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1/37www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers

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GIGA Research Programme:

Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations___________________________

Measuring Geopolitical Power in India:

A Review of the National Security Index (NSI)

Karl Hwang

No 136 May 2010

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2/37

GIGAWP136/2010

GIGAWorkingPapers

EditedbytheGIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudiesLeibnizInstitutfrGlobaleundRegionaleStudien

TheGIGAWorkingPapers series serves todisseminate the research results ofwork inprogressprior topublication inorder toencourage theexchangeof ideasandacademicdebate.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.InclusionofapaperintheGIGAWorkingPapersseriesdoesnotconstitutepublicationandshouldnotlimitpublicationinanyothervenue.Copyrightremainswiththeauthors.Whenworkingpapersareeventuallyacceptedbyorpublishedinajournalorbook,thecorrectcitationreferenceand,ifpossible,thecorrespondinglinkwill thenbe includedon theGIGAWorkingPaperswebsiteat.

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EditoroftheGIGAWorkingPapersseries:BertHoffmannCopyrightforthisissue:KarlHwang

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AllGIGAWorkingPapersareavailableonlineandfreeofchargeonthewebsite.Foranyrequestspleasecontact:Email:[email protected]:++49(0)40 42825 548

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GIGAWP136/2010

MeasuringGeopoliticalPowerinIndia:

A

Review

of

the

National

Security

Index

(NSI)

Abstract

ThisreviewexamineshowIndiaperceivesitsownrisetopowerbyundertakingadetailed

analysisoftheIndianNationalSecurityIndex(NSI)fortheperiodfrom2003to2008.Like

otherpowerformulas,theNSIincludesvariousindicatorsofpower,thoughitisuniquely

Indian in that it initially emphasized human development and later included ecology

basedonaholistichumansecurityparadigm.Theanalysisdemonstratesthatthisholisticapproachhasnowbeenabandonedinfavorofamoreconventionalone,andthatthetech

nical formulas and theoretical concepts of the NSI exhibit various inconsistencies and

problems. Inparticular, one can recognize the absoluteneed for aunified standard for

handlingvariablesintheconstructionofcompositeindexesingeneral.

Keywords: India,geopolitics,statistics,powerformula,powerindex,humansecurity

Karl

Hwang

isaPh.D.studentattheGIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudiesandtheUni

versityofHamburg.

Contact: [email protected]

Website: http://conducator.jimdo.com/

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4/37

GIGAWP136/2010

Zusammenfassung

Das

Messen

geopolitischer

Macht

in

Indien:

Eine

kritische

Analyse

des

Nationalen

Sicherheitsindexes

(NSI)

DieseStudieuntersuchtdurcheinedetaillierteAnalysedesNationalenSicherheitsindexes

(NSI)frdenZeitraumderJahre2003bis2008,wieIndiensichselbstwahrnimmt.DerNSI

bestehtwieandereMachtformelnauchausverschiedenenIndikatorenfrMacht,doch

isterspezifischindischinsofern,alserseinenSchwerpunktursprnglichaufdiemensch

licheEntwicklunglegteunderstspterdiekologieaufGrundlageeinesganzheitlichenParadigmas der menschlichen Sicherheit mit einbezog. Die Analyse zeigt, dass dieser

ganzheitlicheAnsatzzugunsteneineseherkonventionellenWegesaufgegebenwurdeund

dassdie technischenFormelnund theoretischenKonzeptedesNSIverschiedeneWider

sprcheundProblemeaufzeigen.Allgemein istzuerkennen,dasseineinheitlicherStan

dard imUmgangmit denVariablenbeiderZusammensetzung von Indizesunbedingt

notwendigist.

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MeasuringGeopoliticalPowerinIndia:

AReviewoftheNationalSecurityIndex(NSI)

KarlHwang

ArticleOutline

1 Introduction

2 GeopoliticalChallengesinIndiasQuestforGreatpowerStatus

3 TheRoleofPowerinKautilyasArthashastra

4

TheInstitutional

Background

of

the

NSI

5 PossibleInspirationsbehindtheNSI

6 FromNationalSecuritytoHumanSecurity

7 TheHumanDevelopmentIndexandtheEnvironmentalVulnerabilityIndex

8 TheLackofaUnifiedStandardintheCalculationoftheNSI

9 The Trend in the Composition of the NSI Towards the Abandonment of Human

Security

10 ReceptionandCritiquesoftheNSI

11 Conclusion

1 Introduction

Powerindexesdontmeasurepowerassuch;rather,theymeasurepowerasitisperceivedby

theirdesigners.MichaelPillsbury undertook a groundbreaking study onChinesepower

formulasin2000.Hejustifiedhisundertakingbyemphasizingthatitisnecessarytoappreci

ateChineseviewsasuniqueandnotmerelyasamirrorimageofAmericanviews(Pills

bury2000:xv).InordertodosoPillsburyusedtheanalogyofstudiesontheSovietUnion

andquotedAndrewMarshall,whohasbeendirectoroftheOfficeofNetAssessmentinthe

USDepartmentofDefensesince1973:

Sovietcalculationsarelikelytomakedifferentassumptionsaboutscenariosandobjec

tives []performdifferent calculations,usedifferentmeasuresofeffectiveness, and

perhapsusedifferentassessmentprocessesandmethods.TheresultisthatSovietas

sessmentsmay substantiallydiffer fromAmericanassessments. (Marshall,quoted in

Pillsbury2000:xv)

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6 KarlHwang:MeasuringGeopoliticalPowerinIndia

TheAmericaninternationalrelations(IR)theoriesneorealismandoffensiverealismassume

thatthereisauniversalrationalitybehindstatesquestforpower;thetheoriesdifferonlyin

theirapproachestoriskbehavior(seeMearsheimer:1722).Incontrast,advocatesofstrategic

culturepoint

out

that

elites

conditioned

by

different

cultural

environments

may

make

differ

entchoiceswhenplacedinsimilarsituations(Johnston1995:35,38).Rankedpreferencesare

onemethodfordeterminingstrategicculture(Johnston1995:48).Power indexesaregener

ally amore tangible sourceof informationbecause thepreferences are alreadyquantified

andweighted;byknowingthedetailsofpowerformulasonemaythusinfernationalpriori

tiesandpossiblymakepredictionsregardingnationalstrategy.

Powerformulaspartlyexpresstheidiosyncraticviewsoftheirdesigners,partlyexpress

theculturallybasedpreferencesandprioritiesoftheirrespectivesociety,andpartlyexpress

theuniversalpursuitofpowerintheformofcapabilityandresources.Whilepowerformulas

rarelycomealongwithexplicitlynewperspectivesanddefinitions, theymaycontainnew

variablesandnewmethodsofcalculation,whichappear tobe themost importantaspects

whenstudyingthevariouspowerindexes.

ItcanbeassumedthatanynonomniscientBeing(i.e.anyfrailhumanbeing)proba

blycanneverapprehendthetrueobjectivefact(Kent1951:42),butsubjectivitymayindeed

beusefulincontributingnewideasfrompreviouslyignoredperspectives.TheNationalSe

curityIndex(NSI),whichwasdevelopedbytheIndianNationalSecurityCouncilSecretariat

in2002,hasanIndianflavor:itinitiallyemphasizedhumandevelopmentandlaterincluded

ecology,asIndiawherethepopulationdensityishigherthaninJapanisknownformass

povertyandovercrowding.ItistemptingtosuspectthatIndianIRanalystsingeneralwould

beratherfondofGDPatpurchasingpowerparity(PPP)ratherthanattheofficialexchange

rate(OER)asthiswouldimmediatelytripletheireconomicsize,butsuchageneralsubjec

tivepreferencecannotbeconfirmed.1

TheargumentcouldbemadethatIndianpowerindexesarerelevantbecauseIndiais

increasinglyrelevant,butthiswouldthenimplythatthepowerindexesofsmallercountries

arelessrelevant.TheIndianpowerindexesmayberegardedasasymptomofIndiasascen

dancyto

global

power,

but

any

hypothetical

attribution

of

power

indexes

to

growth

in

power

canbe expected to suffer from selfselectionbias,whichmeans that the increasedpublic

availabilityofsomeindexesdatavisvislessavailableindexesdistortsperception.Indians

havemost likelyconstructedpower indexesbefore,and itmaysimplybe the Internet that

makes those Indian power indexes constructed nowadays internationally traceable. Pre

InternetIndianpower indexesmayneverberesuscitatedwithoutconsiderableresearchon

thepartofIndianscholarsthemselves.

1 TheNSIusesOER.TheIndianeconomistArvindVirmanidevelopedhisownpowerindexin2004/05;here

peatedlyinsiststhatPPPisthebettermeasureandresentsanynotionthatOERmaybeasgoodorbetter.The

basisforhisclaim isaratherunconcealednationalistbiasregardingtherankingofIndia(seeVirmani2004,

2005a,2005b,2005c,2005d).

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KarlHwang:MeasuringGeopoliticalPowerinIndia 7

Thepaperisstructuredasfollows:sections2&3seektobrieflyilluminatethecontext

oftheNSI.Theobjectiveofthesesectionsisto,ingeneralterms,connecttheNSItoIndiaas

farasthe lattersgreatpoweraspirationsandstrategiccultureareconcerned.Section2ex

plainsIndias

attempt

to

attain

great

power

status

and

its

economic

performance.

Section

3

returnsto Indiasstrategicculture, lookingattheroleofpower in theArthashastrabyKau

tilya,whichisthekeytextinthisrespect.

