Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 20987

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-25200; IDA-25201; COFN-03470)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDRs 35.0 MILLION (US$ 50.7 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF CHAD

FOR THE SECOND TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT

December 19, 2000

Transport Group (AFTTR)Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective August 17, 2000)

Currency Unit = CFA Francs BEAC (FCFA)FCFA 720 = US$ 1.00US$ 0.138 = 100 FCFA

FISCAL YEARJanauary 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BNF Bureau National de FretCAER Compte Autonome d'Entretien RoutierCISCP Comite Interminist6riel de Suivi et de Coordination des ProjetsFCFA CFA FrancMTPTHU Ministere des Travaux Publics, des Transports, de I'Habitat et de l'UrbanismeSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSNER Societe Nationale d'Entretien RoutierTSAIP Transport Sector Adjustment/investment ProjectTSP2 Second Transport Sector Project

Vice President: Callisto MadavoCountry Director: Robert Calderisi

Sector Manager: Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard

I ~~~~~~~~Task Teamn Leader: Andreas Schliessler

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Republic of ChadSecond Transport Sector Project

Implementation Completion Report

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data I

2. Principal Performance Ratings 1

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry I

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 19

6. Sustainability 21

7. Bank and Borrower Performance 22

8. Lessons Learned 269. Partner Comments 27

10. Additional Information 27

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 29

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 30

Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 33

Annex 4. Bank Inputs 36

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 39

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 40

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 41

Annex 8. Borrower's Project Completion Report 42

Annex 9. Table showing details of training programs 52

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

Project ID: P000530 Project Name: SECOND TRANSPORT SECTORPROJECT

Team Leader: Andreas Schliessler TL Unit: AFTTRICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 19, 2000

1. Project Data

Name: SECOND TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT L/C/TFNumber: IDA-25200;IDA-25201;COFN-03470

Country/Department. CHAD Region: Africa Regional OfficeSector/subsector: TH - Highways

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 02/06/92 Effective: 10/19/93 01/19/94Appraisal. 01/03/93 MTR: 05/06/96Approval: 06/22/93 Closing: 12/31/98 06/30/2000

Borrower/lmplementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF CHAD/Ministry of Public Works and TransportOther Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President. Callisto E. Madavo Edward V. K. JaycoxCountry Manager: Robert Calderisi Jean-Louis SarbibSector Manager: Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard Peter WatsonTeam Leader at ICR: Andreas Schliessler Amadou CisseICR Primary Author: Robert Fishbein

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability. L

Institutional Development Impact: SU

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry:

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

The development objectives of the Second Transport Sector Project (TSP2), as defined in the Staff AppraisalReport, were five-fold: (a) to help stimulate industrial and agricultural development and regional trade throughconsolidated improvements in transport sector efficiency, with a focus on continued reductions in vehicle operating

costs and improvement in the efficiency of the transport market; (b) to continue to improve public investmentefficiency, transparency and budgetary management; (c) to improve internal resource mobilization to meet thelong-term need for routine road maintenance; (d) to promote private sector involvement in road maintenance andstrengthen the road transport industry; and (e) to streamline and continue to improve public administration of thesector.

The project was conceived as part of IDA's support to the Governments economic stabilization process, whichfocused on maintaining sound national investment policies and improving Chad's competitiveness in regionalmarkets. Because of the country's landlocked position, transportation had been at the core of IDA's strategy for theprevious six years, combined with health and education. The project sought to build on the lessons learned andexpand on fundamental reforms achieved in three previous projects in the sector; these were (i) The HighwayMaintenance Project (approved 1986); (ii) the Road Rehabilitation Project (approved 1988); and (iii) the TransportSector Adjustment/Investment Project - TSAIP (approved 1989).

The projects development objectives were clearly stated in the SAR and were fully supportive of the Bank'sCountry Assistance Strategy. By building on previous achievements, the project description introduced a usefulelement of continuity and knowledge-building. In this regard, it regrouped its activities into three agendas: (a) theconsolidation agenda, to ensure that the positive achievements of TSAIP were maintained; (b) the continuingagenda of sectoral objectives that were only partially met in TSAIP; and (c) the evolving agenda to address newlyintroduced long term issues for the transport sector.

3.2 Revised Objective:

The overall development objectives remained the same throughout the project. However, at the mid-term review,the project was restructured and reoriented to address concerns about the project's ability to achieve thoseobjectives. It was observed that the Transport Policy adopted in 1993 was too focused on the reduction of transportcosts through physical improvements to roads, and did not include a broader strategy for the achievement of policyobjectives. Given the particular physical conditions in Chad and technical difficulties encountered during the firstphase of the PST2, there was also a growing awareness that the traditional approach to road maintenance and roadnetwork management needed revision. Finally, fundamental institutional and policy constraints outside the sectorwere preventing the attainment of long-term development objectives. The emphasis in the second half of theproject was to concentrate more on core sector management issues, such as (i) developing an appropriate overallsector strategy, (ii) improving the approach to road network management and maintenance, and (iii) improving thecapacity of key sector institutions.

3.3 Original Components:

The TSP2 had two substantive components:

Physical Component. This component consisted of (i) rehabilitation of roads and bridges, and (ii) routine andperiodic maintenance on the priority network of main and secondary roads. At the beginning of the PST2, thepriority road network was increased from 3,800 km to 4,760 km, with the additional 960 km comprised ofsecondary roads with agricultural potential, including cotton feeder roads. The rehabilitation works to be financedunder the PST2 were to be carried out on 300 km of unpaved roads, drawn from the additional 960 km ofsecondary priority roads. The maintenance program aimed to keep the entire priority network of 4,760 km inadequate condition to handle traffic. The concept was that IDA would fund periodic maintenance on targeted roadsections, while routine maintenance would be funded through the CAER (Compte Autonome d'Entretien Routier)which collected a combination of revenues drawn from (i) fuel taxation, (ii) surcharges on formal transportactivities, (iii) bridge tolls and others.

Institutional Strengthening Component. This component consisted of a broad range of technical assistance,studies and training. These activities were designed to (i) support the physical works component and (ii) ensurethe implementation of the three agendas (consolidation, continuing and evolving), related to improved sector

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management through more efficient and transparent procedures, resource mobilization, privatization and budgetarymanagement. In all these activities, IDA played a key role, in particular by providing substantial guidance for thepreparation of the new National Transport Strategy and Investment Plan (2000-2009), and by coordinating theefforts of the numerous donors involved in the transport sector to support the new National Transport Strategy andInvestment Plan. These institutional strengthening activities of the PST2, grouped by agenda, are summarizedbelow:

(I) Consolidation Agenda

(a) Sector Investment Program. Under PST2, the Government was to pursue a transport sector strategy adoptedearlier under TSAIP which would: (i) allocate sufficient funds to cover the full cost of routine maintenance of thedefined priority road network; (ii) limit road maintenance to the pre-defined priority network and only oneconomically-justifiable roads; and (iii) execute all periodic and routine maintenance works through privatecontractors.

(b) Resource Mobilization and Allocation Program. The Government would mobilize certain pre-defined annuallevels of resources to ensure adequate routine maintenance on the priority road network. These resources would beraised through a levy on formal transport activities, a share of petroleum taxes, and tolls on ferries and bridges.Also, to ensure that these funds are available in a timely manner for their intended purpose, the Government wouldcreate an autonomous Road Maintenance Account (Compte Autonome d'entretien routier - CAER) with funds tobe held in a commercial Bank.

(c) Liberalization and Deregulation Program. This program would seek to consolidate the mission of the BureauNational de Fret BNF) and improve its operations. The mission of the BNF was defined as: (i) information centeron supply and demand of transport capacity; (ii) monitor the share of freight carried by national and foreigntruckers; (iii) ensure timely, efficient and transparent collection of the levy on formal transport operations coveredby the Lettre de Voiture Obligatoire (L VO)and to transfer those resources to the CAER, and (iv) gather statistics onfreight transport.

(2) Continuing Agenda

(a) Institution-building Program. This program would continue the institution-building activities begun underprevious transport projects through technical assistance, studies and training, with the following aims: (i) increasethe efficiency of Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MTPT) and its Directorates in the areas of planning,programming and road maintenance works supervision; (ii) restructure the Road Authority (OFNAR) into anational road maintenance company (SNER - Societe Nationale d'Entretien Routier) operating according to privatemanagement principles; and (iii) complete the restructuring of Air Tchad, through a management contract with anexternal airline company.

(b) Road Research Program. A road research program would be developed in collaboration with the NationalSoils Laboratory (LNBTP), which received assistance through the French Development Agency (CFD). Theprogram aimed to optimize road construction standards and define appropriate roadbuilding materials to be usedfor the road rehabilitation program, taking into account the lessons learned from previous construction programs.

(c) Increased Role of the Private Sector in Road Maintenance. The Govermment would endeavor to increaseprivate sector participation in road maintenance by reinstating the contract award prerogatives to the Directorate ofRoads, and by limiting the share of SNER to no more than 50% of road maintenance contracts, thus guaranteeingthat at least half of all road maintenance contracts would go to emerging local private contractors. The programwould provide industry-specific technical assistance and training in areas such as management, accounting andprocurement.

(3) Evolving Agenda

(a) Environment. This activity would build a capacity in MTPT to systematically carry out environmental

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assessments and introduce environmental considerations into road designs and environmental clauses into biddingdocuments for road works.

(b) Transit Facility and Regional Integration. The project proposed to support the development of a RegionalIntegration Program, which aimed to set up customs and insurance-coverage measures and procedures that would:(i) simplify procedures and transit documents related to transport, customs clearance and trade in conformity withregional (UDEAC) or internationally (ICC and UNEDIFACT) harmonized rules; (ii) redefine and strengthen civiland commercial responsibilities of road transit operators and transit companies; (iii) simplify insurance procedures;(iv) encourage private freight bureaus in Cameroon and Chad; (iv) promote the grouping of individual truckers(owner-operators) to achieve financial viability; and (v) redefine the role of the Chamber of Commerce to limitnegative interference in transport operations. This program would be supported by the construction of a freightinterchange center in N'Djamena (physical component), to be financed by CFD.

The technical assistance and training activities to be provided under PST2 were focused mainly on short-terminterventions of specialized consultants. They were defined as follows: (i) Project Coordination Unit (PCU): 30person-months for coordination and sector policy monitoring; (ii) General Directorate for Public Works andTransport: 23 person-months for procurement, policy formulation and accounting, and 50 person-months for thesupport to emerging local private contractors and works supervision consultants; (iii) Directorate of Roads: 85person-months for long-term and short-term assistance in investment planning, maintenance and workssupervision, technical studies, road research and environmental issues; (iv) BNF: 2 person-months for managementand accounting. Training programs would emphasize the dissemination of private sector management practices,human resources management and improvement of sector planning skills.

3.4 Revised Components:

The same two major components were maintained throughout the project. However, as noted above, the specificcontents of project components were restructured and reoriented to allow the project to reach, in due time, itsdevelopment objectives. These revisions are summarized below:

Physical Component. Following the devaluation of the FCFA currency, additional funds were provided by IDAthrough Amendment A to the Development Credit Agreement (March 1995) for the rehabilitation of selectedroads. In addition, it was determined during the mid-term review that due to the higher-than-expected financialbids received for works contracts and the resulting high commitments under PST2, the Bridge and CulvertRehabilitation component would not be financed under this project and that alternative financing would be soughtfrom the European Union.

Institutional Strengthening Component. The mid-term review mission in November 1995 determined that,while the physical components were mostly being achieved satisfactorily, persistent and fundamental constraints inthe institutional and policy environment posed serious threats to the attainment of the development objectives andjeopardized the overall viability of the project. These constraints involved institutions from both within andoutside the transport sector, and consisted essentially of: (i) the insufficient actual and timely availability offunding for road maintenance; (ii) the lack of clarity concerning the taxation of donor-financed public sectorcontracts; (iii) the difficulty in achieving efficient road network management through the current approach toperiodic and routine maintenance; and (iv) shortcomings in the financial and technical management of variousinstitutions within the sector.

Particularly within the road sector, these problems were highly interrelated, and, if not addressed in a moreintegrated fashion, were leading to a downward spiral of sector performance. Moreover, the first two issues werefurther complicated by certain practices and policies of the Ministry of Finance, which brought into question thebasic principle underlying the establishment of the CAER.

The institutional strengthening component was therefore reoriented to: (i) address head-on the transport sector

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policy problems, both within and outside the sector, in particular those problems related to the Ministry of Financewhich were preventing a secure road maintenance funding; (ii) establish the requirements and action plans toimprove financial and technical management of key sector institutions; (iii) develop more appropriate approachesto road network management; and (iv) carry out a major study to define a coherent national transport strategy andfuture vision for the sector for the period 2000-2009. This orientation resulted in the restructuring of projectactivities which may be grouped under two major headings:

Institutional Reform and Performance Improvement. This would involve the pursuit of technical and financialaudits, technical assistance and training. It also included the follow-up on studies begun earlier, which focused onimproving the management and the viability of key sector institutions, namely: MTPHT (Directorates of Roads,Surface Transport, Civil Aviation, and Studies and Planning), BNF, CAER, SNER, Air Tchad and CISCP.

Sector Dialogue, Strategy Development and Coordination. This would involve: (i) continued technical assistanceand follow-up with the Government in meeting its obligations for mobilizing timely and sufficient funds for roadmaintenance, and solving the increasing problems with the tax code for donor-financed public investmentcontracts; (ii) a comprehensive study to establish a National Transport Strategy; and (iii) lay the groundwork forfuture assistance to the sector by the Bank and numerous other donors. These activities coincided with the Bank'srole as a leader in the transport sector dialogue with the Government and coordinator for the donors' support to thetransport sector in Chad.

3.5 Quality at Entry.

The project was a logical outgrowth of previous activities in the sector. It was consistent with the CAS atthe time, and was a key element in the Government's strategy to improve sector management through theredefinition of public and private sector roles. It recognized the various risks involved with the approach,some of which materialized, particularly those related to macro-economic policies.

Despite these positive aspects, the quality at entry was rather poor. Although the project was based on asectoral policy statement, there was no overall strategic plan that would provide the basis for rationalplanning and management. This was corrected following the mid-term review. In addition, the technicaldesigns for the physical road investment components were inadequate and underestimated the costs. Thesedesigns were based on the traditional technical approach, which, although characterized by lower initialcosts, was ill-adapted to the particularly difficult soil conditions in Chad. During the project, this approachwas rectified, leading however, to higher real costs.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement ofJobjective:

An assessment of progress towards each original development objective is summarized below. Furtherdetails by component are presented in the following section.

(i) Help stimulate economic development and regional trade through improvements in transportsector efficiency and reduction of vehicle operating costs During the first two years of the project,significant reductions in vehicle operating costs were achieved on the roads where rehabilitation andperiodic maintenance took place. As an example, the transport time between N'Djamena and Am Timanwas reduced by three hours, while transport time between N'Djamena and Moundou was reduced by onehour. These improvements were a necessary, but not sufficient condition for more economic developmentand regional trade. However, it has to be considered that at the start of the project, the road network wasrapidly deteriorating; and had these activities not been carried out, the roads would have been blockedduring most of the year, preventing even the most minimal development to take place. Many of these

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benefits, however, were eroded during the next several years, as the funding levels for road maintenancedeclined and the execution of routine maintenance works was often interrupted for long periods (see below).In addition, the full benefit of road rehabilitation and periodic maintenance works were not felt, because theimprovements focused mostly on isolated road sections instead of ensuring the overall usability of maintransport corridors. While some road sections were much improved, other adjacent sections deterioratedbadly, with the result that overall access to some provincial capitals was still severely hampered.

(ii) Continue to improve public investment efficiency, transparency and budget management Theproject contributed to public sector efficiency through the introduction of management and accountingsystems in key institutions such as CAER, BNF and CISCP. Financial and administrative audits duringthe course of the entire project highlighted shortcomings of these institutions, and many of the shortcomingswere addressed successfully. Remaining areas where further improvements are needed include the revenuecollection by the BNF and the complete and speedy transfer of the funds collected to the CAER, as well asadequate financial planning for the CAER, in coordination with the Directorate of Roads. These issues willbe addressed in the context of the new Fonds d'Entretien Routier (FER) which will become functional inJanuary 2001.

