Document of

The World Bank

FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY

Rept No. 12279

PROJECT COMPLJRTOII R TPORT

ZAIRE

NOKRTEAb -URAL DEVEOPMT PROJECT(CREDIT 1325-ZR)

AUGUST 25, 1993

MICROGRAPHICS

Report No: 12279Type: PCR

Agriculture Operations DivisionSouth-Central and Indian Ocean DepartmentAfrica Regional Office

This document has a rsticted distribution and may be usd by recipients only In the perforomae ofdhir offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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EXCHANGE ELATESCurrency Unit: Zaire

US$1.00xm EtdYale1983 131984 361985 501986 601987 1121988 1871989 3811990 7191991 63,673

12/1992 1.7 million

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

ABBREVIATIONS

ACOOPELI Association of Livestock Producer Cooperatives in Ituri (Associationdes Cooperatives d'Eleveurs de l'Ituri)

BPI Project Management Unit (Bureau du Plojet Ituri)CIDA Canadian International Development AgencyDAGP Directorate for the General Administration of Projects (Direction de

l'Administration Generale des Projets)FAC French Ministry of Cooperation (Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation)MARD Ministry of Agricultural and Rural DevelopmentONDE National Livestock Development Office (Office National pour le

Developpement de l'Elevage)OR Roads Office (Office des Routes)PMKO Eastern Kasai Maize Project (Projet Mals du Kasai Oriental)PCR Project Completion ReportPRODEL Association o'f Livestock Producers (Promotion pour la Defense de

l'Elevage)SNRDA National Rural Roads Service (Service National de Routes de Desserte

Nationales)SNV National Extension Service (Service National de Vulgarisation)SSE Project monitoring and evaluation service (Service de Suivi et

Evaluation)T&V Training and visit system of extension

FISCAL YEAR OF GOVERNMENT

January 1 - December 31

THE WORLD BANKWashington, D.C. 20433 FOR OMCI..L USE ONLY

U.S.A.

nffla of DiraotorG.neraOperations Evaluation

August 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECITIVE DlRECTORS AND TlJHE JS

SUBJECI: Project Completion Report on ZaireNortbeast Rural Development Project (Credit 1325-ZR)

Attached is the Project Completion Report on Zaire: Northeast Rural DevelopmentProject (Credit 1325-ZR) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Part II was prepared by theBorrower.

The Northeast Rural Development Project was a continuation of the relativelysuccesfil Ituri Livestock Development Project (Cr. 0697-ZR). It was designed to build on theexisting Project Management Unit and Livestock Producers' Cooperative Union and to extendactivities to crop production through the development of crop farmer associations. Livestockproduction activities proceeded satisfactorily, particularly animal health measures. Cost recoveryfor inputs was increased by the livestock cooperatives during the project and they remained activeat the time of the PCR mission, but their ability to operate without external support is considereduncertain. The use of cooperatives to serve crop farmers proved to be infeasible and little wasachieved. Thus, the project outcome is rated unsatisfactory, institutional development as partialand sustainability as unlikely. Despite the fact that the crop component never really got off theground, the project was generally rated as problem free until misprocurement came to light late inthe implementation period.

The Borrower views the project in a somewhat more favorable light than the PCR,given that the livestock cooperatives, established under the first project, continued to operatesatisfactorily. It also considers the Bank should have acted sooner to avoid the slippage in thecrop component, and also that the Bank was at fault in the misprocurement since it paid thesuppliers for excessive amounts of materials. Foliowing this incident procurement procedures forprojects in Zaire were tightened.

The completion report provides an adequate account of project implementation andoutcomes. No audit is planned.

Attachment

This documennt has a rested dtribton and may be used by recipints only In the performance oftheir offlal du. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wihout Word Bank authorization.

PROJECT COMPLETON REPORT

ZAIRE

NORTHEAST RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CR. 1325-ZR)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE .................. i

EVALUATION SUMMARY ....................................... iii

PART I: PROJECr REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ............ IProject Identity ........ 1Background ....... 1Project Objectves and Descriptions ............................. 2Project Desp and Orga ion ............................... 3ProjectImplementation ..................................... 3Project Results .............. ............................ 5Econoic Rate of Retn ................................... 8Sustainability . .......................................... 8Performance of Borrower ................................... 8Performance of BPI ........... ............................ 9Performance of the Bank ................................... 9Performance of Consultants .................................. 9Project Relationships ...................................... 10P-oject Documentation and Data ............................... 10

PART 11: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .... ... 11

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ............................ 17Table 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits ....................... 17Table 2. Project Timetable .................................. 18Table 3. Disbursements .................................... 19Table 4. Project Costs and Financing ........................... 21Table 5. Implementation Indicators ............................. 22Table 6. Status of Covenants ................................. 26Table7. UseofBankResources .............................. 29

Maps: IBRD 16239R: Existing and Proposed Development ActivitiesIBRD 16240R: The Project Area

PROJECT COMPLEIION REPORT

ZAtE

NORTHEAST RURAL DEVELOPMUENT PROJECT(CR. 1325-ZR)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Northeast RuW DevelopmentProject, for which IDA Credit 1325-ZR in the amount of SDR 12.3 million (US$13.0 million)was approved on February 15, 1983. The credit was closed on April 30, 1991, one year andfour monts behind schedule. The last disbursement took place on May 15, 1991, at which dtmethe undisbursed balance of SDR 2.5 million (US$2.7 million) was cancelled. Co-financing wasprovided by the French Fonds d'Aide et de Coop4radon (PAC), In the amount of US$2.3 million,and the Canadian Intational Development Agency (CIDA), in the amount of US$8.5 million.At the time of credit closing, the acual FAC contribution was etmated at US$2.3 million andthe acual CIDA contribution at US$8.5 million.

Ihe Preface, Evaluation Summary and Parts I and m were prepared by the AgriculturalOperations Division of the South-Central and Indian Ocean Department, Africa Region of theWorld Bank. Government's comments on the PCR form Part 1. In addition, the Borrowerprepared a project completion report of its own, which is available in project files. The co-fiaciers were asked to comment on the PCR, but no comments were received.

information in the PC' ,s based, intealia on discussion with Bank staff associated withthe project, the Staff Appraisal Report, the Development Credit Agreement, supervision reports,correspondence between IDA and the Borrower, intea A memoranda and a completionreport prepared by the implementing agency (Bureau du Projet Itri).

PROJECT COMPLEIION B1IPORT

ZAnRE

NORTBEAST RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CR. 1325ZR)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

1. Agriculture Is vital to Zaire's economy. At the time of project preparation in 1980/81,about 70-75% of the population wrs employed in the agricultural sector. However, agriculturalproduction had declined significantly from pre-independence levels, as a result of inadequate andoften counterproductive Government policies, as well as weak or non-existent agriculturalservices. In 1981, the Government defined a new agricultural strategy, which aimed to achievefood self-sufficiency, through the intensification of production in high potential and highpopulation areas of the country, one of which was the Ituri region. The Northeast RuralDevelopment Project was a continuation of the relatively successful Ituri Livestock DevelopmentProject (Cr. 0697-ZR), which was the second livestock project supported by the Bank in Zaire,and the first to address traditional livestock production.

Objectives and Des ription

2. Project objectives were (a) to fiurther increase livestock production and to begin increasingfoodcrop production, thereby improving smallholders' incomes; (b) to strengthen ruraldevelopment institutions; and (c) to support the Government's efforts to implement adequateagricultural policies. The main instrument through which this was to be done, was throughstrengthening the cooperative movement. Implementation was expected over 7 years, at a costof US$30.2 million. The project was to be managed by the existing Project Management Unit(Bureau de Projet Ituri, BPI), which was established under the first project, and was to keep itscurrent staff and work force. The Livestock Producers' Cooperative Union (ACOOPELI) wasto be responsible for the distribution of veterinary products and agricultural inputs, for the pilotmarketing activities and for the management of dipping stations. Key management posts wereto be occupied by expatriate technical assistants (provided by the French Government) to bereplaced by national staff during the implementation period. Canadian technical assistance wasto provide technical and managerial support to ACOOPELI, as it had done under the first project.

3. The project included features of other integrated rural development projects concurrendyunder way elsewhere in Zaire, such as a heavy dependence on extemal financing for salaries andrecurrent expenses, and a substantial degree of autonomy for project management andindependence from the civil service enabling projects to pay higher salaries and offer better termsof service than the administration. It was recognized early on that the long distance and difficultcommunications between the project and the capital would make it difficult for the Ministry ofAgriculture and Rural Development to exercise close control over project management.

iv

mpleiuentatlou Experience

4. The design of the project rested heavily on the assumption that the successful approachto livestock production under the flrst projec -providing veterinary scrvices, promoting livestockowners associations and makiDng inputs available, to be subsequently distributed through suchassociations to livestock famers at cost - could also be made to work for crop production. Whatwas not sufficiently appreciated, was that the sociological differences between livestock and cropfarmers would make this mitch more difficult. While livestock farmers were a relatively smallbut powerful group commanding large tracts of land, masses of crop farmers existed, occupyingsmall plots of land on which they were essntially producing crops for their own subsistence.Also, among the latter group, no history existed of forming cooperatives for inpit use ormarketing of produce. As a result, the project unit - which was continued from the first project -showed litlle enthusiasm initially for expanding its services to crop farmers, and limited itself

to on-farm research (crop trials) in the fist 2-3 years. When afterwards, the unit did moveahead, the same approach was followed as with the livestock farmers: crop farer asociationswere set up with extensiun or cooperathe agents assigned to each of them, and emphasis was puton extension messages that required the of cash inputs (implements, improved seeds, etc.).