Sections4to7seektoconnecttheNSItoitsspecificinstitutionalandtheoreticalroots.

Section4examinestheinstitutionaloriginoftheNSIasthebasisforitsdevelopment.Section

5tracestheideationalrootsandintellectualheritagethatculminatedinthedevelopmentof

theNSI in order to distinguish the intellectualbaggage from preceding efforts in power

measurementbyotheranalystsfromthefreshimpulsesofthedesignersoftheNSI.Section6

focusesonthetheoreticalbasisfortheuniqueemphasisoftheearlyNSIonhumansecurity

aswellason theconceptualproblematic involved.Section7 lookscriticallyat theHuman

DevelopmentIndex(HDI)andtheEnvironmentalVulnerabilityIndex(EVI)astheseindexes

wereintegratedintotheearlyNSIwithitsfocusonhumansecurity.

Section8maybeofinterestonlytoexpertsonthetechnicalaspectsofpowerformulas.

However, it iscrucialtounderstandingwhy theNSIhasnotmanaged toproducesatisfac

torynumbers.Section9demonstrates through thematicweightingandcorrelationanalysis

howtheNSIhaseffectivelyabandoneditsoriginalemphasisonhumansecurityandlooksat

possiblereasonsforthis.Section10investigateshowtheNSIhasbeenreceivedaswellasthe

criticismsofit.Thelattermaycontainsuggestionsforfurtherimprovement.Section11con

cludes the inquiryby lookingatthetwobig issuesfacingtheNSI,whichare(1)the inclu

sion/exclusionofhumansecurityand (2) the inadequacyofresultsdue totheabsenceofa

unifiedcalculationstandard,andofferssuggestionsforfurtherresearch.

ForreaderswhowanttoseethefivepublishedversionsoftheNSIitself,AppendixA

providesdetailsontheindexschangingcomposition.Thecompleteresultsofthefivepub

lishedindexescanbefoundinAppendixB.

2 GeopoliticalChallengesinIndiasQuestforGreatpowerStatus

IhaveaTHIRDvision.Indiamuststanduptotheworld.BecauseIbelievethatunless

Indiastandsuptotheworld,noonewillrespectus.Onlystrengthrespectsstrength.

Wemustbestrongnotonlyasamilitarypowerbutalsoasaneconomicpower.Both

mustgohandinhand.

AvulPakirJainulabdeenAbdulKalam

EleventhPresidentofIndia(20022007),2006

IntheindexofMearsheimersTheTragedyofGreatPowerPoliticsfrom2001,onefinds65en

triesforthePeoplesRepublicofChinaand3entriesforIndia(Mearsheimer2001:538,543),a

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factwhich issymptomatic for the lowprestige that Indiahassufferedso far.Yet inrecent

yearsithasbecomeincreasinglyfashionabletolaudIndiasascendancetotherankofglobal

power (Basu 2008: 396). The problem is pinpointing the timing of Indias entry into the

leagueof

great

powers.

The

Pokhran

II

nuclear

tests

from

May

11

13,

1998

could

represent

a

suitabledate,butonlybecause Indiasuccessfullyweathered theresultingsanctions.These

testswere surelymeant to validate Indias claim to greatpower status (Nayar/Paul: 27;

Perkovich2003:5).2

In contrast, Indias lowpoint in economicdevelopmentmaybe established as 1979,

thoughrelativetoChinathedifferenceinwealthhasneverbeenasgreatastoday.Thetime

period19471979wasmarkedbyFabiansemisocialism,lesssointermsofownershipthanin

termsofcontrol through the illfamedLicenceRaj.3Therelativelystablepercapitagrowth

rateofjustover1percentduringthisperiodbecameknownastheHindurateofgrowth.

Moderatereformswereinitiatedinthe1980s;however,largefiscaldeficitsduringthistime

periodspilledover into the tradedeficitand thusbroughtaboutaseriousbalanceofpay

mentscrisisin1991,whentheIndiangovernmentwasclosetodefaultonitsexternalobliga

tions.Thiscrisissparkedthepushformoredrasticreformsaimedatfurthereconomicliber

alizationfrom1991to1993.Comparedtoitsunsustainablegrowthtrackofthe1980s,India

nowlookstobeonasustainablepathasallcriticaldebtratios4havedevelopedinafavorable

direction.

Countlessscholarshaveemphasizedtheimportanceofwarinprovingnationalpower.

KarlHaushofer5statedthattheultimatetestofnationalstrengthiswar(Haushofer1913:8);

GeorgePerkovichstated inamorerecent lectureon India thatwarprovides theempirical

test ofmilitary power (Perkovich 2003: 14, 2004: 136); andChangChinLung referred to

oneononealloutconflicts,as theacid test forpowerequations (Chang2004:21). India

2 In thisregard theroleof theBharatiyaJanataParty (BJP)elites inpushing foranovertnuclearprogram in

1998canalsobementioned.TheBJPbases its ideologyonHindutva,whichdemandsHindunationalism,

one nation, one religion, and one country. Its ideology comes from theArthashastra and states that India

shouldbestrong.ApertinentbookonthisissueisChristopheJaffrelot,ed.2007.HinduNationalism:AReader.

Delhi:PermanentBlack.

3 TheLicenceRaj(19471990)referstoabureaucraticsystemthatsetquotasforbusinessesastohowmuchofa

certainproducttheywereallowedtomanufacture.Thequantityofgoodswasthereforenotdeterminedfreely

bysupplyanddemand.

4 That is (1)Debt StockGDPRatio 19901991: 28.7; 19992000: 22.0; (2)DebtServiceRatio 19901991: 35.3;

19992000: 16.0; (3)DebtExports Ratio 19901991: 491.7; 19992000: 258.6; (4) ShorttermDebt/TotalDebt

19901991:10.3;19992000:4.1;and (5)ShorttermDebt/ForeignCurrencyReserves19901991:382.3;1999

2000:11.5(Baru2003:186187).

5 KarlHaushoferhasbeenmuchcriticizedovertheconnectionbetweenGermangeopoliticsandNaziexpan

sion;nevertheless,geopoliticshasbeenregainingsomeof itspopularity,whichalsoencouragesadifferenti

ated treatment of thisparticular issue.When asked aboutKarlHaushofer,prominentAmerican IR expert

ParagKhanna stated recently inan interview thatGermanywas indeedan essentialpillarofgeopolitical

thought.[]Ofcoursewecanusetheoldgeopoliticalterms[authorsretranslation](Khanna2010:45).

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wasclearlybeateninthebriefSinoIndianWarin1962;Vietnamperformedbetterinthebrief

SinoVietnameseWar in1979.Historically,majorvictoriesandmajordefeatshavebeen the

entryandexitpointsformembershipintheleagueofgreatpowers,sothepressingproblem

forIndia

is

the

absence

of

apeaceful

mechanism

for

rising

powers

to

gain

acceptance

in

the

internationalhierarchy(Nayar/Paul2003:78,35).

Figure1:PerCapitaGDPPPPforChinaandIndiaasPercentageofPerCapitaGWPPPP

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1950 1958 1966 1974 1982 1990 1998 2006

China

India

Source: Maddison2009.

Greatpowerstatusmaywellbeanarbitraryjudgment;mostdefinitionsofitareneartauto

logical, employing arbitrary cutoffs as to capability and timing (see Levy 1983: 1119).

Mathematicallytheissueisoneofdeterminingthresholdsfordividingcountriesintodivergentclasseswithemergingattributesclearlyassociatedwithahigher levelofcapability.6A

promisingindicatorofgreatpowercapabilitymaybethelevelofemploymentinarmspro

duction; thus, the fivemembersof theUNSecurityCouncilhappened to alsobe the five

countrieswiththelargestemploymentinarmsproductionaslateas2003.Armsproduction

isIndiasweakpointasitisheavilydependentonexternalsuppliersformajorweaponssys

temssuchasfighteraircraftandadvancedmunitions(Nayar/Paul2003:44).

6 FortheapplicationoftheHerfindahlHirschmanindexofconcentrationtodeterminearatherabstractsystem

threshold,seeHwang2008a:18.

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Table1:EstimatedLevelofEmploymentinArmsProduction,2003

Country Employees

UnitedStates 2,700,000

China 2,100,000

Russia 780,000

France 240,000

UnitedKingdom 200,000

Ukraine 180,000

India 170,000

NorthKorea 120,000

Germany 80,000

Japan 80,000

Source: SIPRIdatabase2009(originalsource:BonnInternationalCenterforConversion).

ManyIndiansinsistasamatterofprinciplethatIndiadeservesapermanentseatontheUNSecurity Council. China seems to act as an obstacle to this aim (Perkovich 2004: 142;

Nayar/Paul:12).BrazilandGermanyaregeographically faraway fromChina,so twoper

manent seats forBrazil andGermanywould have nodirectbearing forChina.However,

givenIndiasandJapansgeopoliticalpositionsasChinasdirectneighborsandcompetitors,

ChinacannotreallybenefitfromsupportingIndiaandJapan.PerkovichputstheIndianchal

lengethisway:

OnemeasureofIndiandiplomacyinthefuturewillbehowiteitherlowersthevalueof

aSecurityCouncilseatandthereforemakesIndiaspowerrankingindependentofsuchaposition,oralternativelyhowIndiaattainsaseat.(Perkovich2003:19)

IndiansmayliketoimagineIndiaasavegetarianelephant(seeVirmani2005a:8),butsooner

orlaterfrustrated impatiencecouldpossibly leadtoadventurism.7SomemayassertIndias

peacefulnature,especiallyasademocracy,butdemocraticpeace theorymerely states that

democraciesdontfightotherdemocracies(seeMearsheimer2001:16),andasIndiasneigh

borsarentdemocracies,theyremainpartofthedevaluedoutgroup,andlegitimatetargets

ofviolence(Johnston1995:6061).Indiansunderstandablyresistthedisadvantagesofbeing

underestimatedbut seem to forget thatbeing considered toopowerful too soonmightbeworse.TheChinesehavewiselyfollowedDengXiaopings24CharacterStrategy8inorderto

avoidpreemptivecontainmentstrategies.

