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WWII Operation Queen
Operation Queen was an American operation during World War II at the Western Front at the
German Siegfried Line. The operation was aimed against the Rur River, as a staging point for a
subsequent thrust over the river to the Rhine into Germany. It was conducted by the 1st and 9th
U.S. Army. The offensive commenced on 16 November 1944 with one of the heaviest Allied
tactical bombings of the war. However, Allied advance was unexpectedly slow, against heavy
German resistance, especially in the Hürtgen Forest through which the main thrust of the
offensive was carried out. By mid-December the Allies finally reached the Rur and tried to
capture its important dams, when the Germans launched their own offensive dubbed Wacht am
Rhein. The ensuing Battle of the Bulge led to the immediate cessation of the Allied offensive
efforts into Germany until February 1945.
Background
In June 1944, the Allies conducted the invasion in Northern France and opened a second front.
After the Allied breakout from the Normandy, the German Wehrmacht was involved in a string
of disastrous battles in July and August, most notably the Falaise pocket. Following those events,
the German defense in northern and western France disintegrated, leading to a hasty retreat of the
German forces. The rapid Allied advance together with ongoing march of the Red Army in the
east let the Allied High command believe that the Wehrmacht was about to collapse and total
victory could be achieved by Christmas 1944. The Allies therefore launched a high risk plan for
a direct thrust through the Netherlands into Germany, called Operation Market Garden. This
overly ambitious plan failed, as the Wehrmacht was able to reorganize itself and consolidate its
strength. By mid-September, the Allied advance abruptly ended, as the Allies suffered from a
supply crisis, because they outran their supply lines. This gave the Germans further time to
prepare for the upcoming Allied offensives. The Germans now could man the fortifications of
the Westwall (Siegfried Line), although its old bunkers were more a symbolic than a real
obstacle for the Allies.
In the north in Belgium, the Allies were still involved in the Battle of the Scheldt, while in the
south in France the Lorraine Campaign was still ongoing. In the center, the Battle of Aachen was
fought from 2-21 October at the German border. The heavy German resistance upset Allied plans
for a fast resumption of the rapid advance. As preparation for Operation Queen, a preliminary
offensive into the Hürtgen Forest had to be carried out, to secure the flanks against a possible
German counterattack out of the forest. The goal was to clear a pathway to the important road
junction at Düren, to gain a respectable starting position for Queen. The 9th Infantry Division
was already engaged in the forest since September, so only moderate German resistance was
expected. On 2 November, three days before the anticipated start of Operation Queen, the
offensive against the town of Schmidt was launched by the 28th Division against the German
275th Division. The town was captured, but the Germans reacted swiftly by reallocating forces
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of the 89th Infantry division and mobile reserves from the 116th Panzer Division, which drove
the Allies out of the town, transforming the battle into a bloody stalemate.
Planning
The Allied High Command planned a large offensive in the area of the 9th U.S. Army together
with the 1st U.S. Army and parts of the British 2nd Army against the Rur River, intending to
establish bridgeheads at Linnich, Jülich and Düren. The 1st Army - already stationed near the
Hürtgen Forest - had to carry out the main effort through the Hürtgen Forest toward the Rur
River. The 9th Army had to advance north of the forest through the Rur plains. The British XXX
Corps - together with units from the U.S. XIII Corps - had to reduce the Geilenkirchen salient in
the north in a different operation named Operation Clipper. The long term target after the Rur
was crossed was to reach the Rhine and establish bridgeheads at Krefeld and Düsseldorf to
secure further advances inside Germany after the winter. A great number of American and
British strategic bombers were to conduct a series of tactical assaults in the area to cut supply
lines and destroy enemy infrastructure, and also to attack the enemy defenders inside their
positions.
The entire operation was codenamed Operation Queen. The 8th U.S. Air Force was to bomb the
fortifications around Eschweiler and Aldenhoven, while the medium bombers of the 9th Air
Force were assigned to the second line of defense around Jülich and Langerwehe. At the same
time the RAF Bomber Command was to hit the traffic centres of Jülich and Düren hard; the
smaller towns of Heinsberg, Erkelenz and Hückelhoven were designated as secondary targets.
