wwii quarterly – winter 2014

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WINTER 2014

RETAILER DISPLAY UNTIL MARCH 17

OPERATION COBRA

NormandyBreakout HITLER'SJewish Soldiers

Fierce Fight for Angaur Island

America's Magnificent Nisei WarriorsBLOODY BATTLE for BURMA

CHARLES DE GAULLE:France's Greatest Hero

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Departments

06 EditorialDigging up history.FLINT WHITLOCK

08 Ordnance The M-3 Grease Gun showcases Yankee ingenuity atits ugly best.DAVID J. LITTLE

12 PropagandaFamed Hollywood driector Frank Capra turned Nazi propaganda films into a powerful weapon of war againstAmericas enemies.HERB KUGEL

Features

18 Deadly Cobra StrikeAfter weeks of trying to break out of Normandys hedgerow country, Omar Bradleys Operation Cobra propelled U.S. forces onto open groundand across France.MICHAEL E. HASKEW

30 An American College Goes to WarBeloit College was one of 150 schools that hosted the Army Air ForcesCadet Training Program from March 1943 to March 1944.PATRICIA OVERMAN

36 The Admin Box 1944The Japanese use tested tactics, but the British have learned from experience.WILLIAM B. ALLMON

46 Americas Most Decorated HeroesDespite being subjected to harsh discrimination, Japanese Americans joined the U.S. military to prove their loyalty.RICHARD HIGGINS

60 Ninth Air Force Captured in Brushstrokes Artist Milton Marx chronicled the Ninth U.S. Air Force preparing for the Normandy invasion and beyond.KEVIN M. HYMEL

66 Wildcats Ashore!The desperate fight for Angaur Island, a tiny piece of Pacific real estate,went almost unnoticedexcept for the soldiers on both sides who werecaught up in its brutality.NATHAN N. PREFER

78 Hitlers Jewish SoldiersWhile millions of German Jews were being persecuted by the Nazis, many of their relatives, willingly or not, were fighting for the Third Reich.BRYAN MARK RIGG

88 In Desperation and TriumphGeneral Charles de Gaulle rose to lead the Free French during World War II and restore his nations honor in the postwar world.MICHAEL E. HASKEW

96 The Lost DUKW of Lake GardaThe Voluntari del Garda conducted an exhaustive search for the last casualties of the 10th Mountain Division.JEFF PATTON, COLONEL, USAF (RET.)

Page 36

WWII Quarterly (ISSN 2151-3678) is published four times yearly by Sovereign Media, 6731 Whittier Avenue, Suite A-100, McLean, VA22101-4554. (703) 964-0361. WWII Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 2 2014 by Sovereign Media Company, Inc., all rights reserved.Copyrights to stories and illustrations are the property of their creators. The contents of this publication may not be reproduced in wholeor in part without consent of the copyright owner. Subscription services, back issues, and information: (800) 219-1187 or write to WWIIQuarterly Circulation, WWII Quarterly, P.O. Box 1644, Williamsport, PA 17703. Hardbound single copies: $19.99, plus $3 for postage.Yearly subscription in U.S.A.: $39.95; Canada and Overseas: $79.95 (U.S.). Editorial Office: Send editorial mail to WWII Quarterly, 6731Whittier Avenue, Suite A-100, McLean, VA 22101-4554. WWII Quarterly welcomes editorial submissions but assumes no responsibilityfor the loss or damage of unsolicited material. Material to be returned should be accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope. Wesuggest that you send a self-addressed, stamped envelope for a copy of our authors guidelines. POSTMASTER: Send address changes toWWII Quarterly, P.O. Box 1644, Williamsport, PA 17703.

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WINTER 2014

RETAILER DISPLAY UNTIL MARCH 17

OPERATION COBRA

NormandyBreakout HITLER'S Jewish Soldiers

Fierce Fight for Angaur Island

America's Magnificent Nisei Warriors

BLOODY BATTLE FOR BURMA

CHARLES DE GAULLE:France's Greatest Hero

COVER: American infantrymanT/SGT Johnny Jonak looks cautiously over a hedgrow inNormandy. See story page 18. Photo: National Archives

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

WWII QUARTERLY

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NOT LONG AGO I was watching one of my all-time favorite warmoviesThe Great Escape, starring Steve McQueen, James Gar-ner, Richard Attenborough, James Coburn, Charles Bronson, andmany others.

If youre not familiar with it, the movie is a fictionalized account ofan actual event: the breakout in March 1944 of Allied prisoners ofwar from Stalag Luft III near Sagan, Poland, 100 miles east of Berlin.

Despite renewed interest in the subject after the film came out in1963, the tunnels remained undisturbed over the decades becausethe camp site was behind the Iron Curtain and the Soviet authorities had no inter-est in its significance.

But not long ago British archaeologists received permission from the Polishgovernment to excavate it and bring to light its remarkable secrets.

How the breakout was accomplished remains nothing less than astounding.For months some 600 prisoners (10,000 POWs were housed there) worked in thegreatest secrecy digging four tunnels (nicknamed Tom, Dick, Harry, andGeorge; George was begun under seat 13 in the camp theater.) In time,Harry became the main escape tunnel and all work was focused on finishingthe passageway, over 110 yards long.

To shore up the Harry tunnel 30 feet below ground in soft sand, the POWsscavenged 4,000 boards from 90 bunk beds and used 635 mattresses, 62 tables,34 chairs, and 76 benches. Diggers used stolen shovels, 2,000 knives, and 2,000spoons. Even a trolley system was built to carry out sand and to move tunnelersback and forth down the tunnels length. To provide air to the diggers, a ventila-tion duct system ingeniously crafted from 1,400 used powdered-milk containers(known as Klim tins) was employed.

On the night of the great escape, March 24-25, 1944, 200 preselected prison-ers, allocated consecutive numbers, gathered in Hut 104 to make their way downthe tunnel, each a few minutes apart. The leaders were dressed in German uni-forms or specially tailored civilian outfits crafted by tailors among the prisonersand equipped with compasses, maps, and false identification papers.

Only 76 Allied airmen managed to leave the camp before the alarm was raisedwhen escapee number 77 was spotted emerging outside the wire.

Tragically, only three of the 76 made it to safety. Another 50 were recapturedand executed by firing squad on Hitlers orders. He was furious after learningabout the breach of security, and Harry was sealed by the Germans after theaudacious breakout.

Digging Up History

CARL A. GNAM, JR.Editorial Director, Founder

FLINT [email protected]

SAMANTHA DETULLEOArt Director

CONTRIBUTORS:William B. Allmon, Michael E.Haskew, Richard Higgins, Kevin M.Hymel, Herb Kugel, David J. Little, Patricia Overman, Jeff Patton, Nathan N. Prefer, BryanMark Rigg

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F L I N T W H I T L O C KE D I T O R I A L

A couple of years ago, a group ofBritish archaeologists got permis-sion to excavate the prison-campsite and find the tunnels. Usingground-scanning radar, what theyfound was remarkable; all fourtunnels and a treasure trove of arti-facts were located.

One of a handful of ex-RAF air-men invited to watch the excavation wasGordie King, a former RAF pilot, who operatedthe bellows pump providing fresh air on thenight of the escape, and who was 140th in lineto use Harry and therefore missed out.

King said only German-speaking officerswere given disguises and papers. He remem-bered sharing final words with many of theescapees, wishing them luck, and compliment-ing them on their impressive disguises. It wasquite exciting. Watching the tunnels beingunearthed, though, brought back strong emo-tions. This brings back such bittersweet mem-ories, he said, wiping away tears.

As Ive said before, the war spawned millionsof stories. The story of the Great Escape is oneof the most dramatic ones.

Flint Whitlock, Editor

70th ANNIVERSARY D-DAY TRIPIn the last issue I mentioned that I will be the study leaderon a week-long, 70th anniversary Smithsonian Institutiontour of D-Day sites in England and France from September6 to 13, 2014. Because of overwhelming response, the Smithsonian has laid on a second tour that will take placefrom May 16 to 23, 2014. If you want to learn more, call (855) 330-1542 or go to www.smithsonianjourneys.org/tours/D-day-tour. Im sure that these will be very excitingand emotional tours, with memories to last a lifetime.

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WWII QUARTERLY 7

ContributorsBRYAN MARK RIGG received his B.A. withhonors in history from Yale University in 1996.Yale awarded him the Henry Fellowship forgraduate study at Cambridge University, wherehe received his M.A. in 1997 and Ph.D. in 2002.He was a Professor of History at American Mil-itary University and Southern Methodist Uni-versity from 2000 to 2006. He has served as avolunteer in the Israeli Army and as an officerin the U.S. Marine Corps.

