Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 7151

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SUDAN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT(Credit 904-SU)

March 11, 1988

Eastern and Southern Africa Projects DepartmentNorthern Agriculture Division

This document has a resticted disbution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disdosed withbout Wonid Bank authorizaion.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

I hectare = 2.47 acres = 2.38 feddanI feddan = 1.04 acres = 0.42 hectare1 short ton = 2,000 pounds - 0.9 metric tonI metric ton - 1,000 kg 2,000 pounds

ABBREVIATIONS

ADS Agricultural Development ServiceDCA Development Credit AgreementEPAPC Equatoria Province Agricultural Projects Corporation.FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of United NationsGTZ FRG's Gesellschaft fur Technische ZusammenarbeitungIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentLMMC Livestock and Meat Marketing CorporationODA UK's Overseas Development AdministrationPCR Project Completion ReportPDU Project Development UnitPFU Project Formulation UnitRMEA Bank Resident Mission in East AfricaRSADP Regional Smallscale Agricultural Development ProgramSRAP Southern Region Agriculture ProjectSRMOA Southern Region Ministry of AgricultureUNDP United Nations Development FundYARC Yambio Agricultural Research Center

FOR OVVCAL US ONLYTHE WORLD SANK

Washngton. D.C. 20433U.S.A.

O0O O OWKW_COsWI0Wgia evahaan

March 11, 1988

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Sudan SouthernRegion Anriolwture Prolect (Credit 904-SU)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled"Project Completion Report on Sudan Southern Region Agriculture Project(Credit 904-SU)' prepared by the Eastern and Southern Africa RegionalOffice. Further evaluation of this project by the Operations EvaluationDepartment has not been made.

Attachment

This document has a md distribu;ond may be od by rscpIntc ony in the perfonmnacofdw ofAthia lsl dutims Its contents may not othewise be dbstsod witbout Wodd Bak uthorition.

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY

SUDAN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT (Cr. 904-SU)

Project Completion Report

Table of Contents

Page No.

Preface .........................................

Basic Data Sheet .....................

Evaluation Summary i - iii

I. Introduction ........ ...................... ........ 1

II. The Project ......... 2

III. Project Evaluation 4......... .................. .... 4

IV. Implementation Problems ............................ 8

V. Assessment of Bank Performanceand Lessons Learned ..... .............. 10

Annex A - Project Related Tables

1. Allocation of Credit Proceeds

2. Disbursement Schedule

Annex B - Other Related Items

1. Compliance with Major Covenants

Map IBRD 13902R

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

SUDN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT (Cr. 904-SU)

ProJect Completion Report

Preface

The credit, US$15.0 million, was approved by the Board on May 8,1979, sdgned on May 11, 1979, and became effective on February 14, 1980.The orlginal closing date was June 30, 1984, but was extended to June 30,1985. The flnal disbursement was mede on July 27, 1985 and on September10, 1985 an undisbursed amount of US$5,884,397.03 wai cancelled.

The Project Completlon Report was prepared by the NorthernAgriculture Division of the Bank's Eastern and Southern Africa Region. Thedocument is based on supervision reports prepared on behalf of theInternational Development Association (IDA) and the International Fund forAgricultural Development (IFAD), joint financiers of the project, and onother documents and correspondence available in the project file. Theearly suspension of project activities caused by political unrest in theregion and the subsequent dispersion of project related staff made Itimpossible to prepare a comprehensive completion report in the field or tocarry out a project completion mission as planned.

Copies of the draft report were sent to the Borrower and co-financierson December 23, 1937 for comments. However, no comments were received.

This project has not been audited by OED.

SUDAN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT(Credit 904-SU)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Basic Dat.- Sheet

KEY PROJECT DATA

Appraisal Actual or Actual as I ofEsti%ate Estimated Actual Appraisal Estimate

Pro ect Costs CUSS million) 56.0 39.8 /a 71Credit Amount (USS million) 15.0 9.1 61Date Board Approval 5/08179C.edit Agreement Date 5211/79Date Effectiveness e/11179 2/14/80 ISODate rhysical Components Completed 1983 1984 25

Proportion Then Completd ()100 25 25Closing Date 6/30/84 6/30/8S 33Economic Rate of Return (2) 15 NegativeInstitutional Perforance InadequateAgronomic Performance Satisfactory for one component (coffee) and unsatisfactory to poor for others

tCUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTSFY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY96

Apraisal Estimate (USS million) 2.4 5.5 8.9 12.3 15.0 - -Actual (USS million) 1.5 3.5 5.t f.9 8.9 9.3 9.1 /bActual/Estimated (2) 63 64 74 56 59 62 61Date of Final Disbursement July 27. 1985Repaid to 10/31/86 (USS million) Mot s,n'lcabe. Creetc st Il fn erace period.

