Doiunlt of

The World Bank

FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY

RepqotN 12550

PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT

INDIA

CENTRAL POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT(LOAN 2283-IN)

NOVEMBER 22. 1993

MICROGRAPHICS

Report No: 12550Type: PCR

Energy Operations DivisionCountry Department II (India)South Asia Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwbe be disclosed without World Oank authorization.

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COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Currency Unit = Rupee (Rs.)Rs, 1 Paise 100

Runee (Rs.)/USS Exchance Rates and CPI (Yearly Averages)

Consumer Price IndexFiscal Year Runees/USS FY80/81=100

FY83 'Projectappraisal &approval) 10.10 /I

FY84 11.36FY85 12.37 133.3FY86 12.61 141.2FY87 12.96 148.0FY88 13.92 163.2PY89 16.23 176.3FY90 17.50 190.6FY91 22.74 216.3FY92 26.20 237.0 (estimate)

/a Conversions in the Staff Appraisal Reportwere made at Rs 9.5/US$.

Government of India andNational Thermal Power CorporationFiscal Year: April 1 - March 31

neasures and gouivalents

I ToO (t) = 1 metric ton-l,000 kg.=2,200 lbs.1 Kilovolt (kV) = 1,000 volts (V)1 Kilovolt ampere (JcA) - 1,000 volt-amperes (VA)1 Kilowatt-hour (kVh) * 1,000 watt-hours1 Megawatt-hour (MWh) * 1,000 kilowatt-hours1 Gigadatt-hour (GWh) 5 1,000,000 kilowatt-hours

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CEA Central Electricity AuthorityDESU Delhi Electric Supply UndertakingGOI Government of IndiaIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction & DevelopmentIDA International Development AssociationMOU Memoranda of UnderstandingNHPC National Hydroelectric Power CorporationNPTC National Power Transmission CorporationNT2C National Thermal Power CorporationPOWERMRID Power Grid Corporation of IndiaROR Rate of ReturnSEBs State Electricity Boards

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washngto D.C. 20433U.SA

Office of Director-Gue:alOperations Evaluatton

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ANP THE PRESIDENT

December 10, 1993

SUBJECTs ProJect Completion Report on IndiaCentral Power Transmission Proiect (Loan 2283-IN)

Attached in the 'Project Completion Report on India - Central PowerTransmission Project (Loan 2283-IN)" prepared by the South Asia Region. Part 1I-as provided by the Borrower.

The US$250.7 million loan iacreased the capacity of the transmissiongrid feeding power from the National Thermal Power Company (NTPC) to the regionalpower companies. The Bank approved a revision in the project scope which waafully justified under the original project objectives. Almost half of the losnamount was canceled (US$119.2 million) partly because of foreign currencysavings. There were three extensions and the project was not fully completed atloan closing.

All the project objectives were substantially obtained albeit withsubstantial delays. The re-estimated economic rate of return is 112 (notdirectly comparable with the initial figure because of the change in scope). NIPCmaintained its good financial health but its performance in bill collection hasprompted the Bank to insist on very strong remedial actions by the Goverrmentwith respect to the least responsive State Electricity Boards. The projectstrengthened NTPC's transmission planning and project management capacity. Theknow how thus acquired was transferred to POWERORID, the recently creatednational transmission company.

Overall, the project outcome is rated as satisfactory, itssustainability as likely, and its institutional impact as substantial. The PCRgives a thorough account of project preparation and implementation which wasmostly uneventful except for the initial delays. No audit is planned.

Ti documnt has a restricted distributio and way be used by recipients only in the performsace oftheir officil duties. Its contents may not otherise be disclosed without World ank authorizatiou.

FOR OMCIL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDIA

CENTRAL POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT

- S~~LOAN 2283-IN).

Table of Contents

Page No.

PREFACE ..... .................................................

EVALUATION SUMMARY .............. ii

PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .1

Project Identity. 1

Project Background ................................ 1Project objectives and Description. 3

Project Design and Organization. 4

Project Implementation .SEnvironment, Resettlement and Rehabilitation 10Physical Results .10NTPC's Financial Performance .. 1

Compliance with Loan Covenants .15Sustainabil4.ty and Internal Economic

Rate of Return .15

Bank Performance . 15Borrower Performance .16Performance of Consultants and Contractors .17Project Relationship .18Project Documentation and Data .................... 18

PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ... ....... 19

PART III STATISTICAL SUMMARY ............................... 23

ANNEXES

1 Description of the Original Project ......... ........ 33

2 Description of the Revised Project .343 Availability of Transmission Lines an

Substations in 1992 .354.1 Income Statements .36

4.2 Sources and Application of Funds .37

4.3 Balance Sheets ...................................... 38

This document has a rcstricted disribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTINDIA

CENTRAL POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT(LOAN 2283-IN)

Preface

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Central PowerTransmiseion Project, for which Loan 2283-IN in the amount of US$250.7 millionwas approved on May 19, 1983. The loan was made to India, acting by itsPresident, for on-lending to the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC).The original loan closing date of Marcn 31, 1989, was extended three times andthe loan was closed on March 31, 1992. On December 5, 1991, an amount ofUS$S0 million of savings arising mainly because of exchange rate variationswere cancelled from the loan account. Disbursements were completed onSeptember 8, 1992, and the undisbursed balance of US$69.2 million wascancelled. Thus, total disbursemants under the loan amounted to US$131.5million.

On August 16, 1991, the management of the project (operation andmaintenance of the assets in service and implementation of those still underconstruction) was transferred from NTPC to the National Power TransmissionCorporation Ltd. (NPTC), the newly established utility responsible fortransmission and grid operations, under a Management Contract signed betweenthe two Corporations. NPTC was later named Power Grid Corporation of IndiaLtd. (POWERGRID). On January 8, 1993, an Ordinance providing for all therights, titles and other interests related to the transmission systems of NTPCand two other centrally-owned utilities', to be transferred to POWERGRID,with effect from April 1, 1992, was promulgated by the i.re:ident of India. Atthe time of preparation of this PCR, the Bank was in the process of finalizingthe modifications on the Development Credit, Loan and Project Agreements toformalize the transfer of the Bink loans and IDA credits from NTPC and NHPC toPOWERGRID retroactively with effect from April 1, 1992. With regard to Loan2283-IN, assets and liabilities for about US$3.4 million remained with NTPCand assets and liabilities for about US$128.1 million have been transferred toPOWERGRID. The amounts will be finalized after accounts between NTPC andPOWERGRID are settled.

The PCR was prepared by the Energy Operations Division of theCountry Department II (India) of the South Asia Regional Office, and by NTPCand POWERGRID. The former prepared the Preface, Evaluation Summary and PartsI and III of the PCR, while the implementing agencies prepared Part II, andprovided all the supporting data.

Preparation of Parts I and III of the PCR was based on informationin the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan and Project Agreements, and materialon the project in Bank files and that provided by NTPC and POWERGRID. Thepreparation was also based c- discussions with some of the Bank staff who wereinvolved with the project and the officials of the Government of India (GO!),NTPC, POWERGRID and the project beneficiaries (i.e., State Electricity Boards)during a PCR mission to India in February 1993.

-1 National Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC) and North-Eastern ElectricPower Corporation (NBEPoO).

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INIA

CENTRAL POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT(WOAN 2283-Ix)

Evaluation Summarv

Obiectivqs

The two main objectives of the project were: (a) to support 001'sstrategy to extend and improve power supply through the establishment ofcentrally owned regional grids and intra-regional connections leading to thepromotion of a national grid; and (b) to improve, in the long run, theoperational, institutional and financial performance of the State ElectricityBoards (SEBs), by assisting in the development of a financially sound, andtechnically and institutionally competent centrally-owned power utility whichwould serve as a model to SEBs (Part I, para. 3.1).

Xmplementat*on ExDerience

NTPC (and, since August 1991, POWERGRID) successfully implementedthe project. Implementation of the project components financed under the loanwas really begun in April 1987, almost four years from Board approval. Thedelay was mostly due to NTPC's decision not to proceed with the implementationof the 400 kV transmission lines and substations in the Southern Region (majorportion of the Project) until firm agreements were reached with the StateElectricity Boards in the Southern Region on the cost recovery arrangementsfor the transmission facilities to be built under the project. In themeantime, the planning was r-dified by GO and subsequently the description ofthe project was amended twice. At appraisal, all the project components werescheduled to be commissioned by March 1988. At the time the Bank closed theloan on March 31, 1992, the project was not completed. Supplies and worksamounting 'o US$23.2 million remained - these expenditures are being fundedunder Loan 3577-IN, anid are expected to be completed during FY94 (Part I,paras. 5.2 and 5.10).

Results

Overall the project achieved its physical objectives, albeit withsubstantial delays. The project has been the first major component in theestablishment of centrally owned regional grids and intra-regionalconnections. The power transmission capacity in the Southern Region has beenincreased in a manner which helps optimal utilization of the installed thermaland hydro capacities in this region and permits for exchanges between theSouthern and Western Regions. The interconnection between the Northern andthe Western Regions is currently used for limited exchanges of power betweenthe two regions and helps the stability of the systems (Part X, para. 7.1).

The project contributed in making NTPC an efficient utility, butdid not, however, contribute towards the longer-term objective of improving - -

the operational, institutional and financial performance of SEBs (Part I,7.1).

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NTPC's financial rate of return an historically valued net fixedassets declined from a high 17* in FY86 and FY87 to 15%-in FY92 against thecovenanted rate of return of 9.5%. Because of the changes agreed by theparties on the project description, it is not possible to make a reasonablecomparison between the internal economic rate of return (IBRR) of the originaland revised project scopes. The IERR for the project ar implemented wasestimated at II% (Part I, paras. 8.1 and 10.2).

Sustainabilitv

The project is sustainable, even though at present its componentsare not yet being fully utilized. Sustainability is certainly assured for thefuture, as the facilities built under the project are integral components ofthe transmission system development program in India (Part I, para. 10.1).

Insufficient generation and transmission tariffs and an uncheckedincrease of NTPCs and POWERGRXD's accounts receivable could endanger suchsustainability. The Bank, GOI, NTPC and POWERGEID have been taking actions toavoid such occurrence.

Findings and Lessons Learned

Major findings are as follows:

a) The project was not completely finalized when the Bank approved it - thefirst transmission line equipment contract was awarded in March 88, fouryears ten months from the date of approval by the Bank. Furthermore thespecific conditions for effectiveness had to be modified. The longdelay in the start-up of project implementation, and the consequentproject revision, are attributed partly to the Bank not verifying thatthere was full agreement and understanding on the part of the SEBs topay NTPC for the transmission charges. NTPC's unwillingness to beginwork before all contracts with the Southern Region SEBs were signed wasnot appreciated sufficiently. Therefore, the Bank approved this Loanprematurely (Part I, paras. 5.1 and 5.2);

b) Once implementation got under way, NTPC implemented the projectsuccessfully, with only minor problems and delays (Part I, para. 5.3);

c) The Bank's agreement on the "revised" project (para. 3.3) which wasdetermined to require some three additional years for its completion,gave GOI and NTPC the perception that the loan would be extended untilthe completion of the project; therefore, the Bank's decision not toextend for a fourth time the closing date of the loan came as a surpriseto GOI and NTPC (Part I, para. 5.4);

d) The project contributed to the enhancement of NTPC's (later POWERGEID'.)expertise in the area of high voltage transmission, created employmentof local labor and helped to the development of local manufacturingindustry (Part I, paras. 5.5 and 5.6);

e) The average time taken from bid opening to the award of the contract(including Bank acceptance of She proposed award) was generally lessthan nine months. In an effort to speed up procurement, standardbidding documents will in futvre be used by NTPC and PC ERGRID.

