Document of

The World Bank

Report No. T-7215-TJ

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

TECHNICAL ANNEX

January 8, 1998

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS(as of August 29, 1997)

Currency Unit Tajik Rubles

TJR 1 US$ 0.0014

US$1 = TJR 735

AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATESThe Tajik Ruble replaced the Russian Ruble on May 10, 1996, at an iiitial conversion rate of TJR 1 LRUR 100

RUR per US$ I TJR per US$ I

1993 932 1995 95

1994 2,192 1996 300

WEIGHTS AND MEASURESMetric System

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AKF - Aga Khan FoundationCAS - Country:Assistance Strategy

CIDA - Canadian International Development AgencyCIS - Commonwealth of Independent States

CNR - Commission for National ReconciliationDC - Direct Contracting

FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United NationsGBAO _ Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous OblastIBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA - International Development AssociationIS - International Shopping

MOTRA - Ministry of Transportation and Road AdministrationNBF - Not-Bank-FinancedNCB - National Competitive BiddingNGO - Non-Governmental OrganizationOED - Operations Evaluation Department

NS - National ShoppingPCERP - Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project

PCU - Project Coordination UnitPCU/PCERP - Project Coordination Sub-Unit for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project

PHRD - Japan Population and Human Resources Development ProgramPPAP - Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project

SOE - Statement of ExpendituresUJNCHR - United Nations High Commission for refugeesUNDHA - United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs

UNDP - United Nations Development ProgramUNMOT - United Nations Mission of Observers to TajikistanUNOPS - United Nations Office for Project Services

UTO - United Tajik OppositionWFP - World Food Program

WHO - World Health Organization

TAJIKISTAN'S FISCAL YEARJanuary I -December 31

Vice President: Johannes F. Linn, ECACountry Director: Ishrat Husain, ECCOI

Sector Director: Ricardo A. Halperin, ECSINSector Leader: Margret Thalwitz, ECSIN

Task Team Leader Felix A. Jakob, ECSIN

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTANPOST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

TECHNICAL ANNEX

Table of Contents

I. BACKGROUND .......................................... I

A. Civil War in Tajikistan .......................................... IB. June 1997 Peace Agreement .......................................... IC. War Damages in the Karategin-Tavildara Valley Area .......................................... 2

II. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE ........................................ 3

III. BANK RESPONSE AND STRATEGY .......................................... 4

A. World Bank Strategy and Programs in Tajikistan ......................................... 4B. Lessons Leamed from previous Bank/IDA Experience .......................................... 4C. Rationale for Bank Involvement .......................................... 5D. Relationship with other Bank/IDA financed Projects .......................................... 5

IV. PROJECT DESCRIPTION .......................................... 6

A Project Preparation .......................... 6B. Project Objectives and Design .......................... 6C. Project Components ......................... 6D. Project Cost and Financing Plan .......................... 7E. Economic Justification .......................... 9F. Environmental Impact .......................... 9

V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ....................... 10

A. Project Organization and Management ......................... 10B. Implementation Arrangements ......................... 10C. Mid-Term Review ......................... 12D. Procurement ......................... 12E. Disbursements ......................... 14F. Accounts and Auditing ......................... 15G. Reporting, and Monitoring ......................... 15

VI. BENEFITS AND RISKS .................... 16

VII. AGREEMENTS REACHED ..................... : : 16

ANNEXES

1. Karategin-Tavildara Valley Needs Assessment: Summary2. Detailed Cost Tables3. Institutional Arrangements4. Eligibility Criteria for Small Community Works Component5. Implementation Plan6. Performance Monitoring Indicators

MAP: IBRD 29171

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L BACKGROUND

A. Civil War in Tajikistan

I. Tajikistan is the poorest CIS country, with a 1996 per capita income of US$ 330. Of thecountry's 5.8 million inhabitants about 70 percent live in rural areas. Only some seven percent of thecountry's 143,000 square kilometers are arable, while the rest consists of mountainous areas.Agriculture contributes to about 25 percent of GDP and 50 percent of employment. Tajikistan's mainagricultural products are cotton, (which generates about 50 percent of total agricultural production),vegetables, grains and livestock. The industrial sector accounts for 35 percent of GDP but only for 15percent of employment. It groups a total of approximately 7,000 state-owned enterprises. Under theSoviet regime, the easy availability of hydroelectric power greatly influenced the pattern and structure ofthis sector and led to the development of aluminum, chemicals and other energy-intensive industries.

2. Tajikistan became an independent country in 1991 as a result of the breakup of the FormerSoviet Union. Civil war in started in May 1992 as different regional and political groups struggled for aredistribution of power after the collapse of the Soviet system. The armed conflict continued for the nextfour years with varying intensity, major fighting being concentrated between 1992 and 1993. Anestimated 50,000 people lost their lives, 600,000 people were displaced inside the country and some60,000 fled to neighboring Afghanistan. Probably as many as half a million people emigrated to otherCIS countries for pnimarily economic reasons, among them a great number of professionals and skilledworkers. While during the first two years the heaviest fighting and physical destruction took place in thesouth of the country (Khatlon region) and in areas that remained under the control of the Government, insubsequent years hostilities moved to the center-east of the country (Karategin and Tavildara valleys), anarea controlled by the forces of United Tajik Opposition (UTO).

3. The war had a severe impact on the whole country as it compounded the effects of the breakup ofthe former Soviet Union (which resulted in cutting off trade links and stopping budget transfers thatamounted to up to 40 percent of GDP), bringing most economic activities to a standstill plunging a largeportion of the population into poverty. GDP is estimated to have declined by about 50 percent during thefirst half of the 1990s. Increases in military expenditures reduced resources for other more productive orsocial sectors. The years of the civil war in Tajikistan also saw the emergence of a number of armedgangs and paramilitary groups. These groups, which have repeatedly taken hostage Tajik personalitiesand personnel of international organizations, constitute a serious threat to security and political stability.

B. The June 1997 Peace Agreement

4. A complex and protracted negotiation process between the Government of Tajikistan and UTObegan in 1994 with the signing of a first cear-fire in Teheran and culminated in the signing, in Moscowon June 27, 1997, of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord inTajikistan. The Peace Agreement lays the foundation for peace in the country and calls for a transitionalperiod of twelve to eighteen months during which the provisions of the agreement are to be furtherdefined and implemented. The principal authority for monitoring the implementation of the agreement isthe Commission for National Reconciliation (CNR) chaired by Mr. Said Abdullo Nuri, the leader of theUTO, and is composed of twenty-six members, half of whom were nominated by the Government andhalf by the UTO.

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5. The Government's strategy for implementation of the Peace Agreement rests on action programsfor the following areas:

Political Reconciliation and Democratization: Political parties, outlawed in 1993 are being legalizedand parliamentary elections are expected to be held in 1998. A Government reshuffling under which anumber of ministerial positions would be given to the opposition is under discussion.

Repatriation and Reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: With the assistanceof the agencies of the UN system, a major effort is being made to complete the voluntary repatriation of allrefugees at the earliest possible date.

Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: An estimated 5,000 to 7,000 UTO ex-combatants are being demobilized and provided assistance to help them engage in civilian activities orbeing integrated into the Government army. Concurrently, the Tajikistan armed forces will be restructuredand reduced by about thirty percent.

Relief. Reconstruction and Development: Assisted by the donor community, the Government'srelief and reconstruction efforts will focus on three phases: (a) a program of immediate relief and food aidto allow the most severely affected populations to go through the winter and resume agricultural activities inSpring 1998; (b) a short-term program of reconstruction of the most essential economic and social services;and (c) a medium- and longer-term reconstruction and economic redevelopment program that will supportthe Government's strive for macro-economic stability, structural reform and resumption of growth

C. War Damages in the Karategin and Tavildara Valley Area

6. The Karategin and Tavildara valleys have together a total population of approximately 250,000people and cover an area of approximately 200 square kilometers, 90% of which is mountainous.Administratively the area is divided into the five rayons of Darband, Gharm, Jirgital, Tavildara andTojikobad. The valleys occupy a key strategic position as they effectively control the roads that linkDushanbe with the eastern part of the country, particularly the Autonomous Oblast of Gorno-Badakshan(GBAO), as well as with the Kyrgyz Republic. The area is fertile, has good agricultural potential and,during the Soviet era, was a net exporter of agricultural products (particularly potatoes, fruit and dairyproducts).

7. The Government and UTO fought for the control of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area since1992. The last open fighting occurred in December 1996. As part of the peace negotiation process,(para 4), a cease fire agreement was signed in January 1997 but left the area under the military control ofthe UTO forces. Because it was controlled by the opposition, the Karategin-Tavildara Valley arearemained cut off from the rest of the country for a several years and, unlike the other conflict areas in thesouth of the Tajikistan, received no support from the Government. It also obtained very little help fromthe international community with the exception of assistance provided by the United Nations Office forProject Services (UNOPS), the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), and a German NGO (German AgroAction). Even in the absence of open fighting, the continuing state of war and insecurity as well as thelack of monetary resources prevented any regular maintenance and repair work for infrastructure andcommunity facilities. The deterioration of the transport conditions, in particular, effectively cut off thelocal communities from their traditional urban markets for vegetables, fruit and dairy products in otherparts of the country and forced them to revert to subsistence farming.

