wwii 8th army engineers section

8/3/2019 WWII 8th Army Engineers Section

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a~U 2 1965

LNCEBULLETIN NO.2

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F.NtNER SCTIONHq.ElIGHTH ARMY

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TABLE OF CONTENTSTitle Page No.

Latest Trends in Japanese Mines andObstacle Tactics and Technique 1 - 3Cebu Landing 4 - 7Japanese Mines on Negros Occidental 8 - 10Zamboanga Landing 11 - end

NOTICEThis document is classified as SECRET only because

portions of the contents describe the effectiveness orineffectiveness of Japanese tactics, techniques, andmaterial against our troops. The material contained here-in may be used for the training of troops.

Published byEngineer Section, Headquarters Eighth Army

in April 1945

Distributed to all Eighth Army units; GHQ, SWPA: USAFFE:FEAF: Sixth Army; Seventh Fleet; and Land Headquarters,SWPA.


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LATEST TRENDS IN JAPANESE MINE AND OBSTACLE TACTICSAND TECHNIQUES

The Negros, Cebu, and Zamboanga operations havesupplied a large amount of important information onth e latest Japanese trends in the use of mines, ob-stacles and defensive installations. This specialbulletin is being published on the basis of incom-plete reports in order to make the information a-vailable for use in operational planning and train-ing at the earliest possible date. Publication offurther details will be made at a later date.

In the succeeding articles on the various opera-tions, the following trends will be noted:

a. Japanese beach defenses were wellplanned and would have proved formidable obstacleshad they been adequately defended.

b. The enemy continues extensive use oflarge bombs, charges, and marine mines for blockingroads by cratering and for destroying passing vehiclesand personnel. Methods of detonation include con-tact detonation, electrical control, and control bya pull cord from a foxhole or pillbox.

c. Naval torpedoes are being used as landmines against both vehicles and personnel. At pre-sent, the danger of handling the inertia type fusecommonly used requires that the torpedoes be detonatedin place. In view of the large charge, this is oftendifficult to effect without undue destruction.

DC r.:G^~iDED AT YEf.R INTERVALS;L-.., S I:.lrAFTER 12 YEAi S.DOD DIR 520.10

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d. Most important bridges are being heavilymined but many have been captured intact by surpriseor because of enemy technical deficiencies in settingup the demolition.

e. Most mines were concealed poorly andcould be located visually by trained men. Shellsand aerial bombs set for contact detonation oftenwere buried with the fuse extending above the sur-face. Road mines have been found covered care-fully but obviously with sheet metal, wood covers,pottery jars, or palm fronds. In at least twocases, debris has been scattered along one side ofthe roadway to canalize traffic directly over themine. Many mines have been found unfused and lyingalongside excavations prepared to receive them.

f. The Japanese continue to utilize im-provised wooden box mines.g. Massive anti-tank obstacles in the

form of steel and log fences, anti-tank ditches,and coconut log "asparagus beds" were used ex-tensively at Cebu.

h. At Zamboanga and at Cebu City theJapanese had prepared strongly fortified defensesconsisting of mines, massive road blocks, pill-boxes, and supporting emplacements. Had any realeffort been made to defend them, reduction wouldhave been expensive and slow.

In summation, our latest operations indicatethat the enemy is using an increasing number ofmines, that his mine technique is improving grad-ually, that his field improvisations are excellent,that bridges are being mined and demolished on anincreasingly large scale, and that he is becoming

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adept at designing well integrated beach and citydefenses combining effective engineer obstacleswith protected shelters and weapons emplacements.

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CEBU LANDING(Figure No. 1)

Preliminary reports from Cebu describe the Japbeach defenses as among the most formidable encounteredto date in this theater. The enemy failed to defendthe beach in force, either having been driven fromhis positions by naval and aerial bombardment, havingbeen caught off balance by tactical surprise, or havingintentionally deserted his beach defenses because ofa change in his defensive plan. It is reported thathad the beach been defended strongly, the landing mighthave been very difficult and costly.

A general description of the defensive installationis as follows: (See Figure 1).