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They would also give further emphasis to finishing promptly the paymentsfor the contracts, so that the closing dates of new loan(s) would notneed to be extended (*art I, para. 5.7);

f) By the t_me the Loan was closed India had repaid almost half of the loanamount utilized (Part I, para. 5.101;

g) The area where NTPC's performance fell considerably short ofe%pectations was in bill recovery. Maintaining a specific level ofaccounts receivables was not a condition of this loan and it was onlyintroduced in 1985 under Loan 2555-IN for the Rihand Power TransmissionProject. Substantial arrears by SEEs affected NTPCs financial positionadversely (Part I. paras. 8.2 and 12.2);

h) GO! interventions through the central appropriations helped NTPCresolve, albeit for limited periods, its accounts receivable problem.These interventions aimed at having NTPC operate efficiently, thus keepthe electric energy supply at an adequate level. It is doubtful that0OI's actions have led to SEBs improving their operational efficiencyand their billing and collection procedures and practices. What isequally important, but so far received little attention, is the need forenergy conservation on the customer side through adoption of appropriatetariffs and tariff structure at SEBs and through end-use efficiencies(Part 1, para. 8.4);

i) The SAM adopted the conventional rate of return (ROR) on averagehistoric fixed assets in operation as the sole covenant for NTPC'sfinancial performance. This performance indicator is less appropriatefor a fast growing utility where the utility's major concern is toensure the availability of adequate funds for investment. Furthermore,when the revenues collected are substantially lower than the revenuesaccrued (due to the large accounts receivable), the financialperformance indicators such as ROR, operating ratio, etc., are lessmeaningful (Part I, para. 8.6);

j) A more appropriate covenant would have been a cash generation covenant,e.g. "contribution towards investment" which would have also highlightedthe deterioration in NTPC's performance (Part $, para. 8.6); and

k) Bank's position (only partially shared by GO!) is that the electricityindustry provides a service which has to be fully paid through user-charges. The perception of the State Governments and SEBe, perhaps forpolitical reasons, is that provision of electricity is partly a socialservice. The transfer of funds to NTPC through central appropriationsis but another subsidy (whether it comes from GOS or from SEB), and nota direct payment through tariffs (Part I, para. 12.4).

Major lessons learned from this project are -summarized below:

a) As a precondition for further Bank loans, more emphasis should be givento improving the commercial arrangements between NTPC and its clients.However, this has proved to be difficult to achieve in practice unlessthe financial performance of the SEBs i8 improved (Part I, para. 12.4);

b) To enable NIPC to operate on a purely commercial basis, GOI should allowNTPC to sell to other customers the allocated shares of the SEBs whichdo not comply with their agreements with NTPC. In cases where technicalreallocation (by limiting availability of power to a particular SEB)cannot be implemented, commercial reallocation can be done. This can bedone by limiting allocations to a defaulting SER and charging a stiffpenalty for drawals exceeding the reduced allocation (Part I, para.12.4); and -

c) As a result of the changes in the overall economic policy environmentwithin which WMPC is operating, its financial policies need orientation.Under the circumstances, it would be appropriate to change the existingrate of return covenant into a self financing ratio covenant, because itwould not only provide a better monitoring mechanism for NTPC'sfinancial performance, but also provide better support to NTPC towardsmeeting its development challenges tPart I, para. 8.6).

The lessons drawn from this and previous projects implemented by NTPChave been used in the preparation, appraisal and negotiations of the NTPCPower Generation Project, which was approved on June 29, 1993:

a) GOI has adopted new investment and commercial policies and electricitytariffs allowing NTPC to shut-off or restrict power supply if itsclients are in default with their bulk supply agreements. Thesepolicies are designed to introduce better commercial discipline at SEEs,along with improving NTPC's own operational and financial performance,including improving revenue collection (para. 12.3);

b) NTPC has agreed with the Bank on an internal cash generation covenant(para. 8.6);

c) GO: established POWERGRID to: (i) improve the efficiency in powertransmission and systems oper~__ons, through an extensive restructuringof the transmission sector; and (ii) complement its policy initiativesto encourage private generation and competition in power generation(para. 2.6); and

d) The Bank and NTPC agreed on standard bidding documents whose use wouldcurtail the procurement period (para. 5.7).

The last two points were also taken into account under Loan 3577-IN forthe POWRGRID System Development Project.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

CENTRAL POWNER TRANSMISSION PROJECT{LOAN 2283-IN)

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BAKK'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Protect Identity

Name Central Power TransmissionLoan No L Loan 2283-INRVP Unit . South Asia RegionCountry : IndiaSector EnergySub-sector : Power

2. Prolect Backaround

2.1 In India, the responsibility for electricity supply is sharedconstitutionally between the Government of India (GOI) and the states. Inaddition, India is one of the few developing countries with a vibrant, ifsmall, private sector presence in public power supply. At independence;private utilities and licensed local authorities, located in urban areas,provided about 80* of public electricity supply. GOI opted to embark on anambitious electrification program to support the development of power-intensive industries for a rapid industrial development and expansion ofirrigation. The Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 (the Act) created the stateelectricity boards (SEBs) and entrusted the state governments and the boardswith primary responsibility for public power supply. The coordination ofSEBs' activities within the national power development policy, and theformulation of longer-term plans for power development is the responsibilityof Central Electricity Authority (CEA), established in 195o.

2.2 Between 1960 and 1980, power demand grew twice as fast as theeconomy, and the generating capacity increased almost five-fold from about5,600 MW to about 32,000 MW. Yet, for the entire period the country facedpower shortages, frequent power interruptions, wide variations in systemfrequency, and large drops in voltage at the consumer level because SEzs couldnot fulfill their responsibilities. Though set up as autonomous bodies, SMUshave been under the stringent control of their state governments in vitalmatters such as changes to tariffs and tariff structure, with the result thatthey have not developed commercial and financial disciplines, and theirfinancial performance generally has been poor, to the extent of depending onthe state governments for operational subsidies.

2.3 In mid-1970s, GOI reoriented its strategy in order to supplementefforts of SEBs in increasing installed capacity and establishing high voltagetransmission networks. Emphasis was put on: (a) acceleratizg the developmentof the hydro power potential and large coal-fired power plants both at pitheadand in the proximity of load centers; (b)-improving the efficiency of thermalpower plants and reducing loses in the tranmission and distribution

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networks; (c) expanding the rural electrification program; and (d}strengthening the organizational and management capabilities of the SEBs.

2.4 GOI established in 1975 two power generating companies, theNational Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and the National Hydroelectric PowerCorporation (NHPC) to construct and operate large thermal and hydro powerstations and associated transmission systems. The rapid increase ingeneration necessitated to expand the transmission networks and also toincrease the voltage level to handle the transfer of large blocks of powerfrom generating stations to load centers. Simultaneously, for the first timea need was felt for power planning and development on a regional basis toensure the optimum utilization of natural resources which are rather unevenlydistributed over the country and also for enhancing the reliability andsecurity of the power transmission systems. The country was divided into fivecontiguous regions (Northern, North Eastern, Eastern, Western and Southern)with a view to build regional integrated grids. Regional Electricity Boards(REBS were established to integrate the operations of each grid throughregional load dispatch centers and to improve collaboration among the SEEs.

2.5 By the time the Central -ower Transmission Project was appraisedin October 1982, IDA/Bank had financti under nine operations implemented byNTPC, 6,800 MM of pithead coal-fired :hermal power plants (TPPs) in four sites(Singrauli, Korba, Ru-agundam and Farakka) and associated trausmission linesto evacuate the power generated at these power stations into the networksowned and operated by SEBs. The project was the 31st Bank/IDA operation inthe sector, and tenth operation with NTPC. As in the previous NTPC projects,India, acting by its President, was the borrower and NTPC the implementingagency. The project was developed from studies conducted by CRA withassistance by Teshmont Inc. consultants from Canada.

2.6 In 1989, G01 established the National Power TransmissionCorporation Ltd. (NPTC) to improve the efficiency in power transmission andsystems operations, through an extensive restructuring of the transmissionsector, and complement its policy initiatives to encourage private generationand competition in power generation. On August 16, 1991, the management ofthe transmission assets (operation and maintenance of the assets in serviceand implementation of those still under construction) of NTPC, including theProject, was transferred to NPTC, under a Management Contract signed betweenthe two Corporations. Subsequently, two other GOI-owned utilities (NHPC andthe North-Eastern Electric Power eorporation - NEEPCO) which had transmissionlines and substations in operation or under construction, signed similarmanagement contracts with NPTC. NPTC was later named Power Grid Corporationof India Ltd. (POWERGRID). On January 8, 1993, an Ordinance providing for allthe rights, titles and other interests related to the transmission systems ofNTPC, NHPC and NEEPCO, to be transferred to POWRMGRID, with effect fram April1, 1992, was promulgated by the President of India. The Bank supports theestablishment and development of POWERGRID under the US$350 million Loan No.3577-IN for the POWERGRID System revelopment Project, approved on March 23,1993. At the time of preparation o. this PCR, the Bank was working on thefinalization of the modifications on the Development Credit, Loan and ProjectAgreements to formalize the transfer of the Bank loans and IDA credits fromNTPC and NHPC to POWERGRID, retroactively with effect from April 1, 1992.With regard to Loan 2283-ZN. assets and liabilities for about US$3.4 millionremained with NTPC and assets and liabilities for about US$128.12 million havebeen transferred to POWERGRID. The amounts will be finalized after accountsbetween NTPC and POWERGRID are settled.

3. Progect Obiectives and Descriittion

3.1 Proiect Ob1ectives. The primary objective of the project w*as tosupport GOI's strategy to extend and improve power supply through theestablishment if centrally owned regional grids and intra-reg:onal corAectionsleading to the promotion of a national grid. To attain this objective, thepro3ect provided for:

(a) an increased capacity of power transmission system from NTPCsRamagundam TTP in the Southern Region, in order to ensure optimalutilization from the installed thermal and hydro capacities inthis region;

(b) a strong power transmission tie between the predominantly hydro-based Southern Region and the predominantly thermal-based WesternRegion; and

(c) an asynchronous ir.er-tie between the Northern and the WesternRegions in order to permit larger exchanges of power between thetwo regions to meet the growing system demands while ensuringstability of the systems.

As in the previous Bank-financed projects with NTPC, another objective was toimprove, in the long run, the operational, institutional and financialperformance of the State Electricity Boards (SEBs), by assisting in thedevelopment.of a financially sound, and technically and institutionallycompetent centrally-owned power utility which would serve as a model to SEMs.

3.2 OriQinal Proiect Descrintion. The project, as approved by theBoard on May 19, 1983, is detailed in Annex 1 and comprised:

(a) construction of 548 km of double circuit and 564 km of singlecircuit 400 kV transmission lines;

(b) construction of three new and extension of five 400/220 kVsubstations associated with the lines mentioned in (a);

(c) construction of a 2x250 MW capacity "back-to-back", high voltagedirect current (WSDC) substation at Vindhyachal TPP to provide anasynchronous interconnection between the Northern and the WeeternRegions;

(d) technical services, for detailed equipment and system engineeringand construction supervision of the HVDC back-to-backinterconnection;

(e) installation of metering, instrumentation and communicationfacilities; and

(f) installation of power line carrier communication equipment forvoice transmission, line protection and data transmission on each400 kv transmission line.

3.3 Revised ProJect Description. After the loan and projectagreements were signed, GOI obtained financing for the HVDC back-to-back

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station from Sweden. The Bank welcomed this co-financing and at 301'srequest, agreed, on January 23, 1985, to reallocate loan funds and thus amendthe project description. In 1984, the construction of two large thermal powerplant projects (Manguru and Vijayawada projects) to be built in the SouthernRegion were deferred beyond the Seventh Plan. In addition, CEA and NTPCwanted to avoid forest land and ensure optimum utilization of the facilitieswith respect to the revised demand and supply scenarioa2. After protracteddiscussions between the Southern Region SEBs and NTPC, and with theinvolvement of CEA, a new transmission system configuration was proposed.Therefore, the project components to be built in the Southern Region (majorportion of Parts a and b of the project - para. 3.2) underwent major revision.The proposed changes were found by the Bank technically acceptable andjustifiable on the basis of the long-term development of the Southern Region.The Bank thus agreed on the new scheme on November 16, 1986. However, 001finalized the scheme only in August 1987. The final project description isdetailed in Annex 2 and summarized as follows:

(a) construction of 164 km of double circuit and 1,229 km of singlecircuit transmission lines; and

(b) construction of four new and extension of seven 400/220 kVsubstations, and of one new switching station associated with thelines mentioned in (a).

Parts (c)-(f) of the project were not amended. The new project descriptionwas still within the overall objectives of the project as originally approvedby the Board. Thus the Management considered that the approval of the Boardfor the said changes was not necessary.

4. Pro, ect Desion and Organization

4.1 Prolect Desian. Uhlike the previous Bank operations with NTPC,where the loans were made for the constructzion of power generation plants andfor the associated transmission lines to evacuate the power generated, thisproject was solely to strengthen the transmission system. NTPC had alreadyacquired adequate experience in the area of 400 kV transmission line andsubstation design and engineering during the construction of the transmissionlines and substations associated with the Singrauli, Korba, Ramagundam and

2 Changes in the supply scenario came from GOI's decision to delaythe Manguru and Vijayawada power projects beyond the SeventhPlan, due to environmental, resettlement and rehabilitationproblems (for the IEanguru project) and lack of financialresources. Changes in the demand scenario came from higherpriority being allocated to small scale industry and to ruralelectrification. The Ramagundam-Manguru-Vijaywada transmissionline was re-routed via Khammam to minimize the passage through theforests, where manguru is located. The Vijaywada-Nellore-RedHills (near Madras) coastal transmission line was discardedbecause of the severe cyclonic conditions in that area, whichwould have placed a high risk of damage to the envisaged coastalline.