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8. A preliminary assessment of reconstruction needs and an initial consultation with stakeholderswas conducted in the five rayons in September/October 1997 by the World Bank and the United NationsOffice for Project Services (UNOPS), in collaboration with local authorities. A summary of thisassessment in Annex 1. The damage to the Karategin Valley is as much in the radical decline ineconomic activity, especially in the growing and marketing of agricultural products, as it is in physicaldeterioration of infrastructure and the loss of social services. The assessment focused on identifyingthose needs that will have an important impact on peoples' lives during the next two years, rather than ona restoration of the complete physical and social infrastructure as it was before the civil war. On thisbasis, the assessment identified almost US$ 24 million in physical rehabilitation costs including US$ 5.3million in transport infrastructure, US$ 7.2 million in shelter, US$ 5.3 million in power andtelecommunications, US$ 3.6 million in education and health, US$ 1.6 million in agriculture and US$0.6 in industries. The assessment showed that reconstruction priorities are very different among the fiverayons and even within the rayons, suggesting that project design should respond to very localrequirements and be flexible.

9. The consultation process also revealed a number of important concerns. People at the local levelwant to be involved in the preparation and implementation of reconstruction programs and to have atransparent system of monitoring and evaluating their impact. The top priority for people is to createopportunities for income and employment generation, initially through agriculture and public worksprojects. Obtaining essential inputs for the 1998 agricultural year is especially important. In addition,rehabilitation and reconstruction of certain bridges and roads were identified as essential to breaking theisolation from markets, especially for marketing of crops and livestock, that the area suffered during thewar period. The provision of basic health and education services was also identified by people as havinghigh priority. The damage to shelter, although significant in terms of monetary loss, was seen as a lesserpriority because it affects only a small proportion of the population (about six percent) who, in a majorityof cases, have started repair and reconstruction work on their own.

IH. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE

10. Since 1993 over US$ 180 million have been contributed by the international coinmunity toemergency aid for Tajikistan. The largest part of this assistance has consisted of food aid, which eventoday is distributed to over 10 percent of the popuilation. It has also covered medical support, in particularassistance to contain outbreaks of typhoid fever, as well as emergency reconstruction of shelter, and otherneeds. In addition to the major UN Agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, UNDHA, WHO,UNICEF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the RedCross (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM and many international NGOs havebeen active in the country, including the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), Save-the-Children-US (SCF-US),Save-the-Children-UK (SCF-UK), Mercy Corps International (MCI), Relief International (RI), ShelterNow International (SNI), CARITAS, and others.

11. On November 14, 1997 the UN Security Council extended and expanded the mandate of theUnited Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), which was established in December 1994.The main role of UNMOT is to assist the Government and the UTO in the implementation of the peaceprocess and, in particular, to cooperate with the CNR in the preparation of elections, monitor thedisarmement and demobilization of UTO fighters, investigate cease-fire violations and ensure an effectivecooperation with CIS Peacekeeping Forces, the Russian Border Forces and the Mission of theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

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12. Both the World Bank and the IMF participated in a task force which, under the aegis of the UNSpecial Representative of the Secretary General, assisted the Government and the opposition in thepreparation of the document International Support to Peace and Reconciliation in Tajikistan. Thisdocument, which identified an estimated US$ 65 million of priority financing requirements for thetransition phase of the General Agreement, for the four areas of the Government's strategy for theimplementation of the Peace Agreement, (para. 5), was the basis for discussion for a Donors Conferencerecently held in Vienna, Austria on November 24-25, 1997. The conference raised US$ 56.5 million inpledges. In addition to pledges of specific support to the peace process the Conference also raisednumerous tentative pledges beyond the timeframe of the transition period as well as humanitarianassistance and rehabilitation. The Bank participated actively in the Conference and presented its post-conflict portfolio for Tajikistan.

13. A Post-Conflict Emergency Assistance operation has been prepared by the Fund presented to itsBoard on December 22, 1997. Further support by the international donors community will be providedthrough a Consultative Group (CG) meeting which is planned to be held Paris in May 1998 and willaddress the needs for Tajikistan's medium- and longer term reconstruction and economic redevelopmentincluded in the Government's strategy for the implementation of the peace agreement.

Hi. BANK RESPONSE AND STRATEGY

A. World Bank Strategy and Programs in Tajikistan

13. At the request of the Government, a World Bank mission visited Tajikistan in September 1997 toidentify the outline of a possible assistance program. In response to the Government's concerns, theWorld Bank decided to prepare two operations: (a) the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit of an amountof US$ 10 million equivalent which will help the Government address immediate general budgetaryneeds associated with the implementation of the peace agreement and was presented to the Board onDecember 16, 1997; and (b) the Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project (PCERP) which willaddress the specific reconstruction needs of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area in order to help with itsreintegration into the national economy.

14. The Bank Group's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Tajikistan was discussed by the Boardon May 16, 1996. Recognizing the risks associated with the political and economic instability inTajikistan, the CAS calls for a flexible approach to the Bank Group's assistance program until. The CASaims at arresting the intensification of poverty through measures designed to foster a supply response,based on employment intensive growth with direct steps to protect the most vulnerable groups. Thebroad elements of the strategy are to: (a) strengthen institutional capacity to plan and implement amedium-term program of structural reform; (b) support the Government's efforts to stabilize theeconomy; and (c) moderate the impact of the economic collapse on vulnerable groups. PCERP isconsistent with the CAS and puts emphasis on a flexible approach to the conditions in Tajikistan. Anew CAS is planned for Board discussion in June 1998 and will articulate the Bank's medium-termstrategy in the new political environment.

B. Lessons Learned from Previous Bank/IDA experience

15. The Bank's experience in working in Tajikistan is still relatively limited and too recent to allowto draw specific lessons that are relevant for an emergency operation. The Bank has, however, a large

experience with emergency reconstruction projects in other parts of the world, with a significant share ofresources committed to post-conflict operations. A Policy Framework for World Bank Involvement inPost-Conflict Operations was prepared in 1997. OED is currently assessing the Bank's experience withpost-conflict reconstruction. The study reviews the experience in the overall Bank portfolio and discusseslessons learned in nine countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti,Lebanon, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka.) Preliminary findings indicate that successful implementation ofreconstruction projects include: (a) early bank involvement in defining a post-conflict reconstructionstrategy; (b) a good assessment of damages and needs; (c) an active Bank role in post-conflict aidcoordination; (d) flexible and expeditious programming, design and implementation processing; (e) awillingness to help local authorities with project preparation; (f) diversification of reconstructionprogramming into various sectors; and (f) the use of pilot projects in community-based activities and inprograms to support local initiatives. Additional preliminary findings of the study are that effectiveassistance to post-conflict reconstruction is management and staff intensive and that it requires aproactive involvement of senior management in key decisions, a strong commitment by country directorsand teams and resident missions with adequate staffing and delegation authority.

C. Rationale for Bank Involvement

16. The most recent CAS for Tajikistan, which was discussed by the Board on May 16, 1996,recognizes the risks associated with operations in Tajikistan and urges a flexible response to the needsof the country. The Peace Agreement between the UTO and the Govermnent represents an importantopportunity for establishing an environment that is conducive to macro-economic stabilization,structural reform and increased growth. Both the Government and the UTO have indicated theimportance of beginning the reconciliation and reconstruction processes as quickly as possible. Notonly are these processes important for their tangible results, but also for their psychological value to awar-weary population. The proposed operation, which is the second of two post-conflict IDAoperations for Tajikistan in FY 98, is therefore an effort to respond to some of the immediate needs ofthe country and contribute to the successful implementation of the peace process. PCERP supports thereconstruction needs in area of the country severely affected by the war and most neglected byreconstruction efforts. Although other donors are active in Tajikistan and IDA's efforts are part of abroader program, no other major donors are involved in this specially important geographical area. Theleadership provided by IDA is considered essential to the success of the peace process by both theGovernment and the donor community.

D. Relationship with other Bank/IDA-financed Projects

17. PCERP complements IDA's support to the peace process in Tajikistan initiated by the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit which will be presented to the Board on December 16, 1997, and which isdesigned to help the Government reduce arrears for the social safety net and finance expenditure for theimmediate-term resettlement of refugees and the demobilization of ex-combatants which are criticalelements in the Government's strategy for the implementation of the Peace Agreement. PCERP is alsoclosely related with the Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project (PPAP), (Cr. 29640-TJ) which was presented tothe Board in April 1997. PPAP finances, among other activities, various NGO-executed shelterreconstruction programs in the south of the country as well as an agricultural support programimplemented by AKF in GBAO. PCERP draws extensively on the PPAP experience for the design of itsimplementation arrangements.

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IV. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Project Preparation

18. PCERP has been prepared as an emergency operation in accordance with the instructions ofOP/BP 8.50 on the basis of the findings of an identification mission which visited Tajikistan inSeptember 1997 and the results of the needs assessment undertaken by the Bank and UNOPS inSeptember and October 1997, (pam. 8 and Annex I). Appraisal was carried out in November 1997.Negotiations were held in Washington on December 22, 1997

B. Project Objectives and Design

19. The primary objective of PCERP is to support the Government's strategy for the successfulimplementation of the Peace Agreement (para. 5) by facilitating the reintegration of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area - which has remained under the control of the opposition longer than any otherpart of the country - into the national economy through a targeted program of short-term reconstructionof physical and social infrastructure, and emergency support to agricultural development.