Initially, the starting date of the offensive was set for 5 November, later 10 November, but
because of bad weather it was delayed until 16 November. The ground offensive was to begin
immediately after the air raids, allowing the defenders no time to reestablish fortifications,
supply routes and communications.
Bradley, Gerow, Eisenhower and Collins
The German planning was entirely different. Running out of strategic options, the Wehrmacht
planned an all-out counteroffensive in the West, codenamed Wacht am Rhein. The first draft of
the plan was already completed in secret in October 1944 and was aimed against the Ardennes,
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mirroring the successful campaign in 1940 against France. The plan required for the best
divisions of the Wehrmacht to be held back from the autumn fighting, to gain time to build them
up for the planned offensive. For the successful execution of the plan, the holding of Rur River
line was deemed as absolutely important, to prevent the Allies from a flanking attack. The
German plan for the November-December Campaign was therefore to hold the Rur River line
with a minimum of available forces until the Ardennes Offensive could be launched.
The Germans also had a card up their sleeve. With control over the the dams on the Rur, they
could release the water from them and flood the Rur valley and everything else downstream of it
as far as the Meuse and into Holland. That would cause large scale destruction and destroy
Allied bridges over the Rur, isolating all troops east of the river. The Allies did long not fully
recognize the strategic importance of the dams, and only days before the end of the offensive
they made their first specific moves towards them.
Rundstedt (middle) and Model (left) planning the Ardennes Offensive
Opposing Forces
The Allied forces participating the operation were the U.S. 1st and 9th Armies, assigned to Omar
Bradley's 12th Army Group. The 1st Army's units for the operation consisted of the V and VII
Corps, that latter assigned for the main thrust through the Hürtgen Forest, with V Corps
protecting its southern flank. For the upcoming offensive, both armies were heavily reinforced.
Total strength of the 1st Army rose from about 250,000 in September to about 320,000 before
the offensive, although only about 120,000 troops would participate in the main operation. The
1st Army's tank strength was about 700 tanks. In October the Allies suffered from major supply
shortcomings, but by early November those had been mostly resolved. The 9th Army was
somewhat smaller, consisting mainly of the XIX Corps and some independent divisions, with the
XIII Corps in reorganization. As support for the ground operations, the Allies planned their
largest tactical bombing of the war, with employing more than 4,500 planes.
After the chain of disasters in the summer of 1944, the Allies expected the Wehrmacht to be
unable to recover, but the opposite was true. Although manpower losses were enormous, the
Wehrmacht compensated this with transferring men from the Reserve Army, the Luftwaffe and
the Kriegsmarine into frontline troops for rebuilding their forces. Regarding industrial production
the situation was even better.
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Despite the increasing Allied bombing campaign and the loss of territories and factories,
Germany reached its peak of wartime production in the autumn of 1944, after the reforms of
Albert Speer and the increased use of forced labour. For the preparing of the Ardennes
Offensive, the 5th Panzer Army was pulled out of the front and replaced by the 15th Army,
although for deception purposes its name was changed to conceal this fact. The Allies therefore
faced two armies: the 15th Army in the Hürtgen Forest; and the 7th Army in the north in the Rur
plains. Although nominally an equal force to the Allies on paper, the Germans were heavily
outnumbered. In some sectors the ratio of attacker to defender was about 5 to 1. The reason for
this were still heavy manpower problems. Most of the German units were seriously
understrength, with some divisions consisting of only a few thousand men. However, heavy
entrenchment and the availability of considerable tank and artillery support went someway to
compensate for those problems. The German troops were commanded by OB West
Generalfeldmarshall Gerd von Rundstedt and commander of Army Group B Generalfeldmarshall
Walther Model, with the latter considered a skilled defense specialist.