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Farakka power plant projects. The. basic and detailed engineering work forthe 400 kV transmission lines and substations was carried out by NTPC in-house. The detailed engineering of the HVDC back-to-back transmission linkcomponent was carried out by NTPC in cooperation with ABS, Sweden, theequipment supplier. NTPC carried out the preparation of specifications,bidding documents, bid evaluation reports and construction supervision of allthe components of the project. To ensure smooth implementation, the executionof the project required co-ordination with a number of major agenciesincluding beneficiary SEBs. This coordination was not always without problems(para. 5.2).

4.2 Prgiect Orcanization4. At the time of appraisal, NTPC hadalready adopted its current three-tier organizational structure at corporate,regional and project levels. The Corporation is headed by a Chairman andManaging Director (CMD), who is assisted by five full time functionaldirectors, namely, Director (Projects), Director (Operations), Director(Technical), Director (Finance) and Director (Personnel). At the CorporateOffice, corporate planning and central procurement functions are headed byExecutive Directors reporting to the CMD. For the purpose of theadministration and execution of work at the sites, the Corporation is dividedinto five regions (Northern, western, Eastern, Southern and National CapitalRegions) with headquarters at present located at Allahabad, Nagpur, Patna,Hyderabad and Delhi, respectively. These regions are under the control ofRegional Executive Directors who are responsible for the implementation,operation and maintenance of power plants in their respective regions. Eachpower plant is headed by a General Manager$. The structure has shown theadvantage of optimizing the span of control of the CMD and provided for thedecentralization of line responsibility while retaining centralized systems inareas such as long-term planning, basic engineering, procurement of criticalequipment and spares, quality assurance, co-ordination with the World Bank andother financing agencies and inspection. Various parts of the Project werelocated in the Northern, Western and Southern regions and were managed by the-respective regional offices.

5. Project Implementation

5.1 Loan Effectiveness. Loan 2283-IN was approved on May 19, 1983;the Loan and Project Agreements were signed on June 8, 1983. It was expectedthat the loan would be declared effective by September 9, 1983. Signing of aSubsidiary Loan Agreement between GOt and NTPC, satisfactory to the Bank, andof bulk supply contracts between NTPC and the SEBs for the sale of electricityfrom the Bank financed Singrauli and Korba power plants, were conditions forloan effectiveness. The Subsidiary Loan Agreement was provided on time.However, delays were experienced in finalizing contractual arrangements with

All these coal-fired power plant projects were partly funded underIDA credits and Bank loans.

As NTPC was the legal implementing agency of the project duringthe life of Ln. 2283-IN, NTPC's project organization andmanagement is reviewed in this section.

Until August 16, 1991, NTPC'-s regional transmission units werealso headed by a General Manager (para. 2.6).

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SEBs. This had been originally a condition for loan negotiations butsubsequently was made a condition for loan effectiveness. The delays led topostponing twice the loan effectiveness date eventually to March 1984. Bythat time, NTPC could only sign Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with theconcerned SEBs. The Bank noted some deficiencies'6 in these MOTls, butconcluded that they fulfilled the purpose of providing an agreement betweenNTPC and the relevant SEEs and other institutions7, covering the sale ofelectricity from the Singrauli and Korba power plants. The loan was declaredeffective on March 29, 1964, a delay of 6 1/2 months from the date ofeffectiveness originally determined at signing.

5.2 Project Start-u ad Imolementation Schedule. At appraisal, theproject was expected to be completed by March 31, 1988. The construction ofthe EVDC back-to-back station proceeded satisfactorily. The station which wasprojected to be commissioned in March 1988, was put into service in end 1987.On the other hand, NTPC could not proceed with the implementation of the 400kV transmission lines and substations in the Southern Region (major portion ofthe Project) until firm agreements were reached with the Southern Region SEBson the cost recovery arrangements for the transmission facilities to be built

The deficiencies found by the Bank were summarized as: fi) shortremaining validity period of the MOU8, to March 1985; (ii) lack offixed commitment charge for the SEBs; (iii) lack of definition forprofits in tariff calculation; and (iv) lack of calculations offlat rate, variable energy price and transmission charge. NTMC'scomments on the above are: (i) MOUs were valid from February 1982to March 1985; (ii) No coLmitment charges were provided as NTPCwas not in a position to assure delivery of shares to SEBs. Thetariff in Rs./kWh basis enabled NTPC to earn higher returns as theactual levels of operation were above the normative levels.Absence of fixed commitment charges did not in any way provedetrimental to NTPC's interests; (iii) Profit by way of return onequity was included in the tariffs as an element of fixed charges;and, (iv) Although the calculations did not form part of the MOUs,the tariffs were based on detailed calculations based on theprinciples and parameters mentioned in the MOUs.

Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (DESU) and the Department ofPower of the Union Territory of Goa.

-7

under the Project . In the meantime, the generation and transmission plansfor the Southern Region and the description of the project were modified(para. 3.3). The SAR envisaged that the bid documents for the first contractsfor all the transmission lines (contract packages for the supply and erectionof the line towers) would be issued at the latest by September 1983 and thecontracts would be awarded by June 1984. The bid documents for these packageswere issued in April 19879, and the first contract was awarded in March 1988(four years ten months from Board approval).

5.3 Implementation Process. Once project implementation got underway, there were some delays but these were not of significance - minor delaysoccurred in the design and fabrication of tower parts for Ramagundam-Khammamline, and supply of some 400 kV circuit breakers. The design, procurement andinstallation of the metering, instrumentation and communications equipmentfpara. 3.2, Items d, e-and f) were not given the importance they deserved andtheir commissionings were delayed substantially to 1990-1992.

5.4 Extensions of the closina Date. The loan was scheduled to beclosed on March 31, 1989. Implementation of the project components financedunder the loan was really begun in April 1987, almost four years from Boardapproval. While agreeing to GOIs request to revise the project, the Bankrecognized that extension of the loan closing date would be required. Asupervision mission estimated in January 1989 that the revised project wouldonly be completed by March 1992, and that completion of the payments wouldrequire the extension of the closing date to 1993. However, the Bank reservedthe right to review progress under the project and extend the closing datewhen necessary. The Bank carried out these reviews annually and agreedextending the closing date by one year each time, for a total of 36 months toMarch 31, 1992. In the meantime, in March 1991, in an effort to acceleratedisbursements under the project, the Bank also agreed in principle to financeitems of equipment totalling US$27.2 million that were originally planned tobe financed by NTPC. The Bank did not extend the closing date of the loanbeyond March 31, 1992, but informed GOl that it would be willing to considerto include funding the completion of the ongoing contracts retroactively underthe POWERGRI7 -ystem Development Project. The latter project was approved by

Even before project negotiations, some of the Southern Region SEBshad questioned NTPC on the utility or the benefit to themselvesfrom the transmission lines being set up under the Ramagundamproject, and manifested significant reluctance to agreeing to payNTPC for the transmission line charges for those lines constructedunder the said Ramagundam Project. The discussions/negotiationsbetween NTPC and Southern Region SEBe became protracted partlybecause these SEBs had not dealt before with a centrally-ownedutility in terms of sharing the power generated from the plant,and the cost of that power. It took about four years for theparties involved t.? develop a consensus on NTPC's tariffs.Although NTPC comm.3nted that the last agreement for the SouthernRegion was signed in April 1985, Bank's files show that this wasan issue until th.e March 22 - April 7, 1987, supervision mission.

It should be noted that at that time, GOX had not yet granted itsfull clearance for the new transmission development scheme, whichit did in August 1987.

the Board on March 23, 1993 (Loan 3577-IN; para. 2.6) and includes US$23.2million for the completion of the contracts of the Central Power TransmissionProject. Disbursements for these expenditures under Loan 3577-IN would becompleted during FY94.

5.5 Procurement. The equipment and materials financed under the loanwere split into 71 packages, most of which were procured under internationalcompetitive bidding (ICB) procedures in accordance with Bank guidelines.Contractors who supplied transmission line tower structure were in charge ofthe erection of the towers, insulators and hardware, and stringing of the lineconductors, on a supply and erect basis. Suppliers of main equipment for thesubstatLens were also in charge of the erection of the substations. NTPCprocured, always under ICS, the conductors, line material such as insulatorsand hardware and the electrical equipment including metering andinstrumentation and had these equipment erected by the above mentionedcontractors. The relatively large number of contracts and the above forms ofpackaging created a significant workload on NTPC as well as Bank staff tomonitor and supervise these contracts. However, the above two characteristicshelped NTPC staff to acquire valuable experience in preparing contractdocumentation, reviewing and evaluating bids, and in managing the engineeringof the project, since they were responsible for proper interfacing of projectmaterials and equipment from different suppliers. Most of the said NTPC staffhave been transferred to POWERORTD. However, it is noted that the aboveprocurement system applied by NTPC, which required drawing up ofspecifications for tenders, preparation of bidding documents and carrying outof bid evaluations swamped NTPC staff who at one point had to handle some1,200 contracts valued at over US$1 billion. On the other hand, dividing theproject material/equipment into numerous contract packages, promotedparticipation from a range of large and medium sized local manufacturers/suppliers which, in turn, has contributed to the development of localmanufacturing industry.

5.6 Of the 71 contracts (total value: US$169 million equivalent) putout for ICB, 12 contracts (valued at US$31 million or about l8* of the total)were awarded to foreign manufacturers/suppliers. Of the two highest valuecontracts (both for the supply of conductors) one was awarded to a local andthe other to a foreign manufacturer/supplier. The local industry was fairlycompetitive where the size of contract packages was within its manufacturingand/or supply capability. NTPC followed its practice of specifying thequalification requirements of the prospective suppliers on the biddingdocuments; this was not objected to by the Bank and worked reasonably.

5.7 For all contracts estimated to cost over US$2.5 millionequivalent, NTPC submitted for Bank's review and comments the biddingdocuments and evaluation reports. Bank files show that there were delays inprocurement, and on some occasions there was need to amend the bid documents,and also to re-bid in some cases. Based on the available documentation, theaverage time taken from bid opening to the award of the contract (includingBank acceptance of the proposed award) was generally less than nine months.In an effort to speed up procurement, standard bidding documents will in thefuture be used by MMPC and POWERGRID. Under the NTPC Power GenerationProjectla and Loan 3577-IN for the POWERGRID System Development Project, NTPC

to This project was approved on June 29, 1993.

-9

and POWERGRID respectively agreed on standard bidding documents, whose usewould reduce the procurement period substantially. NTPC and POWERGRID wouldalso give further emphasis to finishing promptly the payments for thecontracts, so that the closing dates of new loan(s) would not need to beextended.

5.8 Prolect Costs (Part III, Table E). The total cost of the originalproject, including contingencies, taxes and duties, was estimated in the SARat about Rs. 5,864 million (US$617.3 million equivalent). The actual cost ofthe revised project was Rs. 5,423 million (US$264.4 million equivalent). InUS dollar equivalent, the actual project cost was substantially lower than theappraisal estimate because of the substantial devaluation of the Rupee fromRs.9.5/US$ at appraisal to Rs.25/US$ in March 1992, when the loan was closed.During the implementation period, the weighted average rate was Rs.20.5S/US$.While inflation increased project costs in local currency, the devaluation.resulted in the loan proceeds generating a substantially larger amount inlocal currency than had been expected. Despite the inflation, in currentRupee terms, the actual project costs were slightly lower than the appraisalestimates. Although a detailed and realistic cost comparison between theappraisal estimates and the actual costs is not possible due to the majorchanges to some of the transmission lines and the associated substations, itis concluded that costs at appraisal were overestimated.

5.9 Project Financing. The financing plan was changed substantially.The plan estimated at appraisal and the actual plan are summarized in thefollowing table.

Financina of the Proiect

Sources SAR Actual /a(US$ million) .J(e) (USS million) (.) -

- Bank Loan 250.7 41 131.5 50- GOI (as Equity and Loan) 366.6 59 73.8 28- Credit from Sweden - - _9.1 22

Total f 17.3 100 264.4 100

/a Excludes US$23.2 million to be disbursedunder Loan 3577-IN (para. 2.6).