7 CharuMajumdar(19181972)mosteloquentlyexpressedthisfrustratedimpatienceinthecontextofguerrilla

warfare:Merecollectionofarmsdoesnotalterthecharacterofstrugglethegunscollectedhavetobeused

(Majumdar19651967:VIII).

8 Translatedasobservecalmly;secureourposition;copewithaffairscalmly;hideourcapacitiesandbideour

time;begoodatmaintainingalowprofile;andneverclaimleadership(USDOD2007:6).

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3 TheRoleofPowerinKautilyasArthashastra

GiventhattheArthashastraisthekeytextonIndianstrategicculture,itisexpedienttosaya

littleabouttheroleofpowerinit.Kautilyalivedcirca350283BC.Hewaslargelyresponsible

forthecreationoftheMauryanEmpireinhisroleasadvisorandprimeministertothefirst

Mauryaemperor,Chandragupta. Inaddition,hewasaprofessoratTakshashilaUniversity.

KautilyawrotetheArthashastraasatreatiseonstatecraft.AccordingtoRogerBoesche,itis

abookofpoliticalrealism,abookanalysinghowthepoliticalworlddoesworkandnot

veryoftenstatinghowitoughttowork,abookthatfrequentlydisclosestoakingwhat

calculatingandsometimesbrutalmeasureshemustcarryouttopreservethestateand

thecommongood.(Boesche2002:17)

ForKautilyapoweristhemeansandnottheend,sostrengthispower,andhappinessisthe

end. []Hence aking shallalways endeavor to augmenthisownpower and elevatehis

happiness(Kautilya,Arthashastra6.2).Further,thepossessionofaprosperoustreasuryand

a strongarmy is the strengthof sovereignty (Kautilya,Arthashastra6.2).As for the seven

constituentsof the state,Kautilya listedSwamy (King),Amatya (PrimeMinister),Jana

pada(populatedterritory),Durga(fort),Ksha(treasury),Bala(force/army)andMitra(ally)

(Naik2004).

Fortheaugmentationofpowerthegeneralruleappliesthatwhoeverisinferiortoan

othershallmakepeacewithhim;whoever issuperiorinpowershallwagewar(Kautilya,

Arthashastra7.1),sopoweristhebasisfortheacquisitionofmorepower.Forsuccessfulwar

faretheconquerorshouldknowthecomparativestrengthandweaknessofhimselfandof

hisenemy (Kautilya,Arthashastra9.1),and comparisonentailsmeasurementaccording to

SunZi.9

Asfortheimportantconnectionbetweeneconomicsandmilitarymatters,SanjayaBaru

hasrecentlyreiteratedKautilyasargumentasfollows:

Themanagementoftheeconomy,andofthetreasury,hasbeenavitalaspectofstate

craft from time immemorial.KautilyasArthashastra says, From the strength of the

treasurythearmyisborn.[]menwithoutwealthdonotattaintheirobjectiveseven

afterhundredsof trials []Only throughwealth canmaterialgainsbeacquired,as

elephants(wild)canbecapturedonlybyelephants(tamed)[]Astatewithdepleted

resources, even if acquired,becomes only a liability.Hence, economicpolicies and

performancedohavestrategicconsequences.(Baru2009)

9 SunZi(circa544496BC)had inmindaproceduralchain:Therulesofthemilitaryarefive:measurement,

assessment,calculation,comparison,andvictory.Thegroundgivesrisetomeasurements,measurementsgive

risetoassessments,assessmentsgiverise tocalculations,calculationsgiverisetocomparisons,comparisons

giverisetovictory(SunTzu,TheArtofWar:4).

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4 TheInstitutionalBackgroundoftheNSI

Giventhateverypowerindexistheidiosyncraticproductofitsauthoranditsinstitutional

environment, some information regardingwhich people and institutions theNSI has de

pendedon in its formationandevolution isprovidedhere.Thisprovidessomecontextre

gardingthemotivationsandviewpointsthatwentintotheNSI.

TheNationalSecurityCouncil (NSC)wassetuponNovember19,1998 toovercome

structural deficiencies in the coordination of national security. The council originally in

cludedthenewlycreatednationalsecurityadvisor(NSA);theministersofdefense,external

affairs,home,andfinance;andthedeputychairmanofthePlanningCommission.TheNa

tionalSecurityCouncilSecretariat(NSCS)wasestablishedinApril1999andsucceeded,with

expanded responsibility, the existingJoint Intelligence Committee (JIC),which hadbeen

largelylimited

to

producing

amonthly

intelligence

review

(Chandra

2006:

209,

215).

ThenationalistBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP),withAtalBihariVajpayeeasprimeminis

ter,hadcome topoweronMarch19,1998, twomonthsbeforethePokhranIInucleartests

fromMay 1113, 1998. It had then established a task force to study the national security

mechanismsof other countries and to submit recommendationson revamping the Indian

system, the resultbeing the NSC and other subgroupings (Raman 2004, 2005).Apurba

Kunducomments thatinamarkeddeparture frompreviousnationalgovernments, those

ledbytheBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)soughttoaddressnationalsecurityissuesbothproac

tively and strategically in linewith the partys philosophy of achieving a strong India

(Kundu2004a:4).

SatishChandra served as chairmanof theJIC fromJanuary1999 toApril 1999,and

thenasdeputyNSAandsecretaryoftheNSCSfromApril1999toFebruary2005.Heempha

sizesthattheNSCwasintendedtobegearedtowardsamoreholisticviewofnationalsecu

rity that included issues likegoodgovernance,health,watermanagement, environment,

technologyoreven theeconomy inaddition toconventional topicssuchasinsurgencies

andlawandorder,terrorism,foreignpolicy,etc.(Chandra2006:202,seealso207).Inaddi

tiontoevaluatingtheintelligencecollectedbyotheragencies,theNSCSbecameaquasithink

tankthatinitiatedpapersonhumansecurityaswellasnationalsecurity(Chandra2006:217).

TheNSIappearstohavebeenoneoutgrowthofthesecretariatsassertivecreativity.

Thereappearstohavebeensomeinstitutionalresentmentbetweenthetraditionalmin

istries and the newly establishedNSC andNSCS as a result of their different outlooks.

Chandra states thatregrettably, thepoliticalandbureaucratic leadership continues to re

mainweddedtoadamagecontrolmoderatherthanamorecerebrallongtermpolicyevolu

tionmode(Chandra2006:224).TherelativelynewNSCSseemstohavelostoutinthisinsti

tutionalpowerstruggle:ministrieshavenotsoughtadvicefromitonaroutinebasis,andit

hasnot

been

informed

on

all

relevant

issues

(Chandra

2006:

224

225).

The

return

to

power

of

theleftleaningIndianNationalCongress(INC)partyonMay22,2004hasnothelpedeither.

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ThedeputychairmanofthePlanningCommissionisnolongeramemberoftheNSC,andthe

JIChasbeenrevivedincompetitionwiththeNSC;theNSChadoriginallyreplacedtheJIC.

Asoneofitsmanyprojects,theNSCShasfundedtheIndiasNationalSecurityAnnual

Review(INSAR)

series,

though

it

has

been

clearly

stated

in

each

volume

that

the

views

ex

pressed in the INSAR arenot those ofNSCS.TheConfederation of Indian Industry (CII)

joinedasanothersponsorstartingwiththeINSAR2004.TheaimoftheINSARistobringto

getheressaysondifferentnationalsecurityissuesaswellastoprovideareviewofeventsfor

aparticularyear.RegardingtheINSAR,thefirstNSA,BrajeshChandraMishra,stated,we

haveabookwhichtakesaholisticandintegratedviewofinternalandexternalsecuritychal

lengesbeingfacedbyIndia(Kumar2004a:jacket).WiththeINSAR2008,publishedin2009,

theseriesnowconsistsofeightvolumes.

SatishKumarhasbeeneditoroftheINSARsinceitsinceptionin2000.10Hewasbornin

1933,andfrom1961to1998hewasaprofessorofdiplomacyatJawaharlalNehruUniversity

(JNU)inNewDelhi.Hehaswrittenseveralbooks,especiallyonPakistan,andhastraveled

toseveralcountriesasavisitingscholar.HeisconsideredoneofIndiaspreeminentIRschol

arsandhastrainedmanycadresofIndiasForeignServicethroughhispositionatJNU.

Kumar ismostoftenassociatedwith theNSI, though theoriginal ideaaswellas the

firstindexweredevelopedbytheNSCS.KumarwasthenaskedbytheNSCStocontinuethe

projectandtoupdatetheindexeitherannuallyorperiodically.Sincehehasrevisedtheindex

fourtimesinconsultationwithasubgroupoftheINSAReditorialboard.TheNSIhasbeen

publishedirregularly:itwaspublishedfor2002,2003,2004,2006,and2007,butwasnotpub

lishedfor2005and2008.EconomicexpertsfromJNUhavedonethecalculationsfortheindex.