MISSION DATSent Date No. of Man-days Speclalizations Performance Types of

Mission by (mo/yr) Persons in Field Represented /c Rating/d Trend/e Problems /f

Identification HQ/RtHEA /sPreparation I RKEA 7-8/77 1 8 EPreparation 2 RMEA 9/77 2 10/h E, LPreparation 3 RMEA 10-11/77 2 7 E, L1Pre-Appraisal HQ/RH EA 3/78 2 Il/h E, LAppraisal HQ 5/78 4 _i 26 E, A, F, R, C, VPost-Appraisal Ng 12/78 2 3 A. F _____ _______________

Subtotal 65 ____ ________

Superv_iion I _ tEA 6/79 1 12 E 3 2 P. M.FSupervision 2 RMEA 12/79 1 5 E 3 2 F.P.,MSupervision 3 RMEA 5/80 2 7 E.L 2 2 O,MLivestock Review NHQ/REA 10 80 4 12 E. L V - - -Supervision 4 RMEA 11/80 M/ 12 E 2 1 0 MSupervision 5 RHEA 8/81 2/k 9 E, L 3 2 P HSupervision 6 RHEA 11-12/81 3/1 9 E. L,A 3 2 P, P,MSupervision 7 RHE 5/82 2 10 L 3 3 M. P, F, 0Supervision 8a RHeA 8/82 3 t E, L 3 3 M. F. P. 0Supervision Sb RMEA 10-1/82/im 2 2 LSupervisin 9 RMEA 1-2/83/n 3 12 E,L 3 1 N, P,0Supervision 10 RHEA 7/83 1 3 L 3 2 M. F. 0Supervision 11 RMEA 11/83 3 7 E,L 3/o I M,PSupervision 12 SHEA 3/84 1 2 E 3/T, 3 PSubtotal 103

Completion Report 2 5TOTAL 173

OTHER PROJECT DATA

Borrover: Democratic Republic of the SudanExecuting Agency: Southern Region Ministry of AgricultureFiscal Year of Borrower: July 1 to June 30

Nome of Currency (Abbreviation) Sudanese Pound (LSd)

Currency Exchange RateAppraisal Year Average US$1.00 = LSd 0.50Intervening Years Average US$1.00 - LSd 1.06Completion Year Average US$1.00 - LSd 2.50

Follow-on project: None /2

/a Estimate. A total amount of USS5.884,397.83 was cancelled forn the US$15 million IDA credit./b Reduction from FY85 explained by reimbursement to IDA of initial advance provided to Borrower in 1980.Ic E - Economist; L - Livestock specialist; A - Agriculturist; F Financial Analyst; R - Rural Services specialist;

C - Civil Engineer; V - Veterinarian./d I - Problem free or minor problems; 2 - Moderate problems; 3 Major problems./e I - Improving; 2 - Stationary; 3 - Deteriorating.If P - Procurement; M - Managerial; F - Financial; O - Others./j Identification during supervision and review of preceding Douthern Region Agricultural Rehabilitation Project

(Credit 476-SU)./h Joint missions with supervision of Credit 476-SU./i Includes two Bank staff and two IDA consultants but. in addition. there were two ODM and two MTZ consultants.Ij Includes only one Bank staff. In addition, there were four ODA and two IFAD mission members./k Includes Bank staff only. In addition, there were five mission members from ODA./ Includes Bank staff only. In addition, there were three mission embers from ODA.

/e Follow-up to mission of 8/82./n Joint donor agencies' review./o Lau-based components only would rate 2 in performance with I in trend./j Some components of this project have continued as part of the Equatoria Region Agriculture Project, with ODA

support.

SUDAN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT (Cr. 904-SU)

Project Completion Report

Evaluation Summary

i. The Southern Region Agriculture project (SRAP) and Itspredecessor, the Southern Region Agricultural Rehabilitation project (Cr.476-SU), represent the World Bank's Involvement in Southern Sudan'sagriculture during the only period of relative peace in the region's recenthistory. SRAP's main objectives were to assist the Regional Ministry ofAgriculture in strengthening its planning capabilities, agricultural

v0 services and managerial capacity for rural development programs. Theproject provided support for the Ministry's Planning Department as well as

* a range of crop and livestock development activities. Total project costwas US$56 million equivalent, of which US$15 million represented an IDAcredit and the remaining US$15 million provided by the International Fundfor Agricultural Development (IFAD), as well as grants from the OverseasDevelopment Administration (ODA) of US$18.5 million and the FederalRepublic of Germany's foreign assistance agency (GTZ) of US$1.9 million. ASudannese government contribution of US$5.6 million covered the balance ofexpected project costs.

ii. Starting with a delayed effectiveness, the project had to contendwith multiple and often interrelated constraints throughout itsimplementation. Some of the components, notably the strengthening of theregional Planning Department and parts of the crops component, were able toachieve reasonable success. Overall, the project was plagued withmanagerial, procurement, financial and other problems and, except for onebrief period in 1980, was rated a problem project from effectiveness toclosure.

iii. By 1983, Government and donors agreed that the project could notbe implemented in -ts original form and sought ways to decentralize keyfunctions. This process was accelerated by the administrative subdivisionof the Southern Sudan region into three separate regions. Two separateprojects were established: one in the Equatoria Region with support fromODA and one in the Bahr-el-Ghazal Region with IDA/IFAD support. Thesechanges simplified the complex design features of the original projectconcept and an improvement in project implementation led IDA to agree to aone-year project extension. Unfortunately, the unstable politicalsituation in the region made further implementation impossible and theproject effectively ended in 1984, with the IDA Credit being formallyclosed on June 30, 1985.

iv. The cost of the project is now estimated at US$39.8 millioninstead of the US$56 million appraisal estimate. Disbursement of the IDACredit reached only 61% at Credit closing in June 1985. In the absence ofkey data, it has not been possible to calculate the economic rate of returnon project Investments. However, given the deep-seated obstacles todevelopment in Southern Sudan, combined with the vroject's failure to

- ii -

develop adequate momentum prior to the resumption of military hostilities,it is clear that the economic rate of return if calculated would benegative.

v. The design of the project at appraisal proved too large andcomplex for implementatlon by an agency which itself was being strengthenedby the project. In addition to covering tn extensive geographical area, itaddressed a wide range of development constraints while improving theperformance of both the Regional Ministry of Agriculture and the ProjectDevelopment Unit (PDU). The project was also expected to coordinate theefforts of several major donors. These tasks were obviously In excess ofthe available implementation capacity.

vI. The major lessons learnt are:

(a) agricultural and rural development in an extensive and poorlycommunicated area such as the Southern Sudan can be embarked uponwhile simultaneously strengthening the implementing agency onlyif the scope of the development activities is consistent with thegradual Improvement of the agency's implementation capabilities(paras. 3.05-3.09).