His first book, Hitlers Jewish Soldiers, wonthe prestigious William E. Colby Award for thebest military history book of 2002. He is alsothe author of Rescued from the Reich and Livesof Hitlers Jewish Soldiers.

RICHARD HIGGINS is a veteran of the U.S.Coast Guard and a former vice president of theBoeing Corporation. He authored BehindBarbed Wire in America: The Forced Reloca-tion of Japanese Americans, in the Fall 2013issue of WWII Quarterly. He and his wife Jeanlive in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

NATHAN N. PREFER is the author of severalbooks, including Pattons Ghost Corps: Crack-ing the Siegfried Line, Leyte 1944, and The Bat-tle for Tinian: Vital Stepping Stone in AmericasWar Against Japan. A resident of Fort Myers,Florida, he has also contributed numerous arti-cles to various historical publications.

PATRICIA OVERMAN is an application devel-oper at Highline College near Seattle, Washing-ton, and conducts research on Troop CarrierUnits in her spare time. She is an officer in theNational World War II Glider Pilots Associationand has written several articles for that organi-zation. In 2013, Patricia received the S. TiptonRandolph Memorial Award for OutstandingService in the Interest of the National WorldWar II Glider Pilots Association. She is thedaughter of Major Elmer Lee Whitmire, USAF(Ret.), who graduated from the Beloit CTD pro-gram in October 1943. She thanks Kara Con-don, Archive Assistant, Beloit College, for helpwith this article.

DAVID J. LITTLE, a military firearms expert,resides in Highlands Ranch, Colorado.

MICHAEL HASKEW is the editor of Sover-eigns WWII History magazine and the authorof several books about World War II, includ-ing Order of Battle: Western Allied Forces ofWorld War II, The Wehrmacht: The EssentialFacts and Figures for the German ArmedForces, and De Gaulle: Lessons in Leadershipfrom the Defiant General. He lives in Chat-tanooga, Tennessee.

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D A V I D J . L I T T L E

The list of requirements from eachbranch were then reviewed and modifiedat Aberdeen Proving Ground, and a ten-tative specification released to bidders.The initial T-15 specification of 1942 wasfor an all-metal weapon of stamped sheet-metal construction to fire the Armysstandard pistol cartridge (.45 ACP); to bedesigned for inexpensive production witha minimum of machining; and featuringboth semi-automatic and fully automaticfire ability; a cyclic rate under 500 roundsper minute; and the ability to place 90percent of all shots fired (from the stand-ing position in full-automatic mode) on a6x6-foot target at the combat range of 50yards. The standard to which the newweapons performance was to be com-pared was the M-1928A1 Thompson, theTommy Gun.

General Motors Inland ManufacturingDivision in Dayton, Ohio, was just one ofseveral companies that took on the chal-lenge of developing this new weapon.Inlands design team was already involvedin the production of the M-1 carbine, sothe chief engineer made this a personalproject to plan for tooling and production.

The original War Department specs weresimplified in late 1942 to remove the semi-automatic fire capability, and to proposean option to convert the weapons originalcaliber to the commonly available9mmx19 pistol round that was used byboth the Axis and Allied forces. The newspecification for this dual caliber weaponwas numbered T-20.

Five prototype models of the .45 T-20and five 9mm conversion kits were builtby GMs Inland Manufacturing prototypeshop and submitted for testing in Novem-ber. At the Ordnance Department trials,the GM submission completed theendurance test with only two failures tofeed in over 5,000 rounds fired. In theaccuracy portion of the tests, the GMdesign scored an admirable 97 out of 100possible hits on the 6 x 6-foot target. Thenthe real trials began.

Airborne Command, the AmphibiousWarfare Board, the Infantry Board, andthe Armored Forces Board were all

The M-3 Grease-Gun showcases Yankeeingenuity at its ugly best.

WINTER 20148

O R D N A N C E

AS AMERICA GEARED up for war, the economy of building a wartime army wasoverwhelming. Tanks, aircraft, soldiers and weaponsall would consume hugeresources, and manufacturers were challenged to reduce costs wherever they could. Thearms industry was one area where the designers showed great creativity and were ableto place function over form to accomplish their mission.

One of the more expensive (and iconic) weapons at the start of the war, the Thomp-son submachine gun, became a prime target for cost savings. In 1939, the M-1928 A1Thompson cost the government more than $200 eachmore than four times themonthly wages paid to a typical soldier. By 1942, design and production changes had

brought the Armys price down to around $75, and the finalM1A1 variant hit a low price of $45 per copy by 1944.

Even so, in 1941 this was excessively expensive for a singleweapon, so the War Department sought out a cheaper solution.That solution, the M-3 Grease Gun, came in at around $18.50each, a savings of 90 percent.

As the war came closer to American shores, the U.S. Army Ordnance Board consid-ered what was happening in Europe on the weapons front, including the German MP40Schmeisser and the British Sten gun, and initiated a study to develop its own easy-to-make submachine gun. Early in 1942, the Army submitted a list of requirements for thenew weapon, and Ordnance solicited a list of requirements from both the infantry andcavalry branches for a shoulder-fired weapon with full- or semi-automatic fire capabil-ity, in caliber .45 ACP.

National Archives

Resting in a Germanhouse after a patrol,GIs keep theirweapons, including two M-3 Grease Gunsubmachine guns,close at hand.

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encouraged to look at the best of the newdesigns. Each branch was told to inde-pendently test the T-20 prototypeweapons, to see if this new, inexpensiveweapon would meet their needs. All fourreview boards rated the basic GM designas acceptable, with similar suggestionsand concerns.

All liked the short, handy size andreduced overall length, but all found faultwith the GM-designed magazine and feedsystem, apparently due to the short, widefollower in the magazine that tended to tipor jam under hard use. The cocking han-dle was deemed too fragile, and the mag-azine could be difficult to fully load.

In spite of these faults, the T-20 was for-mally approved by the Ordnance Depart-ment for production in December 1942as the U.S. Submachine Gun, Caliber.45, M-3.

The contract to build this new weaponwas issued to the parent organization(GM), which proposed that the GuideLamp plant in Anderson, Indiana, be thefabrication location, as they were famil-iar with metal stamping and weldingoperations and were not working atcapacity (according to WPB inspectors).In 1942 this factory was producing black-

out lights for Army trucks, M-2 HMGbarrels, and parts for the P-39 Airacobraaircraft. With this contract, the GuideLamp plant was at full capacity, with only16 percent of the plant capacity dedicatedto M-3 production.

When the exclusive contract was given,Guide Lamp produced a total of 606,694of the M-3 variant sub-machine gun in1943 and 1944. With no significantchanges, the T-20/M-3 was produced assubmitted. Even the balky 30-round mag-azine was put into production as submit-ted in the interest of expediency. Because ofthe prework done by the team at Inland,the first guns were able to be submitted forinspector approval within 45 days of thecontract.

It was planned that the Grease Gun(so called because of its resemblance to thetype of tool used by mechanics to lubricatea vehicles chassis and axles) or BuckRogers Gun as it was nicknamed by thesoldiers, would be produced in numberssufficient to cancel orders for the moreexpensive Thompson submachine gun andto allow the Army to remove the Thomp-son from frontline service.

Due to production delays, designchanges, and tooling problems, however,

the M-3 never achieved its full potentialduring World War II, and purchases of theThompson continued until February 1944.

Considering the much longer servicelife, it is no surprise that the Alliesput more than 1.5 million Thomp-

sons into wartime service, outnum-bering the M-3 by nearly three to one.What did the Army get?This new and inexpensive M-3 SMG

used many automotive production-linep r o c e s s e sto keep costsunder con-

trol. Like the German MP40, the receiverwas made of two deep sheet-metal stamp-ings welded together to form the tube forthe bolt. The small parts of the firing mech-anism were steel stampings, castings, andpressings, with only three machined partsin the whole weapon. The barrel had to berifled from formed steel tubing, the face ofthe bolt had to be precision ground, andthe threads to retain the barrel wereground, but the balance of the gun wasstamped, pressed, and welded.

The magazine was formed from sheetstock, and even the sights were stampings.(A creative note: The sights on the M3were finished in the test-firing stage whena special drill bored the peep sight hole toalign with where the gun put the bulletsnot trying to move the sights to meet thepoint of impact after the fact.)

In the field, the weapon could be disas-sembled without tools for cleaning or con-version to 9mm. It was simple to work on,reliable, and cheap to build and feed. Thefiring rate was about half that of theThompson, firing 300 to 400 rounds perminute, which allowed the individual sol-dier to stay in action longer.