20. To support the above objective the project has been prepared on the basis of a close consultationof the population of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley through a needs assessment carried out inSeptember-October 1997. The project has also been prepared seeking a great simplicity and flexibility inits design in order to ensure, in a context of severe and extensive resource constraints, a fast and efficientimplementation. The operation complements IDA's support to the peace process in Tajikistan initiated bythe Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit which has been presented to the Board on December 16, 1997, andwill help the Government reduce arrears for the social safety net and finance expenditure for the immediate-term resettlement of refugees and the demobilization of ex-combatants which are critical elements in theGovernment's strategy for the implementation of the peace agreements. It also complements, and is closelycoordinated with, the efforts undertaken by the donor community in other parts of Tajikistan. The project isexpected to be completed by March 31, 2000 with a Credit Closing Date of September 30, 2000.

C. Project Components

21. PCERP - the implementation of which will begin in Spring 1998 and last two years - will includethe following: (a) Agicultual Support for the 1998 Spring planting season; (b) repair, rehabilitation, andreconstruction of Bridges and Roads; (c) repair and rehabilitation of schools, health care centers andother community facilities as well as implementation of other programs of Small Commumit Worksbenefiting local communities; and (d) Other snfratructure Works in the power and agriculture sectors.

C.l Con ent 1: icultural Supp (6% of base cost)

22. The component will finance the purchase and distribution of wheat seeds (150 tons), potato seeds(650 tons), and fertilizer (660 tons) for the 1998 Spring planting season in the Darband, Gharm, JirgitalTavildara, and Tojikobad rayons. The implementation of the component will be managed by the AgaKhan Foundation (AKF), (pam. 36) and allow for the cultivation of a total of about 900 has during theSpring and Winter planting periods of 1998. The seeds to be provided consist of varieties hat have beentested in Tajikistan, have shown good performance, and are certified by the Ministry of Agriculture.Fertilizer will include amophos, seleter and potassium chloride. Inputs will be distributed exclusively to

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about 550 private farmers within the framework of land privatization agreements between AKF and thelocal authorities.

C.2 Component 2: Bridges and Roads (51% of base cost)

23. The component will finance: (a) the rehabilitation, repair, or reconstruction of about fifteenbridges in the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area and the Kalayhumb rayon of the GBAO; and (b) thecompletion a new by-pass road for the town of Darband to replace the existing non functional road.Twelve of the fifteen bridges are on the main roads (M41 and A372) linking Dushanbe with the GBAOor the Kyrgyz Republic, respectively) while the other three link the main road to local communities. Allbridges, which are of either single concrete slab or suspension type with total spans varying between 20and 90 meters, and roads will be repaired or rebuilt by two State enterprises, which operate under theoversight of the Ministry of Transportation and Road Administration (MOTRA) and are specialized, one,in construction of bridges and the other one, in that of roads. Works will be implemented on the basis ofstandard MOTRA engineering designs, construction quality norms, and execution procedures, (para. 37).

C.3 CoMpoen 3: Small Community Works (23% of base cost

24. The component will finance: (a) the rehabilitation or repair of schools, health care facilities,other community facilities as well as small-scale transport and agricultural infrastructure of localeconomic interest, all of which will be identified, and agreed upon by, the local communities concerned;and (b) the provision of essential equipment and supplies to allow facilities repaired or rehabilitated toresume normal operations. Under the oversight of an NGO hired as Implementation Manager, the workswill be carried out by local small- and medium-size enterprises in close consultation and cooperationwith the beneficiary local communities Specific selection criteria for works and implementationarrangements are outlined in para. 38 below and Annex 4.

C.4 Component 4: Other Infrastructure works (20 % of base cost)

25. The component will finance a series of works in the agriculture sector (rehabilitation of ruralroads, bridges, irrigation systems) and in the power sector (transmission lines, transformer stations) forwhich additional technical preparation studies are required prior to the implementation of these works.

26. Project Management: As a result of the civil war, the Tajildstan Government's capacity toeffectively prepare and implernent projects which are of the magnitude of the proposed operation andinvolve external donors is extremly reduced. To allow for a rapid start up of project activities, maintainadequate control over quality of execution, and ensure timely delivery of works, goods, and services,technical assistance (about 60 person/month of foreign and 180 person/month of local consultants) for thetwo-year period of implementation is being sought, under parallel grant financing, from bilateral sources.Discussions to this effect with the Canadian International Development Agency (CEDA) and the JapanPHERD Fund for PNt-Conflict Operations are in progress.

D. Project Cost ad Finandcg Plan

D.1 EPrjectCosts:

27. The total estimated cost of PCERP is US$ 11.0 million equivalent. The estimated costs andforeign exchange by components are shown in Table I below. Detailed costs are shown in Annex 2.

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Table 1: Project Costs(in US$ million)

Component Cost Foreign % of Base IDA GovmtExchange Cost

Local Foreign Total %

1. Agriculture Support 0.3 0.3 0.6 50% 6% 0.6 0.0

2. Roads and Bridges 1.1 4.0 5.1 80% 51% 4.5 0.6

3. Small Conmunity Works 1.9 0.4 2.3 20% 23% 2.2 0.1

4. Other Infrastructure Works 0.4 1.5 1.9 80% 20% 1.6 0.3

Total Base Cost 3.7 6.2 9.9 63% 100% 8.9 1.0

Contingencies 0.4 0.7 1. I

Total Project Cost 4.1 6.9 11.0 10.0 1.0

28. All costs have been estimated in US Dollars due to the difficulties in forecasting exchange ratesfor the local currency. Estimates for the civil works of both the 'Roads and Bridges' and the 'SmallCommunity Works' components are based on detailed assessments of materials and labor requirementsincluding transport cost to the sites and cost-comparisons with similar projects recently carried out inTajikistan by IDA's Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project (Cr. 29460-TJ) or other aid agencies. Estimatesfor the 'Agricultural Support' component are based on a proposal submitted by AKF.

29. The foreign exchange component of US$ 6.9 million equivalent represents 63 % of total projectcost. The foreign exchange component was estimated as follows: (a) goods for 'Agricultural Support'component: 50%; (b) civil works for 'Bridges and Roads' and 'Other Infrastructure Works': 80 %; (c)civil works for 'Small Community Works': 20%; (d) goods for 'Small Community Works' component:90%. Given the short implementation period of about two years no financial contingencies have beenapplied. Physical contingencies have been estimated at 10%. Project costs include an estimated US$ 0.2million equivalent in taxes and duties on civil works and locally procured goods. Goods specificallyimported for the project will be exempted from custom duties and taxes. Labor and in-kind contributionsby local communities have not been included.

D.2 Project Financing:

30. The IDA Credit of US$ 10.0 million equivalent will finance 91% of total project cost (100% ofthe foreign exchange component and 76% of the local cost component). The Government contribution ofUS$ 1.0 million equivalent will finance taxes and duties (US$ 0.2 million equivalent), and salary costsfor the State enterprises executing the works included in the 'Bridges and 'Roads' component, (US$ 0.8million equivalent). The project will include retroactive financing of up to US$ 800,000 equivalent forthe purchase of agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizer) and bridge repair materials prior to CreditEffectiveness, (para. 36 and 41).

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Table 2: Project Financing(in US$ million)

Local Costs Foreign exchange Total project costs % of Total Cost

IDA 3.1 6.9 10.0 91%

Government 1.0 0.0 1.0 9 %

Total 4.1 6.9 11.0 100%

E. Economic Justification

31. The main objective of the PCERP is to support the reintegration of the Karategin-TavildaraValley area into the national economy through repair and reconstruction of essential infrastructure andemergency assistance to agriculture. Aside from contributing to peace and future political stability ofTajikistan, the main economic benefit of the project will, through the restoration of satisfactory transportconditions, consist in providing the local farming communities renewed access to their traditionalmarkets for agricultural products thereby helping these communities to extract themselves from thesubsistence farming economy into which they were forced by the conflict. Introduction of new highquality seeds for wheat and potato will contribute to significant improvements in yields and therefore torural household incomes. Restoration or improvement of operating conditions of schools and healthcare facilities will have significant positive effects on the efficiency of education and yield extensivepublic health benefits. Additionally, through the implementation of the small community works by localprivate small- and medium-size enterprises, the project will create a significant number of, albeittemporary, jobs and help stimulate the development of the local enterprise sector At this stage, however,given the absence of reliable statistical data on current conditions for all sectors in area emerging from aprotracted war it is not possible nor meaningful to estimate an overall Economic Rate of Return for theproposed project.