S. Loose financial controls led to serious misappropriations in 1984 (para. 12.1) andprocurement problems in 1988 (para. 5.6), which external auditors had failed to detect, but whichwere detected by IDA supervision missions. These events, combined with isufficientGovernment counterpart funding, forced the exte financiers to withhold a large part of theirfunding in the last two years of the project.

6. Actual project costs are esthrated at US$24.1 million, 80% of the original projectestimates. IDA funded US$11.8 million of project costs against US$13.0 million estimated atappraisal. Total funding by FAC and CIDA is etimated at US$2.3 million and US$8.5 millionrespectively against US$3 million and US$10 million estimated at appraisal. Governmentfinanced US$1.5 million against US$3.2 million estimated at appraisal. Part of the reasons forthe lower than estimated project cost are devaluation of the local currency and increasedpurchasing power of the foreign exchange contributions, as well as the important slow-down inproject activities after 1989, following procurement irtegularities, a reorientation of projectactivities and inadequate Government recurrent cost funding.

Results

7. The crop component, the major innovation of the project, failed to produce the expectedresults. The crop farmers' association approach proved very costly (extension ratios averaged80 farmers per extension worker, compared to about 300 for the national extension service),reached only a fraction of the target population (5,000 farmers compared to 120,000 farmersestimated at appraisal), and met with little success (crop farmers were either unable or unwillingto buy inputs).

8. The project's livestock component fared much better than the crop component. Animalhealth services, in particular, reached 99% of the target population, and cattle and calf mortalityrates were lower than estimated at appraisal. Some of the new initiatives, such as commonpasture improvement and land titling, failed to reach their initial objectives (only 7,000 ha actualversus a target of 350,000 ha). It is uncertain, however, whether animal health achievements willturn out to be sustainable. A substantial part of the overheads of the livestock owners' apex-cooperative (ACOOPELI) was paid for from external financing, but in the last years of the

v

project, this was cut back forcing greater efficiency and increasing rates of cost recovery. Tnecost of procurement and transport of cash inputs to this remote area is quite high and inputpricing to producers contained a subsidy element under the project. If adequate cost recoveryand greater operating efficiency is maintained by ACOOPELI, it is likely that the livestockcomponent will show a satisfactory rate of return. Nevertheless, with the failure of the cropproduction component, it is likely that the overall rate of return of the project will beunsatisfactory. Because of the paucity of data, the economic rate of return could not beestimated.

Sustabilty

9. At an estimated cost of $163 per annum per livestock owner during projectimplementation, BPI would not be able to continue to provide the services to which local herdersbecame accustomed without extervl assistance. However, both BPI and ACOOPELI applied costrecovery policies for distribution of inputs and vaccines when counterpart funding was reducedin the late 1980s and continuation of these principles could help the livestock cooperativesthrough the difficult post-project period. Significant changes in the recommendation for tickcontrol and cattle dipping and spraying have reduced costs of disease control to livestock ownersand can be considered as a long term sustainable project benefit.

10. However, with the completion of external financing, )PI will not be able to function atthe same level as before, especially as conditions for Government funding, already mixed duringproject implementation, have considerably worsened. Thus, the cooperative associations willbasically have to survive on their own strength. They were still active at the time of thecompletion mission, although at reduced level; their continued existence is uncertain.

Lessons Leamed

11. The main lessons from the project are the following:

(a) a project design successful for certain groups of farmers is not necessarilyapplicable to others. Before launching follow-up projects that include a newtarget population, socio-economic surveys testing farmers response are anecessary part of preparatory work, and should be applied in pilot activitiesbefore major financing decisions are taken;

(1) the set-up of an independent project unit to compensate for the weaknesses ofexisting Government services has not proved to be a feasible alternative, as itcaused management problems and tense relations with the local administration,but most importantly as it was ultimately not sustainable financially. This lessonwas learnt at the same time in similar projects elsewhere in Zaire; and

(c) supervision missions should give close attention to financial accounts even whenproject audit reports give unqualified clearance of such accounts.

12. ITe lessons on methodology of approaching small crop farmers, and on the set-up ofproject units, have been taken into account in the design of subsequent projects. Emphasis is nowbeing given to reinforcement of Government services rather than special project units and theextension methodology has changed to the Training and Visit approach, which relies on the

ji

success of extension messages with target farmers in order to subsequendy have them adoptedon a large scale. This way, the extension service can cover a much larger farmer population thanwith the approach Implementd under the project.

I

PROJECT COMPLElnON REPORT

ZAnRE

NORTHEAST RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECr(CR. 132S-ZR)

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM TIlE BANKS PERSPECTIVE

1. Project Identity

Projec Name: Northeast Rural Development Project (turi UI)Credit Number: 1325-ZRRegion: AfricaCountry: ZaireSector: AgricultureSubsector: Rural Development

2. Background

2.1 Sector development objectives. Agriculture is vital to Zaire's economy. At the timeof project preparation in 1980181, about 70-75% of the population was employed in theagricultural sector. However, agriculural production had declined significanty from pre-independence levels, as a result of inadequate and often counterproductive Govemment policies,as well as weak or non-existent agricultural services. In 1981, the Government defined a newagricultural strategy, which aimed to achieve .ood self-sufficiency, through the intensification ofproduction in high potential and high population areas of the country, one of which was the Ituriregion.

2.2 Policy context and linages with sector policy objectives. The Northeast RuralDevelopment Project was an important component of the Government's agricultural strategy toachieve self-sufficiency in foodcrops and meat. The project was a continuation of the relativelysuccessful Ituri Livestock Development Project (Cr. 0697-ZR), which was the second livestockproject supported by the Bank in Zaire, and the first to address traditional livestock production.The principal obstacles to livestock development were animal disease, marketing difficultiesresulting from the country's poor infrastructure, and changes of policy towards the sector whichdisrupted existing production and marketing arrangements.

2.3 Ituri Livestock Development ProJect (Cr. 0697-ZR). Implementation of the firstlivestock project was satisfactory. Most of the main objectives were achieved, and in oneimportant respect, the establishment of livestock owners' associations and a cooperative federationwhich were intended to provide the institutional framework for sustained long-term development,the project went fiuther than had been envisaged at appraisal. The project su :ceeded in settingup an effective veterinary service which provided vaccination, tick control and therapeutic supportfor catle-owners; it made a start on pasture improvement; marketing infrastructure was

2

strengthened; and input supplies and extension sevices for producers were organized. Aneffective project unit was set up. Total prject cost amounted to US$16.4 million.

2.4 Tbe project's achievements were the more remarkable in view of the difficultcircumstances in which It was implemented, including civil unrest, unreliable communications andsupply lines, the severe shortage of local funds, rapid inflation, and an exchange of currencynotes which eliminated overnight the savings of livestock owners' associations. Unfortunately,the generally encouraging record was marred by several instances of misuse of project fimds.

2.5 At the time of the project audit, the economic impact of the project could not yet bemeasured with certainty, but the evidence was sufficient to confirm that the project brought butan Increase In cattle production, principally through improvements to animal health. Keyproduction parameters improved, and estimated incremental output of meat and milk exceededappraisal expectations. The re-estimaed economic r.te of retr of the project was well above15%. The importance of generating project benefits that could be sustained was recognized fromthe beginning, and significant progress was made in this respect through substantial staff training,establishment of the Ituri Project Unit, and setting up the structure of farmer associations and thecooperative federation.

3. Project Objectives and Descriptions

3.1 The Northeast Rural Development Project was designed as part of a long-termdevelopment program for the area and as a continuation of the Ituri Livestock Project (Cr. 0697-ZR). The second phase project took into account the fact that livestock producers represetedless than 10% of the farming families in Ituri and included resources to help develop foodcropproduction. It also recognized that attainment of long-term development objectives depended onthe building of strong local institutions to provide effective services to farmers. Accordingly, itsobjectives were (a) to increase livestock and foodcrop production, thereby increasingsmallholders' incomes; (b) to strengthen farmer associations; and (c) to support the Government'sefforts to elaborate more adequate agricultural policies. The Project thus continued to providesupport to livestock producers and to strengthen their cooperative movement but also includednew development activities in support of crop production.

3.2 The implementation period was estimated to be 7 years and the cost was expected to beUS$30.2 million. The project included the following components:

(a) A program for the rehabilitation of veterinary and animal production services,infrastructure and the provision of veterinary products;

(b) A program to provide extension services and agricultural inputs to developproduction of foodcrops and smallholder coffee;

(c) Human health services;

(d) A basic data study on the major livestock diseases and agricultural activities, toset up a program to monitor and evaluate the impact of project activities;

(e) Other studies, training, pilot activities and trials, including limited assistance tofisheries and marketing;

3

(t) Selective maintenance and rehabilitation of Infrastructure such as roads andbridges; and

(g) Technical assistance to the Project management unit and to the Association ofLivestock Producer Cooperatives (ACOOPELI).

