census under the RAP commissioned by
the AfDB. The World Bank should have insisted on a new census given the uncertainty of the
figures. In addition, there was an interval of more than two years between the original census and
the updated RAP. The Panel also found that the updated RAP contained an inadequate
vulnerability assessment and did not properly identify necessary assistance programs targeting
vulnerable groups. Consequently, the Panel found that Management did not ensure the
preparation and implementation of an updated RAP compliant with OP/BP 4.12 on Involuntary
Resettlement. Moreover, road construction commenced and continued before most PAPs were
compensated, which is contrary to Bank policy. Such compensation amounts were frequently
insufficient due to failure to assess the full impact of the road on land-take, and there was
insufficient livelihoods restoration assistance as set out in the 2011 RAP.
101. The World Bank failed to ensure the Borrower complied with its obligation to report
monthly on RAP implementation. Early detection of problems by the World Bank would have
permitted interventions to address known concerns and prevented compensation problems from
escalating. World Bank Policy OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement requires institutionalized
mechanisms for the continued participation of affected persons and redress of their grievances.
The RAP set out a procedure for establishing a grievance redress mechanism that included
employing a RAP Implementation Consultant with field presence along the road in collaboration
with a local NGO-funded to monitor RAP effectiveness. This was not done.
102. The 2011 ESIA and appraisal documents for the Additional Finance lacked a required
analysis of risks to women and children caused by labor influx, in particular those risks related to
sex with minors, teenage pregnancies, sexual harassment, child labor, and school dropouts.
31
However, there were provisions for Occupational Health Safety, an HIV/AIDS service provider, and a lump sum
for the environmental action plan.
27
Mitigation measures mainly focused on HIV/AIDS prevention and were inadequate to respond to
the multidimensional problem of gender-based violence and child protection. Management’s
initial response to the complaints failed to meet the standards of systematic or holistic assessment
of risks, which aimed, among other objectives, to identify adequate risk management measures
for affected communities.
103. Finally, despite the Bank undertaking several implementation support missions, the
composition of these teams lacked the requisite expertise to address issues related to gender-
based violence and child protection. Effective implementation support (including adequate
understanding of the community) could have resulted in earlier detection of some problems caused
by the project. The Panel found Management’s overall supervision of the Project, including its
actions in response to the Request received in December 2014, in non-compliance with the
World Bank Policy on Investment Project Financing OP/BP 10.00.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
104. The World Bank overestimated the willingness and capacity of the Borrower’s achieving
the transport reform and the road safety outcomes of the original project design, which proved
far too ambitious. The Kamwenge - Fort Portal road under the AF added another dimension of
complexity and risk as discussed above. The Panel’s Investigation Report revealed many
shortcomings on the part of the World Bank in relation to the AF, which led, in tandem with the
Borrower’s non-compliance with its obligations, to the cancellation of the financing.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
105. In its Letter of Development Policy for the Transport Sector, the GoU placed emphasis
on the provision of technically sound, economically justified, financially and environmentally
sustainable infrastructure as well as the active participation of the private sector. The
Government restructured MoWT to focus on formulating policies, setting standards, strategic
planning, sector oversight and monitoring. At the same time, the Government began delegating
executive functions, including implementation and regulatory functions, to specialized entities,
which had been or are being created. Accordingly, UNRA was established to manage National
roads and the URF was set up, albeit with a smaller budget than needed to provide for adequate
maintenance. Despite this progress, during the life of TSDP there has been a reluctance to move
further forward with new authorities including the NRSA, which was turned down by the
Cabinet. This slowed the reform process and shown a wavering in commitment. Although the
reform component started late, there were pockets of success – for instance, progress was made
in completing the design for the BRT, and a road safety policy was approved. The reform
process within MoWT proceeded overall very slowly and at project closure no new agencies had
been established. There was a disconnect between what had been articulated in the policy and
commitment to implement the steps necessary to achieve the policy goals.
106. The Government also supported the implementation of a Governance and Accountability
28
Action Plan aimed at developing a system and culture for promoting transparency and
accountability in the road sector. This was an important move, but governance is still a major
issue emphasized by the appointment in 2015 of a Commission of Enquiry into UNRA. While
the World Bank welcomed this development, which followed complaints from the public, the
subsequent dismissal and re-appointment of selected staff (after a thorough screening) inevitably
caused a major disruption to the operational capacity of UNRA and its ability to respond to the
supervision issues on the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road. Similarly, the addition of 10,000 km of
district roads re-designated as National roads doubled the responsibility of UNRA, but there was
a failure to provide a commensurate improvement in staff numbers. A cap on recruitment meant
that despite the project’s best efforts to build capacity, the authority continued to be constrained
by weak capacity. The weak governance environment had an adverse effect on implementation.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
Ministry of Works and Transport
107. The MTR mission expressed concern because the reform activities were proceeding more
slowly than anticipated. A sense of urgency was lacking and this did not appreciably improve
during the life of the project. The indicators in the results framework were recorded, but this did
not translate into action when results were falling short of target. There were delays in
procurement and in recruiting additional staff. The MTR states that there was a lack of follow up
and a lack of accountability for the delays in procurement processing. All reform activities were
constrained by the failure to achieve Cabinet approval for any of the four proposed new agencies.
It would be unfair to say that no progress was made with the reform agenda, but the results were
patchy and varied by department. The design of the proposed Kampala BRT was completed, but
there was some dissension as to whether this was the right solution as a light rail proposal was
also suggested. In any case, the planning could not proceed in the absence of approval of MATA.
On the other hand, the timely completion of the URURA condition survey, the establishment of
the crash database, and the annual transport sector performance review were positive steps
forward.
Uganda National Road Agency
108. UNRA suffered from a significant staffing shortage throughout project implementation.
Continuing budget constraints and a cap on hiring limited the number of staff that could be
recruited and even when new staff came on board it was unrealistic to think they could operate at
full capacity until they had received at least some orientation and training. Although there were
not major problems on the Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba roads, the performance of the contractor
appointed for the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road was poor and UNRA did not supervise the project
adequately. Although there were social concerns expressed by the communities affected by the
project, as early as June 2014 and the World Bank’s Aide Memoire at the time expressed
“concern in regard to the violation of basic social, environmental, health and safety requirements
by the contractor,” UNRA took little action. The supervising engineer’s instructions also appear
to have been largely ignored by the contractor and UNRA did not take appropriate actions. It is
clear that the contractor did not give a priority to safeguards as demonstrated by the fact that
safeguard staffing was only hired on a part time basis.
29
109. UNRA’s management capacity was inadequate to deal with this complex project. Over
the last few years, there have been delays in payments to contractors and consultants under
Government-funded projects primarily due to over-commitment in the road sector. Such issues
likely stretched the contract management capacity of UNRA as it has to deal, in parallel with
TSDP, with many contractual claims due to variations, extensions of time, and delayed
payments.32
110. Overall, UNRA lacked the capacity to ensure that projects followed the World Bank
guidelines, did not carry out appropriate supervision and was particularly weak in the areas of
compliance with environmental and social safeguards and community engagement. Subsequent
to the closing of the project, UNRA capacity has steadily improved. This has led to the
contractor complying with 32 of the 36 actions in the Notice to Correct over a 12-month period.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
111. The Government increased the road development program in Uganda over and above the
available capacity to implement the program effectively. This has meant that reforms were not
followed through and on the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road there was a failure to meet the World
Bank’s safeguard requirements. These problems also jeopardized other approved projects, which
had to be suspended pending urgent measures to improve UNRA’s capacity.
Lessons Learned
112. Following the Panel’s investigation, the World Bank conducted a thorough review to
document lessons from the Uganda experience so as to avoid similar problems in other projects
and to improve guidance, procedures and standards to staff involved in project preparation,
design and supervision of projects in countries that had weak capacity. The main lessons and
some follow up actions are given below:
Institutional Reforms
113. New transport agencies should only be established when there is clear acceptance of
their value by the Borrower at all levels and there is a sound understanding of the
financial, legal and political implications of such initiatives. There needs to be sufficient
capacity in place to ensure the necessary stakeholder buy-in, financial clearance from the
appropriate financial ministry, and the preparation of suitable legislation. The establishment of
four new agencies in Uganda covering road safety, metropolitan transport, multi-sector transport
regulation, and district urban and community access roads was unrealistic during the life of one
project, given the extent of the capacity of MoWT to absorb and implement such initiatives.
Cabinet turned down both the MTRA and the NRSA proposals when they were presented.
MoWT has since decided to focus on the MATA and NRSA agencies, the latter now based on a
stronger submission. However, at project closure no new agencies had been established.
114. Reform initiatives and capacity building in the transport sector should not be
32
World Bank. 2014. Northeastern Road Corridor Asset Management Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report
PAD 707. Washington DC: World Bank.
30
subordinate to progress with the physical investment components. There is a natural
tendency in infrastructure projects for attention to be focused on physical construction progress
once contracts have been awarded. In TSDP, there should have been a parallel focus from the
outset on the softer components if the targets set were to be achieved prior to project closure.
There is a tendency for such components to be rolled over to a follow-on project if not completed
on time and this is a concern requiring both the World Bank and its Client’s attention. In this
case, because the loan was cancelled and follow-on projects suspended, continuity was impacted
severely.
Institutional Capacity
115. Where capacity is thin, fewer, but more focused activities should be the norm. In
TSDP there were simply too many activities. Had there been less there may have been a different
outcome.
116. Donor crowding without proper consideration of the client’s capacity to manage its
full aid program can affect the capacity to deliver appropriately. In Uganda, at the time of
appraisal there was a concerted effort by several development partners to operate jointly.
However, it was concluded that this did not necessarily reduce transaction costs because of the
differing agendas and rules of the partners.
117. Capacity building and training indicators need to be given more thought during
preparation. It is not always useful to say that a person attended a course or that a new staff
appointment was made in a critical position. The bottom line is whether the organization can
operate more effectively because of these inputs and this needs to be measured over time. New
staff members are not necessarily immediately effective.
118. In complex projects a thorough assessment of all aspects relating to the
implementing agency’s capacity including safeguards is essential, with credible measures to
address any weaknesses identified. In all large infrastructure projects, the World Bank needs to
ensure that sufficient contract capacity is in place before implementation commences and that
qualified social and environmental staffs are assigned to the project, or if this is not likely,
alternative arrangements are made for greater implementation oversight, which reflects the
capacity constraints. Where applicable the guidance provided in managing the risks of adverse
impacts on communities from temporary project-induced labor influx should be followed.
119. Failure to put in place robust community engagement processes weakens the World
Bank’s ability to anticipate potential social impacts and respond appropriately when
problems arise. There was no grievance redress mechanism in place or partnerships with NGOs
in the Uganda TSDP that could assist in understanding and resolving sensitive local issues.
120. When AF substantially increases the project scope a thorough review of the
safeguard implications of the new component(s) should take place. In some cases, the revised
project should not necessarily be given the same environmental classification as the parent
project. In the case of the TSDP, the circumstances associated with the added road were much
more complex than the ones in the original project and an environmental category “A,”
recognizing potentially significant adverse impacts, should have been designated.
31
121. The World Bank staff skills and capacity need to match the risk and complexity of
the anticipated operations. There was an over reliance by the World Bank on newly hired
safeguard staff who had received limited support from others in the region and from
headquarters. Until well after the Inspection Panel complaint was received, there was no
deployment of staff with the right skills to address systemic social risks or to engage the
communities. Implementation supervision report ratings were misleadingly positive.
Procurement and contract management
122. Based on the lessons learned from the TSDP, the World Bank has taken a series of
actions to enhance the procurement and contractual provisions for both civil contractors and
supervising engineers. While the engineering aspects of works contracts were normally well
covered, the expectations in respect of environmental and social safeguards were not spelt out.