Offensive
Preliminary Air raids On 16 November 1944 between 11:13 and 12:48, the Allied bombers conducted the preliminary
bombings of Operation Queen. 1,204 heavy bombers of the U.S. 8th Air Force hit Eschweiler,
Weisweiler and Langerwehe with 4,120 bombs, while 339 fighter bombers of the U.S. 9th Air
Force attacked Hamich, Hürtgen and Gey with 200 short tons (180 t) of bombs. At the same
time, 467 Handley Page Halifax and Avro Lancaster heavy bombers attacked Düren and Jülich;
180 British bombers hit Heinsberg.
The result of the bombing was mixed. The German towns being hit suffered from severe
destruction. German communications after the bombing were heavily impaired, and there was a
considerable effect on the morale, especially on units consisting of more younger and
inexperienced troops. However, the direct damage dealt to the German frontline troops was low,
and casualties were few. Allied air commanders admitted that the bombing did not measure up
the expectations. About 12 aircraft were shot down during the initial bombing by meager anti-
aircraft fire.
First Army's advance through the Hürtgen Forest
VII Corps November fighting
Together with the bombing raids, heavy artillery raids preceded the main thrust of J. Lawton
Collins VII Corps. Opposed to his units, were the shattered forces of LXXXI Corps, commanded
by Friedrich Köchling. The LXXXI Corps consisted of three divisions: the 3rd Panzergrenadier
Division, the 246th Infantry Division and the 12th Volksgrenadier Division. Another unit, the
47th Volksgrenadier Division was in process to be transferred to the front. It was mostly made
up from 18-19 years old Luftwaffe personnel. All the German divisions were seriously
understrength, but mobile artillery and tank reserve was available.
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The offensive from November until 9 December
The attack of VII Corps commenced with a two-pronged attack with 1st Infantry Division on the
right and the 104th Infantry Division on the left. In its initial attack 1st Division was only able to
make ground slowly against the 47th VGD around Hamich. Casualties were heavy, especially
after reinforced counterattacks by the mobile reserves from the 116th Panzer Division. After four
days of fighting, Hamich was taken, but 1st Division had only advanced about 3.2 km (2.0 mi)
with casualties being already over 1,000 men.
Meanwhile Collins ordered the American 3rd Armored Division to be split into CCA and CCB.
CCA was assigned to assist the 104th Division, while CCB would act independently to take four
villages (Werth, Koettenich, Scherpenseel, and Hastenrath) in the northwestern fringes of the
Hürtgen Forest, defended by the 12th VGD. This small corridor between the 1st and the 104th
Division was one of the few places suitable for an armored thrust. Although CCB was able to
accomplish its task in three days, the heavy mud had hindered its movement and tank casualties
were heavy; CCB lost 49 out of 69 tanks.
1st Division's advance continued to be slow. The German defenders were in a favorable
heightened position, in which they could overlook the approach routes of the Allied forces. The
German tactic was to fight mainly in the thick woods, where American artillery and aerial
support was ineffective and a state of bloody trench warfare emerged. The Americans had to take
hill after hill in heavy fighting, while casualties were mounting. Numerous German
counterattacks slowed the advance down even more, often taken ground back which had been
just captured in a bloody fight. In an act of desperation Collins moved in virtually all of his
available artillery to blast a way for the 1st Division on 21 November.
With the Allied advance flagging already in the first phase of the offensive, CCA of the 3rd
Armored Division was assigned to the northern part of the 1st Division's left flank. The armored
attack was able to capture the castle at Frenzerburg (near Inden). This fight lasted until 28
November. Meanwhile GFM Rundstedt decided to inject some reinforcements to the battle, but
only if simultaneously 2 divisions were pulled out from the front for the Ardennes Offensive
preparation. Therefore the 3rd Parachute Division was transferred to the front, while the bled out
12th and 47th VGD were withdrawn. The logistical difficulties and the inexperience of the new
opponent aided 1st Division and it was finally able to push out of the forest, taking Langerwehe,
Jüngersdorf and Merode until 28 November. Nevertheless the dire situation did not changed, and
a violent counterattack by 3rd Parachute Division at Merode led to the destruction of 2
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companies. At the beginning of December, 1st Division was worn out and had already suffered
about 6,000 casualties.