(b) the experience with institutional performance on the projectindicates that a more workable framework, based on strengtheningof the regional Ministry of Agriculture, but chanellingassistance to agricultural activities through smaller district-based projects, would have achieved a larger impact on both theinstitution building and agriculture support objectives (para.3.20);

(c) in designing a strategy for the development of Southern Sudan orany similarly undeveloped region, careful consideration of theserious economic, political, manpower and infrastructuralconstraints to implementation Is essential to establishing thescope of each stage of activities, and a long-term perspective ofthe strategy's objectives should be maintained when dealing withindividual issues (para. 4.10);

(d) projects which represent a second phase of an ongoing project andfor which they provide continuation of existing activites, shouldprovide interim financing betvreen closing of the first projectand effectiveness of the second, to avoid financing gaps and lossof implementation momentum caused by delays in effectiveness andstart-up (para. 4.03);

(e) careful balance of expatriate technical assistance staff andsenior qualified national staff in terms of numbers and terms ofemployment is essential when comparatively large numbers ofexpatriate staff are required for implementation and sources oftechnical assistance personnel should be identified and evaluatedprior to project implementation to ensure comparative terms ofemployment and sensitivity to potential sources of friction withnational staff (,aras. 4.08 and 4.09).

- ill -

vii. The project was affected by causes foreign to ihe Inherentconstraints. However, a larger proportion of its objectives might havebeen achieved by an earlier understanding perhaps from experience with thepredecessor project (Cr. 476-SU) of some of the problems encountered duringimplementation.

viii. The following points are of Interest:

- availability of agronomic recommendations for the Floodplain ledto significant agricultural achievements in that area as comparedto the Ironstone Plateau for which no recommendations wereavailable (para. 3.05);

- the number of smallholder coffee growers and the area undercultivation incressed steadily during the SRAP, with productionrising by over 50% per year (para. 3.06);

- failure of a cotton development program was caused by thecancellation of a separate project, supported by another donor,to strengthen the Equatoria Province Agricultural ProjectsCorporation (EPAPC) (para. 3.07);

- SRAP produced 53 reports on the natural resources, socialorganization and economic conditions of the Southern Sudan Region(para. 3.12);

- failure to strengthen the force account construction agency waspartly compensated by increasing participation by privatebuilding contractors, an indicator of the region's movementtowards development (para. 3.18);

- delays in credit effectiveness and project start-up created afinancing gap between the earlier SRARP and the new SRAP with aloss of momentum in most project activities which was difficultto recover before the project was closed (paras. 4.02 and 4.12);

- using a professional firm of consultants to provide a full teamof key technical assistance staff helped reduce severe managerialproblems (para. 4.10).

SUDAN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT (Cr. 904-SU)

Project Completion Report

I. INTRODUCTION

Project Objectives

1.01 The Southern Region Agriculture project (Cr. 904-SU) and itspredecessor, the Southern Region Agricultural Rehabilitation Project (Cr.476-SU), represented the World Bank's involvemert in Southern Sudan'sagriculture during the only time of peace in that region's recent history.The project's two fundamental objectives Included: (a) assisting incompletion of the institutional framework for agricultutral developmentinitiated in the earlier project and (b) helping smallholders to improvecrop output in areas of high potential, concentrating on crops with highexport value or capable of rapidly satisfying urban food demands.

1.02 The Southern Regional Government which came to power in April1978, one month before project appraisal, endorsed the concept thatagricultural development should conform to a 15-20 year Regional SmallscaleAgricultural Development Program (RSADP) involving all 23 regionaldistricts. The objectives were consistent with these sectoral goals.

1.03 The project was expected to assist in the initiation of soundagricultural development in all six provinces of the Southern Region and toimprove the incomes and diet of a large mass of farmers and pastoralists.

Project Identification, Preparation and Appraisal

1.04 The SRAP was formally identified during a March 1977 RWEA mid-term review of the Southern Region Rehabilitation project. A Project Briefproposed continuation of activities already started under the ongoingproject, with inclusion of some additional crops and expansion of the areasto be served.

1.05 The project was prepared during the second half of 1977 and early1978 by the Southern Region Ministry of Agriculture (SRMOA) withsubstantial assistance from RMEA staff because of the limited capabilitiesin the executing agency. The preparation report confirmed the projectbrief's recommendations for continuing and expanding ongoing activities andadded components for the development of tea crops and forestry, andsupporting the Yambio Agricultural Research Center (YARC). A latersupplement to the preparation document proposed additional farmer andtsetse fly control training centers, and a number of community centers incrop and livestock areas. Total project cost was estimated at US$39.9million.

