world food prospects: critical issues for the early twenty...

WORLD FOOD PROSPECTS : CRITICAL ISSUES FOR THE

EARLY TWENTY -FIRST CENTURY

Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Rajul Pandya-Lorch,and Mark W. Rosegrant

FOOD POLICY REPORT

INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

WASHINGTON , D.C.OCTOBER 1999

Executive Summary 5

Introduction 7

Prospects for Food Security 8

Emerging Issues 19

C o n c l u s i o n s 2 9

Notes 30

CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

About 73 million people will be added tothe world’s population every year

between 1995 and 2020, increasing it by 32percent to reach 7.5 billion. Much of thispopulation growth will occur in the cities ofthe developing world. While its rural popula-tion is expected to increase by less than300 million during this period, the develop-ing world’s urban population could double to3.4 billion in 2020. Per capita incomes areexpected to increase in all major developingregions over this period. Meeting the foodneeds of a growing and urbanizing popula-tion with rising incomes will have profoundimplications for the world’s agricultural pro-duction and trading systems in comingdecades. IFPRI research suggests some ofthe major developments that will character-ize the world food situation during the nexttwo decades to 2020:• Almost all of the increase in world food

demand will take place in developingcountries. Developing countries willaccount for about 85 percent of theincrease in the global demand for cere-als and meat between 1995 and 2020.

• H o w e v e r, a developing-country person in2020 will consume less than half theamount of cereals consumed by a developed-country person and slightlymore than one-third of the meat products.

• A demand-driven “livestock revolution” isunder way in the developing world.Between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s, the volume of meat consumed inthe developing world grew almost threetimes as fast as it did in the developedcountries. Demand for meat in thedeveloping world is projected to doublebetween 1995 and 2020.

• In response to the strong demand formeat products, demand for cereals forfeeding livestock will double in develop-ing countries. Demand for maize in

developing countries will increase muchfaster than for any other cereal and willovertake demand for rice and wheat by2020.

• To meet demand, the world’s farmerswill have to produce 40 percent moregrain in 2020. Increases in cultivatedarea are expected to contribute onlyabout one-fifth of the global cereal pro-duction between 1995 and 2020, soimprovements in crop yields will berequired to bring about the necessaryproduction increases. However, it is worrisome that growth in farmers’ cerealyields is slowing from the heyday of theGreen Revolution during the 1970s.

• Food production is increasing muchfaster in the developing world than in thedeveloped world. By 2020, the develop-ing world will be producing 59 percent ofthe world’s cereals and 61 percent of theworld’s meat.

• Nevertheless, cereal production in thedeveloping world will not keep pace withdemand, and net cereal imports bydeveloping countries will almost doublebetween 1995 and 2020 to 192 milliontons in order to fill the gap between pro-duction and demand. Net meat importsby developing countries will increaseeightfold during this period to 6.6 milliontons.

• About 60 percent of the developingworld’s net cereal imports in 2020 willcome from the United States. EasternEurope and the former Soviet Union areforecast to emerge as major netexporters, and the European Union andAustralia are projected to increase theirnet exports as well.

• Food prices will remain steady or fallslightly between 1995 and 2020. T h emuch slower decrease in food pricescompared with past trends is due to the

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continued slowdown in crop yieldincreases, as well as strong growth indemand for meat in developing countries.

• With increased production and imports,per capita food availability in the devel-oping world will increase to 2,800 calo-ries per day by 2020, an increase ofabout 9 percent over 1995.

• In the scenario described here, foodinsecurity and malnutrition will persist in2020 and beyond. We project that 135million children under five years of agewill be malnourished in 2020, a declineof only 15 percent from 160 million in1995. Child malnutrition is expected todecline in all major developing regionsexcept Sub-Saharan Africa, where thenumber of malnourished children is fore-cast to increase by about 30 percent toreach 40 million by 2020. With morethan 77 percent of the developingworld’s malnourished children in 2020,Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia willremain “hot spots” of child malnutritionand food insecurity.When IFPRI prepared its last Food

Policy Report on the world food situationtwo years ago, it highlighted recent develop-ments and emerging issues influencingprospects for global food security. Many ofthese issues are still present, and somehave escalated in importance. In this report,

we identify and discuss six critical issuesthat, at the threshold of the next century,could significantly influence the world foodsituation. First, new information on nutritionis shedding fresh light on which policy-related variables could help improve thenutritional status of children; this could helprefocus efforts to eliminate child malnu-trition. Second, world market prices forwheat, maize, and rice, adjusted for infla-tion, are the lowest they have been in thelast century. This situation may threaten pro-ducer incomes and future food productionand stocks. Third, the next round of trade negotiations sponsored by the World TradeOrganization will begin in November 1999.Poor countries and poor people risk losingout on the economic benefits embodied infurther trade liberalization. To gain fromtrade talks, developing countries must par-ticipate effectively in the negotiations. Thelast three issues focus on approaches toincreasing productivity on small-scale farmsin developing countries, in particular on thepotential of agroecological approaches, thepotential role of modern biotechnology, andthe relevance of new information technologyand precision farming. These issues arehotly debated at present, and the outcomesof these debates may influence the foodsecurity of low-income people for manyyears to come.

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INTRODUCTION

The last IFPRI Food Policy Report on theworld food situation, prepared two years

ago, highlighted recent developments andemerging issues influencing the prospectsfor global food security.1 Many of theseissues are still present, and some haveescalated in importance. Although concernsabout the future Chinese food situation havesubsided with two years of surplus grainproduction in China and net exports, theextent to which the Indian population willexpand consumption of livestock products inthe future remains unresolved. The futurefood situation in the former Soviet Union isstill unclear, and the success of the eco-nomic transformations in that region isuncertain. Although many local successeshave taken place, the Sub-Saharan Africanfood situation is still extremely difficult.Large-scale breakthroughs in agriculturalproductivity and improvements in food security are yet to occur in that region.

Concerns about declining soil fertility inmany low-income countries and growingcompetition over water in many locationshave further escalated during the last couple of years, as has the uncertainty surrounding the future use of modern bio-technology for agriculture. The decliningtrend in food aid availability since 1993 hasbeen reversed, owing primarily to low inter-national food prices and increasing stocklevels in traditional exporting countries com-bined with the emergence of large-scalecrises in Indonesia, Russia, and the Balkansduring 1998 and 1999. Whether this will bethe beginning of an upward trend in food aidor merely a short-term blip will dependlargely on what happens to internationalgrain prices and stock levels in industrialnations. Future food aid will be determinedprimarily by supply since demand farexceeds the likely availability. Food safetyconcerns, particularly in Western Europe,have exploded during the last two years

partly because of consumer uncertaintiesand fears about the health risks associatedwith genetically modified food and partlybecause of inappropriate governmentresponses to perceived health-threateningoccurrences in the food chain.

This report provides a summary of themost recent results from IFPRI projectionsof the future world food situation. It thenidentifies and discusses six recent develop-ments and emerging issues that will influ-ence the prospects for global food security.The first of these issues is the nutrition situation, which appears to be deterioratingin some countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, newresearch is shedding light on how child malnutrition may be reduced in developingcountries, which could help refocus effortsto eliminate child malnutrition.

The second issue is grain prices. Twoyears ago, the discussion focused on thecauses and consequences of high prices formaize and wheat. Today, the very low pricesfor these commodities are a cause of con-cern, because they may threaten producerincomes and future food production andstocks. Third, the next round of trade negoti-ations sponsored by the World TradeOrganization (WTO) will begin in November1999, and agriculture is expected to occupya prominent place in those negotiations.The outcomes of these negotiations will sig-nificantly influence food and agriculture pro-duction and trading systems around theworld for years to come.

The last three emerging issues focus onapproaches to increasing agricultural pro-ductivity on small-scale farms in developingcountries. This report will discuss new evidence on the opportunities offered byagroecological approaches, the potentialrole of modern biotechnology, and the relevance of new information technologyand precision farming for small farmers in

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PROSPECTS FOR FOOD SECURITY

Results from IFPRI’s revised and updat-ed global food model, the International

Model for Policy Analysis of Commoditiesand Trade (IMPACT),2 suggest that underthe most likely scenario global demand forcereals will increase by 39 percent between1995 and 2020 to reach 2,466 million tons;demand for meat will increase by 58 percentto reach 313 million tons; and demand forroots and tubers will increase by 37 percentto reach 864 million tons.3 These largeincreases in food demand will result not onlyfrom population growth but also from urban-ization, income growth, and associatedchanges in lifestyles and food preferences.