F. Environmental Impact

32. The project will have a limited environmental impact given the nature and size of the worksfunded by it and has been classified as "B" for the purposes of OD 4.01. The project will focus on therepair, rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of existing infrastructure or facilities. It will not raise anyresettlement or property rights issues and will be executed within the premises of the existing facilities orthe rights of way of the existing public roads network. Fertilizer under the 'Agriculture Support'component will be distributed and its use closely monitored by AKF following the procedures agreedwith IDA for the PPAP project. AKF has a long-standing commitment to socially and environmentallysustainable development and has extensive experience in agricultural development in fragile mountainareas. Wheat and potato seeds imported under the 'Agricultural Support' component are of varieties thatare used extensively in the region. These varieties have been thoroughly tested, have proved theiradaptability, and are certified by the Tajikistan Ministry of Agriculture. All imports will be carried outin accordance with national and international phyto-sanitary standards. The possible impact of works oractivities included in the 'Roads and Bridges', 'Small Community Works' and 'Other InfrastructureWorks' components will be reviewed on a case by case basis and, if required, will be subject to priorenvironmental impact assessment as a condition for approval .

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V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Project Organization and Management

33. The project will be implemented by the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) which has been createdin the Office of the Prime Minister for the management of both the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit(presented to the Board on December 16, 1997) and the PCERP . The Director of the PCU will reportdirectly to the Prime Minister and has been appointed with the approval of the CNR. Maintenance of theProject Coordination Unit (PCU) by December 31. 1997 was agreed during negotiations. (para. 57 (a).

34. Within the PCU, a specific Unit will be created for the management of the Post-ConflictEmergency Reconstruction Project (PCERP). The PCU/PCERP Unit will be managed by an ExecutiveDirector of Tajik nationality recruited on a competitive basis. He will be assisted by a team of foreignand local experts funded under bilateral grant funding currently under discussion, (para. 26). ThePCU/PCRP Unit will be provided by the Government with an annual budget sufficient to cover regularoperating costs such as rental of office space, utilities, salaries of auxiliary personnel and othermiscellaneous expenses. Specific Terms of Reference and organizational arrangements for thePCU/PCERP are included in Annex 3. To facilitate the implementation of the project, the PCU/PCERPwill, in consultation with IDA, prepare an Operations' Manual , which will provide the necessaryguidelines for the management, including procurement, of the project. A tentative Implementation Planis included in Annex 5.

B. Implementation Arrangements

35. Under the oversight of the PCU Director, the PCU/PCRP Unit will be specifically responsiblefor: (a) overall management of the proposed project, including the coordination of project activities withministries and other government agencies, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, andinternational donor agencies; (b) procurement of works and goods financed under the project; (c)supervision and quality control of execution of works and delivery of goods; (d) management of projectaccounts including credit withdrawals and disbursements from the Special Account; (e) monitoring ofthe implementation performance of contractors as well as seeking continuos feedback from beneficiarieson adequacy of project response to needs; and (f) assisting the Government as well as local authorities inadequately informing the population about the project and its different features, (para. 47 and 54; andAnnexes 3a.3b,). Implementation arrangements for the different project components will be as follows:

B.l CQ onent: Agricultural Support:

36. To ensure the availability and satisfactory distribution of seeds and fertilizer in the Karategin-Tavildara area for the Spring 1998 planting season, the implementation of this component will becontracted, under a sole source contract arrangement, by the PCU/PCERP to AKF. AKF, which since1992 has been successfully implementing an agricultural reform program in GBAO and is implementingagency for part of IDA's PPAP project, has recently expanded its activities into the Karategin-TavildaraValley area. Under its agricultural reform program it enters into agreements with local authorities,collective farms, and individual farmers of the five rayons. Under these agreements, land (between oneand four has) belonging currently under control of collective farms is being handed over to individualfarmers with an ownership guarantee given by the local authorities together with inputs and technicalassistance (from its own resources) provided by AKF. Currently, AKF has cooperation agreements with

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about 240 farmers owning around 400 has, but expects to increase the number to about 550 in Spring1998 with about 1,200 has under cultivation. Under its contract with the PCU/PCERP, AKF willpurchase seeds and fertilizer, ensure appropriate and timely transport to the Karategin-Tavildara Valleyarea, and carry out distribution to beneficiaries. It would also provide subsequent technical assistance tothe beneficiaries and closely monitor the adequate use of both seeds and fertilizer. Farmers benefitingfrom AKF assistance would reimburse the latter in kind, that is, primarily in seeds in accordance with aschedule included in the individual cooperation agreements with AKF. All seeds so collected will beredistributed to other farmers newly entering into cooperation agreements.

B.2 Component: Roads and Bridges:

37. The works included in the 'Roads and Bridges' component will be executed under a contractualarrangement between the PCU/PCERP and the two State enterprises (MOST-STROI and DOR STROI),which operate under the oversight of MOTRA and are the only two existing enterprises in Tajikistanspecialized, the first, in construction of bridges, and the second, in road construction. Under theproposed arrangement, PCU/PCERP will procure all materials required for the works and funded throughthe project on the basis of design studies (including environmental review) and bills of quantitiesapproved by MOTRA and following procurement procedures specified in a PCU/PCERP Operations'Manual prepared in consultation with, and agreed upon by, IDA. MOST-STROI and DOR-STROI willprovide the necessary specialized personnel from their workforce, ensure the transport of both personneland materials from Dushanbe to the worksites, and execute the works in accordance with the qualitystandards, timetable, and payment schedule agreed on in the contract.

B.3 Component: Small Community Works:

38. Since (a) the execution of these works requires a strong and continuous participation of localcommunities; and (b) the works are of small size and scattered location, a direct management ofimplementation by the PCU/PCERP would not be practical. Instead, the PCU/PCERP will contract, on acompetitive basis, one or several NGO or other entities acceptable to the Bank to act, under thesupervision of the PCU/PCERP and the relevant line ministries (Ministry of Education, Ministry ofHealth, etc..), as the local Implementation Managers in the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area. In thisquality, the Implementation Managers will be responsible for: (a) identifying, in close consultation withthe local authorities and the population of the communities concerned, the works to be executed orequipment and supplies to be purchased satisfying agreed selection criteria (Annex 4); (b) obtaining, ifneeded, approval from the PCU/PCERP on project management decisions in accordance with conditionsstipulated in the contract; (c) preparing technical designs (including environmental review), bills ofquantities, and tender documents; (d) organizing procurement among local small enterprises; (d)evaluating tenders and preparing contracts; (e) supervising the execution of works and/o delivery and/orinstallation of equipment and supplies; and (f) making payments to contractors and/or suppliers. Allprocurement of specific goods or services required for the component (other than in-situ availableconstruction materials) will be carried out by the PCU/PCERP following the procedures specified in thePCU/PCERP Operations' Manual.

B.4 Component: Other Infrastructure Works:

39. The implementation arrangements for this components will follow, depending on the nature andsize of the works or goods to be provided, the arrangements for the 'Bridges and Roads' component orthe 'Small Community Works' component and will be subject to prior review and approval by IDA.

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C. Mid-Term Review

40. In addition to intensive regular supervision by Bank staff and close follow up by the Bank FieldOffice in Tajikistan, IDA and the Government will carry out by end of November 1998 a mid-termreview to (a) assess progress in project implementation achieved until then; (b) identify constraints andobstacles encountered; (c) discuss solutions and possibly required adjustments in the implementation ofongoing components; and (d) agree on the completion program for the rest of the project. Subsequentperiodic reviews will take place according to a mutually agreed schedule but in no case no later thanNovember 1999. Agreement on mid-term review and monitoring procedures was reached duringnegotiations. (para. 57(c)).

D. Procurement

41. The project will include retroactive financing of goods. Credit proceeds up to US$ 800,000(8% of project cost) will be applied to expenditures for such contracts concluded after December 1,1997. Only those contracts which will meet the Bank's procurement requirements outlined in thissection will be acceptable under retroactive financing. Procurement arrangements were discussed andagreed at negotiations. (para. 57(b)).

42. All goods and works to be financed from the credit proceeds will be procured in accordancewith the IDA Guidelines for Procurement ('Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDACredits' published in January 1995 and revised in January 1996), including amendments as of the creditsigning date, using the Bank/IDA standard procurement documents. A procurement workshop will beheld in Spring-1998.

Table 3: Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements(in US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category Procurement Method Total Cost(including

contingencies)

ICB NCB Other N.B.F

1. Works0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 3.6

(0.0) (0.0) (2.9) (0.0) (2.9)2. Good

0.0 3 1 4.3 0.0 7.4(0--0) (3.0) (4.1) (0.0) (7.1)

0.0 3.1 7.9 0.0 11.0

(0.0) .(3.0) (7.0) (0.0) (10.0)

Note: Cost estimates include taxes and duties. Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA credit

Other include: Direct contracting for bridge and roads repair works US$ 1.5 million equivalentMinor Works Contracts for small community works US$ 2.0 million equivalentDirect Contracting for small community works US$ 0.1 millionNational Shopping for small community work supplies US$ 0.2 millionInternational Shopping US$ 4.1 million

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43. Works: Bridges and Roads Component: The persistence of security problems in Tajikistan andthe scattered and remote location of the worksites requires an innovative approach to procurement. Dueto the civil war in which the country was engulfed for the last six years no major infrastructure workshave been carried out for several years. Therefore, ICB is not expected to be suitable. This is alsonecessary as the size of the contracts is small (below US$ 200,000 equivalent). Also, there are noprivate sector enterprises in the country that have the capacity to carry out the works required under theproject and National Competitive Bidding (NCB) is, therefore, not feasible either. Currently, there areonly two semi-autonomous State enterprises capable of carrying out the works, MOST-STROI and DOR-STROI, which are specialized, the first in bridge constructions, and the second, in road construction, andhave the equipment and skilled personnel that is needed. Therefore, construction works with the help ofthose companies is the only possible approach. In order to have an optimal solution, under the proposedarrangement, all construction materials will be procured by the PCU/PCERP directly in accordance withprocedures acceptable to IDA, (para. 44). PCU/PCERP will procure the execution of the works throughup to about twelve individual Direct Contracts with MOST-STROI (of an average value of US$ 110,000)and one contract with DOR-STROI (of a value of US$ 450,000), on a sole-source basis for a total value ofabout US$ 1.5 million equivalent. Under these contracts MOST-STROI and DOR-STROI would providethe specialized personnel and equipment required to execute the works under the control of PCU/PCERPand technical supervision by MOTRA (if additional construction equipment is needed it would be leasedby PCU/PCERP), (para. 37). Payments to MOST-STROI and DOR-STROI would be made according toa completion rates and time schedule included in their respective contracts with PCU/PCERP.