5.10 Disbursements. The estimated and actual disbursements, and theoriginal and revised allocation of the loan proceeds are given in Part III,Tables E and F, respectively. Due to the fact that the HVDC substation washived off from Bank financing and the hiatus in the implementation of thelines and substations led to virtually no disbursement of loan proceedsthrough end 1986. By the time of the original closing date (March 31, 1989),cumulative disbursements were only US$40.5 million, 161 of the original loanamount. The closing date of the loan was extended three times by one yeareach, to March 31, 1992 (para. 5.4). In December 1991, US$50 million ofsavings arising mainly of exchange rate variations were cancelled from theloan amount. The loan was closed on March 31, 1992; disbursements werecompleted on September 8, 1992. The undisbursed balance of US$69.2 millionwas cancelled on that date. Thus disbursements under the loan were US$131.5million. India began repaying the proceeds of the loan on September 1, 1988,

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and will continue to do so until March 1, 2003. It is noted that by the timetne loan was closed, India had already repaid US$64,666,000, almost half ofthe loan amount utilized.

6. Environment. Resettlement and Rehabilitation

6.1 The project did not create any significant environmental andresettlement and rehabilitation problems. NTPC selected the line routings soas to minimize infringement on forest land. Where trees had to be felled inorder to provide access to the lines, trees of a corresponding number wereplanted in the vicinity. The question of relocation of people affected by theproject did not arise because transmission line routes and substation siteswere selected in un-inhabitated areas remote from the population centers.

7. Physical Results

7.1 Proiect Objectives. Overall, the project has achieved itsobjectives (para. 3.1). The project has been the first major component in theestablishment of centrally owned regional grids and intra-regionalconnections. The power transmission capacity in the Southern Region has beenincreased in a manner which helps optimal utilization of the installed thermaland hydro capacities in this region and permits for exchanges between theSouthern and Western Regions. The asynchronous interconnection between theNorthern and the Western Regions is currently used for limited exchanges ofpower between the two regions and helps the stability of the systems. Theproject contributed in making NTPC an efficient utility but failed in itssectoral objective in inducing improvements in the operational, institutionaland financial performance of SEBs, as seen in the disappointing operational,financial and institutional performances of many SEBs. It is not clear how,if any, NTPC's institutional development helped those performing SEBs, such asthe Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh SEBs whose transmission networks werestrengthened by this project. The failure in obtaining improvements at SEBEwhile supporting the development of NTPC as a model utility can be traced tothe fact that the Bank had not fully appreciated the extent of theinterference by the state governments in the affairs of SEBs (para. 12.4).

7.2 Phvsical Results. The individual components of the revisedproject were commissioned at various dates given in Part III, Table D. The2x250 MW HVDC component was commissioned in end 1987, compared with theappraisal estimate of March 1988, and has been providing for power exchangesbetween the Northern and Western Regions (each block of 250 MW is capable ofoperating independently in either direction). The lines and substations inthe Southern Region were, at appraisal, projected to be commissioned duringthe June-December 1987 period. These lines and substations which were delayedawaiting agreement from the SEEs (para. 5.2) and suffered from NTPC's overloadin processing contract documents (para. 5.5), were actually commissionedbetween May 1991 and March 1992.

7.3 Since their commissioning, the project components have in generalfunctioned satisfactorily. The problems which did arise were invariably of aminor nature and were resolved without seriously affecting the transmission ofpower. The availability of the individual components has been almost 100% in1992 (Annex 3). However, the average daily power transmitted through some ofthe lines is short of its design capacity. The reasons for thisunitrutilization are: (i) suboptimal operation of generating plant on a

regional basis; and (ii) indifferent or unresponsive generation tariffstructure. Generation plants are not operated optimally because individualSEBs do not observe cost merit order in power generation. The tariffstructure in effect up to November 1992 did not encourage merit order plantdispatch in the regional grids. The actual NTPC tariff in application sinceNovember 1992, is on two part basis as per the recommendations of GOIt's K.P.Rao Committee. This tariff is conducive to the introduction of merit orderoperation. POWERGRID is pursuing further tariff improvements in transmission.Assistance is being provided under Loan 3577-IN.

7.4 The Ramagundam-Chandrapur double circuit line linking the Southernand Western Regions was intended for use mainly during emergencies in eitherregion. Only one circuit is presently in regular use carrying power (which isonly a fraction of the line's load carrying capacity) from the Western Regiondirectly to some of the northern areas of Andhra Pradesh in the SouthernRegion. The construction of an asynchronous tie (HVDC back-to-back stationsimilar to the one implemented under the project) to be built at Chandrapur isbeing examined by POWERGRID to help effect large exchanges of power betweenthe two regions in the future and the loading of the Ramagundam-Chandrapurline will increase. When commissioned, this inter-tie will increase theloading of the Chandrapur-Ramagundam double circuit lines.

7.5 The 400 kV transmission system under the project was intended toimprove voltage levels and carry electric power over long distances with lowlosses. However, in practice voltages in the systems drop sometimes to wellbelow the permissible limits (as low as 300 kV). This problem affectsadversely those SEBs which are further away from the sources of generation,and is due to the SESs nearer the generation sources who draw higher reactivepower (MVARs) from the 400 kV systems. Ways to rectify the situation are forSEBs either to install shunt capacitors or to make it obligatory and enforcethe installation of capacitors on all large motors, including irrigation pumpmotors. Five major grid failures were reported in the Southern Region duringthe period November 1991 to January 1993. In every one of these occasions,low voltages were prevailing in the regional grid, because SEBs were drawingunusually high MVARs over the 400 kV network. The problem was aggravatedbecause of low generation in certain states. However, NTPC/POWERGRID 400 kVnetwork worked satisfactorily during this period and did not contribute to thegrid failures.

8. NTPC's Financial Performance

8.1 NTPC started its commercial operation in February 1982, a fewmonths prior to the appraisal of the project. From 1982 to the present,NTPC's financial performance has been satisfactory, except for the largeaccounts receivable (para. 8.2). NTPC's financial statements for the periodPY85 to FY92 are given in Annexes 4.1-4.3 and a summary for the last fiveyears is given in Table 8.1 below. NTPCIs operating data reflect the growththe Corporation experienced since 1982. Key financial parameters, e.g.,assets in operation, revenue from electricity sales, total operating revenues,and operating income before interest, increased some five-fold since 1987.The rate of return on net average fixed assets (historically valued) for thisperiod was high, generally around 151 (between 13* and 17%), well in excess ofthe 8a between FY8S-PY90 and 9.5S starting from FY91, as was stipulated in theproject agreement.

Table 8.1 M' F"'Y"t" A

1so 19 1w0 13 U 19"0 ' 1 tm92_ _ ~~~~~~. n .ee_ _ _.

Fg..s.b 8493. t rewue A.UeWl FNt 849oW1 VW*"*% A493e1 `rmcst AcS Per.o McnI f.r.a.* AInI Aor0ee At,el

6I.s9l.tl sals CtbS) 4.110 11.493 ISt." 13,445 U.40 17.92, 1.&8 8,93M4 24, 85.41 88.411 44,93 40,80 48.m 6,6

Jot. la wUe. b1k 4,5 i,4 1,99 4,47 1,1t2 0,U11 7.142 9.4U7 O."10 . 6,12 4,868 4.,7 33,81

most. $*lJo 1evu 8,07 4,41 4." 5U 5,78 7.,27 7,201 10,7t3 1.1460 i,5108 16,87 191,87 1T4,2U W.1. 45847

lbet. la Isle* 1W. 1"72 4 907 1. 1,45 1145 4,259 4,866 1.1" 4,214 2,9 2.768 1.098

Too$ 0estt.o Ns Ib1 8.21 1 S,440 4,854 5.14 *,M2 6,45 0.145 0,M 1,122 11,740 17,24 90.5M 22,8 24,0 15,99 "89,9

Row. S. 3mp* Req. 1.689 1.105 1.IM 1.178 2,19 8M977 4,11 5,14 7.82 41,09 $,#4 8.194 36.722

_AmSt. Imlwabl* so 1,.8 M 2,.4 447 *,M so 4,0 09 5,08 too" l1.89 16tO 5,1 1.0 19.0

Je. !* An. Soee. M on 79 544 15 S.23 18 1,92 us 5,8 US S,641 280 4

A.aR_1 .s0.C ofOwe) 18 170 M1 2 1n 7 no0 n? 14 n 6 M 1 2 # 14b,nst SbAU- 1.0 5.0 1.6 5.2 1.0 5.7 11 6.1 1.0 4.7 10 4.1 1.9 * 4.1 1.5

taof rs (3) 17 9 173 is lox S$ sox 73 t5 M in Of 15t

eerums RIl*e (3) M 5n 55 573 "S 68 "5 "S six on $0 Ws

t.,b.bub)eCook. M -.1 .n 3 M 91 40 123 -2 24# 1 so 173 53 9

b*S k,lwo Ce"" t tn) 4.9 2.0 4.0 1.5 J.9 1.4 2.4 1.3 2.5 1.4 2.0 1.6 2.4

(.)C esad tbo"saes Is 84 is 44 1t 184 # 55,975 45 2 la "S 64 0 1.42

(b) Av.* ftetip Cos Oew.P. 141 14 221 2*14 04 XO N0 844 464 "4 645 93 t8 1,0on 9 .709

(a) Relt Cs)/() 0.08 0." 0.06 2.09 0.09 0.52 0.12 17." 0.10 0.00 0.0 0.51 0.07 0.n7 O." 1.o

_ 13 -

8.2 Bill collection and accounts receivable have been persistentproblems for NTPC, because of the poor financial situation of many SEPs.NTPC's accounts receivable increased at a far greater pace than its revenuesand operating income in successive years. The receivables, which representedsome 5.2 months of billing in 1987. steadily increased to 7.5 months in 1991,compared to less than one month (27 days) projected in the SAR for the entireperiod. A covenant specifying the level of accounts receivable not to exceedan amount equivalent to the proceeds of its sales of power for the twopreceding months, was first introduced for NTPC under Loan 2555-IN for theRihand Power Transmission Project approved in May 1985, with effect from theend of FY86. The covenant was repeated in three subsequent Bank loans"1, butNTPC has never been able to comply. In 1991, the increase in accountsreceivable (over 1990) was some Re 3.53 billion, while the correspondingincreases in electricity sales revenue and in total operating revenues were Rs2.88 billion and Rs 3.63 billion respectively; in practical terms, NTPCcollected virtually no additional revenue in FY91, even though it sold anadditional 4,800 GWh of energy. In 1986, NTPC internal cash generation barelymet its debt service requirements and the increase in working capital (Annex4.2). A liquidity crisis was averted by the cash received by NTPC from itsfirst issue of medium-term bonds. Since then NTPC has been issuing suchmedium-term bonds every year, mostly to help finance the expansion of itsfacilities. The level of its accounts receivable have also been increasingevery year in absolute terms as well as a percentage of its annual billings.The funds raised from these bonds have helped NTPC to bridge finance itsincreasing working capital requirements.

8.3 Increasing bill collection and accounts receivable problems led toseveral interventions by GOI on behalf of NTPC during the period FY88 to FY92.At each of these interventions, GOl assumed the responsibility to clear someof the arrears from sEBs by transferring to NTPC corresponding amounts fromits allocations to the respective states. Such payments are carried out overa period of four years. In February 1992, NTPC acquired the Unchahar powerstation in lieu of arrears of the Uttar Pradesh SEB. As indicated in Table8.1 above, NTPC has received over Rs 11 billion from the transfers through thecentral appropriations from 1988 to January 1993. Combined with other billcollection efforts, NTPC was able to reduce its level of accounts receivabledespite the rapid increase in sales. At the end of FY93, the overall level ofaccounts receivable was 3.3 months of sales equivalent, but excluding theamount still to be paid through the central appropriations, it was 1.4 monthsof sales equivalent. More encouraging is that during the last three months ofFY93, 93% of billing was realized directly from the SUBs. During thenegotiations of the NTPC Power Generation Project, agreement was reached thatNTPC would maintain the level of its accounts receivable at two months ofsales equivalent excluding the amount still to be paid through the centralappropriations for which a specific payment schedule was also agreed.

8.4 (00's interventions through the central appropriations helpedNTPC avert financial crises and resolve, for limited periods, its accountsreceivable problem. These interventions aimed at having NTPC operateefficiently, thus keep the electric energy supply in the country at an

La. 2674-TN for the Gas Based Combined Cycle Power Project (FY68);La. 2844-IN for the National Capital Power Project (FY87); andLu. 2845-IN for the Talcher Thermal Power Project (FY67).

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adequate level. It is doubtful that GOI'S actions have resulted in SEBsimproving their operational efficiency as well as their billing and collectionpractices from their own customers. What is equally important, but so farreceived little attention, is the need for energy conservation on the customer(SEBs) side through adoption of appropriate tariffs and tariff structure at

SEBS and through end-use efficiencies.