(iii) Improve internal resource mobilization to meet long-term needs for routine road maintenanceThe project was instrumental in introducing the concept and structure for independent financing of roadmaintenance, through the establishment of the CAER. For the first two years of its existence, the CAERfunctioned reasonably well and was able to finance most road maintenance activities. However, beginningin 1995, the system was increasingly undermined by a series of Government actions outside the immediatecontrol of the transport sector. These were linked to macroeconomic efforts encouraged by the IMF toincrease revenues to the public Treasury, in the face of mounting public deficits and deteriorating capacityof the Government to meet its commitments. They involved four actions:

* Borrowing offunds belonging to the CAER by the Ministry of Finance. The first ominous sign ofexternal problems occurred when the Ministry of Finance "borrowed" BNF-collected road maintenanceresources. The "borrowed" amount added up to FCFA 600 million. Since this was a clear violation of theDevelopment Credit Agreement, the Bank exerted significant pressure on the Government in order toachieve the reimbursement of the funds to the CAER, which was eventually done under threat ofsuspension of disbursements for the project.

* Reintegration of the CAER of Finance into the national budget. The next external problem wasthe Ministry of Finance's decision in 1998 (encouraged by the IMF) to reintegrate the CAER into thenational budgetary system. The justification was that road maintenance expenditures were in the publicdomain and therefore the collection of funds and certification of expenses should be under the direct controlof the Ministry of Finance. This contradicted a basic principle which had been agreed upon in theDevelopment Credit Agreement, in the sense that road maintenance would be financed through specific userfees, levies and other sources, and that the funds would be managed by an autonomous accounting bodyindependent from the Ministry of Finance. There were three concrete and severe problems which resultedfrom this decision: (i) significant time delays in the transfer of funds to the CAER; (ii) withholding of fundsfor the CAER by the Ministry of Finance and the detour of those withheld funds for other purposes notrelated to road maintenance; (iii) long delays by the CAER to pay invoices of maintenance contractors, andthe consequent loss of credibility of the CAER as a reliable funding source.

* Application of the Value-added tax (VAT) on transport services and subsequent reduction of thefreight levy for CAER. The government decision to impose VAT on transport services led to a general

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strike of transporters. As a palliative measure, the Government reduced the freight levy (an importantsource of funding for the CAER) by half, further reducing the revenue base for road maintenance.

* Derogation of tax exemptions on public sector contracts. Added to the above actions was thedecision by the Government to eliminate the tax exemption on all donor-financed projects. Since thismeasure was incompatible with the general framework for cooperation of most donors, the effective resultwas a complete halt to all new donor-financed contracts, totaling some US$18 million in the transportsector alone, for a period of about one year. This brought into complete disarray all road maintenanceplans, since roads which were about to be rehabilitated with donor funding now needed unscheduledmaintenance works in order to keep them from deteriorating altogether.

The accumulated result of these events led to a complete paralysis of road maintenance activities in 1998.At that time, arrears to maintenance contractors reached FCFA 1.0 billion (roughly US$ 1.6 million). Thisprovoked a refusal to work by contractors and a fast deterioration of the road network. The situation wasfinally salvaged in 1999 with specific funding by both the European Union (through STABEX funds) andIDA (through SAC III). The table and graphic below summarize the annual financial revenues andexpenditures of the CAER. The table does however not show the fact that revenues did not arrive in atimely fashion, and that the CAER was often unable to pay contractors which then refused to work.Revenues shown for one year often materialized only during the following year. It is however clear that theCAER was in deficit virtually from the beginning, and that the accumulating arrears could only be made upwith external subsidies, which reached extraordinary levels in 1999. Moreover, these accumulating arrearsalso meant that the Roads Directorate could often not "catch up" with the deferred maintenance needswhich have accumulated since 1997.

TABLE: SUMMARY OF CAER REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES

(in million $) Item/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Revenues Chadian resources 1,773 2,613 3,039 3,086 2,441 2,694

External subsidies 1,300 500 0 750 0 3,450Sub-total 3,073 3,113 3,039 3,836 2,441 6,144

Expenditures physical works 2,377 2,654 2,756 2,809 1,945 2,077other expenditures 696 459 720 1,143 1,218 1,426Sub-total 3,073 3,113 3,475 3,951 3,163 3,502

Total 0 0 -437 -115 -722 2,642Cumulative Total 0 0 -437 -552 -1,273 1,369

Despite the various types of difficulties, the creation of the CAER was overall a positive accomplishment.It introduced the underlying concept of user charges to finance maintenance. During the first years ofoperation, it showed the concept to be sound, as long as there is an institutional and political environmentthat permits adequate and timely collection and transfer of funds. The experience has paved the way forthe conception of a second generation road maintenance fund (FER), which has been created by Law inSeptember 2000 and will be operational in January 2001. The new FER was formulated jointly betweenthe Government, the Bank and the IMF, within the context of the ongoing sector dialogue and preparationof the follow-on project (PAProNaT - National Transport Program Support Project).

(iv) Promote private sector involvement in road maintenance and strengthen the transport industry.This objective has been achieved. Road rehabilitation and maintenance is no longer carried out by forceaccount and the previous public road agency (OFNAR) was successfully converted to a publicly-owned

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contractor (SNER - Societe Nationale d'Entretien Routier), managed under private sector managementprinciples. More than 50 percent of all road maintenance contracts have been awarded to fully privatecontractors established in Chad. The ICR mission was informed that the full privatization of SNER is alsounderway and should be completed by the end of 2000. Two local private engineering firms specialized insupervision of works were also created during the project, and received mentoring assistance from aninternational firm. Only one of the two firms is however considered to have an adequate technical capacity.The project has made some inroads in strengthening the transport profession. Skills improvement hasoccurred through the extensive training program carried out during the first half of the project (339 traineesin the private sector), although there is little follow-up data which would allow to evaluate the impact ofthis training. Bank supervision missions held regular consultations with the representatives of thetransporters' unions, which helped to gain their support for the new Road Maintenance Fund. There is alsoa continuing dialog between those unions and the Surface Transport Directorate of MTPTHU. There havebeen limited efforts to sensitize transporters on issues such as respecting rain barriers, and the safetyhazards of overloading and mixed (goods and passengers) transport.

(v) Streamline and continue to improve public administration of the sector. The coordination functionof the CISCP in the transport sector has continued to work well. The initial technical assistance projectsucceeded in establishing a revised structure and operational procedures for the MTPTHU and in particularthe Roads Directorate. This Directorate, which had little previous experience in road network management(this was the responsibility of OFNAR, which kept all its personnel and equipment when it wastransformed into a contractor), has struggled to continue the methods and approaches put in place duringthe first two years with the aid of technical assistance. Over the last several years, most, if not allcontracts, have been characterized by cost overruns, time extensions and/or serious technical problems. Adiagnostic study commissioned under PST2 has proposed basic reorganization and fundamentalimprovements in management of the Roads Directorate, now under consideration by the MTPTHU. Salaryand per diem levels are extremely low and a strict hierarchical system does not reward individual initiative.On balance, the project has made some headway in improving public sector management, particularlythrough the introduction of road network management concepts. Nevertheless, the follow-on project willneed to renew efforts to assimilate these concepts and revitalize basic operational structures.

The following table summarizes the main accomplishments of the project, with respect to each majordevelopment objectives.

Summary of Development Objectives and Main Achievements

Development Objective Main Achievements

(i) Stimulate economic development and regional trade Significant reduction in VOC and transport time due to roadthrough improvements in transport sector efficiency improvementsand reduction of vehicle operating costs.

(ii) Continue to improve public investment efficiency, Improved management & accounting systems for institutionstransparency and budget management. involved with road maintenance management (CAER, BNF and

MTPTHU) and overall sector coordination (CICSP).Adoption of road network management approach.Adoption of improved technical standards adapted to Chadianconditions.

(iii) Improve internal resource mobilization to meet Creation of first generation independent road maintenance fundlong-term needs for routine maintenance. (CAER); experience paved the way to create second generation

road fund (FER).

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(iv) Promote private sector involvement in road Complete transition from force account to private contracting ofmaintenance and strengthen the transport industry. works and supervision.

Extensive training for private sector in transport industry .Participation of private sector transport industry on the FERboard of directors.

(v) Streamline and continue to improve public Comprehensive Transport Sector Strategy and Investment Planadministration of the sector. Improved organization and procedures at MTTP

Environmental Unit and EA procedures created in MTPTHUSecond Generation Road Maintenance FundReform of taxation policies for contracts in the pubic sectorPerformance-based road management and maintenance contracts.

In conclusion, the project accomplished major rehabilitation and periodic maintenance works during thefirst two years, which is faster than foreseen in the original project schedule. It successfully pursued aprivatization program and led the sector into a new era of revised roles of the public and private sector. Inaddition, during the last two years of the project, it was instrumental to conceive a set of institutionalstructures, and set in motion a number of operational procedures that would improve public and privatesector performance. These gains were diminished due to a series of macroeconomic government decisionsthat undermined the basic concepts of the autonomous road maintenance financing mechanism.Management systems in the public sector have been improved from their initial low level, but there stillremains much room for improvement. Finally, a fruifful sector dialogue has continued throughout theproject period, leading to a follow-on project which, based on these experiences, includes a renewedcommitment to sector reform and improved tools for performance improvement. For these reasons, theICR concludes that, on balance, the project's outcome is satisfactory.

4.2 Outputs by components:

Physical Component. The physical component involved two major types of works: (i) periodicmaintenance; and (ii) rehabilitation of certain secondary roads which are part of the priority road networkdefined for PST2.

Periodic maintenance. Periodic Maintenance works were carried out on a total of 1,140 km, whichcorresponds to about 24 percent of the overall priority road network. There were three contracts.

OriginalContract Final Cost IDA Share Cost/km

Name Km Complet. Date Amount (million FCFA) (million FCFA) (million FCFA)(millionFCFA)

Contract 1: 586 mid-1996 1,809 2,250 2,138 3.84Bokoro-Mongo-AtiContract 2: 296 end 1996 1,640 2,445 2,323 8.26Massaguet-Massakory I _I

Contract 3: Mongo - 258 early 1997 821 892 847 3.46Am-Timan I_I_I

All rehabilitation works were completed successfully, although with some start-up difficulties. This waslargely because the two local contractors used (SNER for the first two roads and ETTP for the third road)had just been created as a result of the privatization of the former OFNAR - Office National des Routes;they had some difficulties adapting to their new role of a private contractor working under contract. The

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supervision of the works, carried out by an international consultant, was considered satisfactory and therewas a transfer of technical competence for supervision to the local counterparts.

Cost increases for all three projects involved (i) normal price escalations plus (ii) quantity increases of 6.7percent on Bokoro-Mongo-Ati, 7.5 percent on Massaguet-Massakori and to 8.5 percent onMongo-Am-Timan. For Bokoro-Mongo-Ati, additional works were approved for about 300 million FCFA,or about 17 percent of the original contract amount. For the Massaguet-Massakory road, the relativelyhigh cost per km was due to the fact that a very substantial reconstruction of certain sections had becomenecessary. Also, this contract was used to carry out some corrective works on the N'Djamena-DourbaliRoad, where severe geotechnical problems had occurred just after its rehabilitation, which required animmediate solution (see below).

Rehabilitation of secondary roads included in the Priority Road Network. These works were carried outon a total of 353 km, which corresponds to about 37 percent of the 960 km of secondary roads which hadbeen added to the priority network at the beginning of PST2:

OriginalContract Final Cost IDA Share Costlkm

Road Km Complet. Date Amount (million FCFA) (million FCFA) (million FCFA)(million FCFA)

N'Djamena - Dourbali 103 12/95 3,892 4,149 4,052 40.3Bokoro - Ngama 75 12/95 2,460 2,727 2,361 36.4Bitkine - Melfi 118 5/97 3,896 4,172 3,972 35.4Eref- Mangalme 57 12/96 1,621 1,653 1,559 29.0

Cost increases resulted from the contractual price revisions, as well as a bonus for early completion to thecontractor on the Bokoro-Ngama road.

Serious geotechnical and construction quality problems occurred on the N'Djamena-Dourbali road, and thecontractor was obliged to carry out major reconstruction works during the one-year guarantee period, inconformity with contract requirements. However, geotechnical problems persisted beyond the guaranteeperiod, and additional corrective works were financed through unused funds in the periodic maintenancecontract for Massaguet-Massakory.

On the Bitikine-Melfi road, the design standards were lowered by the Roads Directorate on the first 40 kmin order to reduce costs, without IDA approval, resulting in an unsafe and maintenance-intensive roadprofile. With IDA insistence and technical support, these technical deficits were eventually corrected andthe road completed satisfactorily.

Institutional Strengthening Component. Project achievements and outputs for this component aredescribed below with respect to the objectives stated at the beginning of the project, and grouped into twomajor types of activities: (i) institutional reforn and sector performance improvement; and (ii) sectordialogue, strategy and coordination.

(i) Institutional reform and sector performance improvements.

Assure road maintenance funding through the creation of the Autonomous Road Maintenance Account(CAER). The CAER was created in 1994, in fulfillment of one of the conditions for Credit effectiveness.Its creation was a major break with past practice and represented a promising institutional framework forsustainable road maintenance funding. Its revenue sources were defined as: (i) a portion of the tax levied

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on fuel; (ii) road user charges, such as bridge and ferry tolls, and a surcharge on formal transportoperations; and (iii) contributions from the national budget. The Development Credit Agreement specifiedthe total amount to be mobilized for each year of the PST2, combined from all sources. The managementof the CAER was set up to be independent from the normal budgetary procedures used by the Ministry ofFinance. As noted in section 3 of this ICR (Assessment of Development Objectives), this objective wasonly partially achieved due to the steady demise of the CAER after 1996, brought on by severalgovernment decisions that compromised the independence and credibility of the CAER. When it becameclear that the CAER in its original form was doomed, the project, with substantial technical support byBank staff, helped to conceive the new second-generation Road Maintenance Fund (FER - Fondsd'Entretien Routier) which has been adopted by law in September 2000 and will be fully functional inJanuary 2001. The features of the new FER show several improvements over the old CAER, especially: (i)the management of the FER is done by a Board of Directors, the majority of which are representatives ofprivate-sector road users; (ii) the president of the Board of Directors will be one of the private-sectorrepresentatives; (iii) to ensure liquidity of the FER, a minimum threshold of cash was defined, and if cashreserves fall under that amount, the FER may not enter any new financial obligations; (iv) the revenuecollection mechanism was set up in such a way that the Ministry of Finance cannot access FER funds; and(v) FER funds are held in an account at a private Bank. Because of the direct relationship between theFER and the heavy involvement of some external donors in Chad's road sector, the representatives of themain donors will participate as observers in the meetings of the FER Board of Directors.

Consolidate the mission and improve operations of the Bureau National de Fret (BNF). As envisioned inthe original project concept, institutional strengthening measures for the BNF were carried out, especiallythe installation of an improved accounting system and an improved information system. Similar to theCAER, the BNF's first two years as collection agency for road user fees worked rather well, and at timesthe amounts collected by BNF exceeded the initial goals. However, once the CAER was increasinglybrought under control of the Ministry of Finance, audits revealed that parts of the funds collected by theBNF and normally destined for the CAER were diverted to the national treasury, contributing to the deficitsof the CAER described earlier in this document. Financial audits, and a diagnostic study of the BNFcarried out during the preparation of the Transport Sector Strategy recommend management improvementsthat would enhance efficiency and transparency.

Restructure the Road Authority (OFNAR) into the private National Road Maintenance Company (SNER).This activity was fully accomplished. The OFNAR was converted into a construction contractor (SNER)with minimal social disruptions. Although SNER is still fully Government-owned, its management style isfully compatible with private-sector management principles. The company has been able to show a profitand be competitive in international bids for road maintenance works in Chad. The final step in thisprocess, the full privatization of ownership, is now underway and should be completed by the end of 2000.