44. Small Works Component: The works included in this component are scattered in a regionwhere there is no large-scale construction industry. Therefore, small community work projects of amaximum cost of US$ 50,000 equivalent will be procured under Minor Works Contracts awarded underlumpsum, fixed price contracts on the basis of quotations obtained from at least three qualified domesticcontractors in response to written invitations. Awards will be made to the contractor who offers thelowest price quotation for the required work and who has the experience and resources available tocomplete the contract successfully. Approximately US$ 2.0 million will be procured in accordance withthis procedure. The present approach shall be defined in the PCU/PCERP Operations' Manual. Given therelatively large number of minor works contracts, and for information dissemination purposes, theImplementation Manager will ensure that contracts opportunities are advertised for each six-month periodon a rolling basis for contractors' expressions of interest. The advertisements will be placed in localnewspapers or circulated through other media. The Implementation Manager will prepare and maintain alist of interested contractors and will invite all such contractors to submit quotations. The list will remainopen so that any contractor expressing interest any time is added to the list. Direct Contracting (DC) willbe used for small works contracts under US$ 10,000 equivalent up to total value of US$ 100,000equivalent when because of the remoteness of the worksite, only one contractor is available. Contractcosts will be established by the Implementation Manager, in consultation with PCU/PCERP, on the basisof cost comparisons with, and/or unit costs derived from, other similar contracts.

45. Goods: Considering the emergency situation in the country and the need to expedite projectimplementation, goods to be financed from the IDA credit consisting of construction materials readilyavailable from local suppliers in the country such as sand, gravel, crush stone, etc.. will be procured forcontracts valued at less than US$ 250,000 equivalent and an aggregate amount of up to US$ 3.1 millionequivalent through National Competitive Bidding (NCB). Goods consisting of miscellaneous suppliesincluded in the 'Small Community Works' component, and costing less than US$ 50,000 equivalent percontract, up to an aggregate amount of US$ 200,000 equivalent, will be procured through NationalShippnig (NS) procedures on the basis of price quotations obtained from at least three suppliers.

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nAol S png (IS) baswd on a companso of prce quotations oblained from at east threesuppLiers from at kast two eligible coun will be used for the pourement of ctucib maialssuch as steel, timber, cement, etc.., seeds, fertilizer, fuel, vehicles, computers, and office equipm notavailable in Tajikun for contracts with a value not exceeding US$ 200,000 equivalent each and anaggregate amount of US$ 4.1 million equivalent.

46. Rak Prior Review. All contracts awarded under NCB and IS of a value in excess of USS100,000 equivalent and contract awarded under DC of a value above US$ 10,000 equivalent will besubject to prior review by IDA. Additionally, the first two contracts for procurement under IS and NSwill be submitted to prior review inTespective of their value. All other procurement documents andcontract. will be subject to ex-post reviews by IDA supervision missions. Mechanisms for prior reviewof Minor Works contracts with a value not exceeding US$ 50,000 equivalent will be described in thePCU/PCERP Operations' Manual, (para. 34).

47. : Procurement will be carefully monitored by the PCU/PCERP whichwill set up to this effect a computerized monitoring system. All procurement documentation will be keptat the PCU/PCERP office in order to be available for review by Bank supervision missions and extenauditors. Quarterly reports will provide detailed information on procurement.

E. Dsbursements

48. The IDA Credit is expected to be disbursed in two and a half years, including six months for thefinalization of accounts and submission of final withdrawal applications and other reports.

Table4.amm LdCedtsbushan Shd&(in USS million)

Bank Fcal Year FY 98 FY 99 FY 2000

Anuwa 1.0 6.0 3.0

Cumnuladve 1.0 7.0 10.0

49. The proceeds of the Credit will be disbursed as follows:

Table 5fliab.urmLcnClgwim (USS million)

Caegoy Amom of Credit % of eedfite to be fiuancedWorh 2.6 90%

Goods 6.4 100% of forei exiture100% of ocal ependitur [ex-

y cost]90% of local pmutur for odorgoods poured locly

U _uxcted 1.0

Total 10.0

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50. To facilitate timely project implementation the Government will establish, maintain, and operateunder conditions acceptable to the Bank, a Special account in US Dollars with an authorized allocationof US$ 500,000 in a commercial bank that meets the requirements. During the early stages of projectimplementation, the initial allocation of the Special account will be limited to US$ 200,000. However,when the aggregate disbursements under the Credit will have reached the level of SDR 700,00equivalent, the initial allocation may be increased to the authorized allocation of US$ 500,000 bysubmitting the relevant applications for withdrawal. Replenishment applications should be submittedevery three months and must include reconciled bank statements as well as other appropriate supportingdocuments.

51. Disbursements for all contracts for works and goods of amounts of less than US$ 100,000 will bemade on the basis of Statements of Expenditures (SOEs). Payment conditions and modalities fordisbursements under the 'Small Community Works' component will be stated in the respectivecontractual agreements with the Implementation Managers for the component. Disbursements will bemade on the basis of SOEs. Records of the Special Account proceeds and outlays will be available forreview by Bank supervision missions and subject to annual audit. Modalities of Special Accountmanagement and disburse ent arements were discussed and agreed during negotiations, (pam.i-7(d)).

F. Accounting and Auditing

52. The PCU will be responsible for the overall financial management of the project and will, to thateffect, establish within PCU/PCERP an accounting system acceptable to the Bank, with technicalassistance as required. The PCU will be subject to annual external audit by independent auditorsacceptable to the Bank. Accounting and auditing arranents were agreed on during negotiations(nara. 57(a.

G. Reporting and Monitoring

53. The PCU/PCERP will prepare quarterly progress reports for the Bank according to an agreedformat. The reports will summarize the status of implementation of the different project components interms of procurement, work execution, and disbursement. A final Implementation Completion Report(ICR) will be prepared by the Government no later than six months after the Closing Date of the Creditof September 30, 2000.

54. Performance monitoring indicators will be used to monitor the achievement of the projectobjectives, (para 57(g)). The indicators (Annex 6) reflect the concerns of the Government and IDA tothat the project provide a fast and adequate response to the needs of the population of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area. The monitoring of the indicators will also help to detect at an early stage possibleshortcomings in the project design and implementation arrangements and allow to quickly take remedialaction, if necessary. Agreement on reportiWng procedures was reached during negotiations. (para. 57(c)).

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VI. BENEFITS AND RISKS

55. The major benefits of the project are: (a) the provision to the inhabitants of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area of renewed and satisfactory access to the rest of the country thereby allowing theredevelopment of the local economy especially in the agricultural sector and contributing to thereduction of poverty; (b) the restoration and improvement of education and health services to acceptablequality levels; and (c) increased incomes for farmers as a result of expansion of land privatization andintroduction of new quality seeds. Additionally, through the implementation of the small communityworks by local private small- and medium-size enterprises, the project will create a significant numberof, albeit temporary, jobs and help stimulate the development of the local enterprise sector.

56. The project faces considerable risks, many of which cannot be avoided. These risks fall into two broadcategories: (a) Political risks: Despite a promising start, the continuing successful implementation of thepeace agreement remains a fragile enterprise. The demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration intocivil life in the context of Tajikistan's economy constitutes a formidable challenge and its favorablecompletion could be jeopardized by a variety of factors. Political risks are difficult to manage, but theprovision of budgetary support under the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit to help the Govemment bearsome of the costs of the peace process can be expected to contribute to bolstering political stability. (b)Managerial and technical risks: Effective and timely implementation of the project requires the earlycreation of the PCUIPCERP, including the appointment of key staff. The capacity of the local contractingindustry is not known at this point, and contracting bottlenecks could delay implementation. The diversionof credit resources to other uses is an additional risk. The risks are minimized by (a) the simplicity of thedesign of the project focusing on a few key components, (b) the relatively unsophisticated nature of theworks to be carried out, (c) the provision of technical assistance as early as possible in the implementationprocess, and (d) the involvement of NGOs that already have experience in the management of this type ofreconstruction and rehabilitation works in Tajikistan. Placing the project under the responsibility of thePrime Minister and having its implementation closely monitored by the CNR should help ensure theappropriate use of funds and minimize the risks of diversion.