About 73 million people, equivalent tothe current population of the Philippines, willbe added to the world’s population on aver-age every year between 1995 and 2020,increasing it by 32 percent to reach 7.5 bil-lion in 2020 (Table 1). An overwhelming

97.5 percent of the increase in population isexpected to occur in the developing world,4

whose share of global population wouldincrease from 79 percent in 1995 to 84 per-cent in 2020. Whereas the absolute popula-tion increase will be largest in Asia, 1.1billion, the relative increase will be greatestin Africa, where the population is expectedto increase by 70 percent. This rate ofincrease, however, is less than had beenprojected in the past, partly because ofHIV/AIDS, which is ravaging the Africanpopulation. One-third of the total populationincrease is anticipated to occur in just twocountries—China and India. However,India’s population is growing much fasterand is poised to overtake that of China by2035.5 The world’s growing population willcontinue to exert pressure on food supplies.

Much of the population growth is expect-ed to take place in the cities of the develop-

developing countries. These issues arehotly debated at present, and the outcomesof these debates and the related policies

may influence the food security of low-income people for many years to come.

Table 1—World population, 1995 and 2020

Population levelPopulation increase, Share of

Region 1995 2020a 1995–2020 increase

(millions) (millions) (percent) (percent)

Latin America and the Caribbean 480 665 185 38.5 10.1

Africa 697 1,187 490 70.3 26.7

Asia, excluding Japan 3,311 4,421 1,110 33.5 60.5

China 1,221 1,454 233 19.1 12.7

India 934 1,272 338 36.2 18.4

Developed countries 1,172 1,217 45 3.8 2.5

Developing countries 4,495 6,285 1,790 39.8 97.5

World 5,666 7,502 1,836 32.4 100.0

Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision (New York: UN, 1999).a Medium-variant population projections.

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ing world. While its rural population isexpected to increase by less than 300 mil-lion between 1995 and 2020, the developingworld’s urban population is projected to dou-ble from 1.7 billion to reach 3.4 billion in2020 (Figure 1). By 2020, about 52 percentof the developing world’s population will beliving in urban areas, up from 38 percent in1995.6 The rapid urbanization of the devel-oping world and associated changes inlifestyles will have significant effects on food preferences and hence on demand. As people move from rural to urban areas,they tend to adopt more diverse diets, shifting away from coarse grains such assorghum and millet to rice, and sometimesmaking secondary shifts from rice to wheat.They also tend to consume more livestockproducts, fruits, vegetables, and processedfoods. Agricultural production and researchsystems will be challenged to keep abreastof changing dietary preferences in comingyears.

Prospects for economic growth appearfavorable in the developing world, and likeurbanization, rising incomes will push peo-ple toward more diversified diets. IMPACTprojects total income in the developingworld to increase at an average of 4.3 per-cent annually between 1995 and 2020,which would double per capita incomes tomore than US$2,200 (Table 2). Per capita

incomes in all major developing regions,including Sub-Saharan A f r i c a ,7 are expectedto increase over this period. However, evenby 2020 Sub-Saharan Africa’s per capitaincome is projected to be less than a dollara day; poverty of this magnitude will con-demn many people in this region to foodinsecurity.

Although many millions of people couldremain mired in absolute poverty, meetingthe food needs of a growing and urbanizingpopulation with rising incomes will have pro-found implications for the global agriculturalproduction and trading system in comingdecades. Some of the major developmentsthat will characterize the world food situationduring the next two decades to 2020 are thefollowing:

Almost all of the increase in worldfood demand will take place in developingc o u n t r i e s . Developing countries willaccount for about 85 percent of the 690 mil-lion ton increase in the global demand forcereals between 1995 and 2020 (Figure 2).Surprisingly, they will account for a similarlylarge share of the 115 million ton increase inthe global demand for meat products overthe same period. China alone is forecast to account for one-quarter of the globalincrease in demand for cereals and for two-fifths of the increase in demand for meat.Although India’s population is projected to

Figure 2—Share of increase in globaldemand for cereals and meatproducts, 1995–2020

Figure 1—Urban and rural population levelsin developing countries, 1950–2020

Source: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The1996 Revision (New York: UN, 1996). Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.

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increase much faster than that of Chinabetween 1995 and 2020, its share of theglobal increase in demand for cereals isexpected to be about half that of China’swhile its share of the global increase indemand for meat is expected to be onlyone-tenth that of China. India is currently ina period of economic transition; should poli-cy reforms result in much faster economicgrowth than currently expected, the demandfor meat and other livestock products,including milk, could expand much faster inthat country.8 Also, it is still not clearwhether poverty or culturally based foodpreferences are the primary reason whymeat consumption in India is so low. Thereare indications that a large share of theIndian population would prefer to eat moremeat if their income were to rise. By 2020,developing countries as a group are fore-cast to demand twice as much cereals andmeat products as developed countries(Figure 3).

H o w e v e r, a developing-country per-son in 2020 will consume less than halfthe amount of cereals consumed by adeveloped-country person and slightlymore than one-third of the meat products.

Per capita demand for cereals and meatproducts in developing countries will contin-ue to lag far behind that in developed coun-tries, although the gap will begin to narrowin the case of meat products (Figure 4). The disparities in demand can be explainedpartly by lower incomes and greater depen-dence on roots and tubers for sustenance indeveloping countries (see Box 1) and bymuch heavier use of cereals for feeding livestock in developed countries. Within thedeveloping world, increases in per capitademand for cereals (food and feed) andmeat products in East Asia will far outstripthose in other regions. This is not surprisinggiven that income levels are already relative-ly high in East Asia and are projected tocontinue to grow rapidly in the next twodecades, triggering massive increases in demand. In the case of cereals, forinstance, while per capita demand in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase by13 kilograms between 1995 and 2020 toreach 156 kilograms in 2020, in East Asia itis projected to increase by 66 kilograms toreach 373 kilograms in 2020, driven to alarge extent by increases in demand forfeedgrain.

Table 2–Income levels and growth, 1995–2020

Annual income Per capita income levelgrowth rate,

Region 1995–2020 1995 2020

(percent) (1995 US$ per person)

Sub-Saharan Africaa 3.40 280 359

Latin America and the Caribbean 3.59 3,590 6,266

West Asia and North Africa 3.83 1,691 2,783

Southeast Asia 4.44 1,225 2,675

South Asia 5.01 350 830

East Asia 5.12 984 2,873

Developed countries 2.18 17,390 28,256

Developing countries 4.32 1,080 2,217

World 2.64 4,807 6,969

Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.a Excluding South Africa.

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A demand-driven “livestock revolu-tion” is under way in the developingworld, with profound implications forglobal agriculture, health, livelihoods,and the environment. Between the early1970s and the mid-1990s, the volume ofmeat consumed in the developing countriesgrew almost three times as much as it did inthe developed countries.9 With continuedpopulation growth, urbanization, incomegrowth, and changes in lifestyles and foodpreferences, we project that meat demandin the developing world will double between1995 and 2020 to 190 million tons andincrease by 25 percent in developed coun-tries to 122 million tons. Demand for meatwill grow much faster than for cereals in thedeveloping world, by 2.8 percent per yearfor meat compared with 1.8 percent forcereals. In per capita terms, demand formeat in developing countries will increaseby 40 percent between 1995 and 2020,whereas it will increase by only 10 percentfor cereals. Worldwide, demand for poultrymeat is projected to increase by more than85 percent between 1995 and 2020, forbeef by 50 percent, and for pigmeat by 45percent. Nevertheless, demand for pigmeatwill continue to exceed demand for the othermeat commodities. In the developing world,demand for poultry meat is expected toincrease fastest, at an average annual rate

of 3.6 percent, compared with 2.8 percentfor beef and 2.3 percent for pigmeat. EastAsia’s per capita demand is projected toincrease most, and Sub-Saharan Africa’sand South Asia’s least; by 2020, East Asia’sper capita demand for meat could be asmuch as seven times that of South Asia(Figure 5). It is crucial that governments andindustries prepare for this ongoing livestockrevolution in order to meet consumerdemand while alleviating stresses on publichealth and natural resources (see Box 2).

Demand for cereals for feeding live-stock will double in developing countries.In response to the strong demand for meatproducts, developing countries’ demand for

Figure 3—Total demand for cereals and meatproducts, 1995–2020

Figure 4—Per capita demand for cereals andmeat products, 1995–2020

Figure 5—Per capita demand for meatproducts, 1995–2020

Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999. Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.

Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.

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Many of the developing world’s poorest farmersand food-insecure households are highlydependent on roots and tubers as a significant, if not principal, source of food and income. Inmany parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, roots andtubers account for about 20 percent of calorieconsumption. In Asia and Latin America, theyprovide an important supplemental source ofcarbohydrates, vitamins, and amino acids infood systems that are dominated by othercommodities. The production and processing of roots and tubers, which tend to be very l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e , are also important sources ofemployment and income. Production of rootsand tubers tends to be concentrated in countrieswith lower per capita incomes and, within thelow-income countries, they are typically locatedin remote, often marginal, areas with particularlylow levels of income and limited access to farminputs. These characteristics make roots andtubers an important crop for low-incomesmallholders in the marginal areas of Africa,Asia, and Latin America.