4. iroject Design and Organization

4.1 ProJect design Included continued support for animal health and livestock developmentactivities starwd under the first Ituri Livestock Project. Organization and management was to bea continuation of the first phase project, with the addition of an agricultural department attachedto the project unit (Bureau du Projet Ituri, BPI). ACOOPELI was to be invited to join the sub-regional consultative committee, which was supposed to coordinate Project actvities. Thelivestock component drew from the experience of the previous project. The crops program wasto be implemented in coajunction with BPrs extension and training Department and with thirdparties such as the British American Tobacco (BAT) company, which was operating an effectiveagricultural extension program for tobacco in the sub-region.

4.2 BPI was to keep its current staff and work force, under the general supervision of theMinistry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). ACOOPELI would be responsible forthe distribution of veterinary products and agricultural inputs, for the pilot marketing activitiesand for the management of dipping stations. Key management posts in BPI were to be occupielby expatriate technical assistance (provided by the French Government) to be replaced by nationalstaff as soon as possible. Canadian technical assistance was to provide technical and managerialsupport to ACOOPELI.

4.3 After initial clarification of minor differences between the French Fonds d'Action et deCoopdration (FAC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) on assignmentof technical assistance staff, and between BPI and ACOOPELI on the roles and responsibilitiesof the two agencies supported by the project, organization and execution of the project proceededas anidcipated at appraisal. Following the successful experience of the first project, with aconsiderable degree of financial and administrative autonomy and with a strong team of fivetechnical assistants, BPI was poised in 1983 to continue to make a significant contribution toagricultural and livestock productinn in the northeast of Zaire.

4.4 The project included features of other integrated rural development projects under wayelsewhere in Zaire, such as the North Shaba and Eastern Kasai Maize (PMKO) projects, and theMweka rural development project in Western Kasai. These features included a heavy dependenceupon external financing for salaries and for recurrent expenses, a substantial degree of autonomyfor project management and an independence from the existing civil service enabling the projectsto pay higher salaries and offer better tems of employment than the civil service.

5. Project Implenentation

5.1 The main divergence between planned and actual implementation of the project objectiveswas the poor performance of the crop production component of the project. Concern with projectmanagement in the early years to ensure the continuation of the satisfactory performance of thefirst project distracted attention from the new agricultural production component. The delays in

4

the recruitment of the technical advisor to the crop production service Leld up progress duringthe first two years. After obtaining positive results from field trials and defining appropriateextension messages, the project limited its activities to working with some 60 farmer associations,whose numbers never exceeded more than 800 farm families in all - a mere fraction of the120,000 farmers which the project had been intended to reach by its final year. Whencounterpart funds fell short, it was the crop production component which was cut back and thetraining element of the training and viskt approach was abandoned for two years in mid-projectcycle due to lack of funds.

5.2 In an attempt to resuscitate the crop production component in 1988, the Bank intensifiedits technical supervision of the project, but this coincided with the discovery of a series ofprocurement irregularities, which clouded the reputation of the project and compromised thecofinanciers' confidence in project management (para. 5.6). By the time a decision was takento incorporate the project activities in the Pilot Extension Project (Cr. 2096-ZR), the latter wasalready too heavily committed to be able to give the sub-region the needed support.

5.3 At project appraisal, it was envisaged that part of the incremental meat production fromthe project would be marketed In Kinshasa, thus saving foreign exchange on imported meats.Following the liberalization measures of 1983, imports of meat from Europe and South Americasharply increased. This, combined with difficulties caused by the poor state of the airstrip atBunia, virtually ruled out Kinshasa as a realistic market. Most of the meat was therefore soldon the North Kivu, Kisangani and Uele markets.

5.4 At appraisal, satisfactory execution of the agricultural component was considered low risksince the objectives were straightforward, the approach and the instruments were proven, and thephasing was realistic. On the other hand, interference by Government in price policies wasconsidered a risk, which was reduced when the Government adopted a policy of priceliberalization nation-wide. However, this did not prevent interference by local authorities in pricefixing, wbich created difficulties for meat marketing and low returns to livestock owners.Recurrent shortages of foreign exchange were resolved by the availability of Canadian supportfor the importation of veterinary medicines. Interruptions in counterpart funding from Kinshasawas not mentioned as a risk in the Staff Appraisal Report, but became a major reason for thecurtailment of specific project activities.

5.5 Considerable autonomy was accorded to project management in the early years, given thedistance which separated Ituri from Kinshasa and the problems of communication with such aremote area. Irregularities by the expatriate project administrative and financial director andother local staff were revealed, but reaction from Kinshasa to reports of these irregularities wasslow. No disciplinary action was taken against the staff involved and only after the Bankrequested action against implicated project staff were they transferred to other Governmentagencies. At that point, the Ministry also reverted to central control of major expenses by theDirectorate for the General Administration of Projects (DAGP).

5.6 Procurement. In 1989, a supervision mission reported on serious anomalies inprocurement procedures. The mission discovered that for a series of procurements in 1988,tender documents were not sent to IDA, limited international bidding was used instead ofinternational competitive bidding, lists of suppliers were not sent to IDA for approval and bidawards were not always made to the lowest evaluated bidders. In addition, quantities of itemsordered far exceeded quantities approved in the 1988 work program. Because goods werepackaged in lots with a value of less than US$100,000 each, which was below the prior review

5

threshold, disbursement requests were routinely honored by IDA. In this manner, US$1.1million was disbursed. After review, IDA decided that in order to regularize accounts, no furtherpayment would be made on goods and equipment purchased by the project in 1988 and that nogoods for the extension service (for whom the majority of the orders had been placed) would beeligible for IDA fnancing during 1989. In addition, the Development Credit Agreement was"aended to prevent a recurrence (para. 5.8). IDA supervision missions suggested to project staff

that excess goods that were procured in 1988 could be sold at cost in order to obtain thenecessary funds for project activities. No excess goods were sold, however, and no plan hasbeen developed for their appropriate disposal.

5.7 Project Costs and Flnanclng. Actual project costs are estimated at US$24.1 million,80% of the original project estimates. IDA funded US$11.8 million of project costs againstUS$13.0 million estimaed at appraisal. Total funding by FAC and CIDA is estimated at US$2.3million and US$8.5 million respectively against US$3 million and US$10 million estimated atappraisal. Government financed US$1.5 million against US$3.2 million estimated at appraisal.Part of the reasons for the lower than estimated project cost are devaluation of the local currencyand increased purchasing power of the foreign exchange contibutions, as well as the importantslow-down in project activities after 1989, following procurement irregularities, a reorientationof project activities and inadequate Government recurrent cost funding.

5.8 Disbursenents. After some minor initial delays, disbursements attained levels estimatedat appraisal through 1989. The credit was closed on April 30, 1991, after a four month extensionto allow for an orderly closing of project activities (final payment of salaries to project employeeson contract and the 1990 audit). Two amendments were made to the credit agreement. The first,dated July 11, 1986, concerned the establishment of a revolving fund (special account) in theamount of US$340,000 at a commercial bank and the financing of fuel from the credit. Thesecond, dated October 21, 1988, reduced the threshold for Bank prior review from US$100,000to US$35,000 and made changes in the procurement procedures. Following these measures andthe decision to declare extension activities ineligible for IDA financing in 1989, disbursementsslowed to a triclde during the final 18 months of project execution.

6. Project Results

6.1 General. The human health services and studies, pilot activities and trials componentslargely achieved their objectives. Reporting on project activities was satisfactory. The veterinaryand anima production, infrastructure and technical assistance components of the project wereonly partially satisfactory, while achievements under the crop production component were largelyunsatisfactory.

6.2 Veterinary and Animal Production Services and Infrastructure components. Theimpact of the veterinary and animal production services component of the project was satisfactoryin achieving physical targets. However, in view of the high costs of services provided by BPI,production objectives do not appear to be sustainable. Ihe population of catde in the project areareached 418,000 head in 1990, just short of 420,000 targeted at appraisal. Mortality in bothadults and calves in 1990 was below expected levels (3.5% and 8.5% respectively against 5%and 20% projected). Distribution of hand pumps for tick control and the systematic dewormingof cate herds contributed significantly to this result. However, the recurrence of brucellosis andthe increase of tuberculosis and other diseases for which treatment was not available led to a dropin fertility and birth rates from 68% in 1983 to barely 42% in 1990. Recommendations to reduce

6

the frequency of dipping cattle were introduced following a report by a consultant andconsiderably reduced the csts of thbis form of parasite control.

6.3 The vaccination canpaigns against blacldeg and rinderpest were generally well conducted.Vacciation against blacldeg was assured throughout the second phase project with coverage ofbetween 70%-75% of the catte population aually, except for 1985 and 1986 (67% coveragefor thes two years) due to increases in the price of the vaccine to livestock owners. Rindepestvaccination was carried out between 1985 and 1989 with coverage varying between 62% and76% of the herd, except for 1988 when coverage dropped to 49% due to shortage of vaccinesand the inroduction of payment for these vaccines, which were previously free. In 1985, anoutbreak of foot and mouth disease was quicldy curtailed by vaccination and a further outbreakwas controlled the following year by quarantine and control of herd movements. BPI staff andmanagement were co;mnmended for their rapid action to control this disease. Genetic improvementthrough castration of bulls was 14% above projections by 1990 and some 5,500 unproductivefemales were slaughtered annually during the project period. The program for the sale ofimproved bulls and for public bulling stations was abandoned after 1987, as a measure to controlthe spread of brucellosis.