The Bank Standard Procurement Documents have been revised to incorporate changes reflecting
enhanced environmental or social, health and safety safeguards as of January 2017. This
includes:
Bidders are required to declare any civil works contracts that have been suspended or
terminated by the employer for reasons related to environmental or social safeguard
compliance (including health and safety issues in the past five years). This information is
used to inform additional due diligence that may be required prior to contract signing.
Contractors are required to post an environmental and social performance bond that the
contracting entity could cash should a contractor fail to remedy cases of environmental
and social non-compliance. The bond is for a reasonable amount, which, in combination
with the current performance bond, would normally not exceed 10 percent of the contract
amount. The bond would be cashable based on failure to comply with the engineer’s
notice to correct the said defects.
A provisional sum could be included in civil works contracts to be used as agreed
between the contracting entity and the contractor in cases where contractors have fully
met all environmental and social obligations under the contract and propose to further
enhance environmental and social outcomes. The parties’ agreement on the use of this
provisional sum would be subject to the World Bank’s ‘no-objection.’
Civil works contractors and supervising engineers would be required to include dedicated
staff with appropriate qualifications and experience to manage specific social and
environmental impacts.
A guidance note has been produced for managing the risks of adverse impacts on
communities from temporary project induced labor influx.33
The importance of assessing
impacts and designing mitigating factors increases with the social fragility of the road
corridor. While many of these potential impacts should be carefully identified and
evaluated in a project’s ESIA, they may only become fully known once a contractor is
appointed and decides on sourcing the required labor force. This means that not all
33 World Bank, 2017, Managing the Risks of Adverse Impacts on Communities from Temporary Project-induced Labor Influx,
Operations Policy and Country Services, and Environmental and Social Safeguards Advisory Team, Washington DC
32
specific risks and impacts can be fully assessed prior to project implementation, and
others may emerge as the project progresses. Site specific measures may have to be
developed before the contractor starts work, and they may have to be updated as the
project is implemented.
Land acquisition, resettlement, and compensation processes need to be aligned with
procurement in a manner that those processes are appropriately completed along specific
segments of the road project ahead of the start of civil works on those segments.
123. For the purpose of addressing the actions listed above, the Bank is launching a
procurement pilot in the East Africa Region with the purpose of engaging with a broad set
of stakeholders and devising strategies and actions to enhance procurement and contract
management approaches. This engagement will form the basis for i) introducing the enhanced
Standard Procurement Documents to the Road Agencies and other stakeholders in the sub-region
to get their commitments to its implementation, and ii) exchanging ideas on strengthening
bidding documents to set out clear expectations with respect to environmental or social
safeguards. UNRA is expected to use this platform to play a leading role in peer regional efforts.
124. Road agencies, as UNRA is doing, can also take steps to strengthen clauses and
requirements in bidding and contractual documents for all road projects that relate to
social, environmental, health and safety, and labor issues. This includes the revision of
bidding documents to include penalties for contractors that do not comply with such
requirements, as well as the development of a Contract Management Manual that should
contribute to overall successful contract performance and value for money throughout the
procurement and contract management process. For the ongoing NERAMP procurement process,
UNRA is including clauses in the contract document to incorporate the new environmental,
social, health and safety requirements.
125. In addressing the issues related to the TSDP, UNRA has also learned some lessons
and taken actions that are applicable to other road agencies, such as: (i) revamping its
environmental and social management systems, staffing and training, and embrace general
attitudinal changes with a recognition of the need to deliver road infrastructure projects in a way
that enhances social impacts for the local communities; (ii) improving community engagement
(with client care officers, dedicated resident project engineers and on-the-ground land
compensation teams, as well as training and the rolling out of Grievance Redress Committees);
and (iii) enhancing the collaboration with, and empowerment of supervision engineers.
126. The TSDP has also shown the large and pivotal value of introducing the services of
NGOs to work closely with the road agency, Supervision Engineers, and contractors in
“Enhancing Social Impact” under (Bank financed) road contracts. The aim is to help: (i)
prevent issues related to sexual and gender-based violence; (ii) promote the empowerment and
improved livelihoods for young girls; and (iii) monitor implementation of various measures to
address social risk and enhance the positive social impacts associated with the road works,
including addressing issues associated with the implementation of resettlement action plans.
33
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrow/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
127. See Borrower’s ICR in Annex 5.
128. There is a disconnect between the Bank and Client perceptions of project ratings. The
Client refers primarily to the extent of the road upgrading completed under the project, which it
says met most of the PDO outcome indicators. (It met two out of five of the original indicators,
but the impact on these indicators was reduced by the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road that was
unfinished when the Credit was cancelled). Regarding intermediate indicators, some were
achieved, but none of the four new authorities proposed under the project were established.
Efforts to strengthen capacity also produced mixed results. The contractual non-compliance with
agreed social and environmental standards compounded by unsatisfactory progress with the
handling of compensation claims by PAPs contributed to the cancellation of the Credits, such
impacts are not factored in to the ratings given in the Borrower ICR.
(b) Co-financiers
129. The draft report was sent to DFID for comment but comments have not been received to
date.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
130. There were no other comments received.
34
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$, millions equivalent)
Components
Appraisal
Estimate
(US$,
millions)
AF Estimate
(US$,
millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
(US$,
millions)
Latest %
of
Appraisal
Latest %
of Revised
Estimate
A. Road Investments 162.1 235.1 140.7 86.8 59.8
B. Enhanced Road Safety 4.5 4.5 2.1 46.7 46.7
C. Urban Transport Planning 4.5 4.5 4.1 91.1 91.1
D. Institutional Support (Government) 10.9 10.9 5.8 53.2 53.2
E. Institutional Support (UNRA) 16.0 18.0 12.5 78.1 69.4
Total Project Costs* 198.0 273.0 165.2 83.4 60.5
Total Financing Required 198.0 273.0 — — —
Note: *Including physical and price contingencies.
(b) Financing
Source of Funds
Appraisal
Estimate
(US$,
millions)
Revised
Estimate at
AF (US$,
millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate (US$,
millions)
Latest % of
Appraisal
Latest % of
Revised
Estimate
IDA 190.0 265.0 159.1 83.7 60.0
DFID 8.0 8.0 6.1 76.2 76.2
35
Annex 2a. TSDP Outputs by Component
Original Components at Appraisal
Component A: Road Investments
Project Surfacing Contract Progress Land and Property
Compensation
Gulu-Atiak (74
km)
Surface
dressing
Works contract:
UGX 89.669 billion
Supervision contract:
€928,027
RAP contract:
UGX 317.486 million
Commenced in February
2012. The project is nearly
completed. Major works on
the Gulu Municipal road to
the airport and cathedral have
also been completed; the
contractor is finalizing
drainage works and
correction of defects within
Gulu town.
The project was completed on
January 30, 2015; the
performance certificate was
issued on May 20, 2016.
Approved value:
UGX 10.262 billion;
Amount paid
UGX 10.140 billion;
Valued PAPs 2,027;
paid PAPs 1,884;
percentage: 92.94
Vurra-Arua-
Oraba (92 km)
Surface
dressing
Works contract:
UGX 138.861 billion
Supervision contract:
US$2.108 million,
revised to US$2.362
million
RAP contract:
UGX 396.599 million
Approved value:
UGX 18.396 billion;
Amount paid
UGX 16.827 billion.
Valued PAPs 3,935;
paid PAPs 3,276;
percentage 83.20
1. The Gulu-Atiak road, which lies entirely in the Acholi region of Uganda, is part of the
northern corridor route that links South Sudan to the port of Mombasa. It is a strategic road as it
is the main gateway for trade between Uganda and Southern Sudan to bolster regional
integration. The road also provides links to Moyo and Adjumani districts in northern Uganda.
Physical works progress of major works is 100 percent complete. The Vurra-Arua-Oraba road is
part of the national road network linking northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo and
southwestern Sudan to the port of Mombasa. It is situated in the northwestern part of Uganda
stretching northward parallel to the Uganda-Democratic Republic of Congo border and connects
with South Sudan close to where the borders of Uganda, South Sudan, and Democratic Republic
of Congo converge.
Preparation of Road Design and Bidding Documents
2. Component A also financed consultancy services for feasibility study, the ESIAs, and
detailed engineering design for the reconstruction and upgrading of the following roads:
(a) Tororo-Mbale-Soroti-Lira-Kamdini road (340 km): The contract was signed in
May 3, 2013. The contract was amended on October 3, 2013, to allow the consultant
to assess the corridor and prepare a long-term OPRC for the Tororo-Mbale-Soroti-
Lira-Kamdini road. The consultant has submitted all the reports, which were the
basis for the preparation of the NERAMP.
36
(b) Kafu-Karuma-Kamdini road (104 km): The contract was signed on April 23,
2013, and the consultant submitted the final detailed engineering design on
September 29, 2014.
(c) Zirobwe-Wobulenzi road (23 km): The contract was signed on September 25,
2013, and was amended to cater for an extended scope of services. The consultant
submitted the final documents for the detailed engineering design, bidding
documents, ESIAs, and RAP.
(d) Kamdini-Nebbi-Goli and Ayer-Bobi road (230 km): The contract was signed on
May 3, 2013, for the Lira-Kamdini-Gulu road (148 km) road. However, because of
the proposed plan to have Tororo-Kamdini corridor as an asset management
contract, the scope of service for this contract was amended to enable the consultant
to prepare design and bidding documents for the rehabilitation of the Kamdini-
Karuma-Olwiyo-Pakwach-Nebbi road (161 km) and for upgrading of Nebbi-Goli
(15 km) and Ayer-Bobi (54 km) road to paved bitumen standard. The consultant has
submitted the final documents for the detailed engineering design, bidding
documents, ESIAs, and RAP.
Revised Component at AF
Project Funder Surfacing Contract Progress Land and Property
Compensation
Kamwenge-
Fort Portal
road (66 km)
World
Bank/
GoU
Surface
dressing
Works contract:
UGX 117.942
billion
Supervision
contract:
€1.929 million
(UGX 1.142
billion)
RAP contract:
UGX 961.150
million
Civil works commenced in
August 2013, originally
scheduled for completion in
January 2016.
Cumulative progress as of
October 2016 was 83.9
percent against a plan of
100 percent. Time elapsed
was 130 percent.
The project encountered
challenges regarding
adherence to environmental
and social safeguard
standards, resulting in
cancellation of funding by
the World Bank in
December 2015.
Approved value:
UGX 9.121 billion
Amount paid:
UGX 8.228 billion
Valued PAPs: 2,844
Paid PAPs 2,246
Supplementary valuation
report 3 approved
number added in the
total above.
Verification and
disclosure is completed;
preparations of payment
are batches ongoing.
3. The additional IDA credit in the amount of US$75 million was approved in May 2011 to
scale up the project to include the paving of the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road (66 km). This road
connects Western Uganda to the Northern Corridor and the Trans-Africa Highway.