While much of the focus in developing-country food production in recent years hasbeen on cereals, similarly large rates of increasein production occurred for potatoes and yams,although growth was much lower for cassavaand sweet potatoes. By 1995, about 630 milliontons of roots and tubers were produced on 49million hectares worldwide, with 70 percent of theproduction taking place in developing countries.The estimated annual value of the major rootsand tubers produced in the developing world in1995–97 amounted to about US$40 billion.

IMPACT projections suggest that globaldemand for roots and tubers will increase by 37 percent between 1995 and 2020 to reach 864 million tons, with more than 97 percent ofthe increase in production occurring in thedeveloping world (see figure). Sub-SaharanAfrica alone will account for more than two-fifths

of the increase in demand. Worldwide, demandfor cassava and other minor roots and tubers isprojected to increase by 49 percent, for potatoes by 40 percent, and for sweet potatoesand yams by 30 percent between 1995 and2020. A rapid expansion in the demand for rootsand tubers for livestock feed has been underway for some time, particularly in Asia, and islikely to continue as demand for meat productsgrows rapidly in coming years.

Average yields for roots and tubers indeveloping countries are well below those indeveloped countries, 11.6 tons per hectareversus 16.7 tons in 1995, and are far belowtechnically feasible levels. Potential is great for increasing production through improvedvarieties and other farming innovations as wellas improved policies. Better yields for thesecrops would bring significant benefits to the foodsystems in developing countries, particularly topoor producers and consumers. The importantcontinued and future role of roots and tubers in the food systems of developing countries has potentially far-reaching implications forinvestments in agricultural research at both thei n t e r n a t i o n a l and national levels.

Box 1The Contribution of Roots and Tubers

feedgrain is projected to double between1995 and 2020 to 445 million tons, whiledemand for cereals for direct human con-sumption is projected to increase by 40

percent to 1,013 million tons (Figure 6). By 2020, 27 percent of the cereal demandin developing countries will be directed toanimal feed, compared with 21 percent in

Share of increase in global demandfor roots and tubers, 1995–2020


Note: This box is drawn from information generated by IMPACT simulations as well as from G. J. Scott, M. W. Rosegrant, and C.Ringler, “Roots and Tubers for the 21st Century: Trends, Projections, and Policy for Developing Countries,” Draft 2020 Vision for Food,Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., photocopy).

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1995. In developed countries, feed for live-stock will account for over 70 percent of thecereal demand, and the increase in cerealdemand for feed will far outstrip the increase

in demand for food between 1995 and 2020. By 2020, demand for maize in devel-

oping countries will overtake demand forrice and wheat (Figure 7). Essentially, as

The Livestock Revolution is a term used by theauthors of a recent 2020 Vision DiscussionPaper, Livestock to 2020: The Next FoodRevolution by Christopher Delgado, MarkRosegrant, Henning Steinfeld, Simeon Ehui, andClaude Courbois, to describe the massiveincreases in demand for foods of animal originfueled by population growth, urbanization, andincome growth in developing countries over thenext 20 years. Like the Green Revolution, theLivestock Revolution involves the large-scaleparticipation by developing countries intransformations that had previously occurredmostly in the temperate zones of developedcountries.

The Livestock Revolution encompassesseven distinct trends: (1) rapid worldwideincreases in consumption and production oflivestock products; (2) a major increase in theshare of developing countries in total livestockproduction and consumption; (3) an ongoingchange in the status of livestock production froma small-scale local activity to a global activity; (4) increased substitution of meat and milk forgrain in the human diet; (5) rapid rise in the useof cereal-based feeds; (6) greater stress ongrazing resources and more intensive productioncloser to cities; and (7) the emergence of rapidtechnological change in livestock production andprocessing in industrial systems.

While increased consumption of livestockproducts among high-income people indeveloped countries who regularly consumeexcess calories could lead to health problems,including cardiovascular diseases, increasedconsumption of even relatively small amounts of meat and milk among low-income people indeveloping countries could contribute toimproving their nutritional status by supplyingnecessary proteins and micronutrients as well as calories. Similarly, while rapidly increasinglivestock production can cause serious damageto the environment, when appropriate types and

levels of production are in place it can beharmonious with the environment.

The Livestock Revolution will undoubtedlystretch the capacity of existing production anddistribution systems and exacerbate environ-mental and public health problems. It presentsmany opportunities and dangers that suggest it would be unwise for developing countries to adopt a laissez-faire policy for livestockdevelopment. Governments and industry mustprepare for this continuing transformation withlong-run policies and investments that will satisfyconsumer demand, improve nutrition, directincome growth opportunities to the poor, andalleviate environmental and public health stress.Delgado and his coauthors suggest four broadpillars on which to base a desirable livestockstrategy for developing countries. These are: • Removing policy distortions that promote

artificial economies of scale in livestockproduction;

• Building participatory institutions of collectiveaction for small-scale farmers that allow themto be vertically integrated with livestockprocessors and input suppliers;

• Creating the environment in which farmers willincrease investment in ways to improveproductivity in the livestock sector; and

• Promoting effective regulatory institutions todeal with the threat of environmental andhealth crises stemming from livestock.

The Livestock Revolution is a structuralphenomenon that is here to stay. As in the caseof the Green Revolution, the stakes for the poorin developing countries are enormous. Howgood or bad the Livestock Revolution will be forthe people of developing countries depends onhow these countries choose to approach it. Lack of policy action will not stop the LivestockRevolution but it will ensure that the form it takesis less favorable for growth, poverty alleviation,and sustainability in developing countries.

Box 2Preparing for the Livestock Revolution

Note: This box is drawn from C. Delgado, M. Rosegrant, H. Steinfeld, S. Ehui, and C. Courbois, Livestock to 2020: The NextFood Revolution, 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 28 (Washington, D.C.: InternationalFood Policy Research Institute,1999).

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incomes rise, per capita demand for rice isbeginning to plateau, but demand for maizefor feed purposes is growing substantially;this development has major implications forthe world’s agricultural production andresearch systems. Driven by the increaseddemand for animal feed, demand for maizein developing countries will increase muchfaster than for any other cereal, by a pro-jected 2.35 percent per year between 1995and 2020 compared with 2.09 percent forother grains, 1.58 percent for wheat and1.23 percent for rice. About 64 percent ofthe maize demand will go toward feedinglivestock compared with 8 percent of wheatand 3 percent of rice in 2020. In China,where total demand for meat is projected todouble between 1995 and 2020, demand formaize is forecast to increase by around 2.7percent per year whereas demand for rice,the most important staple for human con-sumption, is projected to increase by only0.6 percent per year.

The world’s farmers will have to pro-duce 40 percent more grain in 2020, mostof which will have to come from yieldincreases. IMPACT projections suggest thatfarmland cultivated with cereals will increaseby only 7.4 percent or 51 million hectares by2020, with much of the growth concentratedin the relatively low-yielding cereals of Sub-Saharan Africa. A modest expansion incereal area is forecast for Latin America, but

virtually no growth is projected for Asia orthe developed countries. IMPACT projec-tions suggest that global cereal productionwill grow at an average annual rate of 1.3percent between 1995 and 2020 (Figure 8);increases in cultivated area are expected tocontribute only one-fifth of the global cerealproduction needed to meet demand between1995 and 2020. Therefore, improvements incrop yields will be required to bring aboutthe necessary production increases.

H o w e v e r, growth in farmers’c e r e a lyields is slowing. In both developed anddeveloping countries, the rate of increase incereal yields is slowing from the heyday ofthe Green Revolution in the 1970s (Figure9). This is due partly to reduced use of

Figure 6—Demand for cereals for humanfood and animal feed, 1995–2020

Figure 7—Increase in demand for majorcereals in developing countries,1995–2020

Figure 8—Sources of growth in cerealproduction, 1995–2020



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inputs like fertilizer, reflecting low and fallingcereal prices, and partly to low levels ofinvestment in agricultural research and tech-n o l o g y. Poorly functioning markets and lackof appropriate infrastructure and credit arealso contributing factors. Without substantialand sustained additional investment in agri-cultural research and associated factors, itwill become more and more difficult to main-tain, let alone increase, cereal yields in thelonger term. The gap in average cerealyields between the developed and develop-ing countries is slowly beginning to narrow,but it is widening considerably within thedeveloping world as Sub-Saharan A f r i c alags further and further behind the otherregions, particularly East Asia (Figure 10).