6.4 Little progress was made on pasture improvements. Problems were encountered inattributingtitles to livestock owner associations (PRODELs) for collectivepastures. Total pastureland for which boundaries were drawn only reached 115,000 hectares or 33% of originalprojections. Pastures for which titles were actually obtained and distributed covered less than7,000 hectares or a mere 2 % of the 350,000 hectares originally envisaged. Administrative delaysand the distance between the regional capital (Kisangani) and the project area were pardy toblame, as was the pressure brought to bear by local influential land and catde owners to slowdown the process of registration. Some progress was made in the establishment of fodderpastures and the distribution of improved fodder grasses. Seed bed nurseries were alsoestablished for eucalyptus, cyprus and sisal trees (for demarcation).

6.5 Extension of animal husbandry and animal health practices was assured by regularmeetings between groups of livestock owners and the veterinary agents employed by thePRODELS. The frequency of meetings fell off after 1988, due to the shortage of recurrent costfunding from government. They were supplemented by rural radio programs designed by theproject and transmitted by the local station. The project monitoring unit estimated the adoptionrate of the three principal animi health messages (blacideg control, worming and tick control)at over 70?',, although the rate of adoption of pasture hygiene and parasite control messages wasconsiderably lower (12%).

6.6 Provision of Extension Srvices and Agricultural Inputs for Fooderop Development.Activities under the crop husbandry component were delayed and started only after the arrivalof an expatriate agronomist in 1984. Activities during the first two years concentrated on theestablishment of adaptive research trials and the establishment of five seed farms. Suitable cropvarietiee were identified and the crop production division of BPI started working with some 30existing farmer associations in 1986. Eight animal traction stations were set up but this numbersoon dwindled to three, with a mere 23 oxen trained during the entire project period and no morethan eight pairs distributed to farmers by 1990. The impact of the crop husbandry componentwas also very limited. Initially, too much emphasis was placed on reaching farmers by the ruralradio broadcast service, which had been relatively successful for the diffusion of livestockmessages, but which was ineffective for small scale farmers, most of whom had no access to aradio. Between 1986 and 1988, only 5 extension staff, supported by 5 cooperative development

7

agents worked with a total of about 800 farmers. In 1988, a joint supervision missionrecommended a significant increase in the number of extension staff with the objective ofcovering 10-15 associations, of about 30 farmers each, per agent. This recommendation receivedlittle follow-up. In 1989, it was proposed that the project mobilize the services of some 40extension agents of the Ministry of Agriculture working under the sub-regional inspectorate and,in conjunction with the National Extension Service (SNV), adopt the modified Training and Visit(l&V) system of extension, which was being applied with success elsewhere in Zaire with thehelp of the IDA financed Pilot Extension Project (Cr. 2096-ZR). Unfortunately, due to alreadyheavy commitments elsewhere in the country, the SNV was unable to mobilize staff to launch theextension program in the project area and the project closed with only about 5,000 farm familieshaving benefitted from intensified extension senrices, compared to the 120,000 projected atappraisal.

6.7 Foodcrop husbandry took second place to livestock production objectives and althoughthe project started with sound intentions (distributing agricultural Inputs and staring local trialsand seed production), the decision to imitate the successful livestock development program bylimiting extension to working with associations seriously impeded progress on this importantcomponent. By the time there was agreement on the reorientation of the extension approach, theproject had become bogged down in financial and procurement difficulties, which led to a markedslowdown in available finding and the decision not to extend the closing date.

6.8 Human Health Services. The project funded a medical dispensary for project staff. Theservice provided urgent medical care, which had a beneficial effect on general morale, even when^unds to pay monthly salaries were delayed from Kinshasa.

6.9 Basic Data Study and NMonltoring and Evaluation. Basic data studies on livestockdiseases were carried out satisfactorily both by external consultants and by the project'smonitoring and evaluation service (SSE). The study to detemine the impact of dipping led tochanges in the recommendations for tick control and to significant economies for livestockowners. SSE failed to collect data on crop production.

6.10 Other Studies, Training, Pilot Activities and Trials. A number of studies werelaunched to establish ways of improving marketing of livestock and crop products but receivedlittle follow-up. The results of a base data study on the rural environment carried out by the cropproduction service was never published. Training activities at the level of field staff wereseriously curtailed in 1985 and 1986 due to lack of Government funding. Higher level projectstaff benefitted from a considerable number of external training visits.

6.11 Selective Maintenance and Rehabilitation of nrastruture. The construction of some33 houses, dispensaries, rural slaughterhouses and stores was completed more than 2 years behindschedule. The contractor encountered financial difficulties during the course of the contract anddelays in transporting materials to the building sites. However, the 33 units were completed tothe satisfaction of project management. No buildings were started for the crop developmentcomponent. This is furher evidence of the lack of priority accorded to this component. Therural roads component, financed separately by the Government, the FAC and the National RuralRoads Service (SNRDA) only completed 277 km out of the 700 km of road maintenanceenvisaged at appraisal, due to irregular fimding and serious degradation of rural roads, whichbecame too badly degraded for labor-intensive maintenance. SNRDA installed about 30 bridgesand culverts, providing access to remote villages and facilitating vaccination coverage.

8

6.12 TechnIcal Assistance. Five posts in the project management unit were filled by FACfinanced technical assistants from the start-up of the second phase. Serious efforts were madeby both the Government and donors to ensure rapid replacement with Zairian nationals and by1985 the posts of Director, chief of the veterinary, construction and mechanical services had beenfilled by nationals. The expatriate crop production specialist was appointed in 1984 and remaineduntil 1989, when the project Director decided not to renew his contract due to poor execution ofthe crop production component. Technical assistance was provided by the CIDA to AC'OOPELIduring 5 years of the project. The early transition from long term foreign technicaf experts tonational experts proceeded satisfactorily and earlier replacement of external expertise in the cropproduction and financial and administrative services could arguably have resulted in betterperformance (ref. section 11 below).

7. Economic Rate of Return

7.1 At appraisal, the overall economic rate of return was estimated at 30%, with an estimated36% for the livestock component and 17% for the agricultural component. In view of thenegligible impact of the foodcrop production component, the estimated rate of return of thiscomponent is clearly negative. Actual costs and estimated benefits of the livestock componentwere both about 15% less than at appraisal. This component has likely generated a positive rateof retmn. While data are insufficient to be able to provide a detailed calculation of the overallrate of return for the project, it is unlikely that it exceeds 12%, in view of the weight of theunproductive expenditures for the crop production component.

8. Sustainability

8.1 At an estimated cost of $163 per annum per livestock owner during projectimplementation, BPI could not provide the services to which local herders had becomeaccustomed without exteral assistance. However, both BPI and ACOOPELI applied costrecovery policies for distribution of inputs and vaccines when counterpart funding was reducedin the late 1980s and continuation of these principles could help the livestock cooperativesthrough the difficult post-project period. Significant changes in the recommendation for tickcontrol and cattle dipping and spraying have reduced costs of disease control to livestock ownersand can be considered as a long term sustainable project benefit.

8.2 With the completion of external financing, BPI will not be able to function at the samelevel as before, especially as conditions for Government funding, already mixed during projectimplementation, have considerably worsened. Thus, the cooperative associations will basicallyhave to survive on their own strength. They were still active at the time of the completionmission, although at a reduced level; their continued existence is uncertain.

9. Performance of Borrower

9.1 With the exception of 1985, the Government did not provide satisfactory counterpartfunding for the project. This represented a permanent source of problems for projectmanagement which resorted to the use of funds from the sale of inputs, originally intended fora credit program (consequently abandoned), to substitute for the insufficient level of Governmentfunding. Occasional interference in the mid-1980s from the then Secretary General in Kinshasa

9

(a former employee of the project) with disciplinary measures taken by the project director,eroded the authority of the director over project personnel.

10. Performance of BPI

10.1 BPI was supposed to be a light-weight management structure. Already in 1983,supervision missions noted a 16% increase in staff over original estmates and recommendationswere made throughout the project to reduce staff. There were still more than 350 staff with theproject when it closed, a reduction from about 500. BPI did exploit the possibilities ofcollaborating with other local institutions but attempts to draw up agreements with the successfullocal tobacco company BAT, with the local diocese (BDD) and with a private cotton company(SOTEXCO) which was diversifying into foodcrops, all came to nothing. However, BPIsucceeded in delegating responsibility for animal health care and extension to ACOOPELI. Themisprocurement of 1988, discovered in 1989, seriously shook confidence of the Ministry andexternal donors in what had nitherto been a relatively successful local management experience.