8.5 The accounts receivable as of March 1990 were about Rs 11.5billion (scme US$500 million equivalent, and represented over six months ofcurrent billings). it was around the same time that the Bank took theexceptional step of cancelling the processing of a loan of USS375 million toNTPC for a project which had already been negotiated, primarily because of theinability of NTPC to reduce its accounts receivable. Since October 1992, GOIadopted new investment and comercial policies and electricity tariffs forNTPC. They are designed to introduce better commercial discipline at SEBs,along with improving NTPC's own operational and financial performance,including revenue collection. New two part bulk supply tariffs for NTPC coalfired stations became effective in November 1992. Further reforms in bulkpower and transmission tariffs will be studied and implemented under Loan3577-IN. The process of establishing commercial contracts between the SEBsand the central utilities is cumbersome, but progress is being made withstrong Bark support under Loan 3577-IN and the NTPC Power Generation Project.The new commercial policies and bulk power supply agreements should enableNTPC to reach a level of bill collection close to 100% during FY94.

8.6 The legal documents of the Loan adopted a sole covenant on NTPC'sfinancial performance, the conventional rate of return (ROR) on averagehistoric fixel assets in operation. An important objective of thisconventional ROR indicator is to serve as a measure of the adequacy ofrevenues compared to the cost of capital. Therefore, it has more appropriateapplication with mature utilities, and where the investment, which is notincluded in the rate base, is a fraction of the utility's net fixed assets inoperation (or the rate base). Table 8.1 indicates that throughout the entireproject implementation period i.e., FY84-FY92, the projected "Works inProgress" (WIP) was a substantially high proportion of the rate base; through1987, WIP was higher than the Gross Assets in Operation; for practicalpurposes the rate base was insignificant relative to the annual investment. Autility could well have a very high rate of return performance but be facedwith liquidity crisis, and the computation of other standard financialindicators such as operating ratio would not provide meaningfulinformation"2. One could, readily conclude that such a performance indicatorwas not appropriate for NTPC at the time. A more appropriate financialindicator under such circumstances is "contribution to the investment",because it targets at generating from internal sources a pre-determined levelof funds towards the on-going investment after taking into account debtservice and working capital requirements. Under the NTPC Power GenerationProject, NTPC agreed that it would produce, starting from FY95, funds from itsinternal cash generation equivalent to not less than 20% of its capitalexpenditures on a three-year moving average. The amount for FY94 would be 15%of the average of NTPC's capital expenditures for the FY93-PY95 period.

The most recent analysis of NTPC's finances is given in the SARfor the NTPC Power Generation Project (Report -o. 11827-IN; DatedJune 4, 1993).

9. Comuliance with Loan Covenants

9.1 The ke'y institutional and cost recovery covenants introduced inthe Loan and the Project Agreements and the extent they were complied with arelisted in Part III, Table R.

10. Sustainability and Internal Econ0omic Rate of Return

10.1 The project is sustainable, even though at present its componentsare not yet being fully utilized (paras. 7.3 and 7.4). Sustainability iscertainly assured'for the future, as the facilities built under the projectare integral components of POWERGRID' s system development program. However,insufficient generation and transmission tariffs and an unchecked increase ofNTPC's and POWMRGRID's accounts receivable could endanger such sustainability.The Bank, GOI, MTPC and POWERGRID have been taking actions to avoid suchoccurrence (paras. 8.5 and 8.6).

10.2 Because of the changes agreed by the parties on the projectdescription, it is not possible to make a reasonable comparison between theinternal economic rate of return (IERR) of the original and revised projectscopes. The IERR for NTPC/POWERGRID's time-slice investments for the FY84-FY92 period has been estimated at 11%. Under Loan 3577-IN, the IERR forPOWERGRID's time-slice investments during the FY93-FY2002 period was estimatedas 22%. The difference is explained by improvements in tariff settingparameters"3 and the unusually high inflation encountered in India in late1980s and early 1990s, which brought down tariff revenues in real terms(Part III, Table G).

11. Bank Performance

11.1 It is difficult to provide a judgement for a project whosedescription was substantially amended twice, albeit within its originalobjectives, and was really begun about four years from Board approval. TheBank might have cancelled Loan 2283-IN during the project hiatus in 1984-1987.But it might have lost an opportunity to influence transmission development inIndia. Instead the Bank opted to continue its dialogue with GOI, CEA, NTPCand POWERGRID on transmission system development and operations. The dialoguehas culminated with the recent approval of Loan 3577-IN (para. 2.6).

11.2 On another front, the Bank opted not to suspend disbursementsunder loans to NTPC, when NTPC fell into default of the accounts receivablecovenant and substantial arrears from SEBs began creating problems for thisCorporation's financial position and overall future (para. 8.2). Although theaccounts receivable covenant was not included in this Loan, the Bank hadconsiderable leverage in refusing to extend the closing date after March 1989,particularly, if the Bank had invoked the accounts receivable covenants inother on-going projects with NTPC. The Bank decided to continue its dialogueto encourage GOI to adopt for NTPC new investment and commercial policies, andelectricity tariffs. It alerted GOI and NTPC that the Bank's continued

The return on equity for projects started before FY90 was 10%; forthose projects started in FY91 and FY92 it was 12%. The returnhas since been adjusted to 16% for future projects. Depreciationwas also increased.

- 16 -

funding for their projects would no longer be possible unless actions tocorrect NTPC*s finances are taken. In 1990, the Bank decided not to presentto the Board the then-negotiated Regional Power Systems Project, because GQIand NTPC were unable to fulfill the conditions for Board presentation within areasonable time period. other multilateral and bilateral agencies followedthe Bank in limiting their financing of NTPC projects. All these actionshelped GO0 to initiate reforms in the power sector and adopt new investmentand commercial policies for NTPC. If the Bank had suspended disburs-nents, itmight have lost another opportunity, this time to influence reforms in powergeneration. In view of GO$'s, POmEGRIDo s and NTPC's recent actions prior tothe approval of Loan 3577-IN and negotiations of the NTPC Power GenerationProject, the Bank's above decisions bore their fruits.

11.3 Bank's supervision effort was concentrated mainly on theprocurement issues, in which area the Bank provided valuable help to NTPC. Itcovered as well, other important areas such as physical progress includingproblems in implementation, in disbursements performance, etc. However,visits to the work sites by each mission could not be undertaken because eachmission covered supervision of all Bank funded NTPC projects. it is concludedthat the Bank's performance under the project was satisfactory.

11.4 Even though contracts amounting to about US$23.2 millionequivalent were already committed (but not yet paid) under the project, andthere were ample funds still available in the loan account on March 31, 1992,the Bank did not extend the closing date of the loan for a fourth time. Justa year before, the Bank had extended the loan for the third time withoutstating this was the last extension or any other conditions. At that time theBank had also agreed on funding contracts which were originally to be financedby NTPC. This might have given GOI and NTPC the impression that the Bank wasfollowing the views of the January 1989 mission (para. 5.4). The Bank's 1992decision not to extend the closing date came as a surprise to GOI and NTPC andincreased NTPC's fiscal problems as the utility did not have the local andforeign funds to pay its suppliers and contractors on time. The Bank's actionstemmed from (i) its more stringent implementation of the policy on themanagement of the closing dates; and (ii) its desire to have NTPC reachpromptly, an agreement with POWERGRID on the transfer of the transmissionassets.

12. Borrower Performance

12.1 The performance of NTPC in the technical and managerial activitieswas satisfactory. Bank missions have reported delays in preparation ofspecifications, bidding documents and bid evaluations, and in preparing itsquarterly progress reports in a timely manner; these shortcomings, however,have been mainly due to the large workload of NTPC at the time and because theinformation needs to be collected from various sites which are located in

-17

remote places". The project provided continuing opportunity for NTPC toenlarge its skills and experience in procurement under ICB procedures, indesigning the transmission systems and in supervising their implementation andconstruction. The PCR mission was advised that the services of NTPC staff,involved in implementation of the HMVDC .ibstation, were subsequently used bythe supplier, on a consultancy basis, in the installation of {VDC substationin another country.

12.2 The only area where NTPC's performance fell considerably short ofexpectations was in bill recovery. Maintaining a specific level of accountsreceivables was not a condition of this loan and it was only introduced in1985 under Loan 255$-IN for the Rihand Transmission Project. Substantialarrears by SEBs affected NTPC's financial position adversely. NTPC maintainedit had little recourse against the defaulting SE8s, because of itsunderstanding that it could not cut off the power supply-to the defaultingSEES even if it wanted to. At present NTPC is carrying out more systematicand aggressive efforts at all levels of the organization (from the regionalmanagers to the CMD) to obtain letters of credit from SEBs for the appropriateaMounts of energy sales. These actions include seeking the intervention ofthe Minister of Power in order to collect dues from SEBs. GOT's newcommercial policies and new bulk power supply agreements should enable NTPC toreach a level of bill collection close to lo0o during FY94.

12.3 GOT has recently adopted new investment and commercial policiesand electricity tariffs allowing NTPC to shut-off or restrict power supply ifits clients are in default with their bulk supply agreements. These policiesare designed to introduce better commercial discirline at SEBs, along withimproving NTPC's own operational and financial performance, includingimproving revenue collection (para. 8.5).

12.4 There appears to be a difference in the positions of the Bank, GOIand the State Governments. The Bank's position is that the electricityindustry provides a service which has to be fully paid for by each customercategory (cross-subsidization permitted) through user charges. GOI seems tobe moving towards the Bank's position as shown by the measures and incentivestaken in recent years including recommendations to the state governments toincrease tariffs. The states in general, appear to perceive (sometimes forpolitical purposes) the provision of electricity as a social service and donot allow SEBs to operate independently and in line with commercial practices(para. 2.2). Furthermore, in an economy, where the public perception of apublic utility oftn is to provide primarily a social service, the use of aprofit criterion as the sole measure of the utility's financial performance isnot generating adequate public support.

13. Perfo.,rmance of Consultants and Contractors

13.1 The performance of consultants engaged in the design andconstruction of HVDC and 400 kV facilities was satisfactory. There was a

14 Furthermore, after the transfer of the management of NTPC'stransmission assets to POWERGRID, the information relating to thetransmission system are collected from this Corporation.Stabilization of a proper coordination system between the twoCorporations has taken some time.

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positive transfer of technical know-how from these consultants to NTPC staff.Barring a few problems and some minor delays, overall the performance of thecontractors/suppliers was also satisfactory. The packaging of contracts inappropriate sizes promoted participation from local manufacturing industry,and the Bank's and NTPC's involvements resulted in improvement in the qualityof the product.

14. Proiect RelationshiD

14.1 A good working relationship was maintained between the Bank andGOI and NTPC, and later also with 'OWERGRID.

1S. Prolect Dogumentation and Data

15.1 The project's legal agreements adequately reflected the objectivesof the project -nd the Bank's interests. The staff appraisal report provideda relatively useful framework for the Bank and NTPC during projectimplementation. One of the weaknesses of the SAR was that it did not verifywhether there was a full agreement and understanding on the part of the SEEsto pay for the transmission charges (paras. S.l and 5.2). Bank supervisionmissions appear to have been adequate in terms of their frequency. However,most of the missions had to supervise and/or prepare other projects. It istherefore likely that the missions were not able to make visits to some ofproject sites. Some of the important project documentation (e.g. supervisionmission reports, aide-memoires), project progress reports and annual financialstatements was not found in the Bank files.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDIA

CENTRAL POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT(LOAN 2283-IN)

PART I:: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

Comments by NTPC and Endorsed by the Government of India

A. Preface

1. The loan was made to India in May 1983 for on-lending to theNational Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC). The two main objectives of theproject were: (a) to support GOI's strategy to extend and improve powersupply through the establishment of centrally owned regional grids and intra-regional connections leading to the promotion of a national grid; and (b) toimprove, in the long run, the operational, institutional and financialperformance of the State Electricity Boards (SEBs), by assisting in thedevelopment of a financially sound, and technically and institutionallycompetent centrally-owned power utility which would serve as a model to SEBs.On August 16, 1991, the management of the project was transferred from NTPC toNational Power Transmission Corporation Ltd., under a Management contractsigned between the two corporations. On January 8, 1993, an ordinanceproviding for all the rights, titles and other interests related to thetransmission systems of NTPC to be transferred to POWERGRID (NPTC was laterrenamed as Power Grid Corporation of India) was promulgated by the Presidentof India.