Extending the length of the beach (Area 1,2 and 3, Figure 1), on the open sand strip, an anti-personnel barrier 10 feet in width consisting of pointedbamboo barbs 12 - 18 inches long, partially covered byvines, projected from the sand at a 450 angle towardthe sea. In and immediately in rear of these barbswas a field of improvised land mines, principally 77 mmand 155 mm shells and aerial bombs, also extending thelength of the beach and consisting of several shallowbands between the beach and the coastal road. It isreported that these mines were placed with th e nosefuses flush or slightly above sand level, in some casesbeing covered with a board. In general they were easilylocated visually. One report states that the narrowbands comprising the mine field consisted of two rowsof mines in checkerboard pattern, the average distancebetween mines being about 5 feet. Another report statesthat every 10 - 15 feet an armed shell ranging from 1 -200 pounds was buried upright with the fuses just pro-truding above the foamy vine covered surface.

About 50 yards inside the seaward edge of thepalm grove fringing the beach and parallel to the beachwere several lines of strongly prepared palm tree obsta-cles designed to block the advance of tracked or wheeled

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vehicles. Two types are described. One type consistsof several rows of palm logs of about 12 inch diameterembedded vertically or inclined toward the beach andextending above ground level from 3-6 feet. The othertype was a single fence made of heavy log posts sup-porting two horizontal steel railroad rails formingthe body of the fence.

To the rear of these obstacles were severalreinforced concrete blockhouses. Some of these werecamouflaged as nipa huts. The right flank of thebeach defenses (Area 3, Figure 1) consisted of a stronggroup of mutually supporting camouflaged pillboxes,fronted with shallow barbed wire fencing and supportedin depth by a trench network. To the immediate frontof these pillboxes were small stick-like obstaclesprotruding from the surf approximately 2 feet. In-formation on the total number of these block housesand their location is unavailable at present.

All beach exit roads inland past the rail-road were either effectively blocked, mined, or pre-pared for demolition. Roads 6 and 7, Figure 1, wereso effectively blocked that they could not be used.Roads 5 and 15, Figure 1, were mined but easily clearedand made passable. Road 4, Figure 1, is reported tohave been blocked with three road blocks, consistingof cement pipes and coconut logs with 12 mines (77 and105 mm artillery shells and 250 pound aerial bombs)in each block. One of these blocks was covered withfire from a light machine gun which was neutralizedquickly.

The following notes on specific items are not all-inclusive but only representative. Some details maybe inaccurate.

a. On the beach, assault waves sufferedcasualties and delay from mines that were subject tolocation by careful visual observation.

b. The almost continuous band of wet ricefields behind the beach made defiles of all exit roadsand were well integrated into the Jap obstacle plan.

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c. At point 8, Figure 1, a deep crater ata small bridge formed an effective road block. Itwas flanked on one side by an impassable swamp areaand on the other by a series of craters extendingwell into the impassable wet rice fields. 105 mmmines were incorporated into the block.

d. At points 9, 10, 11 and 12 the road wasmined with two rows of mines extending diagonally a-cross the road with 12 mines in each block. Thesewere easily located, being covered rather obviouslyby palm fronds.

e. At point 14, Figure 1, several casualtieswere suffered by an infantry patrol from a mined roadblock of the type mentioned in "d" above. Later in-spection indicated that this block could have beenlocated visually and avoided.

Preliminary reports indicate that Cebu City washeavily mined and fortified. In seven heavy road blocksreported were found 16 depth charges, 1 aerial bomb,and 2 parachute bombs. Details will be published later.

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BEACH DEFENSES - CEBU APPROX. SCALE 1: 11,800 -_COCONUT M WET RICEFigure I - Page 7


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JAPANESE MINES ON NEGROS OCCIDENTAL(See Figure 2)

Mines and prepared demolition charges were usedextensively by the Japs on NEGROS OCCIDENTAL to impedeour advance north on Highway 1 and a major portion ofthe engineer effort was devoted to mine detection andremoval. Various types of mines were encountered, themost common being the aerial bomb buried nose up andprepared to detonate on contact. Mines were found onall the main highways, in city streets, at crossroadsand intersections, and under bridges and culverts.They were a constant hazard to the incautious butfailed to delay our forces materially thanks to vigor-ous forward engineer reconnaissance and the promptaction taken towards their removal.

Mines were commonly laid along the sides andshoulders of the road but in some instances were foundburied in the middle of th e road or in the wheel tracks.Employment was haphazard and no definite mine patternscould be established. Most mines were easily detectedbut some were skillfully concealed and difficult tolocate. Concealment was effected by covering the minewith earth or road dust or in appropriate cases bybrush, sod, and other natural materials. Both visualinspection and the mine detector were used to locateenemy mines.