11. Perfornance of the Bank

11.1 In the early years of the project, the Bank was flexible in its support to the project andagreed to substitute for the Government by agreeing to the use of project funds for recurrent costfunding when countetpart funding fell behind. Supervision missions during the early years ofthe project should have been more assertive about the urgency for mobilizing activities in supportof the crop production component. The Bank reacted swifUy when procurement anomalies wereuncovered in 1989 (para. 6.13). Disbursements were suspended informally for extension-relatedprocurement (para. 6.15) pending the results of the auditors' report on the misprocurement ofgoods and equipment. Subsequent Bank supervision missions focussed primarily on financial andadminisutve maners.

12. Performance of Consultants

12.1 The performance of CIDA consultants in support of ACOOPELI was satisfactory. Theperformance of four of the six long-term experts provided by FAC was also satisfactory.However, the contract of the expatriate financial and administrative director was terminatd in1985 by FAC, due to suspected conflict of interest. During the course of 1985, a Banksupervision mission discovered that the expatriate financial and administrative director hadmisappropriated at least Z 2.4 million (US$67,000 equivalent) in cash and goods. He had furthergiven large advances to some project staff in order I'n enable them to buy some luxury items,which he was importing privately. The external at had identified no anomalies In its reviewof the 1984 accounts and the auditors were subse. ty replaced. The performance of thereplacement financial and administrative director was unsatisfctory and no attempt was made toprolong his two year contract. Supervision missions suggested the use of IDA fiuds for therecruitment of a successor for this key post but the Ministry finally nominated a national.

12.2 Difficulties in recruiting suitably qualified and motivated exnal candidates to work inremote areas in Zaire have frequently led to less than satisfactory performance by incumbents.The experience of the Ituri project in this respect coincided with similar experiences in other

10

projects during the 1980s (see Project Completion Report for the Eastern Kasai Maize Project(Cr. 1040-ZR).

13. Project Relationship

13.1 Good relations were maitained throughout the prOject between the cofinanciers andGoverment. Supervision missions were generally joindy organized and local representatives ofCIDA and FAC frequendy sent representatives to participate in field supervision. There werefrank exchanges of views on the sometimes thorny problems created by under performance ofexterna consultants f-nded from bilateral sources.

14. ProJect Documentation and Data

14.1 The project provided work programs and regular progress reports and prepared acompletion report in conformity with the Development Credit Agreement.

11

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

ZARE

NORTHEAST RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECr(CR. 1325-ZR)

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECT 11

INRMODUCTION

The Project for Rural Development of Northeastem Zaire, initially entited 'the IturiProject Office' (BPI-Bureau du Projet Ituri), is part of the General Program to RevitalizeAgricultural and Stockbreeding Activities in Zaire.

The site of the project is Bunia, which is located in the Ituri subregion of Upper Zaire.Ituri has a population of 1,800,000, the peasant strata of which include an estimated 18,380stockbreeders and 8,600 farmers. 2/

Identified by a World Bank (IDA) mission in 1974 in collaboration with the Ministry ofAgriculture and Rural Development, the project was set up under Cr. 697-ZR, in the amount ofUS$8.0 million. This initial stage was followed in 1983 by a second, Cr. 1325-ZR, signed onFebruary 15, 1983, in the amount of SDR 12.3 million, i.e. US$13.0 million.

Ihe following additional bilateral aid was granted by friendly countries to complete thefunding arrangements:

- the Republic of France (FAC) 20,000,000 in FF- CANADA (CIDA) 10,000,000 in C$

Countepart funding in the amount of US$3,250,000 was to be provided by the ZairianGoverment

The possibility of a third stage, based primariy on the farm production component, wascontemplated by the next to last IDA supervision mission in May 1990. Unforunely, theoverall situation of the country, the position adopted by IDA in regard to project financing andthe new 'service' approach espoused by the Ministry were such that the chances of having a thirdstage covered by the initial agreement no longer exist.

The Bank's proposal to restart the project's agriculture component by means of the PilotExtension Project (Cr. 2096-ZR), however, deserves to be encouraged. The stockraising

e

1/ Comments received from the Minisatry of Agricultre and Rural Development.

2/ Editor's Note: The comments mentioned only 8,600 farmers, whereas the SAR andBank supervision missions use an estimate of 300?000 farm families.

12

coMPonent will continue to be part of the Priority Public Investment Program (PIP) in order topreserve progress made thus far.

REVIEW OF THE OBJECTIVES:

The project's original objeives were:

o to increase the production of meat and food crops;

o to strengthen the institutions engaged in agricultural and stockbreeding development; and

o to improve the marketing process by organizing stockbreeders and farmers.

Accordingly, the aim was to improve the peasants' living standards and to help ease thebalance-of-payments situation by reducing imports of food products, in parficular meat.

To accomplish these objectives, the project had scheduled the following priorityobjectives:

i. rehabilitation of production and animl health services, management of thezoosanitary infratructure and the provision of veternary iputs;

ii. agricultural extension services;

iii. improvement of human health care services;

iv. conduct of studies necessary to promote agricultural and stockraisingdevelopment;

V. limited assistance for fishery and the marketing of farm products;

vi. strengthening of the Project Management Office and the Association of LivestockProducer Cooperatives in Itari (ACOOPELI); and

vii. upgrading of the requisite infrastructure for agricultura and rural development,particularly abandoned farm roads and bridges.

ORGANIZATION OF TIBE PROJECT

The project was placed under the supervision of the Mistry of Agricultre and RuralDevelopment, with technical oversight by the Directorate for the General Administration ofProjects (DAGP). It includi eight sevices, a liaison office based in Kinshasa and a field unitat Kisangani. Its director was assisted by a technical deputy and an administrative and financialdeputy. In addition to the Zairian staff, the project received counseling from foreign technicaladvisors in the areas of finance, animal husbandry and food crops.

13

PROJECT EXECTION PERFORMANCE

a. Physical Execution

By and large, the project results were satisfactory. In the animal health category, 80%of the target goals were atained, and in stockbreeding 102%; but in plant production only 18%of the r,jectives were accomplished. Moreover, 127 Associations of Livestock Producers wereset up, whereas only 110 had been scheduled. The project succeeded in completing 60% of theanimal husbandry program for stockralsers and 4% of the training for farmers, while 40% of therural cuction program was executed. The efforts deployed in the area of geneticImprovement warrant continuation.

Under the heading of marketing, a strong upturn was noted in fntional meat markets,along with an increased number of catde sales, despite the poor condition of the roads and thelack of facilities for transporttion to the consumption centers with the greatest market potential.

A fairly Impressive number of studies were conducted in the project, but not all of themwere intelligendy utilized or properly distributed. It should be noted that the project has not yetcompleted enough surveys to establish specific criteria for monitoring and performanceevaluation.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is not satisfied with the results ofthe agriculture component. Despite numerous supervisory missions organized by the Bank, thiscomponent did not receive special attention, either by the donors or by project staff, although itsstart-up was planned from the time the project was launched. The lack of action in this respectexplains most of the poor results achieved in this component.

Tne Ministry is very hopeful that future supervision missions from the World Bank willmake it possible to detect any weaknesses in the project in ime to take the requisite correctivemeasures instead of allowing the situation to worsen and terminaing the project precipitously.Hence the need for punctilious preparation of these missions, ensuring an adequate sojourn andmaldng greater use of the Ministry's services responsible for monitoring and evaluation.

b. FNnanial Execution

T*he project funds were used in the following manner:

* the IDA credit was used to defray the expenses of the works, supplies and services;

o most of the Canadian assistance was utilized to strengthen the institutional capabilities ofthe Association of Ituri Stockbreeders' Cooperatives (ACOOPELI). Canada's grant thusmade it possible to purchase veterinarian supplies for the Ituri cattlemen. Canada alsofinanced the rehabilitation of the Bunia industrial slaughterhouse;

* the French grant covered the fees of experts assigned to the project; and

* the funds provided by the Government of Zaire defrayed 20% of the project's operatingexpenses.

14

lbe shares contributed by the parties participatig in the project as of April 30, 1991were distributed as follows:

IIDA 87.20%

PAC 4.23%

Goverament 8.67%

lbe foregoiag percentage calculations do not include the expenses covered by theCanadian and French thnical assistance, for which no data are avaRable.

A number of irregularities should be pointed out in the procurement procedures for itemspurchased with the MIA credit, which were particulaly flagrant In the 1988 procurement. Itshould nevertheless be noted here that the procurement tainted by such misconduct had obtainedthe Bank's approval (in the form of its stement of no obecion) and the transactions took placein the presence of the international financial advisor. In addition, quite a number of companiescollected some US$3.0 million after having obtained thg stement of no objecton from the Bankto supply articles, which to this day have not yet been delivered. The Ministry of Agricultureand Rural Development therefore declines all responsibility for these irregulatities. I/

Given the progress made by the project thus far, it is strongly recommended ta waysand means be found to permit the safeguard and perpetuate its achievements.

Lastly, we should point out that most of the budget earmarked for the agriculturecomponent was utilized by the stockbreeding component in the course of project execution.

PERFORMANCE OF THIE ZAIRUIN GOVERNMET

Despite the finanial constraints imposed by macroeconomic difficulties, the Ministry ofAgriculture and Rural Development bas always accorded priority to the completion of thisproject.

For purposes of smooth execution of the project, DAGP has organized training seminarson the monitoring and management of projects to enhance the managerial skills of thoseresponsible.