Food production will increase muchfaster in the developing world than in thedeveloped world. Between 1995 and 2020,cereal production in the developing world isprojected to increase by 51 percent from 9 6 5million tons to 1,460 million tons, whereas inthe developed world cereal production is pro-jected to increase by only 24 percent from812 million tons to 1,006 million tons. By2020, the developing world will be producing59 percent of the world’s cereals, up from 54percent in 1995. While both the developingand the developed world were each produc-

ing about the same volume of meat in 1995,about 99 million tons, the developing world isprojected to almost double its productionbetween 1995 and 2020 to 191 million tonswhile the developed world is projected toincrease its production by only 24 percent to123 million tons. By 2020, the developingworld will be producing 61 percent of thew o r l d ’s meat, up from 50 percent in 1995.

Nevertheless, net cereal imports bydeveloping countries will almost doubleto fill the gap between food productionand demand. Despite large increases,cereal production in the developing worldwill not keep pace with demand. IMPACTprojections suggest that the developingworld’s net cereal imports will increase by80 percent between 1995 and 2020 to reach191.6 million tons. With the exception ofLatin America, all major regions are forecastto increase their net cereal imports (Figure11). The massive increase forecast in SouthAsia’s net cereal imports from 0.3 milliontons in 1995 to 20.8 million tons in 2020 willarise because domestic production in theregion will not keep up with income andpopulation growth. In Pakistan, problemswith salinity and waterlogging in the maincereal production areas will limit crop yieldgrowth, while population growth will berapid. India is projected to shift from moder-ate cereal exports to moderate imports,

Figure 9—Annual growth in cereal yields,1967–82, 1982–94, and 1995–2020

Figure 10—Cereal yields, 1995–2020

Source: 1967–82 and 1982–94; Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database<http://faostat.fao.org>, accessed March 1997; 1995–2020:IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.


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owing to declining growth in cereal yieldsand relatively rapid income growth. Sub-Saharan Africa’s net cereal imports areexpected to remain low because of lack offoreign exchange and entrenched poverty.Wheat will constitute more than half of thedeveloping world’s net cereal imports, butthe share of maize is projected to rise from28 to 33 percent between 1995 and 2020(Figure 12). Trade in rice is forecast toremain small. About 12 percent of the devel-oping world’s cereal demand is projected tobe met through net imports from the devel-oped world, up from 10 percent in 1995.

Net meat imports by developingcountries will increase eightfold between1995 and 2020. Although trade in meatproducts is much smaller than in cereals,IMPACT projects that developing countrieswill increase their net meat imports from 0.8million tons to 6.6 million tons. The propor-tion of the developing world’s meat con-sumption that will be met through netimports is forecast to rise from 0.8 to 3.3percent. Latin America will remain a netexporter while South Asia will switch frombeing a net exporter to a net importer(Figure 13). East Asia is projected toincrease its net meat imports 28-fold, albeitfrom very low levels, primarily because ofthe massive increases expected in meatdemand in China. Poultry meat is expected

to constitute 55 percent of the developingworld’s net meat imports in 2020, followedby pigmeat at 28 percent and beef andsheepmeat at 9 percent each.

About 60 percent of the developingworld’s net cereal imports in 2020 willcome from the United States. With a 34percent increase projected in its net cerealexports between 1995 and 2020, the UnitedStates will continue to capture a large shareof the increased export market for cereals(Figure 14). However, with the projectedemergence of Eastern Europe and the for-mer Soviet Union as major net exporters ofcereals and the increase in net exports fore-

Figure 13—Meat trade of major developingregions, 1995 and 2020

Figure 12—Composition of net cereal importsof major developing regions, 1995 and 2020

Figure 11—Net cereal imports of majordeveloping regions, 1995 and 2020




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cast for the European Union and Australia,the market share of the United States in thenet cereal exports of the developed world isprojected to decline from 80 percent in 1995to 60 percent in 2020. The outcomes of theupcoming WTO negotiations and relatedchanges in domestic subsidies in the UnitedStates and the European Union, as well asdevelopments related to biotechnology andgenetically modified foods, may influencetrade patterns.

Food prices will remain steady or fallslightly between 1995 and 2020. Realworld prices of food are projected to decline,but at much slower rates than in the pasttwo decades (Figure 15). Cereal prices on

average are projected to drop by aboutUS$19 per metric ton by 2020 (about 17percent). The much slower decrease in foodprices, compared with past trends, is due tothe continued slowdown in crop yieldincreases, as well as strong growth indemand for meat in developing countries.Real cereal prices are expected to increaseslightly through the year 2010. It is only after2010 that the continued decline in the rateof population growth, combined with declin-ing income elasticities of demand for cere-als, will reduce demand growth enough tocause cereal prices to resume their long-term downward trend. By comparison,between 1982 and 1995, real world wheatprices dropped by 28 percent, rice prices by42 percent, and maize prices by 43 percent.

With increased production andimports, per capita food availability inthe developing world will increase.IMPACT projections indicate that about2,800 calories will be available per personper day in the developing world by 2020, an increase of about 9 percent over 1995.Increases in per capita food availability areexpected in all regions. China is projected toexperience the largest increase, and WestAsia and North Africa the smallest increase,albeit from already high levels (Figure 16).At less than 2,300 calories per person perday, average food availability in Sub-

Figure 16—Daily per capita calorie availability,1995 and 2020

Figure 14—Net trade in cereal of developedcountries, 1995 and 2020

Figure 15—World prices of majorcommodities, 1995–2020



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Saharan Africa will barely meet the require-ments for a healthy and productive life. And since available food will not be equallydistributed, many Africans will have lessthan the minimum required.

In the scenario described here, foodinsecurity and malnutrition will persist in2020 and beyond. Under the most likelyscenario, IMPA C T projects that 135 millionchildren under five years of age will be malnourished in 2020 (Figure 17).1 0 This rep-resents a decline of only 15 percent from 160million in 1995. Hence, one out of every fourchildren in developing countries will still bemalnourished in 2020 compared with everythird child in 1995. Child malnutrition isexpected to decline in all major developingregions except Sub-Saharan Africa, wherethe number of malnourished children is fore-cast to increase by about 30 percent to reach40 million by 2020. In South Asia, despite areduction in the number of malnourished children by 18 million, as many as two out offive children will still be malnourished in 2020(Figure 18). With more than 77 percent of thedeveloping world’s malnourished children in2020, up from 70 percent in 1995, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will remain“hot spots” of child malnutrition and foodi n s e c u r i t y. Many of the countries in these two regions are among the least-developedcountries in the world; they will require spe-

cial assistance to avert widespread hungerand malnutrition in the years to come.

In summary, the world food situation atthe threshold of the 21st century is mixed:astonishing advances in agricultural produc-tivity and human ingenuity have not yettranslated into a world free of hunger andmalnutrition. Dramatic changes in food pro-duction, processing, and trade in recentdecades have resulted in enough food tomeet the basic needs of each and everyperson in the world. Doubling grain produc-tion and tripling livestock production sincethe early 1960s has made available about2,700 calories per person per day. Yet, about820 million people lack access to sufficientfood to lead healthy and productive lives,11

and about 160 million children are seriouslyunderweight for their age.

This mixed outlook for the world food situation could be significantly worse withincreased policy complacency or greaterthan anticipated constraints in or deteriora-tion of key variables such as water avail-ability, land quality, human resourcedevelopment, and technological innova-tions. On the other hand, with concertedpolitical will and appropriate investments, a food-secure world is within reach.Ultimately, our behavior, priorities, and policies will determine the nature of theworld food situation in the 21st century.

Figure 17—Number of malnourished children, 1995 and 2020

Figure 18—Percentage of malnourishedchildren, 1995 and 2020


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EMERGING ISSUES

Described here are six critical recentdevelopments or emerging issues that

could significantly influence and alter theoutlook for the world food situation in theearly years of the next century.

New Evidence on Nutrition and Policy

New information confirms that while theglobal nutrition situation is improving, nutri-tional status is deteriorating in several coun-tries, particularly in Africa. Research showsthat about 33 percent of preschool childrenin the developing world will be stunted by2000.12 This is a significant decline from theprevalence rate of 47 percent just 20 yearsago. In terms of numbers, about 182 millionchildren are expected to be stunted in 2000,down from 221 million in 1980. Although theprevalence of stunted children hasdecreased and is expected to continue to doso beyond 2005 in the three major develop-ing regions (Figure 19), the number of stunt-ed children has increased significantly inAfrica, from less than 35 million in 1980 to

45 million in 1995, and is projected to reach49 million in 2005 (Figure 20). While thenumber of stunted children is higher thanthe number of malnourished children pre-sented in the previous section, Sub-SaharanAfrica is clearly a region of grave concernfor both.