Promote the private sector. In conformance with the Development Credit Agreement, the volume of roadmaintenance contracts allocated to the SNER was limited to 50 percent, with the remainder going to fullyprivate contractors established in Chad. Two new local companies specialized in the supervision of roadmaintenance works were formed. Both companies received substantial support through a mentoringprogram with an international design and construction supervision firm, with financing through the project.These firms obtained contracts for supervision of routine maintenance work, for the period 1998 - 2000.

Complete the Restructuring ofAir Tchad. Technical assistance was provided to establish and implement aprivatization plan for Air Tchad, which is the National Flag Carrier of Chad and the owner of thecorresponding traffic rights. The company stopped operating airplanes around 1994, but continued tooperate flights on an irregular basis through various types of charter arrangements. Early in the project,

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hopes for a successful privatization of Air Tchad were spurred by initial agreements with operators for thehighly profitable route between N'Djamena and Jeddah (for the pilgrimage to Mecca and airfreight). Thesehopes, however, were dashed with (i) the rupture of these contracts and (ii) the failure of company'smanagement to pursue recommended measures to reform its overall and financial management practices.By June 1995, the deteriorating financial situation became alarming, and the non-transparent way ofoperations continued. One year later, at the mid-term review, the company had not yet taken any of therecommended actions to correct mismanagement and was on the verge of bankruptcy. It became clear thatthere was no true political will to privatize Air Tchad. By October 1997 there were still only very fewchanges in management, other than a change in the Administrator. At that time, it was felt that little couldbe done through the PST2 project. The Air Tchad privatization issue was then transferred to the overallPrivatization Component of the Structural Adjustment Program. In 1999, Air Tchad was formallyliquidated. During 1999 and until the closing date of the PST2, the project financed technical support tothe Government with the aim of identifying suitable private Air Transport Operators to take over Chad'straffic rights through a concession agreement, both for regular domestic air services and regional routes inCentral and West Africa. This process is ongoing as of December 2000.

Develop a Road Research program through the National Public Works Soils Laboratory (LBNTP).Initial efforts to establish a research program centered uniquely around the identification of appropriatematerials in proximity to the roads proposed for rehabilitation. The program yielded very little information,as the research limited itself to areas within a very short distance to the roads. It did not at all address thesubject of improved technical designs that would respond to the particular geotechnical issues facing thecountry. The Bank supervision missions encouraged the LBNTP management to develop a broadertechnical capability that would respond to these needs, with a view toward eventually privatizing itsoperations. This never materialized. Following the mid-term evaluation, this activity was droppedcompletely from the list of PST2 activities. Today, the Laboratory continues to operate through amanagement concession with a private company, and carries out geotechnical work for private roadcontractors, design engineers and supervision consultants.

Introduce environmental assessment procedures. During the initial project period an Environmental Unitwas established within the Roads Directorate. Through the technical assistance contract (see below),training was carried out on basic procedures of environmental assessments for road projects. Theenvironmental unit has two staff members and currently maintains the files of all environmentalassessments carried out during the past years in the transport sector. Based on donor requirements, all roadprojects undergo environmental assessments of varying degrees of detail. During the preparation of thefollow-on project PAProNaT, a programmatic environmental assessment was carried out, which containsstandard formats and checklists for environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and EnvironmentalManagement Plans (EMPs) to be carried out for all future projects in the sector. The Environmental Unitof the Roads Directorate will play an important role in this area, and the follow-on project PAProNaTprovides for further institutional strengthening and on-the-job training for the application of these tools inthe future.

Transit facility and regional integration. With Bank support and assistance, agreements were reached withneighboring countries in Libreville in 1994 to harmonize fiscal and customs regulations in Central Africancountries. This included, among other issues, the introduction of the value-added tax (TVA) on transportservices. Bilateral transport issues, related to transit through neighboring Cameroon, were dealt primarilythrough European Union assistance, and have shown little practical results. The Freight Transfer Centerenvisioned in the PST2 was completed in March 2000 with AFD financing, with the MTPTHU asdelegated construction manager on behalf of the City of N'Djamena. The building will serve as a center forarranging and arbitrating local and international transport services, and will be managed by the association

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of transporters. By July 2000, the Freight Transfer Center was however not yet functional, due to delays inelectricity and water connections.

Technical assistance and sector support. These activities can be divided into three categories: (i) initialsector support contract; (ii) short and long term engineering assistance to support the physical component;and (iii) short term support to sector coordination and other as-needed requirements.

* Initial sector support contract. The centerpiece of the program to transform and improve sectormanagement was a technical assistance contract with an international consulting firm. It was carried outduring the first half of the program, and was intended to assist the Government to manage and plan theoverall sector program and lay the institutional foundation for efficient sector management in the future.The program involved one long term project manager/advisor to the Coordinator, accompanied by otheradvisors who provided short- and medium-term support. These included: (i) Advisor to the DirectorGeneral of Transport; (ii) Head of the Legal and Contracts Unit; (iii) Deputy to the Director ofRoads/Planning Expert; (iv) Road Maintenance Advisor; (v) Two Heads of Regional Services; and (vi)additional short-term advisors. The major outputs of the contract were:

* The introduction and publication of various laws and texts that provided the legal andinstitutional framework for the management and liberalization of the sector. The texts aimedto clarify the functions and organizational structures of the various public services, vis-a-visthe private sector.

* The introduction of organizational methods and management tools for the various technicalservices. These included:

1. a data collection framework for producing an annual statistical bulletin by the DEP;2. a transport sector data base for the DTS/BNF, including a basis for determining

annual performance indicators for the sector, issuing the vehicle registrations andproducing monthly statistical bulletins;

3. technical guides and procedures manuals for the regional delegations of the DTS;4. a proposed institutional framework for collaboration and regular consultation with the

transport sector stakeholders;5. a study and proposal on the organization and management of the BNF;6. draft bilateral agreements with Cameroon for improved transit conditions;7. a proposed program for the promotion of small and medium enterprises (PME);8. a proposed program for reorganization and legal texts of the civil aviation sector;9. procedural guides for competitive bidding and contract supervision; and

10. an organizational framework and procedures for the environmental management oftransport sector projects by the MTPTHU.

At the mid-term review, these contract services had been completed. Later during the project, additionalservices were recruited under the contract to provide technical assistance to the Roads Directorate inN'Djamena and short-term mobile training at the regional Delegations of the MTPTHU.

* Short and long-term engineering support to the physical component. This consisted of contractswith international firms for the design and supervision of the periodic maintenance and rehabilitation worksfinanced under the project, as well as supervision for routine maintenance contracts. In general, theseservices were carried out successfully and ensured that the physical component was implemented correctly

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and on time. One of the contracts also contained a significant mentoring component, through which itprovided on-the-job training to two newly formed local engineering firms.

* Short term assistance to sector coordination and as-needed requirements. This involved regularfinancial and administrative audits during the course of the entire project, and a specific financial andtechnical audit which was part of the mid-term evaluation. It also included a contract to provide regularshort-term support to the CISCP, following the completion of the initial sector support contract. Variousother short term services were recruited to address specific problems and issues, and within the context ofpreparing the follow-on project PAProNaT. These included:

I . formulation of a National Transport Strategy and Investment Plan (see sector dialogue below);2. technical strategies for the least-cost design of paved roads in Chad;3. validation of the road condition data base, in preparation for the National Transport Strategy

definition;4. technical assistance for the liquidation of Air Tchad;5. specific technical designs and preparation of bidding documents for the strengthening of

existing paved roads in Chad;6. drafting of the law creating the Road Maintenance Fund, incl. by-laws;7. technical design and preparation of bidding documents for upgrading and paving of the

Ngoura-Bokoro road;8. diagnostic study of the Roads Directorate, including proposals for reorganization;9. drafting of a Guide for Bidders on the taxation of public contracts, including donor-financed

contracts.

Training. This component was carried out through two major sub-activities:

* Overall support to human resource management, and training of sector personnel (period1994-1997). Parallel to the initial technical assistance contract for sector support (during the first twoyears of the project), the PST2 training program was implemented through the framework of a globalcontract with an international firm. The goal was to assist the Government to: (i) assess the humanresource requirements in the transport sector vis-a-vis existing capacities in the public and private sectors;(ii) design and execution of training programs to meet the perceived needs; and (iii) improve the humanresource management capacity of the Ministry of Public Works. The terms of reference for the consultantcalled for the local training of 360 persons, and 27 persons through training programs outside Chad.However, based on the initial diagnostic carried out by the consultant, the program for overseas trainingwas reduced from 27 to 17 persons, so as to permit to train more people in-country. At the end of 1997,the program had provided training for 680 participants, of which 663 were in in-country and 17 benefitedfrom training courses held in other countries. Among those trained in-country, 324 were from the publicsector and 339 were from the private sector. In terms of the human resource management in the Ministryof Public Works, the results were:

- establishment of a procedures manual for human resource management, currently being used by theHuman Resources Management Unit;

- installation of a data base for human resources management at the Human Resources ManagementUnit, which however, is not being used to its full potential, due to insufficient training in its use; and

-development of forms for regular updating of human resources capacity and requirements, which

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however, was later deemed too sophisticated, and a simplified version is now under consideration.

Following the completion of these services, the firm was asked to prepare a complementary TrainingProgram for the period 1999-2000, based on a series of training modules.

* Complementary Training Program 1999-2000. Based on the draft modules developed in theprevious contract, a complementary training program for the period 1999-2000 was developed, consideringthat there were still funds available in the training component of the PST2. This involved theimplementation of 16 training modules through a framework contract with the Center for ProfessionalTraining / National Training Center for Public Works (ENTP) in N'Djamena. The ENTP acted as acoordinating agency, mobilizing specialized external trainers mainly from overseas. A total of 123 personsparticipated in these training courses: 108 from the ministry; 6 from the private sector; and 9 from thepolice and municipal security services.

A table showing details of the training programs is given in the Annex.

(ii) Sector Dialog, Strategy and Coordination. Under this heading, three interrelated activities wereaccomplished: (a) completion of a comprehensive Transport Sector Strategy and Investment Plan for theperiod 2000-2009; (b) continued sector dialog within the context of the country's broader economic policyenvironment; and (c) laying the foundation for future assistance to the sector by the Bank and other donors.

Comprehensive Transport Sector Strategy and Investment Plan. A comprehensive study to develop acoherent sector strategy was commissioned following the mid-term evaluation. This included detailedtechnical, economic and institutional analyses of all sub-sectors; and the evaluation of road networkcomposition, road conditions, road network management and maintenance, etc. It also included a series ofregional workshops and village-level consultations, with the objective of soliciting the views of thepopulation and engage public participation in the process. As a result of the analyses and regionalworkshops, the Government has prepared a National Transport Policy Letter, a Ten-Year NationalStrategy for the Transport Sector and Investment Plans for the periods 2000-2005 and 2005-2009. Forthe road transport system, the strategy includes a revised road network management approach, whichre-classified the road network into functional classes, using a multi-criteria approach. This re-classificationestablished a framework for assigning management responsibilities for different parts of the network.Based on the regional workshops, and an assessment of the Chad's capacity for local financing of roadmaintenance, the management responsibilities of the national Government were limited to a well definedcore backbone network of all-weather roads (2,600 km) and seasonal roads (3,200 km). Maintenance ofroads outside the core National Road Network will become the responsibility of local Governments andcommunities, or of Government Ministries outside the Transport sector which may receive support throughrural development projects or others.

Following the completion of the National Transport Strategy and Investment Plan (jointly called theNational Transport Program), a donors roundtable meeting was convened in N'Djamena in November1999, during which the Government presented its overall sector policy, strategy and investment program.The roundtable meeting was hailed as a success, and resulted in numerous donor commitments which,together with local financing for Road Maintenance, allow to almost fully finance the investments of theNational Transport Program for the period 2000-2005 (close to US$ 450 million equivalent).

Continued sector dialogue. As noted earlier, the deteriorating situation of the CAER and the resultantcatastrophic effects on the condition of the road network were the result of a series of Government actionsstarting in 1995. It thus became clear that the macroeconomic policy environment was preventing the

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transport sector from functioning efficiently and that a multi-sector dialogue was necessary. To this end,the Bank engaged both the Government, the IMF and other donors in an intense dialogue to harmonize theapproach to donor-financed projects in general, and to road maintenance financing and management inparticular. This (sometimes contentious) dialogue continued throughout the remainder of the project periodand finally resulted in a positive outcome. The main issues and results obtained are briefly discussedbelow:

* User fee-based financing of road maintenance, and a second-generation road maintenance fund(FER). The thrust of this effort has been to re-establish a consensus on the principle of user-fee financingfor road maintenance, and to put in place the institutional framework for an independent Road MaintenanceFund. Consensus has been reached with the Government and the IMF on: (i) the principle of financing roadmaintenance through road user fees; (ii) the creation of an independent body (FER) to manage the fundscollected from road users, under the supervision of a management committee in which road userrepresentatives from the private-sector constitute the majority; and (iii) regular technical and financialaudits on the FER and the activities it finances. Bank staff provided much input into this during projectsupervision visits and the preparation of the new PAProNaT project; this included the coordination of thedialogue with other donors and the IMF. Additionally, the project's technical assistance funds were tappedto provide expertise to assist the Government to draft the legislation establishing of the FER anddetermining its operation.

* Taxation of donor-financed contracts. At the beginning of the project, the chadian legislationprovided for a full tax exemption for donor-financed contracts. The legislation was changed in late 1997,making all contracts fully taxable at rates between 21 and 30 percent. Since this was incompatible with thegeneral conditions of the Bank and most other donors, very serious implementation problems resulted andbasically blocked the signature of new donor-financed contracts for almost two years, until adequateprocedures for the reimbursement of taxes under donor-financed projects were established. The projectprovided support through consulting services in order to solve this problem, including a national seminar onthe subject. Further assistance has been provided to draft a revised set of Instructions to Bidders, whichhas been accepted by donors and formally adopted by the Government in May 2000.

v Performance-based Road Maintenance Contracts. Although considerable efficiency gains wereachieved by fully contracting out road maintenance, experience in other countries have shown that furtherimprovements are possible. and necessary to obtain acceptable results with the scarce resources available.To this end, the Bank has helped to introduce the concept of performance-based road management andmaintenance contracts, and has assisted the Government to design a pilot program to test that type ofcontracts during the upcoming PAProNaT project.

Lay the foundation for future assistance. As the coordinator for donor assistance to the transport sector,the Bank, jointly with the European Union, mobilized resources to assist the Government in the finalizationof the National Transport Sector Policy Letter, the Ten-Year National Strategy for the Transport Sectorand an Investment Plan for the period 2000-2009. This, plus the various short-term technical assistanceservices mentioned earlier, provided key inputs for the elaboration of the follow-on project, PAProNaT.The European Union was instrumental in organizing and supporting the successful transport sectorroundtable meeting of November 1999.

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4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

An economic assessment was carried out during project preparation for the rehabilitation of secondaryroads. The SAR reported an Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of 13 percent for the component ofsecondary road rehabilitation which included three separate individual roads. The rates of return for theindividual roads were 10 percent, 14 percent and 15 percent. There is no documentation in the project fileswhich allows to determine which rate corresponds to which road. According to the SAR, the justificationof including the particular road with the low 10 percent rate of return was based on: "(a) the economicjudgment that production will increase more if the region is truly opened up to a range of markets; (b)the fact that the market concerned is the capital city (i.e. the largest market); and (c) experience underprevious projects that induced traffic has been typically substantially higher (up to 50% higher) thanappraisal estimates. "

As part of the ICR preparation, an economic evaluation was carried out for the two subcomponents(rehabilitation of secondary roads, and periodic maintenance) within the physical works component. Forthe periodic maintenance subcomponent, the methodology for this analysis was constrained by the fact thatthe initial condition of the roads (before periodic maintenance was carried out) is not known. This wouldnormally be essential information for the comparison of the "with and without project" scenarios.Furthermore, the analysis is normally carried out for an evaluation period of fifteen to twenty years, butmost works under the project were carried out between 1994 and 1996. Finally, because most of theperiodic maintenance works are not "lumpy", but are spread out over several years, the typical IRRcalculation based on negative cost streams during an initial short period, and a longer period during whichproject benefits occur, could not be made. Nevertheless, an analysis of NPV was made using the RoadsEconomic Decision Model (RED) which was developed by the Bank specifically for very-low-volumeroads; this model makes specific assumptions on the operating life span for the periodic maintenance andthe rehabilitation cases. The following table summarizes the results of the economic analysis. More detailson economic costs and benefits of the physical works component are presented in Annex 3.