5 PossibleInspirationsbehindtheNSI

TheoriginalNSIwaspublishedintheINSAR2002;however,inthefirstINSAR2001Satish

Kumaralreadyexhibitedadeterminedinterestinquantificationmeasures:

Anynationalsecurityreviewwouldrequirethatanongoingassessmentofthepower

profileofthenationismade.Itmaynotbepossibletoassessallthecomponentsofna

tionalpoweratagiventime,orquantifyallof them.Andyet, it isworthwhile toat

temptasmanyaspossible.(Kumar2002:21)

InthisregardalltheINSARpublications,from2001to2008,haveincludedastatisticssection

unrelatedtotheNSI.Thoughnodirectlinkexists,thepatternisreminiscentoftheZeitschrift

frGeopolitik[JournalforGeopolitics],publishedfrom1924to1944,whichalsoregularlyfea

10 SatishKumar lookedat the initialdraftof thisworkingpaperandkindlycontributedmanycommentsand

suggestionsthatcorroboratesomeoftheinformationpresentedhere.

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turedsectionsonstatistics.11Geopoliticshasbeenunderstoodfromtheverybeginningasa

practical and empirical science as opposed to excessively abstract theorizing (see Ratzel

1923:1;alsoHwang2008b:101102).Ageopolitical triangleconsistingofgeography,statis

tics,and

international

politics

can

be

depicted.

Given

that

the

INSAR

seeks

to

provide

practi

cal informationandguidance for longtermpoliciesandemphasizesgeography,ascanbe

seeninthemaponIndiasstrategicneighborhood(Kumar2006:318,2007:xxi),alongsideits

regularstatisticssection,itsstructuralpatternsandemphasesareunquestionablyinthetra

ditionofgeopolitics.

Intermsofaroughgenealogicaloutline(seeHwang2008a:59),theinspirationforthis

powerindexmostlikelycamefromtheUnitedStatesandChina.TheUnitedStateshashad

somethingofacrossreferencingquantitativecommunitypartiallyconcernedwiththemeas

urementofpoweratleastsince1960.Fromthelate1980sonwardstheChinesehavedevel

oped a vibrant community focused onmeasuring comprehensive national power (CNP);

theytooktheirinspirationfromtheUnitedStatesandJapan.Indiahasnotyetdevelopeda

communityproper concernedwith themeasurement ofpower,but this index couldbe a

creativesparkinthisdirection.

SatishKumaralreadymentionedtheTellisapproachintheINSAR2001(Kumar2002:

2021);itseemslikelythatthisapproach,publishedbytheRANDCorporation,awellknown

American think tank, in2000,waswidelyknownat thatpointandmayhave inspired the

constructionof theNSI. Itmeasuresnationalpoweraccording to threerealms:nationalre

sources, national performance, andmilitary capability. Each realm consists of numerous

variables.TheTellisapproachhasnotproducedaworkingformulaorresultssincethattime,

possiblyduetoquantificationproblemsencounteredintransformingagreatdealofmeticu

louslydetailedtheory(212pages!)intopracticallyusefulcalculations(seeTellisetal.2000a,

2000b).IntheintroductiontotheNSI2003KumarstatesinregardtotheTellisapproachthat

itisobviousthatallthesefactorsarenotquantifiable(Kumar2004b:228).

ThesameintroductiontotheNSI2003alsomentionsMichaelPillsburysworkonChi

nesegeopoliticalpowercalculationsregardingCNPstartinginthelate1980s(Kumar2004b:

228229).

Before

Pillsburys

work

in

English,

access

to

information

on

Chinas

vibrant

efforts

in the calculation ofCNPwas limited toChineselanguage sources.Like theTellispaper,

Pillsburysworkwaspublishedin2000,butitisnotclearwhetheritreceivedthesameim

mediatepublicity inIndia.WhileSatishKumarfocusedontheCNPformulafromtheChi

neseAcademyofSocialSciences (CASS),hedidntshowany interest in theotherCNP in

dexes,norinthepowerindexesbyWilhelmFucks,RaySteinerCline,andtheJapanesegov

ernment,allofwhichinspiredtheChinese(seePillsbury2000:225226).TheCASSindexwas

11 Statisticswasmostlydefinedasstatecraft (Staatskunde)until1850,while from1850onwardsmostdefini

tionsconsideredstatisticsamethodologicalscience.Hybriddefinitionsfallmostlyintotheperiod18461854

(Klezl1940:12).InEnglandstatisticswasknownaspoliticalarithmeticbefore1798,whentheGermanword

Statistikwasthenimportedasstatistics(Witt1993:12).

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createdbyWangSongfen;itconsistedof64variablesgroupedintoeightmajorareas,asout

linedinTable2.

Table

2:

Weighted

Coefficients

of

Major

Component

Factors

NationalPowerFactor WeightedCoefficient

TotalCNP 1.00

Naturalresources 0.08

Economicactivitiescapability 0.28

Foreigneconomicactivitiescapability 0.13

Scientificandtechnologicalcapability 0.15

Socialdevelopmentlevel 0.10

Militarycapability 0.10

Governmentregulationandcontrolcapability 0.08

Foreignaffairscapability 0.08

Source: Pillsbury2000:229 (originalsource:WangSongfen,ed.1996.Shijiezhuyaoguojiazongheguolibijiao

yanjiu[Comparativestudiesofthecomprehensivenationalpoweroftheworldsmajornations].Chang

sha:Hunanchubanshe,169).

SimilartohiscommentontheTellisapproach,Kumarstatesthatmanyofthesefactorsare

againnotquantifiable(Kumar2004b:229),whichisnottrue,astotalCNPvalueshavebeen

calculatedusing theCASS formula.ThusKumar isprobablyreferring to factors forwhich

expertshadtobesurveyed.Itcanbearguedthatperceptionvaluesarelessreliablethanma

terialdata,whileatthesametimeperceptionsurveysaremuchmorework.Intermsofbasic

structure theCASS isnot faraway from theNSI,andaccording toPillsbury it isnotclear

whethertheCASSindexusesaunifiedstandardforhandlingaggregatesandpercapitaval

ues.SanjayaBaru (formermediaadviser to theprimeminister) comments thatbasedon

suchconcepts,theINSARsNationalSecurityIndex(NSI)forIndiaisanattempttoconstruct

asimplerindex(Baru2005:113).

ThesocialdevelopmentlevelintheCASSformulaconsistsof(1)educationallevel,(2)

culturallevel,(3)healthcarelevel,(4)communications,and(5)urbanization(Pillsbury2000:

221).AssuchitprecededtheNSIinusinghumansecurityvariables,buthumansecurityfig

uresaccount

for

perhaps

5percent

of

the

index;

this

small

percentage

does

not

indicate

a

consciousparadigmshift.Incontrast,humansecurityintheoriginalNSIstoodat26.67per

cent,awhoppingdifferencefromtheCASSindex.

Chinese scholarswere quite fond of theGrowthCompetitiveness Index (GCI)pub

lishedannuallyby theWorldEconomicForum in theGlobalCompetitivenessReport (GCR).

TheGCI focused onmacroeconomic conditions andwas complementedby the Business

Competitiveness Index (BCI),which focused onmicroeconomic conditions;bothwere re

vamped and consolidated into anewGlobalCompetitiveness Index in 2004 (seeBandura

2008:42).Y.S.RajanmentionstheGCIinrelationtonationalpower(Rajan2002:255).Healso

mentionstheTellisapproachinrelationtocompetitivecommercialtechnologies(Rajan2002:

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252253).WhilecompetitivenessisnotdirectlypartoftheNSI,itcanbenotedthattechnol

ogyhasreceivedarelativelyhighweightingat1520percent.

AsforthenameoftheNSIitself,theNSIdoesnotdirectlymeasurenationalsecurity.It

doesso

only

indirectly,

as

evidenced

by

the

introduction

of

the

original

NSI,

where

it

is

statedthatacountrysnationalsecurityissafeguardednotjustbyitsarmedforcesbutbyits

comprehensivenationalpower (NSCS2003:349).Thedifferencebetweennationalpower

andsecurityisthatthenotionofnationalpowertendstotakeashorttermviewofinterna

tionalrelationswhilenationalsecurityprovidesalongtermperspectiveoninternationalre

lations,psychologicallyspeaking.

6 FromNationalSecuritytoHumanSecurity

Interstatemilitaryconflictshavedecreasedrelative todomesticconflictsandviolence.This

tendencyhaschangedthefocusofsecuritythinking.Nationalsecurityhastraditionallybeen

concernedwithterritorialintegrityandarmsraces,butgiventhattheinternationalenviron

mentisrelativelystableandthatinternationaltreatiesnolongerguaranteedomesticpeace,a

closerlookatconflictsisrequiredinordertolinkdomesticstabilityandsecuritywithhuman

development.Accordingly,individualsratherthanstatesmovetothecenterofattention,for

individualsaretheprimaryconsumersofinsecurityintermsofciviliandeathsand,equally,

theyare theprimaryperpetrators in termsof insurgenciesandsocioeconomicmotion.The

conceptofhumansecuritypromotesaholisticconvergenceofwarstudieswithdevelopment

studies.

TheUNDPsHumanDevelopmentReport1994activelypromoteshumansecurityas its

central theme. Itprovidesanexplicitdefinitionofhumansecurityby focusingon twokey

aspects:Itmeans,first,safetyfromsuchchronicthreatsashunger,diseaseandrepression.