37
Distribution of Funds by Components
Components Works
Total Contract
Amount, US$ (at
Contract Rate)
Total Cumulative
Amount, US$ (Paid
up to May 31, 2016)
Component A: Road Investments: Upgrading and Rehabilitation of National Roads
A1.1 Construction of gravel to bitumen of Gulu-Atiak
road (74 km) 55,188,698.00 49,477,370.00
A1.2 Construction supervision of Gulu-Atiak road 1,991,613.71 1,537,580.72
A1.3 Construction of Vurra-Arua-Oraba road works
(85 km) 58,331,426.00 56,616,495.00
A1.4 Construction supervision of Vurra-Arua-Oraba
road works 2,669,480.00 2,666,226.00
A1.5 Construction of Kamwenge-Fort Portal road
works (66 km) 47,310,635.00 21,857,069.00
A1.6 Construction supervision of Kamwenge-Fort
Portal road 2,891,169.00 2,285,465.00
A1.7
Assessment and preparation of an asset
management contract for Tororo-Mbale-Soroti-
Kamdini road (340 km)
2,193,253.00 2,029,914.00
A1.8
Design and bidding documents for full
reconstruction of Kamdini-Pakwachi-Nebbi-
Arua road
2,384,279.00 1,077,994.00
A1.9 Consultancy services design update of Zirobwe-
Wobulenzi road (23 km) 498,215.00 409,560.00
A1.10
Consultancy services for feasibility study and
detailed engineering design for Kafu-Karuma-
Kamdini road (104 km)
1,211,079.00 1,101,028.00
Component B: Enhanced Road Safety
B.1 Support to putting in place the NRSA and road
safety enhancing measures 466,808.00 419,465.38
B.2 Preparation of draft bill for the NRSA 39,126.71 1,914.35
B.3 Making the crash database operational 2,068,595.06 1,504,518.51
Component C: Urban Transport Planning: Preparation of Kampala Urban Transport Project
C.1 Preparation of Phase 1 of the Kampala BRT
studies 4,215,293.76 3,691,928.45
C.2 Support to start up MATA 408,305.73 408,305.73
Component D: Institutional Support to Ministry of Works and Transport
D.1 Support to policy and planning division/NTPS 682,676.30 682,676.30
D.2 Support to the Ministry for Software
Development for the TSDMS 60,138.35 46,473.92
D.3 Inland Water Transport Legislation 486,810.00 486,810.00
D.4 Support to start up MTRA Nil Nil
D.5 Assistance to DUCAR agency 3,319,200.00 2,821,477.76
D.6
Support to other core MoWT functions -
preparation of detailed strategic implementation
plan for the NTMP/GKMA
632,047.08 632,047.08
D.7 Support to other core MoWT functions - training 127,443.72 127,443.72
D.8 Support to MoWT supply of information
technology equipment 1,298,932.06 958,548.44
Component E: Institutional Support to UNRA
E.1
Consultancy services (design and construction
supervision) for the renovation and upgrading of
five UNRA station offices to regional offices
443,336.00 85,343.00
38
Components Works
Total Contract
Amount, US$ (at
Contract Rate)
Total Cumulative
Amount, US$ (Paid
up to May 31, 2016)
design completed, but works not tendered.
Supervision will extend into 2016.
E.2 Technical assistance to UNRA
E.2.1 Technical assistance for capacity-building
support to UNRA 3,490,595.00 2,442,027.00
E.2.2 Asset management support to UNRA (2 years) 1,689,811.04 992,681.29
E.2.3 Technical assistance to UNRA - Axle Load
Control Advisor 836,513.00 836,513.00
E.2.4 Technical assistance to UNRA - Procurement
Consultant 522,812.00 522,812.00
E.2.5 Technical assistance to UNRA - Procurement
Specialists 297,000.00 188,765.00
E.2.6 Technical assistance to UNRA - ferry services 120,000.00 100,000.00
E.2.7 Technical assistance to UNRA -
Communications Specialist 118,800.00 118,800.00
E.2.8
Consultancy services for establishing and
developing a Technical Audit Unit in the
Directorate of Internal Audit, UNRA
1,661,172.00 1,538,166.00
E.2.9 Preparation of ICR 25,600.00 25,600.00
E.2.10 Preparation of road investment priority list by
individual consultant 6,400.00 6,400.00
E.2.11 Recruitment of six consultants to fill technical
skills gap in three Directorates (two in each) 147,762.00 147,223.00
E.3 Studies
E.3.1 National Roads Data Collection Study
(Implementation of RMS and Addendum No. 1) 3,831,725.13 2,085,883.00
E.3.2 GIS-based Rights-of-Way Management
Information System 1,295,595.46 1,252,118.53
E.3.3 Development of UNRA's Communication
Strategy 150,000.00 43,566.00
E.4 Training
E.4.1 Training in accordance with the approved
UNRA Training Plan 1,407,425.00 1,407,425.00
E.4.2 Asset management/OPRC Best Practice Study
visits 179,122.00 179,122.00
E.5 Equipment
E.5.1 Three heavy-duty scanners 94,500.00 94,500.00
E.5.6 Equipment for GIS-based ROW MIS 190,000.00
E.5.7 Vehicles 448,155.00 448,155.00
E.6 Operating costs
E.6.1 Incremental Operational Costs because of
UNRA’s function as implementing agency 1,000,000 124,799.00
Total of all components 206,431,548.11 163,480,210.18
39
Institution Key Issues to be
Addressed World Bank EC DFID DANIDA Total
MoWT
Sector policy setting
Strategic planning
Sector oversight
Transport regulation
Sector monitoring
Road safety capacity
Adjustment of legal
framework
US$0.4 million
under RSDP-3
for TA
US$7.9 million
support to
MoWT under
the TSDP
US$3.5 million
for road safety
under the TSDP
— US$4.0 million support to
World Bank TSDP —
US$15.8
million
DUCAR
Strategy for district
road management
Planning, budgeting,
and expenditure
management
Technical oversight
Monitoring
Support to DUCAR
included in the
above
— Support to DUCAR
included in the above
Long-term
advisor to
DUCAR
division in
MoWT
(US$2.0
million)
US$2.0
million
Road Fund
(Ministry of
Finance)
Establishment of Road
Fund Secretariat
Regulations
Operating procedures
Financial management
systems
Monitoring systems
—
US$2.6 million for TA to
work in coordination with
DFID support
— — US$2.6
million
40
Institution Key Issues to be
Addressed World Bank EC DFID DANIDA Total
UNRA
UNRA management
Road network
management
Procurement, MIS
Contract/bridge
management
Ferry operations
Axle load control
US$2.6 for TA;
US$ 12m for
regional offices
US$6.2 million for TA (to
work in coordination with
DFID and World Bank
support)
US$4.0 million support to
World Bank TSDP
US$24.8
million
National Road
Construction
Industry
Strengthening of
contractors and
consultant associations
Business development
Technical skills
Contract management
Code of conduct
US$4.3 million for TA to
work in coordination with
DFID support
US$15.8 million for project
to promote markets for
northern corridor
integration to work in
coordination with EC
support
US$20.1
million
Total
Total planned
expenditure
US$26.4 million,
of which US$3.0
million for RSDP-3 US$13.l million US$23.8 million
US$2.0
million
US$65.3
million
Source: PAD TSDP, page 26.
Note: DANIDA = Danish International Development Agency; TA = Technical Assistance.
41
Annex 2b. Operational Risk Assessment Framework
No. Description
(MoWT Transport Sector Performance Report 2014–15) June 2011 June 2012
Actual
June 2013
Actual
June 2014
Target
June 2015
Actual
June 2015
Roads
1 Road network in fair to good condition (%)
National roads (paved) - fair to good 74 77.6 77.0 80.0 78 80.0
National roads (unpaved) - fair to good 64 66.6 66.0 68.0 68 70.0
District roads (unpaved) - fair to good 55 65.0 65.3 50.5 55 57.8
Urban roads (paved) - fair to good 50 61.0 73.7 58.2 — 58.0
Urban roads (unpaved) - fair to good 55 44.0 44.7 48.5 — 47.0
KCCA roads (paved) - fair to good 11 — 35.0 48.0 50 49.0
KCCA roads (unpaved) - fair to good 48 — 60.0 60.0 62 61.0
2 Paved road network (km)
National roads 3,264 3,317 3,489 3,795 4,000 3,981.0
Urban roads 684 824.0 745.0 745.0 — 745.0
KCCA 416 422.0 463.0 483.5 495 498.0
3 Road safety
Total fatalities (road deaths) 2,954 3,343 3,124 2,937 — 2,845.0a
Fatalities per 10,000 vehicles 46 45.0 36.0 30.0 — 26.0
Total registered vehicles 635,656 739,036.0 865,823.0 974,714.0 — 1,102,021.0
4 Road service level - travel time (minutes/km)
On national roads n.a. 1.18 1.15 1.01 — 1.15
Note: a. All data on road fatalities is for the previous calendar years as opposed to the financial year from Uganda Police.
42
Table 2.3. Additional Financing of the Transport Sector Development Project
Project Development Objective:
The PDO is to improve the connectivity and efficiency of the transport sector through (i) improved condition of national road network; (ii) improved capacity for
road safety management; and (iii) improved transport sector and national road management.
PDO-level Results Indicators:
1. Average vehicle operating costs on targeted roads (US$ per vehicle km)
2. Travel time on targeted routes (hours)
3. Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads (percentage) - core indicator
4. Share of rural population with access to an all-season road (percentage) - core indicator
5. Annual rate of road accident fatalities (percentage)
6. Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage)
7. Roads rehabilitated, non-rural - core indicator
Risk Category Risk
Rating Risk Description Proposed Mitigation Measures
1. Project
stakeholder risks M-I
Experiences have shown that compensation for land and
properties did not move ahead as planned, thus delaying
some road projects.
An action plan was developed with UNRA before appraisal,
which included the following actions: (a) UNRA to appoint
consultants before appraisal who will implement the RAP; (b)
UNRA to ensure the consultants enhance stakeholder
awareness; (c) UNRA to ensure there are adequate resources to
meet the involuntary RAP costs and be able to timely
compensate the local people for loss of land/property and/or
income.
2. Implementing
agency risks
43
Risk Category Risk
Rating Risk Description Proposed Mitigation Measures
Capacity M-L
The increased annual budget for the transport sector
(US$318 million in FY2007/08, US$542 million in
FY2008/09, and US$546 million in FY2009/10, 85 percent
of which is managed by UNRA) requires a substantial
increase in UNRA’s implementation capacity. Thus, the
need to address the following: (a) weak organizational
structure; (b) inadequate experience in procurement
management; (c) inadequate record keeping; (d) inadequate
staff numbers; and (e) delays in implementation of the
approved Procurement Plan for the main TSDP.
UNRA’s board has given approval to fill 46 vacant positions in
its various directorates. Currently, only 14 of the proposed
positions can be filled as a result of the wage cap. An action
plan to lift the cap on recurrent expenditure has been discussed
with the GoU. UNRA will also pursue the transfer of all
operational expenses related to road maintenance to a special
account to be financed by the URF, as stipulated in the Road
Fund Act.
Other actions include the following:
(a) The PDU to report directly to the Executive Director to
increase management oversight and monitoring of procurement
functions; (b) unbundle the concentration of activities in the
PDU and delegating and reassigning activities as appropriate to
functionally designated units;
(c) recruitment of a Procurement Consultant to provide hands-
on coaching and mentoring to the PDU staff; (d) introduce an
outsourced independent procurement evaluation to benchmark
and validate UNRA’s procurement actions; (e) strengthen the
internal audit functions of UNRA to provide real-time technical
audits of road projects/program implementation; (f) strengthen
the PPDA’s oversight function through the World Bank
Integrity Vice Presidency’s capacity-building initiatives; (g)
enhance mechanisms for stakeholder and external monitoring
of road projects; and (h) establish acceptable MIS for
procurement tracking.
Fraud and corruption M-I
Petty and high-level corruption are prevalent and affect
every institution in the country and are rifest in
procurement, privatization, administration of revenues and
public expenditures, and public service delivery.
Despite the Government’s purported zero tolerance policy
on corruption, few, if any, high-level officials involved in
major corruption scandals have been tried, hindering
attempts to raise the bar and address lower-level corruption.
The World Bank is working with the GoU to reinvigorate
institutions and accountability systems, rethinking
decentralization policies, and relaunching stalled public service
reform processes. The Governance and Anticorruption is a
cross-cutting pillar in the CAS 2011–15 and plans are being
built into new operations and the value for money agenda is
supported across the portfolio, including in Analytical and
Advisory Activities/Economic Sector Work, particularly the
44
Risk Category Risk
Rating Risk Description Proposed Mitigation Measures
Performance Evaluation Reviews. The recently developed data
tracking mechanism provides the Government with a self-
assessment tool for corruption and governance and identifies
areas where key reforms to address governance have failed.
This will help provide pointers for better governance
arrangements in investment projects.