B. Comments on the Analysis in Part-I

2. The analysis made by the Bank under Part-I is comprehensive andhas covered the important aspects. The analysis is generally in order.Nevertheless, there are certain issues which need to be further examinedkeeping in view the background of developments as they took place to betterappreciate the events. These are as follows:

Project Start-up and Imnlementation Schedule (reference nara. 5.2 of Part-I}

3. Actual dates of signing of BPSA (Bulk Power Supply Agreement) inSouthern region are as follows:

APSEB 22.3.1985KEB 21.3.1985TNEB 22.3.1985KSEB 10.4.1985GQA 17.4.1985

Extensions of the Closing date (reference nara. 5.4 of Part-I)

4. The Bank did not accept GOI's request to cover the expenditure onongoing contracts under the savings available under other ongoing loans toNTPC after loan closing date till POWERGRID System Development Project loan

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became effective. The continuity in Bank financing w-- sought on account ofcertain problems relating to the deemed export benefits to the contractors andalso relating to the import license.

Procurement (reference nara. 5.7 of Part-I)

5.1 In an effort to speed up procurement and after having extensivediscussions, NTPC had finalized with the World Bank a standard biddingdocument in April 1992. However, the Bank withdrew its "No-Objection" to thisstandard bidding document in December 1992 and wanted certain modifications tobe included. NTPC has now finalized standard bidding documents with the Bankbased on the suggested modifications and further discussions. NTPC will usethis document for procurement under the recently negotiated loan for NTPCPower Generation Project. This is expected to reduce the procurement time.Further, the proposed NTPC Power Generation Project, negotiated with the Bankin May 1993 would be under time slice concept which would help in bringingabout timely disbursements.

5.2 NTPC has started giving further emphasis to finishing promptly thepayments to the contractors.

Prolect Costs (reference para. 5.8 of Part-I)

6. It has been stated that "that costs at appraisal were overestimated". It is clarified that the basis of costing during the appraisalhad been explained in the Staff Appraisal Report. It, inter-alia, states thatthe estimates for the main items of equipment and material are based on thequotations received since 1980 for similar projects such as the 400 kV linksand sub-stations associated with Singrauli, Korba, Ramagundam and FarakkaPower Plants with prices updated to mid-1982 price levels. On the other hand,the exchange rate changes have played a major role in bringing down theproject cost in dollars terms.

Financial Performance (reference nara. 8.2 to 8.5 of Part-f)

7. In the discussions on accounts receivable presented in Section 8of the Part I, the Bank has included the amount due to NTPC by way of CentralAppropriation in the accounts receivables. 0OI has in the past orderedCentral Appropriation of plan assistance funds to State sectors for offsetingtheir dues to Central sector agencies like NTPC. Such amounts are being paidto NTPC as per agreed schedules and the Bank had been kept informed about thearrangement since August 1990. Considering that these were committed paymentsfrom G01, the amounts were set off against the dues of the SEBs and NTPC'saccounts receivable reduced by the total amount of Central appropriation.

As has been mentioned in para. 8.3, during the negotiations of theproposed NTPC Power Generation Project, agreement was reached that NTPC wouldmaintain the level of its accounts receivable at two months of salesequivalent excluding the amount still to be paid through the Centralappropriations for which a specific payment schedule was also agreed.

8. The Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank conductedthe performance audit of few Bank-funded projects, namely Korba (Credit 793-IN), Ramagundam (Credit 874-IN and Loan 1648-IN), Singrauli-1I (Credit 1027-IN) and Farakka (Credit 1053-IN and Loan 1887-IN). In its report No. 10854

21 -

published in February 1993, the Audit Mission has summed up NTPC's financialpolicy in a paragraph as below:

"NTPC has reached its large size (it is India's largest corporate entityin terms of fixed assets) in a record time without jeopardizing orcompromising its financial viability, even in spite of the accountsreceivable issue. This is a performance that very few utilities in thesame situation are able to achieve. The performance is even moreimpressive since NTPC is stili in a major investment mode. A good partof NTPC's above-par performance is to be credited to GOI's originaldesign (e.g., debt-equity ratio set at a conservative 1:1; tariffformula to pass on all investment, operation, and financial costs.)"1

9. As is common practice in transaction of a commodity likeelectricity, the agreements allow the beneficiary of its energy supply aperiod of 30 days from issue of the bills for making payments'. Therefore,outstanding should be reckoned after expiry of this period of 30 days.

Bank Performance (reference Daras. 11.2 fi 11.3 of Part-I)

10. It has been stated that the Bank's decision not to present to theBoard the then proposed Regional Power System Project because of GOI andNTPC*s inability to fulfil the conditions for Board presentation within areasonable time period, has helped GOI to promote reforms in the power sector.It is worth mentioning that the sectoral reforms are brought about graduallywith time. It is easier to bring out such changes when they are accompaniedby large development programmes such as the proposed US$1.2 billion time sliceloan operation of World Bank for NTPC Power Generation Project.

Comments by POWERGRID and Endorsed by the Government of India

Environment. Resettlement and Rebhailitation

11.1 In the context of transmission projects there is no significantimpact on environment except in the cases where the transmission lines involveany forest area. The impact of transmission line projects on environment isnot considered as severe as in case of thermal, hydel, nuclear power projects.This is primarily because the effect on forest due to laying of tranmissionlines is reversible and can be nullified by planting more trees.

11.2 With the worldwide concern over the fast depleting forestreserves, due consideration is given to these aspects at the planning anddesigning stage itself. While identifying the transmission system for CTP-I,detailed surveys were conducted by the executing agency in association withthe state forest authorities to identify most suitable route having minimuminfringement on forest land. Where trees had to be felled in order to provideaccess to the lines, trees of a corresponding number were planted in thevicinity as per guidelines from Ministry of Environment and Forest.

11.3 Sites for construction of the sub-stations were generally selectedin uninhabitated areas remote from the population centers. Hence, the-resettlement and rehabilitation-of people did not arise.

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Final Pavments

12. The loan was originally scheduled to be closed on March 31, 1989.But the project configuration underwent major revision following thereluctance of SEBs to pay the fixed transmission charges associated with thisproject and also because of changes in load generation scenario in SouthernRegion than what was envisaged at the planning stage. The revised projectconfiguration was approved in August 1987. Thereafter, Bank decided to extendthe loan closing date by one year each time for a total of 36 months to March1992. The total disbursement of loan till March 1992 was US$131.49 million.Further, the Bank has included funding tne balance portion of the on-goingcontracts retroactively under the niew POWERGRID System Development Project(Loan No. 3577-IN).

Procurement

13. GOI approval for the revised project was accorded in August 1987and immediately thereafter the exercise for placement of award for towerpackage (for eight transmission lines) was begun. Awarding took 6 to 8 monthsto complete. This was possible due to advance planning in preparation of biddocument. However, this time could have been further reduced by around amonth had the Bank approval been obtained in a period of about 15 days. Asregards procurement of domestic goods and services, a comprehensiveprocurement action plan resulted in cutting down of award time, and henceachieved the completion of project without any delays.

Evaluation of the Borrower's Own Performance

14.1 The project has achieved its objectives. With the satisfactorycompletion of the project, the power transmission capacity, security andreliability in the Southern region has increased. The inter-connectionbetween the Northern and the Western regions is currently used for limitedexchange of power between the two regions and helps the stability of thesystems.

14.2 Unlike the previous Bank funded power projects, this project wassolely for the purpose of transmission system. Since NTPC had alreadyacquired sufficient experience in the area of design and engineering of 400 kVtransmission lines and substations, entire basic and detailed engineering workfor the 400 kV transmission lines and substations was carried out byNTPC/POWERGRID in-house.

14.3 This project also provided an opportunity for NTPC/POWERGRID togain valuable experience in procurement under ICB procedures, which was laterused for other Bank financed projects. Also the first time introduction ofHVDC technology with this project helped NTPC staff to enlarge its skills andto gain valuable experience in the execution of HVDC substation, which waslater used, on a consultancy basis, in the installation of HVDC stations inother countries.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDIA

CENTRAL POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT(LOAN 2283-IN)

PAMT III- STATTSTICAL SUMMARY

A. Related IDA Credits and Bank Loans

_r./Loan No - Year ofand Title Purose aMoval Status Comments

Cr. 685-IN To help reduce the power April 1977 Closed The project

Singrauli shortage in the Northern on June was successfully

Thermal Power Region through the con- 30, 1984 completed

Project struction of the 3x200

NW initial phase of

the NTPC's first largecoal fired thermal power

plant with associated 400

kV transmission lines.

Cr. 1027-IN Assist NTPC to mitigate May 1980 Closed The project

Second power shortages in the on June was successfully

Singrauli Northern Region through 30, 1989 completed.

Thermal the construction ofPower 2x200 MW and 2x500 MW

Project coal-fired units and

associated 400 kVtransmission lines.

Cr. 793-IN To help reduce the power April 1978 Closed The project

Korba shortage in Western on March was successfully

Thermal Region through the con- 31, 1986 completed.Power struction of the 3x2ao

Project MW coal fired thermalpower plant with associated400 kV transmission lines.

Cr. 1172-IN To help reduce power July 1981 Closed The project

Second Korba shortages in the Western on was successfullyThermal Region through the con- December completed.

Power struction of 3x500 MW 31, 1991

Project coal-fired units and

associated 400 kV

transmission lines.

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Cr. /Loan No. Year ofand Title Puroose A&nroval Statug Comments

Ln.1648-IN & To help: (a) solve January Closed The project

Cr. 874-IN rationing in the 1979 on was successfully

Ramagundam Southern Region by June completed.Thermal Power providing 3x200 MW 30, 1987

Project generating units; (b)assist G0I in achievingits objective of furtheradvancing the regionaland ultimately thenational integration ofthe power sub-sector.

Loan 2076-IN Alleviation of power December Closed The project

Second shortages in the 1981 March was successfully

Ramagundam Southern Region through 31, 1992 completed.Thermal the construction of

Power 3x200 MW and 3x500 MWProject coal-fired units and

associated 400 kVtransmission lines.

Sectoral Ob,ectives Common to All the Above Prolects

In addition to the This purposeabove project-wide was not fullyobjectives, the sectoral attained

objective was to assistNTPC become an efficientutility (implementation ofprojects, operation ofpower plants, institution-and finance-wide) to form amodel to the poor performingSEBs.

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B. Project Timetable

Date Date1Item Planned Date Actual

-Appraisal Mission October 1982

Credit Negotiation April 18-22, 1983

Board Approval May 19, 1983

Credit Signature June 8, 1983

Credit Effectiveness Sept. 9, March 29, 19841983 /a

Credit Closing March 31, a) 3/31/90 March 31. 19921989 b) 3/31/91

Completion of Disbursements September 8, 1992

/a At Loan signing.

C. DisbursWements (Estimated aqd Actual)(US$ million)

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

(a) Estimate 3.5 20.0 90.0 180.0 240.5 2S0.7 250.7 2S0.7 a/

(b) Actual - 0.6 0.6 0.8 19.8 26.1 40.5 84.0 126.7 131.5

Ratio (b)/(aW - 3% 7t 4% 8% 10% 16% 34*

I/ US$50 million from the Loan amount was cancelled on December 5, 1991.

kl The Final Disbursement was in September 1992.

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D. Installation and Commissioning of Transmission Linesand Sub-stations/Switchyard (*Y

A. Installation of 400 kV AC

Transmission Lines Commissioned in Lenath (kml.

1. Ramagundam-Khammam (S/C) March 1992 202

2. Khammam-Vijayawada (S/C) March 1992 £$0

3. Vijayawada-Gazuwaka (S/C) January 1992 317

4. Nagarjunasagar-Gooty (S/C) July 1991 298

S. Gooty-Bangalore (S/C) July 1991 _302

Total Single Circuit Lines: 1,229

B. 400 kV-Inter-Regional System

1. Ramagundam-Chandrapur (D/C) February 1991 180

2. Vindhyachal-Singrauli (D/C) December 1987 . 4

Total Double Circuit Lines: 184

C. 400 kV AC Sub-stations/Switchyard Extensions

1. Khammam (new) March 1992

2. Vijayawada (new) January 19923. Gazuwaka (new) January 1992

4. Gooty (new) July 1991

S. Ramagundam (ext) February.19916. Chandrapur (ext) February 19917. Vindhyachal (ext) December 1987

8. Singrauli (ext) December 1987

9. Bangalore (ext) March 1990

10. Nagarjunasagar (ext) March 1991

(*) Commissioning dates estimated in SAR for the original project

are given in Annex 1.

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E. Project Costs - Estimated and Actual

Estimated Actu,alRs Million USS Million Rs Milli2o PS$-Millign

400 kV lines 1,435.10 151.04 2,416.5 128.9400 kV substations 851.90 89.66 1,092.6 57.0Back-to-back HVDCsubstation 813.45 85.62 1,556.4 59.1

Metering andInstrumentation 201.60 21.22 95.6 5.2

PLCC Communications 39.47 4a1 72.9 4.0

Sub-total 3,341.52 351.69 5,234.0 254.2

Physical Contingencies 171.17 18.03

Price Contingencies 915.6 96.4?

