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Alex Hines October 11th, 2014

SPEA-V 502 Case Study Analysis #2

“The Decision to Go to War with Iraq,” discusses factors that led to President

George W. Bush and his Administration’s decision to declare war and overthrow Saddam

Hussein’s regime. Some of these factors include the decision from the administration of

former President George H. W. Bush to not get involved with Iraq and how it affected his

son’s course of action. He also goes on to explain the influence of political appointees in

the bureaucracy on the decision making process. The effect of the September 11th 2001

terrorist attacks on Bush’s decision to invade Iraq is also discussed as an important factor.

Political appointees are individuals selected by either the President, Vice

President, or agency head to positions in the government bureaucracy. The appointees

situated near the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy help sway and carry out the political

agenda of the President or whoever appointed them. In this case, political appointees

who promoted the decision to go to war were Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Chair of the Defense Policy Board Richard

Perle, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, and Lewis Libby, Chief of Staff to

Vice President Richard Cheney. Though he does not meet the exact criteria to be

considered a political appointee Vice President Richard Cheney was one of the pro-war

political appointees’ most influential allies.

Each political appointee played a role in the decision to go to war with Iraq.

Rumsfeld created the Office of Special Plans to do an analysis on the threat of Iraq to

U.S. national security that provided a more favorable outlook to support military action

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than that given by the CIA and DIA. Paul Wolfowitz closely monitored and added

political pressure on CIA analysts to come up with conclusions that favored going to war

with Iraq. Richard Perle chaired the meeting of the Defense Policy Board regarding the

decision whether or not to invade Iraq and also advised Rumsfeld on issues of national

security. Lewis Libby made personal visits with Richard Cheney to the CIA Langley

Headquarters to question the CIA’s analysis on evidence of weapons of mass destruction

in Iraq.

One of the reasons why pro-war political appointees were so effective at

developing their case and setting the policy agenda is because of prospect theory.

Prospect theory describes how emotional tendencies affect our decision-making. This

theory claims that decision-makers will be more risky when presented with a loss rather

than a gain. The factor in this case that helped promote prospect theory was the terrorist

attacks on September 11th, 2001. Americans were looking for a reason why this

happened and someone to blame. September 11th was an emotional event that gave pro-

war bureaucrats the opportunity to point the blame at Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.

Though Al-Qaida claimed responsibility for the events, Bush’s pro-war administrators

claimed the best way to fight the terrorists was to attack their source of funding coming

from Iraq. Also, pro-war bureaucrats explained the situation to Americans in terms of

loss rather than gain. If we did not go to war with Iraq we would have experienced

another event like 9/11 and more lives would be lost. Seeing a substantial loss as the

only outcome of not going to war helped pro-war political appointees effectively develop

their case and push their agenda to go to war.

Another reason why they were effective is because of the priming effect. Priming

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effect is when subconscious and subliminal stimuli affect our decision making without

being readily apparent. In the October 7th 2002 speech that Bush made in Cincinnati, he

stated, “Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking

gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” Bush refers to this smoking gun

in multiple speeches. By doing this he paints a picture for his audience of a mushroom

cloud like the one famously depicted in Hiroshima. This creates an image of fear,

destruction, and death and associates it with the possible consequence of not going to war

with Iraq. This helped push the agenda without it being readily apparent that he was

influencing or manipulating the decision making process.

Political Appointees who were against the decision to go to war with Iraq

included Secretary of State Colin Powell, George Scowcroft, who served as Assistant for

National Security Affairs to former president George H. W. Bush and mentor to

Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary of State James Baker, some CIA officials, and some

active duty and retired military officials. One of the reasons why the anti-war

bureaucrats were ineffective in presenting their case was because of bounded rationality.

Bounded rationality states that people do not have the capacity to be perfectly rational.

One reason is because people sometimes base decisions on limited, and potentially

distorted information. Even when the CIA and the United Nations failed to find weapons

of mass destruction in Iraq the Bush administration would create its own committees and

coalitions (e.g. the Office of Special Plans) to analyze data in favor of their agenda. They

would claim the CIA and United Nations did not look thoroughly enough or were taking

too much time in their search. The Bush administration also obtained information from

British intelligence officials claiming that Iraq was buying uranium and aluminum tubes

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from Niger to build nuclear weapons. However, the CIA discovered that this information

was based on forged documents and tried to convince officials to take it out of the

President’s State of the Union address. The information was still included in the address

and people had to base their decision off this questionable claim. These are only a couple

of examples of how information was distorted in the decision to go to war with Iraq,

making it harder for anti-war bureaucrats to be effective in making their case.

Another reason why they were ineffective is because of the timing of the terrorist

attacks of September 11th, 2001. These attacks emotionally affected the decision making

process of whether or not to go to war with Iraq, making it harder for rational thinking.

Pro-war bureaucrats made claims that Saddam Hussein financially supported Al-Qaida

and was directly involved with 9/11 based on questionable evidence. They said another

attack would happen again unless we go to war and cut major funding to Al-Qaida. The

claim was that winning a war with Iraq would be a victory in the war on terror.

Groupthink is another major reason why those presenting their case against war

were ineffective. Groupthink is when group members striving for agreement, fail to

realistically appraise alternative courses of action. This can cause pressure to conform

and create problems where people are uncomfortable sharing different opinions. Political

appointees who were against the decision to go to war in Iraq were afraid to press their

case because of pressure to go with the popular vote. They feared when reelection time

came around their opponents could use their vote not to go to war against them as well as

lose support from other high ranking political appointees.

There are many lessons we can learn from this case. The first is that when leaders

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approach major decisions they need to avoid groupthink. Groupthink hampers the ability

to realistically appraise different courses of action and inhibits the ability to express

innovative ideas by pressuring conformity. Brainstorming before discussion of what

action to take would help reduce groupthink and promote a wide variety of ideas.

Leaders also need to refrain from expressing early opinions. This will help reduce the

pressure to conform to the popular opinion. Inviting outside experts to help develop and

evaluate alternative solutions will help prevent bias and distorted information from the

decision making process. Also, encouraging people to question ideas and voice concerns

will help prevent making a hasty decision without enough evaluation and interpretation.

Some changes do need to be made to the design and management of intelligence

organizations. The president should not politically appoint agency heads. This causes

political pressure to influence the decisions of these appointees. A non-partisan

government organization or entity should evaluate the criteria needed for the position and

look through potential candidates to see who is most qualified, not who would help most

in promoting certain political agenda. Political appointees promote a spoils system where

people are rewarded with a position based on how well they serve the needs of the person

who appointed them. If we take away the political criteria for these appointments we can

prevent bias, groupthink, and other factors that distort and constrain the decision-making

process and promote rational thinking.