3. Project risks
Design M-L Capacity of UNRA to review the quality of documents
submitted by design consultants is highly constrained.
A substantial technical assistance program to strengthen the
capacity of UNRA has been built in the TSDP to address this.
Social and
environmental M-I
Relevant environmental regulations and policies are largely
in place but not adequately implemented. Capacity of the
implementing agency for environmental management,
including supervision of implementation of planned
environmental mitigation measures is lacking.
Project road crosses Kibale National Park with critically
endangered primate species including chimpanzees.
The Roads Authority retains consultants for the
implementation of RAPs and their reporting is weak and
irregular in spite of guidance provided by IDA.
Implementing agency will continue receiving capacity
strengthening assistance from the European Union. The ESIA
and RAP for the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road will guide the
road works undertaken in the AF. Implementation of the
environmental management plans and RAPs will be undertaken
by the contractor and UNRA with support of short-term
consultants respectively. Environmental mitigation measures,
as outlined in the ESIA, will be implemented, including (a) a
special, low impact regimen for road upgrade design and
activities in Kibale National Park; (b) intensive IDA
supervision; and (c) advisory monitoring of project activities in
Kibale National Park by a major conservation, NGO, or
academic entity.
Capacity building in UNRA with one additional sociologist and
all to be trained in monitoring and reporting for RAPs
implementation.
Program and donor M-I
Framework for program and donor coordination is not
strong, and proposed subcommittees of the Transport Sector
Working Group do not meet regularly.
Meetings of the Transport Sector Working Group to be held on
a monthly basis and the subcommittees to sit more frequently,
as and when needed. Progress of the previous year and program
of the following year to be discussed annually.
Delivery Quality M-I Capacity of UNRA to supervise major civil works contracts
is highly constrained.
A substantial number of technical assistants under a technical
assistance program to strengthen the capacity of UNRA has
been built in the TSDP to address this.
Overall Risk Rating at
Preparation
Overall Risk Rating During Implementation Comments
M-I M-I
45
No. Issue Actions
1 Compensation
(a) Provide the World Bank with a comprehensive report including strip maps on the
compensation status of the PAPs on the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road, including
number of PAPS in original, first supplementary, second supplementary, and third
supplementary; location of PAPs by chainage; and type of compensation impact,
cost, and progress in payments; and
(b) 100 percent compensation of PAPs by December 31, 2015.
2 Road safety
(a) All safety signage and speed humps along the road installed as per the engineer’s
instructions;
(b) PAPs living in houses in precarious conditions compensated, relocated, and
houses demolished in km 193+535, km 150+750, km 156;
(c) Proper safety barriers erected in areas with heavy excavations on the road or at
high embankment locations and not the single run tape provisions currently in place;
(d) Prepare and implement a robust Traffic Management Plan; and
(e) Undertake road safety campaigns.
3 Child protection
(a) Sign contract on expanded Terms of Reference with the HIV service provider to
undertake child protection work, including collaborations as necessary with other
competent persons and institutions to deliver this priority task;
(b) Implement the child protection activities specified in the contract, including but
not limited to sensitization, awareness campaigns, liaising with schools, health
centers, sensitization of contractor’s workers, liaising with local communities,
MoGLSD, parents, crime preventers, linking to legal services, liaising with police
on prevention and prosecution, and preparation and display of zero tolerance
materials toward child protection.
4
Employment
contracts,
workman’s
compensation,
identity cards
(a) Prepare and sign contracts with workers that are compliant with the national
labor laws,
(b) Document all payments paid to accident victims (both workers and members of
the public) in accordance with the national laws and the contract,
(c) Maintain the accident log and status on follow-up of claims, and
(d) Provide all workers with identity cards.
5 Sexual harassment
(a) Provide a copy of the sexual harassment policy,
(b) Implement the zero tolerance toward sexual harassment policy including
sensitization of all contractor’s workers, and
(c) Provide gender-separated facilities.
6 General health and
safety
(a) Register workplace with the MoGLSD;
(b) Prepare and implement an Occupational Health and Safety Plan, eecruit a
competent Occupational Health and Safety Officer;
(c) Provide Occupational Health and Safety training to all workers;
(d) Provide drinking water, bath, changing, and sanitation facilities (including
gender separated facilities) to workers; and
(e) Provide appropriate and adequate Personal Protective Equipment to all workers
and ensure its use by all the workers.
7
Grievance Redress
Committees
(GRCs)
(a) Ensure adequate facilitation (stationery) and working of the GRCs; and
(b) Prepare monthly progress report on their functionality, complaints received, and
status of resolution.
8
Communication
and Community
Engagement Plan
(a) Prepare and implement a Communication and Community Engagement Plan that
ensures that communities are informed of road activities, receive feedback on the
status of their compensation, and can also air other concerns related to the project
road that the GRCs cannot handle or resolve at the community level; and
(b) Ensure non-retaliation of community members, workers, or other parties who
have raised complaints.
9 HIV/AIDS
sensitization
(a) Ensure implementation of HIV/AIDS service provider work according to the
contract with timely payment of the service provider and review the work
46
No. Issue Actions
awareness and
education
undertaken to ensure compliance with national standards.
10
General ESMP and
associated social
and environmental
requirements
(a) Undertake actions included in the ESIA, 2011 ESMP, and the contractor’s 2014
ESMP: (i) take reasonable precautions to prevent unlawful conduct on by its
employees; (ii) provide accommodation for workers in a camp; (iii) prepare and
implement a Gender Action Plan which includes gender sensitization for
communication and conduct toward women; (iv) retain an environmental and social
specialist on site; (v) provide separate bath and toilet facilities for men/women; (vi)
allocate certain jobs to women; (vii) implement an HIV prevention and awareness
program; (viii) prohibit child labor; (ix) institute and enforce a policy to prevent
sexual harassment; and (x) establish a community liaison; and
(b) Comply fully with NEMA conditions of approval for operation of quarries and
other work sites, including not blasting before compensating people living within a
500 m safety radius; wet crushing, proper waste material disposal, proper licensing,
operation and restoration of borrow pits, quarries, dump sites, and other work sites;
and
(c) Comply with the project environmental requirements and the Uganda Wildlife
Authority approvals for work undertaken in Kibale National Park.
11 Drainage and
access
(a) Address drainage and access provision issues as per engineer’s instructions and
community requests.
12 Work resource
mobilization
(a) Mobilize adequate, good working equipment and competent personnel as per
contract requirements and engineer’s instructions.
47
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
Project Efficiency
1. Appraisal: Economic Evaluation of the Upgrading of the Gulu-Atiak road (74 km)
1.1 Project Costs
1. Economic analyses for the upgrading of the Gulu-Atiak road at appraisal were undertaken
using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4). The analyses were based
on economic costs, excluding taxes and duties. The economic costs were assumed to amount to
91.9 percent of financial costs and the discount rate used was 12 percent. The appraisal period
was 25 years. No shadow pricing of unskilled labor was undertaken.
2. Before the improvement, the road had a gravel surface in poor condition. The subprojects
comprised the construction of a new sub-base, base, and a bituminous surfacing for the main
carriageway and its shoulders; upgrading the road furniture; and the installation of drainage
structures. Two alternative design standards were defined for the road: Alternative A - DBST on
200 mm crushed stone-base course, 150 mm mechanically stabilized sub-base, and 150 mm
natural gravel subgrade and Alternative B - 50 mm asphalt concrete on 200 mm crushed stone-
base course, 150 mm mechanically stabilized sub-base, and 150 mm natural gravel subgrade.
Alternative A was found to be the less costly option. The financial costs for the upgrading of this
road project are summarized in table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Financial Costs of Upgrading Gulu-Atiak Road Project at Appraisal
Description Length
(km)
Total Cost (US$, millions) Cost/km (US$)
Alternative A Alternative B Alternative A Alternative B
Gulu-Lacor
Lacor-Atiak
11
63
9.0
51.6
11.0
63.0
818,919
818,919
1,000,000
1,000,000
Total 74 60.6 74.0 818,919 1,000,000
3. The maintenance regimen adopted for each alternative was a scheduled routine and
standard periodic maintenance. Total maintenance costs were approximately the same for
alternatives A and B. Traffic growth from 2010 to 2023 was assumed as 6 percent a year and
3 percent thereafter for all vehicle types. The road project road was split into two sections for
economic analysis, with a separate assessment of traffic for each link The HDM-4 analysis was
based on economic factors alone to calculate the viability of the proposed works. The results
were predominantly influenced by road roughness, which was greatly improved because of the
pavement upgrading.
1.2 Results of the Economic Analysis at Appraisal
4. The results of the economic analysis are set out in table 3.2. The analysis indicated that
for both Alternatives A and B, road upgrading for the two road sections was economically
48
feasible with an EIRR well in excess of the 12 percent economic feasibility threshold. The
combined result for Alternatives A and B on all the sections gave NPVs (at a 12 percent
discount rate) of US$25.68 million and U$16.91 million, respectively. The approximate overall
EIRR for the combined projects under Alternative A was 18.l percent, while that for Alternative
B was 15.5 percent.
49
Location Alternative
Surface Type
Length
(km)
Pavement
Width Initial
Roughness
(IRI m/km)
Base
Year
2007
ADDT
Range
Revised Financial Costs Revised Economic
Analysis
Existing Appraised Existing New
Total Cost
(US$,
millions)
Cost per km
(US$)
NPV at 12%
(US$,
millions)
NPV/Cost
Ratio
Gulu-
Lacor
A
B
Gravel
Gravel
DBST/CSB
AC/CSB
11
11
5.0
5.0
9.5
9.5
14.0
14.0
779
779
9.008
11.000
818,919
1,000,000
13.94
12.56
1.548
1.142
Lacor-
Atiak
A
B
Gravel
Gravel
DBST/CSB
AC/CSB
63
63
5.0
5.0
9.5
9.5
17.0
17.0
330
330
51.592
63.000
818,919
1,000,000
11.74
4.36
0.228
0.069
Note: AC = Asphalt Concrete; ADDT = ; CSB = Crushed Stone-Base; IRI = International Roughness Index; Economic costs in the economic analysis were
calculated to be 91.9 percent of financial costs. The combined project EIRRs are derived from the HDM-4 output tables.
50
1.3 Sensitivity Analysis
5. The sensitivity analyses undertaken examined the impact on the economic feasibility of
assuming 20 percent lower traffic, 30 percent higher investment costs, and a worst-case scenario
combining 20 percent lower traffic and 20 percent higher investment costs. The analyses
indicated that all sections using Alternative A would remain economically feasible, even with 20
percent higher investment costs and 20 percent lower traffic. However, the more expensive
Alternative B was uniformly more uneconomical because of its higher overall investment costs.
Alternative A was selected as a more robust investment.
2. Appraisal: Economic Evaluation of Upgrading of Vurra-Eruba, Arua-Oraba road (85
km)
2.1 Project Costs
6. Economic analyses for the upgrading of the Vurra-Eruba-Arua-Oraba road at appraisal
were undertaken using HDM-4 on the same basis as for the Gulu-Atiak road. The existing road
in this case was a gravel road in fair condition. Base year (2009) traffic estimates and subsequent
traffic growth assumptions are used for the economic analysis, as shown in tables 3.3 and 3.4.
Road Section Vurra-Eruba Arua-Manibe Manibe-Koboko Koboko-Oraba
Motorized 422 1,584 694 1,685
Bicycles 1,140 2,735 422 1,567
Pedestrians 536 1,430 1,021 2,122
Analysis Period Vurra-Arua Eruba-Arua-Manibe Manibe-Koboko Koboko-Oraba
Existing Surface Type Unpaved Paved Unpaved Unpaved
Growth Rate Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight
>
2012–16 7.6 7.3 7.4 5.3 7.6 5.3 7.6 8.1
2017–26 7.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 6.0
2027 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
7. The project road was split into six links for the economic analysis, with separate
assessments of traffic for each link. The HDM-4 analysis is based on economic factors alone to
calculate the viability of the proposed works.