Combined with the lighter weight of theweapon (eight pounds as compared to theThompsons 13+ pounds), the GI armedwith an M-3 Grease Gun could carry moreammo and stay in the fight longer that onecarrying the venerable M-1928 A1.

In combat, the GIs laughed at the uglyduckling. It lacked the fit and finish of theTommy Gun, and had none of theimage that came with the Thompson(which had been used by both gangstersand the FBI in the 1920s and 30s). But

WINTER 201410

Authors Collection

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when the chips were down, the Greaserdid its job. Dirt didnt bother it (exceptthat pesky magazine), it was short andhandy, and threw enough of the man-stopping .45 ACP rounds that it couldhelp decide a fire fight.

As one GI said, I hated that gun whenthey gave it to me. It wasnt as sharp look-ing as my Thompson, and looked like aleftover from the parts locker. But when Ineeded it, that gun never let me down. Ididnt clean it in combatI just loaded itand drug it through the mud and it keptshooting.

In 1945, the Guide Lamp factory man-ufactured a simplified M-3 A1 sub-machine gun before production contractswere canceled with the end of the war. Atotal of 15,000+ were produced, but fewsaw combat in World War II. During theKorean conflict, the Ithaca Gun Companyin Ithaca, New York, produced another33,000 complete M-3 A1 guns, as well asmanufactured thousands of parts for the

repair and rebuilding of existing M-3 andM-3 A1 weapons.

The Army originally intended thisweapon to be a disposable onerepairparts were not initially ordered or even inthe supply system until the end of WorldWar II. The plan, if it broke, was simple:drop it and pick up another. The major-ity of the failures in combat with this sim-ple gun were related to the magazine,which remained an issue for its entire mil-itary career.

The 9mm conversion kit was not widelyused, and it is estimated that approxi-mately 1,000 kits were produced by theRock Island Arsenal and by Buffalo Arms,as well as another 1,000 completedweapons produced by Guide Lamp. Thekit consisted of a 9mm barrel, a revisedbolt, and a magazine adapter that wouldpermit the use of Commonwealth Sten-magazines. Another variant was producedupon request for OSS use that fitted asilencer to the original barrel. These

weapons were built with sound suppres-sor components produced by High Stan-dard on a Bell Labs design.

However, like many weapons of this era,the M-3 lasted longer in service than any-one thought it would. The Russian Armywas provided with a large quantity as partof the U.S. Lend-Lease aid program, butthe lack of ammunition left most of themin storage for most of their life. A copy (in9mm) was produced for the ArgentineArmy through the 1970s, and was in ser-vice long after that time. Several units inthe first Gulf War reported for duty withthe M-3 or M-3 A1 Greaser as an indi-vidual-protection weapon for tank-recov-ery vehicle crews.

A DoD inventory in 1996 showed thatmore than 1,000 still remained in thedepots. Unfortunately for the historical

community, few of these have seen thelight of day, and examples of the M-3 areseldom seen outside of museums.

The M-3 Grease Gun filled its intendedrole as an inexpensive, reliable weapon ina wartime economy. It used existing tech-nologies and production methods in newways to solve a problem and fill a need.While never as popular with the troops asits predecessor, it served the American GIand others around the world for 50 years,and serves as an example of what can bedone when there is a need.

WWII QUARTERLY 11

Both: National Archives

ABOVE: The American soldier at right covers two Germans captured north of Lorient France in August 1944with his M-3 submachine gun. RIGHT: Corporal Carlton Chapman, a member of the African American 761st TankBattalion, peers out from the hatch of his Sherman tank. His M-3 Grease Gun is visible at top. OPPOSITE: ThisM-3 Grease Gun submachine gun and 30-round stick magazine was made by Guide Lamp, a division of Gen-eral Motors. Although inexpensive to manufacture, the .45-caliber weapon packed a powerful punch.

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made to teach American soldiers just whythey were fighting.

The evidence about what happened nextregarding Capras enlistment is complex,but the bottom line was that Capra agreed,on December 12, to accept a majors com-mission and join the Army Signal Corps.Capra would then make the films Mar-shall urgently wanted: the now famousWhy We Fight series.

Capra was ordered to active duty onJanuary 15, 1942, but was given an exten-sion to complete Arsenic and Old Lace.Capra was actually sworn into the Armyon January 29, 1942. He did not take hisoath on a film studio soundstage as heclaimed in his autobiography but wassworn in at the Southern California Mili-tary District Headquarters in Los Angeles.With the exception of receiving an exten-sion to allow him to complete Arsenic and

Old Lace, the rest of Caprasaccount of his enlistment isapparently totally untrue.

The question arises as towhy a brilliant motion picturedirector, the winner of sixnominations and three Acad-emy Awards for best directionfor It Happened One Night(1934), Mr. Deeds Goes toTown (1936), and You CantTake it With You (1938), aswell as the Directors Guild ofAmericas D.W. GriffithAward in 1958, and threehonorary doctorates, wouldwrite such an autobiographi-cal fantasy? Why was the manwho was personally awardedthe Distinguished ServiceMedal by General Marshall

on the day of his military discharge onJune 15, 1945, creating a fantasy about hisenlistment some 15 years after the event?

It is not known why Capra wrote this ego-centric story, but it was thought to be due toemotional problems dating back to his grimearly childhood. Because of untrue sectionsin The Name Above the Title, some criticshave wrongly attacked the entire autobiog-raphy. With watchful reading, there is much

Famed Hollywood director Frank Capra turnedNazi propaganda films into a powerful weaponof war against Americas enemies.

WINTER 201312

IN HIS 1971 AUTOBIOGRAPHY, The Name Above the Title, prestigious Hollywoodfilm director Frank Capra claimed that on Monday morning, December 8, 1941, theday after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, two U.S. Army Signal Corps officerscame to the Warner Brothers Studios soundstage where he was editing his film Arsenicand Old Lace.

He said that the officers then swore him into the Signal Corps and that he asked forand received an extension to finish his film. Then he received, on February 5, 1942, atelegram directing him to proceed to Washington, D.C., six days later.

Unfortunately, little of this appears to be true. Two officers did go to Hollywoodon December 9, but they did not come to swear Frank Capra into the Army. The offi-cers, Colonel Richard I. Schlosberg and Captain Sy Bartlett, were in Hollywood fora one-day series of discussions on the expansion of the wartime film training pro-gram. The two men met with Colonel Darryl. F. Zanuck, supervisor of Army SignalCorps training films.

Zanuck, the head of 20th Century-Fox, like all the other Hollywood stu-dio moguls, was commissioned a colonel in the Army Signal Corps. Swear-ing Capra into the Army on December 8, 1941, was not on the agenda.

What came up later relating to Capra began with a telephone call made onDecember 9, by Brig. Gen. Frederick H. Osborne, chief of the Morale Branchof the War Department (later called the Information and Education Divisionof Special Services). Osborne had been contacted by Army Chief of Staff Gen-eral George C. Marshall regarding a series of films Marshall urgently wanted

A still from Frank Caprasfilm, Divide and Conquer,the third film in the WhyWe Fight series, showsFrench civilians watchingas the French Army leavesFrance from Toulon Harborin 1940, later to becomepart of the Free Frenchforces. BELOW: Frank Capra

H E R B K U G E LP R O P A G A N D A

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WWII QUARTERLY 13

that can be learned about Capra and thegenuinely important work he did that is notavailable from other sources.

Francesco Rosario Capra was born inBisacquino, Palermo, Sicily, on May 18,1897. He suffered a painful birth bornfrail, badly dehydrated, and not expectedto live. The story handed down by Caprasfamily was that little Francesco was left todie while friends and relatives spent theirenergies caring for his mother, doing thisuntil her father, Capras grandfather, cameto Francescos rescue. It is presumed that histimely intervention saved Francescos life.

Capra suffered through a bleak child-hood. He spent his first six years with hisfamily on a Sicilian farm. In May 1903,Capras father scraped up enough moneyfor the family to immigrate to America.The family sailed from Palermo to Naples.Then, on May 10, 1903, their ship set sailfor the United States. Francesco and hisfamily suffered through a nightmarishsteerage crossing before landing in NewYork harbor on May 23.

Capra later said of his Atlantic cross-ing: Theres no ventilation, and it stinkslike hell. Theyre [the family] all miser-able. Its the most degrading place youcould ever be.

The family then endured a ghastly rail-road trip across the United States to theSouthern Pacific Railroad Station in down-town Los Angeles. Capra recalled: For thekids, the train was the worst. The seatswere wooden, and thats where you wereseated day and night. They locked the carsso you couldnt move around, and youslept there....

They arrived in Los Angeles on June 3,1903. Frank saw his father bend downand kiss the ground when the family leftthe train.