German artillery in the Hürtgen Forest
The advance of the 104th Division went somewhat better. The unit secured the left flank of VII
Corps between the First and the Ninth US Army. The target of the unit was the industrial triangle
at Eschweiler-Weisweiler and the Eschweiler woods at Stolberg. This part of front was
dominated by the Donnerberg near the identical named village. The division faced the German
12th VGD as well as the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division. During the first days heavy fighting
ensued at the Donnerberg, but by 19 November the important hill was in American hands. After
that, the division renewed its drive and headed for Stolberg and Eschweiler simultaneously.
Stolberg was taken on the same day, but German resistance at Eschweiler was heavy, so the
Americans attempted to encircle the town. This worked and the German command decided to
withdraw from the town, abandoning it to the 104th Division. The division then advanced
alongside the western bank of the Inde River. Heavy fighting ensued, and the 12th VGD fought
to its near destruction, until it was replaced by the incoming 3rd Parachute Division. By 26
November Weisweiler was taken after the Germans choose to retreat from the town. Inden fell
on 30 November, bringing the industrial triangle into American hands. The 104th Division now
held the western bank of the Inde and was ready to cross the river to push to the Rur.
The crossing of the river at Lamersdorf commenced on 2 December. It was initially successful
and in a swift advance the real objective, Lucherberg was taken. The division was still
conducting mop-up operations, when the German mounted a counterattack assisted by heavy
tanks against the town. The intense fighting raged only for hours and at 5 December the town
was finally secured, when Collins ordered a ordered a pause due the slow advance of the other
divisions of the corps.
Aside from the double thrust conducted by the 1st and 104th Division, the American command
had determined that another attack route should be taken towards Düren. This task was passed to
the 4th Infantry Division, which was positioned at VII Corps southern wing to take a route
between Hürtgen and Schevenhütte, also capturing the villages of Kleinhau and Grosshau. Here
the division would take over positions of the depleted 28th Infantry Division, which had been
badly mauled during the preliminary fighting of Operation Queen at Schmidt. This position was
still held by the weakened but experienced German 275th Infantry Division. The thinned out
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German lines could not offer as much resistance as in early November, but the difficult terrain as
well as the mines caused heavy casualties to the Americans.
After five days of fighting, the division had only advanced about 2.5 km (1.6 mi), but had
already suffered 1,500 casualties. At the same time the German command again made changes to
the order of battle. The 116th Panzer Division, which had helped to mount several counterattacks
during the early fighting, was withdrawn on 21 November from the area to be refitted for the
upcoming Ardennes Offensive. The same was for the understrength 275th Division. As
compensation, the inexperienced 344th Volksgrenadier Division was released and rushed to the
front, while the 353rd Volksgrenadier Division was placed behind it as reserve force.
V Corps joins the offensive
The initial planning did not see a deployment of General Gerow's V Corps until VII Corps had
achieved a major breakthrough. V Corps then would have to make a close drive together with
VII Corps towards Bonn. However, after the first days the American senior command realized
that VII Corps need extra assistance to achieve a breakthrough. Therefore V Corps was ordered
to join the fighting. The Corps was situated south of VII Corps. Gerow's first action was to
relieve the 28th Division with the 8th Infantry Division, to assist the drive of the already fighting
4th Division. The division was assisted by a CCR from the 5th Armored Division. The corps
took over Hürtgen and Kleinhau as objectives from the 4th Division and started its attack on 21
November.
Engineers repairing a muddy road in the Hürtgen Forest
The advance of the 8th Division was steady, but very slow. 4th Division reached Grosshau on 25
November, but could not capture it due to heavy resistance and coordination problems with the
armor. At the same time, the tanks of CCR tried a direct assault on Hürtgen, which ended in
complete failure against German anti-tank positions. In a renewed attack conducted by infantry
only, Hürtgen was taken on 28 November. The 4th and 8th divisions simultaneously attacked
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Grosshau and Kleinhau on 29 November, and both towns were captured the same day. This
success spurred the American efforts. The 8th Division together with the CCR continued its
advance for the next days eastwards towards the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge. Brandenberg was
taken on 2 December. The same day a rare massive Luftwaffe raid occurred with about 60
planes, but did only minor damage. On 5 December Bergstein fell. Facing the Allied advance,
the Germans mounted a massive counterattack into the town. During the night and over the next
day heavy fighting ensued until the German forces were repulsed, and Castle Hill, an important
hill beyond Bergstein overseeing the town, was taken. V Corps was now in striking distance of
the Rur and reached the river a day later.