Table 3: Summary of Results of Ex-Post Economic Analysis

Road Length (km) ADT (veh/day) NPV at 12% IRR(in US$ million) (%)

MaintenanceProgramBokoro-Ati 355 22 2.44 N/AMongo-Abou Deia 122.5 54 4.44 N/AAbou Deia-Am 135 81 7.69 N/ATimanMassaguet-Massakor 68 120 1.05 N/AyTotal Maintenance 15.62ProgramRehabilitationProgramNjamena-Dourbali 103 153 4.22 22.1%Bokoro-N'Gama 75 30 -1.41 4.8%Bitikine-Melfi 118 9 -4.02 -5.6%Eref-Mangalm6 52.2 37 0.24 13.5%

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Total Rehab. -0.97 11.0%ProgramTotal Physical 14.65 39.8%Invest.

For the road rehabilitation subcomponent, not all the roads yielded an IRR greater than the typicalthreshold 12 percent. Two roads (Bitkine/Melfi and Bokoro/N'Gama), showed lower returns, largelybecause of their lower traffic levels. The sensitivity analysis showed that the traffic on these roads wouldhave to be around 45-49 vehicles per day in order to achieve an IRR equal to 12 percent, while actualtraffic is below these values.

It should be added that these roads are part of the essential backbone road network of the country, and playa crucial role in providing the country's rural and urban populations with minimal basic access to servicesand markets. Because of the particularly difficult soil conditions in Chad, it has been concluded that highercost technical solutions are sometimes necessary to ensure this basic access, even where traffic volumes arenot high (see section on "Sustainability"). Therefore, the relatively low economic rates of return on certainroads are balanced by their social importance.

4.4 Financial rate of return:N/A

4.5 Institutional development impact:

The Institutional Development (ID) impact is defined as the extent to which a project has improved anagency's or a country's ability to make effective use of its human and financial resources. During the firsthalf of the project, the institution-strengthening activities yielded moderate results. However, throughcontinued sector dialogue, several mechanisms have been put in place, in particular, a Comprehensive RoadSector Strategy and Investment Plan, the adoption of a network management approach to the road sector,the Second Generation Road Fund and the Performance-based road management contracts, all of whichpromise to have significant long term impacts for sustainable finance and management of the road network.For these reasons, the ID impact is considered to be significant.

Human resources. The skill and knowledge levels in the sector have been raised through the large numberof training sessions in which hundreds of trainees participated, both from the public and private sector. Itis, however, difficult to gauge the impact of this training on the actual performance in the workplace. Forexample, there are still serious concerns about low productivity within the Directorate of Roads, asexpressed even by the Director of Roads himself. The impact of training programs is also limited whentrainees return to an essentially dysfunctional or inefficient work environment, in part caused by very lowsalaries, which is generally true throughout the public sector in Chad, except in the case of certain staffworking under temporary contracts related to donor-financed projects. The recent organizational study ofthe Directorate of Roads highlights these and other difficulties, which are being seriously considered by theMinister himself, who has taken an active interest in this problem.

A repeated comment with respect to training has been that there needs to be more intensive on-the-jobtraining to achieve functional tasks, and that this training should be designed in cooperation with servicedirectors. In some cases however, this is further constrained by service directors and sub-directors, whothemselves need assistance in basic planning, programming and management. It should be taken as apositive sign that the Director of Surface Transport has expressed a desire for on-the-job assistance in the

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management of the DTS. The management of human resources at the MTPTHU has been improved duringthe project, due to the creation of the Human Resource Management Unit and training of its personnel, andthe introduction of a procedures manual still in use.

It should be noted that at the beginning of the project, the Ministry of Public Works and the RoadsDirectorate had very limited experience in managing a road network. This was previously carried out bythe OFNAR - Office National des Routes, who, when transformed into SNER, kept most of its experiencedpersonnel and field resources. Thus, the Roads Directorate essentially started from scratch with very littlehuman resource capacity. Because of this state of affairs, the technical assistance team which was put inplace under the project included not only advisory positions, but also direct line positions. During the firsttwo years of the project the technical assistance team was instrumental in getting the MTPTHU'sDirectorate General and the Roads Directorate up and running within a revised set of attributions. At themid-term review, this TA team was abruptly terminated, and it is the general feeling in the Ministry that theabsence of a transition period left the Ministry and Directorate at a serious handicap. Over time, theorganization has managed to function, but as the above-mentioned study shows, many of the basicoperational functions within the MTPTHU need to be refocused and revitalized.

Financial resource management. The project has introduced functional financial management systems tothe CISCP, the CAER and the BNF. These continue to provide adequate accounting for funds provided bydonors and through the CAER. However, it is clear that there is still room for improvement. For example,the lack of regular communication between the CAER and the DR aggravated the unchecked accumulationof arrears at the CAER; if such communication occurred, the CAER could have warned the DR to reduceor stop work orders when it was clear that funds were not forthcoming. Financial audits of the BNF haverecommended management improvements, not all of which have been instituted.

Sector and macroeconomic policy. At the policy level, the project has undertaken a constant and intensesector dialogue on how to most effectively utilize scarce resources provided by donors and the Governmentfor transport infrastructure, and how to sustainably finance the maintenance of the road network. TheTransport Policy Letter, Sector Strategy and Investment Program, which were presented at the beginning ofthe PST2, all reflected sound principles for the management of public funds and the financing of roadmaintenance. During the course of the project, the Govemment deviated from these principles andprofound disagreements surfaced, including between the IDA and the IMF (see section below on MajorFactors Affecting Implementation and Outcome). However, the fact that this dialogue has continued and aconsensus between all parties was finally re-established, indicates that, over the long term, this investmentin time and effort will result in more efficient use of the nation's scarce financial resources.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5. 1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

CFAF devaluation. The impact of the devaluation of the CFAF in January 1994 led to a general priceincrease of between 30 and 60 percent for expenses in local.currency. At the same time however, the valneof foreign currency doubled, such that, on balance, the devaluation had little adverse, and even a slightlypositive, effect on the implementation of the project. Nevertheless, the Development Credit Agreement wasaugmented in March 1995 by DTS 8.8 million, as part of a Bank program to assist CFAF zone countriescope with the general effects of the devaluation.

Conflicting signals from the Bank and IMF. In 1995, mounting public deficits led to a deterioratingcapacity of the Government to meet its commitments. The intervention of the macroeconomic staff of the

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Bank as well as the IMF with the objective to redress this situation resulted in a number of decisions onmacroeconomic issues (described earlier), which undermined some of the basic principles of theDevelopment Credit Agreement and therefore caused confusion in the country as to the coherence of thepolicy of the World Bank Group.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

Between 1995 and 1997, the Government took various actions, which, in their cumulative effect,undermined the project's original concept and prevented the full attainment of its objectives. These actionswere:

* the "borrowing" of CAER resources by the Ministry of Finance (1995), causing the first problems ofcash-flow and payment delays to contractors, and a certain loss of credibility of the CAER;

* the obligation for CAER resources to pass through the treasury (1997), combined with an increasingretention of those resources which were used to pay for budget expenditures not related to roadmaintenance;

* the application of the sales tax on transport services and the parallel reduction in half of the freight levydue to CAER

* the elimination of the tax exemption for donor-financed contracts.

Beginning with the mid-term evaluation, IDA supervision missions repeatedly raised these issues, but therewas little progress, in large part because the Government was receiving contradictory signals (i) from theBanks transport sector staff on one hand, and (ii) the macroeconomic staff of the Bank and the IMF on theother.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

Throughout the difficult period when the sector suffered under external policy shocks, the CoordinatingUnit (CISCP) played a key role in maintaining the dialogue between the Bank, the IMF, other donors andvarious Government ministries. CISCP insured through its accounting department appropriate accountingmechanisms and financial reporting. A very positive factor for project management was the continuity ofthe CISCP staff; this is in contrast to the MTPTHU in general, which underwent several upheavals inpersonnel, which hampered continuity in the management of certain project components.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:

The Development Credit Agreement No. 2520 was signed on July 21, 1993 and totaled SDR 26.000,000.It was supplemented through an amendment (Amendment A to the Development Credit Agreement, CreditNo. 2520-1 CD of SDR 8,800,000 on March 7, 1995). Amendment A was approved as part of a generalmeasure to assist CFAF countries cope with the January 1995 devaluation. It provided additionalfinancing for the rehabilitation of three principal roads, as well as about 300 kilometers of additionalpriority secondary roads.

Following the mid-term evaluation, funds originally earmarked for the bridges sub-component wasreallocated to cover: (i) additional rehabilitation; and (ii) additional consulting services related to thepreparation of the Transport Strategy and the follow-on project. It was agreed at that time that financingfor the bridges would be provided by the European Union. However the EU later withdrew from thisagreement. During the Roundtable meeting on Transport in November 1999, the French aid agency (AFD)has pledged funding for some essential bridges on the road axis between N'Djamena and Abeche.

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The actual unit cost (per km) for the rehabilitation of unpaved roads was twice the appraisal estimates.This was because the estimated standards in the appraisal report were significantly below the actualrequirements of the selected roads.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationalefor sustainability rating:

The sustainability of the project is rated as "likely", for the following reasons:

Government commitment and policy framework.Road Maintenance Financing: During the preparation of the follow-on project PAProNaT, the Governmentrenewed its commitment to establishing an autonomous funding mechanism for road maintenance, througha Second-generation Road Maintenance Fund, whose management will be overseen by a committee inwhich private sector stakeholders are the majority. The concrete proof for this commitment was the formaland unanimous adoption by Parliament of the law establishing the FER in September 2000. This lawhowever has since been complemented through appropriate decrees detailing the levels and sources of thefunding, and the institutional relationship with the BNF and the Roads Directorate of MTPTHU.Consensus has also been reached with the IMF on the basic principles of the FER. The actual results ofthese endeavors will be seen over the next several years.

Taxation of donor-financed contracts: Concerning the separate issue of taxation of donor-financedcontracts, the Government, with help from the Bank financed under the PST2, has finally issuedappropriate "Instructions to Bidders" which clearly describe the mechanisms by which the Government willfinance taxes to be paid by consultants, suppliers and contractors.Procurement procedures: The Government has also adopted a decision that procurement decisions in thetransport sector will continue to be made under the same procedures which have successfully been usedunder PST2. These procedures assure relatively speedy decision-making based on recommendations of atechnical committee in which qualified professionals dominate.

Increased role of private sector. As a result of the project, all physical works and supervision have beentransferred from force account to private contractors. With regard to construction, the force accountcapability has been transformed by creating a fully privatized construction firm, and converting agovernment-owned construction company, managed under private sector principles and able to successfullycompete for contracts. For supervision, a fully private engineering firm has been created. Thesefundamental changes have increased the sustainability of the project interventions.

Institutional/management effectiveness. The introduction of performance-based management contracts andthe Second Generation Road Maintenance Fund are important institutional gains that provide a foundationfor sustainability (see below). The institutional weaknesses that persist at the MTPTHU, in particular theRoads Directorate, will be addressed through further technical assistance and training under the PAProNaTproject. This time, however, TA activities will be targeted more towards achieving better operationalefficiency, and will be accompanied by periodic technical, management and financial audits to closelymonitor performance and increase accountability. These audits will provide a basis upon which to refineand revise, if necessary, the institutional responsibilities in the road sector.

Technical sustainability. A number of serious technical issues were confronted during the implementationof the physical works component, especially the difficult geotechnical conditions in Chad and the inefficient

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nature of traditional road maintenance planning and management. Regarding the geotechnical issue, amajor step was taken by adopting the principle that certain essential national roads need to be paved fromthe start, so as to ensure sustainability, despite the fact that their traffic levels may not generate high ratesof return. The follow-on project PAProNaT includes a rather large pilot component to test the new conceptof performance-based road management and maintenance on 440 km of unpaved roads over a 4-yearperiod, through one contract. This contract will be the first of its kind in Africa, and if successful, wouldresult in major gains in efficiencies. It would also simplify road network management systems. It is hopedthat participation in this innovative program will stimulate a more "network management" mentality in theminds of the Roads Directorate staff and private sector.

In sum, the project has successfully put in place a set of institutional structures that will help the sector toevolve and improve its performance in the future. There is still much room for improvement in thefunctioning of these structures. During its last two years, the project has heavily invested in taking stock ofthe situation and addressing these shortcomings. A key element of this process has been continued sectordialogue with the Government to confront difficult policy issues and achieve an agreement and commitmenton resolving them. Important results include the introduction of performance-based road contracts for roadmanagement and maintenance in Chad. Thus, while difficult times still lie ahead, the follow-on project willprovide a framework for the Government to: (i) show that it is serious about sustainably improving sectormanagement; and (ii) show its capacity to effectively utilize its technical assistance and refine and adjust itsmanagement systems to achieve continuous improvement in sector performance.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

As noted, a great deal of effort during the last two years of the project to lay the groundwork for thefollow-on project, PAProNaT. Within that context, the second generation road maintenance fund, FER,will replace the CAER at the beginning the year 2001. Credit effectiveness for the PAProNaT is projectedfor the end of 2001. The transitional period for continuing road maintenance will begin in October 2000,which will be financed through an advance of STABEX funds from the European Union. The installationof the FER will be accompanied by a technical assistance, which will also oversee technical and financialaudits of the FER, as well as the utilization of its funds by the DR.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:

The identification of the project was a logical follow-up operation on three previous projects in the sector.It built on the experience of those earlier projects and was conceived in parallel to an ongoing sectordialogue between the Bank, the Government and others; it therefore reflected participation of the variousstakeholders in the public and private sectors. The project fell squarely within the government's strategyand priorities for Bank assistance, and still does today.

A pre-evaluation mission was carried out in October 1992. At that time, Government commitment wasconfirmed through a Letter of Transport Sector Policy, as well as a number of action plans for eachsusector. The appraisal mission was carried out in January 1993, and the Staff Appraisal Report waspublished on June 3, 1993. Project preparation leading up to appraisal was carried out over a relativelyshort period with a large team of experienced consultants, led by the Bank Task Manager. The SARprovides a comprehensive treatment of the historical context of the project and overall sector goals. Thetechnical analyses were based on a good and complete information. As mentioned earlier, the estimatedcost per km for earth road rehabilitation were about half the actual costs, due to an underestimation of the

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required technical standards. Due attention was paid to environmental considerations, including thecreation of an institutional capacity to incorporate environmental considerations in sector analyses througha dedicated unit in the Directorate of Roads.

The principal risk identified in the SAR was: "chronic instability which affects political commitment tofulfill or sustain policy reforms and agreed financial conditions. " In response to this, broadconsensus-building was carried out as a mitigation measure during preparation. However, duringimplementation, this risk materialized, as evidenced mainly by the various government actions whichcontradicted the agreed principles for independent road maintenance financing. Thus, the achiqvement ofearly consensus did not ensure consistent political commitment throughout the entire project period.

7.2 Supervision:

Since the beginning of the Bank's involvement in Chad, and also throughout the PST2, the Bank played amajor role as sector advisor and coordinator of donor activities in Chad. During supervision missions,Bank staff consistently pursued a broad sector dialogue with the Government, the private sector and otherdonors. A particular innovation during the last several years was to conduct regular consultations with thetransport profession.

Prior to the mid-term review of the project, the Bank carried out an extensive technical and financial audit,which provided a sound basis for re-orientating the project for the remaining implementation period. Theaudit concluded that (i) the physical objectives were being successfully achieved, (ii) the broad-basedtechnical assistance activities to the MTPTHU had reached their term and (iii) the training program wasonly partially implemented. It also noted the lack of a coherent overall transport sector strategy andinvestment program, as well as continued need for further specific assistance to the Roads Directorate,particularly for managing the road maintenance program. After the re-orientation, the project thereforefocused on developing a coherent national transport strategy and investment plan, completing the trainingprogram and providing targeted technical assistance to the CISCP and the Roads Directorate. Someadditional periodic maintenance works were also carried out in 1998 and 1999, mainly as an emergencyresponse to the failing CAER.