1.06 Project appraisal took place in May 1978 and includedrepresentatives from the United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germanyforegn aid agencies, interested in participating in the project. To ensure

- 2 -

consistency In the approach of the major donors to the development of theregion, the Association developed a joint approach with ODA and GTZ, thetwo bilateral agencies. Later IFAD was added and a larger-scope projectwas designed encompassing all cofinancing.

1.07 The appraisal report followed preparation recommendations butdropped some components (e.g. farmers' training and tsetse control trainingcenters) while adding others. The concept of the RSADP (par8 1.02) wasIntroduced and a Project Formulation Unit (PFU) was added to the existingfroject Development Unit to strengthen SRMOA's capacity to plan and managethe development of the region as a whole. The project's total cost wasfinally set at US$56 million of which the foreign exchange component wasUS$40 million.

II. THE PROJECT

Project Components

2.01 Crop Development. This component contemplated the continuationand expansion of the ongoing food crop and smallholder rainfed coffeedevelopment programs; expansion of cotton extension and spraying program;support to improved seed multiplication for crops such as maize, groundnutsand sorghum, and to food crop research emphasizing improvement of thesesame crops. Food crop development concentrated on two major centers -Equatoria Province and Bahr-el-Ghazal Province - serving as a base ofoperation for activities in six districts. Smallholder rainfed coffee wasto be expanded from 3,500 feddans (1,470 ha) to 6,500 feddans (2,730 ha).Included in the component were medium-term credit for smallholder coffeefarmers, staff training and research support for the Equatoria ProvinceAgricultural Production Corporation.

2.02 Livestock Services. Included in this component were support forthe Livestock Production Center established under the earlier project, aswell as initiating a pilot dairy ranching scheme geared to supply low costmilk and milk products to urban centers; strengthening of the AnimalResources Department of the SRMOA, particularly in the coordination withits veterinary field services, provision of capital, operating expendituresand technical staff for the three veterinary laboratories established underthe earlier project, and support for the livestock marketing system,Including technical assistance and purchase of a barge to transportlivestock on the White Nile. A range ecology survey tc determine rangelandtypes and their present use was also to be funded.

2.03 Institutic-nal Support. One of the project's major objectives wasto establish a Proje.;t Formulation Unit (PFU) in the SRMOA to preparedistrict development plans, oversee the RSADP and run the monitoring andevaluation unit established under the rehabilitation project. Fivecooperative marketing and development teams were established and theProject Development Unit (PDU), established under the earlier project, wasto be strengthened with staff, buildings, supplies and vehicles. Funds forfuture project preparation and to undertake special studies related to theagricultural development of the region were provided to the SRMOA underthis component.

- 3 -

2.04 Extension and Training. Two extension units, one in each of thetwo maJor centers, were to be established and each provided with anutritionlst. Agricultural training was to be expanded by providing 44man-years of scholarships and short-toem training courses and by fundingteaching staff and operating costs to a training school for stockmen,allowing training of about 75 stockmen annually. Also a DevelopmentSupport Media Section was to be established to assist crop, livestock andnutrition extension services, train junior level employees and promoteinter-agency cooperation.

2.05 Civil Works. The project area infrastructure was to bestrengthened by supporting the Building Unit, established as part of thePDU under the rehabilitation project, through provision of staff, aworkshop and stores, an office and a drilling rig to drill and equip about20 wells. The Secondary and Feeder Road Unit in the PDU was to beexpanded, equipped and staffed to rahabilitate about 560 km of feeder roadsand to maintain the improved network. In addition, four 200-ton districtstores and fifty 40-ton distribution stores for the buying and selling ofproduce and input supplies were to be constructed under the project. Allcivil works construction was to be completed and the feeder roadconstruction teams but in operation within a period of four years.

Organization apd Management

2.06 The Southern Region Ministry of Agriculture (SRMOA) wasdesignated executing agency. The PDU, was responsible for implementing thevarious components with the exception of the veterlaary services and animalhealth program which was the responsibility of the SRMOA's Department ofAnimal Resources, and the running of the Malakal Stockman Training School,under the ministry's Deputy Director of Research and Training. The PDU, asthe major implementing unit, already operated on a relatively autonomousbasis and the maintenance of its autonomy and flexibility while improvingadministration and logistical support was a major concern during projectimplementation.

2.07 The planning and coordination of all RSADP activities were to bethe responsibility of the Chief Planning Adviser in the SRMOA, withassistance from the PFU to be created under the project. A new RSADPExecutive Committee was to replace the existing PDU Executive Committeeestablished under the rehabilitation project. This new committee,reporting to the Minister of Agriculture, was to be responsible foroverseeing project implementation.

2.08 The Project Director ir the FDU and his deputy were to beassisted by two Assistants, one in each major center. Technicalsupervision of the project components was to be the responsibility of sixdivisions in the PDU, including Finance and Administration, CropDevelopment, Rural Services, Veterinary Services, Livestock Production andConstruction Services.

-4 -

III. PROJECT EVALUATION

General Assessment

3.01 Overview. The project was unsuccessful partly because ofinherent problems related to design and difficulties encountered instaffing key positions, but largely due to the unstable political situationduring the latter part of the implementation period.