New evidence shows that low birthweight continues to be a major contributorto child malnutrition and premature death.13

About one in four children born in 2000 isexpected to suffer from insufficient fetalgrowth and resulting low birth weight. Thepoor fetal growth and low birth weight arecaused by mother’s poor nutrition bothbefore conception and during pregnancy.

New information on consumption ofmicronutrients such as vitamins and miner-als confirms that anemia stemming fromi n s u fficient iron intake is widespread amongwomen, particularly pregnant women, andchildren (Figure 21). About 2 billion peoples u ffer from iron deficiency anemia.1 4

S i m i l a r l y, data from a large number of coun-tries show that vitamin A deficiencies arewidespread. Recently updated information

Figure 19—Estimated prevalence of stuntedchildren, 1995–2020

Figure 20—Estimated number of stuntedchildren, 1995–2020

Source: Subcommittee on Nutrition of the United NationsAdministrative Committee on Coordination/InternationalFood Policy Research Institute (SCN/IFPRI), “Fourth Reporton the World Nutrition Situation” (SCN/IFPRI, Washington,D.C., July 1999, photocopy).


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on iodine deficiency disorders (IDD) indi-cates that this is a public health problem in130 countries around the world, with morethan 2 billion people at risk of IDD and about740 million people affected with goiter.1 5

Researchers have been working to iden-tify which policy-related variables are likelyto help improve the nutritional status of chil-dren. New IFPRI research finds four criticalreasons why child nutrition improved in thedeveloping world between 1970 and 1995:improvements in women’s educationaccounted for almost 45 percent of the totalreduction in child malnutrition during thisperiod, followed by improvements in percapita food availability, improvements in thehealth environment, and improvements inwomen’s status relative to men (Figure 22).This research suggests that investments inthese four areas could significantly reducechild malnutrition but warns that theseinvestments will make little difference with-out improvements in national incomes anddemocracy.16 For Sub-Saharan Africa andSouth Asia—where the proportion and num-ber of malnourished children are highest—improving per capita food availability andwomen’s education offers the best hope for

reducing child malnutrition in the future, thestudy concludes.

Comparing African countries thatshowed improved child malnutrition withthose that showed worsening malnutritionleads to similar conclusions. The countrieswith improved nutritional status had largerincreases in the enrollment of women insecondary school, in per capita food con-sumption, and in per capita incomes.17

Furthermore, although women’s status dete-riorated in both groups, it deteriorated muchmore in countries where the nutritional sta-tus worsened. The data do not establishstrict causality, but this analysis providedstrong indications that women’s schooling,women’s status, per capita food intake, andper capita incomes are important determi-nants of child nutrition in Africa.

The presence of civil conflict increasesvulnerability to food insecurity, and viceversa.18 Recent information from the Foodand Agriculture Organization of the UnitedNations vividly demonstrates that the incidence of undernourishment or food insecurity is highest in countries with a highincidence of civil conflict. For example, 56percent of the countries where more than

Figure 21—Prevalence of anemia in pre-school children and pregnantwomen by region

Figure 22—Estimated contribution of majordeterminants to reductions in childmalnutrition, 1970–95


Source: L. Smith and L. Haddad, “Overcoming ChildMalnutrition in Developing Countries: Past Performance,Future Possibilities,” Draft 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture,and the Environment Discussion Paper (International FoodPolicy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., photocopy).Note: Malnourished children refers to underweight children.

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half of the population was undernourishedwere experiencing conflict while only 8 per-cent of the countries with the lowest inci-dence of undernourishment were mired inconflict (Figure 23). Similarly, child mortalityrates are highest in those countries where alarger proportion of the population is under-nourished; in other words, child mortalityrates decline as the prevalence of food insecurity declines.

The large numbers of malnourished children and the upward trend in Sub-Saharan Africa make it more urgent thanever for research and government policy toaddress this unfolding human tragedy. Aconference held at the International RiceResearch Institute (IRRI) on October 5–7,1999, explored opportunities for enhancingthe nutrition impact of the research conducted by the research centers of theConsultative Group on InternationalAgricultural Research (CGIAR) and nationalagricultural research systems. It is criticalthat every reasonable effort be made toassure that future CGIAR priorities reflectthe widespread human suffering and eco-nomic losses associated with malnutritionand the urgency of reducing and eventuallyeliminating such malnutrition.

Low Food Prices: What Will the Future Bring?

World market prices for wheat, maize, andrice, adjusted for inflation, are the lowest theyhave been in the last century (Figure 24).Prices fell dramatically in the 1980s,although some adjustments in the early1990s resulted in a relatively large priceincrease for wheat and maize during 1995and the first half of 1996. Since then, the realinternational prices for wheat, maize, andrice have once again dropped significantly tothe current very low levels. The severity ofthe price fluctuations since the mid-1990s isillustrated by the prices received by UnitedStates farmers (Figure 25). Maize and wheatprices increased about 70 and 50 percent,

respectively from April 1995 to April 1996. ByApril 1999, they had dropped to less thanhalf of the 1996 level. U.S. soybean pricesare expected to fall to their lowest level since1972/73, and the stock is likely to doublefrom last year.1 9 The fluctuation in the riceprice was considerably less.

Why these severe price fluctuations? As further discussed elsewhere,20 a numberof factors coincided in 1995 to raise prices:adverse weather conditions in Canada and

Figure 23—Food security, civil conflicts, andchild mortality, 1990–96

Figure 24—Real export prices for wheat,maize, and rice in selected years,1 9 1 0 – 1 9 9 9

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,Assessment of the World Food Security Situation, Report No.CFS:99/2 of the 25th Session of the Committee on World FoodSecurity, Rome, May 31–June 2 (Rome: FAO, 1999).Note: Countries grouped by prevalence of undernourishment.

Source: D. Gale Johnson, “The Growth of Demand Will LimitOutput Growth for Food over the Next Quarter Century,” P N A SOnline 96 (11, 1999): 5915-5920; USDA, <http://www.usda.gov>(accessed August 1999); U.S. Department of Labor,<http://www.dol.gov> (accessed August 1999); World Bank,<http://www.worldbank.org> (accessed August 1999).

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the United States, drought and civil conflictin Sub-Saharan Africa, stagnating grainyields in Asia, set-aside programs andreduced subsidies in the European Union,and decreased food production in the former Soviet Union and China. Some countries buffered both consumers andfarmers from the higher grain prices, but in countries that did not, farmers expandedthe area of land cultivated with grain. World-wide, the wheat and coarse grain areaincreased by 5 and 3 percent, respectively,between 1995/96 and 1996/97. As pricesbegan to drop, farmers cut back area, and itis expected that by 1999/2000, the wheatarea will be back to the 1995/96 level, whilethe coarse grain area will be 3 percentbelow the 1995/96 level (Figure 26). Thearea adjustments in the world’s largest grainexporter, the United States, were consider-ably greater: U.S. farmers increased thewheat area by close to 9 percent between1995/96 and 1996/97 and cut it back by 16percent during the subsequent three years.The maize area was increased by 11 per-cent and has stayed at that level since1996/97.

Despite declines in the area planted towheat and maize, yield increases due to past investments in improved technologyhave kept total production on the rise since1996/97. Thus, farmers are expected to pro-

duce 7 percent more wheat in 1999/2000than they did in 1995/96, on the sameamount of land. Similarly, although the global maize area is expected to fall by 3 per-cent from its 1995/96 level, global productionis expected to be 10 percent higher. U.S.maize production is expected to be 30 per-cent larger in 1999/2000 than it was in1996/97. The increase in global maize pro-duction is influenced not only by productivity-increasing technologies but also by the largershare of the global maize area occupied bythe United States (where yields are higher).

So why have grain prices fallen soseverely since mid-1996? The answercomes straight from basic economics: Theproduction increases exceeded demand atexisting prices. Even after it became obvi-ous that the high prices of early to mid-1996could not be maintained, farmers did not cutarea planted sufficiently to compensate forthe long-term trend in productivity increase.Favorable weather in major producing areasalso contributed to production increases.While production was rising, demand wasfalling. As a result of their economic crisis,Asian countries sharply reduced theirimports of livestock products and grain, anda deepening crisis in the former SovietUnion reduced imports of grain and live-stock products by that region. Chinaswitched from being a major net grain

Figure 26—World area and production forwheat and coarse grains,1 9 9 5 – 2 0 0 0

Figure 25—Average real prices received byU.S. farmers, 1995–99

Source: IFPRI calculations from U.S. Departments of Agricultureand Labor data.Note: For 1995–97, preliminary April averages are used. For1998–99, actual April averages are used.