When it became clear in 1995 that several basic principles and conditions of the Development CreditAgreement were being eroded, the Bank staff brought this to the attention of the Government and took afirm position on the need to resolve these issues. These efforts were however complicated by the parallelintervention of the IMF, which tended to reinforce these contradictions. Given the macroeconomic natureof the policy reforms, it became difficult for the Bank staff to effectively bring the borrower back into lineregarding the independent funding mechanisms for road maintenance. However, the Bank was not overlylegalistic or rigid in its interpretation of the Development Credit Agreement, which could have resulted inclosure of the project. The persistence of the Bank staff in the dialogue with both the Government, the IMFand the Bank's macroeconomic staff paid off with a consensus finally reestablished within the context of thefollow-on project PAProNaT.

The Bank was flexible in adjusting the project's original allocation of funds to project components, and inmobilizing supplementary funds. In 1998, the Bank approved, as an extraordinary measure, the utilizationof SAC funds to temporarily salvage the CAER which had become underfunded due to the macroeconomicmeasures taken by the Government. The European Union took similar steps. This was instrumental inpreventing a complete collapse of the road maintenance program and at least a temporary salvation for theroad network, much of which was becoming unusable. During the second half of the project, remainingproject funds for technical assistance were efficiently used to support numerous short interventions to

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advance the sector dialogue and prepare the follow-on project.

The Bank staff played a key role in engaging the Government in a sector level dialogue and coordinatingthe various donors assisting the sector. This is a role that none of the other donors were willing or able toplay, but was essential in establishing a consensus on the basic policy reforms.

From credit effectiveness to closure of credit (six years), there were five task managers, two of which onlyhad a rather short and marginal involvement with the project. Supervision was particularly weak duringthe period 12/96 - 10/97, during which time three task managers were assigned to the project. The resultwas a complete gap in supervision missions. The change of task managers inevitably introduced an elementof instability vis-a-vis the borrower, but, aside from the gap noted above, does not seem to have undulyprevented the overall continuity in the operation of the project.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

Overall, the Bank's performance can be considered satisfactory. The main shortcoming was the conflictingsignals given to the borrower by the Bank's transport sector staff in charge of the project, on one side, andthe Banks macroeconomic staff and the IMF on the other. In this sense, the Bank must share theresponsibility for the unsatisfactory performance of the Government (see section below). On the otherhand, high marks are due for untiring and patient sector dialogue and intellectual leadership to improvesector performance, with Government authorities at the macro and sector levels.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:

Because the PST 2 was based on the experience of three previous sector projects, the Government was verymuch involved in project preparation and pronounced its commitment to the project's approach through aTransport Sector Policy Letter.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

When judging the Government's implementation performance, a clear distinction must be made between thepractical day-to-day management and implementation of the project, and the creation of an overall enablingenvironment for the sector.

The day-to-day management of the project and its implementation was very well taken care of by theexperienced staff of the CISCP, mainly the project coordinator, and the chief accountant who throughoutthe project was responsible for the financial management and disbursement. An important and positive rolewas also played by the key technical staff of the Roads Directorate, the Directors for Planning and SurfaceTransport, and by some professionals who at different times held the post of Director General ofMTPTHU. Over the course of the project, the MTPTHU had eight Ministers, four Directors General andtwo Directors of Roads. However, this latter problem was mitigated by the stability of staff in theCoordination Unit during the entire project period, which enabled a continuity in management and sectordialogue.

Concerning the maintenance of an enabling environment of the transport sector, the overall Governmentperformance has been less than optimal. Despite a strong commitment of the sector Ministry MTPTHU toimproved performance, a series of Government decisions and actions on the macroeconomic level fatallydamaged the functioning of the road maintenance financing system, which is a centerpiece of overall

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performance in the transport sector. The two most significant actions in this sense were (i) the integrationof the CAER revenues into the general budget managed by the Ministry of Finance, and (ii) the introductionof full taxation for donor-financed projects without adequate implementation procedures. The latter actionseverely hampered the signature of new donor-financed contracts during at least 18 months. Both of theseactions were part of a macroeconomic agenda of the Government which was actively encouraged by theBank's macroeconomic staff and the IMF. Here the Bank Group must share some responsibility because ofthe conflicting messages from different Bank staff and IMF. However, the responsibility for withholdingfunds belonging to the CAER rests squarely with the Government.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

Throughout the PST2, the Coordination Unit (CISCP) provided an important element of continuity andsteady leadership to the sector program. As such, it maintained a high level of credibility with othergovernment agencies and the donor community, despite the negative macroeconomic environment. The unithas well-established project management and accounting procedures which have stood the test of time andits staff is efficient and well-motivated. Its one shortcoming is that it has failed to provide regular formalprogress reports to the Bank. This shortcoming was however compensated for by a close day-to-daycooperation between the staff of the CISCP and the Bank, which allowed for a steady two-way flow ofup-to-date information of the project and its environment.

The other major de-facto implementing agency has been the MTPTHU, in particular the Roads Directorate(DR - Direction des Routes). The DR was, and continued to be, is in charge of preparing and managing allcontracts in the road sector, both for physical works (routine and periodic maintenance, rehabilitation andupgrading) and consultant contracts (works design and supervision); under financing from numerousdonors as well as local sources. As noted earlier in this document, this directorate was built from thebottom up at the beginning of the project. The staff of the DR has worked hard to come of age, and theyhave gained a significant amount of experience over the past six years. However, a very recent diagnosticstudy has pointed out a number of problems in technical and financial management, which, if addressed,would enhance its effectiveness and accountability. A main problem cited has been the lack of in-housecapacity to oversee and verify the quality of work carried out by consultants and contractors in the field.Another shortcoming has been the lack of separate accounting systems for maintenance activities on onehand and for rehabilitation/construction on the other. Separate accounting for these areas are a necessaryelement for accurately estimating, managing and monitoring the annual budget for the Road MaintenanceFund. Finally, the DR's internal structure for managing contracts for road maintenance was not beensufficiently linked to the CAER revenue management and accounting system; this led to very significantpayment arrears to maintenance contractors. In faimess, it should be noted that the DR operates under thesame severe constraints as all public services in Chad: rigid operating rules, extremely low salaries and perdiem rates, poor working conditions and low operating budgets, not to mention the unreliable funding fromthe CAER for its maintenance activities during much of the project period.

7. 7 Overall Borrower performance:

On balance, borrower performance can be considered satisfactory. Government decisions and actionsexternal to the sector had a negative effect on the achievement of project objectives, but these actions werein part carried out within the context of confusing signals from the Bank and the IMF. The implementingagency MTPTHU and more specifically the CISCP and the DR, laboring under a severe handicap of fundsshortages and an unstable macroeconomic environment, have managed to keep the sector program alive,but there clearly remains room for improvements in operational, technical and financial management,especially in the DR. The follow-on project gives the implementing agency an opportunity to address such

- 25 -

improvements.

8. Lessons Learned

The role of technical assistance and responsibility-taking is changing. Prior to the PST2, manyfunctional tasks in Chad's Ministry of Public Works and Transport were assumed directly by expatriatetechnical assistance (TA) personnel, within the context of force account implementation of works. In orderto reduce the dependence on expatriate TA personnel, the project supported the strengthening of capacitiesof local staff, and the technical assistance provided under the project was focused accordingly. After sixyears of project implementation, a number of chadian professionals have now acquired importantprofessional capacities, but it is generally acknowledged that technical assistance will still be required inthe future for specific technical tasks in the sector, and to support specific and large road upgradingprojects. However, the perceived role and responsibility of this Technical Assistance is changing.

It has been recognized quite some time ago that the mere presence of a highly qualified expatriate cande-motivate local staff to take on true responsibilities, especially if the TA personnel is placed in linepositions. Technical assistance and specialized consulting services should mainly provide methods andtools to achieve performance results. However, these methods and tools cannot sustainably improveperformance if they are not assimilated and continuously applied by the local staff and managers. Thus,despite the presence of continuing technical assistance during the first two years of the PST2, there was arecurring litany of reasons (notably, not enough vehicles, low pay and poor motivation, low per diems forfield trips) why the essential work could not be carried out on time, within budget and at an acceptablequality. Yet, many of these "reasons" could have been dealt with by the implementing agencies, throughmore efficient operational procedures and better use of existing resources, many of which are suppliedthrough the project or government budgets. After this situation was recognized during the mid-term review,(i) long-term technical assistance was generally abolished; (ii) technical assistance was limited to veryspecific tasks for which local capacity was not available, and (iii) no line position was occupied by anexpatriate.

There is a need for continued close coordination within the Bank and between the Bank and the IMF.This has become clear to all concemed. In this case, the lack of such coordination led to an undermining ofthe Bank's sectoral approach, and dire consequences for the sector. It would seem that country teammeetings and Bank/IMF coordination meetings are the best venue for ensuring this continuing coordination.This experience also suggests that the macro-economists should not limit their purview to purelymacro-economic considerations, but should also seek to facilitate the implementation of sector-specificpolicies.

Maintain independence of road funds. The experience of the Road Fund has emphasized the need forthese funds to be independent and at arms length from the Government. There must be majorityrepresentation of private sector and users, a solid legislation for the establishment and functioning of theRoad Fund and technical audits to supplement financial audits.

Sector dialogue and continuity is an important Bank role. Throughout the project, both the Bank andthe Coordination Unit CISCP played a vital role of maintaining continuity for sector management, withinan unstable macroeconomic policy environment. When the macroeconomic policy environment becamedifficult, the Bank could have withdrawn altogether, citing non-compliance with certain credit covenants.However, the Bank' sector staff (Task Managers) instead pursued an intense and patient dialog with a widerange of individuals in the Government and NGO's, and this course of action certainly produced better andmore lasting results than a withdrawal would have produced. Other donors clearly look to the Bank for

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overall leadership in the transport sector, including for support to policy definition and sector planning.Although the European Union was formally designated as the coordinator of the transport sector strategywhich was developed during the last phase of the PST2, it did not have the actual technical capacity to fullyplay this role, and this responsibility has defacto fallen back to the Bank.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

There is a broad consensus of Government officials that the PST2 was, on balance, a success in pointingthe way to more efficient sector management, through its support to privatization, sustainable funding forroad maintenance, developing the overall sector strategy, coordinating donor efforts and pursuing acontinuous sector dialogue. However, it is also admitted that the policy environment outside the sector,including the mixed signals received from the Bank and the IMF, hindered the full achievement of projectgoals. Complements were paid by the current Minister of Plan (former Minister of Public Works) and thecurrent Minister of Public Works to the Bank's Task Manager during the second half of the project, for hispersistent and patient pursuance of difficult policy issues, and the flexibility shown in the management ofthe credit.

The original comments made by the borrower (in French language) are included in the annexes to this ICR.

(b) Cofinanciers:

Agence Franqaise de Developpement and European Union. Both the AFD and EU representativesexpressed satisfaction and appreciation for the Bank's role in dealing with broad sector management issues,within the context of PST2. They continue to rely on the sector framework which was built under thePST2 to guide and manage the operations financed with their resources.

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

The two commercial Transporters' Unions expressed their satisfaction for the fact that mainly due to theBank's support they were consistently included in the transport sector policy dialog, and in particular thediscussions leading to the creation of the new second-generation Road Maintenance Fund, in themanagement of which they will participate actively.

10. Additional Information

Persons met in Chad during ICR Mission

Ministry of Public Works, Transport, Housing and Urban PlanningMr. Bichara Ch6rif Daoussa, MinisterMr. Hassane Saline, Director RoadsDr. Palkoubou Issakha, Director of Studies and PlanningMr. Ahmat Nene Tassy, Coordinator CISCPMr. Elvam Bamboh, Deputy Coordinator CISCPMr. Michel Guimbert, Consultant CISCP, Support to Management of PST2Mr. Idriss Goukouny, Director of Surface TransportMr. Djimbaye Mbaipa, Accountant CISCPMr. Jean-Loup Blanchet, Consultant to the Directorate of RoadsMr. Ngariaguila Gauthier, Head of Human Resources Management Unit

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Ministry of Economic Planning and CooperationMr. M. Ahmed Lamine Ali, Minister

European UnionMr. Guido Libotte, Conseiller A la Delegation de l'Union EuropeenneMr. Jens-Uwe Schuetz, Technical Advisor

French Development Agency (AFD)M. Victor Paulin, Technical Advisor

T'ransporters' UnionsDjibangar Madjirebaye, General Secretary UNATRANST

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome I Impact Indicators:

_ ndictor/MAtWx Projected in last PSR ActualLatest EstimateOriginal project did not include quantifiableoutcome/impact indicators. Project has notbeen retrofitted (based on agreement withOCS).Indicators have therefore not been defined.

Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix Projected In last PSRI ActuaULatest EstimatePhysical Works Component: 100% complete. 100% complete.- Planned works for road rehabilitation andperiodic maintenance completed.

Institubonal Strengthening Component:- Force Account execution of physical works 100% complete. 100% complete.abandoned in favor of prvate contractors.- Independent road maintenance financing Achieved through CAER, however New second-generation Road Maintenancemechanism established. restructuring is required. Fund (FER) has been created in September

2000 and is expected to be fully operationalin January 2001.

- Private sector capability for road (i) SNER and 2 other local firms specialized Full privatization of SNER is well advancedmaintenance works and works supervision in road maintenance are established and and to be fully achieved by end 2000.established. working;

(ii) 2 local consulting firms for supervision ofmaintenance works are established andworking.

- Public and private sector staff trained. 917 persons received training in-country; 17 PST2 training program completed. Morepersons received training overseas. training to be provided under follow-on

project.- Management capability of MTPTHU for Reasonable management capability Follow-on project will provide continuedrevised roles improved. achieved, especially in preparation and support to further improve management

supervision of investment projects capability.- Sector planning and management (i) A national 10-year strategy and investment (i) Sector strategy and investment planimproved. plan for the transport sector has been provide sound basis for future sector

achieved, using a wide participatory development.approach.(ii) Impact monitoring indicators for National (ii) Baseline study for impact monitoring hasTransport Strategy established. been completed in July 2000.

End of project

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Proiect Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)Appraisal Revised I Actual/Latest % of

Project Cost By Component Estimate it Estimate 2'1 Estimate % of RevisedUS$ million Appraisal]| Estimate

A. Physical Component

I. Investment Costs - Civil Works 34.4 33.4 33.1 96.2% 99.1%

(a) Rehabilitation 23.2 23.7 23.4 100.9% 98.7%

(b) Periodic Maintenance 8.7 9.7 9.7 111.5% 100.0%(c) Bridges 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0% l

(d) N'Djamena Interchange Bldg. 0.0 0.0 0.0

2. Recurrent Costs(a) Routine Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0

B. Institutional Strenatheninn Comionent

I. Consultants Services for Public Works 6.9 6.3 6.0 86.4% 94.6%/(a) Studies and Works Supervision 3.4(b) Technical Assistance 1.9(c) Audits and Project Co-ordination Unit 1.6

2. Consultants Servicesfor Transport & Civil Avia. 0.6 6.9 6.9 1150.0% 100.0%(a) Studies and Supervision(b) Technical Assistance 0.6

3. Training and Scholarship 2.3 2.0 2.0 87.8% 101.6%

4. Operating Costs (PCU) 0.7 0.7 0.8 117.1% 118.2%Base Cost 44.9 49.3 48.8 108.7% 99.0%

C. Contin2encies 0.1

1. Physical Contingency 2.22. Price Contingency 1.1

D. Refinancing PPF 1.5 1.3 1.3 83.9% 100.0%°

Total Project Cost 49.71 50.71 50.1ol 100.7% q 98.8%|

1/ This includes the Original Appraisal Estimate, Plus Supplemental Credit2/ Although the total SDR amount of the IDA Credit remained the same, the distribution between categories

was revised.Note: The change in the Revised total amount of the IDA Credit is due to conversion from SDR to US Dollars.