3.02 The per.ormance of the various project components varied. Interms of institutional objectives and agricultural development, come sub-components, e.g. the planning capability support and the food crop andcoffee development, recorded significant progress. By 1983, Government andthe donor agencies agreed to divide the project into two separate projects,and the administrative division of the Southern Region into threeindividual regions. Implementation of the project components began toimprove because of the reduction in scope and removal of some of the majorconstraints. Of the two projects resulting from this sub-division, onecovered the Equatoria Region with ODA support while the other wasconcentrated on the Bahr-el-Ghazal Region and was assisted by IDA and IFAD.

3.03 The improvement in project performance in the Bahr-el-Ghazalproject led donor agencies to agree to a one year extension beyond June1984 and to consider a follow-up project. The deteriorating politicalsituation prevented further progress.

3.04 The project failed to achieve number of its objectives but hadsome success with some of its components once adjustments were made in theproject scope.

Agricultural Development Objectives

3.05 Crop production. Food crop development, which had proved to beone of the most successful components of the rehabilitation project, wascontinued under the SRAP with satisfactory results although some of themomentum of the earlier project had been lost. Crop trials which suffereda reduction in the number of sub-stations during 1982, eventually had thereduction reversed after staffing improvements in 1983. The seedproduction sub-component was one of the best performers in the project withthe farm well managed and a sustained operation of the innovativesmallholder contract grower system for groundnuts and sorghum begun underthe earlier project. The total area of arable land in the crop station wasincreased to 490 feddans (205.8 ha) during the latter part of theimplementation period. The lack of agronomic recommendations for theIronstone Plateau and Floodplain, where one of the two major centers waslocated in comparison with the Greenbelt area served by the second center,resulted in uneven achievements for the two areas, although some usefulon-station trials were carried out in the former center.

3.06 The smallholder coffee program continued to perform well underSRAP. The number of growers and the area under cultivation increasedsteadily over the second project's life, with production rising by over 50%per year from 1978 onwards. The main reasons for its success were the

-5-

attractive market prices which made the program financially sound, thesimplicity of its design with emphasis on rainfed production, and thesatisfactory management of the supply of inputs, mainly seedlings andhand tools.

3.07 The cotton program failed to make a headstart. At appraisal, theproposal for support to the spraying program under SRAP had been based onthe premise that a separate project supported by another donor wouldstrengthen the Equatoria Province Agricultural Projects Corporation(EPAPC). This assistance did not materialize and in 1983, Government andthe donor agencies for SRAP agreed to transfer all responsibility forcotton promotion and development to EPAPC.

3.08 Livestock Development. The approach to livestock develor-ient hadnot been well established at the time of appraisal and a Livestocl

* Component Review undertaken in 1980 had changed some of the key features ofthis component. In contrast with the appraisal proposal that the projectlimit its role in vaccination services to the supplies and logisticsrequired by the Veterinary Department, the 1980 review proposed analternative approach to strengthen local veterinary offices on a district-by-district basis, as well as building up in the Veterinary Department acapacity to respond to outbreaks of animal disease. Before Governmentaccepted this approach in 1983, a disease survey had already been conductedin the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province in 1979-81 with GTZ support.

3.09 A main livestock development center for Southern Sudanestablished by the rehabilitation project at Marial Bai and equipped withbasic infrastructure as well as supplied with cross-breeding stock fromnorthern Sudan and Kenya, fluctuated in its performance during projectperformance largely due to difficulties in senior staffing. By 1983, staffstrength reached a level sufficient to ensure continuing progress. Theonly aspect of this development center to show steady progress was thedairy, based on cross-bred stock and under which financial support wasprovided for a pilot smallholder dairy scheme set up as an outreach from aformer UNDP/FAO dairy project.

3.10 The project provided for assistance in developing a livestockmarketing policy for the region, as well as for a river barge to relievethe transport constraint. A condition of disbursement against this sub-component was that a parastatal livestock marketing agency, possibly abranch of the Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation (LMMC), be set up inthe region. The 1980 livestock review agreed with Government in focusingattention on the operation of the private sector rather than becominginvolved in commercial-type activities. A strategy was prepared andalthough its infrastructural proposals were not implemented, it remains auseful starting point for future livestock development.

Institutional Objectives

3.11 Planning. One of the major objectives of the SRAP was tostrengthen the Regional Ministry's capacity to plan and executeagricultural and rural development in the Southern Region. During projectimplementation, progress was made in refining an agricultural development

- 6 -

strategy for the region. Three District Development Plans were preparedfrom the six originally envisaged, while preparatory studies were carriedout for two others. A significant step taken during implementation was themerger of the Planning Department of SRMOA and the newly created ProjectFormulation Unit (PFU), originally two separate and distinct entities.This merger was agreed by Government and the donor agencies as an effort tostrengthen SRMOA to the fullest extent possible.

3.12 An additional function of the planning component was to providesupport to PDU in drawing up annual work plans and budgets and in preparingstudies and reports related to the development of the region. Overall, 53reports were prepared between 1980 and 1984 which together represents aunique and valuable body of knowledge about the natural resources, socialorganization and economic conditions cf the region.

3.13 Monitoring and Evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation of PDU'sfield activities was an additional and important planning functionsupported by SRAP. Performance in this activity was disappointing and thepaucity of progress reports produced resulted in wide areas of ignoranceabout project impact and loss of opportunity to learn from implementationexperience for the benefit of future development efforts in the region.