Capra, according to some, personifiedthe rags to riches American dream. Itallegedly began when he sold newspaperson Los Angeles streets at the age of 12and then extended to his enjoyment ofextreme wealth when he became arenowned film director.

However, rags to riches ignored a darkside in Capras psyche. One Capra associ-ate said, Capra was always coming toAmerica. Given his difficult ship and traintrips to and across America, this was not agood thing to have been seen about him.Another associate said,Capra was drivenby self-doubt as much as his belief in thepower of the little man.

One thing was certain, however. Capra,

the sickly child and unhappy little immi-grant boy who initially hated Americabecause of his childhood misery, the manwho changed parts of the story of his life inhis autobiography to make himself appearmore important than he really might feel,grew to love his adopted country deeplyand would do everything he could to helpthe United States win World War II. What-ever Capras personal demons, the workthat he would be doing for the Army heldhis demons at bay and allowed him free-dom to fight ogres of a different kindthe

ones that had been unleashed by Germanyand Japan.

In May 1941, the Nazis 114-minute pro-paganda film Sieg im Westen (Victory inthe West) played to enthusiastic audiencesin Manhattans Yorkville District of NewYork City, then an area with a large ethnicGerman population.

Sieg im Westen, produced by the GermanArmy High Command, merged twothemes, the first a prologue that narrated aNazi version of European history and theorigins of World War II, and the secondthat graphically illustrated the power of theNazi blitzkrieg in Western Europe in thespring of 1940.

The movie was spliced together with sec-tions from Leni Riefenstahls 1934 epicGerman propaganda documentary Tri-umph des Willens (Triumph of the Will)and current German military newsreelfootage. The films purpose was to illustratethe aggressive boldness of the Germanblitzkrieg and the superiority of Germanarms. The film also claimed that Germanmilitary power was needed because Ger-many was not permitted to live in peace.

Arch Mercey, the assistant to LowellMellett, the director of the U.S. Office ofGovernment Reports, wrote to his boss

ABOVE: A U.S. Army Signal Corps film crew, including many who had once worked for Hollywood studiosas civilians, shoots a scene for a training film. Hollywood fully supported the war effort and workedtirelessly to ensure victory. RIGHT: The title frame of the Why We Fight series, seen by millions of GIsas part of their indoctrination. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall felt the films were vital in pro-viding soldiers with needed motivation to face the enemy.


after viewing the film: The applauseisamazing. Hitler naturally enough draws themost applause, but there is plenty for theparachutists, dive bomber pilots, andadvance guards.

The Nazis also produced a second propa-ganda documentary, the 69-minute Feldzugin Polen (Campaign in Poland), a film thatdepicted the 1939 German invasion ofPoland and the ethnic Germans living inPoland as a downtrodden minority. Therewas much more in the way of propaganda,and the film was regularly given to andscreened by German overseas minorities toexpress the German point of view.

The U.S. government had absolutely noth-ing to compare with films such as theseeither in quality or quantity. In 1941, it pro-duced a total of 25 films on national defense,but the American film industry, extremelyreluctant to give away any theater time,refused to show any government film thatwas more than three minutes in length.

In addition, the film industrys certainlymisnamed Motion Picture CommitteeCooperating for National Defensedemanded to see the outline and script ofeach government film before passing judg-ment on whether it would allow the film tobe shown in theaters. Mercey wrote Mellett:The Committee is exercising a censorialpower over the government at the moment.

The American government had been cer-tain for some time that war was com-ingand soon. When the Selective Train-ing and Service Act, the first peacetimemilitary conscription act in American his-tory, was implemented on September 16,1940, it triggered a growing apprehensionabout the motivation and morale of thenew conscripts. Renowned Kansas news-paper editor William Allen White wroteLowell Mellett that the new conscriptshavent the slightest enthusiasm for thiswar or this cause. They are not grouchy,they are not mutinous; they just dont givea tinkers dam.

The governments concern spread to thehighest military levels. General Marshallread a May 1941 Atlantic Monthly articleby Stewart Alsop, Wanted: A Faith toFight For. Alsop expressed deep concernthat while the German soldier had a pow-erful cause for which to fight and die, the

American soldier did not. A worried Marshall was quoted saying,

Weve got to tell our young men whytheyre in uniform. Theyre going to fightseasoned soldiers whove got a thing goingfor them, a superman thing, and their sol-diers believe it. And we havent got that.

This was why Frank Capra becameinvolved. The Army Morale Branch estab-lished earlier to provide military indoctri-nation failed miserably. General Marshallblamed the the deadly effects of preparedlectures, indifferently read to troops.Troops found these lectures to be baffling,bewildering, or just plain boring.

Frank Capra left for active duty with theSignal Corps on February 11, 1942, andarrived in Washington three days letter. Hecame into a city heavy with depressionregarding the American chances for win-ning World War II.

Capra was loud in his scorn of defeatism;he quickly went to work producing ideasfor scripts and immediately ran into tena-cious resistance from the Signal Corpsbureaucracy. There were obviously manysenior Signal Corps officers who wanted tokeep the status quo.

Capra believed these officers wanted toshove him aside. He became convincedwhen he was abruptly transferred from theSignal Corps into the Morale Branch of theWar Department. He was now com-manded by Maj. Gen. Frederick H.

Osborne, under whom he would reportdirectly to Colonel Edward Lyman Mun-son, Jr., the head of the Information Ser-vices Branch, a unit consisting of depart-ments for news, radio, pamphlets, and film.

Capra protested the transfer; he claimedhe was a victim of office politics and jeal-ousy. He insisted he was a moviemakerwho knew little of morale, but nobody lis-tened to his protests.

You are the head of the film section,Major, Munson said, when he met Capra.He smiled. In fact, you are the whole filmsection.

Capra recalled his reply: Colonel Mun-son, as a fool who turned his back onCamelot, I dont feel like jumping up anddown over heading a one-man film section.

Capra recalled the twinkle in Munsonseye when Munson replied:

Well, welcome to fantasy land. Here,have some coffee and meet the other MadHatters.

It wasnt fantasy land. Capra laterlearned from Munson that his transfer wasnot office politics but was ordered from thehighest levels. He learned that GeneralMarshall did not feel the Signal Corpscould make the type of film he strongly feltthe Army needed. On the contrary, he waswell aware the Signal Corps officers wouldfight to keep everything as it was.

It was against this background thatCapra was ordered to report to Marshallbecause the general wanted to speak to himprivately. Capra, a Catholic, later com-mented wryly, Not being a military man,I didnt realize that this was tantamountto a private audience with the Pope.

Munson escorted Capra through appar-ently miles of Pentagon corridors to a doorlabeled Chief of Staff. Munson explainedthe rules to a suddenly nervous Capra.Capra was to give his name to the guardinside when he went in, and then, when theguard gave him permission to enter, Caprawas to walk directly into the inner officewithout knocking. Munson stressed thatCapra was not to salute. If Marshall wasbusy, Capra was to walk to the chair at theside of Marshalls desk and quietly sitdown. He was to do nothing else. Capra,now very nervous and alone, did as Mun-son ordered.

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Capra, left, with fellow director John Ford, acommander in the U.S. Navy. Like Capra, Fordcreated wartime documentaries; he also head-ed the photographic unit of the Office ofStrategic Services.


Even though he had been nervous, thefilm director in Capra later observed thatGeneral Marshall could be cast [in a film]as a sad-eyed Okie watching his soil blowaway. Capras legs were trembling, butthey were moving as he walked into Mar-

shalls private office. He later recalled whatone sergeant said: Morale is what makesyour feet do what your head knows justaint possible.

Capra and Marshall were alone togetherfor a considerable time, and there is

absolutely no reason to doubt Capras auto-biographical report of their conversation.Marshall spoke frankly. He told Capra thatAmerica would raise a large army, abouteight million men, and the Army had tomake soldiers out of boys, who for the mostpart had never held a gun.

These boys were to be uprooted fromcivilian life, sent first to Army camps fortraining and then shipped to various warzones, and finally into combat. The reasonswhy they were fighting were often vagueor blurred in their minds. Capra laterrecalled Marshall saying that in a shorttime America would have a huge citizensarmy in which civilians would outnumberprofessional soldiers some 50 to one.

Would these draftees survive the rigorsthey would be put through? Marshallsanswer was yes, but only if these boysknew the reasons why they were fighting.Marshall laid down the bottom line whenhe told Capra, And that, Capra, is ourjoband your job.

After the meeting, Capra walked into alavatory, entered a stall, and closed and

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Capra (right), now a colonel in the Signal Corps, discusses the editing of the documentary TunisianVictory with a member of the British Army Film Unit, February 1944. Capra was one of three co-directors on the Anglo-American film project.