In the meantime 4th Division also had made some progress. After the capture of Grosshau, the
division was aided by the armored forces of the CCR. The division now headed for Gey, which
was reached on 30 November, but heavily defended. 2 days later the Germans mounted a
counterattack out from Gey, which caused heavy casualties. The attack was only stopped by
intense artillery fire. Since the beginning of the offensive, 4th Division had already lost about
6,000 men and was now unable to conduct further offensive operations. Subsequently, Collins
decided to halt its offensive operations and pulled the division out to replace it with the 83rd
Infantry Division on 3 December.
At the beginning of December, 1st Army had fought its way through most of the Hürtgen Forest.
Although V Corps had reached the Rur at the very southern wing, VII Corps was still short of its
objective of reaching the Rur. Casualties for this campaign were tremendous. The fighting for the
Hürtgen Forest, which lasted already since September, had cost the Americans about 32,000
men.
Ninth Army's advance through Rur plains
Parallel to 1st Army's advance through the Hürtgen Forest, 9th Army had to advance through the
Rur plains. This terrain was fundamentally different from the dense forest, consisting of flat
farmland with small villages. Planning for this areas for both sides was different, as the Germans
expected the Allied main thrust through this area, while it was actually through the Hürtgen
Forest. One of the reasons for this decision was the dangerous Geilenkirchen-Salient at Ninth
Army's northern flank, which would have threatened the American advance. This salient was
reduced and rendered harmless in Operation Clipper, by a combined US-British attack until 22
November. The 84th Division of XIII Corps of the Ninth Army played a major role in this
operation.
9th Army's drive was conducted mainly by XIX Corps under General Gillem and was opposed
by Köchling's LXXXI Corps as well as the reserve forces of the XLVII Panzer Corps. The plan
called for a swift advance to Jülich with its 3 Division. The 2nd Armored Division had to
advance in a narrow line towards Linnich and from there towards the Rur. In the center 29th
Infantry Division had to take the direct path towards Jülich and in the south the 30th Infantry
Division had to take Würselen and then continue to the Rur.
As in the 1st Army's sector, Operation Queen began with a massive aerial bombardment against
German towns and positions on 16 November. After the air strike was over, the American
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offensive was launched. 30th Division started a frontal attack against its first objective -
Würselen. After four days of slow advance, the town was taken. The German resistance from the
3rd Panzergrenadier Division was hampered due the large area it had to cover. In the center, 29th
Division also commenced with its attack. The plan called to advance in between the towns to
deal with the fortified strongpoints after they were encircled. This plan however was flawed and
29th Division soon was pinned down making no further progress. With assistance from the 2nd
Armored Division, on 18 November its drive was renewed against the opposing German 246th
VGD, taking Steerich, Bettendorf and the surroundings of Siersdorf. The understrength 246th
VGD was heavily reduced, and by 21 November the Americans were just 2 km (1.2 mi) ahead of
the Rur.
Captured Tiger II with improvised US markings
Meanwhile in the north 2nd Armored Division also had commenced its attack on Gereonsweiler
and Linnich. The advance was very steady, and already on the next day the towns Puffendorf and
Immendorf were taken. This alarmed the German command and Rundstedt authorized the release
of the 9th Panzer Division for a heavy armored counterattack against the two towns. Attached to
this unit was the schwere Panzerabteilung 506 (506th Heavy Tank Battalion) with about 36 King
Tiger tanks. At Immersdorf, the Germans were able to break into the town, but were soon
repelled at close quarter fighting at dawn.