And second, itmeansprotection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of

dailylifewhetherinhomes,injobsorincommunities(UNDP1994:23).Humansecurity

consistsof(1)economicsecurity,(2)foodsecurity,(3)healthsecurity,(4)environmentalsecu

rity,(5)personalsecurity,(6)communitysecurity,and(7)politicalsecurity(UNDP1994:24

25).Criticshavearguedthathumansecuritymayaltogetherbeamanipulativeattemptto

capturesomeofthemoresubstantialpoliticalinterestandsuperiorfinancialresourcesasso

ciatedwithmoretraditional,militaryconceptionsofsecurity(Paris2001:95).

Theproblemwithconceptsofhuman security is that they tend tobe toobroadand

fuzzy,makingithardtodiscernadifferencebetweenhumandevelopmentandhumansecu

rity(seeTrachsler2003:7576).SanjayaBarustatesthattheUNDPsHumanDevelopmentRe

port tries to capture trends in human security throughmeasurement of humandevelop

ment(Baru

2005:

112).

Moreover,

it

can

be

argued

that

human

security

runs

counter

to

na

tionalsecurity,sothathumansecuritycanbeconstruedasaninvitationtohumanitarianin

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tervention thatdisregardsandunderminesstate sovereignty (seeTrachsler2003:70,7778,

8586,102).

Effortshavebeenmadetoquantifyhumansecurity(Trachsler2003:7981),oneofthem

beingthe

Index

of

Human

Insecurity

(IHI)

from

2000

(see

Bandura

2008:

54

55).

One

of

the

sixteenvariablesof theIHI ispublicexpendituresondefenseversuseducation,which is

reminiscentofthevariablethatmeasuresmilitaryspendinginrelationtohealthspending

in theGlobalMilitarization Index (GMI)by theBonn InternationalCenter forConversion

(BICC).Itisunclearhowsuchvariables,whichbringmilitaryspendinginoppositiontoso

cialspending,couldeverconvincemoreconservativelymindedscholars.Humansecurityis

theproductoftheUNDPmilieu;however,devoidofanypoliticalagenda,aholisticandin

tegrated approach to security is also compatiblewithmore conservative views (compare

Paris2001:97).

ApurbaKunduconsidershuman security tobe thebasisof theoriginalNSI,andhe

implicitlycommendstheNSIforthis(Kundu2004b).Kundudisplayssomenavetwhenhe

asksWhatdohighlyexpensivemilitarymodernisationitemsdoforthehumansecurityof

theindividualcitizen?(Kundu2004b:7)becauseinademocracyhumansecurityshouldbe

moretheconcernofthepoliceandnotaquestionofdirectmilitaryprowess,asthequestion

implies.Still,Indiaisapoorcountrywherecapitalisscarce,sosynergyeffectsaredesirable

inordertooptimizetheuseofresourcesandcapabilities.Thismaysuggestthatexpenditures

onnationalsecurityenhancehumansecurity,atleastwithregardtoinsurgenciessuchasthe

MaoistNaxaliteinsurrectionandtheconflictoverKashmir.

7 TheHumanDevelopmentIndexandtheEnvironmentalVulnerabilityIndex

ThefirsttwoNSIpublicationscontainedtheHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),whichwas

perhaps the most prominent feature of the NSI. The HDI was developed by Pakistani

economistMahbubulHaq(19341998).PriortoitsdevelopmentHaqhadexplainedtofellow

IndianeconomistAmartyaSen, weneedameasureof the same levelofvulgarityas the

GNPjustonenumberbutameasure that isnotasblind tosocialaspect (sic)ofhuman

livesas theGNP is (Sen1998).Thisvulgarmeasurehappened tobe theHDI,whichwas

publishedwith the firstHumanDevelopmentReport1990andhasbeenpublishedannually

eversince.TheHDIbasicallytendstoinflatethedevelopment levelofpoorcountriescom

paredtoGDP,whetherattheofficialexchangerate(OER)orintermsofpurchasingpower

parity(PPP).SenexplainsthatHaqwasanoptimistopposedtothepessimismthattheexclu

siverelianceonGDPgenerates.12

12 TheNSIhasadoptedthebasicmethodologyoftheHDI,butwithoutusingaunifiedstandard(seeSection8)

fortreatingvalueseitherasaggregatesorpercapitavaluesorotherwise.TheHDIseekstorepresentpercap

itadevelopment,andtheNSIseekstorepresenttheaggregatepowerofnations,butinusingtheHDImeth

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ThethirdNSIincludedtheEnvironmentalVulnerabilityIndex(EVI).TheEVIwasini

tiallydevelopedbytheSouthPacificAppliedGeoscienceCommission(SOPAC)forsmallis

landdevelopingstatesin1999,andwasthenexpandedtoallstatesin2004and2005.TheEVI

consistsof

50

indicators

grouped

into

(1)

hazards,

(2)

resistance,

and

(3)

damage.

All

indica

torshaveascaleof1to7tomakethemdirectlycomparable.Thecutoffvaluesforeachindi

catoronthisscalearearbitrary,buttheyrepresentthebestestimatepossiblegiventhecom

plexityofmatter(Prattetal.2004:14).Acompositescoreiscalculatedfromthese50indica

tors.TheEVIhasanumberofproblematicindicatorsthatconstructanirreconcilableopposi

tionbetweenhumandevelopmentandenvironmentalsustainability.Forexample,oneindi

cator (use of electricity for industry over the last 5yearsper squarekilometre of land)

negativelyevaluateseconomicactivityperse;itdoesnottakeintoaccountthetypeofindus

try,thesourceofelectricity,ortheenvironmentalstandardsinplacetolimitandcompensate

fordamagetotheenvironment.Thismeansthataprimitivelifestylealwaysscoresbetterre

gardlessoftheactualdamagecaused.Anotherissueisthoseindicatorsthatareafixedfea

tureoftheenvironmentandindependentofhumanaction(numberofvolcanoes);practi

cally,theymayrendertheindexstatic.

8 TheLackofaUnifiedStandardintheCalculationoftheNSI

ThechangingcompositionoftheNSIinvariousyearsisdocumentedinAppendixA,there

sultsinAppendixB.Themostimportantobservationfromatechnicalpointofviewisthat

theNSIsdifferentsubindexeshaverandomsharesofaggregateandpercapitavariables,as

wellasofattributablevariablesthatareneither.Aggregatevaluesmeasurethesumtotalofa

variable inagivencountry, forexample, thetotalnumberofpatents.13Percapitavalues

odologywithoutadjustment,theresultisatechnicaldisasterthatproducesquestionableendresults.Inany

casetheHDIisnotwithoutflawseither,andforthisreasonitisusefultotakeacriticallookattheHDIitself.

TheHDIconsistsof threesubindexes: (1) lifeexpectancy, (2)educationcomprisingadult literacyandgross

enrollment,and (3)GDPPPP.While theareasof thesesubindexesseemoptimal for itspurpose, theHDIs

methodofcalculationiscarelessandinconsistent.Forlifeexpectancy85isarbitrarilytakenastheupperlimit

and25asthelowerlimit,insteadoftherealmaximumandminimumvalues.TheCIAFactbookexplainsmost

eloquentlythatroundingofnumbersalwaysresultsinalossofprecisioni.e.,error(CIA2009:FAQ).For

literacyandgrossenrollmentnominimumvalue isused in thecalculation.ForgrossenrollmentandGDP

PPPacompletelyarbitraryupper limit isapplied,beyondwhichnodifferenceswillberegistered;forGDP

PPPanequallyarbitrarylowerlimitisapplied.Giventhatadultliteracyhasreachedsaturationindeveloped

countries, themeasure isworthless incomparingsuchcountries.The logarithm isusedonly forGDPPPP,

though itwouldmakemoresensetoapply itallsubindexes,sothatrelationshipsarepreservedinthecom

positeindexscale.Instead,thenumericalvalueoftheHDIismoreorlessdevoidofmeaningfulinformation;

the only usefulness is in determining rank. India is ranked 128 out of 177 countries measured (UNDP

2007:128).

13 Complicationsarisewhentheseaggregateshappentomeasuresomethingnegativelikeenergyimports(i.e.,

themoreenergyimported,theweakerthecountry).Thoughtheyarestillaggregates,theproblemingeneral

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divide theseaggregatevaluesby thepopulation todetermine theaverage individual level,

for example, researcherspermillion.A third group of attributable variables consists of

valuesthatbythemselvesareneitheraggregatenorpercapita,forexample,hightechnol

ogyexports

as

percentage

of

manufactured

exports.

No

system

for

the

use

of

variables

can

bediscernedbeyondtheinertiaofinitialavailability,whichmeansthatifthedesignersofthe

NSIfindanaggregatevariable,theyuseitdirectlywithoutdiscriminationoradjustmenttoa

unified standard.The sameway that if they findper capitavariablesor attributablevari

ables,theyusethesevaluesdirectlywithoutdiscriminationoradjustmenttoaunifiedstan

dard.Theproperwayofconstructingan indexwouldbe todecideonauniformstandard

thatdetermineswhetherallvariablesaretobeconvertedintoaggregatesorpercapitavalues

andtostickwithit.Onlythenwoulditmakesensetocombinethosevalues.

Table3:DifferentFunctionsofNSIVariables

Function 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Aggregate 56.00% 52.00% 55.00% 57.25% 60.25%

Percapita 28.00% 28.00% 26.00% 14.50% 15.25%

Neither 16.00% 20.00% 19.00% 28.25% 24.50%

Source: Authorsowncalculation,seeAppendixAfordetailedindexes.