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Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate)(US$ million equivalent)

ExpenditureCategory lICB | NCB jOther I N.B.F. I Total

1. Civil Works 29.9 9.8 0.0 77.1 116.8(29.0) (8.7) 0.0 0.0 (37.7)

2. Consulting Services for TA 0.0 0.0 11.5 0.0 11.5works supervision & studies 0.0 0.0 (7.5) 0.0 (7.5)

3. Training 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 3.90.0 0.0 (2.6) 0.0 (2.6)

4. Operating Cost (PCU) 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.20.0 0.0 (0.7) 0.0 (0.7)

5. Reimbursement PPF 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.30.0 0.0 (1.3) 0.0 (1.3)

Total 29.9 9.8 17.9 77.1 134.7l (29.0) (8.7) (12.0)j 0.0 Jl (49.7)

Figures in parenthesis are IDA allocation.

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate)(US$ million eouivalent)

[ Expenditure Category | ICB | NCB | Other N.B.F. | Total

1. Civil Works 33.2 33.2

2. Consulting Services for TA 12.9 12.9works supervision & studies

3. Training 2.0 2.0

4. Operating Cost (PCU) 0.8 0.8

5. Reimbursement PPF 1.3 1.3

Total 33.2 l 1 17.0 | l 50.1]Note: Figures above represent IDA allocation only

Discrepancies in figure are due to rounding

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Proiect Financing by ComDonent (in US$ million equivalent)Appraisal/Supplem Actual/ Latest % of % of

Component ental Estimate Revised Estimate Estimate Appr. J[RevisedIDA Govt. CoF. IDA IGovt.1 CoF. IDA IGovt.1 CoF. IDA IDA

A. Physical Component

I. Investment Costs - Civil Works 34.4 7.5 33.6 33.4 7.5 33.6 33.1 96.20/ 99.1°0,

(a) Rehabilitation 23.2 2.4 15.9 23.7 2.4 15.9 23.4 100.90/ 98.7/i,

(b) Periodic Maintenance 8.7 5.1 12.9 9.7 5.1 12.9 9.7 111.5% 100.0%fs,

(c) Bridges 2.5 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0% 0.0f'[

(d) N'Djamena Interchange Bldg. 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0

2. Recurrent Costs

(a) Routine Maintenance 0.0 25.4 3.9 0.0 25.4 3.9 0.0B. Institutional Strenethenin2 ComDonent D D

1. Consultants Servicesfor Public Works 6.9 0.0 2.3 6.3 0.0 2.3 6.0 TA AT 86.4% 94 6(a) Studies and Works Supervision 3.4 1.3 1.3 A A

(b) Technical Assistance 1.9 1.0 I.C

(c) Audits and Project Co-ordination Unit 1.6 0.0 N N

2. Consultant Serv. for Trans. & Civil Avia. 0.6 0.0 0.3 6.9 0.0 0.3 6.9 0 0 1150.0% 100.00/,(a) Studies and Supervision 0.3 0.3 T T(b) Technical Assistance 0.6

3. Training and Scholarship 2.3 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 A A 87.80/ 101.6/o/4. Operating Costs (PCU) 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.8 V V 117.1j 118.2°A

Base Cost 44.9 33.4 41.1 49.3 33.4 41.1 48.8 108.70/ 99.00/C. Contineencies 3.3 4.4 6.1 0.1 4.4 6.1 L L

1. Physical Contingency 2.2 2.2 3.8 2.2 3.8 A A

2. Price Contingency 1.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 B BD. Refinancinz PPF 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 L L 83.9%1 100.0%

Total Project Cost | 49.71 37.81 47.21 50.71 37.8 47.2T 50.1 E E 100.7%] 98.8% j

Revised |[ Financiers j Appraisal Supplemental Total I _Appraisal_+ |Actual %Of_Ap_r.I I I u I SunnlemAp tal a R e

Govemment 37.2 0.6 37.8 37.2 NAIDA 37.0 12.7 49.7 50.7 50.1| 100.7%|| 98.8%/European Dev. Fund (EDF) 22.0 0.0 22.0 22.0 NA

French Cooperation Agency (CFD) 4.2 0.0 4.2 4.2 NA

BDEAC 15.0 0.0 15.0 15.0 NAOPEC Fund (Closing Date Feb. 15, 2001) 6.0 0.0° 6.01 6.01 3.91 65.0/2 65.0%1Total Project Cost T 121.4 13.3| 134.71 135.11 54.01

Note: The change in amounts is due to exchange rate.No data was available for the other financiers.

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Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits

Summary of benefits and costs:The Roads Economic Decision Model (RED) developed by the World Bank was used to carry out anex-post evaluation of economic benefits of the physical works component of the project. The RED model isdesigned to compensate for the scarcity of reliable data, of the type which is normally needed for afull-fledged economic evaluation using the HDM model, as is often the case with roads in the Sub-Saharanregion. However, recent data does exist in Chad on vehicle operating costs, road conditions and vehiclefleet characteristics; these were established for the project roads as part of the economic evaluation carriedout for the follow-on project (National Transport Plan Support Project - PAPRoNaT). Based on thesevalues, the RED model was used to compute a series of speed- roughness-VOC relationships byinterpolating polynomial functions of the above characteristics. These functions allowed the estimation ofVOC and roughness in the "without/before project" situation, by entering the known average speed ofvehicles on these roads. A test was carried out to check the reliability of those functions; the results werefound to be similar to those produced by HDM III. For the "with project/current situation", the roadcharacteristics and travel speeds were taken from the recent network inventory carried out in the context ofthe Chad National Transport Plan in 1999. The costs used in the analysis were based on the actual costs ofrehabilitation or periodic maintenance, depending on the specific road analyzed.

Main assumptions:Periodic Maintenance Program. Periodic maintenance works financed under the project were carried outon unpaved roads only. Based on the specific characteristics of those road, which are highly vulnerable dueto bad soil conditions and the absence of good surfacing materials such as gravel, the overall evaluationperiod was limited to 8 years. This period is composed of an initial four years during which the actualmaintenance works were carried out, and another four-year period after which the condition of the roadwould be the same as if no further maintenance is carried out. The traffic growth rate was assumed to be 5percent per year, in line with average traffic growth in Chad. The RED model requires input for each roadon location, length, road class, traffic level, traffic composition, and road condition, in the with/withoutproject scenarios. The road condition is defined in terms of passability, duration of interruptions in traffic,and estimates of average travel speeds of different vehicle types during the dry and rainy season. The speedestimates are then used, along with the judgment of local and Bank's engineers, to estimate the roadroughness of each road section, again with and without project. It was further estimated that the periodicmaintenance works carried out through the project have improved the IRI from 23.1 to 10.8 on average,and reduced the number of days during which the roads are blocked from 90 days per year to 60 days peryear.

The outcome of the RED analysis show very positive results for the investment in periodic maintenance.Outputs show that all costs spent on periodic maintenance on any given in any of the four years was morethan recovered that same year in terms of VOC benefits, except for the road Massaguet/Massakory, whichactually involved significant rehabilitation works.

The table below summarizes the results of the analysis in terms of NPV, both for the base case and ascenario in which overall benefits are reduced by 25 percent. As an additional cross-check, the theoreticalthreshold roughness was calculated which would result in a NPV of zero. It can be safely assumed that onall project roads the actual roughness before the project was higher than the theoretical threshold, roughnessshown.

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Base Case Sensitivity Analysis Threshold RoughnessRoad (Benefits x 0.75) before project (to make

NPV = 0)Net Present Value Net Present Value(million US$) at 12% (million US$) at 12%Discount Rate Discount Rate and

User Benefits *0.75

Bokoro/Ati 2.44 1.17 18.7

Mongo/AbouDeia 4.44 3.20 14.3

AbouDeia/AmTiman 7.69 5.63 14.0

Massaguet/Massakor 1.05 0.07 20.5

Road Rehabilitation Program. The analysis shows that as a result of the road rehabilitation works, vehicleoperating costs (VOC) were reduced in average by 20 percent, and travel times by 25 percent. In theanalysis of the road rehabilitation program, it has been assumed that after the initial road rehabilitationworks, the roads will continue to receive routine maintenance, and that routine maintenance will continue tobe assured as a consequence of the creation of the new Road Maintenance Fund (FER). However, VOCbenefits during the evaluation period were decreased over time, to account for the risk that VOC may go updue to insufficient maintenance. It has also been assumed that seven years after the end of the initialrehabilitation works, some additional periodic maintenance will be carried out in order to eliminate thestructural deterioration which will occur during that time (the analysis showed that if no periodicmaintenance is carried out in the seventh year, VOC benefits will decline rapidly). The estimated cost ofroutine maintenance is based on the estimates which were established within the framework of the technicalstudies carried out as part of the National Transport Strategy and Investment Plan. Those studies alsoprovide the basis for further assumptions used in the analysis, regarding the average vehicle speeds andfleet composition in the with- and without-project scenarios. In addition, it has been assumed that the roadrehabilitation works have reduced the period of road closure (during the rainy season) by 30 days per year.The table blow summarizes savings to road users generated by the project, both for the Road RehabilitationComponent and for the Periodic Maintenance Component.

IMPACTS OF ROAD EXPENDITURES ON ROAD USERSSavings generated by

Periodic Savings generated by the Rehabilitation Program (in %)Maintenance

Vehicle ProgramType (in %)

N'Djamena/Dourbali Bokor/NGama BitkinelMelfi Eref/MangalmdVOC Time VOC Time VOC Time VOC Time VOC Time

Car -36 -39 -27 -28 -29 -29 -28 -28 -27 -28Utility -40 -38 -30 -27 -32 -29 -31 -28 -30 -28Light Bus -27 -41 -19 -30 -20 -31 -19 -30 -19 -30Medium -26 -39 -18 -29 -19 -30 -18 -29 1 8 -29B us _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __3 4_

-34 -

Heavy -31 0 -23 0 -25 0 -24 0 -23 0TruckArtic. -33 0 -24 0 -26 0 -25 0 -25 0Truck

The results of the economic evaluation indicate that the net present value (NPV) of the rehabilitationprogram, at a 12 percent discount rate, is US$ -0.86 million, with an internal rate of return (IRR) of 11percent. Not all the roads rehabilitated yielded an IRR greater than the typical threshold of 12 percent. Inthe case of two roads (Bitkine-Melfi and Bokoro-N'Gama), even if the VOC have been significantlyreduced, traffic levels are so low (9 and 30 vehicles per day, respectively) that the resulting IRR is below12 percent. Sensitivity analysis show that, in order to reach an IRR of 12 percent, traffic volumes wouldneed to be in the order of 49 vehicles per day on the Bokoro-N'Gama road, and 44 in the case of theBitkine-Melfi road. Alternatively, there would need to be an annual traffic growth rate of 10.5 percent and21.7 percent respectively. The following table summarizes the results.

Net Present Value IRR IRR if user benefitsRoad (US$ million) at 12% are reduced by 25%

Discount Rate

N'Djamena- Dourbali 4.22 22.1% 16.7%

Bokoro -N'Gama -1.41 4.8% 1.0%

Bitkine - Melfi -4.02 -5.5% N.A.

Eref- Mangalme 0.24 13.5% 9.2%

Total -0.97 11.0% 7.0%

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating

(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS. etc.) Implementation DevelopmentMonth/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/Preparation03/92 1 Principal Transport Engineer

09/92 1 Principal Transport Engineer

10/92 1 Principal Transport EngineerI Highway EngineerI Transport SpecialistI Institution Dev. Spec. (Cons)I Road Mtce. Spec. (Cons)I Transit Facilitation Spec. (Cons)I Transport Economist (Cons)I Civil Works Equip. Spec.(Cons)I Road Materials Spec. (Cons)I Rural Road Economist (Cons)

Appraisal/Negotiation01/93 1 Principal Transport

I EngineerI Highway EngineerI Department Director

Division ChiefI Consultants (12):2 Transport Facilitation Spec.I Transport Institution Spec.2 Road Maintenance Spec.I Mechanical Engineer2 Transport EconomistI Transport Industry Spec.I Environment Specialist

Soils & Road MaterialsI Specialist

Financial SpecialistEngineer, Bridge Specialist

Supervision07/93 Initial Summary S S01/94 Update HS HS

06/94 Update HS HS

11/94 HS HS

06/95 Update S HS

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11/95 1 Sr. Financial Analyst U U

05/96 1 Sr. Financial Analyst U UI Sr. Highway Engineer1 Sr. Procurement SpecialistI Consultant

12/96 1 Sr. Financial Analyst U UI Highway Engineer (Cons.)

07/97 Update U U

10/97 1 Sector Director U UI Highway Engineer (Cons.)I Sr. Transport EconomistI Project Officer

05/98 1 Sr. Transport Economist S SI Intern ENPCI Project Officer

06/98 Update S S

10/98 1 Sr. Transport Economist S SI Intern ENPCI Financial Specialist1 Project Officer

02/99 1 Sr. Transport Economist S SI Intern ENPCI Financial SpecialistI Project Officer

06/99 Update S S

08/99 1 Sr. Transport Economist S SI Environment Specialist (Cons.)I Civil EngineerI. Task Team Assistant

01/00 1 Sr. Transport Economist S SI Intern ENPCI Environment Specialist (Cons.)2 Rural Transport SpecialistI Civil Engineer (Cons.)I Financial Management Spec.I Procurement SpecialistI Project Officer

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04/00 1 Sr. Transport Economist S SI Intern ENPCI Environment Specialist (Cons.)I Civil Engineer (Cons.)I Procurement SpecialistI Project Officer

ICR07/00 1 Transp. Specialist (Cons.)

(b) Staff:

I Stage of Project Cycie Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ (,000)

Identification/Preparation 19.4 62.1Appraisal/Negotiation 17.1 54.5Supervision 99.6 460.4ICR 5 20.0Total 597.0

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingOMacro policies O H * SU O M O N O NA* Sector Policies * H OSUOM O N O NA

I Physical * H OSUOM O N O NAC Financial OH OSUOM ON *NAZ Institutional Development 0 H 0 SU O M 0 N 0 NAO Environmental O H OSUOM O N O NA

SocialL Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NAEl Gender O H OSUOM O N * NAL Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA

N Private sector development 0 H * SU 0 M 0 N 0 NAX Public sector management 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NAO Other (Please specify) 0 H O SU O M O N 0 NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

• Lending OHS *S OU OHU• Supervision OHS *OS OU OHUE Overall OHS OS OU O HU

6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating

• Preparation OHS OS O U O HU• Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU• Implementation agency performance O HS 0 S 0 U 0 HUN Overall OHS OS OU O HU

-40 -

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

Development Credit Agreement 2520 CD, Second Transport Sector Project, July 21, 1993Development Credit Agreement 2520-01 CD (Amendment), Second Transport Sector Project, March 7,1995

Republique du Tchad, Table Ronde de Geneve IV, Reunion Sectorielle sur les Transports L'Habitat etL'Urbanisme, N'Djamena, Novembre, 1999:-Lettre de Politique Generale dans le Secteur des Transports-Synthese de la Strategie de Developpement du Secteur des Transports au Tchad-Diagnostic et Strategie de Developpement du Secteur des Transports au Tchad-Programme Indicatif des Depenses du Secteur des Transports au Tchad

Republique du Tchad, Ministere des Travaux Publics, des Transports, de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme,Fiches d'Executions et Commmunications pour Rapport d'achevement:-Cellule de Gestion des Ressources Humaines et Formation-Direction des Etudes et de la Planification-Direction des Routes

Republique du Tchad, Ministere des Travaux Publics, des Transports, de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme, AuditTechnique et Financier du Second Project Sectoriel des Transports, Volume 2: Sous-secteur Routier,Sous-secteur des Transports Terrestres et Aeriens, Gestions des Ressources Humaines and Comptabilite etFinances, Mars 1996.

Republique du Tchad, Rapport d'achevement PST 2(draft), Juillet 2000.

Rapports de mission 1-8 - Appui a la Coordination, PST 2, M. Guimbert, Juilletl998 - Avril 2000.