At the same time, it should be noted that public adminitration very often fails to applydisciplinary measures governing civil servants either speedily or in a timely fashion. As a casein point, entry of the instances of mismanagement observed in the project chief has not yet beencompleted in the files of the responsible govemment offices.

a/ Editor's Note: In this instance, project staff deliberately circumvented Bank guide-lines. A substantial amount of goods was delivered to the project site and discussionsbetween Bank and project staff on their appropriate disposal were initiated by theBank, without result. The fate of these goods, following the political disturbance in1992 and 1993, is unknown (see also pam. 5.6, Part 1).

15

PERFORMANCE OF THE ITWRI PROJECT OMICE

Ibe BPI has helped to imprve animal health and to increase the total number of cattein the national herd.

The training program for project agents bas been completed to the satisfaction of thepro laers.

Ite project has also succeeded In regrouping the sockbreeders in coopeativeassociations, PRODELs, and this will facflitate the tafer of knowledge and skills.

On the whole, the project was satisfactorily executed, notwlthstanding the anomalies notedin connection with the procurement procedures.

THE BANK'S PERFORMANCE

The World Bank has fully honored its financial commitments, but certain weaknesseswere evident in the areas of project supervision and monitoring.

Despite the mnmerous supvisory missions, such visits failed to detect the irregularitiesobserved in the procurement procedures in time, and even consented to these practices (by notobjecting to the purchases in question).

In any case, particular mention should be made of the efforts expended by theAgricultura Country Officer attached to the World Bank Resident Mission at Kinshasa.

CONSULTANTS' PERFORMANCE

The consultants assigned to the stockbreeding and animal health sector performed theirproject tasks satisfactorily.

In the agricultural sector, weakness were evident in execution of the tasks entrusted tothe interaatk'nal adviser in the field.

The share of responsibility borne by the intrnational financial adviser in themismanagement observed in connection with procurement should be singled out particularly.

In general, the Zairian side should take timely steps to ensure a mechanism forprogressive replacement of foreign experts by local teams who have been trained and providedwith the necessary experience for that purpose. This would avoid the or -asional gaps resultingfrom the difficulty in recruiting qualified foreign advisers.

PROJECr RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTInTONS

Throughout the project execution period, relations between the BPI and other institutions-such as the veterinarian laboratories at Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, and the regional and sub-regional inspection conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development-have notbeen easy.

16

lbe same Is true of relations between the donors involved in the projet: nmely, theWorld Bank, CIDA, FAC and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

CONCLUSION

On the whole, the project was well executed. A substantial share of the target objectivesin the stockbreeding compone were accomplished. The results In the agricultural component,on the other hand, were disappointing. It is therefore recommended that the Ministry ofAgriculture and Rural Development mobilize the necessary resources to consolidate the project'sachievements in the field of stockbreeding. The Government's priorities in this area should focuson rehabilitating the airplane landing strip, remodeling the slaughterhouse and strengthening theanimal health protection buffer zone to prevent the spread of diseases from neighboring countries.

Personnel Training and Management: suitable measures should be envisaged to heightenthe efficiency of this component.

Monitoring and Evaluation: the DAGP is invited to set up an effective system ofmonitoring and evaluation and a suitable data management procedure.

Procurement Procedures and Management: in the future, the project directorate shouldadhere stricdy to the directives set forth in the Development Credit Agreement and the accountingprocedures. The Bank should shoulder its responsibility in this respect when it has alreadyassented to the procurement.

The Government of Zaire is properly appreciative of the assistance received from theWorld Bank and other donors of funds involved in the financing of this project.

17

PROJECT COMPWIMON REPORT

ZAIRE

NORTHEAST RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CR. 1325-ZR)

PART II: STATISLJICAL INFORMATION

Table 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits

Title Purpoe -Approved status

Coton Rehabilitation Project Improvement of cowton produeton. 09/21/76 Closed on(Cr. 0660-ZR) 12/31183

Livesock Dewvlopnut Project Livestock improveaent. 04/12/77 Closed on(Cr. 0697-ZR) 06183

Oil Palm Project Oil palm production project 05/02/78 Closed on(Cr. 0796-ZR) 12131/87

Snuabolder Maie Project Promote main production in the 06105180 Closed on(Cr. 1040-ZR) Kasai-OrWentalregion. 06/30/90

Kwilu-Ngongo Sugar Project Suga production project. 12/23/80 Cloed on(Cr. 1089-ZR) 12/31187

Agriulturwal Technical Asistance Instiuion building and progrm 05/11/82 Closed on(Cr. 1244-ZR) imp _monwion strengtbeoing. 06/307

Lulua Agricultural Development Project Fodcrop production ptoject. 0O1s1 Closed on(Cr. 1540-ZR) 06130/92

Agiculture Sector Management and Follow-up technical assistance 10/20/88 On-goinglntutional Dovelopment Project project.(Cr. 1958sZR)

Pilot Extension Poject Support to thedevelopment of 08/20/91 On-going(Cr. 2096-ZR) sustainable agricultutal extnsion

services.

[~~~~~~~~~~ '-

|~~~~~ -

19

Table 3. Disbursements

A. Estimated and Actual IDA Credit Disbursements(US$ '000)

MA Fisnd Apisal Eata A.- Act Cumladvi lYoar a ss % of Esimad

A=nua Cumlaive AJnu Cmulativo CurISaZvDisbusmnents Disbursemenft Disburmnents Disbursement Disbursomens l

1983 900 900 0 0 0

1924 900 1Q0 1,230 1,230 68

1985 1,200 3,000 1,290 2,520 84

1986 2,000 5,000 1,010 3,530 71

1987 3,000 8,000 1,890 5,420 68

1988 2,300 10,300 3,320 8,740 8S

1989 1,200 11,500 2,520 11,2M0 98

1990 1,000 12,500 230 11,490 92

1991 500 13,000 319 11,809 91

1992 0 13,000 0 11,809 91

Cancellation ~,~- _ _ _2,660

20

Table 3. Disbursements

B. Estimated and Achal Disbursements by Category(SDR '0W)

Category Est nate _Actua Actual as X ofEstimate

SDR '000 US$ 000 am SDR 000 USS '000 ( In US terms)

1. Civil Works(a) by force account 323 390(b) under contract 799 968

To be To be2. Equipment. Natertats and Vehicles allocated allocated 6,410 7,764 93

l _______________________________________ pursuant to pursuant to ltnAe Aimual the Arnnua

3. Consultants' Services, Fetlouships Work Prograt Work Programand Study Tours 996 1,206

4. Operating Costs(incremental expenditures) t80 1,066

S. Refunding of Project Preparation Advance 760 800 342 414 52

6. Unallocated (to be allocated to Categories 11,540 .12,200 . .(1) through (4) pursuant to the AnnuatWork Program)

Total t2 300 13.000 9783 31 11 809 91Cancellation 2.517 2.660

Two amendments were made in the credit agreement. The first, dated July 11, 1986,concerned the establishment of a revolving fund in the amount of US$340,000 at acommercial bank and the financing of fuel from the credit. Category (2) was relabelled*(2) Equipment, Materials, Vehicles and Fuel." The second, dated October 21, 1988,concerned the procurement procedures defined in Schedule 3. This amendment alsoreduced the threshold for Bank prior review from US$100,000 to US$35,000.

1/ Disbursements in US$ were estimated using the average exchange rate duringimplementation.

ZI Totals do not add up due to balance adjustments.

21

Table 4. Project Costs and Financing

A. Project Costs(JS$ million)

Appraisal Estimae Actual a Atua a& % of

LUveack Development 9.1 10.4 114%

Agricultural Development 8.7 2.6 30%

Human Heath 1.1 0.2 18%

Plot Activities, Research 1.4 0.9 64%

Cal ProjctManagemnat and 9.9 10.0 101%Support Secvie

Total 30.2 24.1 80%

B. Project Financing(US$ million)

Appraisal Actual Actual as %Estimate of Estimate

Government of Zaire 3.2 1.5 50%

CIDA 10.0 8.5 85% I/

FAC 3.0 2.3 77% 3/

ACOOPELI 1.0 n.a.

IDA 13.0 11.8 91%

Total 30.2 24.1 80%

a' Technical assistance costs have been estimated for individual components given theabsence of details from bilateral cofinanciers.

Discrepancies, to a large extent, are due to exchange rate fluctuations.

22

Table S. Imlementation Indicators

A. Project Beneficiaries

Befticarlu Ap,r aial ma Ac_ual Acu aa % of Estimat

I3vestock Pducots 23,000 23,000 100

Ctop Pducs 120,OQ 5,00 4

B. Animal Iealth

ivso Com_ without Project Appl Target A .U .(reus of

Cr. 0697-ZR)

|(I Tment with polyvant aent 87% 90% n.a.

(ii) aluegactiato 73% n.a. 72%

(lii) Bncllosb vacclatoms 33% 80% n.a.

23

Table S. Implementation bidicators

C. Global Results by Activity

I ._..... ._, -:- r,-1* g_- 1.- - - 1590- ....