TheNSI is thusan incoherenthybridwhich calculates resultsofdubiousvalue;14 theNSI

valuesareneitheraggregatevalues indicating the totalpowerof India compared toother

countries,noraretheypercapitavaluesenablingtheindirectmeasurementofthelevelofse

curityfortheaverageIndiancomparedtotheaveragecitizensofothercountries.TheNSIis

indireneedofaunified standard forhandlingaggregatesandper capitavalues,and the

moststraightforwardsolutionwouldbe to transformallvalues intopositiveaggregatesas

farpossible.ThecombinedNSIvaluewouldthenindicatenationalpowerasasumtotal,al

lowingthesimplecomparisonofnationalvalues.

Thecriticismcanbemadethatongoingchangesincompositionandweightingprohibit

yeartoyear comparisons.While this is true to some extent, it is exactly these ongoing

changesthat

mark

the

NSI

as

acreative

and

well

run

experiment,

despite

all

the

misgivings.

Anydemandfortemporaluniformitywouldkillthiscreativity,astheNSIwouldnolonger

befreetouseallavailablevariables,includingmanyofrecentorigin,tosustaincontinuous

qualityimprovement.

Fourminorissuesremain:(1)TomultiplytheHDIbythepopulationleadstoimpreci

sionbecauseHDIvaluesareintheorystretchedbetweenmaximumandminimumandnot

isthatthemorenegativeaggregatesareused,themorelikelythelinearcalculationscouldresultinnegative

sumtotals,sothatacountrywouldhaveanegativevalueastotalpower,which isillogical.Becauseofthis,

suchnegativeaggregatesarecountedasNeitherinTable3.

14 The incongruousmethodofrandomlyaddingupaggregateandpercapitavaluescreatesabias favoring

smallbuthighlydevelopedcountries(Scandinavia).

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precisevalueswithfixedratios;theNSIno longeruses theHDI. (2)Economicgrowthasa

componentoftheNSIdoesnotrepresentcurrentabilitiesbutratherfutureexpectationson

thebasisofpastperformance;furtherrapideconomicgrowthalsomeansthattheinfrastruc

tureis

increasingly

deficient

relative

to

economic

activity,

so

economic

growth

may

confer

an

inflatedpictureofeconomicconditions in the short run. (3)Populationby itself canbea

strengthaswellasweakness(NSCS2003:351).Theadditionofpopulationaged1564to

theNSI2007contradicts thisearlierrealizationby takingdemographysolelyasastrength

withoutadjustment forqualitative factorssuchashealthandeducation thatcoulddemon

stratepopulationtobeaweakness;demographyalonedoesnothingbutboostIndiasrank.15

It canbeassumed thatpopulation isalready included inmostaggregatevalues (compare

Mearsheimer2001:61).(4)TheNSI2004includedHongKong,whichisobviouslyasubna

tionalarea.

Thenumberofvariablesintechnologywasincreasedfrom3intheNSI2002to5inthe

NSI2007,thoughtheweightingoftechnologywasdecreasedfrom20percentto15percent.

Theinclusionofnumbersonmainbattletanks,aircraft,andprincipalsurfacecombatants16to

indicatedefensecapabilityseems toosimplebecause itdoesnotaccount forqualitydiffer

ences;however,nobettermeasureisreadilyavailable.17Giventhatthetotalnumberofvari

ablesintheNSIincreasedfrom8intheNSI2002to17intheNSI2007,parsimonyseemsad

visable.

15 TheNSIdesignersputsomeeffortintomeasuringwhattheycalleffectivepopulation(thepopulationin

dexintheNSI2002and2003)bychangingthecomponentsofthissubindexthreetimes(seeAppendixA),a

factwhichalso indicatesthattheyhaventyetfoundasatisfactorymeasure.Theobviousgoal istomeasure

thepopulationwithoutomitting thequalitydimensionof thispopulation,suchaspertaining tohealthand

educationforexample.Somewhatsimilarinnatureandintent,theCIAFactbookhasalsocalculatedavariable

calledmanpowerfitformilitaryservice:Thisentrygivesthenumberofmalesandfemalesfalling inthe

militaryage range fora country (definedasbeingages1649)andwhoarenototherwisedisqualified for

healthreasons;accountsfor thehealthsituation inthecountryandprovidesamorerealisticestimateofthe

actual number fit to serve (CIA 2009:Definitions andNotes). Though the input and the formula of this

measurearenotgiven inthisdefinition,multiplying thepopulationaged16 to49bythesquarerootof life

expectancyprovidesarelativelygoodproxy.

16 PrincipalSurfaceCombatants (PSC)arenot counted inaconsistentmanner inTheMilitaryBalance; that is,

sometimescorvettesareincludedinthenumberandsometimesnot.AnalternativetocountingPSCistolook

attonnage(seeMartello1990:1617,6768).

17 In1976thePentagondevelopedtheconceptofArmoredDivisionEquivalent(ADE),whichcombinedmany

factors tomeasureconventional force.By1988 thishadbeen refined intoDivisionEquivalentFirepower

(DEF)(seealsoMartello1990:36);theinformationavailableontheInternetaboutthesemeasuresislimited.

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9 TheTrendintheCompositionoftheNSITowardstheAbandonmentofHuman

Security

Ascanbeseen fromTable4, the first threepublicationsof theNSIhadarelativelystrong

humansecurityelement.ThisismostevidentintheNSI2004.Thenabreakoccurredin2005,

whentheNSIwasntpublished,andnowtheelementishardlyvisible.

Table4:DecomposedNSIAccordingtoNationalSecurityandHumanSecurity

ThematicSectors 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

NationalSecurity 73.33% 73.33% 65.00% 85.00% 97.00%

Economy 33.33% 33.33% 25.00% 25.00% 28.00%

Military 20.00% 20.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00%

Technology 20.00% 20.00% 15.00% 15.00% 15.00%

Energy 20.00% 20.00%

Demography 9.00%

HumanSecurity 26.67% 26.67% 35.00% 15.00% 3.00%

Education 13.33% 13.33% 7.50% 7.50% 3.00%

Health 13.33% 13.33% 10.00%

Poverty 7.50% 7.50%

Ecology 10.00%

Source: Authorsowncalculation,seeAppendixAfordetailedindexes.

ThistransitioncanbefurtherdocumentedbylookingattheresultsoftheNSI,asshownby

thefollowingPearsoncorrelationcoefficientsfortheresultsofsuccessivepublicationsofthe

index:

NSI2002&NSI2003: 0.97

NSI2003&NSI2004: 0.91

NSI2004&NSI2006: 0.88

NSI2006&NSI2007: 0.99

Itsdiscouragingthatthelatestcorrelationcoefficientisalsothehighest,whichcouldsuggest

that theNSIhassettledsomewhatand that lessvariation in itscompositionmight thusbe

expectedinfuturerevisions.

Kumarpointsoutthattheselongterm[nontraditionalsecurity]issues[]cannotbe

mixedwithindicesofinstantlyusablepower(Kumar2007:446),providingonehintofjusti

fication for thisdrasticmeasureofexcludinghumansecurity.Thejustification itself isofa

practicalnature,asanyadvancesinthenationalsecuritysectorstendtodirectlyincreasethe

powerofgovernment,abettereconomyimmediatelycontributeshighertaxrevenues,mili

taryassetsaredirectlyavailableinaconflict,etc.Anyadvancesinhumansecuritytendtodo

soonlyindirectly:educationprovidesabasisfortechnology,decreasedpovertymaysupport

political stability, etc.Another reason for excluding human security is that sometimes no

changeseems

to

take

place

in

the

status

of

acountry

on

issues

like

health,

education,

envi

ronment, etc. for years.These three issues have thusbeenput in a separate index in the

INSAR2006becausetheymaynotneedtobereproducedeveryyear.Still,Kumarisaware

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thatIndiahastodoalottomoveuptheladderwithregardtoitsinternationalrankingon

theseissues.

TheINSARhasregularlyincludedoneortwoarticlesonhumansecurityissues.Satish

Kumarhimself

has

stated

that

military

capability

is

still

the

most

important

component

of

nationalpower(Kumar2002:20).TheprogressiveforcebehindtheoriginalNSIwasproba

blySatishChandra,thesecretaryoftheNSCSfrom1999to2005.Hevehementlypusheda

holisticlineinaretrospectiveessayontheNSCS,goingsofarastoimplythataholisticun

derstanding of security was what necessitated the NSC and NSCS to come into being

(Chandra2006:201202,205208).SatishChandraseemstohavehadthesupportofhissupe

riorsBrajeshChandraMishra,who servedasNSA from1998 to2004,andJyotindraNath

Dixit,whoservedasNSAfrom2004to2005(diedinoffice).

TheNSIstwomostrecentpublicationsnowmake itfall intothecategoryofChinese

CNPindexesasithasbroadenedtheconceptofnationalpowerbuthasntfirmlycommitted

itselftoaparadigmshifttowardshumansecurity.