3.14 Technical Assistance. The achievements recorded in theagricultural and planning components, as well as the important shortfallsand delays in the implementation of some of their functions are stronglyrelated to the success or failure in the recruitment of suitable expatriatetechnical assistance staff. The recruitment task was enormous. Of 67technical assistance posts envisaged at appraisal, about 40 were to behired directly by the project with 19 posts envisaged at appraisal to befilled by ODA and GTZ and 5 posts recruited by the Agricultural DevelopmentService (ADS). After several unsuccessful recruitment efforts made byindividual direct-hire, the Government in 1983 approached an Australianfirm of consultants to provide a full team. This approach was highlysuccessful and was largely responsible for the improvement of projectperformance ratings by subsequent supervision missions.

3.15 Training. The project, with ODA financing, successfully expandeda training center established in the region by the Rehabilitation project,providing it with the required facilities to become an AgriculturalTraining Institute. Curricula were developed for this center to enable itto provide certificate-level training.

3.16 Overseas training totalling 88 man-years of fellowships, 44 morethan the appraisal estimate, were provided under the project with financingfrom IDA/IFAD supple'mented by ODA. By late 1982, 56 man-years offellowships had been completed, 45 financed by IDA/IFAD and 11 by ODA,involving a wide range of key disciplines and technical skills and theprogram was proceeding satisfactorily when project activities werestopped. A Training Committee, consisting of SRMOA and PDU staff, wasestablished, and dealt effectively with a wide range of difficult trainingissues.

- 7 -

3.17 The lack of proper monitoring during implementation or afterproject closing makes it impossible to assess the impact of SRAP-relatedtraining. However, there is little doubt that improved performance duringthe 1983-1984 period was in part due to a better trained national staffassisted by a larger and more effective technical assistance. The finalassignment of trained staff after project activities were stopped is notknown.

Civil Works

3.18 The construction goals of SRAP were ambitious, with 72 houses forsenior, middle and junior staff to be constructed during the first year ofimplementation. This tsrget was meant to compensate for lack of housingduring the earlier project which had represented a serious constraint tostaff recruitment and a source of low morale. To achieve this goal, a muchexpanded Construction Service Division was established under SRAP, butproblems of recruitment and procurement continued to render it inadequatefor the task. Fortunately, in the intervening years, additional buildingcontractors had begun to work in Southern Sudan and some buildings, notablystaff houses and a training center were built by these privatecontractors. The construction program, however, had fallen short of itsobjectives Tsith only 25% of its physical targets achieved.

Financial and Economic Analysis

3.19 Project Costs. Total project costs are estimated to have beenabout US$39.8 million, in comparison with appraisal estimates of US$56million. The influence of inflation assumptions on these figures has notbeen estimated as the totals themselves are largely conjectural. Actualcost by component could not be ascertained for this report. Owing toweaknesses in the accounting section of the PDU, the management accountingsystem designed for the project could not be implemented. Routine reportsshowing expenditures by project component were never made and, although itwould have been possible to reconstruct estimates from project records, theProject Completion Report (PCR) mission that would have undertaken thistask had to be cancelled because of lack of security in the region. Thebest estimates available of actual costs by donor source are as follows:

Appraisal EstimatedEstimate Actual---- US$'000-

IDA 15,000 9,100IFAD 15,000 12,000ODA 18,500 14,800GTZ 1,900 1,900Government of Sudan 5,600 2,000

3.20 In summary, it is evident that while taken individually, eachcomponent of the project, both in terms of development activities and ofmanagerial procedures were adequately designed. Implementation of theoverall effort became too complex for the executing agency's capacity, even

-8-

though supported by a substantial amount of technical assistance. A lesscentralized institutional framework, including the strengthening of SRMOA,particularly in its planning capacities, but chanelling the assistance tospecific development activities through less ambitious and more cohesiveprojects with a district rather than regional base, would in allprobability have achieved a larger proportion of the project's objectiveswithin the same period of implementation. This was not possible because ofthe security situation.

3.21 Economic Rate of Return. Despite the unavailability of key data,it is clear that the economic rate of return of the project, if calculated,would be negative. For most project components, significant economicbenefits cannot be expected from the substantial investments that weremade. The underlying causes of these negative results were the persistenceof deep-seated obstacles to development in the Southern Sudan, combinedwith the project's fa.Lure to develop adequate momentum prior to theresumption of military hostilities.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

Development Strategy

4.01 The majority of the problems met during project implementationappear to have risen from an under-estimation of the severe economic,political, manpower and infrastructural constraints to be faced. In thelight of these constraints, most of the project's objectives could only beexpected to be achieved in the long-term, while short-term perspectivestended to create frustration in both the national and expatriateimplementing staff. A clear recognition of the obstacles to developmentand establishment of the long-term goals sought should be the basis onwhich any future project of this type should be designed.

Effectiveness and Start-Up

4.02 The project was not declared effective until February 14, 1980,nine months after signature of the Development Credit Agreement (DCA),because the National Assembly, which had to approve the project, was inlong recess and the Attorney General could not issue a legal opinion. Toavoid the serious effects of a financial gap between the earlierRehabilitation project and the new SRAP, IFAD made available an advance ofUS$200,000 in August 1979, while ODA provided some grant funds for projectcomponents to which the agency was not committed. Even with thisassistance, all but the highest priority expenditures were halted, severelydisrupting ongoing programs.

4.03 A further, though unrelated, difficulty for all developmentprograms in the region, was the closure of the Uganda border cutting theroute over which 90% of the project's supplies passed and seriouslyaffecting project implementation.