The World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report No. 11670-CD, Second Transport Sector Project, June 3, 1993

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ANNEX 8REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD

MINISTERE DES TRAVAUX PUBLICS DES TRANSPORTSDE L'HABITAT ET DE L'URBANISME

DIRECTION GENERALE

PST2Credits 2520 CD et 2520-1 CD

RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DE L'EMPRUNTEUR

Aout 2000

42

PST2 :Credits 2520 CD et 2520-1 CDRAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DE L'EMPRUNTEUR

SOMMAIRE

I bilan general ................................................ 442 objectifs et composantes du projet ................................................ 44

2.1 le contexte initial ............................................... 442.2 les objectifs et les moyens ............................................... 442.3 les composantes et les conditions du financement de l'IDA ............................................... 44

3 le deroulement chronologique et les evenements majeurs .................................... 453.1 la mise en vigueur ............................. 453.2 la devaluation du franc CFA ............................. 453.3 la revue A mi-parcours ............................. 453.4 la fiscalisation des marches publics ............................. 453.5 le report de la date d'achevement du projet ............................. 463.6 la crise des transports de 1998 ............................. 46

4 1'execution physique des composantes .. 464.1 les travaux routiers .46

4.1.1 1'entretien periodique des routes en terre .. 464.1.2 la construction des routes A vocation agricole .. 474.1.3 la construction des ouvrages d'art .. 464.1.4 la participation A l'entretien courant .. 46

4.2 les reformes institutionnelles .464.2.1 la mise en place du financement de l1entretien routier ................................ 464.2.2 la privatisation des travaux routiers ..................................... 474.2.3 la restructuration de la Direction des Routes .................................... 474.2.4 la reforme du secteur des transports ..................................... 474.2.5 la privatisation d'Air Tchad .. ................................... 47

4.3 les services de consultants .474.3.1 les contr6les de travaux 474.3.2 I'assistance technique 474.3.3 les etudes ................ 484.3.4 les appuis institutionnels ................ 484.3.5 les audits ................ 48

4.4 la gestion des ressources humaines et la formation .......................................... 484.4.1 la premiere phase d'intervention .......................................... 484.4.2 la seconde phase d'intervention .......................................... 484.4.3 le bilan global .......................................... 48

4.5 les indicateurs de performance .......................................... 495 l'execution financiere du credit .......................................... 496 la gestion du projet par le Gouvernement .......................................... 49

6.1 le Haut Comite Interministeriel .......................................... 496.2 la Cellule de Coordination .......................................... 506.3 les responsables ministeriels et les cadres dirigeants .......................................... 50

7 la gestion du projet par l'ida .. ........................................ 507.1 le suivi par les charges de projet .......................................... 507.2 les non objections .......................................... 507.3 les decaissements directs .......................................... 507.4 le compte special .......................................... 50

8 la coordination avec les autres partenaires financiers ....................................... 509 Recommandations .......................................... . 51

9.1 Assistance technique .......................................... 519.2 Indicateurs de performance .......................................... 519.3 Ressources humaines .......................................... 519.4 Le compte special .......................................... 51

Credit 2520/CD et 2520-1/CD PST2 - Rapport d'achevement de l'emprunteur 43

I BILAN GENERAL

Le Second projet sectoriel des transports (PST2), dont une partie a ete financee par le credit de l'IDA, avait dteconcu en 1993 comme un ensemble coherent de reformes institutionnelles et de remise A niveau desinfrastructures.

Les realisations physiques ont bien ete faites et les reformes ont ete mises en place. Cependant pour des raisonsexterieures au secteur des transports, tides A la conjoncture economique, la mise en place d'un systeme stable etsecurise de 1'entretien routier n'a ete effective que jusqu'en 1996 et le niveau de service du reseau routier s'est peuameliore.

Dans le meme temps la performance des institutions chargees d'administrer le secteur ne s'est pas amdliore demaniere significative par manque d'une politique soutenue de recrutement, de motivation et de formation dupersonnel de l'Etat.

Enfm, la fragilite des financements n'a pas favorise l'mergence de PME locales.

Ce bilan montre qu'un projet sectoriel reste sensible A des contraintes exogenes.

Ce constat a ete fait avant l'achevement du projet et a permis au Gouvemement de proposer A la communaute desbailleurs de fonds une nouvelle strat6gie de developpement du secteur.

2 OBJECTIFS ET COMPOSANTES DU PROJET

2.1 le contexte initial

Le Second Projet Sectoriel des Transports (PST2), fait suite A une politique suivie d'interventions de la Banquemondiale consistant A redonner au secteur des transports un r6le de developpement economique. Jusqu'en 1993I'entretien du reseau routier par la r6gie administrative, la difficulte de trouver un fmancement stable de1'entretien routier et I'absence de PME locales dans le sous-secteur routier etaient des facteurs qui freinaient ledeveloppement du secteur.

2.2 les objectifs et les moyens

Les objectifs affiches par le Gouvernement en mai 1993 et acceptes par la communaute des bailleurs de fondsdtaient de baisser les coAts de transport et de desenclaver l'interieur du pays. Les moyens pour atteindre cesobjectifs etaient de developper un reseau routier prioritaire durable, de mettre en place un financement stable del'entretien, de privatiser les taches d'entretien et d'exploitation du reseau. Ils s'appuyaient sur une politiqueconsistant A liberaliser le secteur des transports et A valoriser la profession de transporteur routier.

2.3 les composantes et les conditions du financement de l'IDA

La Banque a convenu de contribuer A cette politique en apportant son fmancement sur des travaux de remise Aniveau d'une partie du reseau de routes en terre, I'appui institutionnel A la reforme du secteur et la formation.L'accord de credit correspondant comprenait donc: des travaux de genie civil, des services de consultants, desactions de formation et la participation aux couts de fonctionnement de la cellule de coordination du projet.

Les conditions acceptees pour la mise en vigueur du credit etaient les suivantes:

* la creation d'un Compte Autonome de I'Entretien Routier (CAER), hors du budget et de lagestion du Ministere des Finances,

* I'alimentation reguliere et programm6e de ce compte,

* des interventions strictement limitees A un reseau prioritaire de 3 800 km, complete par 900 kmde routes A vocation agricole,

* Ia liquidation de l'Office National des Routes (OFNAR) et creation d'une Societe Nationaled'Entretien Routier (SNER) avec gestion de type privee,

* Ia restructuration de la compagnie nationale Air Tchad.

Credit 25201CD et 2520-1ICD PST2 - Rapport d'ach6vement de 1'emprunteur 44

3 LE DEROULEMENT CHRONOLOGIQUE ET LES EVENEMENTS MAJEURS

3.1 la mise en vigueur

L'accord de credit correspondant (2520/CD pour un montant de 26 200 000 DTS) a ete signe le 21 juillet 1993 etson entree en vigueur est intervenue le 9 juin 1994. Ce decalage s'explique par la necessite de prendre avant lamise en vigueur, tous les textes 1lgislatifs et reglementaires concemant la creation de la SNER et la mise enplace du CAER.

3.2 la devaluation du franc CFA

En janvier 1994, la devaluation du francs CFA a conduit A reevaluer le coat des differents contrats deja engagesdans le projet. Ce travail a ete mene rapidement par le Gouvemement avec l'appui de la Banque mondiale et n'apas entraine de retards significatifs dans l'avancement des actions. Cette devaluation a ete appuyee par la mise enplace d'un credit complementaire (2520-1/CD signe le 7 mars 1995) d'un montant de 8 800 000 DTS.

3.3 la revue A mi-parcours

La revue A mi-parcours du projet a eu lieu en avril 1996. Cette revue, A laquelle ont participe les principauxbailleurs de fonds du secteur, a degage les constats suivants:

* toutes les composantes physiques de travaux routiers sont achevees,

* le programme de construction des ouvrages d'art n'a pas commence,

* les interventions de l'assistance technique en appui institutionnel et en formation sont arrivees Aleur terme,

1 'engagement des credits est realise a 92%,

* il y a un risque de deficit du Compte Autonome de l'Entretien Routier

* il y a une mauvaise connaissance du secteur des transports,

* il n'y a pas de politique A long terme du secteur,

* il y a des incertitudes sur le financement du secteur A moyen terme,

- la Direction des Routes n'a pas d'outils de gestion et son personnel manque d'experience

Devant ces constats il a ete convenu de redistribuer les fonds disponibles sur le credit de la facon suivante

- suppression de la composante construction des ouvrages d'art,

recentrage de l'assistance technique vers l'appui A la maitrise d'ceuvre et A la maitrise d'ouvrage,

- appui A la promotion de l'ingenierie locale,

* relance des actions de formation,

* appui a la preparation d'une strategie des transports par le Gouvemement.

Ces d6cisions se sont traduites par une re allocation des categories de l'accord de credit.

3.4 la fiscalisation des marches publics

En 1996 le Gouvemement en accord avec le FMI a engage une reforme profonde du systeme des recettesfiscales dont les deux axes principaux etaient l'introduction d'une TCA (devenue ensuite TVA) et l'abandon del'exoneration des marches publics finances sur crddits exterieurs. Si les principes de cette politique sont clairs, samise en nuvre a cre des difficultes d'application qui ont eu pour consequence de bloquer toutes les nouvellesactions du projet jusqu'en juillet 1998. Ceci a en particulier retarde la mise en place des nouveaux appuisinstitutionnels, la pr6paration de la strategie des transports et 1'execution de travaux complementaires d'entretienperiodiques sur les routes en terre.

Ce probleme est devenu crucial les deux dernieres annees du projet car il n'6tait pas clairement etabli lesconditions de taxation des marches publics, si bien que,

* les conditions d'appel d'offres etaient faussees,

* les bailleurs de fonds ne pouvaient pas evaluer precisement la part hors taxes des contrats.

Credit 2520/CD et 2520-1/CD PST2 - Rapport d'achevement de l'emprunteur 45

Finalement, avec le financement du credit IDA, un consultant a ete recrute pour rediger un "Guide auxsoumissionnaires" qui vient d'etre approuve par les bailleurs de fonds et par le Gouvernement.

3.5 le report de la date d'achevement du projet

Les consequences de la fiscalisation des marches publics decrites plus haut ont pratiquement bloqueI'avancement du projet pendant deux annees. Dans ces conditions il a 6te demande A l'IDA de reporter la dated'achevement du projet. Un amendement a ete signe en novembre 1998, repoussant de decembre 1998 A juin2000 la date d'achevement du projet.

3.6 la crise des transports de 1998

L'introduction de la TCA sur les transports routiers a conduit A une greve des transporteurs qui estimaient subirune double imposition A la fois de la redevance CAER et des finances. Devant ce conflit, le Gouvernement amaintenu l'application de la TVA mais en contrepartie a reduit de moitie la redevance d'affretement. Ceci a eupour consequence immediate de reduire les recettes du CAER et de precipiter sa faillite.

4 L'EXECUTION PHYSIQUE DES COMPOSANTES

4.1 les travaux routiers

4.1.1 1'entretien periodique des routes en terre

Les travaux se sont deroules conformrment au previsions.

4.1.2 la construction des routes a vocation agricole

Les travaux ont permis de reconstruire 350 km de routes. Le cofit moyen kilometrique des travaux a ete pluseleve que celui estime dans le rapport d'evaluation. Cette difference s'explique par une sous estimation initialedes standards d'amenagement.

4.1.3 la construction des ouvrages d'art

La construction des ouvrages d'arts a ete retiree du projet A la suite de la revue a mi-parcours puisque que l'Unioneuropeenne avait pris l'engagement de financer ces travaux. Apres trois ann&es de negociations, l'Unioneuropeenne a annonce qu'elle renoncait a ce financement. Le Gouvernement vient de signer, avec l'Agencefrancaise de developpement, la convention de financement de ces travaux.

4.1.4 la participation A l'entretien courant

Devant les difficultes du CAER, la Banque mondiale a accepte de financer en 1999, sur les reliquats disponiblesdu credit, certains travaux d'entretien A travers des avenants aux marches d'entretien periodique. D'autre part laBanque mondiale, par l'intermediaire de credits d'ajustement structurel, a apure une partie de la dette du CAERpour 1'exercice 1998. Cet apport de 2,2 milliards de francs CFA a ete strictement utilise pour regler des arrieressur les marches de travaux d'entretien courant.

4.2 les reformes institutionnelles

4.2.1 la mise en place du financement de l'entretien routier

La mise en place du CAER a ete faite des la mise en vigueur du projet. Ce nouveau systeme a fonctionnecorrectement jusqu'en 1996, malgre un deficit chronique de recettes stables compense par des subventionsexceptionnelles de l'Union europeenne. A partir de 1996, le deficit du CAER s'est progressivement accru enraison de rentrees insuffisantes et de l'augmentation de la masse de travaux d'entretien A realiser. L'application en1998 de la TCA aux transports routiers conjuguee avec le fait que le CAER a e reintegre dans le budget del'Etat on conduit A une situation de faillite de ce systeme puisque la dette aux entreprises et foumisseurs avaitatteint I milliard de francs CFA A la fin de l'exercice budgetaire 1998. Parallelement des reflexions ayant etengagees sur le financement de l'entretien routier (dans le cadre de la definition d'une nouvelle strategie destransports), il etait devenu evident que le CAER dans sa conception actuelle devait disparaitre au profit d'unnouveau systeme de type Fonds routier. De fait la decision A ete prise en novembre 1999 et confirmee par unprojet de loi en juin 2000, de supprimer le CAER A la fin de l'annee 2000 et de mettre en place un fonds routier.

Credit 25201CD et 2520-1 /CD PST2 - Rapport d'achevement de l'emprunteur 46

L'echec constate du CAER n'est pas du A sa conception ou sa structure, mais A un ensemble de facteurs exogenes(reformes fiscales, difficultes economiques).

4.2.2 la privatisation des travaux routiers

L'accord de credit prevoyait qu'au moins 50% des travaux d'entretien seraient confies au secteur prive. Cettedisposition a ete totalement respectee depuis le debut du projet puisque tous les travaux ont ete realises par desentreprises privees ou par la SNER.

La transformation de l'OFNAR en SNER (Societe d'Etat chargee uniquement de travaux routiers) a et rapide etreussie. Cela n'a pose aucun probemne social et la SNER a fait preuve d'efficacite dans l'execution des travaux ets'est montree competitive dans les appels d'offres internationaux. La SNER a subit au meme titre que les autresentreprises les difficultes de financement du CAER, mais a reussi A assurer un minimum de travaux d'urgences,jouant ainsi son role de service public.

La derniere etape du processus de privatisation aurait du etre le retrait de l'Etat dans le capital de la SNER. Lamaltrise de ce processus A echappe au Ministere des Travaux Publics car les operations de privatisation dessocietes d'Etat ont ete confides A une commission speciale relevant de l'ajustement structurel. Si tous leselements sont maintenant reunis pour privatiser la SNER, la decision finale non prise A I'achevement du PST2releve de l'autorite politique.

A une moindre echelle la gestion des bacs, des barrieres de pluie, des comptages routiers a ete confide au secteurprivee. Le service rendu est efficace mais il s'avere d'un cofit plus eleve que lorsqu'il etait traite parl'administration et reste sensible aux difficultes de financement du CAER.

La gestion du Laboratoire National a egalement ete donnee au secteur prive sans probleme majeur. 11 faut noterque l'objectif fixe au Laboratoire National etait de realiser un programme de recherche routiere permettant demettre au point des techniques de construction et d'entretien prenant en compte les materiaux locaux. Cetobjectif n'a pas ete realise ce qui a entratne la decision de privatisation.

4.2.3 la restructuration de la Direction des Routes

Apres la transformation de l'OFNAR en SNER, toutes les taches de gestion du reseau et de son entretien ont etereaffectees a la Direction des Routes. Cette direction a souffert d'un manque de personnel d'experience et Al'issue du PST2, ses capacites de gestion doivent encore etre renforcees..

4.2.4 la reforme du secteur des transports.

La reforme du secteur des transports terrestres a fait l'objet de plusieurs actions en debut de projet (projet de loisur les transports interieurs, code de l'aviation civile, creation d'une Agence pour la gestion des principales plateformes aeroportuaires). Cependant l'action au niveau du transport routier n'a pas et poursuivie et en particulierla profession reste mal organisee.