10 ReceptionandCritiquesoftheNSI

PranabKumarMukherjee,theministerofdefensefrom2004to2006,commentedwithpride

ontheNSIinoneofhisspeeches:

[The]compilation

of

the

National

Security

Index

(NSI)

by

the

National

Security

Coun

cilin2002hasbeenthefirstsystematiceffortinIndiatowardsevolvinganindigenous

databasetocalculatecomprehensivenationalpower.Indiaisranked10thamong30na

tionsintermsofitsNSIanditispertinentthatinrelationtootherindicators,theDe

fenceexpenditureisamongthelowestinrelativeterms.Thegreateremphasisonnon

militarydimensionsofnational security in [the]caseof Indiadispels the impression

emanating fromafewquarters thatIndiasmilitarycapabilitiesmaybemotivatedby

thequest forpower status. (Mukherjee 2004; see alsoSingh 2005; compareMukher

jee2006)

TheNSIgainedtheattentionoftheIndianandChinesemediain2003/04.TheFinancialEx

pressranastringofarticlesonit(seeTheFinancialExpress2003a,2003b,2003c,2004;seealso

TheHindu 2004), and the 2004piecewasnoticedbyChinasPeoplesDaily,which subse

quentlyechoeditinastringofarticlesthere(seePeoplesDailyOnline2004a,2004b,2004c).

Oneofthesearticleswas inturnpickedupbyanIndianjournalist(Shahin2004).TheChi

neseweresatisfiedwithChinabeingrankedsecondbyitsneighboringcompetitorandstated

thatIndiasNSIisavariantoftheChineseComprehensiveNationalPower(CNP)indexand

anAmericanindexconstructedattheRandCorporation(TheFinancialExpress2004;Peoples

DailyOnline2004c).

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TheintroductiontotheoriginalNSIstatedthatitdidhavesomelimitations,sothatit

didnottakeintoaccountresourceabundance,environmentalhealthandgoodgovernance

(NSCS2003:351).Resourceabundancewaslaterpartiallytakencareofthroughtheintroduc

tionof

energy

security

in

the

index

in

2006

and

2007.

Environmental

health

was

addressed

in

theNSI2004butdroppedafterwards.Forgoodgovernance,theWorldGovernanceIndica

tors (WGI)by theWorldBankmightbeperfect foruse in future revisionsof theNSI (see

World Bank 2009). Meetu Jain has criticized the NSI 2006 as the index ignores non

conventional threats likehealth,environment andHRD [HumanResourceDevelopment]

(Jain2007),whichwereincludedinthepreviouspublicationsoftheNSIandthendropped.

Jainfurthercriticizesthefactthatapowerfularmyandrobusteconomydonotcompensate

fordeficientsecurityduetoterroristsandinsurgents.HefindssupportforhisviewinSatish

Chandra,whohasstatedLookatpolicing,itsamixedexperience.Youcannotreallycallit

numberfour(Chandra,quotedinJain2007;compareAyar2006).

Table5:TopTenCountriesAccordingtotheNSI,20022007

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

UnitedStates UnitedStates UnitedStates UnitedStates UnitedStates

Japan China China China China

China Japan Japan Norway Norway

SouthKorea SouthKorea Sweden India Russia

Germany Sweden Finland Japan India

France Russia Russia Russia Japan

Russia Germany Canada SaudiArabia SouthKorea

UnitedKingdom India SouthKorea UnitedKingdom UnitedKingdom

Israel France India Germany Germany

India UnitedKingdom Germany SouthKorea France

Source: NSCS2003,Kumar2004b,2005,2007,2008.

RetiredlieutenantgeneralV.R.RaghavanisconsideredoneofIndiasleadingstrategicthink

ers;hiscriticismoftheNSI2007asafeatureoftheINSAR2007isthattherankingsinthe

book seem tobearno relation to the real security statusof these states (Raghavan2008).

RaghavanseemstoobjecttoIndiabeingrankedabovetheUnitedKingdom,Germany,and

France.Healsoseems toobject toSwedenbeingrankedaboveBrazilandPakistan.More

over,Raghavan states thatthese rankingsdonotalsohelp in formulating securitypolicy

andplansforthefuture.Itishopedthatamorerealisticsecurityrankingofstatescanbepre

sentedinthenextvolumeoftheseries(Raghavan2008).TheINSAR2008didnotincludean

NSI.Withabitofluckmajorrevisions,especiallytowardsaunifiedstandardforthecalcula

tionmethod,areunderway;thistechnicalityappearstobethemajorreasonthatsomeNSI

valuesareinadequate.

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11 Conclusion

HumansecuritywasthetrademarkoftheNSIfrom2002to2004;itiswhatdistinguishedit

fromallpreviouspower indexes.However,human security isnotuncontroversial.Skepti

cismisabundantastowhetherhumansecurityisreallyafeasiblesecurityconceptorjustan

attempttoimposeadevelopmentagendaonsecurityissues.Thisunderlyingambiguitymay

havealsoplayedaroleinthewithdrawalofhumansecurityfromtheNSIin2006and2007.

KumarSatishandtheINSARareprincipallyopen tonontraditionalsecurityapproaches.

At thesame time theirmaincommitmentremainswith traditionalsecurity. If the fivever

sionsoftheNSIpublishedsofarproveanything,itisthatthedesignersareneitherdogmatic

norstaticintheirthinking.TheNSIhasbeenrevisedeachtime,andnoversionhasbeenlike

thepreviousoneintermsofthevariablesandweights.Thismeansthatevenifhumansecu

rityhas

been

abandoned

for

the

moment,

it

may

find

its

way

back

into

future

editions.

ThebigproblemoftheNSIisthattheresultsarenotveryconvincing.Itisobviousthat

perceptionsdiffervastlyonwhatrankanemergingcountrylikeIndiashouldhave,butitis

clear thatrankingNorwayas the thirdmostpowerfulcountry in theworld is implausible.

Norwayiscertainlyaveryrichcountryduetoitsoffshoreoilandthehighlevelofsocialin

frastructure typicalofScandinaviancountries,whichmakes itoutstandingonapercapita

scale,but it is stilla countrywith less than fivemillionpeople.TheNSImixes aggregate

variables,percapitavariables,andotherattributablevariablestogetherinthemostcareless

manner,sothatsuchresultsnotonlybecomepossiblebutlikely.Ifsomethingcanbelearned

fromtheNSI,itisthataunifiedstandardisasinequanonforapowerindex.Theeasiestsolu

tionwouldbetotransformallvariablesintopositiveaggregatesbeforeaddingthemupac

cordingtotheirweights.HopefullythiswillhappeninthenextNSI.

Furtherresearchshouldbedevotedtoidentifyingotherpowerindexesthatmayhave

beenconstructedinIndiabeforethearrivaloftheInternet.WhiletheNSIisthemajorpower

indexproduced in the country, it is essentially an Indian adaptation of the SinoJapanese

CNPconcept,sotrilateralcomparisonsseemopportune.An intriguingculturalresearch is

suealongtheselinescouldbewhetheranAsianmodeofthoughtisseekingandfindingex

pression in these power formulas.Any early conclusions on this topic are dangerous as

powerformulasaretoofewtoprovesuchhypothesesstatistically;however,thelimitedsetof

availableformulasencouragesspeculation.

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APPENDIXA:NSIComponentsfor2002,2003,2004,2006and2007

TableA1:NSI2002for30countries

A

20.00%

HumanDevelopment

Index

(HDI)

1 20.00% HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)2000

B 20.00% ResearchandDevelopmentIndex(RDI)

2 4.00% Patentsgrantedtoresidentspermillion1998

3 12.00% Researchanddevelopmentexpenditureas%ofGNP,19992000

4 4.00% ScientistsandengineersinR&Dpermillion,19902000

C 20.00% GDPPerformanceIndex(GDPPI)

5 16.00% GDPatofficialexchangerate,2000

6 4.00% GDPgrowthinpercent,2000

D 20.00% DefenseExpenditureIndex(DEI)

7 20.00% Defenseexpenditureatofficialexchangerate,2000

E

20.00%

Population

Index

(PI)18

8 20.00% PopulationxHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),2000

Source: NSCS2003.

SubindexesareidentifiedbycapitallettersAE,componentsarenumbered18;theirrespec

tiveweighting isgiveninthesecondcolumn.Informationforthese indexescamefromthe

HumanDevelopmentReport2002(1,2,3,4,8)andtheMilitaryBalance20012002(5,6,7).This

istheoriginalNSIbytheNSCS.For1,valuesaretakendirectlyfromHDR2002.For2to7,

valuesarenormalizedusingthemaximumvalue,whichisthemethodusedbytheHDIfor

theeducationsubindex:actualvalue/maximumvalue=indexvalue

For8,valuesarenormalizedusing themaximumvalueand theminimumvalue,which is

akintothemethodusedbytheHDIforthelifeexpectancysubindex:

(actualvalueminimumvalue)/(maximumvalueminimumvalue)

=indexvalue

18 George Perkovichmentioned the Population Index (PI) in a lecture,but he incorrectly stated that the PI

rankedIndiatwentyseventhofthe29countriesincluded(Perkovich2003:9).InfactthisistheHDIranking

byitself,withoutbeingmultipliedbypopulation.Inanarticlebasedonhislecture,hecorrectedhismistake

andstatedcorrectlythatIndiaisrankedsecondoutof29countries(Perkovich2004:131).Ascanbeseenfrom

thetable,thePIwasonlyonesubindexamongthefiveequallyweightedsubindexes;Perkovichdidntmen

tiontheotherfoursubindexesnortheNSIitself.

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TableA2:NSI2003for50CountriesSelectedontheBasisofDefenseExpenditures

A 20.00% DefenseIndex(DI)


2 10.00% Armedforcespersonnel

B 20.00% GDPIndex(GDPI)


4 8.00% GDPgrowthin%,20002001

C 20.00% HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)

5 20.00% HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)2000

D 20.00% ResearchandDevelopmentIndex(RDI)

6 12.00% Researchanddevelopmentexpenditureas%ofGNP,19992000

7 4.00% Patentsgrantedtoresidentspermillion,1998


E 20.00% PopulationIndex(PI)

9 20.00% Population2001xHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)2000

Source: Kumar2004b.