The usual method of removal involved investigationof the area for booby traps, careful excavation to un-cover the fuse, defusing the mine and removal by man-handling or winch and A-frame. None of the mines en-countered up to 1 April were booby trapped.. Some mineswere not fused and gave evidence of hasty emplacement.

It was demonstrated forcibly that previous vehicu-la r travel over a particular road is no sure guaranteeof its freedom from mines. An engineer truck was over-turned and its occupants injured on the main highwaysouth of Bacolod several hours after the road had beenused by all types of traffic. Wheel and tank tracksleading to the mine crater showed that the mine hadbeen run over by many vehicles before this particularone made the proper contact.


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A lunge mine attack on one of our tanks by a Japin the streets of Bacolod gave further evidence of Nip-ponese fanaticism and willingness to employ suicidetactics. It was reported that bedding rolls carriedon the side of the tank protected it from the explo-sion and damage to the tank was negligible. The Japwas blown to pieces.

All large bridges were mined and prepared forelectrical detonation but the speed of our advancenorth to Talisay permitted their seizure intact. De-molition charges, consisting of aerial 'bombs,artilleryshells, as well as the usual types of Japanese explo-sives, were placed skillfully to blow abutments andcut main stringers. Delousing a bridge required loca-tion and cutting of electrical connections, disarmingthe charges, and removal by manual means.

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ZAMBOANGA LANDING

(Figures 3 - 27)The following information has been extracted from

reports made by the force engineer at Zamboanga:

"MINEFIELD REPORT #1"

"I. GENERAL:

A. The Zamboanga area was the most heavily minedarea encountered by the Division to date. The townand the area along the ocean front and the two air-strips were mined extensively with well-built minechambers, but were never completed in time to be useddefensively. Many mines were found alongside of theprepared mine chambers. There were a considerablenumber of mines in position, armed and ready for action,but due to the lack of camouflage, they were readilydetected and rendered harmless.

B. Mines located to the north of the coastal areaare more deliberate and are better concealed. A lo t ofthe mines are prepared to be fired electrically, witha Jap soldier remaining behind in a pillbox to deton-ate the mines as our troops enter the area. Anothertype of mine was found to be detonated manually by aJap soldier pulling a rope or wire to remove the safetypin and thus detonate the mine.II. TYPES OF MINES:

A. The majority of mines found to date have beena barrel-type sea mine with a pressure detonating device.These mines had been set in prepared chambers in roadsand streets and were also found placed on a built-upsection of ground along a road. The latter were riggedup to be detonated by a rope leading to a nearby emplace-ment where a Jap soldier would pull the safety pin out,allowing a heavy lead weight to fall down the well in-side of the mine, striking the detonator and exploding

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the mine. These were readily detected. (See Figure 3).B. A sea mine about 49" long and 24" in diameter

has also been used along the roads and in buildings.A majority of these mines have been arranged for detona-tion using the rope method mentioned above, but utilizinga lever to smash the glass vial in the lead horn deviceused on the "teakettle" mine. Several of this type werefound with the lead horn bent over but the mine intact.This mine is the type that is fired by the acid in thebroken vial making contact and completing the circuitfor electric detonation. In all mines found the masterswitch has been closed, completing the circuit exceptfor the contact points near the lead horn. (See Figure 4).

C. Aerial bombs of 60 Kg and 250 Kg sizes havebeen found in roadways, placed nose-up and armed withtype A3A Japanese Navy nose fuse. No booster chargeshave been found under these bombs and none of them werebooby trapped. Several bombs found in place were lackingthe nose fuse.

D. Japanese "yardstick mines" have been found, butwere not used extensively. Two were found near SantaMaria attached to a rope so a Jap soldier in an entrench-ment across the road could drag the two mines into thepath of an oncoming tank or vehicle. The rope was plainlyvisible and the soldier had retreated before using it.Three "yardstick mines" were found lying in the middleof the main road just south of the west end of San Roqueairstrip.

E. Box mines both large (12" cube) and small (6"x 6" x 3") also have been used. The large mines werefused with two type 91 hand grenades, but were lackingthe detonators. A crude sack of rocks was attached tothe bottom of each box by ropes. The large box mineshad ropes attached to them so they could be carried asa pack. The small box mines were used by two Japs onan attempted suicidal raid on a PT base at Caldera Point.These mines were armed. The Japs were killed beforethey could use the mines.