VII. AGREEMENTS REACHED

57. During Negotiations agreement on the following points was obtained:

(a) Maintenance of Project Coordination Unit (PCU), (para. 33);

(b) Procurement arrangements, (para. 41);

(c) Mid-term review, monitoring and reporting procedures, ( para. 40 and 54);

(d) Special Account and disbursement management arrangements, (para. 51); and

(e) Accounting and auditing arrangements, (para. 52).

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ANNEX 1page I of 5

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTANPOST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

POST-CONFLICT NEEDS ASSESSMENT of KARATEGIN -TAVILDARA VALLEY,Summary

INTRODUCTION

1. Tajikistan's civil war damaged agriculture, education, health institutions, power andtelecommunications, housing, industry and administration, the economy, human resources and the fabricof civil society. The 1997 peace agreement provides a context for enhanced assistance to nationalrecovery and reconstruction. Of the two main conflict areas, Khatlon (Vakhsh and Kofarnihon valleys)has been effectively under government control and received external relief and rehabilitation assistance.But the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area in the center of the country came under opposition control untilthe peace accord. The area is strategically situated astride roads linking Dushanbe with Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO), and with Osh in Kyrgyzstan, along the Vakhsh river's major headwaters, theSurkhob and Obihingou rivers. It shares a long border with Kyrgyzstan. Its five rayons, DarbandGharm, Jirgital, Tojikobod, and Tavildara, contain almost 250,000 inhabitants. Of its 200 km2,90 percent is mountainous. The Karategin-Tavildara Valley area is critical to post-conflict rehabilitationbecause of the damage it suffered, its relative neglect, and its strategic and political importance.

2. The Bank, with UNDP/ UNOPS, conducted an assessment of needs, priorities for reconstruction,including some stakeholder consultation in the five rayons over four weeks in September-October 1997.Six trained investigators assisted by individual district specialists, visited every community (jamoat),completed questionnaires with local leaders and commanders, who gave full cooperation. Theyinventoried war damage, interviewed key informants, established local rehabilitation priorities andcompiled an extensive photographic record. This assessment seeks to be as comprehensive as possible.It covers, in particular, needs in the sectors of roads and bridges, agriculture, power andtelecommunications, health, education and women, and indicates priorities for the local populations andlocal leadership. It includes a partial stakeholder and institutional analysis.

3. Most of the population lives in settlements along the main river banks. The Surkhob valley isbroad, contoured and well populated, while the Obihingou is narrow, precipitous and sparsely inhabited.Before the war, the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area was a leading region in the production of potatoes,export quality fruit, honey, wool, animal skins, meat and dairy produce, focusing on national urban andexport markets. It was a net importer of wheat. Mechanization was extensively used to maintain andrehabilitate irrigation and land-protection structures, to prepare land, harvest and transport crops. Themain centers benefited from cheap internal air services, good roads, some local industry, and a goodlevel of education and basic health.

4. Heavy fighting along the major roads and in the mountains, and aerial bombardment broughtgreat suffering to civilians. The five rayons were differently affected by the war: (i) Gharm rayon(population 84,000) is the most developed, being effectively a regional center with an air strip and manyfacilities, but suffered only moderately from hostilities; (ii) Darband (Komsomolobad) (63,000) suffered

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ANNEX 1page 2 of 5

great infrastructural damage and prior neglect. Situated just upstream of the Rogun dam, and destined forpartial submersion, government investment since 1971 has focused on an uncompletecd (and uninhabited)new regional capital; (iii) Jirgital (51,000) adjoining Kyrgyzstan, and being well behind the front lines,suffered little direct damage, but its pre-existing poverty was exacerbated by isolation, economichardship and infrastructural deterioration and some destruction, and thus the district deserves inclusion inthe reconstruction program, and its border location is important for future road communications.(iv) Tojikobod, (33,000) opposite Gharm, is a major agricultural district now in great decline; while(v) Tavildara, (14,000, 6 percent of the area's population), possesses the most difficult terrain, theObihinkho Valley being narrow and steep. The war began here, and it suffered some of the heaviestfighting, and a disproportionately high level of damage.

ASSESSMENT FINDINGS

5. Roads and Bridges. The main Dushanbe-Jirgital road (A372) through Darband and Gharm toOsh and Bishkek, connects the four main districts to markets, schools, enterprises, hospitals. TheTavildara road (M41) connects GBAO to this road near Darband. Both are in poor repair, being virtuallyimpassable or dangerous in spots. Over a third of the 1,500 km of district and village roads are in badshape, mostly in Tavildara, Darband and Gharm. Of 158 bridges, over 100 were destroyed or damaged,Darband and Tavildara being the worst affected. Several bridges are critical to communications, servinglarge communities, while others link small isolated communities to the larger network or are designedprimarily for road protection and alignment. Bridges, being of strategic importance, suffered more thanroads. Roads require constant maintenance owing to local conditions (rock falls, mud-slides, river-bankerosion), and most damage has been through lack of maintenance. All seven road managementdepartments, responsible for repair and maintenance, were destroyed and their equipment stolen. The sixasphalt-gravel mixing plants and gravel quarries are non-functional as is the precast concrete plant atGharm, which fabricated culverts and other components. For most people, local authorities andspecialists, the Dushanbe-Jirgital road is vital. They are less concerned with road quality, than withensuring year-round movement of traffic and access to internal and external inputs and markets. Asecond priority is roads and bridges in Tavildara district, the only link from other parts of the country toGBAO. Two other priorities are: (i) the 45 km of the road in Kamarob-Nazar Aeiloq, to connect themain road to a major anthracite deposit, and enable small-scale artisanal extraction of coal for much-needed winter heating; and (ii) completion of the Yamgalik bridge across the Surkhob, to link some30,000 people to the main road.

6. Agriculture. Agriculture suffered severe damage, through the loss of many factors: male labor;machinery and the capacity to repair it; productive land (to mud-slides, flooding and erosion); access toinputs and markets. While the state farming sector declined, private land was brought under wheatcultivation, usually at higher productivity. Wheat production increased by over half in five years, withalmost three quarters of this coming from private land. By contrast, production of almost everything elsefell far below previous levels: potatoes, livestock, fruit, vegetables, and honey. The seven percent ofirrigated land accounted for most production. Irrigation system in every district were damaged; UNOPShas installed or rehabilitated small local irrigation systems. Much agricultural machinery was looted ordeteriorated, and the Gharm central agricultural machinery repair workshop was destroyed. Localpriorities for agricultural rehabilitation are: seeds (especially potato); rehabilitation of irrigation systemsand destroyed agricultural machinery; rehabilitation of agricultural processing facilities; reconstructionof destroyed bridges and roads to facilitate the marketing of goods in other regions.

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ANNEX 1page 3 of 5

7. Power and telecommunications. Extensive damage has been done to the main electricity supplynetwork, which provided the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area with power from Nurek. Power lines andtransformers, have been destroyed, looted or neglected with other transformers suffering from resultantoverload. The highly irregular supply or complete lack of electric power has had widely felt impacts inall districts, and particularly in Darband and Tavildara. Economic and environmental consequencesinclude the cutting and burning of trees for winter fuel, which have depleted productive orchards andforests. The telephone service also proved extremely vulnerable to war, looting and lack ofmaintenance, resulting in damage and destruction to about 60 percent of the system. Currently onlythree of five rayon exchanges and none of the local exchanges are in service, with the Darband andTavildara systems completely out of operation. Priority areas for rehabilitation of are: repair of theObigharm to Gharm high tension line; reconstruction of the Gharm and Darband substations;rehabilitation 80 km of the electricity line between Langar and Lodjurg in Tavildara; rehabilitation ofthe Darband central telephone exchange.

8. Health and sanitation. Health care was organized according to the standard Former SovietUnion hierarchy: 5 district hospitals (with the principal one in Gharm), 20 village hospitals, 17 ruralclinics or dispensaries and 119 rural health posts, together with district pharmacies,sanitary/epidemiology stations, and 7 public bath houses. Health institutions were extensively damagedby attack and looting of equipment and vehicles. Hospitals now "function" with almost no equipment orsupplies. Equally serious was the loss of professional staff, doctors and mid-level professionals, owingto emigration, low salaries or their non-payment. Staff remaining show a high sense of dedication toduty. Together with the deterioration of urban drinking water supplies and the destruction of publicbaths, these changes have increased the risk of infectious and water-borne diseases, with hundreds ofcases being reported of typhoid, hepatitis, dysentery, scabies and malaria. Priorities locally identifiedamount, in effect, to the hope that the old system can be restored in entirety: rehabilitation and equippingof district central hospitals, especially Gharm, and of village hospitals, local health posts, centralpharmacies, sanitary & epidemiological stations and public baths; provision of medicines and vaccinesfor prevalent diseases; rehabilitation of the only interregional tuberculosis hospital (Gharm);rehabilitation of the state psychiatric hospital in Navobod. A more focused response is discussed brieflybelow.