19g4 1983 19a" M1? 18 1990

* N,hWta ck obd) 34434 374.21S 383999 400460 409-33 413S204 416.187 418,097 420.000* TVWPmdutlp{vf*(%) 14.1 10.7 9.S 143 9.90 11.93 10.S3 1I.39 16

. OU"waDg(%) 8.1 62 6.8 10.9 9.00 10.29 10.29 10.9) 16* e& a (S) 6.0 4.S 3.0 3.6 0.90 1.44 0.24 0.46 0

* MVrf o(%I * ca (S) to 1.3 16 213 23.46 1234 12.34 8.30 20

.aub (S) 3 S 3 3.6 2,79 S.26 324 3.46 3* Payw "a(%) 6S 64.9 M s33 49.30 SS.77 S3.77 42.50 62* Avrwu e woftyamdu(s Ow) 200 226 203 207 193.82 193.64 225

2.1 bmmem_of* C*M3mnothlWb ud o GlS, S 6 3 23,229 22.179 22.272 22,S54 21.30 24.334 27,496 24000* cams9 Ec1 O4m S,070 2.00 3.760 5.343 3.439 6.6 7.24S 6,3S6* 93b f &(Vftw f 93 46 4 . .*O1suOumof1mpt.wdockd) a5 4 12 17 10 9 . 30 .*dwCmn s . . 6 4 10

*C2.U2 uibw(F P e eps,m 123 148 192 245 30 28 328 32B28* C _xwMnla44v faMw;du A(b) 4132 4,089 67.273 S9.113 105.340 11S.018 115.018 115.018 350.000* Cumabtiwsgau dUIIuUdJIUSUI 0 0 1,213.4 1,213.4 1,213.4 1213.46 2,7.40 6,947.40 350M0O0

*d adoaotbeu, m. ... 41 234 402 187- ibu ef wpiua.. 46.976 29.432 2 652,420

'Dbb%t*Imoftfddw -t-qcw f dPnh * . . 45,96t 83.333 76.579 111.036 124.000

. a d - . . 1.000 S50 S00 326 11S 1t0

dmodum . . 1IU Ls 5s.0 364. 13 17

m. MORMN f O c_M96S.l- -d -- - -

*X n_dketawdw4aP 143 232 243 282 392 460 487 M8. Numbstotmlmal,pu.mAld Quad 12,145 12.013 13.039 15,483 16,121 23.249 24.442 19.93i Ave ptc p. klcg of llw bt (Z) 10.72 13.44 20.50 22.76 M.0 9 170 318.90* N _uabs t *(=buak Wu Qa.4) 8.8 10.216 10.640 1u.000 13.ff 17.699 17,180 17.419*• Aw W ( . . .g14 25Ml7 236 262 261

3.2 Skmbkb• fm "b 04 S1,936 11.322 12.015 9.160 11.835 13.497 11,904 11,943* l (ead) . 1,079 1.202 1.469 1.54 1.429 1.663

3.3 RX00*4ootrs VW* Nd-lw (bua 2,834 4.,52 5,264 3.707 7,474 4.903 7.506 3.398* Krmn d) 47D0 149 1422 S3" 1.054 657 9n 1,144* U1M (boo 1,ll 1,390 1.102 732 1S30 1,678 2,02N 1,476

3.4 ExltW= - M307 233 47.2 29.59 20.19 23.70 3.94 43.90• Kbmbftu (tano 307 3S 47.2 2.34 8.56 13.07 2.24 33.32* KbuPW (t=) . . 27.25 11.63 10.64 1.70 10.s8

IS5 P~dMZ ormmiWwwmwitbon*(=ir*) 40 43 so 35 193 350 2.000 3.000

*bowl= _ 1W _(z ) 45 30 60 a5 22 400 1.000 3.500

IV. imm 3tudis I~~~ I I 2 1

am _=_

24

Table 5. Implemention Indicaton

D. Agricultural Input Distribution

Unit Appraisal Actual_ _ _ Estmate

Hoes number 150,000 n.a.

Machstes number 90,000 na.

Sicldes mnmber 30,000 n.a.

Punmig Tools number 1,600 La.

Coffee Pulpers number 100 na.

Seed Producdon I/

Maize t/year 60 na.

Beans t/year 150 n.a.

Paddy t/year 1S n.a.

Groundmuts t/year 60 n.a.

E. .is.

CMQD Yields - Unit Without With ProjectProject Appraisal Actual

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Estimate

Maize kg/ha 1,000 1,350 n.a.

Beam kg/ha 600 700 n.a.

Paddy kg/ha 1,000 1,300 Ln.a.

| Groundunts _ kg/ha 8M0 1,000 n.a.

SI Note: Production level at year 4 and later.

25

Table 5. Implementation Indicators

F. Infrastructure

Apprs E,ti Actual Acual as a % of_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~Estia te

Road Rehabilitaton (Oun) 700 277 40

Bridge. (number) _.a. 18

Dipping tanks (number) n.a. 1.a.

Rehabllion __

Barn a.a. 2

Spray Race 100 0 0

Dipping Coral a.a. 5

Cale Scales 7 10 143

Senior Staff Housing n.a. 2

Quaranti Stations 7 1 14

Cate Sheds n.a. I

Fuel Stions .a. I _

NwQG2I

Rural slaughterhouses, 33 33 100dispensaries houses

26

Table 6. Status of Covenant

3.01 (a) (i) The Bonowr sall cany out the Project, thuough Its dqe t onsible for lIfeuently complied with. RNeularaiWtre, wi duo diligence and eftficncy and In conformity wih appropria days In countpar fuding.financial, adminItative, technical and agrcultual practces, and shall provide,ptomptly as neede, te fuvs (Including foign exchange), faliie, sevics, ad ohrresourese quired for the purpose; and (U) for purposes of the provision of funds toBreau du Projet tur ( .PI), the Borower shall make ls contribudon the budget ofDPt In quadrely inallments to be made no later than the last day of the s month ofeach calendar quart , unless the Asociaon shall otherwis a .

(b) (i) Borroe shall nsue t PI bhas overall rponsibty for execoan of th Complied withProjec and dat SPR shall be organized edhall opere as provided In Sectio 3.01 (c)of the 1977 Credit Agrent; and (U) without limitation to the toregoiag the Borroweral mainin ia operdon the compnatIon plan establshed for BPI staff undr dtItud ivetock Development Ptoject to offer adequate wok ineves to such sff.

(a) The Borowr shall, untl the completion of the Project, mainta the Project Policy Not complied with. Ibe Commiteand Coordinatiag Commitee, wbichb shll be organized and shall operat as provided in never met.Section 3.01 (d) of the 1977 Credkt Agreement.

(d) The Borrow all maint in ludr, unti compledon of the Project, the Regional Complied withConsultative Commtte which shall be organzed and shall operae as provided InSection 3.01 (a) of the 1977 Credi Agreement and which shall indude a repstativeof the Association of Livesock Producer Cooperaive (ACOOPELI).

3.02 In order to assist the Borrow in carying out Pam D and B of the Project, the Complied withiBorower shall, as and when needed, employ consultnts whose qualificatin,experience and tms and conditions of employmen sh be satisfacry to theAssoon, such consultants to be seected 'n accordance with principlas andprocedurem sauttory to the Assoclation on the basis of the *Gudeline for the Use ofConsulant by World Bank Borow and by the World Bank as Executing Agencypublihed by the Bank in August 1981.

3.03 (b) The Borwer sll cause aU goods and services financed out of the proceeds of the Not always complied with.Credit to be used exlusively for the purposes of the Projea.

3.04 (b) Th Borrw: O() shall main records and procedure adequate to record and Complied witbmonitor the progrems of the Project (ncluding is cat and the benefts to be derivedfrom it), to etify the goods and srvices financed out of the proceds of the Credit,ed to disdose their use in the Project; (ii) sball amble the Associtio's resntativesto visit the faciities and consuction sites included in the Ptoject and to examin thegoods fhianced out of the proceeds of the Ctedit and any rdevant records anddocuments; and (Mi) shall furnih to the Asociation at regular inteals all schinformatin as t4s Asciation all reasonably request concning the Ptoject, its costand, where a,propriat, the beneflts to be derived from it, tbe expendtre of theproceeds of the Credit and the goods and services raned out of uch proceeds.

(d) No later than December 31, 1983, or such inter dat as may be agreed for this Complied withpus between the Borrower and the Associ'aton, the Bomrwer shall prepare andfurnish to the Association a repor, of such scope and in sch deil as the Asoiaionall rasonably request, on the execution and iniial opeation of the Itui Livestock

Development Project, its cost and the benefits derived and to be derived from it, theperformance by the Borro and the Association of their respective obligaons underthe 1977 Credit Agrment and the accomplishment of the purposm of the Credit No.0697-ZR.

(c) The Bo mer shall pcp and fmrnish to the Assocition: (i) no laterth Complied withDecember 31, 1986, an Interim report; and (ii) promptly after completion of the Project,but in any event not lat than six mt aftr the aosing Date or such lakr date asmay be agreed for this purps between the Borrower and the Association, a completion

27

3.6 The Boower sball, by September 31, 1983, (of su" other at -t AssocItiony Complid with but ner exeuteda ), ter ino an agrmet wthb th Brtih Aalmcn Tobacco Co>may (DBA)wbhein shall be def4ed, for prpos of Pasn B of the Project thetearm of thecoeperatIon bewn U ad RTad the goods finaned out of th proees of theCredit to be mado avalale r, RAT for tobacco growig faIr of the Ptoject Aasuh grmentsall be saftor the Assaton.