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F. The type 93 "tape measure" mine has not beenused in mining roads, but a supply dump of them has beenfound. Detonators for the mines were missing.

G. One "Dotty Lamour" anti-tank grenade was re-covered at Pasananca this date. It was armed with tailfuze, but was lacking the grass skirt. It was droppedby a retreating Jap and not used against our vehicles."

"I. Considerable use was made of artillery shells.One definite mine field was found at Gavilan Point inwhich 38 - 75 mm shells had been placed nose-down incontainers and the ends covered with a 1" x 4" x 4"block of wood. Pressure on the block of wood forces theshell nose fuze onto a tin clip with a firing pin deviceon it and detonates the shell. One shell mine was struckby a 3/4 ton truck and the only damage was a puncturedtire.

III. CONCEALMENT OF MINES:

A. The Japanese did a poor job in camouflagingtheir mines. The small barrel sea mine was generallyset flush to the road surface and for pressure detona-tion. A 2 x 6 plank extended across the roadway setso that a vehicle crossing it would exert pressure onthe mine at the side of the road and detonate it. Othershad a piece of corrugated iron laid over the mine. Someof them were fairly well concealed. This type of mineusing the lead weight and rope for detonation was easilylocated as the mine was placed alongside the road onone side with a pipe leading across the road for thepull wire or rope to pass thru from the mine to the Japin the emplacement. The pipes were flush with the roadsurface, but not covered over.

B. The large type sea mines with the lead hornswere also very easily detected. A majority of this typewere lying alongside of the prepared chamber and werecovered with a few palm branches. Those placed in theirchambers were detected by the wooden framework above theground banked with dirt and sod. The ropes or wires

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leading from the mine to a pill box or emplacementwere placed in metal pipes, bamboo and wooden tri-angular box pipes. Since the ground was raised overthe pipe its position was easily detected.

C. The aerial bombs used as road mines were fair-ly well concealed, only a small portion of the bombnose and the fuze protruding, but enough to be seen.IV. DUMMY EQUIPMENT:

A. In one Jap headquarters building were severalwooden "Dotty Lamour" anti-tank grenades and also severalwooden "yardstick mines" Three dummy Japanese tanketteswere located in the vicinity of San Roque strip.V. BOOBY TRAPS:

A. Extensive use was made of the 60 Kg. aerialbomb as a man-controlled booby trap. These were foundthroughout the area. The bomb was placed on its side,covered with palm branches, armed with the JapaneseNavy A-3-B bomb nose fuze, with a rope or wire attachedto the safety pin. This rope ran to an emplacement wherea Jap soldier could operate it. This type of fuze hadthe arming vanes turned out and the shear wire replacedby a safety pin with an eye on it. When the safety pinwas withdrawn, a strong rubber band, which was attachedto the arming vanes and the fuse base, would drive thefiring pin into the detonator cap and explode the bonb.The rope lying on top of the ground was the key to locat-ing the booby trap. Some of the ropes were green, othersnatural color.VI. MINEFIELD PATTERNS:

A. Two definite minefields have been found to date;one consisted of 12 - 60 Kg. aerial bombs in a roadwaynear San Roque village and the other was a field of 38 -75 mm artillery shells in an area next to a road nearGavilan Point. The pattern of the field in each casewas easily detected by eye. (See Figures 5 and 6).

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B, The practice of placing other road mines atroad junctions was followed. There were a lot of minesfound at the entrance to a coconut grove where pill boxesexisted. These mines were placed just off the road be-tween the shoulders and the first row of trees."

"VII. METHODS OF DISARMING:A. The small barrel-type sea mine has been dis-

armed in two ways, depending on whether the pressure de-vice or lead weight was used for detonation. The detona-tor booster charge, etc. of the pressure type was justpulled and disassembled. The lead weight of the secondtype was carefully removed with the safety pin in place.The detonator charge was then withdrawn. The disarmedmine was lifted out of place by means of a wrecker.

B. The large 49" x 24" sea mines were disarmedby opening the master switch on the rounded end of themine and then unscrewing th e lead horns from th e otherend. Next, the booster charge assembly was removed fromthe middle portion of the mine.