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locked the door. He recalled wanting to becompletely alone, to think things through.He knew he didnt have the foggiest ideahow to make a wartime documentary. Hehad no organization, a very small budget,nothing except a direct order from Marshalland, shortly after that, a newly painted signon his door reading, Major Frank Capra,Orientation Film Section. As Capra laterreported, I was that section.

As the weeks went by, Capra successfullystruggled to fight office politics and build hisorganization but fought unsuccessfully tofind a hook on which to tie everythingtogether for his Why We Fight films. He andthe men who were joining his now-expand-ing unit spent hours in the New York CityMetropolitan Museum of Art, studying cap-tured or confiscated Nazi films.

In April 1942, Capra suddenly found hisanswer. Coming directly from a showingof Triumph of the Will, it had been staringhim in the face all the time. This was thefilm that Hitler claimed was a totallyunique and incomparable glorification ofthe power and beauty of our movement.

Riefenstahls film begins when Hitlerssolitary plane is seen flying, almost magi-cally, through a beautiful German sky andthen descending through the clouds to landin Nuremberg. Hitler had come to a NaziParty rally in Nuremberg, a huge event puttogether to honor the Nazi movement togenerate praise for the partys leader, theNazi Aryan superman, Adolf Hitler.

At first Capra, sitting in the darkened the-ater, was stunned. He was staring at a filmthat fired no gun, dropped no bombs. Butas a psychological weapon aimed atdestroying the will to resist, it was just aslethal.

My God, Capra told one of his newworkers, I cant compete with that.

He was wrong. Some time later, Edgar(Pete) Peterson II, a young filmmaker whoworked under Capra at Warner Brotherson Meet John Doe, joined Capras unit.

Let their own films kill them, Capratold Peterson. He wasnt joking.

His idea was to take the Nazis ownfilms and revise, replace, or delete scenes asneeded. Importantly, he would rewrite thenarration and replace the Nazi soundtrackwith his own. He would shoot a few new

scenes as needed and add animation foreffect. He would change the poisonoussnake into a reptile that bites its own tail.While Capras solution was miraculous inits simplicity, its implementation wouldnot be easy. Hundreds of miles of filmwould have to be viewed, reprocessed, andreedited. It would require thousands ofhours of work.

Capra began his work with a vengeance.His script went for the Axis jugular andspared no irony, rested on no subtleties. Heasked actor Walter Huston to do the newnarration; Hustons powerful voice had beenused in many of Capras Hollywood movies.His narration is filled with nationalist andracist rhetoric which smears pitiless GermanHuns and blood-crazed Japs.

The narration also praised the courageand sacrifice of the British, Soviets, andChinese. Realistic sound effects and a pow-erful musical score intensified and embell-ished the dramatic Why We Fight scenes.

The first Why We Fight film, Prelude toWar, for instance, had six of Hollywoodsfinest film music composers working onthe soundtrack. Capra was not apologeticabout its powerful script. America was atwar; in 1942, it was not certain if shewould win.

The Walt Disney Studios were con-tracted to produce the animated portionsof the films. The Disney organization didmuch to animate certain concepts to makethe film powerful and excitingnot tomention clearly understandable to an audi-ence of GIs whose intelligence varied con-siderably. For example, weak amoeba-likePolish units were shown encircled thendevoured by superior predatory Nazi bac-teria. The films were made even more per-tinent by Disneys animated maps, whichdepicted all Axis and Axis-occupied terri-tories in funereal black and dark grays.

In three years until the end of the war,the Capra organization produced sevenpictures for Marshalls Why We Fightseries and many other military films. TheWhy We Fight films are, in order: Preludeto War (1942), The Nazis Strike (1943),Divide and Conquer (1943), The Battle ofBritain (1943), The Battle of Russia(1943), The Battle of China (1944), andWar Comes to America (1945).

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Each film ends powerfully with a quo-tation from General Marshall: No com-promise is possible and the victory of thedemocracies can only be complete with theutter defeat of the war machines of Ger-many and Japan.

This quotation, including the underlinedutter defeat, is shown on screen fol-lowed by a ringing Liberty Bell. Over thisis superimposed a large letter V for Vic-tory accompanied by a stirring soundtrackplaying patriotic or military music.

In addition, Capra also produced a seriesof four films dealing with the militaryaspects at the end of the war and intopeacetime. They were made in 1945, andare titled Two Down and One to Go, HereIs Germany, Know Your EnemyJapan,and Your Job in Germany.

Eventually the Army changed Capra. Theegocentric Hollywood director who wantedhis name above the title wrote to his offi-cers in 1942, Most of you were individu-als in civilian life. Forget that. You are work-ing for a common cause. Your personal egosand idiosyncrasies are unimportant. Therewill be no personal credit for your work,either on the screen or in the press. The onlypress notices we are anxious to read arethose of American victories!

This military Capra surprised many ofhis Hollywood associates; they had onlyknown the pretentiousness of hisHollywood persona. Brig. Gen. FrankMcCarthy, Marshalls secretary duringWorld War II and later the producer of the1970 Oscar-winning film Patton, summedup the World War II Capra in a few words:He was a team player. He displayed noself-interest at all.

However, Capras lack of self-interestwould have to change soon. On June 14,1945, Colonel Capra, the assistant chief ofan Army Pictorial Service unit, was empty-ing his desk because the next day he wouldbe formally discharged from the Army.

His commanding officer, Brig. Gen.Edward Lyman Munson, Jr., unexpectedlycame into his office, and told him thatGeneral Marshall needed him at once.Capra, expecting more work, complainedthat he was being discharged; Munsonignored Capras complaint, so Caprahigh-tailed it to Marshalls suite.

He was immediately ushered into Mar-shalls private office by Frank McCarthy.What happened next and its final outcomeare best put into Capras words 26 yearsafter the event.

In The Name Above the Title, heappeared to relive the event: I [wentinto Marshalls inner office] then stoppedas if I had been shot. Facing me and stand-ing at attention was a line of beribbonedgenerals all were grinning at me. TwoSignal Corps photographers raised theircameras. General Marshall was present-ing Capra the Distinguished Service Medal.

Capra continued, And now GeneralMarshall is going to pin that greathonor on me [Capras italics]. Camerabulbs flash I feel like a bum I flushwith shame I walk down the hall likea zombie... [I] go into the first washroom into a cubicle lock the door sit onthe toilet seat and cry like a baby.

Capras discharge from the Armybrought on a sudden upsurge in his emo-tional difficulties, which appeared to havebeen kept under control because he wasactive in the Army. It is thought by somethat his problems had been kept in coldstorage by his knowledge of what he wasdoing for the American war effort. Thiscold storage vanished when the war ended.

As if to underscore the loss of all of thecreative juices that had been expended dur-ing the war, Capras postwar films werepoorly received. One critic called themCapra-corn, while another called themsentimental and flabby. Two of these filmswere remakes of his prewar films. Capraretired from filmmaking after completingPocket Full of Miracles (1961), a remake ofhis 1933 production Lady for a Day.

Capras later years were difficult. Hefailed at restarting his film career then suf-fered a series of minor strokes some yearsbefore his death, which put him under 24-hour nursing care. He died in his sleepfrom a heart attack in his La Quinta, Cal-ifornia, home on September 3, 1991, atage 94.

He is still remembered by Americans,who were inspired by his Why We Fightfilms, as a man who put his heart and soulinto his work to help the Allies win thewar.

THE STORM WAS VIOLENT, the waves were hugeand the noise was deafening for the soldiers in thelanding craft on D-Day, June 6, 1944. As theyneared the beach, the door dropped open and thisphoto lets you see exactly what they saw, and feel whatthey felt: treacherous breakers, withering machine gunfire, a long beach, huge cliffs, and near-certain death.

None hesitated. These brave unselfish men jumpedinto the cold Atlantic waters. Two thirds of them died soonafter, so that we could live in freedom.

This historic photograph shows American soldiers fromCompany E, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division exitingtheir LCVP landing craft under heavy German machinegun fire on Omaha Beach. The photo was taken by CoastGuard Chief Photographers Mate Robert F. Sergeant.

Company E landed on Easy Red Beach at 0645 in theface of murderous fire. Those few who survived kept wad-ing right into everything the enemy had and took theirobjective, which provided the only exit from the beachthat the entire Fifth Corps had for two days. CompanyE, perhaps by strength of will and courage alone,helped keep the entire landing force from being thrownback into the sea. For a month afterwards, those who sur-vived remained almost in a daze.

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D-DAYThrough A Soldiers EyesLIMITED EDITION PRINT


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After weeks of trying to break out of Normandys hedgerow country, Omar Bradleys

Operation Cobra propelled U.S. forces onto open ground and across France.