3.07 (a) The Bonower hal, no later Sptember 30, 1983. (or such other date a tho CpUiled witbAssociatIon m agre): (O open a alon behalf of RP! in a bank

cable to the Asswi lut whicb shall be doposited all poceeds fo the ril toACOOPEU and the Assocan of Livock Ptodces (PRODEL) of verinmyproduct and agiulura inputB undr Pat A and B of th Project ad (II) eaish aceihte_ comprsi of the acowAuni and fianeo mAner and ano ta_ membeof PI and the predont (ot bhi teprsentative) and tbe manag t epecialist ofACOOP3UL it being pecifled dt said commte hall review credit applIcatio madeto BPIn acodane with cre aeptable to the Associton.

(b) Ecept as the Aociation shall otherwi agree, the Bormwer shall cure tat Not compled wth. Cedit schemeproeed dqepsd In the c are used exclusively for the opeaton of the droppedpio cri seme uder Part B of the Ptoject

(c) Bdor any withdrawl made fiom the ooDt =&W the Bonower shall fnih Not complied with (we 3.07 (b)to the Association for its approval credit applictons which hflill the critr referd to abovo)in pagraph (a) (iiM of this Section.

3.08 e Baorrowr shall: (a) (i) by July 31 of each year. prepr and subit to the Compld witAssociatio for it eview and comment the Anua Wotk Progrm of UN for the nextcaledr yewr toeth wkb the budget proposl peaiing thero (sch progm andbudget to be prepaed according to the provisions et out in Schedule 4 hreto, an sucScdule may be amended from tim to time by agreem bewe the Borower endthe Association); and (U) by October 31 of sid yea, prepae end submit to the

ssociatin for Its approval the fina veio of said work progam and budget; and (b)to that and, secur ACOOPELI' astne

3.09 Unless the Asockiton se otherie agree, the Borowe shall: Complid with paly. Subsidiswee reduced lm tn eeted

(a) Enue tat _s in the Project Ar of: (i) all equipment and implements tofoodcop fa, (i) al equipment ad impm to liveawk producer under dwanimal diea control program, ad (Ill al inputs to industral crop fames, sll bemade at prics sicnt to at leas reco at all tim th full cos thereof; ad

O) Ovwr a five-yearpid sardg June 30, 193, tk all mer satsfay to theAsociation to easure that, by the ad of such period, Sles in the Projc Area of a1lopur to foodorop farms and livestocproducets under de animal dise controlprogram (in addion, to thos refetred to In pgapb (a) (i) and (O) above) shl bemade at prices sufiiet to at s recover at all times the full cost herf; k being

Wecifled thau, in ordet to achieve such objoeve, the Borower dshll ensure tt theraio betwe the cost of acb input and th price ally paid for it be reduced eachyewr by at lea one-fifth over its initial lvel.

28

4.01 (a) The BorrowershaI maintain or cau to be maintained separ accounts, adequt Compiled withto rec In acordae with conadny maiaied eppropriato acountig pratc theopation, reourc and expendtu, in respect of th Projea, of to depqatmes oragencies of tb Borrower respoble for canying out the Project of any pa thereof.

(b) Wiout limitation to the foregoing, the Borrower sbal: (i) through PI min-an or Comnplied withcause to be maiSntid sea accounat reflectig eli expenditur on acount of whichwithdrawals ar requtd from the Credit Account under Caegories (1) and (4) of thetable set out in parasph 1 of Schedule 1 hemo On the basis of aments ofexpenditure; (ii) through BPI retain. unti one yer afe the Closing Date, all records(contaucts, orders. invoices, bWi, receipts and other documets) evideing theexpenditures on aecount of which withdrawals ae equested from the Credit Account onthe basis of ' aements of expendre; and (iii) enable te Aocation's teprcsativesto examine Ucb records.

(a) 'Me Boarower all: (i) have the accounts referred to in paagaph (a) of this Complied withSection for each fisal year audited, in accordance with appropriato auditing principlesconsiAnty applied, by independent auditors acceptable to the Association; (ii) furnishto the Asotin, as soon as available, but in any case not ater than six months aflerthe end of each such year, a certfied copy of the teport of such audit by such audto,of such scope and in such detail as the Associatioon hall have reasnably requested,including wivout litnitation to the toregoing, a separate opinion by said auditors inrespect of the eendiues and records refetred to in paragph (b) of this Secio as towhether the proceods of the Credit withdrawn from the Credit Account on te basis ofstements of expenditure have been used for the purpose for which they wve ptovided;and (iii) furnish to the Association such other iormation concerning said accounts,records and expenditures and the audit thereof as the Association shall from time to timerasnably request.

4.02 Tbe Borrower shall

(a) Make arrangements satisfactory to the Association for the transfer of management Transfer completedresposibill:y for the Bunia gkg from the National Livesock Bureau (ONDE) to theCooperaive Union of Livestock Ptoducers Associations (ACOOPEL); and

(b) Eansre that ACOOPELI at all times manage the Bunia abeko on a commercW Complied withbasis with experieaced and qualified personne in accordance with appropriat financialand adminiaive practices.

4.03 The Borrower shal: (i) implementits policy, as described in Ar No. 018/81, and Partially complied with. Thee wasNo. 110, dated June 1, 1981, and May 29. 1982, respectively, on the liberalization of little review with IMA of the impactprices for agricultual and agro-indusral products; (ii) review, onCe a year, the impact of tho prie liberaliaon measuresof such policy on the output of such products In the Project Ar; and (ii3) exchngviws with the Association on sucb impact, promptly upon the completion of suchreview.

4.04 (a) The Borrower shall cause the buildings, infastaucture and equipment included in the Complied withProject to be adequatly maintained and cause aU necessar renewals and repais therofto be made promptly as required, all in accordance with apprtptiste agricultal andmanagement practices, and shal provide or cause to be provided, promptly as needed,the funds, facilities, services and other resources required for this purpose.

(b) Wtthout limitation to paragraph (a) of thi Section the Borrower sball ensure that(i) during the execution of the Project BPI adequatly maintain the roads and bridge Partially complied with. Indequatrehabilitated under Part F of the Project, and (i) following completion of the Project, funds available for maienancACOOPEUI aequately maintain said woads and bridges and carry out all necesaryrepairs and renewals thereof, alU it; acordance with approptiate engineering pacices.For purposes of this paragraph, the Borrower shall make available, initially to BPI, endsbsquently to ACOOPELI, the ncessary funds, facilities, equipnent and services.

I-q

E~~~ q.

E t1~~~~~~~~0

]w}l~~~~' . qS~~~~~~~0 E '

, Sb __ __ _~*

R v __ _ _ d~~

:~~~~0 @1VI_

Table 7. Use of Bank Resources

B. Mission Data

8PaVlo Dat Days in Phid Kv fat Speci - dwRqputcd PT_ of?p abkdMiso. __ _ _ Past __ __ 2'g! 1

1 033 11 2 ApiasbglUcowmtLvatockSpedais

2 01/84 21 1 ApioUIfmcoamls 2 FpA

3 t214 12 2 Agd_u_ Economist I

4 06J85 10 2 ASdOhml 2 F

5 ti/85 7 2 Ala _ 2 FM

6 11/186 n.. 3 A _ t F0s..

LIV*d pk SpIist W- ~~~~~~ o

7 tin? S SFluaAisyst I F

8 03188 7 1 FlWhA=ty I P

9 03/89 8 3 FwiulAm Ayt (2) 2 PA,P_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A Sronofist _ __I_A S_ __s_ _

10 12W9 8 2 Fmsn hAmlya 3 F.,P

it 07/90 4 2 FinJl hAnti 3 F.M.?

6 1 =problem-free or minor problms; 2=moderate problems; 3=major problems.

7/ F=Financial; M=Management; T=Technical; P=Procurement.

4IRD 1623"

ZA I R ENORTHEAST RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

EXISTING AND PROPOSED ACTVTIES SUDAN . -"

f r, '-h, b. O.a t

A,,|9g, (RlFDr. r1 t F", N

- d,,, A A"-

0 4~~~~~~~~~~~~~IQ

- &oq, *,, BVJ.A,,.

O Z o4 0o- e--ql Bo,d,.,,. ,.t*1

-. - ... r11b0 e; Ado Hh>'es

-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

~~~~~~~~~~~~~'1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1

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MAY19IM

I/ 16240

C E N RA L A F R I C A N E P U B L WO

/ 9 ,.6 * A---A_ >' ZAIRE

V S U D A N ~~~NORTHEAST*oKem g Adomo t~> ~ ~~ , RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

THE PROJECT AREA

_^ - s B A S"E (7 f tl v z v k ir r IHt G,AtAMti IL / Mo- Co-smng CentersN +_ _&7 < vy@- ; 8 / ( ' PAtf '' -Rds of G.neol toI.nce

Rand, of Local In,o..

Di|-.i A D A opor

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~sir Mogb / Sob -- og _o Eoood a snG0a ' igt

11 77 . = )A4K{lOMETeRSO 20 40 m,tis0 t00 IL000460O00

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