Source: United States Department of Agriculture, A g r i c u l t u r a lOutlook, August, Publication No. AGO-263 (Washington, D.C.:Economic Research Service, USDA, 1999). Note: Coarse grains include maize.

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importer in 1995–96 to being a net exporterin 1997–98.

As grain prices fell, the low world grainstock of 1996 was rebuilt and reached 337million tons in 1999, corresponding to 17.9percent of expected annual consumption(Figure 27). The stock adjustments inresponse to the high prices in 1995–96 andthe falling prices since then occurred pri-marily in the major exporting countries.

What does the future hold? There is littledoubt that the current maize and wheatprices are below the long-term trend. It isdifficult to predict how long it will take toreturn to the trend. Although increased cli-matic variations may cause larger produc-tion fluctuations in the future, current largegrain stocks and the continued productivityincreases make it difficult to believe thatprices will spike significantly in the next fewyears. However, the current low grain pricesare causing large income losses amongfarmers in countries where internationalprices are transmitted to them. This is thecase in the United States and most othertraditional grain exporters. Further cuts inarea planted to wheat and maize, along withreduced fertilizer use, is likely. Additionaldecreases in grain production could result ifthe European Union and the United Statesdecide to reintroduce or expand area set-aside programs. A return to rapid economicgrowth in Asia would increase grain andlivestock consumption and imports, as wouldimprovements in the economic situation inthe former Soviet Union. Depending on howthese factors play out, and barring unprece-dented bad weather in the major producingareas, it seems reasonable to expect thatreal grain prices will stay below the trend forat least the next couple of years.

Trade Negotiations: Preparing for the Next WTO Round

Recent analyses reported in various IFPRIpublications, including the annual report anda collection of 2020 policy briefs, indicate

that in the upcoming WTO round of agricul-tural trade negotiations, expected to beginin November 1999, poor countries and poorpeople risk losing out on the economic bene-fits embodied in further trade liberalization.2 1

To gain from trade talks, developing coun-tries must participate effectively in the n e g otiations. Among other things, developingcountries should pursue better access tomarkets in industrial countries for their agricultural commodities. However, withoutappropriate domestic economic and agricul-tural policies, developing countries in generaland poor people in particular will not be ableto capture fully the potential economic bene-fits from international trade liberalization.

According to FAO, the most frequentproblems confronted by developing countriesin their participation in the debate on interna-tional agreements related to agriculture andtrade are inadequate administrative and legal capacity to meet WTO requirements;i n s u fficient national policy formulation capacity;limited scientific, administrative, and infra-structure capability to deal with food standards;and lack of plant variety protection.2 2

As shown in Figure 28, the African shareof world agricultural trade continues todecline rapidly. While it is too early to esti-mate the impact of the Uruguay Round on

Figure 27—World cereal stock carryover,1 9 9 3 – 2 0 0 0

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,<http://faostat.fao.org> (accessed August 1999).aArgentina, Australia, Canada, European Union, and the UnitedS t a t e s .

bE s t i m a t e d .cF o r e c a s t .

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Africa, research results indicate that theround will have adverse economic effectsfor most of the countries in Sub-SaharanAfrica. The negative effects can be largeand will be worse in countries that fail toundertake the necessary domestic policyreforms. Without such reforms, these coun-tries are less able to respond effectively toopportunities arising from more liberalizedagricultural trade. Failure to participate asthe rest of the world moves toward a moreliberalized trade regime may isolate Africafrom the mainstream world economy.

The only real option for African andother low-income developing countries is totry to strengthen their bargaining positionand pursue a set of key goals for bothdomestic policies and international tradearrangements. The most important issuesinclude the following:

• Continue to pursue domestic policyreforms that remove distortions adverseto small farmers and the poor while facil-itating access to the benefits from moreopen trade;

• Gain better access to industrial-countrymarkets, particularly free entry for goodsfrom the least-developed countries andthe elimination of tariff escalation;

• Eliminate export subsidies in industrialcountries and export taxes and controls

that exacerbate price fluctuations inworld markets;

• Obtain technical assistance and finan-cial support from industrial countries todevelop the agricultural sectors in low-income developing countries;

• Continue a strong sanitary and phyto-sanitary framework domestically andseek technical support to help produceat the standards expected in developed-country markets; and

• Gain adequate levels of food aid target-ed to poor groups, in ways that do notdisplace domestic production.23

The Potential of AgroecologicalApproaches

Although the Green Revolution technologieshave been responsible for enormous pro-ductivity increases among small-scale farm-ers in Asia, Latin America, and a fewcountries of Sub-Saharan Africa, manyfarmers have been bypassed. The desire to find ways of assisting these farmers,combined with concerns about excessivedependence on external inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation waterembodied in the Green Revolution technolo-gies, has stimulated interest in alternative orcomplementary approaches, including theso-called “agroecological approach.”

The agroecological approach aims toreduce the amount of external inputs thatfarmers have to use. Instead, it relies heavilyon available farm labor and organic material,as well as on improved knowledge and farmmanagement. Thus, while the agroecologicalapproach needs more external inputs in thearea of knowledge and management, physi-cal external inputs such as fertilizers, pesti-cides, and irrigation water are reduced. Alarge number of nongovernmental organiza-tions have dedicated themselves to providingsuch knowledge inputs in direct collaborationwith farmers and farmer representatives. T h eagroecological approach also focuses onfarm-level research and experimentation

Figure 28—African share of world agriculturalt r a d e

Source: N. Mukherjee and R. L. Harris, “Getting Ready for theMillennium Round Trade Negotiations: African Perspective,” 2020Vision Focus 1, Brief 4 (Washington, D.C.: International FoodPolicy Research Institute, 1999).

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rather than dependence on the more formalagricultural research structures. Use of local-ly available materials such as crop residues,farm manure, and compost to improve soilfertility is an important part of the agro-ecological approach, as is integrated pestmanagement. While the definition of theagroecological approach does not excludethe use of chemical fertilizers and chemicalpesticides, it argues that such chemicalinputs should be used only as a last resort.

Agroecological approaches tend to bevery labor demanding, and the returns tolabor from many agroecological activitiestend to be low. Therefore, as agriculturaldevelopment increases the opportunity costof labor, agroecological approaches willneed to adjust to reduce labor requirements.This will probably mean moving away fromsuch activities as mulching and compostingtoward chemical fertilizers and other inputsthat enhance labor productivity. Manyagroecological approaches, such as theproduction of green manure, tend to be land using. While this may be appropriate in certain communities where land is abun-dant, it may be inappropriate in areas withsevere land scarcity.

Low and declining soil fertility is a seri-ous problem in many low-income countries,including most of Africa. Figure 29 showsthe average annual nutrient depletion inAfrica during the early to mid-1990s. About86 percent of the countries in Africa shownegative balances of nutrients greater than30 kilograms of NPK per hectare per year.The cost of eliminating this nutrient deple-tion by using fertilizer would amount toUS$1.5 billion per year.24 Although improvedsoil conservation measures, recycling ofcrop residues, better rotation schemes, anduse of nitrogen-fixing legumes as well asfarm manure are important to deal with soilfertility problems, expanded use of chemicalfertilizers will be necessary to effectivelysolve the soil fertility problem in most of thelow-income countries.

The current average consumption ofchemical fertilizers in Africa is 10–15 kilo-

grams per hectare, and its use is heavilyconcentrated on a small number of exportcrops. Failure to combine expanded use ofchemical fertilizers with agroecologicalmethods is likely to result in further declinesin soil fertility and crop yields to the detri-ment of the livelihoods of small-scale farm-ers in Africa. Furthermore, opportunities forusing modern biotechnology to developcereal varieties that could fix nitrogen fromthe air and extract phosphorus from acidsoils should be explored.

One of the great strengths of the agroecological approach is that it pro-motes sustainable management of naturalresources and active participation by farmers in identifying problems as well asdesigning and implementing appropriatesolutions at the farm and community levels.Such participatory technology developmentcan be extremely effective in finding themost appropriate solutions to productionproblems.

Figure 29—Average annual nutrient depletion(NPK) in Africa, 1993–95

Source: J. Henao and C. Baanante, “Nutrient Depletion in theAgricultural Soils of Africa,” 2020 Vision Brief 62 (Washington, D.C.:International Food Policy Research Institute, 1999).