BY MICHAEL E. HASKEW

Ogden Pleissner, an artist and war

correspondent for LIFE magazine, captured

American tanks advancing through the

bombed-out city of St. L as German

prisoners are marched to the rear.

U.S. Army Art Collection

DeadlyCOBRA STRIKE

Q-Win14 Operation Cobra_Layout 1 11/19/13 4:15 PM Page 18

19WWII QUARTERLY

The Allied planning for Operation Overlord had been ongoing for more than two years. Vastquantities of supplies and hundreds of thousands of fighting men and their machinery of warhad crowded southern England. Then, on June 6, 1944, the Allied invasion of Normandy was unleashed.

The expectations for Overlord were ambitious to say the least. Five beachheads were to be consolidated.In the east, the British were to capture the important road and communications center of Caen on D-Day, penetrating inland 20 miles. To the west, American forces were to slice across the Cotentin Penin-sula and capture the major port city of Cherbourg in nine days. In less than two weeks the entire Alliedpenetration was to be at least 15 miles deep inside France along a line extending through Saint L andCaumont in the south and swinging eastward to Villers Bocage and beyond the mouth of the River Orne.

By the evening of June 6, however, it was apparent that the drive inland from the beaches would bean extremely arduous undertaking, costly in men and matriel. Tenacious German resistance and someof the most challenging terrain in the world impeded Allied progress to the extent that the specter of


stalemate became quite real to senior com-manders, who had pinned their hopes ona quick breakout from the extended beach-head in Normandy and rapid movementacross open country, where tanks andarmored vehicles could operate freely.

Cherbourg fell to troops of the U.S. VIICorps, under Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins,on June 27, two weeks behind schedule,and Caen was still in German hands at theend of the month; the British and Cana-dian soldiers of Lt. Gen. Miles DempseysSecond Army did not enter the town untilthe afternoon of July 9. Casualties wereheavy. British losses neared 4,000 men,and the Germans lost at least 6,000 killed,wounded, or captured. Civilians died ingreat numbers as well.

Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt,commander of all German forces in the

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West, and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of Army Group B, had deployedthe bulk of their armored forces in the defense of Caen, realizing that the plain to thesouth of the town offered open country and rapid maneuver, while the terrain to the westand south was ideal for prolonged defensive operations and required fewer resources tohold the Americans at bay.

By early July, several German counterattacks had done little but to temporarily sta-bilize the front in Normandy. The Americans were bogged down and, although theBritish possessed most of ruined Caen, the Germans still held the high ground of Bour-gubus ridge, where their artillery commanded the approaches and presented a signifi-cant obstacle to a breakout.

Still, both Rundstedt and Rommel realized that future offensive operations wouldonly further deplete their limited resources. The troops of the German Seventh Army,under General Paul Hausser, and Panzer Group West, commanded by General HeinrichEberbach, had been hammered by Allied ground forces, air power, and naval gunfire.

Hitler refused to transfer troops of the Fifteenth Army, 200,000 strong, from the Pas deCalais. The highest echelons of the German command remained convinced that Normandywas but a diversion and the main invasion effort was yet to come. Operation Fortitude,the creation of the fictitious First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) around Lt. Gen. George S.Patton, Jr., had succeeded beyond the Allies wildest hopes and caused Hitler to withholdthe resources that might have brought about a different outcome in Normandy.

Following a failed counterattack against the British and Canadians around Caen onJuly 1, Rundstedt telephoned Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the high commandin Berlin. When Keitel asked what could be done to alter the deteriorating situation,Rundstedt bluntly replied, Make peace, you fools! What else can you do? Rundstedtwas relieved the following day and replaced by Field Marshal Gnther von Kluge.

Along with the stiff German defense, the land itself was a prominent adversary in theAllied effort. The hedgerows, or bocage, were mounds of earth with drainage ditchesrunning alongside that stretched for miles between pastures and farmlands in Nor-mandy. Centuries old, the hedgerows were often several feet thick with trees growing15 to 20 feet high on top of them. The bocage was excellent terrain for defense.

The Germans concealed machine guns, antitank weapons, and snipers throughoutthe area, and the narrow country lanes became death traps to advancing GIs. Casual-ties were extremely high, and a days progress was often measured in yards. Armoredvehicles were more or less restricted to the dirt roads and became easy marks for hid-den enemy weapons.

General Walter Bedell Smith, chief of staff to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the SupremeAllied Commander, remarked that in the south of Normandy every small field was afortress, every hedgerow a German strongpoint. Indeed, the soldiers of the First U.S.Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, discovered just how horrific such close-quar-ter combat could be in early July. (Bradley led First Army in the Normandy campaignuntil August 1, 1944, when he became commander of Twelfth U.S. Army Group.)

After the fall of Cherbourg, Bradley reoriented the bulk of First Army southward andfocused on two major objectives, the crossroads town of Saint L on his eastern flankand the village of Coutances about 15 miles to the west where five roads converged.Bradley amassed the strength of three corps, Collinss VII in the center, Maj. Gen. TroyMiddletons VIII on the right, and Maj. Gen. Charles Corletts XIX to the left. Eventu-ally elements of 10 armored and infantry divisions were committed to the effort to takeCoutances and Saint L and gain control of the highway that linked the towns.

The First Army offensive jumped off on July 3, and the going was rough from the start.Foul weather and determined German defenders ground the advance to a halt, and in17 days of fighting the Americans suffered 40,000 casualties. The offensive faltered wellshort of Coutances, while Saint L fell to troops of the 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th

Map 2014 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

OPERATION GOODWOOD: As late as five weeks afterOverlord, British and Canadian troops had notadvanced much beyond their June 6 front lines, but aweek later were making good progress.


WWII QUARTERLY 21

Division on the afternoon of July 18. The bulk of First Army was now drawn up alongthe Saint L -Periers road, and Bradley conceded that the effort could go no farther. How-ever, by that time he was already contemplating a renewed offensive to finally break outof the hedgerow country.

Bradley had spent hours in his headquarters tent poring over a giant map of Normandyand the surrounding countryside. He concluded that the best prospect for a breach ofthe German defensive positions lay in the concentrated use of air power to pulverize arectangular area about 31/2 miles wide and 11/2 miles deep just beyond American linesalong the Saint L-Periers road.

As soon as possible following the aerial bombardment, Collinss VII Corps would strike.The 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions were to plunge through the weakened German linesand open the shoulders of a three-mile-wide corridor through which the 3rd and 2ndArmored Divisions and the motorized 1st Infantry Division would race. The initial objec-

tive was Coutances. German forces wouldbe encircled and squeezed between the viseof VII and VIII Corps.

After reaching Coutances, the potencyof the German resistance and momentumof the attack would be assessed, andAmerican forces might indeed roll for-ward another 30 miles to Avranches,where the open country of Brittanystretched eastward.

The coordinated air-ground effort wascode-named Operation Cobra. Originallyset for July 18, bad weather forced severaldelays, and Cobra did not get under wayuntil the morning of July 25.

Eisenhower was enthusiastic aboutCobra, as was General Bernard Mont-gomery, commander of 21st Army Groupand all Allied forces in Normandy, whohad called a conference at his headquar-ters in Creuilly on July 10. It was there thatBradley first broached the idea of Cobrawith Montgomery and Dempsey. Mont-gomery knew that Bradley needed time toresupply and reallocate his forces; there-fore, he initially proposed that the Britishin the Caen sector continue to keep thevast majority of German armor andmobile reserves occupied, drawing themaway from the Americans to allow thegreatest potential success for Cobra.

At the conclusion of the July 10 meet-ing, Dempsey suggested that the Britishmight do more than simply serve as theimmovable base for the upcoming offen-sive. Second Army might launch anotheroffensive of its own. Montgomery agreedand ordered Dempsey to plan for anattack, codenamed Operation Goodwood,which would involve the troops and armorof three corps.

In the center of the thrust, three armoreddivisions of the British VIII CorpstheGuards, 7th, and 11thwould attacktoward Falaise and the open plain of Brit-tany. The Canadian II Corps was to securethe portion of Caen that remained in Ger-man hands near the River Orne and thesurrounding high ground. Meanwhile, XIICorps was to conduct preliminary opera-tions as a diversion. Montgomery andDempsey concluded that if Goodwood


ABOVE: A Sherman tank raises a cloud of dust as it races past a disabled German PzKpfw IV tank during theOperation Goodwood advance, July 19, 1944. BELOW: In the shadow of a Normandy hedgerow, American troopslob 81mm mortar shells at the nearby enemy.


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were completely successful, the Britishoffensive might reach beyond Falaise andas far south as Argentan.