9. Education. The impact on education is similar to that on health, but affects more people on adaily basis. Almost half of the schools have been damaged and destroyed (mostly in Tavildara, Gharmand Darband). The learning environment sharply deteriorated. Classrooms lack heating, furniture, andtextbooks. Many children lacked suitable clothes and shoes, or do not attend owing to prevailinginsecurity. The number of teachers, the proportion of trained teachers, and the number and proportion ofwomen teachers have all declined, for the same reasons as in health. Reconstruction of facilities isalready being undertaken in some places with community support. Education priorities were identifiedas: rehabilitation of destroyed and damaged schools; provision of winter heating, supplies and textbooks,and school feeding and shoes and clothes to enable needy primary school pupils to attend.

10. Housing. During the war, over 2,200 houses were damaged of which a quarter were destroyed.This damage was mainly in Gharm and Tavildara, with Tavildara proportionately worst hit, and Gharm

most affected in absolute terms. People have begun reconstruction, hampered by lack of construction

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ANNEX 1page 4 of 5

materials, and often forced to sell cattle, their only tradable assets and often their only source of income.Many houses have been patched up, often with thatch, mud, and recycled polyethylene sheeting. As aresult internal heating is poor, a major problem during winter months. Priorities for housing aretherefore, for the affected minority, a supply of building materials, including roofing materials, timber,nails, cement, lime and glass. Other local building materials are available

11. Social aspects: women, children, security and local government. Even before the civil warwomen in the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area were below the national average in secondary and highereducation and least likely to work in the public service. With the war, the number of educated womenfell to a negligible amount. Most women in the area are unemployed, particularly in Tojikobod, Darbandand Tavildara. Families lost husbands, fathers, brothers, traditional bread-winners, leaving almost 4,500female headed households and around 30,000 orphans (most informally cared for). Moreover, theemigration of young males for employment has left a pool of over 11,000 marriageable but unmarriedgirls, according to officials. Priorities for women are: organizing women's centers; micro-credit for pettytrade and small businesses; assistance in small enterprise development; training in home economicsincluding home births, sewing, processing of fruits and vegetables, traditional handicrafts.

12. Industry. Many industrial plants were destroyed, mostly in Gharm, including the Gharm centraldairy processing factory, with a capacity of 24 tons per day; the pre-cast concrete factory, workshops forrepair and maintenance of agricultural machinery and road building.

13. Relative priorities. A simple district ranking by proportionate damage to infrastructure resultedin: (1) Tavildara; (2) Darband; (3) Tojikobod; (4) Gharm and (5) Jirgital. A priority ranking of 14commonly expressed needs across districts, resulted in five clusters: (1) Seeds and employment; (2)electricity, transport and fuel; (3) education, health and roads; (4) irrigation, drinking water, and bridges;(5) food and telecommunications.

THE RESPONSE: PRINCIPLES, PRIORITIES AND PROCESS

14. A first principle is to treat the needs of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area as an emergencysituation, although it is not the poorest part of the country. This approach is justified by: the extent ofdamage; the collapse of the productive economy and of most educational, health and social protectionservices, together with the ineffectiveness of local government machinery; lack of effective relief andrehabilitation over the last three years; and the impoverishment and asset depletion of ordinary people.Fragile local institutions, widespread expectations of a peace dividend, and local willingness toparticipate in rehabilitation all point to an opportunity to consolidate peace, in which the next six monthsare critical so as to help people through the difficult winter and early spring months, and ensure the 1998spring planting and harvest.

15. Secondly, the focus should be on functional rehabilitation, which bridges the gap between reliefon one side and development on the other. Emergency investment is targeted so as to meet immediatepriority needs, including those of the poor and vulnerable, while laying the basis for future development.This requires the rehabilitation of essential functions rather than the reconstruction of specific would notnecessarily respond to the entire catalogue of needs identified in the survey, since it is natural, inpresenting needs, that people would tend to wish to restore what had been there before. Localconsultation on the best use of limited resources to ensure quick impact will therefore be necessary.

-21 -

ANNEX 1page S of 5

16. Thirdly, resource allocation must take account of the diverse needs of different rayons,communities and population elements. Each district is different, and has different priorities. In order toavert fears that some districts may receive less assistance than they deserve, the process of decision-making has to be inclusive, transparent and fair, with public information, open discussion, localconsultation and confidence-building. Sufficiently broad local consultation would also help to ensurethat benefits are widely spread. An implication for design is flexibility in the allocation of funds, whichshould not be too rigidly pre-programmed. A modest relief response is still required to address theurgent humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable, particularly in Tavildara. Tavildara should be treatedas a special case, with a higher per capita investment, by virtue of its high level of destruction, its smallpopulation, and its limited economic potential. The rehabilitation needs of the other four districts in theSurkhob valley are similar and interconnected, and all jamoats should be eligible.

17. Investment priorities within sectors, as indicated by the needs assessment, should focus on:(i) Agriculture: ensure the preconditions for a sustained increase in production and family incomes,starting in the new year, through the provision of seeds and essential inputs, supplemented byrehabilitation of necessary infrastructure and local capacity: key road communications for storage,transport and processing and marketing of field crops and fruit; land protection and preparation;rehabilitation of machinery. The timing of agricultural inputs and land preparation is critical,(ii) Education and health: restore essential services, to avert the risk of a "lost generation" of childrenwho had neither adequate education nor health care. The objective should be to ensure restored basiceducation functions during the first year and the operation of most schools through the 1998-9 winter,probably with a priority to secondary education; and to ensure essential immunization, maternal andchild care services. (iii) a widely distributed and targeted program of local rehabilitation microprojects,to be implemented with full local government and community participation; with selection criteria basedon local priorities. This will help to restore purchansing power and reduce poverty. There could also thecompletion of some works started before 1991 where this would be cost effective. and to complementany common interventions of small, local microprojects that respond to specific local priorities. Specialissues in relation to specific districts are dealt with below under investment choices.

18. Process. It will be important to ensure close interagency coordination, as well as full partnershipwith local leadership, communities and government institutions. The area's ample human resource ofeducated and skilled people that should be tapped. The creation of parallel local government orimplementation mechanisms should be avoided. Local government can develop expertise in preparingtenders; managing local contractors for the implementation of small works; of working in partnershipwith local community contributions; and handling some funds transparently. There should therefore bea process of phased devolution of responsibility to local government. In addition the local militaryforces should not be excluded from the consultative process, particularly in the early stages, althoughtheir role should not be allowed to usurp that of local authorities. The process of demobilization, and thereintegration of forces into the community, is part of building civil society, and it would be unwise toattempt to marginalize local military forces. Poverty monitoring using simple local mechanisms isrequired to track poverty indicators, to ensure the transparent and effective use of resources, the effectivetargeting of relief, and assess the effectiveness of the rehabilitation program.

IS

-22 -

ANNEX 2page 1 of 2

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTANPOST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

DETAILED COST TABLE

(in Us$ miillion)Project Component Local Foreign Total % of total cost

1. Agriculture Support

Wheat seed 70 0 70Potato seed 200 125 325Fertilizer 0 160 160Fuel 0 45 45

Subtotal 270 330 600 6%

2. Roads and Bridges

Reconstruction 560 2,380 2,940Repair 420 1,350 1,770Completion of Darband by-pass 100 290 390

Subtotal 1,080 4,020 5,100 51%

3. Small Community Works

School Repair 850 175 1,025Health care facilities repair 450 75 525Other Community Works 600 150 750

Subtotal 1,900 400 2,300 23%

4. Other Infrastructure Works 400 1,500 1,900 20%

Total Base Cost 3,650 6,250 9,900 100%

Physical Contingencies (10%) 400 700 1,100

Total Project Cost 4,050 6,950 11,000

-23 -ANNEX 211

page 2 of 2REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

POST -CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

BRIDGES AND ROADS COMPONENT

DETAILED COSTS

A. BRIDGES

H. OEOMCRIP1ION Im EX SPAN TOTAL MATERALS EOUPMENT LABOLR DRLLUJN

DUSHANBE M cOsT COST COST COST SCOURPROTECToN

tUD USD USD USD PART COMFLETEO

113 113 113 (ADJUSTWENTS)

1 Replacetemporary 129 24 329,025 89,575 89.675 89,675 60,000Dndge :

* 2 Re ace mporary 132 18 218,500 65.500 65.500 65.00 20,000Dndge

3 Replace temporary 133 18 227,700 65,900 65,900 65,900 30,000

bDdge

4 Bombed bridge 150 61.5 630,450 200,150 200,150 200.150 30.000Tavidara road

5 Bombed bdge 165 24 215,500 38,500 38,500 38,500 100.000

6 Incomplete bdge 170 31.5 340,500 93.500 93,500 93.500 60.000

7 AccetDSsouth ban* 178 54 238,740 79,580 79,580 79.58Ndestroyed

8 Neaty complete 185 24 62,650 47,550 47,550 47,550 (80,000)

9 Tobecompleted 183 24 90,400 41,800 41,800 41,80D (35.000)

10 Destroyed 196 31.5 373,800 111,200 111,200 111,200 40.000

11 Suspersion Brdge to Tavildara 202 90 447,800 162,600 162,600 162,600 (40.000)destroyed

12 New drift across laindslde area 207 DrIn 90 M 62,950 37,650 37,650 37,650 (50,000)

13 Brdge destroyed by flood 215 31.5 195,825 70,275 70,275 70,275 (15,000)

14 Destroyed 224 18 193,350 64,450 64,450 64,450

15 Hat repaired bxIdge 225 18 178.755 59,58 59.585 59,585

16 Destroyed. New Toqkobad twn Toikobad 16 180,000Km 43 Ex. Ghbrm

SUB-TOTAL 3,983,745 1,227.915 1,227,915 1,227,915

CONTINGENCIES 15% 597,562

TOTAL 4,581,307

.B. ROAD WORKS

No LOCATION LENGTH

1 Daband by-passfrom kmi 130 km 134.5 4.5 480,000

TOTAL 48W,000

GRAND TOTALROAD AND BRIDGES TOTAL 5,0ti1307

-24 -

ANNEX 3Apage 1 of 2

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTANPOST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

INSTITTUTONAL ARRANGEMENTSPROJECT COORDINATION UNIT

In support of the implementation of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit the Government establishedin the Office of the Prime Minister a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and appointed its Director. Asagreed with IDA, the PCU will be responsible for both the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit and thePost-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project (PCERP). The PCU Director, assisted by qualifiedpersonnel, will be responsible for the overall management of the Post-Conflict EmergencyReconstruction Project.