The main fighting however was at Puffendorf. Since 2nd Armored Division also wanted to
continue its advance towards Gereonsweiler, the division was caught in the open when about 30
German tanks approached it. In the ensuing battle, the Americans were pushed back into
Puffendorf with heavy losses. Fighting continued then around the towns. German losses for this
day were 11 tanks, while the 2nd Armored Division lost about 57 tanks in the fighting. However,
the stalemate did not last long, as the Americans were able to push slowly forward through
combined heavy artillery and aerial support. On 20/21 November, heavy fighting occurred at and
in Gereonsweiler, until the Germans retreated and the town was finally in American hands.
As of 22 November, all 3 division of XIX Corps were in striking range of the Rur. At this point,
the German command decided to release another division, the 340th Volksgrenadier Division, to
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the front, as the threat to Jülich came apparent. The 340th Division moved in to took over
positions of the badly mauled 246th VGD. Due to this reinforcement, the advance of the 29th
and 30th infantry Division stalled after they were ejected from Bourheim. The last German
defense ring before Jülich was now between Bourheim, Koslar and Kirchberg. The same
happened to the 2nd armored Division which was repelled from Merzenhausen. During the next
days, fighting at the defense line was very intense, mostly leading to the exchange of heavy
artillery barrages. Bourheim was taken on 23 November, but remained under constant shelling
from German forces. 2 days later American troops entered Koslar. A subsequent German
counterattack managed to break into Bourheim and Koslar, but was soon afterwards repelled. On
26 November a general offensive was started to finally push to the Rur. Koslar, Kirchberg and
Merzenburg were taken on 27 November. By 28 November, XIX Corps had reached the Rur on a
broad front with only two German bridgeheads on the western side of the river remaining, which
were not taken until 9 December.
North of XIX Corps, Geilenkirchen had been captured during Operation Clipper, but the Allied
advance had stalled at Würm some kilometers short of the Rur, rendering the Allied advance in
this sector into a stalemate. 9th Army's casualties for Operation Queen were 1,133 killed, 6,864
wounded, and 2,059 missing.
VII Corps pushes to the Rur
While 9th Army's advance was successful, at the beginning of December VII Corps had just left
the Hürtgen Forest, was still short of the Rur and had taken heavy casualties. For the upcoming
conclusion of the offensive, 1st Infantry Division was replaced by 9th Infantry Division and 4th
Infantry Division by 83th Division. After a deliberate break for reorganization, the attack was
resumed on 10 December towards the Rur and the key city of Düren. German manpower at this
point was very low with the defense relying mostly on artillery support. In the north 104th and
9th Division, assisted by the 3rd Armored Division, didn't face much resistance. The 3rd
Parachute Division and especially the worn out 246th VGD were not able to offer serious
resistance. After four days 104th Division was at the Rur. The same was for the 9th Division.
During the fighting, 3rd Parachute Division was replaced by the hastily assembled 47th
Volksgrenadier Divison.
In the south 83rd Division faced larger problems. It had to advance through the towns of Strass
and Gey, the latter had been just the location of a heavy battle which practically had rendered 4th
Division unable for further offensive operations. Nevertheless the fresh 83rd Division assisted by
the 5th Armored Division was able to take most of Strass and reach Gey the same day against the
worn out 353rd VGD. However, the muddy road and mines prevented the Americans to bring
their tanks into both towns to support the infantry. As result, after some determined German
counterattacks on Schafberg, the American units in Strass were effectively cut off and had to be
supplied through aircraft, while the Germans started several attacks on the town. Schafberg was
retaken on 12 December and tanks reached Gey and Strass, easing the situations. Casualties
nevertheless had been heavy, with about 1,000 men for the division in just 3 days.
In the north of Gey the division's advanced fared better and the division took the towns
Gürzenich and Birgel. On 14 December a renewed drive conducted by tanks was launched. After
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meeting initial heavy resistance east of Strass, the advance at other parts of the frontline forced
the Germans to retreat. By 16 December VII Corps finally had reached the Rur, with only a few
small bridgeheads west of the river remaining. Casualties for this campaign were tremendous, as
VII Corps had about 27,000 casualties in one month.
