WRIT OF AMPARO

SEC. OF DND ET. AL vs. RAYMUND MANALO, ET AL., OCTOBER 7, 2008

PONENTE: Puno, C.J.

PARTIES:PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINESRESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALONATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining OrderSupreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as Amparo PetitionCourt of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

FACTS:On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.

On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.

While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition.

On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition.

On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond

and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody.

Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions.2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person

may be invoked.

ANSWER:It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements.No.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS

Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.

2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION

Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Some scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

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Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

Freedom from fear as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the “freedom from threat.” Viewed in this light, the “threatened with violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked – While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.

FR.ROBERT REYES vs. SEC. RAUL GONZALES, DECEMBER 3, 2009

FACTS:Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion. On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety. On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge. On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable

cause. On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioner’s letter stating that the DOJ could not act on petitioner’s request until Atty. Chavez’s right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ. On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioner’s counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.

Issue:The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.

HeldThe right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.[20] As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] “xxxa person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.” Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I – XIII, Inc. et al.,[23] this Court ruled that This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads: Section 22.Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. – When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo. Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.[24] We quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this matter: The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[25] that once a complaint or information is

filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondent’s MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).[26]Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[27] thus: Where, as in this case, there is an on going civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.[28] Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watch list Orders and for Other Purposes).WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

MARYNETTE GAMBOA vs. MARLOU C. CHAN et al., July 24, 2012

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity asthe PNP-Provincial Director of Iloco Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, inhis capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte(G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)SERENO, J.:

Facts:On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President".Gamboa alleged that the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–IlocosNorte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone

who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas dataagainst the PNP-Ilocos Norte’s Provincial Director and Chief of the Intelligence Division, in their capacity as such officials. In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database;(b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports. The RTC categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy. Nevertheless, the RTC dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification. Hence, Gamboa filed this Appeal by Certiorari.

Issue:Whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

Held: NO.Ratio:1)The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, the right to privacy is not absolute. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.

2) The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. In order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads: Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission. Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. To enable the Zeñarosa

Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records. A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions. Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a)enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b)maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and(c) investigate and prevent crimes. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored the mand counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is Gamboa. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter. However,to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature.

That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for thi sunintended disclosure In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

Finally, Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

FELIPE NAVARRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUST 26, 1999

Aggravating Circumstance – Crime Committed in Places where Official duties are discharged

Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police station to report for a blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose between police officer Navarro and the two reporters. Navarro then poked his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then irked Navarro and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance against Navarro due to the fact that he committed such crime in the police station?

HELD: A police station is a place wherein public authorities such as policemen are engaged in the discharge of their duties. Since Navarro, who is a cop, committed the crime inside the police station, an aggravating circumstance is appreciated against him.

RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 248 SCRA 590

Facts:A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue:W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The afore stated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape

recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 253 SCRA 699

Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martin’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the

properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.

Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WATEROUS DRUGS CORPORATION vs. NLRC, OCTOBER 16, 1997

PONENTE: DavideFacts:

-Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.-Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tabletsat P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price isP320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640- YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her-Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check forP640 for Catolico.-Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

Issue:-W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held:- Yes Ratio:-Marti

ruling:

the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico.

MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO, JUNE 27, 2001

FACTS:Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where she is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et al. The basis of the Ombudsman ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail managers checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-097-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman by virtue of its power to investigate and to require the production and inspection of records and documents granted to it by RA No.6770.The Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents relative to accounts in issue in line of her persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsman's order which they sais as an unjustified, and is merely intended to delay the investigation of the case; constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by this office punishable as Indirect under R.A. 6770.Petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunctions 8 with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, against the Ombudsman. The lower court denied petitioner's petition. On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director, Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB).Petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that compliance with the Ombudsman’s orders would be in violation of RA. No. 1405.But petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was dismissed. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405)

HELD:The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the

Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What’s existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection. Zone of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.

OPLE vs. TORRES, JULY 23, 1998

Facts:The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled" Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Issue:WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling:YESRationale:As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. o. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, supra

Facts:

Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Issue:Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC tosupervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Held:No.The petition is dismissed. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III,§7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized,” while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.” To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained.

For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest rewarding the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING vs. COMELEC, January 28, 2000

FACTS: Comelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls during elections for the reason that exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion.HELD: Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of speech and of the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the Comelec cannot be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in voting centers.