Air power was expected to play a criti-cal role in Goodwood, and more than2,100 planes, heavy bombers of the U.S.Eighth Air Force and Royal Air ForceBomber Command along with the tacticalfighter bombers of the U.S. Ninth AirForce, opened the offensive on the morn-ing of July 18, dropping more than 8,000tons of bombs on German positions.Royal Navy warships in the Bay of theSeine added their guns to the effort.

Confronting the British were the 13 divi-sions of Panzer Group West, organizedinto four corps, under Eberbach. Thesetroops held a 70-mile line with the bulk oftheir strength, five divisions at the frontand five in reserve, around Caen. Eberbacharranged his defenses in three lines to adepth of 1,200 yards. The 88mm guns ofthe III Flak Corps were positioned todeliver devastating artillery fire, and rocketlauncher brigades supported each corps.

Although he expected a British attack,Eberbach was surprised that Montgomerymoved with such speed on the 18th. Whenthe VIII Corps armor rolled forward, the

tanks made good progress. Only when they reached the concentrated German antitankand artillery positions along the third defensive line was their momentum slowed. Britishproblems were compounded by the narrow field of maneuver afforded the tanks andthe tenacious defense put up by German infantry and armor in small towns and villages,upsetting the offensives timetable.

By late morning, Eberbach had committed four infantry and four armored battalionsof the 21st Panzer and the 1st SS Divisions to deal with Goodwood. The 13 PzKpfw VPanther tanks of the II Battalion, 1st SS Panzer Regiment engaged 60 British tanks south-east of the village of Soliers and destroyed 20 of them. Kluge finally received help fromthe Fifteenth Army, when the 116th Panzer Division was released as reinforcement.

The Germans successfully prevented a direct breakthrough but had given ground andexhausted their reserves in the effort to contain Goodwood. The British lost 270 tanksand 1,500 casualties on July 18, renewed the attack on the 19th, and lost another 131tanks and 1,100 killed, wounded, or captured, and then ground to a halt on the 20thas heavy rains turned roads into rivers of mud. The 500 tanks lost during Goodwoodamounted to 36 percent of the entire British armored force available in Europe. Onearmored regiment had lost 57 of its complement of 61 tanks.

In exchange for the butchers bill, the Canadian II Corps had cleared all of Caen andmoved modestly onto the plain southeast of the town, while the VIII Corps had man-aged to gain control of 34 square miles of territory.

To this day, controversy surrounds the true intent of Operation Goodwoodto achievea breakout or to erode German combat efficiency in order to aid the American Cobra offen-sive. Montgomery may well have attempted to hedge his bet on the outcome. Prior to July18, he had assured Eisenhower that the eastern flank of the German line would burst intoflame. The whole weight of air power might bring about decisive results. Then, onthe evening of July 18, he raised the stakes by issuing a battlefield communiqu thatasserted, Early this morning British and Canadian troops of Second Army attacked andbroke through into the area east of the Orne and southeast of Caen.

Four days earlier, Montgomery had written to Field Marshal Alan Brooke, chief ofthe Imperial General Staff: And so I have decided that the time has come to have a realshowdown on the Eastern flank ... into the open country around the Caen-Falaiseroad. Nevertheless, Montgomery sent an aide to the War Office to explain vaguely thatthe object of Goodwood was to muck up enemy troops and at the same time ... totake advantage of ... the enemy ... disintegrating.

ullstein bild

ABOVE: Lt. Gen. Leslie McNair, commander of U.S. ArmyGround Forces, died when an errant American bomb fellinto his foxhole during Cobra, July 25, 1944. BELOW:German SS troops leap over barbed wire and take coverduring their stubborn defense of Caen.

National Archives


WWII QUARTERLY 23

Despite the fact that Goodwood succeeded in rendering as many as four German divi-sions ineffective by the time Cobra was launched and depleted German armor substan-tially, Eisenhower had expected more. The furious supreme commander came close torelieving Montgomery, and there was plenty of support for such a decision from seniorcommanders both British and American. Among Montys leading detractors was AirChief Marshal Arthur Tedder, the deputy supreme commander, who alleged that Mont-gomery had never actually intended a breakthrough and had misled Eisenhower. Agroup of senior British officers urged Montgomerys removal due to a serious lack offighting leadership.

In the end, Eisenhower chose to retain Montgomery, writing a letter to the 21st ArmyGroup commander expressing his disappointment that the hoped-for breakout did notcome about. Eisenhower further urged Montgomery to renew offensive operations insupport of Bradleys offensive. The hope for an Allied breakout in the summer of 1944now depended substantially on the success of Operation Cobra.

On July 12, Bradley stood before his staff and corps commanders and raised the cur-tain on Cobra. He said bluntly of the Germans, If they get set again, we go right backto this hedge fighting, and you cant make any speed. This thing must be bold.Bradley further explained that a rapid breakout from the sluggers match in Nor-mandy was to be achieved with the aid of three or four thousand tons of bombs.

Lightning Joe Collinss VII Corps staff went to work. Since the 9th and 30th InfantryDivisions had both been depleted by weeks of combat, Collins requested the 4th InfantryDivision for added strength during the ground phase of Cobra, and under his directionthe plan of attack evolved.

The Cobra plan in final form, wrote historian Martin Blumenson, thus called forthree infantry divisions, the 9th, 4th, and 30th, to make the initial penetration closebehind the air bombardment and create a defended corridor for exploiting forces,which were to stream westward toward the sea. The motorized 1st Infantry Division,with CCB (Combat Command B) of the 3rd Armored Division attached, was to thrustdirectly toward Coutances. The reduced 3rd Armored Division was to make a wider

envelopment. The 2nd Armored Division,with the 22nd Infantry attached, was toestablish blocking positions from Tessy-sur-Vire to the Sienne River near Crencesand, in effect, make a still wider envelop-ment of Coutances.

Bradley counted on the saturationbombing to soften up the German posi-tions considerably, and on July 19 he trav-eled to the headquarters of Air Chief Mar-shal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the overall aircommander, to discuss the plan. Bradleystressed the need for a blast effect andsuggested the use of 100-pound fragmen-tation bombs and nothing heavier to avoidthe deep cratering of roadways and routesof advance that had hindered earlier Alliedoffensive efforts in Normandy.

He further suggested that the bomberstake a lateral approach to the designatedarea, flying parallel to the American linerather than over the heads of the groundtroops. This would allow the bombers tooperate with the sun at their backs. Finally,Bradley compromised with the air leaders,agreeing to lengthen the distance thetroops would be pulled back from thebombing zone from 800 yards to 1,200.Still, this left virtually no margin for errorfor the bombardiers; the air commandershad originally requested a distance of3,000 yards.

The saturation bombing was to begin 80minutes prior to the jump-off of theground offensive. The first to go in wouldbe 350 fighter-bombers that would strafeand bomb the area for 20 minutes. Then,1,800 heavy bombers of the Eighth AirForce would deliver their payloads for thenext hour. Another 350 fighter-bomberswere to hit the area again for 20 minutes,and the final blow was to be delivered by396 medium bombers against the south-ern half of the rectangle in a 45-minute airassault. Altogether, with 500 fighters flyingtop cover, 2,500 planes were to attack thedesignated area for two hours and 25 min-utes, dropping 5,000 tons of ordnance.

Stretching across the path of OperationCobra was the German LXXXIV Corpsunder General Dietrich von Choltitz. TheLXXXVI Corps consisted of the under-

Aerial photo of the Normandy countryside after the U.S. Air Force'scarpet bombings shows hundreds of bombcratersbombs that inadvertently killed and wounded American troops.

National Archives


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strength remnants of several divisions,including the 243rd, 91st, 77th, 265th,2nd SS Panzer, 17th SS Panzergrenadier,5th Parachute, Panzer Lehr, and others.Along with the adjacent II ParachuteCorps, the number of German defendersin the area approached 30,000.

Panzer Lehr, holding a three-mile frontalong the Saint L-Periers road, was inCobras crosshairs and would receive thebrunt of the Allied aerial bombardment.At full strength, Panzer Lehr was autho-rized to field 15,000 men and 200 tanksand armored vehicles. Battered in Nor-mandy, the division could muster onlyabout 2,200 fighting men and 45 armoredvehicles as Cobra neared.

The Germans troubles in Normandyworsened on July 17 when Generalfeld-marschall Erwin Rommel, returning to

Army Group B headquarters in La Roche Guyon after a meeting with 1st SS PanzerCorps commander Sepp Dietrich in St. Pierre-sur-Dives, was seriously injured when aSpitfire from RAF 602 Squadron strafed the open Horch staff car near Livarot andcaused it to crash. With Rommel hors dcombat, the German Army in the West lost oneof its ablest leaders.