26

A large number of projects and initia-tives have successfully applied agroeco-logical approaches to expand yields andimprove the livelihoods of farm families.25

Illustrations from more than 30 African,Asian, and Latin American countries demon-strate the tremendous potential of agroeco-logical approaches to promote sustainableproductivity increases in small-scale agricul-ture. While some approaches will have tochange in response to increasing agricultur-al development and changes in farmerincomes and opportunity costs, suchchanges should come about easily as aresult of farmer participation and leadership.Therefore, it is critical that farmers are, infact, put in decisionmaking roles and thatthey are informed about their options forimproving productivity, reducing risks, andincreasing the well-being of the farm family.Such options should include access toexternal inputs and appropriate technolo-gies to complement agroecologicalapproaches. Farmers should not be madeto suffer from the current debate amongprofessionals over which approach is themost appropriate. Farmers should be ableto put together the most appropriate compo-nents from each of the various “approaches”in order to develop their own solutions.Attempts to persuade farmers to pursue oneapproach over another, rather than combin-ing the most appropriate elements of thevarious approaches, is not in their best interest. For example, combining certainagroecological approaches with access tochemical fertilizers to supplement availableorganic matter and access to improvedseeds containing characteristics such asdrought tolerance and resistance to certainpests is likely to be the most appropriateway to assist certain small-scale farmers.Although on-farm experimentation should be an important part of the overall agri-cultural research effort, both the public- and the private-sector agricultural researchsystems have a role in developing tech-nology that would be of interest to small-scale farmers.

The Potential of Modern Biotechnology

The extent to which modern biotechnologywill contribute to the achievement of foodsecurity for all is still an open question.While molecular biology-based science ismoving at great speed, its application toagriculture has been mostly limited to solving problems facing farmers in theindustrial countries and large farmers in a few developing countries. Most of thecommercialization of transgenic seed hasoccurred for soybeans, maize, and cotton inthe United States, and to a lesser extent inArgentina, Canada, Mexico, China, andSouth Africa (Figure 30).

Strong opposition to genetically modifiedfood (GM food) in the European Union hasresulted in severe restrictions for modernbiotechnology for agriculture. The oppositionis driven in part by the perceived lack of con-sumer benefits of the transgenic foods avail-able to date, uncertainty about possiblenegative health and environmental eff e c t s ,and a widespread perception that a few largecorporations will be the primary beneficiariesof modern biotechnology for agriculture.

Consumers, who in most Europeancountries outnumber farmers by a factor ofmore than 20, see few if any benefits orpotential benefits from GM foods. The bene-fits from the current generation of transgeniccrops, which are resistant to herbicides and

Figure 30—Area of transgenic crops, 1998

Source: C. James, Global Review of Commercialized TransgenicCrops: 1998, ISAAA Brief 8 (Ithaca, N.Y., U.S.A.: InternationalService for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, 1998).

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certain pests, accrue primarily to farmers.Consumer benefits might include reducedpesticide residues in the food as chemicalpesticides are replaced by pest-resistantvarieties. Even when biotechnology helpslower the unit costs of production, existingEU price and subsidy policies may preventconsumers from seeing lower prices. Even ifthey did, food occupies a small share of theconsumer budget, and price falls would notbe of great importance to European con-sumers. At the same time, an effective cam-paign by advocacy groups in some EUcountries, fueled in large measure by thenews media, has emphasized the potentialrisks associated with GM foods. Eventhough the evidence of these risks is weak,the uncertainty in the minds of many is real.Given that the expected benefits are small,opposition is perfectly reasonable.

The situation is very different for poorpeople in the developing countries. First,60–70 percent of the poor live in rural areasand depend directly or indirectly on produc-tivity increases in agriculture to get out ofp o v e r t y. Biotechnology, if appropriatelyfocused on solving small farmers’ p r o b l e m s ,together with traditional research methods,better agronomic practices, and better mar-kets and policies, may help these farmers toincrease productivity. Second, biotechnologymay help farmers reduce production risks bymaking available crop varieties that aredrought tolerant, pest resistant, and able tocapture nitrogen from the air. Third, biotech-nology to increase the content of iron or vitamin A or to make other nutritionalimprovements in foods may address seriousand widespread nutritional problems amongthe poor in developing countries. Fourth,increased productivity will, in most develop-ing countries, result in both higher incomesfor small farmers and lower food prices. T h i sis important for the poor, who typically spend50 percent or more of their incomes on food.

Although much of the past molecularbiology-based research should be useful asa starting point for the development ofbiotechnology suited for small farmers in

developing countries, very little adaptiveresearch has been undertaken. Except for afew of the larger or better-off countries suchas Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, andSouth Africa, most of the developing coun-tries are unable or unlikely to mount effec-tive agricultural biotechnology researchprograms without support or partnershipsfrom outside the country. The CGIAR cen-ters are well placed to bridge the gapbetween biotechnology research in industri-al countries and the needs of the smallfarmers in developing countries, but only asmall share of their budget is spent on suchadaptive research. The large life-sciencecorporations, which are responsible for mostof the applied agricultural biotechnologyresearch to date, focus on industrial-countryagriculture, where they can expect to recu-perate the costs of the research. With someexceptions, small farmers in developingcountries do not offer a profitable market atthis time. Yet, the social benefits of develop-ing and applying appropriate biotechnologyfor small farmers are likely to be high. Theyinclude reduced risks from biotic and abioticfactors, increased yields, foods that aremore nutritious and easier to store, develop-ment of edible vaccines in staple foods, andprotection of the environment throughreduced use of fertilizers and pesticides andreduced pressure on land currently notunder cultivation. As usual, in cases wherethe private sector cannot capture largesocial benefits, the public sector needs toeither invest or introduce policies that willassure that enough of the social benefitscan be captured by the private sector towarrant investment.

Delivering the potential benefits of agri-cultural research in general and biotechnol-ogy in particular to small farmers and poorconsumers in developing countries willrequire a combination of expanded publicinvestment by developing countries and theCGIAR as well as public-private partner-ships. Governments in industrial and devel-oping countries also have an important roleto play in regulating the biotechnology

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industry. They must develop effectivebiosafety regulations, create and enforceappropriate intellectual property rights legis-lation, and enforce antitrust legislation tocounter excessive concentration in the lifescience and seed industry. Relevant infor-mation on these issues must be made avail-able to the public. If these steps are nottaken, modern biotechnology will bypass thepoor; opportunities for reducing poverty,food insecurity, and child malnutrition willnot become reality; and the productivity gapbetween developing and industrial coun-tries’ agriculture will widen. A fuller discus-sion of biotechnology for developingcountries is forthcoming from IFPRI.26

Information Technology and PrecisionFarming: Relevance for Small Farmers

The revolutionary developments in informa-tion and communication technology (ICT)during the last few years have resulted indramatic falls in the cost of processing andtransmitting information.27 The price ofbandwidth has been dropping by a factor of100 every 10 years,28 and digitalization andcompression have reduced the amount ofbandwidth needed for both wired and wire-less telecommunications.29 The widespreadbelief that modern information and commu-nication technology is relevant only for richcountries and nonpoor people is not onlyincorrect, but dangerous, because it maybecome a self-fulfilling prophecy. To viewICT as irrelevant for poor people will furtherexclude them from the mainstream of soci-ety, increase the gap between poor andnonpoor, and forgo opportunities for alleviat-ing poverty. It will also expand the gapbetween rich and poor nations. ICT, likeelectricity, is a key generic technology. Itsutility for the poor will be determined by howit is used and the related institutions andpolicies, not by the nature of the technologyas such.

ICT offers tremendous opportunities for reducing rural poverty in developing

countries. Traditional information and communication technologies, such as wiredtelephones, fail to reach a large share of therural poor partly because the wires areeither not in place or not maintained inmany rural areas and partly because exist-ing institutions and rationing systems favorthe nonpoor. Satellite-based cell phonesand internet access can bypass therationing system and, possibly, the existingantipoor institutions. At the same time, dramatic decreases in the cost of solar panels and wind energy make it feasible forthe rural poor to power ICT, including cellphones, internet access, radio, and television, with solar and wind energy. The massive capital investments in, forexample, electrical and telephone wiringmay no longer be needed.

Access to ICT and energy opens up newopportunities for education, primary healthcare, and agricultural extension as well asfor conveying information on markets, trans-port options, road conditions, employmentopportunities, and other issues important tothe rural poor. It will help not only farmersbut also traders and rural wage laborers.

Access to ICT by rural people in devel-oping countries is currently constrained byhigh costs and lack of appropriate institu-tions and policies. Where facilitating institu-tions have been developed, collective use of ICT, such as cell phones, internet, and e-mail, at the village level is becoming economically feasible as costs continue tofall. The Grameen Bank has initiated a community-based cell phone project in ruralareas of Bangladesh, and village kiosks,cybercafes, and individual low-income people are offering ICT-based services inseveral African countries.30 Farmers in partsof Africa are beginning to use ICT to getmarket information and thereby improve thecompetition in agricultural input and outputmarkets. Almost all African countries arenow connected to the internet, but access in rural areas is still limited.