Results of Economic and Sensitivity Analysis at Appraisal
8. The results of the revised economic analysis by alternative are set out in Table 3.5. The
analysis undertaken using HDM-4 indicates that each upgrading alternative for the two road
sections is economically feasible, with EIRRs well in excess of the 12 percent economic
feasibility threshold. A combined result for all the road sections is given in table 3.5. Alternative
A, which has the highest NPV of US$53.96 million and an EIRR of 21.2 percent, made it the
selected option for the detailed design. The analysis by section revealed that the VurraEruba
section failed with an NPV of −US$2.11 million and EIRRs below the 12 percent discount rate
of 5.5 percent. All other sections had positive NPVs and EIRR above 12 percent. The sensitivity
51
analyses indicated that all sections using Alternative A would remain economically feasible,
even with 20 percent higher investment costs and 20 percent lower traffic.
Table 3.5. Summary of Economic Analysis by Alternative
Alternatives NPV (US$, millions) EIRR (%)
Alternative
Carriageway
A – DBST with 6.5 m wide 53.96 21.2
Alternative B - AC with 6.5 m wide carriageway 47.36 19.4
Note: AC = Asphalt Concrete.
3. Additional Financing: Economic Analysis for the Kamwenge-Fort Portal Upgrading (66
km)
9. The economic analysis of the additional works for upgrading the Kamwenge-Fort Portal
road was also carried out using HDM-4 and was based on the estimated costs from the design
stage and the projected traffic volume. Financial costs were determined for each section and
converted to economic costs by applying a conversion factor of 83 percent based on UNRA’s
procedural guidelines. The period of analysis was 20 years, with cost and benefits discounted at a
rate of 12 percent using benefit categories of savings in vehicle operating costs, timesaving, and
induced agricultural production. Traffic volumes were 1,569 motorized vehicles per day and 788
nonmotorized vehicles per day (mainly bicycles). A sensitivity analysis was also conducted by
varying investment costs and traffic growth. In the worst-case scenario (combining −20 percent
traffic and +20 percent costs), overall project NPVs/EIRRs for the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road
were US$-5.7 million and 13.2 percent, respectively.
10. On the other hand, an EIRR of 13.4 percent and NPV of US$20.5 million were obtained
when a corridor-wide (that is, Nyakahita-Kazo-Kamwenge-Fort Portal) sensitivity analysis is
done. The sensitivity analysis results indicate that even in the worst-case scenario of lower
traffic growth rate of 20 percent and higher investment cost of 20 percent, upgrading the
Kamwenge-Fort Portal road to bitumen standard offers robust results—that is, with an EIRR of
13.2 percent, which is higher than the economic viability threshold of 12 percent. The economic
analysis results indicate that the project is economically viable. The economic analysis (base
case) showed the preferred option to be DBST, on crushed stone aggregate base and natural
gravel sub-base, with an EIRR return of 16.8 percent and NPV of US$19.9 million. For the
corridor, the EIRR was 19.6 percent and the NPV was US$117.4 million, as summarized in table
3.6.
Road Link and intervention NPV@12%
(US$, millions) EIRR (%)
Kamwenge-Fort Portal road (DBST) 19.9 16.8
Project corridor 117.4 19.6
4. Results at Completion
Gulu-Atiak Project Analysis Results
52
11. The economic evaluation results of the DBST base case cost-benefit analysis, considering
the final completion economic cost of construction of US$563,182 per km and the central 2014
Annual Average Daily Traffic for the entire road, indicated an EIRR of 28.3 percent. The NPV
was US$65.09 million. The EIRR is above the cutoff rate of return of 12 percent opportunity cost
of capital in Uganda and thus, confirms the viability of the intervention in the project.
Vura-Arua-Oraba Project Analysis Results
12. The economic evaluation results of the DBST base case cost-benefit analysis, considering
the final completion economic cost of construction of US$612,100 per km and the central 2014
AADT traffic for the entire road, indicated an EIRR of 18 percent. The NPV was US$22.507
million. The EIRR is above the cutoff rate of return of 12 percent opportunity cost of capital in
Uganda and thus, confirms the viability of the intervention in the project.
Kamwenge-Fort Portal Project Analysis Results
13. The economic evaluation results of the DBST base case cost-benefit analysis, considering
the final completion economic cost of construction of 737,955 per km and the central 2014
AADT traffic for the entire road, indicated an EIRR of 9.7 percent. The NPV was US$ −6.196
million. The EIRR is below the cutoff rate of return of 12 percent opportunity cost of capital in
Uganda. However, this result may be disregarded because the project was not actually completed
at closure.
Table 3.7. Summary of Base Case Economic Evaluation Results at Completion
Road Section Investment Cost
(US$, millions)
Economic Cost
Per Km
NPV
(US$,
millions)
EIRR
(%)
Gulu-Ataik (74 km) road 49.03 563,182 65.089 28.3
Vurra-Arua-Oraba road (85km) 61.21 612,100 22.507 18.0
Kamwenge-Fort Portal (66 km) road 57.30 737,955 −6.196 9.7
Source: UNRA 2016 HDM4 Project Completion Results.
Operational and Administrative Efficiency
14. The project has been characterized by delays. The MTR reported that most components
were behind schedule; the Trust Fund Administrative Agreement took 23 months before
approval, by which time the value of DFID Grant had shrunk by 30 percent because of exchange
rate fluctuations. At the AF, steps were taken to improve procurement capacity; however, by
closure, most of the reforms in the transport sector had still not been completed. The Kamwenge-
Fort Portal road could only have been completed using IDA finance if a further extension of the
closing date had been approved, but this did not happen as the Credit was cancelled.
53
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Nina Chee Regional Safeguards Adviser OPSPF
Martin Fodor Sr. Environmental Specialist
Grace Nakuya Musoke
Munanura Senior Procurement Specialist GGO01
Faith-Lucy Matumbo Program Assistant AFCE1
Richard Olowo Lead Procurement Specialist GCFKE
Nina M. Jones Program Assistant AFTTR -
HIS
Agnes Kaye Program Assistant AFMUG
Labite Victorio Ocaya Sr Highway Engineer AFTU1 -
HIS
Dieter E. Schelling Consultant GSURR
Paul Kato Kamuchwezi Sr. Financial Management Specialist GGO31
Zemedkun Girma Tessema Sr. transport Specialist GTI07
Constance Nekessa-Ouma Social development Specialist GSU07
Subhash C. Seth Consultant GTI06
Supervision/ICR
Richard Martin Humphreys Lead Transport Economist GTI01
Negede Lewi Sr Highway Engineer GTI01
Peter Nigel Freeman Consultant GTI01
Stephen Muzira Sr. Transport Specialist GTI01
Paul Kato Kamuchwezi Sr Financial Management Specia GGO31
Agnes Kaye Program Assistant AFMUG
Grace Nakuya Musoke
Munanura Senior Procurement Specialist GGO01
Labite Victorio Ocaya Sr Highway Engineer AFTU1 -
HIS
Subhash C. Seth Consultant GTI06
Celi Marie Dean Temporary GTI01
Barbara Nalugo Program Assistant AFMUG
Constance Nekessa-Ouma Social Development Specialist GSU07
Franklin Mutahakana Sr. Operations Officer AFMUG
Herbert Oule Sr. Environment Specialist GEN01
Shamiela Saeki Mir Communications Officer ECRIM
Sheila Byiringiro AFREC
Zemedkun Girma Tessema Sr. Transport Specialist GTI07
54
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY05 0.18 3.30
FY06 0.0 4.26
FY07 0.0 0.0
FY08 8.56 48.76
FY09 25.19 130.1
FY10 30.78 171.8
Total: 64.71 358.22
Supervision/ICR
FY10 5.72 27.3
FY11 21.18 71.4
FY12 30.47 70.9
FY13 31.75 112.3
FY14 20.89 83.4
FY15 19.98 101.3
FY16 43.96 272.4
FY17 12.5 146.2
Total: 186.45 885.2
55
Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR34
and/or Comments on Draft ICR
1.1. Introduction
1. This document is the contribution of the GoU ICR of the TSDP, which was co-financed
by IDA and DFID through Credits and a Grant, respectively. The GoU and the DPs attached
great importance toward the achievement of the PDOs. The ICR provides an evaluation of the
TSDP implementation and operation against the costs and benefits that have been derived from
the project finances. The ICR also provides an assessment of lessons learned, the financiers’
performance in relation to their respective obligations under the financing agreements, and the
extent to which the purpose of the finances were achieved. It is intended that the project
performance data provided in this ICR will assist the World Bank in the preparation of its final
ICR.
1.2. Context at Appraisal
2. In 1996, the GoU, with the assistance of DPs, formulated the first 10-year (1996/97–
2005/06) RSDP Phase 1. In April 2002, RSDP Phase 1 was updated and rolled over to the
second 10-year RSDP Phase 2 (2001/02–2010/11) and its total estimated cost was increased
from the original US$1.5 million to US$2.3 billion. An MTR of RSDP Phase 2 was carried out
in 2007/08 to assess the pace of implementation. The findings and lessons drawn from RSDP
Phase 2 were to be used in the preparation of RSDP Phase 3 (2009/10–2018/19). It had been
planned to continue with a fourth phase (RSDP Phase 4) that would have financed those RSDP
Phase 3 projects that could not be financed because of cost increases. During a bilateral meeting
between MoWT and IDA on October 7, 2008, it was decided that the GoU could finance most of
these items through an increased road sector allocation.
3. The road component of the proposed TSDP was intended to support a three-year period
(2010/11–2012/13) of the Five-Year National Roads Development and Maintenance Plan
prepared by UNRA as an interim investment plan. The TSDP was aimed at improving the sector
performance through contributing jointly with other DPs in a sector wide approach. The TSDP
was intended to be the first in a series of proposed transport sector projects that would
individually support three-year rolling plans of the overall road transport investment and reform
program. Total financing of the TSDP was US$198 million, with IDA supporting the project
with Credits of US$190 million and a Grant of US$8 million from DFID.
1.3. Project Development Objective and Key Indicators
4. An SIL-financed the TSDP. This instrument was selected as the most appropriate to
support sector reforms and capacity building, complemented by targeted infrastructure
investment, all to be accomplished within a defined period.
5. The key development objective of the TSDP was to improve the performance of the
transport sector in Uganda to enhance economic growth and reduce poverty through (a)
reduction of transport costs and travel times on major corridors, (b) improvement of road safety,
34
To avoid duplication, details on outputs and funds per component and economic and financial analysis are to be
found in annex 2A and 3.
56
and (c) enhancement of sector management capacity.
6. The project outcome indicators included the following:
(i) The reduction of transport costs and travel times on major road corridors and
enhancing regional connectivity
(ii) Share of national roads in poor condition decreased
(iii) Percentage of rural population with access to an all season road in the target area
increased
(iv) Decline in annual rate of growth of accident fatalities
1.4. Key Project Data
Project ID Type Credit/Grant
No.
Approval
Date
Financing
Agreement
Signing
Effectiveness
Date
Closing
Date
Amount
(US$,
millions)
P092837
Credit IDA-49790 December
10, 2009
February 3,
2010 July 15, 2010
January
31, 2016 190.00
Grant TF-11094 April 6,
2010
March 27,
2012 March 27, 2012
June 30,
2014 6.15
AF Credit IDA-46790 June 16,
2011 June 5, 2012
October 22,
2012
January
31, 2016 75.00
Total
Amount 271.15
1.5. Risk Assessment and Mitigation at Appraisal
7. The following are the critical project risks and proposed mitigation strategies:
Description of Risk Why is it Important? Risk
Rating Mitigation Measures
Residu
al Risk
The URF is not
operational as per the
law. One of the
requirements of the
Road Fund Law is
that user charges are
being transferred
directly from the
source to the URF on
a monthly basis.