4.04 The financing gap caused the development activities to lose thesubstantial momentum they had achieved by 1978, affecting the morale of thenational staff and causing a number of expatriate technical assistance

-9 -

staff not to renew their contracts. In sulmmary, this disastrous start forthe new project had resulted from a schedule that allowed Insufficientmargin for delay and which, after slipping then by several months, had asevere negative impact on the early Implementation of SRAP.

Procurement

4.05 The lack of a working system for the procurement of supplies hadpossibly been the single most serious constraint to implementation of theRehabilitation project. For a project with the larger scope of SRAP, theproblem could be expected and in fact became more acute, particularly asthe project like its predecessor, relied mainly on supplies purchased in

* Kenya. This country was itself in serious foreign exchange crisis andconsequently, long delays and high costs were inevitable.

* 4.06 The project appraisal had provided for an expatriate ProcurementSpecialist and in 1980, after approval by the Executive Committee, an ADSstaff member was appointed. However, this official did not take up hispost until 1983, two years after project effectiveness. In 1981, theGovernment had also agreed to use a procurement agency and one based in TheNetherlands was selected. As a result of these changes, some improvementswere recorded In procurement and in 1983, a joint donor supervision missionIdentified more effective procurement as one of the main factors inexplaining a significant upturn in project performance.

Technical Assistance

4.07 Under the Rehabilitation project, difficulties related torecruitment of expatriate staff and in-country management of expatriatepersonnel had included: inability to fill some key posts; discontent amongbome expatriates as a result of widely diverse terms of employment; lowprofessional level resulting from uncompetitive terms offered by the

* project, and a large proportion of time spent by the project's managementin dealing with personnel matters.

4.08 Under SRAP, the task of recruiting expatriates was enormous. The

fact that there was no provision in the DCA stipulating that a satisfactoryrecruitment system should be in place, greatly reduced the Association'seffective influence on this matter.

4.09 The above difficulties were further compounded by the imbalancebetween expatriate staff and senior qualified national staff, both in termsof numbers and of levels of remuneration, control of scarce resources andother not infrequent sources of friction. While many of these problems areunavoidable, they can be minimized by early attention to their potentialappearance and by steps such as an active training and staff-developmentprogram for national staff, proft -sionally organized recruitment ofexpatriate and promotion of maiagement styles in both the project and thesponsoring agency that emphasizes collaboration and sensitivity topotential areas of friction.

4.10 After several attempts to identify candidates for key posts anddirect recruitment by the project of expatriates who, in some instances,

- 10 -

performed well but in others did not, a firm of consultants was approachedin 1983 to provide a full team for key positions. This approach wasimplemented with satisfactory results.

Construction

4.11 Problems of construction plagued the project from its start,largely because of the weakness of the Construction Services Division ofthe SRMOA and the inability of Management to recruit a suitable Chief CivilWorks Engineer. The few achievements in construction were in housing andin a training center and were due to the increasing participation ofprivate contractors instead of the forced account envisaged during projectappraisal.

Project Financing

4.12 Financing arrangements were unduly complicated and did nothing toease the job of record-keeping by the project staff. SRAP was in partjointly financed by IDA and IFAD and partly parallel-financed by ODA. Theresult was a substantial overlap between the various financing sources withsome operating costs for different equipment at the same location being metby different funding sources. Strict accountability, especially of ODAfunds, could not be maintained under these circumstances. It should havebeen possible to devise a simpler financing plan than the one that wasadopted.

4.13 Some disruption to project implementation was caused by a three-month suspension of the IDA/IFAD funds in 1981. Although this suspensionwas fully justified by the non-repayment by Sudan of funds owed to the twoorganizations, its impact on project implementation caused additionaluncertainty at a time when prospects for a successful achievement of theproject's objectives were, in any case, poor.

V. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE AND LESSONS LEARNED

5.01 The appraisal report is well written and provided a reasonableapproach to regional agricultural development of the Southern Sudan. Thescope of the project, however, was too ambitious, particularly in light ofthe still weak stage of the regional institutions and the vast geographicalarea covered by the project's activities. This was clearly illustrated bythe improved performance resulting from the administrative division of theregion into three separate regions and the subsequent partition of theproject into two separate projects.

5.02 The project had set out to address a wide range of developmentconstraints in the agricultural sector and had to operate in five of thesix provinces of the region. In addition, it had to coordinate the effortsof several major donors by including their activities within a singlemanagement structure and with shared support services. It was, therefore,inevitably large by Southern Sudan standards both in terms of resources andof professional and technical staff.

- 11 -

5.03 Project supervision monitored implementation problems closely andit was a problem project from its early stages. The supervision missionsacknowledged improvements in project performance as a consequence of thereduction in scope. The nature of the major problems, however, escapedsolution through supervisory decisions, particularly the recruitment ofsuitable technical and managerial assistance.

5.04 The main lessons learned under the project are as follows:

(a) agricultural and rural development in an extensive and poorlycommunicated area such as the Southern Sudan can be embarked uponwhile simultaneously strengthening the implementing agency onlyif the scope of the development activities is consistent with thegradual improvement of the agency's implementation capabilities(paras. 3.05-3.09).