Access to global information systems(GIS), global positioning systems (GPS),

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and remote sensing is contributing toincreasing application of precision farmingin the United States and Europe. Precisionfarming helps farmers to use inputs such asfertilizers, pesticides, and water more effi-ciently. It reduces waste, use of chemicals,runoff, and pollution of land and water.Thus, it contributes to lower unit costs ofproduction, more sustainable managementof natural resources, and reduced healthrisks associated with agricultural production.

Precision farming as practiced in theUnited States and Europe is inappropriatefor small farmers in developing countriesbecause it relies on capital-intensive equip-

ment used on large farms, but the principleis highly applicable. In fact, it should be anintegral part of sustainable farming practicesfor small farmers because it increases theefficiency of plant nutrients and other inputs,while protecting the environment and help-ing to assure sustainable management ofnatural resources. Like agroecologicalapproaches, it is knowledge and manage-ment intensive. If appropriate small-scaleand inexpensive equipment were devel-oped, GIS, GPS, and remote sensing couldhelp small farmers get the information theyneed to apply the principles of precisionfarming.

CONCLUSIONS

IFPRI projections suggest that, under themost likely scenario, food insecurity and

child malnutrition will remain widespread in2020. Many millions of people will sufferfrom hunger and its debilitating conse-quences. This does not have to be so. If we can mobilize the revolutionary devel-opments in information technology andbiotechnology for the benefit of the poor andfood-insecure in developing countries; if wecan renew our investments in the factorsessential for agricultural growth, includingagricultural research, human resourcedevelopment, and strengthened agroeco-logical approaches; if we can harness thepolitical will to adopt sound policies for

eradicating poverty, fostering food security,and protecting natural resources; and if wecan alter our behaviors and priorities toassure sustainable development, a food-secure world—a world in which every per-son is assured of access at all times to thefood required to lead healthy and productivelives—will be within our reach. This is not an insurmountable task. We have alreadymade great strides in reducing the burden offood insecurity around the world. Buildingon the progress made and taking theactions described here should enable us tofinally realize a food-secure world in the 21st century.

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1 . P. Pinstrup-Andersen, R. Pandya-Lorch, and M. W. Rosegrant, The World Food Situation:Recent Developments, Emerging Issues, and Long-Term Prospects, 2020 Vision FoodPolicy Report (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1997).

2 . I M PA C T is a global food model covering 37 countries and country groups and 18 majoragricultural commodities. The base data used in the current version are averages of the1994–96 annual data from the statistical database of the Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations. Since each of the 37 country groups produces and/or consumes atleast some of each commodity, thousands of supply and demand parameters are specified(income, price, and cross-price elasticities of demand; production parameters including croparea and yield growth trends; price response parameters; trade distribution parameters; andso forth). Parameter estimates are drawn from econometric analysis, assessment of pastand changing trends, expert judgments, and synthesis of the existing literature. The modelhas been developed and periodically updated by Mark W. Rosegrant and his colleagues.Model information is available in M. W. Rosegrant, M. Agcaoili-Sombilla, and N. D. Perez,Global Food Projections to 2020: Implications for Investment, 2020 Vision for Food,Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 5 (Washington, D.C.: International FoodPolicy Research Institute, 1995); M. W. Rosegrant, M. A. Sombilla, R. V. Gerpacio, and C.R i n g l e r, “Global Food Markets and U.S. Exports in the Twenty-First Century,” paperpresented at the Illinois World Food and Sustainable Agriculture Program conference“Meeting the Demand for Food in the Twenty-first Century: Challenges and Opportunities forIllinois Agriculture,” Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, U.S.A., May 27, 1997; and M. W. Rosegrantand C. Ringler, “Asian Economic Crisis and the Long-Term Global Food Situation,” paperprepared for the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium symposium “PolicyReform, Market Stability, and Food Security,” Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.A., June 26–27,1998. Projections from the July 1999 version of the model are reported in this paper.

3. The authors would like to thank Julie Babinard for her thorough review of this section.

4. The developing world is primarily composed of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), and LatinAmerica and the Caribbean.

5. United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision (New York: UN, 1999).

6. United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1996 Revision (New York: UN, 1996).

7. In the IMPACT simulations, Sub-Saharan Africa does not include South Africa.

8. G. S. Bhalla, P. Hazell, and J. Kerr, “Prospects for Balancing Cereal Needs in India to2020,” Draft 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper(International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., photocopy).

9. C. Delgado, M. Rosegrant, H. Steinfeld, S. Ehui, and C. Courbois, Livestock to 2020: TheNext Food Revolution, 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment DiscussionPaper 28 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1999).

10. Malnourished children have a very low weight for their age, below –2 standard deviationsof the median value of the National Center for Health Statistics/World Health Organizationinternational growth reference. Subcommittee on Nutrition of the United NationsAdministrative Committee on Coordination/International Food Policy Research Institute

NOTES

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(SCN/IFPRI), “Fourth Report on the World Nutrition Situation” (SCN/IFPRI, Washington,D.C., 1999, photocopy).

11. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Food, Agriculture, and FoodSecurity: Developments since the World Food Conference and Prospects, World FoodSummit Technical Background Document 1 (Rome, FAO, 1996); FAO, The State of Foodand Agriculture (Rome, FAO, 1998).

12. Stunted children have a very low height given their age, below –2 standard deviations ofthe median value of the National Center for Health Statistics/World Health Organizationinternational growth reference. SCN/IFPRI, “Fourth Report on the World NutritionSituation.”

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. World Health Organization, Progress towards the Elimination of Iodine DeficiencyDisorders (IDD) (Geneva: Department of Nutrition for Development and Health, WHO,1999).

16. L. Smith and L. Haddad, “Overcoming Child Malnutrition in Developing Countries: PastPerformance, Future Possibilities,” Draft 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and theEnvironment Discussion Paper (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy ResearchInstitute, photocopy).

17. SCN/IFPRI, “Fourth Report on the World Nutrition Situation.”

18. E. Messer, M. J. Cohen, and J. D’Costa, Food from Peace: Breaking the Links betweenConflict and Hunger, 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment DiscussionPaper 24 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1998).

19. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Outlook, September (Washington, D.C.:Economic Research Service, USDA, 1999).

20. P. Pinstrup-Andersen and J. L. Garrett, “Rising Food Prices and Falling Grain Stocks:Short-Run Blips or New Trends?” 2020 Vision Brief 30 (Washington, D.C.: InternationalFood Policy Research Institute, 1996).

21. E. Díaz-Bonilla and S. Robinson, “Essay: Globalization, Trade Reform, and the DevelopingCountries,” IFPRI 1998 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute,1999); and E. Díaz-Bonilla and S. Robinson, eds., Getting Ready for the Millennium RoundTrade Negotiations, 2020 Vision Focus 1 (Washington, D.C.: International Food PolicyResearch Institute, 1999).

22. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Report on Technical AssistanceRelated to the Uruguay Round,” Committee on Commodity Problems, 62nd session,January 12–15, 1999 (Rome: FAO, 1999).

23. N. Mukherjee and R. L. Harris, “Getting Ready for the Millennium Round TradeNegotiations: African Perspective,” 2020 Vision Focus 1, Brief 4 (Washington, D.C.:International Food Policy Research Institute, 1999).

24. J. Henao and C. Baanante, “Nutrient Depletion in the Agricultural Soils of Africa,” 2020Vision Brief 62 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1999).

25. These were identified and discussed at a recent conference on “Sustainable Agriculture:Evaluation of New Paradigms and Old Practices,” sponsored by the Cornell InternationalInstitute for Food, Agriculture, and Development, Bellagio, Italy, April 26–30, 1999.

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26. G. J. Persley, ed., Biotechnology for Developing-Country Agriculture: Problems andOpportunities, 2020 Vision Focus 2 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy ResearchInstitute, 1999).

27. E. A. Chaparro, “Investigating the Digital World,” in Information and CommunicationTechnology and Development, RAWOO Lectures and Seminar Publication No. 18 (The Hague: Netherlands Development Assistance Research Council, 1998).

28. J. van Till, “Information and Communication Technology: How Does It Help?” in Informationand Communication Technology and Development, RAWOO Lectures and SeminarPublication No. 18 (The Hague: Netherlands Development Assistance Research Council,1998).

29. Chaparro, “Investigating the Digital World.”

30. M. Jensen, “Internet Opens New Markets for Africa: Many Practical Benefits for Business,Farming, Health, and Education,” Africa Recovery 12 (3, December 1998): 6–7.

Per Pinstrup-Andersen is director general of IFPRI. Rajul Pandya-Lorch is head of IFPRI’s 2020Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment initiative. Mark W. Rosegrant is leader of theI M PA C T project and a research fellow in IFPRI’s Environment and Production Technology Division.

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