The URF is essential for
the sustainability of the
road network. The URF is
expected to provide a
consistent flow of finance
for maintenance. This will
help develop the local
construction industry.
M
The URF, with the MoFPED
approval, will cover the funding for
that maintenance of the project. The
MoFPED has already committed to
secure the budget allocation for the
project while UNRA will prioritize
the project among other maintenance
requirements.
L
57
Description of Risk Why is it Important? Risk
Rating Mitigation Measures
Residu
al Risk
UNRA’s constrained
implementing
capacity
The increased annual
budget allocation for the
national roads subsector
(from an average for
US$100 million from
2001/02 to 2007/08 to
about US$500 million
from 2008/09 to 2014/15)
requires a substantial
increase in UNRA’s
implementing capacity.
S
To mitigate this risk, UNRA will
establish a Contract Management
Team responsible for managing the
project on behalf of the UNRA.
M
Financial
management risks
Substantial country risks
persist S
UNRA, which takes on the key
financial management responsibility
for the project, has substantial
experience and a good financial
management record (from its
predecessor RAFU)
M
Procurement risks
UNRA procures works for
over US$500 million
annually.
H Regular monitoring and follow-up of
procurement timelines. S
Overall risk rating: Moderate
Note: Rating of risks is on a four-point scale: H = High; S = Substantial; M = Moderate; and L = Low.
1.6. Implementation Arrangements
8. MoWT and UNRA implemented the project. UNRA is the legal entity responsible for the
development, maintenance, and management of the national road network under the supervision
of MoWT. The proceeds of the credit were availed by the MoFPED to UNRA as a Grant. The
Permanent Secretary of MoWT and the Executive Director of UNRA were the Accounting
Officers for the project. MoWT implemented Components B, C, and D, while UNRA
implemented Components A and E. The Permanent Secretary of MoWT and the Executive
Director of UNRA delegated the function of the day-to-day management of the project to the
TSDP Project Coordinators within MoWT and UNRA. MoWT and UNRA implemented the
project fully mainstreamed in the existing institutional systems. Project Managers were
appointed by UNRA for day-to-day management of the project. UNRA was responsible for the
overall financial management of the project and the timely presentation of consolidated progress
reports and consolidated unaudited interim financial reports to IDA.
1.7. Partnership Arrangements
9. The TSDP was co-financed by IDA (US$190 million equivalent) and DFID (US$8
million equivalent). It was supported jointly by parallel funding from other DPs for a three-year
period (2010/11–2012/13) of the implementation of the GoU’s National Transport Master Plan
(NTMP) in a sector wide framework. The GoU led the coordination through annual Joint
Transport Sector Review meetings and quarterly performance reviews, where progress against
the targets set were reviewed and discussed with sector stakeholders. Furthermore, to monitor
and coordinate the reform process in general and the implementation of the RSDP in particular, a
Steering Committee was set up within the MoFPED, consisting of its Permanent
Secretary/Secretary to the Treasury as Chairperson and Officials from the Ministry of Public
58
Service and MoWT as well as representatives of the DPs.
1.8. Sustainability
10. MoWT was to enhance its policy setting, strategic planning, oversight, and monitoring
capacity and assist the various executing agencies to perform their duties that were crucial for the
sustainability of the transport sector program. Improvement of maintenance performance was
key for the sustainability of the road sector program. This required timely and stable availability
of maintenance funding and capacity of the private sector. In the past, when maintenance of the
national roads was under MoWT, the quality of maintenance was mixed, as the maintenance
budgets were unpredictable and fluctuating, and as a consequence, planning was difficult and the
local construction industry did not develop adequately. It was expected that with the
establishment of the URF on July 1, 2010, the situation would improve.
2.1. Project Components
11. The project was structured into five components intended to achieve the PDOs to
improve the connectivity and efficiency of the transport sector through (i) improved condition of
the national road network; (ii) improved capacity for road safety management; and (iii) improved
transport sector and national road management.
Component A: Road Investments: Upgrading and Rehabilitation of National Roads
12. This component comprised the following subcomponents.
Subcomponent 1: Upgrading of Gulu-Atiak Road (74 km) to Bitumen Standard
13. The works are completed. The road is constructed to a width of 6.5 m, with 1.5 m
shoulders either side (increased to 3.25 m in urban areas to allow for parking). The works
executed include (a) geometric improvements to the existing road’s vertical and horizontal
alignment carried out to conform with UNRA’s requirements as provided for in MoWT Road
Design Manual and in the standard and special specifications for the civil works; (b) site
clearance and removal of topsoil; (c) earthworks for new alignment inclusive of the formation of
all drains, side ditches, junctions, and minor link roads in urban and rural locations and in
climbing lanes; (d) construction of embankments over swamps; (e) construction of pavement
layers consisting of a mechanically modified sub-base and crushed stone-base and double
bituminous surface dressing as a wearing course; (f) construction of rigid pavement at two
roundabouts and five major junctions; and (g) installation of streetlights at the two roundabouts,
road marking, guardrails, road signs, bus-bays, speed humps, rumble strips, and other items of
road furniture.
Subcomponent 2: Upgrading of Vurra-Arua-Oraba Road (85 km) to Bitumen Standard
14. The works are completed. The road is constructed to a width of 6.5 m, with 1.5 m
shoulders either side (increased to 3.25 m in urban areas to allow for parking). The works carried
out under this subcomponent include the upgrading of the existing gravel road to a class II
bituminous standard road. The pavement structure comprised 200 mm mechanically stabilized
gravel sub- base, 200 mm crushed stone-base, and DBST wearing course—900 mm and 1,200
59
mm main culverts and 600 mm access culverts were constructed. Longitudinal drains comprised
earth and lined (stone pitch and concrete) drains. Ancillary works included metal guardrails and
vertical road signs to improve safety. HIV/AIDS awareness information was satisfactorily
carried out, including education and communication services. Utilities within the road prism
were successfully relocated.
Subcomponent 3: Upgrading of Kamwenge-Fort Portal Road (66 km) to Bitumen Standard
15. The road is constructed to a width of 6.5 m, with 1.5 m shoulders either side (increased to
3.25 m in urban areas to allow for parking). The works executed include (a) geometric
improvements to the existing road’s vertical and horizontal alignment carried out to conform
with UNRA’s requirements as provided for in MoWT Road Design Manual and in the standard
and special specifications for the civil works; (b) site clearance and removal of topsoil; (c)
earthworks for new alignment inclusive of the formation of all drains, side ditches, junctions, and
minor link roads in urban and rural locations and in climbing lanes; (d) construction of
embankments over swamps; (e) construction of pavement layers consisting of a mechanically
modified sub-base and crushed stone-base and double bituminous surface dressing as a wearing
course.
Subcomponent 4: Preparation of Road Design and Bidding Documents
16. Component A also financed consultancy services for feasibility studies, ESIAs, and
detailed engineering designs for the reconstruction and upgrading of the following roads:
Tororo-Mbale-Soroti-Lira-Kamdini road (340 km): The contract was amended on
October 3, 2013, to allow the consultant to assess the corridor and prepare a long-
term OPRC.
Kafu-Karuma-Kamdini road (104 km).
Zirobwe-Wobulenzi road (23 km): The contract was amended to cater for the
extended scope of services.
Kamdini-Nebbi-Goli and Ayer-Bobi road (230 km).
Component B: Enhanced Road Safety
17. Under this component, the GoU committed to prepare and develop the National Road
Safety Policy and establish and operationalize an NRSA by FY2011/12. The policy was
developed and approved on November 26, 2014. However, the Policy Statement for the
establishment of the NRSA was not approved. The top management team (TMT) of MoWT
recommended the ministry to rather strengthen the capacity of the department implementing road
safety issues. The review of the Traffic and Road Safety Act has, nevertheless recommended the
establishment of a strong road safety lead agency to replace the NRSC.
18. This component also provided funding for the establishment of an RCDS. Phase I, (needs
assessment system design, review of crash form) and Phase II (database software development,
training and piloting of the new crash form, and testing the database) were completed.
60
Implementation of Phase III (rollout phase), however, was delayed because of the lack of
equipment, which was under procurement. The equipment was eventually delivered to the
ministry at the beginning of December 2015.
19. The following pending activities are yet to be implemented to ensure successful
completion of the subcomponent:
Securing funds for pending training programs to enable rollout of the RCDS
Roll out of the RCDS country wide
Internet connectivity for the police stations
20. Because of these pending activities, a request for contract extension was granted from
December 25, 2015, to December 24, 2016, to successfully roll out the RCDS. This extension
approved by the Contracts Committee was subsequently affected by the cancellation of the
credits. Cancellation of the credits affected the program in the following ways:
The implementation of the RCDS had reached a critical stage where most of key
inputs required for its establishment had been achieved, leaving only training and
rollout.
The establishment of the RCDS was left in suspense despite the effort that had been
made toward the implementation and commitment from both the ministry and other
key stakeholders such as the Uganda Police and UNRA.
Failure to secure funds could waste the expenditure made so far toward the RCDS
establishment.
21. The road safety enhancement included an update of the transport sector legal framework
by MoWT by July 1, 2013. The drafting principles for the amendment of the Traffic and Road
Safety Act were prepared and approved by the ministry’s TMT. The Drafting Principles were
reviewed and harmonized with the Roads Bill, which is being drafted by the First Parliamentary
Council.
22. Improved roads and increased private car and motorcycle ownership, coupled with the
absence of public transport facilities, have led to an alarming deterioration of road safety. In
FY2015/16, there was an increase in fatalities by 13 percent over the previous year. The total
estimated financial loss as a result of road crashes in Uganda was US$1.32 billion in 2015. The
economic cost of dealing with the consequences of road trauma already runs into hundreds of
billions of dollars each year and the social cost is equally high. The TSDP’s outcome indicator
was to reduce the accident fatality rate and enhance safety. The TSDP cancellation based on the
failure of one activity (that is, Kamwenge-Fort Portal road) should not have affected other
important Government priorities such as the rollout of the RCDS, customization, technical
support, and training.
Component C: Urban Transport Planning: Preparation of Kampala Urban Transport
Project
61
23. MoWT implemented this component. The main purpose was to finance the feasibility
study, detailed engineering designs, and contract preparation for the pilot BRT project for the
GKMA and fund preparation for the legislation for the establishment of a MATA.
24. The BRT feasibility study and system engineering designs were prepared and completed,
ready to be implemented by the Government. Drafting Principles for the establishment of the
MATA Bill were prepared and approved by the Cabinet (January 2016). The approved Drafting
Principles have been forwarded to the First Parliamentary Council for Drafting of the bill. The
GoU affirms that the establishment of MATA is a priority institutional reform strategy to
mitigate the challenges of congestion within the GKMA, which is faced with high urbanization
resulting into increased motorization. Commitment to actualize plans is yet to be concretized by
concerned Ministries, Departments, and Agencies.
Component D: Institutional Support to the Ministry of Works and Transport
25. The GoU Sector Policy required MoWT to carry out institutional reform actions to
devolve power to the new institutions accountable to it. This required redefinition of the role of
the ministry to focus on policy formulation, sector oversight, strategic planning, setting
standards, and M&E. To that effect, MoWT launched a number of studies and service contracts
under this component. The main activities undertaken are summarized below.
Strengthening of the Policy and Planning Division
26. Under this component, the ministry was able to procure hardware office equipment and
design DEVINFO for the establishment of the TSDMS. The TSDMS was launched and
commissioned in 2014 at a joint Transport Sector Review Workshop. The system has been tested
and is currently being used. A number of studies related to transport policy and planning were
carried out by the ministry, namely the development and update of an NTPS, the Inland Water
Transport Legislation, whose drafting principles have been approved and forwarded to First
Parliamentary Council for drafting of the bill. The detailed Strategic Implementation Plan for the
National Transport Master Plan including the Plan for GKMA was prepared and successfully
developed. Preparation of a condition survey for the DUCAR network and creation of a database
were completed. The final draft of the NTPS was presented to the TMT and discussed.