The Rur dams
The Schwammenauel dam at the Rur
During the Allied approach towards the Rur, the issue of the Rur dams took on a new urgency.
The dams were a strategically important target, as they would allow the Germans to flood the
Rur valley and everything else downstream of it as far as the Meuse and into Holland. This
would be a lasting delay to the Allied offensive effort into Germany and also cause major
casualties as well as the possible trapping of Allied units east of the flooding. It took a long time
until the Allied high command recognized its importance and until the first specific actions were
implemented towards them. The first approach was made by the RAF which was tasked to
breach them, with bombing starting in early December. In continuous attack waves, hundreds of
aircraft were thrown against the dams, but damage was only negligible. On 13 December V
Corps, already at the Rur, was tasked to start an offensive to seize the dams from various
direction including the Ardennes sector. The offensive took the Germans by surprise, but as the
Allies ran directly into the Germans being near ready for the Ardennes Offensive, resistance
soon stiffened. On 16 December the Germans launched their final all-out offensive on their
western front, Wacht am Rhein, which led to an immediate end of all Allied offensive efforts in
this sector.
Aftermath
Operation Queen was not able to meet its sophisticated goals. At the beginning of the offensive,
Allied planners envisioned for the offensive to be just a staging point for a deep penetration over
the Rur into Germany to the Rhine. After one month of heavy fighting the Americans had barely
made it to the Rur. No bridgehead over the river had been made, the Germans still held some
portions west of the river and the important Rur dams were still in German hands, threatening
any further offensive operations. Even without knowing the upcoming German offensive, Allied
planners estimated the earliest date for a large thrust into Germany for mid-January.
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The Wehrmacht was successfully able to delay the American advance towards the Rur. The Rur
River line, whose holding was deemed necessary for the successful implementation of the
Ardennes Offensive, was held. The preparation of the final Ardennes Offensive was mostly
successful with Germany being able to build up enough troops in secrecy for a sufficient blow.
On 16 December the Allies were taken by complete surprise and the Germans were quickly able
to achieve a breakthrough. Only in February 1945 were the Allies finally able to cross the Rur,
by then the road to the Rhine was clear.
However, the Ardennes offensive also showed the lack of any long-term strategic perspective for
Germany. The superiority of the Allies in numbers of men and equipment could not be overcome
by Germany. The successful holding of the Rur River line would only lead to a lengthened war,
causing additional destruction and losses of life. Overall U.S. losses were
VII Corps: 2,448 killed, 15,908 battle casualties, 8,550 non-battle casualties
V Corps: 2,800 battle casualties, 1,200 non-battle casualties
Ninth Army: 1,133 killed, 6,864 wounded, and 2,059 missing
~340 tanks
Casualties of the Rur dams offensive (13-16 December) and casualties in the Hürtgen Forest
preceding 16 November are not included in these figures.
Operation Queen
The ruins of Jülich after heavy aerial and artillery
bombardment
Date 16 November – 16 December 1944
Location Rur valley and environs, Germany
Result German defensive victory
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Siegfried Line Campaign
American soldiers cross the Siegfried Line.
Date 25 August 1944 - March 1945
Location
Along and around the Siegfried Line,
(France, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Netherlands and Germany)
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Western Allies
United States
United Kingdom
Canada
France
and others
Germany
Commanders and leaders
Dwight Eisenhower
(SHAEF)
Gerd von Rundstedt
(Oberbefehlshaber
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Bernard
Montgomery
(21st Army Group)
Omar Bradley
(12th Army Group)
Jacob Devers
(6th Army Group)
West)
Walter Model
(Army Group B)
Strength
5,412,000 troops[1] ~1,500,000 troops
Casualties and losses
U.S.:
240,082 casualties
(50,410 killed, 172,450
wounded, 24,374
captured or missing)
(15 September 1944 - 21 March
1945)
[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Queen Nov 2011 ++]