C. The artillery shells used as mines were dis-armed by simply withdrawing the shell from its containerin the ground. Any that were difficult in withdrawingwere removed by fastening a winch cable to it and pull-ing it out from a safe distance.

D. The aerial bombs were disarmed by unscrewingthe bomb nose fuse and lifting the bomb out of the groundby hand or by a truck crane.VIII. SUMMARY:

A. Two companies of this battalion were employedin removal of mines in addition to their other work.One company did not require the use of their mine detec-tors as all the mines they encountered were visible andeasily located. The other company used their mine detec-tors only as a check of a section of road where there was

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were also designed for impact firing. Aerial bombsranging from 60 kilograms to 250 kilograms were usual-ly found above ground with nose fuses prepared to func-tion as pull type firing devices. Isolated bombs werefound buried with fuses up and prepared for normal im-pact functioning.

b. During the period following the landing(10 March 1945 to 15 March 1945) the enemy failed tocamouflage mines properly and in many instances failedto place firing devices or detonators in the mines.Other mines were found with detonators and firingmechanisms prepared in such a manner that functioningwas impossible except by detonation of another explo-sive at close range. (It is believed that the latterresulted from lack of understanding by enemy troops ofthe proper functioning of the detonating mechanism).In the period covered by this report, however, theenemy has been more thorough in his camouflage as wellas in his manner of placing and preparing firing devicesand fuses. Natural camouflage had been used in all in-stances.

c. No dummy minefields have been encountered.However, since the enemy occasionally mined a road withconcrete-topped depth charges placed approximately 25meters apart in line along the axis of the road, onewater pipeline similarly installed with concrete boxcouplings above the surface served the purpose of adummy field until investigated.

d. No booby traps have been encountered.e. Enemy troops infiltrating our positions

at night occasionally left mines in our areas in local-ities used by our vehicles.

2. Mine Types.a. A Japanese naval torpedo dump built into

the side of a mountain one kilometer north of Santa Mariawas blown by the enemy while the area was in the handsof friendly infantry, causing 61 casualties. The methodof detonation is unknown, but it appears to have been by

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electrical means. The explosion literally moved a moun-tain side and scattered debris over an extensive area.It is estimated that approximately eighty torpedoeswere included in the charge, with twenty torpedoes leftunexploded but widely scattered by the explosion.

b. (1) In the vicinity of Pasonanca navaltorpedoes without propelling mechanisms were found ingroups of two or three approximately thirty meters a-part. All were placed off the road and camouflaged onlyby grass. Mines were set to be detonated from pillboxesseventy-five meters away, using a 3 /8" pull cable.

(2) The firing device appeared to be acomplex mouse trap arrangement (not improvised) whichwas held in a safe position only by a nail wedged be-tween two spring-operated levers which moved in oppositedirections. (See Figure 14).

(3)' The manner of preparing the firingmechanism made it dangerous to attempt to remove thedetonator. Naval torpedo experts advised blowing inplace in spite of damage to roadway, buildings, andwater pipes.

c. Ehemy infiltration parties buried two yard-stick mines in the dust of a road leading to a POL dump.Both mines were effective, partially destroying two ve-hicles and causing three casualties.

d. An M-4 tank detonated a 60 kilogram bombplaced nose-up in a field of twenty-one such mines camou-flaged with palm branches. Fuses were type A-3-A. Thetank suspension system was destroyed and six casualtiesresulted.

e. One bangalore torpedo with pull type fuse,lunge mines, and grass skirt mines have been encountered.These had not been placed in fields but were found indumps or being carried by Japanese attempting to infil-trate behind our lines."

* * - * * * *

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*i * * * * * * *

REPORT OF ENMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS #1

I. General.a. The Japanese had prepared a well integrated de-

fensive system for the Zamboanga area. The beaches andsea wall from Gavitan Point to Zamboanga were covered

by an extensive system of well-built and well-camou-flaged pillboxes with protective wire. To the West ofGavitan Point the beach area contained only scatteredinstallations. It was apparent from the nature of thebeach defenses that the enemy expected the main assaultto take place over the sea wall or a few hundred yardswest of the wall.b. San Roque Drome was protected on the West, South,

and East by pillboxes, trenches, dugouts, and wire con-structed to provide centers of resistance at strategicpoints. There was no continuous integrated line in thevicinity of the drome.c. The main enemy positions began approximately

three kilometers north of the beach and extended approx-imately five kilometers in depth. These positions wereplaced to dominate all approaches with excellent andunhindered observation of the entire plain. While theenemy held these defenses it was impossible to preventour movements from detection. This mountainside defen-sive position was made up of thousands of yards of mu-tually supporting pillboxes and trenches covering bothridges and draws. The system gave every evidence ofbeing well planned, organized, and constructed.d. Existing roads were adequately covered by pill-

boxes or dugouts placed approximately twenty yards toeither side or directly at intersections.

e. As in the past the enemy made use of hillsidecaves and tunnels. These were made a part of the mu-tually supporting positions wherever they existed.