4.2.5 la privatisation d'Air Tchad

La restructuration de la compagnie nationale n'a pu etre realisee dans le cadre du projet et finalement leGouvernement A adopte le principe de sa liquidation.

4.3 les services de consultants

4.3.1 les controles de travaux

Les controles de travaux de rehabilitation des routes ont ete effectues correctement par des bureaux de consultantinternationaux. Les controles de travaux d'entretien periodique et d'entretien courant ont ete realises dans unpremier temps par un bureau international, puis par deux bureaux tchadiens crees A cet effet. La performance desbureaux tchadiens est jugee insuffisante par manque d'experience du personnel.

4.3.2 I'assistance technique

Pendant les trois premiires annees du projet une assistance technique lourde a ete mise en place pour appuyer laDirection des Routes, la CISCP et la Direction generale. Globalement le Gouvernement a ete satisfait de laperfornance de l'assistance technique, cependant il n'existe pas de criteres objectifs d'appreciation de la

Credit 2520/CD et 2520-1 /CD PST2 - Rapport d'achevement de 1lemprunteur 47

performnance individuelle de chaque expert. Concretement son r6le a ete beaucoup oriente vers de la substitutionet les outils de gestion et de suivi elabores n'ont pas ete maintenus et valorises apres le depart des experts.

4.3.3 les etudes

Une premiere s6rie d'etudes a ete faite prealablement aux travaux d'investissement.

Une seconde serie d'etudes a ete realisee a partir de 1998, dont l'objectif etait de definir une nouvelle strategie detransports.

4.3.4 les appuis institutionnels

Un appui A la gestion financiere de la cellule, du CAER, du BNF a permis de mettre en place de faconsatisfaisante des outils comptables et des interventions A la demande.

Un appui au suivi et au pilotage du projet a ete mis en place apres la revue A mi-parcours en remplacement del'assistance technique permanente. Cette solution, qui fait intervenir un expert de haut niveau pendant troissemaines tous les trois mois, a e jugee efficace car elle permet de recentrer regulierement les actions du projettout en laissant une entiere autonomie de gestion A I'administration.

4.3.5 les audits

L'audit financier du credit a et fait regulierement et n'a pas pose de problemes majeurs. Cet audit a demontreque le cr6dit avait 6te correctement gere par la Cellule de coordination bien que celle ci n'ait pas dispose demanuel de procedures. Des audits financiers ont ete faits sur le CAER, le BNF, Air Tchad et la SNER. Ils ontpermis de deceler des faiblesses de gestion. Ces audits ont bien atteint leur objectif et le Gouvernementrecommande d'en maintenir le principe qui permet de donner un eclairage exterieur sur le fonctionnementfinancier des institutions. Un audit technique et financier a ete fait pour la revue A mi-parcours qui a permisd'evaluer de facon objective la situation du projet.

4.4 la gestion des ressources humaines et la formation

4.4.1 la premiere phase d'intervention

Le volet formation a ete confie initialement A un bureau de conseil qui avait pour mission, de faire l1evaluationdu personnel et des besoins de formation, de realiser le programme de formation ainsi arrete et de mettre enplace une structure administrative permanente de gestion des ressources humaines au sein de la Directiongenerale du ministere. Ces actions ont e realisees pendant les deux premieres annees du projet, le contrat duconsultant etant arrive A terme en mai 1996. Le resultat est juge insuffisant car la methodologie d'evaluation dupersonnel n'a pas appropriee, et la cellule de gestion des ressources humaines qui a ete creee manque d'autoritereconnue. La post evaluation des actions de formation n'a pas ete faite et il est difficile d'en mesurer l'impact surla performance des personnels.

4.4.2 la seconde phase d'intervention

Aucune action de formation n'a ete faite entre juin 1996 et juin 1999. La relance d'un nouveau programme a etefaite dans l'urgence dans la mesure ou l'echeance de l'achevement du projet ne permettait pas une reflexionapprofondie. Un programme restreint a e elabore par le Gouvemement et son execution a ete confide A l'EcoleNationale des Travaux publics. Une post evaluation a montre que les formations ont ete reques avec satisfaction.

4.4.3 le bilan global

Le Gouvernement estime que le volet formation n'a pas totalement atteint ses objectifs pour les raisonssuivantes:

* Ia formation s'adressant au secteur prive a ete insuffisante,

* les formations dispensees sont un ensemble de petits modules qui ont touche un public tropdisperse,

* il n'est pas demontre qu'il y a eu adequation entre les besoins et les formations donnees,

* Ia duree du projet aurait peut-etre permis de selectionner quelques jeunes ingenieurs et de leurdonner une formation plus longue et mieux adaptee.

Credit 2520/CD et 2520-1/CD PST2 - Rapport d'achevement de 1emprunteur 48

4.5 les indicateurs de performance

Les indicateurs de performance retenus A l'valuation du projet ont e remis en question pendant la revue A mi-parcours. Le Gouvemement et l'IDA n'ont pas reussi A mettre au point de nouveaux indicateurs. Ainsi depuis1997, il n'est pas possible de mesurer de fason objective et fiable l'impact du projet. Une tentative a e faite demettre au point un indicateur permettant d'evaluer I'evolution des couits de transports. Elle sest av6ree impossibleA mettre en place car les facteurs exogenes influencant le coat des transports sont trop nombreux et dependant dela conjoncture economique.

5 L'EXECUTION FINANCIERE DU CREDIT

Au 30 juin 2000, date de cl6ture du credit, les fonds etaient engages et liquides A 99,8%. Les engagements onte faits majoritairement dans les deux premieres annees du projet puisque A la revue A mi-parcours (30 moisapres le demarrage) 90% des credits etaient engages et 50% decaisses. Les quatre dernieres annees du projet ontessentiellement ete consacrees A des depenses d'appui institutionnel et de formation. Le tableau ci dessous, quicompare les depenses par categorie, montre que par rapport A l'allocation initiale il y a eu des variationsimportantes et qu'en particulier,

* les depenses de consultant ont doublees, et sont passees de 17% du montant du credit A 26% dumontant depense,

les depenses de rehabilitation de routes rurales ont doublees, et sont passees de 32% du montantdu credit A 46% du montant depense

les ressources pour financer ces deux depassements ont et trouvees dans la suppression destravaux d'ouvrage d'art et dans le non affecte,

les depenses de formation ont ete reduites de 5%

CATEGORIES ET ALLOCATION INITIALE ALLOCATION TOTALE UTILISATION FINALE VariationCOMPOSANTES 2520/CD 2520/CD et 2520-1 /CD final/initial

montant repartition montant repartition montant repartition

ITRAVAUX GENIE CIVIL 17 000 000 64,9% 23 880 001 68,2% 22 725 928 65,1% 33,7%L.a Entretien p6riodique 6 200 000 23,7% 6 200 00 17,7% 6 794 635 19,5% 9,6%

L.b Rehabilitation routes rurale 8 300 000 31,7% 15 180 00 43,4% 15 931 293 45,7% 91,9%I.c Rehabilitation ouvrages 2 500 000 9,5% 2 500 000 7,1% -100,0%

2. SERVICES CONSULTANTS 4 400 000 16,8% 5 300 000 15,1% 9 151 016 26,2% 108,0%2.a partie A 1 500 000 5,7% 2 400 000 6,9% 4 228 412 12,1% 181,9%2.b partie B 2 900 000 11,1% 2 900 000 8,3% 4 922 604 14,1% 69,7%

3. FORMATION 1 600 000 6,1% 1 600 00 4,6% 1 518 458 4,4% -5,1%4. CISCP 500 000 1,9% 500 000 1,4% 575 007 1,6% 15,0%5.PPF 900 00 3,4% 900 000 2,6% 917 568 2,6% 2,0%6.NON AFFECTE 1 800 00 6,9% 2 820 000 8,1% -100,0%

GRAND TOTAL 26 200 00( 100,0% 35 000 000 100,0% 34 887 978 100,0% 33,2%

6 LA GESTION DU PROJET PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT

6.1 le Haut Comite Interministeriel

Le Haut Comite Interministeriel (HCI) cree en 1989 et reconduit en 1994 pour assurer le suivi des actionssectorielles a continue son action avec efficacite. 11 est souhaitable que cet organe soit maintenu dans l'avenir carc'est un relais indispensable entre les partenaires du secteur et les pouvoirs legislatifs et executifs. Le decretinstituant le HCI disposait d'une derogation pour la passation des marches qui a permis d'avoir une procedureplus simple et plus rapide. Cette disposition doit etre maintenue dans l'avenir.

Cr6dit 2520/CD et 2520-1/CD PST2 - Rapport d'ach6vement de l'emprunteur 49

6.2 la Cellule de Coordination

La Cellule Interninisterielle de coordination des projets du secteur des transports (CISCP), creee en 1989 lors du10 projet sectoriel de la Banque mondiale, a assure la coordination et le suivi du PST2. Son role a etefondamental parce que c'est le seul organe perenne et stable depuis plus de 10 ans qui possede la connaissancehistorique des projets du secteur. La cellule a egalement assure la gestion fmanciere du credit de l'IDA. II avaitete envisage de transferer progressivement les attributions de la cellule a la Direction generale mais dans laphase actuelle il est necessaire de la maintenir.

6.3 les responsables ministeriels et les cadres dirigeants

Jusqu'A fin 1997, les cadres de la Direction generale n'ont pas change assurant une continuite dans les actions. Larestructuration du Ministere en septembre 1997 a cree un nouveau poste de Directeur gen6ral adjoint charge destransports et deux postes de sous directeurs A la Direction des Routes et A la Direction de l'Aviation civile. Cettedisposition qui ameliorait le fonctionnement de la Direction generale s'est traduite par le changement dudirecteur general, du Directeur des Routes et du Directeur de l'Aviation civile. Depuis, le Directeur general a eteremplace trois fois.

Pour memoire, neuf ministres se sont succedes pendant les 6 annees d'execution du projet.

7 LA GESTION DU PROJET PAR L'IDA

7.1 le suivi par les charges de projet

Pendant les 6 annees de l'execution du projet, 5 charges de projet se sont succedes. Parall6lerment la strategie dela Banque mondiale dans I'approche des projets transport a evolue vers la mise en place d'une vision A longterme de la strategie sectorielle. Cefte situation a entrainm une remise en question d'options retenues. LeGouvemement a apprecie la disponibilite des charges de projet lors des missions de supervision et s'est fdlicitede la remise immediate des aides memoires.

7.2 les non objections

Les reponses aux demandes de non objections ont ete donnees rapidement et n'ont pas freind le deroulement duprojet. Depuis 1999, la mise en place d'un systeme de courrier electronique a encore reduit les delais de reponse.

7.3 les decaissements directs

Les decaissements directs ont connu des retards qui sont devenues problematiques depuis 1998. Le dialogueavec le service des decaissements est difficile, meme lorsque le charge de projet intervient pour regler desproblemes.

7.4 le compte special

La gestion du compte special a et delicate, en particulier dans les deux dernires annees du projet oui les realimentations ont e longues. Le Gouvernement a demande A plusieurs reprises que le montant du comptespecial soit relev6 ou que le montant des decaissements directs soit baisse. La Banque mondiale n'a pas regle ceprobleme si bien que la capacite de paiement sur le compte special est devenue inferieure aux montants desfactures presentees. Cette situation A entramee des retards de paiement de l'ordre de 2 mois.

8 LA COORDINATION AVEC LES AUTRES PARTENAIRES FINANCIERS

Le PST2 avait e concu comme un ensemble d'actions financees par plusieurs bailleurs, y compris leGouvernement. La Banque mondiale avait ete designee comme chef de file des bailleurs de fonds et son roledevait permettre d'assurer la coordination des financements et I'appui institutionnel. II y a 10 bailleurs de fondsqui sont intervenus pendant le PST2. Leurs financements ont concemr la construction et la rehabilitation desinfrastructures routieres et d'une partie des infrastructures aeroportuaires. L'implication des bailleurs dans leprocessus de reformes institutionnelles a ete negligeable chaque bailleur se preoccupant de 1'execution de sacomposante physique.

Lors de la revue A mi-parcours, la Banque mondiale a effectivement recu I'appui formel de tous les bailleurs pourla poursuite de la reforme et pour la perennisation du financement de 1'entretien routier.

Credit 2520/CD et 2520-1/CD PST2 - Rapport d'achevement de l'emprunteur 50

Pour ce qui concerne la mise en place des credits d'investissement, les procedures particuli&es de chaquebailleur ont conduit a des decalages importants dans la reconstruction du reseau routier, si bien que la charged'entretien a ete plus importante que prevue pour le CAER. A titre d'exemple la construction de la routeDjermaya -Massaguet, financee par la Banque Africaine de Developpement, a debute avec 5 ans de retard.

L'action des charges de projet de la Banque mondiale a permis de provoquer des concertations lors des missionsde supervision, en particulier avec l'Union europeenne et la BAD.

Depuis fin 1998, et les conclusions de la table ronde de Geneve IV, il a ete convenu que l'Union europeenne etaitle chef de file des bailleurs de fonds du secteur des transports. Dans la periode transitoire actuelle, la Banquemondiale continue A jouer un role important pour accompagner les reflexions sur les reformes institutionnelles.

9 RECOMMANDATIONS

Les lecons tirees de l'execution du projet permettent de formuler les recommandations ci-apres pour les projetsfuturs.

9.1 Assistance technique

Eviter dans la mesure du possible une assistance de substitution. II conviendra pour ameliorer la capacite del'administration:

* Donner une formation ciblee par poste;

- Accompagner les agents ainsi formes par un appui ponctuel etale dans le temps;

- Mettre en place un mecanisme de suivi evaluation de la performance.

9.2 Indicateurs de performance

Adopter des indicateurs simples et pertinents dont l'analyse permettra de mesurer l'impact du projet et deprendre les decisions appropriees.

9.3 Ressources humaines

* Adopter une politique de recrutement pour repondre aux besoins;* Promouvoir de mesures de motivation du personnel;* Octroyer de bourse de formations aux jeunes cadres pour des formations pointues faisant defaut;* Assurer une stabilite aux postes de responsabilite pour une continuite dans les actions.

9.4 Le compte special

Relever le montant du compte special.

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Annex 9: Table showing details of training programs.

The following tables summarize the results of the two training programs.

Table 1: Results of Initial Training Program (1994-1997)

Number of Persons trainedPublic Sector Private Sector Total

ThemesCommuncations/Management 31 14 45Improvement Secretarial 15 21 36ServicesIntroduction Microcomputing 46 26 72Environmental Planning 20 0 20Public Works Maintenance 0 39 39Automobile - Electrical 0 4 4Soldering 0 7 7Heavy Machinery Mechanics 0 12 12Public Works Mechanics 0 7 7Metrology/Weights&Measures 0 10 10Laboratory Tests 7 20 27Work Site Organization 6 10 16Introduction to Firm 6 14 20ManagementIntroduction to Human Res. 19 4 23Mgmt.Transport Economics 72 25 97Airport Infrastr. & Equipment 6 0 6Sectoral Computer Science 7 65 72Works Supervision 23 2 25Recycling of Roads 0 35 35Public Expenditure 16 16 32Complement - Computer 8 0 8ScienceSpreadsheet Excel 8 0 8SAARI Accounting System 4 0 4Complement - Firm Mgmt. 7 0 7Total 324 339 663

Outside ChadHuman Resource Development 2 0 2Road Maintenance Management 2 0 2Road Safety I 0 1Technical English 1 0 1Management Control 0 2 2Equipment Maintenance 0 3 3Training of Trainers 0 2 2Management 1 0 1SAARI 7.1 Accounting 1 0 1Admin. & Finance Mgmt. 1 0 1Civil Aviation Administration 1 0 1Total 10 7 17

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Table 2: Results of additional Training Program (period 1999-2000)

Module No. of Persons trainedTransport Economics 13Road Safety 18Monitoring and Supervision of Work Sites 13Management of Public Contracts 23Technical English 7Applied Statistics 9Human Resource Development 8Economic Impact of Transport Projects 7Improvement of Personnel Training 37Project Planning (PERT & ZOPP) 32Application of SGBD 7Application of Spreadsheets 8Office Management 24Internet 12Mastering Data Bases 7Mastering Spreadsheets 29Total 254

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