Within the PCU, a Unit specifically in charge of the management of the Post-Conflict EmergencyReconstruction Project is created (PCU/PCERP) with the following responsibilities:

- coordinating the activities carried out under the project with the concerned line-ministries andensuring that they are consistent with their standards, priorities and criteria;

- preparing, in consultation with IDA, an 'Operations Manual' specifying the procedures to befollowed for the execution of the different components including procurement and disbursementprocedures;

* coordinating the execution of works carried out by implementing agencies and contractors,including periodic visits to work sites as required;

* monitoring, in association with the corresponding line ministries, the technical quality of theworks carried out and/or goods delivered by contractors and/or implementing agencies and,monitoring the general performance of contractors and/or implementing agencies; and takingremedial action, if required;

* coordinating the activities carried out under the project with the local authorities of thecommunities concerned in order to ensure sustainability, ownership and effectiveness of thedifferent operations;

* reviewing and signing all contracts, payment orders and disbursement requests related to projectexecution;

* providing necessary technical assistance to executing agencies;

* monitoring progress in procuremnent, including the creation and operation of a computerizedProcurement Management System;

* preparing periodic progress reports for the Government and IDA;

-25 -

ANNEX 3Apage 2 of 2

* coordinating the implementation of preparatory technical studies (final designs, bills ofquantities, etc.) by consultants or government agencies including obtaining necessary approvals,permits, etc. from relevant authorities;

* arranging for annual external audits of project accounts; and

* monitoring feedback from beneficiaries on the adequacy of the project response to the needs of thepopulation concerned and, if needed, providing, in consultation with IDA, for adjustments in theproject implementation arrangements, project content, or contractual arrangements withimplementing agencies or contractors in accordance with the stipulations of their respectivecontracts; and

* assisting the Government and the local authorities in informing the population about the featuresand other aspects of the project.

Within the PCU/PCERP a separate department will be created to be specifically responsible forprocurement and accounting, and, in particular, for:

carrying out all project related procurement activities for goods and works and overseeing allprocurement done by implementing agencies ensuring that IDA procurement procedures areconsistently applied to all contracts for goods, works or services for which IDA funds will beused to disburse part or all of the contract amount; preparing tender documents, evaluatingoffers, preparing award proposals, negotiating and preparing contracts and/or, in the case of theSmall Community Works component, review and approval of project proposals submitted by theImplementation Manager.

* controlling the quality of goods delivered and providing, and arranging, if necessary, fortemporary storage;

* establishing payment orders and disbursement requests; and

* keeping project accounts in accordance with international standards.

- 26 -ANNEX 3B

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTANPOST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PCU

-

a Prime Minister. -

Project - Coordination Unit

PCIU

Post-ConflictReconstuction Project UnitPost-Conflict RPRehabilitation

Credit . Z Unit Director .

Procurement|

Accounting

I It' 1i

Bokges Communit Agricultural

S z_ I I

|Enepr | Manager|

'II

LocaA LocalCommunite Farmers

I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~_ _

n

- 27 -

ANNEX 4page I of 2

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTANPOST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR SMALL COMMUNITY WORKS COMPONENT

Eligibility Screening:

The eligibility screening for Small Community Works will consider the following elements:

* whether the Project Proposal is presented in the right format and provides information on allelements required by the Application Form included in a set of specific 'Instructions' preparedjointly by the Implementation Manager and the PCU/PCERP;

* whether the proposed project has been identified in collaboration with, and is supported by, thelocal authorities and the beneficiary community;

* whether the proposed project falls within the acceptable typology of projects eligible forfinancing under the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project agreed upon by IDA;

* whether the community is willing to contribute, if needed, with labor or in kind to the project andto which extent;

Appraisal of Project Proposals

Each project proposal, if considered eligible for financing, will be appraised by the ImplementationManager taking into account the following elements:

* numbers of beneficiaries served;* cost per beneficiary;* sustainability of the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure, facility; or equipment to be

financed;* technical and financial soundness of the proposal;* environmental soundness of the proposal;* gender balance of the proposal;* extent of community participation in project implementation;* whether proposed works are comprehensive where required; and* whether the project can be implemented by a private contractor;

-28 -

ANNEX 4page 2 of 2

Approval procedures:

* Projects for works with an estimated value of less than US$ 20,000 equivalent will be approvedby the Implementation Manager without prior approval by PCU/PCERP. Conformity of selectionand appraisal will be subject to periodic ex-post review by PCU/PCERP.

* Projects for works with an estimated value of between US$ 20,000 equivalent and US$ 100,000equivalent will be approved by the PCU/PCERP based on the recommendations of theImplementation Manager.

* Projects for works with a value in excess of US$ 100,000 equivalent will be approved by thePCU/PCERP upon review and non objection by IDA.

* All projects involving the purchase of goods will require prior approval by PCU/PCERP and, inthe case of contracts in excess of US$ 100,000 equivalent, to prior review and no objection byIDA.

-29 -

ANNEX 5

REPUBLIC OF TAJTKISTANPOST-CONFLICT EMERGENCYRECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Target Date Activity Agency

January 15 Procurement of seeds and fertilizer AKF

January 31 Contracting of technical assistance PCU /IDA

February 15 Credit Effectiveness IDA

February 15 Appoint PCU/PCERP Director PCU

February 28 PCU/PCERP operational PCU

March 15 Supervision mission + procurement workshop IDA

April 30 Preparation of complementary studies for 'Other InfrastructureWorks' launched

March 31 Tender for Implementation Manager for Small Community PCU/PCERPWorks component launched

March 31 Contract negotiations for Road and Bridges component PCUSPCERPinitiated

April 30 Contract negotiations for Road and Bridges component PCU/PCERPcompleted

April 30 Distribution of seeds and fertilizer completed AKF

May 15 Tender for Implementation Manager for Small Community PCU/PCERPWorks component evaluated

May 30 Begin works for Bridges and Roads component SEs

June 15 Implementation Manager for Small Community Works PCU/PCERPcomponent contracted

June 30 Begin identification of works for Small Community Works NGOcomponent

July 31 First tenders for Small Community Works launched NGO

August 31 Preparation of complementary studies for 'Other Infrastructure PCU/PCERPWorks' completed

September 15 Supervision Mission IDA

October 31 Mid -Term Review documents completed PCU/PCERP

November 30 Mid -Term Review IDA/PCU/PCERP

-30 -

ANNEX 6page 1 of 2

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTANPOST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

PERFORMANCE MONITORING CRITERIA

Agricultural Support Component:

Quantities of seeds and fertilizer received by AKF * March 31, 1998* April 30, 1998

Quantities of seeds and fertilizer distributed by AKF * March 31, 1998* April 30, 1998

Number of farmers enrolled in AKF cooperation programs by * March 31, 1998* September 30, 1998* March 31, 1999* September 30, 1999* September 30, 2000

Average yield increase (by type of product) by * September 30, 1998* September30, 1999* September 30, 2000

Average household income increase by * December 31, 199* December 31, 1999* December 31, 2000

Roads and Bridges:

Number of bridge repair / reconstruction contracts signed by * June 30, 1998* December 31, 1998* June 30, 1999

number of bridge repair / reconstruction contracts in execution by * June 30, 1998* December 31, 1998* June 30, 1999* December 31, 1999

number of bridge repair I reconstruction contracts completed by * December 31, 1998* June 30, 1999* December 31, 1999* March 31, 2000

-31 -

ANNEX 6page 2 of 2

Small Community Works

Number of Small Works contracts identified by * June 30, 1998* December31, 1998* June 30, 1999* December 31, 1999

Number of Small Works contracts under execution by * December 31, 1998* June 30, 1999* December 31, 1999

Number of Small Works contracts completed by * December 31, 1998* June 30, 1999* December 31, 1999* March 31, 2000

Number of beneficiaries during six months period preceding * December 31, 1998* June 30, 1999* December 31, 1999* March 31, 2000

Number of jobs created during six months period preceding * December 31, 1998* June 30, 1999* December 31, 1999

Amount of credit proceeds spent by rayon by (in total and per capita) * December 31, 1998June 30, 1999

* December 31, 1999* March 31, 2000

STAN 769/ "~^-S JTAJIKISTAN

J Xj >~POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCYRECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

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