NOTE: SEARCH AGAIN

SOCIAL WEATHER STATION vs. COMELEC, MAY 5, 2001

Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners

argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”

A.M. 10-4-03 SC RADIO TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN SANDIGANBAYAN, JUNE 21, 2001

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORKS, INC. vs. HON. CESAR DY, APRIL 2, 2009

HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA vs. PDI, MARCH 15, 2009

ISSUES:1. Whether or not petitioner is required to prove malice to been titled to damages?2. Whether or not the respondents are liable for malicious and imputing statements to the petitioner?

FACTS:1. Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the May 11, 1992

elections.2. Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing

Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story: The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayor’s office of Bais City. A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar story, to wit: The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayors office in the city.

3. On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid.

4. Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were maliciously timed to defeat him. He claimed he should have won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by his rivals and voted for other candidates. He asked for actual damages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign, moral damages of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of P300,000 and costs of

suit.5.Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice can be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature.6.On April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner that the defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation with their respective officers are liable [for] damages to plaintiff:

1. As moral damages, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and the Manila[Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation are ordered to pay P1,000,000.00 eachto plaintiff; 2. Both defendants are likewise ordered to pay an exemplary damage in the amount of P500,000.00 each; 3. To pay plaintiff’s attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00 4. And to pay the costs.

7. This petition for review on certiorari assails the Amended Decisiondated May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.54134, reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. 206-B, which had awarded damages to petitioner for respondents false reporting.

RULING:1. YES.The news items derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s reputation and candidacy. It faulted respondents for failing to verify the truth of the news tips they published and held respondents liable for negligence, citing Policarpio v. Manila Times Pub. Co.,Inc. the news items lacked truth and fairness, they were not privileged communications.

2.Although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no proof they were obtained from a press conference or release, respondents were not impelled by malice or improper motive. There was also no proof that petitioner’s supporters junked him due to the reports. Neither was there any proof he would win, making his action unfounded.

3. YES.Petitioner argues that his cause of action is based on quasi-delict which only requires proof of fault or negligence, not proof of malice beyond reasonable doubt as required in a criminal prosecution for libel. He argues that the case is entirely different and separate from an independent civil action arising from libel under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. He claims he proffered proofs sustaining his claim for damages under quasi-delict, not under the law on libel, as malice is hard to prove. He stresses that nowhere in the complaint did he mention libel, and nothing in his complaint shows that his cause of action had some shade of libel as defined in the Revised Penal Code. He also did not hint a resort to a criminal proceeding for libel.4.PDI and its officers argue that petitioner’s complaint clearly lays a cause of action arising from libel as it highlights malice underlying the publications. And as malice is an element of libel, the appellate court committed no error in characterizing the case as one arising from libel.

SORIANO vs. MTRCB, MARCH 15, 20120FACTS:

In a preliminary conference, MTRCB initially filed a 20-day suspension on Soriano following the affidavit-complaints by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo against the remarks made by Soriano in his show Dating Daan: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang

babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumaganalang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putangbabae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mgademonyong ito.

Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration to the MTRCB and a petition for certiorari and prohibition to SC tonullify said preventive suspension. MTRCB, in reviewing the case and in accordance with Implementing Rulesand Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure, found Soriano liablefor his act and imposed a penalty of a3-month suspension from his program.

Soriano then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

ISSUES and RATIO: Petitioner argues: SC refutes:(1) that Sec. 3 of PD1986 unduly infringes on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, speech, and expression.

On freedom of religion:The petitioner’s statements did not convey any particular religious belief, and nothingfurthered his avowed evangelical mission. Merely being in a bible exposition program does not automatically entail that statements made are of a religious discourse. “…he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction.” On freedom of expression:The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

On freedom of speech:Soriano’s statements can be classified somewhat as unprotected speech or low value expression libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, OCTOBER 5, 2010

FACTS:This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist fronts” by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the“transcendental importance”doctrine and theirstatus as citizens and taxpayers.

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to

“close security surveillance by state security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons” and“vehicles with dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with military build.” They likewise claim they have been branded as “enemies of the State.”

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim suchTagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.

Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.

Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear andpanic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous,leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUES:1.WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper NO.2.WON petitioners have locus standi NO.3.WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging” NO.4.WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine NO.5.WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizen NO.6.WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy NO.7.WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism NO.

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

BAYAN, KARAPATAN ET. AL vs. ERMITA ET.AL, APRIL 25, 2006

The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.Issue:

Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 violated their rights as organizations and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005

Held:Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.

Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights.

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies 22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firm ament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No.880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger "standard. In this Decision, the Court

goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.

Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.

Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal.

Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

ESTRADA vs. EXCRITOR, JUNE 22, 2006

Facts:In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.

Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Issue:

Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Ruling:Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

SORIANO vs. LAGUARDIA, APRIL 29, 2009

Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue: Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

Held: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

Section 6

PASTOR AUSTRIA vs. NLRC, AUGUST 16, 1999

Facts:Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law and is represented by the other private respondents. Petitioner was a pastor of SDA until 1991, when his services were terminated. Austria worked with SDA for 28 years. He started as a literature evangelist in 1963 then got promoted several times. He became the Assistant Publishing Director in the West Visayan Mission of the SDA in 1968 and Pastor in the West Visayan Mission in 1972.Finally in 1989, he was promoted as District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA. On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications from Mr. Ibesate, treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking the former to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be made accountable since it was private respondent Pastor Buhat and Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time. Thereafter, petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, president of the Negros Mission, and asked for a convention to settle the dispute between petitioner and Pastor Rodrigo. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner because there was no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until petitioner left the office. However, while on his way out, he heard Pastor Buhat saying, "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough)´ which prompted him to go back and overturn Pastor Buha’s table, scatter books in the office, bang Buhat’s attaché case and throw the phone. Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the meeting to discuss the non-remittance of church collection and the events that transpired between him and Pastor Buhat. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services.(Nakakainis µtong part na µto dahil appeal nang appeal! Hahaha)1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. = decision rendered in favor of petitioner 2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of respondent3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor Arbiter 4) SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision rendered in favor of respondent (grabe ang kulit!)Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner.Issues:

1) WON the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA;

2) 2) WON the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state.

ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EXEC. SEC, 405 SCRA 497

Facts: Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus,

among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.

Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office. On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

Issue:Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

Held:It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

VELARDE vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, 428 SCRA 283

Section 14The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions .They alleged that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion.

ISSUE: What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the challenge Decision comply with the aforesaid form?

RULING:The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors;(4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.

No. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision. The Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the court’s constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition.

TARUC ET. AL. vs. BISHOP DE LA CRUZ, MARCH 10, 2005

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?

Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

CHAVEZ vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744

Facts:Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government official) initiated this original action seeking(1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and(2) to “compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they on going or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

-PETITIONER INVOKESSec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest

“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.”

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed andoperative official acts, not to those still being considered.

Issue:Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

Ruling: “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.”

RD:-The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:

(1) national security matters and intelligence information- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to with hold documents and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection."

(2) trade secrets and banking transactions-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)are also exempted from compulsory disclosure

(3) criminal matters- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts neither mayor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.

(4) other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public." Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings andexecutive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

-In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be "matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."- As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, elucidated: “In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. “ “Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.”-As to whether or not the above cited constitutional provisions guarantee access to information regarding on going negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement, this same clarification was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations,

MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts,agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to theconsummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover bothsteps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of thetransaction?MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.- Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court believes that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed above— such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY, JULY 9, 2002

Facts:On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding. The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal. On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA. The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate Committees. On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domains as blatant violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billion of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit.

Ratio Decidendi: The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. This duties are particularly in answer of the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern, and of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Furthermore,

the court considered that the petition raised matters of transcendental importance to the public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the issues raise are of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the court to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single corporation. The court does not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public. The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal or constitutional question. The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement as required by the constitution. The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently enjoined from implementing the amended JVA which is hereby declared null and void ab initio.

NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, MARCH 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

HELD:

The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more

questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

CENTER OF PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT vs. COMELEC, SEPTEMBER 21, 2010

FACT: Comelec failed to provide plaintiffs with the source code of identified canvass machines despite repeated requests and demands. CenPEG is now praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections, claiming that the source code remained important and relevant "not only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud."Issue:W/N COMELEC could be compelled to release the source code to CenPEG- YES

Doctrine:Pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that "once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof."- The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security reason, "under a controlled environment." The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.