Total 4,428.65 466.19 5,234.0 254.2

Consultancy 23.75 2.50 10.0 0.5

Engineering andAdministration 297.4S 31.31 178.7 9.7

Total Project Cost 4,749.85 S00.00 5,422.7 264.4(before dutiesand taxes)

Duties and Taxes 617,$Q 65.00

Total Project Cost 5,367.35 565.00

Interest DuringConstruction 490.31 51.58

Front-End Fee 6.65 t.7Q

Total FinancingRequired 5,864.31 617.28 5,422.7 264.4

wwl:wSW t==wW $"""GW t:umam

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F. Allocation of Loan Proceeds(Original and Actual)

(MtS million)

Loan Agreement Actual

(1) Equipment and Materials 235,000,000 123,721,729.58

(2) Consultants' Services 2,500,000

(3) Pee 625,18? 625,187.00

(4) Associated civil worksand erection 7,316,027.03

Unallocated 12,574,813

Difference due to crossexchange rates onSpecial Accounttransactions ( 169,045.60)

Total disbursed 131,493,898.01

Amount cancelled(Dec. 5, 1991) 50,000,000.00

Amount cancelled(Sept. 8, 1992) 69,206,101.99

Original Loan Amount 250,000,000 250,700,000.00

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G. Summary of the Internal Economic Rate of Return Computations /a

OUTFLOW INFLOW NET Discounted @Investment O & M Revenue OUTFLOW 11.10%

0 1985-86 3155.8 10.0 135.0 3030.9 3030.91 1986-87 1965.8 15.8 214.3 1767.3 1590.72 1987-88 2496.6 21.9 286.5 2231.1. 1807.43 1988-89 2184.9 34.9 359.0 1860.7 1356.74 1989-90 1673.3 77.8 773.2 977.9 641.75 1t90.91 1402.5 86.2 962.9 625.9 310.66 1991-92 1254.0 110.4 1370.9 -6.4 -3.47 1992-93 207.9 133.4 1740.7 -1399.4 -669.68 1993-94 718.8 204.9 2210.4 -1285.7 -553.79 1994-95 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -777.410 1995-96 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -699.711 1996-97 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -629.812 1997-98 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -566.913 1998-99 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -510.214 1999- 0 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -459.215 2001- 1 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -413.316 2002- 2 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -372.017 2002- 3 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -334.818 2003- 4 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -301.419 2004- 5 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -271.320 2005- 6 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -244.121 2006- 7 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -219.722 2007- 8 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -197.823 2008- 9 204.9 2210.4 -2006.5 -178.024 2009-10 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -160.225 2010-11 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -144.226 2011-12 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -129.827 2012-13 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -116.828 2013-14 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -105.229 2014-15 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -94.630 2015-16 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -85.231 2016-17 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -76.732 2017-18 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -69.033 2018-19 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -62.134 2019-20 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -55.935 2020-21 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -50.336 2021-22 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -45.337 2022-23 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -40.838 2023-24 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -36.739 2024-25 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -33.040 2025-26 204.9 2210.4 -2005.5 -29.7

The inteemal rate of return of the project is computed as 11. I%.

La Detail tables have been forwarded to Asia Information Center.

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H. Status of Compliance of Covenants

Section Summary of Undertaking (Covenant) Status

LA 2.02(b) GOI shall maintain a special account in Comptiedamended U.S. Dollars

LA 3.01 (b) GOI onlending to NTPC under terms acceptable Compliedto the Bank (not less than 12% per annum)

LA 4.03 GOI to furnish audit on special account Compliedamended (due within 6 months of FY end)

LA 4.04 GOI to furnish audit on SOEs (due within Receivedamended 6 months of FY end)

PA 2.0413.04 NTPC to take out adequete insurance Complied

LA 4.02 (a) For goods to be supplied from overseas, CompliedGOI to promptly grant permission to import them; (bureaucratic

delays)

'b) For goods to be manufactured in India, CompliedGOl to promptly issue import licenses, (bureaucraticmake available necessary foreign exchange delays)and allocate materials

PA 2.02 NTPC to employ engineering consultants to assist Compliedin carrying out Part F of the Project

PA 4.02 NTPC to have its accounts and financial statements Compliedaudited and to submit audited reports, within seven (delays inmonths of the end of the year to the Bank earlier years)

PA 4.03 NTPC to set tariffs and other actions to achieve Complieda rate of return of not less than 9.5% p.a. fromApril 1, 1990 and thereafter

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1. Use of Bank Resources

I . 1 Staff Inouts

Staff inputs in carrying out the various tasks through the project cycle from preparationin FY83 to completion in FY93 were as follows:

Task Inout (Staff-weeks)

Project Preparation - 27.5Project Appraisal 40.7Loan Negotiations 04.1Project Supervision 46.3Project Administration .t

TOTAL 118.7

I 2 Missions

Project Cycle Month/ Number of Days Specializaffon Performance Type ofYear Persons in /a Rating /0 Problems If

Field

Throuah Anoraisal

Identification 1dPreparation /aPre-appraisal 14Appraisal 10182

SuoervisionSupervision 1 05/19185 to 06/17/85 2 E; FA 1Supervision 2 02/19186 to 03102/86 1 FA 4Supervision 3 03/20187 to 04101/87 2 E; FA 4Supervision 4 01/18/88 to 02/22/88 4 E; E; FA; FA 2Supervision 5 08/16/89 to 08/30/89 2 E; EC 2Supervision 6 02/17/91 to 02/26/91 1 E 2Supervision 7 07122/91 to 07/30191 2 E; FA 2

/a E: Engineer; LO: Loan Officer; FA: Financial Analyst; EC: Economist1 1 = No or minor problem; 2 = moderate problem; 3 - major problem/£ I: Implementation delays; Pft: Procurement problems and delays/1 Identifcation was made by GOI in 1974. Preparation and prappraisal were made

by NTPC in 1978.

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Annex 1INDIA

CENTRAL POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT(Loan 2283-IN)

DescriDtion of the Original Proiect

The original project approved by the Board on May 19, 1983, consisted of the followingcomponents:

Part A 400 kV AC Transmission Lines (Construction)Estimated in SAR

AgDroximate Le2ngth to be commissiond by

Ramagundam-Mangur double circuit line 230 km June 1987Mangur-Vijayawada, double circuit line 160 km December 1987Vijayawada-Nellore, single circuit line 305 km June 1987Nellore-Red Hills, single circuit line 246 km December 1987Singrauli-Vindhyschal, single circuit line 14 km March 1988Ramagundam-Chandrapur, double circuit line 158 km March 1988

Ear£ Suststaons (400/200 kV) (Construction or Extension)Ramagundam - extension for the 400 kV Ramagundam-Chandrapur line and for the

second 400 kV Ramagundam-Mangur circuit (the equipment for the fircircuit was provided under the Second Ramagundam Thermal PowerProject)

Mangur - new {1x315 MVA)Vijsyawada - new (1x315 MVA)Nellore - new 11x315 MVA)Red Hills - extension for the 400 kV Nellore-Red Hills lineChandrapur - extension for the 400 kV Ramagundam-Chandrapur lineSingrauli - extension for the 400 kV Singrauli-Vindhyachal lineVindhyachal - extension for the 400 kV Singrauli-Vindhyachal line

In SAR, the sub-stations were estimated to be commissioned with their associated transmissionlines.

Part C 500 MW HVDC Sub-stat«onThe construction of a (two 250 MW) back-to-back sub-station at Vindhyachal (estimated in SAR

to be commissioned In March 1988).

Elrm. Metering and InstrumentationInstallation of tariff metering systems and disturbance recorders in important sub-stations of the

Northern, Western and Southem Regional grids.

Pnrt g gommunicationsThe acquisition and utilization of power line carrier communication (PLCC) equipment for speech

transmission, line protection and data transmission on each 400 kV transmission line.

Part F Technical ServicesUtilization of technical services for the carying out of detailed equipment and system ngineeri

and supervision during construction, for the High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) back-to-back Inter-tie atVindhyachal linking the Singrauli and Korba power stations.

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Annex 2INDIA

CENTRAL POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Description of the Revised Proiect

After the loan was signed, GOI obtained financing from Sweden for the HVDC sub-stationAt GOI request, in January 1985, the Bank agreed to make the change in the project description and to treallocation of the loan funds. NTPC did not initiate the construction of the 400 kV transmission lines ansubstations -in the Southern Region until the SEBs in this region agreed to pay for the transmission chargeThe last agreement was signed in April 1987. almost four years after the approval of the loan by the banIn the meantime, the project components in the Southern Region transmission system underwent majorrevision. The reasons for the revision were as follows: (il Even before the Loan Negotiations, some of thSEBs had been questioning NTPC the usefulness to themselves of the transmission lines being constructeunder the Ramagundam project (Loan 2076-IN), and had been expressing reluctance to pay the chages fthose transmission lines. The discussions between NTPC and those SEBs became protracted. partlybecause the SEBs had not dealt before with a centrally-owned utility tariffs which they thought were toohigh, while at the same time each one of those SEBs had already been allocated a specified share ot thepower from the Ramagundam plant; (ii) The load generation scenario in the Southern Region had changedsubstantially from that prepared by CEA in 1982, which was the basis for the transmission system of thesubject project. The construction of the Manguru (because of environmental and other problems) and theextension of the Viiayawada thermal power plants were deferred beyond the Seventh Plan period. Inaddition, there was a change in the power demand scenario, with higher priority being allocated to thedevelopment of small-scale industry and to rural electrification in the region; and (iii) The plan to constructhe coastal transmission line (Viiayawada-Nellore-Madras) was abandoned because of the increased riskfrom the serious cyclones on the coast. After lengthy discussion between NTPC, the SEBs and with theinvolvement of CEA, a new transmission system configuration was proposed. It should be noted that thepower from the Ramagundam thermal plant was delivered to its customers, albeit under less than optimatransmission conditions, while the above changes were being decided upon.

On November 16, 1986, the Bank agreed on the revision of Parts A and 8 of the project as per thefollowing:

Status of Transmission ines and Sub-stations/Switchina Stations after Revision

A. 400 kV AC Transmission Lines LenoathRamagundam-Khammam (single circuit) 202 kmKhammam-Vijayawada (single circuit) 110 kmVijayawada-Gazuwaka (single circuit) 317 kmNagarjunasagar-Gooty (single circuit) 298 kmGooty-Bangalore (single circuit) 302 kmSingrauli-Vindhyachal (double circuit) 4 kmRamagundam-Chandrapur (double circuit) 180 km

B. Sub-stations/Switching StationsRarn'gundam (Ext) Hyderabad-Nagarjunasagar (Ext) Chandrapur (Ext)Khammam (New) Nagarjunasagar (Ext) Singrauli (Ext)Vijayawada (New) Gooty (New) Vindhyachal (Ext)Gazuwaka (New) Bangalore (Ext)

Other parts of the project were not changed.• Date of Agreement by the Bank: November 16, 1986* Date of Finalization by GOB: August 1987

MAD

CEIURAL POER MISSION PROJECT(Loan 2288-IN)

PMOJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Avol.bllbt oI Transmlieln Line and Sub-sttion In 9lm

Li. Ju s2 Feb Nor 92 Apr 92 kby 92 Jon 92 Jul 92 Aug 92 Sp 92 Oct92 Nov 92 Dec 92 Jan-oc 92

TRANSMISSION LI

1. 101143l 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.70 100.00 98.91 100.09 100.00 99.6

2. RD1-CPR2 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.08. NSR-GTy 99.06 99.85 100.00 99.70 90.60 97.90 98.28 96.00 07.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 09.04. TT-L 9.99 99.99 100.00 100.00 90.70 100.00 09.04 06.02 90.02 09.02 100.00 100.00 9.6. VJAW - - 94. 99.2 100.00 95.89 100.00 55.10 100.00 100,00 100.00 90.10 ".6

6. RD3-4WM !/ - 96.14 89.98 96.28 90.80 100.00 92.00 100.00 100,00 100.00 99.69 97.0

7. KMt-VAJ j - - 96.61 90.?g 97.41 90.19 100.00 92.46 100.00 99.52 93.60 91.88 95.7

/ LUr nas c_oiiond on March 20, 1992jy Excluding avallability In Auguet 1992

SUB-STATIONS

1. VIJa ywdb 100.00 90.99 99.52 100.00 100.00 99.03 100.00 12.24 - 96.84 100.00 92.60 90.4 sJ

2. "yderobed 99.60 100.00 08.6 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0 cSI8. O*uwWak 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.72 100.00 90.11 100.00 92.54 100.00 100.00 100*.0 100.00 00.0 1

4. Bengalore 100.00 100.00 100.00 89.96 100.00 100.00 99.63 100.00 100.00 9.90 93.6s 100.00 90.4 Q6. GOoy 100.00 100.00 99.79 99.U0 99.69 99.09 99.20 98.20 100.00 99.52 100.00 100.00 99.2

Excluding sutd n In AuJut A September 1Mi% Ex0:0: shutdown In March 1992dExeludln shutdXown In August 199

Excluing *huton In April 1992

I NA, "IIUL 130WL MM tWPAnT0 LTD.