However, it did not obtain financial clearance approvals from the MoFPED to enable submission
of the Cabinet Memorandum to the Cabinet Secretariat. The NTPS supported the establishment
of the NRSA and MATA but experienced serious financial setbacks after the TSDP Credit
cancellation. Further, consultation is being made with relevant stakeholders to clarify and
respond to issues raised by the MoFPED before resubmitting the draft for financial clearance
and, thereafter, to proceed with submission to the Cabinet Secretariat for approval.
Technical Assistance toward Establishment of MTRA
27. Technical officers of the ministry undertook in-depth consultations about the
establishment of the MTRA. They collaborated with all transport sector stakeholders. The
concept of establishing a new MTRA was mooted to take over the functions of the Directorate of
Transport. The stakeholders objected to this concept and advised through the TMT to
alternatively strengthen the capacity of the Transport Directorates to enable them to perform this
62
task.
Other Support to MoWT through TA, Studies, Equipment, and Training
28. This component was focused on assistance to transform the DUCAR divisions to an
agency through technical assistance, purchase of equipment, training, and finance operating
costs. The ministry was able to procure information technology equipment for a DUCAR data
center and for the local governments to improve the condition of the local roads. The ministry
increased the capacity and skills in transport planning by training a number of several officers in
Transport Planning and Economics to master’s level at Leeds University. It is important to
evaluate and take into account the knowledge, skills, talents, and competencies achieved as a
result of the TSDP activities in Uganda.
Component E: Institutional Support to UNRA
29. The main activities undertaken under this component are summarized in the following
paragraphs.
30. Upgrading of regional offices. This involved the detailed design, construction, and
supervision for the upgrading of five UNRA regional offices. The design and supervision
contract commenced on April 18, 2013. The design is completed, but the supervision phase
depended on the procurement of the works contract, which was subsequently affected by the
cancellation of the credits.
31. Road inventory and mapping. About 10,000 km of roads that were formally district
roads and reclassified as national roads were transferred to UNRA for management. The data
collection, which included mapping of this new network, inventory of the road assets, condition
assessments, and traffic census information, were substantially completed in December 2011.
Quality assurance and uploading of the data in the RMS was successfully completed on May 4,
2012. The contract was completed with the commissioning of the RMS in June 2012.
32. Development of a GIS Right-of-Way Management Information System. The aim of
developing this system was to support the RAP preparation, land acquisition, registration and
land administration, query, complaints management, and M&E. A computerized database of the
Right-of-Way information was created to increase efficiency and effectiveness of service
delivery at UNRA.
33. System development was completed and the system was installed on the UNRA server
and end-user computers. Capacity building and training of end users was conducted. A core team
of GIS officers was trained to give technical and helpdesk support. The system is being used on
new projects and data generated from previous projects will be uploaded. Training and capacity
building will be continued, especially to cater for new staff joining the organization. The
designer, because of intellectual property rights, can only implement future system upgrades and
modifications. There is need to put in place a service maintenance contract to cater for upgrades
and any changes requested by end users. Furthermore, the system was developed based on
ArcGIS software, licensed software from ESRI. There is, however, favorable development in
free GIS software. The cost of maintenance would have been lower where the system is to be
designed based on free GIS software.
63
34. Equipment. Fifteen double cabin pickup vehicles and heavy-duty scanners were
procured.
Technical Assistance: Specialist Assistance (UNRA)
35. Communication Specialist. The consultant commenced work on May 4, 2012. The
contract was for a period of two years with the original expiry date of April 24, 2014, but was
extended to October 23, 2014.
36. Procurement. The consultant commenced work in August 2010. The consultant doubled
as the Acting Director for the PDU. The consultant offered his services up to June 31, 2014,
when he handed over the work to a new substantive Director, who was appointed by UNRA. In
addition, a Procurement Specialist was recruited, who commenced service on July 21, 2011, up
to October 22, 2015.
37. Ferry Services Advisor. The contract with the Ferry Services Advisor was for a period
of six months and commenced on July 10, 2012.
38. Axle Load Control Advisor. The consultant commenced the services on September 30,
2013, and concluded on January 31, 2015.
39. Internal Audit Unit. The consultant commenced the services on September 30, 2013, for
a period of two years.
40. General capacity building. The two-year contract for these services commenced in June
2014. The contract was terminated on December 30, 2015, because of the restructuring exercise
the organization was undergoing.
41. Asset management support. This was a two-year support service intended to help
UNRA fully functionalize its RMS and to mainstream asset management practice in its business.
The services commenced in February 2015 and will expire in February 2017.
2.2. Fiduciary Issues
Procurement
42. The procurement for the project was carried out in accordance with the World Bank’s
‘Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits’, dated May 2004 and revised
October 2006; ‘Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank
Recipients’, dated May 2004 and revised October 2006; and the provisions stipulated in the
Financing Agreement. The national legislation on public procurement, as laid out in the Public
Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, is generally in line with the World Bank’s
guidelines.
Financial Management
43. The financial management for the project was generally reliable and adequate systems
were in place. Pastel accounting software was used to account for project funds. The project
64
finances were released and utilized in accordance with the agreed financial schedule. The
supervision missions reviewed the project financial management arrangements with regard to
correct recording of all transactions and balances, to ensure proper use of World Bank’s funds in
an economic and effective way for the purpose intended. In this way, the funds disbursement by
donor, component, and category were scrutinized.
2.3. Environment and Safeguard Compliance
Gulu-Atiak and Vurra-Oraba Roads
44. The project obtained approvals for ESIAs from NEMA. Auxiliary components of the
projects undertook stand-alone environmental assessments and obtained approvals from NEMA.
Comprehensive environmental audits for the road projects were undertaken and approvals were
also obtained from NEMA.
45. The contractor’s ESMPs were prepared for the two completed projects to guide
implementation of environmental and social management and monitoring activities on a
continuous basis throughout project implementation. The ESMPs were based on the
Environmental Impact Statements and NEMA approval conditions in the licenses and
certificates.
46. RAPs were prepared and approved by the Chief Government Valuer to guide mitigation
of social impacts and implementation of compensation for PAPs. Both projects procured
HIV/AIDS service providers to mitigate social impacts resulting from interaction of workers and
the local communities.
Physical Cultural Resources
47. Physical Cultural Resource Assessments were undertaken alongside ESIAs to guide
Physical Cultural Resource Assessments’ preservations for both roads. The monument and
graves and customs house in Vurra, historical buildings in Arua town, and ritual trees in Aroi
sub-county and Koboko were preserved. Historical buildings in Atiak and a historical fort in
Pabo were preserved.
Quarries and Borrow Pits
48. The quarry operations for both projects were preceded by stand-alone ESIAs, which were
approved by NEMA. A total of 300 borrow pits were opened on the Vurra-Oraba road and
almost all have been restored. Forty borrow areas were opened on the Gulu-Atiak road and all
have been restored. The few borrow areas that are still operational have been formally
transferred to other projects and NEMA informed.
Decommissioning Plans
49. Both projects prepared decommissioning plans for major components, including
contractor’s camps, quarries, borrow areas, and spoil disposal areas, which were submitted to
NEMA for review and approval. NEMA was informed of the project’s completion and transfer
of quarries for purposes of providing materials to other projects.
65
Final Environmental Mitigation Reports
50. Final Environmental and Social Mitigation Reports for the completed projects have been
prepared and submitted for review and approval in line with the General Specifications for Road
and Bridge Works 2005. The reports will be submitted to NEMA for concurrence before the
retention money can be released.
Lessons Learned in Environmental and Social Management
51. The ESMPs should always be undertaken and approvals obtained in line with national
systems and World Bank safeguard policies. Conditions of approval and environmental and
social contract clauses should always be implemented on a day-to-day basis to avoid
noncompliance with environmental and social safeguards. While acquiring quarry facilities,
abbreviated RAPs should always be prepared and approved to ensure fair compensation of PAPs.
For a discussion of environmental and social issues on the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road, see
section 6.
52. For the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road see Section 6.2.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
53. At cancelation of the Credit, the project had achieved 84 percent of the planned km of
road to be upgraded (189 km of tarmac against the planned 225 km). The Gulu-Atiak road (74
km) and Vura-Arua-Oraba road (85 km) were completed. About 30 km of the Fort Portal road
was complete against the planned 66.2 km. The project, on the whole, met most of the outcome
indicators as detailed in the TSDP Results Framework.
3.1. Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
54. The TSDP was highly relevant to the country’s development objectives as stated in the
Vision 2040 and the National Development Plan II strategy to achieve middle-income status by
2020. The TSDP strategy was based on achieving the goals of the TSDP of 2008 and the
National Transport Master Plan that included the Plan for GKMA and the 2002 draft NTPS. It
was consistent with the Government’s poverty reduction and economic growth strategy by
improving the rural and urban populations’ access to basic services, markets, and employment
opportunities. Through civil works and bridges in remote and isolated areas, it has facilitated
connectivity between and within regions as well as employment generation and marketing
opportunities. It has complemented other Government efforts with a rich HIV/AIDS agenda in
the project areas.
3.2. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
55. The TSDP is rated Satisfactory because of its contribution to improve the performance of
the transport sector in Uganda to enhance economic growth and reduce poverty through (a)
reduction of transport costs and travel times on the major corridors, (b) improvement of road
safety, and (c) enhancement of sector management capacity.
56. Policy and institutional reforms in the transport sector were aimed at supporting MoWT
66
in reviewing its portfolio mandate and rationalizing its service deliveries. However, the targeted
authorities had not been established, namely MATA, the NRSA, MTRA, and DUCAR agency.
The project ended while the processes toward the establishment of agencies such as MATA and
the NRSA were still under way, while the establishment of MTRA and DUCAR has been
suspended.
57. The TSDP financed important studies, which comprised an update of the NTPS, Strategic
Implementation Plan for the National Transport Master Plan including a Plan for GKMA, Inland
Water Policy and Legislation, National Road Safety Policy, and a review of the Traffic and Road
Safety Act. Capacity building was also addressed in the subsectors based on information from
the studies’ reports. The recommendations from the studies led to skills upgrading training as
well as professional enrichment for various categories of staff in all road agencies. In MoWT
Department of Policy and Planning, for instance, transport planners and economists received a
master’s degree in Transport Planning and Economics from the University of Leeds. A number
of staff in the Directorate of Transport and Engineering received short-term training in transport
project management and appraisal from the Transportation Institute in Israel. The retooling skills
obtained are being put to good use within the ministry.
4. Performance of the Government and the Bank
4.1. Assessment of the Government Performance
58. The performance of the GoU can be assessed as follows:
Positive
The PDOs were consistent and in conformity with Uganda’s Vision 2040, the
National Transport Master Plan, and the National Development Plan. It was,
therefore, consistent with the Government planning and legal frameworks.
The Government demonstrated its commitment by establishing an acceptable
procurement tracking and record keeping system within 12 months of effectiveness.
Reliable and adequate systems for financial management were put in place.
Negative
Contractual noncompliance—the Government did not adequately enforce
compliance to road safety issues, labor issues, health and safety issues, and social
and environmental safeguards on the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road upgrading works.
Compensation—unsatisfactory progress with respect to the speed in handling the
claims and a number of pending compensation claims.
4.2. Assessment of IDA Performance
59. The performance of IDA in the project can be assessed as follows:
67
Positive
The project was consistent with the CAS.
The World Bank played a leadership role among donors in supporting road sector
reforms and capacity building.
Regular supervision missions provided the necessary support in project
implementation, were constructive, and were strong in enforcing fiduciary measures
and safeguards.