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Types included trenches with prepared firing steps,communication t renches, and connecting trenches. Somepiliboxes were provided with trenches radiating approx-imately fifteen yards from the trench to provide allaround squad protection."

"b. Attached sketches (Figures 17 to end) are selfexplanatory."

* *c * * *i *

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Soo ~4h~1LeadI

SMALL SEA BARREL MINENote: Mine is detonated by a lead weightfo r pressure detonation, the booster is roisedby a wood plug so that it extends above the ie

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Figure 4 -Page 2 3


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'MINEFI ELD PATTERN*

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MINEFIELD PATTERN

Bombs 24 apart except Zamnboanga. - -' I8 aparf ____ ____ as shown ____ ________ ___

12' -/2 9 12

424,r 9 1ie d co is tin o /2- 0 g bo mrs loca e neaSan R-oque village


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PHOTOGRAPH ANNEX 20 March 1945

LEAD /1400e

Lead horn assembly unit with lever attaohment usedon the large barrel sea mine. A pull-rope was attach-ed to the lever to break the acid vial in the lead horn.

C!,6I~

Component parts of lead horn assembly unit.Lead horn. (B) White rubber sack for acid vial.Acid vial with spring and cork wrapping.

(A)(C)

Figure 7 - Page 26


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A

A.3sf 13 ~L /

Complete and disassembled units of detonating de-vice used in Depth Charge shown in photo no. 5. Awood cap (A) is replaced by the metal cap (B). A wideflange has been welded on metal cap (C) to provide ad-ditional contact for pressure detonation. Firing pinis (D), detonator cap (E), and booster charge (F).For manual detonation of mine, lead weight (G) is drop-ped by pulling holding pin and falls 10" to strike cap(C).

SA

xiAnother view of items in photo No. 3.

Figure 8 - Page 27

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Depth Charge. The protruding wooden plug is usedto hold the detonator unit inside the mine so that themetal cap is above the ground.

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Type A-3-B aerial nose fuze prepared for manualpull firing as used in 60 Kg. bombs. The shear wirein the fuze has been replaced by safety pin (A). Thearming vanes are retracted to armed position. When thesafety pin is withdrawn by the rope (B), a strong rub-ber band (C) pulls the arming vane forward driving thefiring pin into the detonator (D). The rubber band isheld in tension by the arming vanes and two nails in-serted as shown.

Figure 9 - Page 28

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44;

Another view of type A-3-B aerial nose fuze.

A--B

One pound of Type 88 explosive in cardboard con-tainer. Recess in end is for inserting blasting capand fuze and tying in place with cords (A). Cord (B)is used to tie the charge to object to be destroyed.Size of unit 3x" diameter x 4" long.

Figure 10 - Page 29


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Improvised grenades. 25 mm shell (A) is filledwith nails (B), gravel (C) and Picric Acid (D). Safe-ty fuse and blasting cap (E) fit into paper sack (F).Beer bottle (G) used as improvised grenade with ironfilings for shrapnel effect.

5 A

A.T. grenade, "Dotty Lamour", less grass tail (A).Wooden dummy grenade (B).

Figure II - Page 30


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/

Miscellaneous Items.gas molotov cocktail (B);grenade (D), and model 89Type "93" land mine (A);small box mine (C); type "97"grenade (E).

Scene explosion of Jap torpedo dump. Cocoanuttrees in foreground knocked over by explosion.Figure 12 - Page 31


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Unexploded torpedoes at scene of explosion. Partsof small railway car visible on right side.

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Close-up view of torpedo.

Figure 13 - Page 32

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Torpedo minus propelling mechanism used as a mine.Hole 2' deep. The empty box contained the fuze assem-bly.

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Close-up view of fuze assembly in torpedo warheadmine.