Theonlychange in theNSI2003ascompared to theNSI2002was theadditionofarmed

forcespersonnel(2)fortheDefenseIndex(A),whichwascalledtheDefenseExpenditureIn

dexinthepreviousindex.InformationfortheseindexescamefromtheMilitaryBalance2002

2003(1,2,3,4),theHumanDevelopmentReport2002(5,6,7,8,9:HDI),andtheWorldDevel

opmentReport2003(9:population).For5,valuesaretakendirectlyfromHDR2002.For6to8,

valuesarenormalizedusingthemaximumvalue.For1to4and9,valuesarenormalizedus

ingthe

maximum

value

and

the

minimum

value.

Furthermore,

an

alternative

NSI

without

thePopulationIndex(E)isoffered,whichmayindicatethattheinclusionofitwasuptothe

NSIsdesigners,whowereunsurewhethertoincludethissubindexintheNSI.

TableA3:NSI2004for50CountriesSelectedontheBasisofNationalIncome

A 25.00% NationalIncome

1 15.00% GNIatofficialexchangerate,2002

2 10.00% GNIgrowthratein%,20012002

B 25.00% DefenseCapability

3 12.50% Defenseexpenditureatofficialexchangerate

4 12.50% Sizeofarmyintermsofpersonnel

C 15.00% EffectivePopulation

5 15.00% Populationxadultliteracy2001xpercentageofpopulationabovepovertyline

D 15.00% TechnologicalStrength

6 3.00% Patentsgrantedtoresidentspermillion,1999

7 9.00% Researchanddevelopmentexpenditureas%ofGDP,19962000


E 10.00% NationalHealth

9 3.33% Lifeexpectancyatbirth,2001

10 3.33% Incidenceoftuberculosisper100,000citizens,2000

11 3.33% PrevalenceofHIVaspercentageofadults

F 10.00% EnvironmentalVulnerability12 10.00% EnvironmentalVulnerabilityIndex(EVI)

Source: Kumar2005.

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ThemostnotablechangefortheNSI2004wastheadditionoftheEVI,whichhadrecently

been createdbySOPAC.Anotherchangewas that theHDIwasdroppedand replacedby

similarmeasures ineffectivepopulation (C)andnationalhealth (E). Information for these

indexescame

from

the

World

Development

Report

2003

and

2004

(1,

2,

5,

9,

10,

11),

the

Military

Balance20022003(3,4),theHumanDevelopmentReport2003(6,7,8),andtheTechnicalReport

No.356(12)bySOPAC.For6to8,valuesarenormalizedusingthemaximumvalue.For1to

5and9to12,valuesarenormalizedusingthemaximumvalueandtheminimumvalue.

NoNSIwascalculatedfor2005.

TableA4:NSI2006for50CountriesSelectedontheBasisofGDPatOfficialExchange

Rate

A 25.00% GrossDomesticProduct


2 10.00% GDPgrowthratein%



4 12.50% Armedforcespersonnel,2003

C 20.00% EnergySecurity

5 10.00% Percapitaenergyproductioninkilotonoilequivalent,2002

6 10.00% Energyimportsinkilotonoilequivalent,2002


7 6.00% Researchanddevelopmentexpenditureas%ofGDP2002

8 4.50% Researcherspermillion

9

2.25%

Hightechnology

exports

as

percentage

of

manufactured

exports,

2003

10 2.25% Totalnumberofpatents

E 15.00% EffectivePopulation

11 15.00% Populationxadultliteracy19982002xpercentageofpopulationabovepovertyline

Source: Kumar2007.

Themostnotablechangewastheadditionofenergysecurity(C).Furthernationalhealthand

environmentalvulnerability indicatorsweredropped altogether. Information for these in

dexescamefromtheWorldDevelopmentIndicators2004and2005(1,2,5,6,7,8,9,10,11)and

the

Military

Balance

2003

2005

(3,

4).

For

5

and

7

to

8,

values

are

normalized

using

the

maxi

mumvalue.For1to4,6,and9to11,valuesarenormalizedusingthemaximumvalueand

theminimumvalue.Furthersupplementalindexesonhealth,educationandenvironmental

securitywereoffered,butthoseindexesnolongerconstitutedapartoftheNSI.

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TableA5:NSI2007for50CountriesSelectedontheBasisofGDPatOfficialExchange

Rate

A

25.00%

Economic

Strength


2 6.25% AverageannualGDPgrowthratein%,20002005


3 10.00% Armedforcespersonnel

4 7.50% Defenseexpenditureatofficialexchangerate

5 2.50% Mainbattletanks

6 2.50% Aircraft

7 2.50% Principalsurfacecombatants

C 20.00% EnergySecurity

8 10.00% Percapitaenergyproductioninmetrictonsofoilequivalent,2004

9 10.00% Netenergyimportsinmillions,$2004


10 2.25% Hightechnologyexportsaspercentageofmanufacturedexports,2004

11 2.25% Totalnumberofpatents,20002004

12 6.00% Researchanddevelopmentexpenditureas%ofGDP

13 2.25% Researcherspermillion

14 2.25% Scientificandtechnicaljournalarticles,2004

E 15.00% EffectivePopulation

15 9.00% Populationaged1564,2004

16 3.00% Populationeducateduptopostsecondarylevel,2000

17 3.00% PercapitaGDPatofficialexchangerate,2005

Source:Kumar

2008.

Themostnotablechangewastheadditionofpopulationaged1564alongsideothervari

ablestoeffectivepopulation(E).Thisvariableispurelydemographicandhasnothingtodo

withhumandevelopment,thepreviouslysyntheticvariableforeffectivepopulationhaving

beendropped.Furtherchangesweretheadditionofmorevariablesfordefensecapability(B)

andtechnologicalstrength(D).InformationfortheseindexescamefromtheWorldDevelop

mentIndicators2007(1,2,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17)andtheMilitaryBalance20062007

(3,4,5,6,7).For5to8and11to14,valuesarenormalizedusingthemaximumvalue.For1

to4,9to10and15to17,valuesarenormalizedusingthemaximumvalueandtheminimum

value.

NoNSIwascalculatedfor2008.

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APPENDIXB:CompleteListofResultsfromtheNSI,20022007

TableB1:CompositeIndexValuesfromtheNSI,20022007

Country

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

UnitedStates 0.726 0.687 68.51 56.50 57.5

China 0.411 0.551 52.93 45.90 42.5

Japan 0.480 0.481 40.61 26.67 24.1

Russia 0.330 0.386 35.40 26.60 24.8

Norway 0.321 32.87 31.36 29.1

India 0.296 0.384 34.73 27.05 24.6

SouthKorea 0.363 0.404 34.92 19.29 17.4

Germany 0.358 0.384 34.40 19.50 16.7

France 0.346 0.376 32.55 18.18 15.6

UnitedKingdom 0.329 0.358 30.67 19.89 17.2

Sweden

0.400

36.33

17.80

14.1

Australia 0.294 0.334 33.14 18.42 15.0

Belarus 0.255

Israel 0.328 0.352 29.89 15.02 11.9

Canada 0.320 35.13 17.56 14.9

Vietnam 0.230

Switzerland 0.344 33.36 13.28 10.6

Finland 0.233 35.91 17.93 13.2

UnitedArabEmirates 0.225

Denmark 0.314 27.43 16.03 13.0

Oman 0.219

SaudiArabia 0.201 0.216 27.79 24.44 14.8

Italy 0.275 0.307 25.34 13.00 9.9

Hong Kong 20.68

Ukraine 0.306 10.7

Netherlands 0.324 25.87 13.07 10.2

Kazakhstan 0.202

Uzbekistan 0.179 0.223

Brazil 0.240 0.267 26.81 12.58 9.4

Kuwait 0.184 0.213

Morocco 0.198

Spain 0.291 25.59 13.25 10.2

Belgium 0.304 25.94 12.42 8.8

Iran 0.198 0.257 23.83 15.46 11.5

Austria 0.297 25.87 12.16 8.9

Greece 0.222 0.266 24.99 12.01 8.2

Turkey 0.210 0.202 25.96 14.97 10.8

Egypt 0.213 0.272 24.10 11.77 7.9

Mexico 0.238 27.24 12.50 8.7

Singapore 0.255 21.34 13.55 11.7

Algeria 0.157 0.200 24.86 16.55 12.0

Poland 0.258 25.40 12.20 7.2

Malaysia 0.199 0.214 21.92 13.99 9.7

NewZealand 29.58 12.37 8.4

Thailand 0.222 22.35

13.45 8.4

Indonesia 0.191 22.27 14.47 10.0

Ireland 27.07 11.89 10.0

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Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Colombia 0.203 23.57 12.88 8.1

Argentina 0.205 0.217 18.72 13.95 6.1

Chile 0.242 25.51 8.90 4.4

Peru

22.27

9.04

Portugal 0.253 23.56 8.67 4.7

CzechRepublic 26.90 12.03 7.6

Pakistan 0.138 0.193 20.78 13.13 9.0

Venezuela 0.220 21.40 7.55 7.8

SouthAfrica 0.185 0.221 11.47 10.54 7.1

Hungary 23.91 10.95 6.8

Philippines 0.188 16.09 12.11 7.5

Angola 0.136

Bangladesh 17.18 9.89

Nigeria 0.121 8.1

Romania 11.29 7.3

Iraq 0.017

Source: NSCS2003;Kumar2004b,2005,2007,2008.

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