* N Eic" PrAT90ES

* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oS. .1111mm)

7 lt owing 1 1S 1 197 1109 1900 A9 1

* D636 013'tI FPOMM6 4,915 F.ee.l cil FOMW6 At.al Fores ibetl Frouu_t ALterni fu.rel LAbel FreseeS-Aetuel forosot Ag1..

U Iterel law 0. "esse. (M) 9,294 14,14 15.921 19*,8 2n.2,8 6,59l 45."s 61,197

1I tow CA ee=.(W )on 1.515 1,615 I,m 2.421 S.14 5,65 4.54

IS uat$* W e. two 9156 *#,0 u,492 12.150 1,446 14,406 17,Vo9 17,3 25.4 24. 11,451 5.421 46.94 40,'06 4.759 ."5?

14U . IbTewiff (PTleS) 27 so n6 40 40 40 41 41 46 4 81 44 46 1is

17 Ussidt ,Is. 0M 077 4,4t1 4,2e 58 .7u 727 7,901 10,715 MM.460 6 ,81 19,617 21,254 22,6 4,4

is Vnu_e.1e. a..,. 144 964 6 1,1769 "9 19" 2.4" 5.742

19 wetrlet 9 18 st at 1 *U 24 a Ut1 47" 171 M5 4 . 547 "01 4UMae Z1am 15M 10 932 To70 M i5 7 Ur 2 "a 11s 1.5 93 *, 1s 2,05 1.884

St 1AL 7 FATh 6 5,210 ,430 4,064 6,"4 $,5 7 ,454 6,145 6,62S2 I2.I 12.743 17.264 20.515 236 24.207 26,910 8,92

14 0mI C.S 1,15 .1.9 1.159 1,160 1,649 *,1 2.600 8, $5,7 ,965 4,461 9,760 38,424

66' , 1.672

0 Usssl. m" a I lueses. 404 4 m4y 6 72M WY7 964 1.175 1.1 1,745 loan 2,106 974

of oeul tio 6 577 77" 445 1,075 S7" 2,015 912 9,"l I.5 5.974 2,251 5,54 $3.6

tgd etlowtW 112 III 7 6 16 93 404 179 S" 994 740 SO4 45s

s0o 5. 10 21 1 9 3 147 133 *! 1PM. Jt 371 IP1e1 1.704 12.642 3M 92,945 3.1M5 8.22 4.676 4,732 7,02 7,550 10.4s 12,567 2,9s 14,577 14,406 24.134

Sl 0.. 1_s. 1.. Swn 1,6'6 1,9 9,91 s.as 1.T4? 2,951 8.457 S,910 4,120 5,190 6,041 6,00 9,49 f,630 11.61, 15.7"

84 .... *.... * 64 49 1,137 R70 .40 S" 2.600 I24m 4,035 1t,71 .494 2.780 5.7 5.472 5.586 65.4

65P19 bdl fors Tom "9 904 All01 1,781 1,94 1,05 97 2.662 485 3.19 1.347 5,n7 5.46 $,56 5.05 30,151

Jt FoSi oiler *e 69 9 04 1.501 1.760t 146 2,064 957 2.652 4es 5,596 1,547 5.27 5.64 5,166 5.025 30,15

so him orSod Ise .eb) to9) 60 Is M2 (90) 90 M5 n

M lbS rftI GU 87 ttOt 1,6 1,246 2,t11 "67 8,024 45 8,306 1,847 .611 ,44 7,009 526 1.920

40 Avon" M" pled Am*t 10,957 14,016 ",66 17.90 51,025 25.651 76,046 85.075 41.466 68,U5 9,2 75.402101,077 102,045

411t18 of uM so hOe itn M75 6 176 7S 1 .n is M5 u0ts M5 Ito 1in

48 ots4 ftA Id M.... .. in as us on o " " Ul M_n M u

46* , tled. defed .eo Peo.pSIeIeV . .ha Ops..s.rst. la atoewe e"d oeetlueonstee.46 O*Sb la e6 .teiIoia o. be* 6 aed. f..' futue peejeoble..

80

81 IMTI&LM 1IHWAL Pt CA7rTE

McB AND APPLCATION Of BOS64

5 WgR md 9 Ibt l 81

a Iwo 1966 199 I96 196 100 199 1WItNt ea - 0 1-6 - 'nn-'.e' -.. n -59 -6. I A , forone 1 .e.Fcr.1 A.upI ftercm.1 Actu1a Forenel A.t4. Vv.g4 AdamS FW*cow. AIut Pt.0,6 Ackd*$tlO CB eF tU04 - --- -- - - -- _- -. ~-U 6p.t1t 1*lo". b. Ial. 1.606 l,JN *,21 1.8 174? 1*"I 8.467 *.910 4.50 8,19 6,41 .006 9.416 9,660 11,11 18.79462 Prl ttI .tetem 0 16 s0 as 1s U() t 65OS 0.pmi.lIa*F() s7o * 16 m 77 9 446 1.076 5" 1.065 912 1.6S1 1,46 8.174 2.181 8,648 8.62544 Tout It.brst Cash Gas. 1,0 1,661 2,04 2.m 8.56 0.461 4.54 4.681 4.855 0.0t '.61 9.402 2,02 1U.7U 14.464 1,49O6 Spiwt cOs.6h95... 1U.64 4.659 6,29 $,66 9.480 8,969 J.OW 6.07 8564 8.6 6748 4.54 8,86 12.81* 0 6,6WUS CpIRel Iwdlp 1 114 14 07 t U? 6

T7 Los" Contd 64,m 4,416 1,2 6,761 1t,42 J,6S6 9.94 4.66 4,676 11.U71 12.4 .72 4 6 ,019 4,4N 15848771 O1 0 1.83 4 4.SO6 4.394 1.499 4.s46 4.0001 T.4"n1 Total 6mn'1.p 0.225 4.416 98,6 7,6 18.416 10,165 9.094 9.160 6,670 16.471 21.84 1.056 6S 9,019 4.6176 6.421

74~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.n TIL 94*to 2,661 t,011 24,7 14.60 19,4D 19,40 186, 94 16.79?7 19,151 16,79* 2,307. 19.68 6.66 9.16 8.4

7677 t.l. 1a.1, 16 ,696 10011 16,86 14.846 17.449 17.606 18,866 17.660 11,657 19.064 8,n6 10.897 10.52 ,167 9,906 61.784T6 0.81 Swt.

7 b19,. Omesd to 0w. 614 492 70 1,499 666 2,600 1,246 4,08 .1"t *,494 .7160 6.72 8.472 S. 8.64*00 Aawtl5a41. d ftos- - S0 47 - 768 747 1,97 Sim7 2."T7 $.42 .5 2.5691*To It D bl Gargle 64 49 87 *,799 66 2,97 1.248 4, ,620 2.6 711 6.,I7 6.79 6,016 9,.42 6,1462 1w. (D...) l. V. C. 460 2,312 166 6 416 (6.416) 60 6.011 87 .041 5S9 J.Wm I" (0.6668 PomiI.. for T. 1 064 T* AICA"TW OP IUOS 0,66 10,98 6ffO0 19,620 20.984 18.414 #6,066 4.$71 19.7 67,141O5 606 6 102 16 5,51 10 (.156) *a 1.109. a 60 2.24441 m Cm66i0t.0 to Cmi.r. -0.01 9 10 49 40 11 -Am 241 .19 SIX 171 513 15187 t1 to C.,*. (5vt# AP)

$0 rvil. Ce,... 8.68 8.82 4.61' 1.9 S. 1.5 8.69 1.56 2.67 1.6 I.49 1.44 2.64 1.64 2.6.*69

60(0) 0.pl1tm1 pertla.6 peII.m. I*t1

NATIONAL TERHAL POWER CORPORATION

91 eauacu Sf771~~~~~~~~~~~~1111 oni

U Ye,, s41. Shre 1 196 196 19.7 19 1909 1990 199 19929 _. - _ - - . . ..... .

m WD = Acfmi $ Actoo& FcaroFe"% le*¢.................................................. re ere**

102 A0S

1o ae" 11u.6 21I04 zs.,a "107 16,047 86.68 2D.b1. 704 0s , 60.00 9000 44,7t4 106,990 09,81 111,433 9422 U1114 11,18104 LettO90geuItld 476 1,266 908 2.04? L,416 e.2 S.0I9 1.210 3,00 7.14& 4.64 11.008 6.67? 14,400 1o.,mUS 14. Plood Aseee Is Ope. 1*064.00 112.0 14.690 16f,44 .84.683 10.278 7,2106 20.489 04,800 41.716 "0,096 61,410 100,611 0,640 101,70 1,3451s0 599. Verb. In Prestor e 19,10 41,604 $1,069 56,01 44.301 85.704 52.10? 27.112 57,002 19,091 1.660 95.30? 0.03 00,414 70,000I09W 1.1 Fixed Aeet. 11004.00 02,480 13.774 4.211 90.462 0811,70 10*.90 00.026 112,492 ",78 116.06 117.77 11.076 141.664 12,940 190.426

160 e ed Pee Oblee 11 04 Is .448 19 18 a 1.7 45 2 u 21 6S a"4 u 1.742lit son-tw dpell.o 8 7 1,68 7I7 4,644 5,64 6.27 6.46611 lwelabl.e 240 1&,01 s8 2.234 447 .02* 00 4.05c 693 5.901 1,259 11,801 1.610 1.102 1.640 16.086In lveeloere 211 700 16 9o 869 1,01 70 1.742 901 2,6U9 1.060 3.632 1.114 5,414 1,102 7.30114 Lee S Ad.." 81 1.2 .,646* 7 2,614 1.024 2.0I 1.4971,0t&.. Cr. A. 2,t/ t 2 .1 2 to 1 4 176 2 104 2 626 231 2 S"$so Tell C.s...S Meet. 470 8.161 m6 9.129 "? 9.12? 1841 18.469 1,461 1u,164 2.74 22.767 2.ro2 6.79 6,062 84.495 I17 wIe.cepiwl aspwelwre t1 to to 17 so 10 41 t Iu11 IUIM s85 * 04 86.718 74.419 622.521 91.19 72.71 *04.921 *4.112 114.833 14,660 120,400 140,6U94 ".47 170.424 138,802 224.919S"

121 U4tu16

mm She" Coptlil teemd 20,62 26.466 47,110 821.61 50,11? WI,6S 53,651 44,076 57,421 46,640 s3,ns 5.27 0.995 69,641118 U ie0.pe 2911 990 734 2.00, 78 1,00 4.814 877*14 P ed Ceale 1,402 8,231 0,6817 54.s 4,484 6.511 5,11 11.," 6.40 17.193 0,112 14.420 1S.987 64.8S1 Te Ilbt 0 22.210 0 80.00 50. 89.040 54.751 40.976 u.6e0 14,052 183.69 66,038 74.10? 07,971 79.02 104.744

116 T.lt4 Beep-Ieee 0.16 10.814 17,?29 40,5t2 1764r" 49,2a0 87.124 1,.173 49.446 6.*0, 5,9.19 6f,6 4 7.96 40r24 97.761 orre.6 Mobs 8 f llw m4 8.061 in9 8,091 1t0 8.77 14 6.014 840 0,78 O 11,742 655 $5.16S0 75" 22.44

"1 Totel 0.6 04 *3.445 1S 21.620 40.122 33.672 49.514 45.188 5S1A3 66.526 511,0' 72.641 64.151 0.464 5,460 120.21419 1A3 64 .7m 1" 52,e4 1,m192 72,J20 104,265 94.1) *14.33 114,500 *90,401 140,694 126.406 170.41 166.412 224.956to

"18 DeblstuIbg Ilato am2 86/64 421/ 48/67 47/63 47/5 48/57 401/9 46622 Cewree #Mte, *.6 1.0 8.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 5.? 1.7 6.1 1.6 4.7 1.6 4.2 1.9 4.1 1.8

1011 SAs. 1oeiva. (.e of 901) n 7I a In 60 n7 169 27 too6 20 10 n e 2 225 26 146

I. .I.sn

UN