Figure 14 - Page 33


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Figure 15 - Page 34


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t1--1

Figure 16 - Page "35

oLE6ENO.tf Larqe SeaMne.,o Small Sea Nine0i Aerial Bomb Pline 604


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K EY MA PSHOWING THE AREAS. THAT HAVE BEEN SURVEYED

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Scale (Approx)0 /000 2000 3000 406

NOTE: THIS OVERLAY WASNO. 5731- IV,5 ZAMBOANGI MADE FROM SF4EET

00 YARDS

MINDANAO , I: 50,000


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AREA -A-

P/LLOOXES, Concrete 6

Log 20

SHELTER, Air roid 5

REVETMvENT, Log /

ENTRENCHMENTS

Figure 18 - Page 37

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AREA "B"

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P/I /8OXF5, ConcreteLog 9

S/ELTERS, Air raid 8

ENTRENCHMENTS

D Destroyed 0

X x Wire, 3.' high, single apron

AEMARKS: Ports of this areo hove been regroded for our use,oblferating some enemy defences

Figure 19 - Page 38

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AREA C-

DcPILLBOXES, Concrete 3 D Destroyed 2iLLog /0 2Os SHELTERS, Air raid /2 l

.TANKL5STACLES, Log /VN/ENTRENCHMENTS

X x X X WIRE , 3' high, Single apron., Ji

REMARKS Concrete Pi1/box was camnouflogedto look like o dwelling

Figure 20 - Page 39


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AREA-D

.9L P/LLBOXES ,Log /IOS SHEL TERS, Air roid /3

u REVETMENT, Log /....TAN/K OBSTA4CLE, Log

./-\a E/VTRENCHM/EN/TSx xx xx WIRE, 3'high, single apron

D Desfroyed 30

Figure 21- Page 40


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AREA -E-

et + 4L* 4f44 1 444444 *.4.e t'4}

P/LL BOXES, Log 3TANKA OBSTACL ES , LogENTRENCHlMENTSWIRE, 3' high, doub/e oporon

0 Destroyed /

Figure 2 2 -Page 41


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AREA -F-

cPILL BOXES ,Concre,'e 2 e Des frayed 29L Log 7 ., 3QS. SHELTERS, Air raid 6QCAVES , 3

u GUN P05/ T/OMS, Open 7%A. ENRENCHIMEWT5xxxx WIRE High, double 'apron

High fenceSfow,

Figure 23 -Page.42


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AREA -G-

PILLBOXES Concrete / PD eslroyedL g /

Qs SHELTERS Lo4' 5

ti CAVES, /\/'\ [A'TRENCHAIEMT5

o FOX HOLES , 4xx WIRE , #/igh double apron

Figure 24 -Page 43


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AREA -H-

CAVES

I' "

Figure 25 -Page .44


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PILLBOXES / Log 6 D DestrOyed .3SHELTERiS / Log 9 " 0FOX AIOLES, /0[/VTRENCH/vENT$, Loco ted under tree thickelsWIRE / 3' high, double apron

Figure 26 - Page 45

AREA -I-

Os0


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COMBINED RMSRESEARCH IBRARYFORTLEAVENWORTH, KS

3 1695 00701 4830

AREA "J-

P/LLSOXES log" Smoll 5

\-V ENTRENCHMEWTSx WIRE , 3' h4igh, douh/e apron

Figure 27 - Page 46

D Destfroyed


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ADDENDA

Additional information about the fuse assembly ofthe Jap naval torpedo used as a mine has just been re-ceived from Zamboanga in time to be included in thisbulletin.

"The detonating mechanism is an all-way inertiatype operated by approximately seven pounds pressurein any direction. When used in water the fuse armsitself through a rotating vane in the same manner asan aerial bomb fuse. When prepared as a land mine,the fuse is manually armed and ingeniously rigged forfiring by a wire attached to the inertia cup. An anti-withdrawal wire is also attached.

This mine is extremely dangerous to disarm andit is recommended that the mine be destroyed in placeunless removal is absolutely necessary. CUTTING THEPULL WIRE OR ANTI-WITHDRAWAL WIRE IS DANGEROUS, sincethe release of any springs in the mechanism jars theinertia cup sufficiently to cause detonation and be-cause slight tension on loose wires will also detonatethe fuse."


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wwii 8th army engineers section

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