(b) the experience with institutional performance of the projectindicates that a more workable framework, based on strengtheningof the regional Ministry of Agriculture, but chanellingassistance to agricultural activities through smaller district-based projects, would have achieved a larger impact on both theinstitution building and agriculture support objectives (para.3.20);

(c) in designing a strategy for the development of Southern Sudan orany similarly undeveloped region, careful consideration of theserious economic, political, manpower and infrastructuralconstraints to implementation is essential to establishing thescope of each stage of activities, and a long-term perspective ofthe strategy's objectives should be maintained when dealing withindividual issues (para. 4.10);

(d) projects which represent a second phase of an ongoing project andfor which they provide continuation of existing activites, shouldprovide interim financing between closing of the first project

* and effectiveness of the second, to avoid financing gaps mnd lossof implementation momentum caused by delays in effectiveneiss andstart-up (para. 4.03);

(e) careful balance of expatriate technical assistance staff andsenior qualified national staff in terms of numbers and terms ofemployment are essential when comparatively large numbers ofexpatriate staff are required for implementation. Sources oftechnical assistance personnel should be identified and evaluatedprior to project implementation to ensure comparative terms ofemployment and sensitivity to potential sources of friction withnational staff (paras. 4.08 and 4.09).

5.05 In retrospect, there are strong indications that by the time theproject's activities had to be stopped because of political instability inthe region, some substantial steps had been taken to overcome some of themajor problems faced in the period of implementation, in particular theestablishment of a satisfactory team of expatriate technical assistance

- 12 -

staff and improvement of procurement procedures. The decision byGovernment to divide the region in three distinct regions and thesubsequent splitting of the project into two separate projects, with theIDA/IFAD-assisted components concentrating on the Bahr-el-Ghazal regionprovided a reduction in scope that would have contributed strongly to allowthe project to achieve many of its objectives, had it been possible tocontinue implementation.

- 13 -

ANNEX ATable I

SUDAN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT (Cr. 904-SU)

Prolect Completion Report

Allocation of Credit Proceeds(US$ million)

OriginalAllocation Actual UseUS$ 2 US$ %

Vehicles and Equipment 1.4 9 1.0 7

Experts and Consultant Services 4.0 27 2.1 14

Operating Cocts, includinglocal salaries 3.0 20 4.5 30 d/

Civil Works 1.0 7 0.7 5

Credit to Farmers

Coffee hullers - a/ - -

Haize shellers, rice threshers,and ox-drawn equipment - b/ - -

Livestock Marketing

Vehicles and Equipment 0.6 4 - -

Expert and consultant services 0.7 5 - -

Operating costs, includinglocal salaries 0.7 5 - -

Initial Advance under Section 2.02 (c) 1.0 7 0.8 5

Unallocated 2.6 16 - -

TOTAL 15.0 100 9.1 c/ 61- - -

a/ $62,000 in SDR equivalent.b/ $234,000 in SDR equ~ valent.c/ $5,884,397.03 were cancelled from the credit.d/ Despite disbursement of only 61% of the Credit, cost overrun of this

component was about 50%; in the absence of project records, it has notbeen possible to determine the reasons for it.

- 14 -

ANNEX ATable 2

SUDAN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT (Cr. 904-SU)

Project Completion Report

Disbursement Schedule(US$ militon)

Appraisal Estimate Actual% of Z of

Annual Cumulative Credit Annual Cumulative Credit

1980 2.4 2.4 16 1.5 1.5 10

1981 3.1 5.5 37 2.0 3.5 23

1982 5.4 8.9 59 1.6 5.1 34

1983 3.4 12.3 82 1.8 6.9 46

1984 2.7 15.0 100 2.0 8.9 59

1985 - - - 0.4 9.3 62

1986 - - - (0.2)/a 9.1 /b 61

/a Repayment of US$200,000 of initial IDA advance provided to Borrower in 1980.

/b US$5,884.397.03 of the Credit was cancelled.

- 15 -

ANNEX B

SUDAN

SOUTHERN REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT (Cr. 904-SU)

Project Completion Report

Compliance With Major Covenants Provided For In TheDevelopment Credit Agreement

Section 3.01 (d)

Borrower shall establish a Project ExccutiX'e Committee. The ExecutiveCommittee was established but rarely met.

* Section 3.02

Recruitment of technical assistance on terms acceptable to IDA. Someimprovement took place, but terms of employment were not competitiveinternationally.

Section 3.04 (d)

Regular progress reports on the project will be provided. Not compliedwith.

Section 3.06

A radio link will be maintained with Nairobi and yearly landing permitswill be issued for charter aircraft.

Radio link established. Yearly landing permits not issued..

Section 3.07

* Accounts to be audited within six months of the end of each financial year.

Audits prepared late.

Section 4.07

Borrower to appoint a Director General of the Ministry of Agricultureacceptable to IDA.

complied with.

2' SUDAN 2 -,

Southern RegionCROP DIS- RAINFALL, AND ECOLOGICAL ZONES >-

R Rice M Maize Central ralniands - Main roase AverageCHA, K Ka C cotton -d reion O ther roods .91 i931 r i960.CHAD; TE CF Cotte / ironstone plateu . *Railws in millimneters

Mechniz OS Oil 1100ft Central hills - Riversh SC Sugar cone 1 Grown belt - c4lstibosldU

vot*.* Soq TO Toioocro Southetern plains -*-International boundoariesSwOmmianFi ................. ,,*e55. = Mountain slopes and hills U KJ

th M*M H~~~~~~~~~~igh altitude areas

C E N T R A L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ / lE IP

A F R I C A NHR

0W

MAILES

0 100 200 300XILOMETE3S

241

AFRICA

, Wf- o\t4f w- YA GADW~~~~~~~~_ .. S ~