Negative
Delays in providing ‘no-objections’
5. Disbursements
Disbursements – by Loan
Pro
ject
Lo
an
/Gra
nt
Sta
tus
Cu
rren
cy
Ori
gin
al
Rev
ised
Ca
nce
lled
Dis
bu
rse
d
Un
dis
bu
rse
d
Dis
bu
rse
d (
%)
P092837 IDA-46790 Closed US$ 190.00 190.00 30.92 159.08 0.00 83.73
P092837 IDA-49490 Closed US$ 75.00 75.00 75.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P092837 TF-11094 Closed US$ 6.15 6.15 0.00 6.15 0.00 100.00
Total 271.15 271.15 105.92 165.23 0.00 60.94
TSDP - Loss in Loan Value (US$40.76 million)
60. The present depreciated value of the two TSDP Credits is US$40.76 million. This
represents the movement between the SDR (the Credits’ currency) and the U.S. dollar (the
disbursing currency) over the Credit term.
6. Project Closure
61. The project closure was a result of the project not being carried out in accordance with
appropriate and agreed social and environmental standards. The genesis of the closure of the
project stemmed from the social and environmental social safeguard issues on the Kamwenge-
Fort Portal road, which were not adequately managed. This first led to the suspension of the
project’s credit disbursements, which culminated in the cancellation of the funding to the TSDP.
6.1. Suspension of the Project Credits Disbursements
62. After road works commenced under the project on August 1, 2013, World Bank
supervision missions repeatedly found instances of noncompliance with a number of
environmental and social requirements, particularly concerning land acquisition and various
physical impacts of construction, and alerted the implementing agency, UNRA, that they
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required remediation. After multiple reviews, there was a lack of progress with corrective actions
and concerns about allegations of sexual misconduct by contracted road workers. The World
Bank’s Regional Vice President for Africa sent a letter dated October 21, 2015, to the GoU
informing the suspension of disbursements under the project (Credits: IDA-46790 and IDA-
49490), effective October 22, 2015. Under the conditions of suspension, no funds already
withdrawn and in the project Designated Accounts were to be applied for any payments for civil
works on the Kawenge-Fort Portal road. The reasons underlying the suspension were threefold:
(i) Contractual noncompliance. The contractor failed to comply with general
contractual requirements including, but not limited to, road safety issues, labor
issues, working with the community issues, health and safety issues (including
incidences of deaths reported), and environmental issues, among others.
(ii) Compensation. Unsatisfactory progress with respect to the speed in handling the
claims and a number of pending compensation claims,
(iii) Social safeguards. There were complaints from the community citing workers of
the contractor involved in sexual abuse and sexual harassment of female employees.
Certain actions on child protection that were agreed to be necessary had not been
fully undertaken.
6.2. Cancellation of the Project
63. Concerns related to sexual misconduct of contracted road workers under the project were
first brought to the World Bank’s attention in a letter of complaint from some communities in
December 2014. Subsequent World Bank missions to the project site to review the issues raised,
working closely with the Government agencies concerned, specialized social development
consultants, and a local civil society organization, provided more insight into the complaints. The
World Bank concluded that there was credible evidence of project road workers engaging in
sexual misconduct with minors. The World Bank alerted the Government and UNRA, urging the
involvement of law enforcement and child protection agencies. On September 28, 2015, the
Inspection Panel—the independent accountability mechanism for people and communities who
believe that they have been, or are likely to be, adversely affected by a World Bank-funded
project—registered a request for inspection regarding the TSDP. The request concerned
complaints from the Bigodi and Nyabubale-Nkingo communities, located along the Kamwenge
to Fort Portal road. The World Bank Management reviewed the request and concluded that the
World Bank and the GoU failed to take sufficient measures to mitigate the identified risks and to
take action in a timely manner after serious issues were brought to their attention. After further
review and after the GoU and the Government contractor failed to take corrective steps, the
World Bank management informed the World Bank Board that it was cancelling the project,
effective December 21, 2015. The World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim announced the
cancellation of funding to the Uganda TSDP because the project was not being carried out in
accordance with appropriate and agreed social and environmental standards.
64. At the time of cancellation of funding, substantial progress had been achieved for the
planned road upgrading works and capacity-building activities planned for UNRA. The Gulu-
Atiak road and Vura-Arua-Oraba road were substantially completed. For the Kamwenge-Fort
69
Portal road, only 30 km of the planned 66 km had been paved with tarmac. The GoU continued
with the financing of the Kamwenge-Fort Portal road.
65. The obligation left to the GoU upon cancellation of the funding was enormous, whereby,
some of the subcomponents could no longer be completed because of budgetary constraints. The
shock of cancellation of funding highly risks the effort the project had made in supporting the
sector’s policy and strategy.
7. Challenges, Lessons Learned, and Conclusion
7.1. Challenges
The implementation of the RCDS had reached a critical stage where most of key
inputs required for its establishment had been achieved with only training and
rollout remaining.
The cancellation of the Credits on account of an unrelated component left the
establishment of the RCDS in suspense at a critical stage. A lot of effort had been
made toward implementation by both the ministry and all key stakeholders who
were left frustrated by the cancellation.
Failure to find alternative funding for completion of the program means that all the
prior expenditures could result in sunk costs.
Getting a champion for the BRT project was necessary for the completion and
implementation of the BRT system.
Reviewing BRT feasibility and design documents was challenging because of
insufficient skills regarding BRT designs at the ministry.
There are different opinions from different stakeholders on choice of mass rapid
transport that would reduce congestion in the GKMA (BRT versus light rail).
Preparatory activities such as the transformation of the taxi industry, land
acquisition, and sensitization before implementation of BRT are a hindrance to the
BRT’s success.
Government processes and approvals to establish MATA have been lengthy and
affected the implementation of the BRT system in Kampala.
A long procurement process basing on the PPDA and World Bank procedures
delayed progress.
Delays in approving requests for reallocating funds from nonperforming components
to reprioritized activities affected completion of vital objectives.
7.2. Lessons Learned
70
Project Appraisals should gather adequate information from previous programs in order to arrive
at a realistic, achievable timeline for implementation of major institutional reforms; and
Cancellation of an entire Credit with a multitude of components because of problems with a
single subcomponent is unfair. Only the funds for the problematic one should be withdrawn.
There is need for continued capacity building in the field of Public Transport and Planning in the
Ministry.
Political support and Top Management support is critical to the success of major public
infrastructure projects.
Involvement of stakeholders enriches the outputs and outcomes of infrastructure projects.
MoFPED has to be heavily and actively involved at each and every stage of an infrastructure
project, especially at conceptualization, to have agreement and guarantee counterpart funding.
Contracts ought to be drafted carefully to pay attention to such details as taxes in order to
minimize conflicts during contract implementation.
Establishing of a fully funded BRT Implementation Unit within the Ministry in the initial stages
is key for the success of BRT before actualization of MATA
Additional resources are required to fast track the reforms
Environmental and social plans should always be undertaken and approvals obtained in line with
national systems and World Bank Safeguard Policies. Conditions of approval and environmental
and social contract clauses should always be implemented on a day-to-day basis to avoid non-
compliance with environmental and social safeguards. While acquiring quarry facilities,
Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plans should always be prepared and approved to ensure fair
compensation of Project Affected Persons.
7.3. Conclusion
66. The Government’s sector policy and medium-term strategy hinge on the promotion of
sustainable, efficient, safe, and reliable transport services as the means for providing effective
support to increase agriculture and industrial production, trade, tourism, social, and
administrative services. This is in line with the Government’s National Development Plan, which
is to improve the stock and quality of roads infrastructure, transport, and traffic management.
The TSDP provided the framework for fulfilling the Government’s objective. The project was
critical in supporting the GoU to roll out the sector reforms into implementation.
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Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents
Aide Memoires, Project Progress Reports, Implementation Status and Results Reports,
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments and Environmental and Social
Management Plans
Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Uganda for the Period 2011-2015, April
27, 2010, Report 54187-UG.
DFID (U.K. Department for International Development), 2015, Final Report on DFID
Trust Fund Utilization in the Transport Sector Development Project
DFID (U.K. Department for International Development). 2009. Review of the Uganda
Joint Assistance Strategy - Current and Future Prospects by Alison Evans of the
Overseas Development Institute, London and Peter Sentongo of the Centre for
Performance Management, Kampala.
Employment (Employment of Children) Regulations, Government of Uganda, April 20,
2012.
Fact Sheet, Uganda Economic Update 6. 2015 (September).
First Progress Report on the Implementation of Management’s Action Plan in Response
to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report (INSP/106710-UG) on the Republic of
Uganda Transport Sector Development Project- Additional Financing (P121097), March
30, 2017
Financing Agreement for Credit 4679-UG conformed, February 3, 2010.
Guidelines for Reviewing World Bank Implementation Completion and Results Reports, a
Manual for Evaluators, last updated August 1, 2014.
Implementation Completion Report Guidelines, OPCS, August 2006, last updated July
22, 2014.
Inspection Panel Investigation Report: Transport Sector Development Project -
Additional Financing, August 4, 2016; and Management Response.
Inspection Panel Process Guidance Note, October 2014.
Inspection Panel: Request for Inspection - Notice of Registration, September 28, 2015.
Letter of Development Policy for the Transport Sector (Uganda), October 8, 2009.
Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Uganda Transport
Development Project - Additional Financing, December 17, 2015.
Managing the Risks of Adverse Impacts on Communities from Temporary Project
Induced Labor Influx, 2016, Environmental and Social Safeguards Advisory Team,
Operations Policy and Country Services, Washington DC
Mclean, L, and P. Bukuluki. 2016. Uganda Gender-Based Violence Diagnostic.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mid-term Review, Mission Report, April 22–May 10, 2013.
Ministry of Works and Transport. 2015. Annual Sector Performance Report Financial
Year 2014/15, Government of Uganda
Progress Report on Country Assistance Strategy.
Resettlement Action Plan, January 2011, AWE Engineers, Kampala, Uganda.
The Independent. 2016. How Uganda Ranks in Drink Driving, Fatal Accidents and
Helmet Use. All Africa Global Media (March).
Transport Case Study, Republic of Uganda, April 2012, Independent Evaluation Group.
72
Transport Paper TP-21, Monitoring Road Works Contracts and Unit Costs for Enhanced
Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, Alexeeva V. et al, September 2008.
Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2016. Census 2014 Final Results.
Uganda National Road Agency. 2012. Preparation of Third Phase of Road Sector
Development Program. Kagga and Mott Macdonald.
Uganda Police. 2013. Annual Crime and Traffic Road Safety Report, Kampala.
Uganda Road Fund. Road Maintenance Monitoring Report, Q1 FY2015/16, November
2015.
Uganda Sexual and Gender-based Violence Diagnostic. 2016. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
Uganda Transport Sector Development Project, Environmental Assessment, E1879, July
2009.
Uganda Transport Sector Development Project, Resettlement Action Plan, RP665, July
2009.
United Nations Refugee Agency. 2005. Uganda Hosts Record 500,000 Refugees and
Asylum Seekers. (accessed September 7, 2016), www.unhcr.org.
World Bank. 2010. Rural Road Investment Efficiency: Lessons from Burkina Faso,
Cameroon and Uganda, Report 53646.
World Bank Bridges Across Borders--Unleashing Uganda’s Regional Trade Potential.
Uganda Economic Update 1. 2013 (February).
World Bank Northeastern Road Corridor Asset Management Project, Project Appraisal
Document, Report PAD 707, Washington, DC: World Bank. 2014
World Bank Uganda Overview, Country at a Glance (accessed October 14, 2016).
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda.
World Bank, 2016, Lessons learned and Agenda for Action from the Uganda TSDP
World Bank, 2011, Transport Sector Development Project, Project Paper on a Proposed
Additional Credit, Report 59825, Washington DC
World Bank, 2009, Transport Sector Development Project, Project Appraisal Document,
Report 50977-UG, Washington DC
World Health Organization. 2015. Road Safety Report, Geneva.
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MAP