Since the opening act of Operation Cobra was the aerial phase, Leigh-Mallory retainedthe right to set the starting time. Bad weather began to clear on July 23, and the air mar-shal ordered the bombers to begin taking off the following morning. Soon afterward,the weather soured again as clouds obscured the target area, and Leigh-Mallory, whohad flown to Normandy to observe the bombardment, cancelled the mission. The order,however, came too late for several of the leading flights to get the word. Nearly 400planes dropped 685 tons of explosives. Tragically, a number of the bombs fell short,killing 25 and wounding 131 soldiers of the 30th Division.

Bradley was appalled when he learned that the bombs dropped were considerablyheavier than the 100-pound fragmentation types he had requested. The bombers hadalso approached the rectangle directly over the troops rather than parallel to them.When he inquired of Leigh-Mallory as to the source of the deviations from his under-standing of the plan, Bradley was told that the line of flight was changed intentionally.Approaching laterally, said Leigh-Mallory, placed the bombers on a path that was toonarrow, forcing them to fly too close together while also exposing them to German anti-aircraft fire for a prolonged period.

An hour before the bombers arrived, American troops had pulled out of their posi-tions along the Saint L-Periers road as ordered. When the movement was observed by

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OPERATION COBRA: July and August 1944 saw the battleof Normandy change from static to highly mobile war-fare in northwest France.


WWII QUARTERLY 25

the Germans, Maj. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein, commanding Panzer Lehr, ordered his owntroops into the vacated area. As the bombs fell, he expected an attack. However, thefighting that took place was only with Collinss troops attempting to retake the groundthey had given up as a precaution against errant bombs.

Bayerlein was satisfied that he had parried a significant thrust and moved additionaltroops into the positions the Americans had held, placing them directly in the path ofthe coming Allied air bombardment, now rescheduled for 11 aM the next day, July 25.

Bradley was still stinging from the changes to the air operation that had occurredwithout his knowledge. Nevertheless, he agreed that the renewed bombardment wouldbe carried out on the terms that Leigh-Mallory specified. The bombers would come inabove the American ground troops and enter the rectangle through its broad side. Thistime, 2,350 heavy bombers, medium bombers, and fighter-bombers were to deliver morethan 4,000 tons of bombs.

To minimize the risk of another friendly-fire incident, the bombardiers wereinstructed not to release any bombs until they had cleared the Saint L-Periers road. Aweather-monitoring aircraft was to be aloft, and if possible the heavy bombers wouldcome in low to sight their targets visually for better accuracy.

The 522 guns of the U.S. VII and VIII Corps along with the four infantry and twoarmored divisions involved in the ground assault were scheduled to commence a heavyartillery bombardment in support of the Cobra offensive. A total of 170,000 shells wereallotted for the barrage.

Flying in groups of 12, the heavy bombers arrived over the target area on the morn-ing of the 25th. The medium bombers then swept in with their high- explosive and frag-mentation bombs. The fighter-bombers carried their bombs and a significant amountof napalm, jellied gasoline that burned furiously and clung to any surface with which itcame in contact.

Cloud cover once again forced adjustments in bombing altitude. As ordnance fell, cloudsof dust spewed skyward and the earth convulsed. Due to difficulties maintaining forma-tion and because the bomber crews had been told to avoid hitting the Saint L-Periers road,a number of bombs missed their mark in several directions. One lead aircraft dropped itspayload prematurely, and nearly 80 medium and heavy bombers followed suit.

For the second straight day, bombs fell on American soldiers, this time killing 111 andwounding 490. Among those killed was Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair, the commanding gen-eral of U.S. Army Ground Forces. McNair had come to the area as an observer and wasslated to assume command of the fictitious First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) to main-

tain the deception of Operation Fortitude.(General Patton was reassigned to com-mand of the U.S. Third Army, which wasto be activated on August 1.)

Bradley wrote, The ground belched,shook and spewed dirt to the sky. Scores ofour troops were hit, their bodies flung fromslit trenches. Doughboys were dazed andfrightened.... A bomb landed squarely onMcNair in a slit trench and threw his body60 feet and mangled it beyond recognitionexcept for the three stars on his collar.

The news of McNairs tragic, unneces-sary death was withheld from the media,and he was buried in secrecy to preservethe integrity of Fortitude.

Famed war correspondent Ernie Pyle waswith soldiers of the 4th Division when thebombers appeared. He described the scene:And then the bombs came. They began likethe crackle of popcorn and almost instantlyswelled into a monstrous fury of noise thatseemed surely to destroy all the world aheadof us. A wall of smoke and dust erected bythem grew high in the sky. The bright daygrew slowly dark from it. Many times Iveheard bombs whistle or swish or rustle, butnever before had I heard bombs rattle. I stilldont know the explanation of it. But it is anawful sound. We dived. Some got into adugout. Others made foxholes andditches. There is no description of thesound and fury of those bombs except to sayit was chaos, and a waiting for darkness.

Bayerlein and Panzer Lehr were also

BELOW: Although his cause is lost, a camouflagedGerman paratrooper (Fallschirmjger), equipped withrifle, stick grenade, and binoculars, waits for theAmericans to arrive. LEFT: An American Sherman tanksweeps past an upended panzer on a country lane inNormandy. German armored forces suffered hugelosses during Cobra.



WINTER 201426

stunned by the ferocity of the Americanbombardment. Bayerlein recalled, Backand forth the bomb carpets were laid,artillery positions were wiped out, tanksoverturned and buried, infantry positionsflattened and all roads and tracksdestroyed. By midday the entire arearesembled a moon landscape, with thebomb craters touching rim to rim. Allsignal communications had been cut, andno command was possible. The shockeffect on the troops was indescribable. Sev-eral of my men went mad and rushedaround in the open until they were cutdown by splinters. Simultaneously withthe storm from the air, innumerable gunsof the American artillery poured drumfireinto our field positions.

Panzer Lehr sustained more than 1,000dead, wounded, or incapacitated by thebombing, roughly one-third of the troopsmanning the main defense line or posi-tioned nearby. Only about a dozen tanksand tank destroyers remained operational,and three of Bayerleins forward commandposts were obliterated. A parachute regi-ment attached to the division was killed orwounded to a man.

Although a regiment of the 9th Divisionand a battalion of the 30th Division werestill busy digging out casualties from theerrant bombs, the three spearhead divi-sions of VII Corps moved forwardpromptly at 11 AM and initial progress wasgood. An assault battalion of the 330thInfantry Regiment that had been detachedfrom the 83rd Division for Cobraadvanced 800 yards in 40 minutes. Thenthe Germans who survived the cripplingair assault shook off their malaise andmanned their weapons. The Americanadvance was slowed by a surprising vol-ume of enemy fire, and, just as in earlieroperations, the presence of bomb cratersthat made the ground difficult to negotiate.

The immediate objectives of the Cobrapenetration were the towns of Marignyand St. Gilles, about three miles beyondthe shattered German lines. Pockets ofresistance held up the Americans progress,and on the right of VII Corps the 330thRegiment was halted several hundred

yards from its initial objective, an intersection along the Saint L-Periers road. Troopsof the 9th Division came up short of most of their early objectives after advancingbeyond the saturation bombing zone and failed to reach Marigny.

In the center, two battalions of the 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Division drove along a2,000-yard front. One of these advanced a mile and a half. The second ran straight intoa well-defended German position in an orchard. It took two hours for 18 tanks that hadtemporarily lost contact with the infantry to come up and blast the Germans from amongthe apple trees. Seven hundred yards south of the Saint L-Periers road, two German tankswith infantry support had dug in along a sunken lane. The panzers were knocked out withbazooka fire, and the 8th Infantry battalion executed a double envelopment of the enemyposition. Once again, however, it took tanks to blast the way clear so that the Americanscould change direction and reach the edge of the village of la Chapelle-en-Juger.

The 30th Division was tasked with opening the road to St. Gilles for the armored thrustthat was to come soon and to take control of crossing points along the Vire River. On theleft, troops of the 30th Division jumped off but were soon forced to take cover when theywere once again struck by friendly fire from the fighter-bombers. Then, as they crossedthe Saint L-Periers road, the troops ran into a trio of Panther tanks and supportinginfantry. Three Sherman tanks fell victim to the Panthers, and a double envelopment bythe infantrymen uncovered more German strongpoints. Finally, a coordinated effort by theAmericans succeeded in knocking out a dozen German tanks and armored vehicles.

Another 30th Division objective was the capture of the town of Hbcrevon, but thegoing was slow as the Americans were obliged to cross streams, and landmines pre-vented tanks from using the roads. It was midnight before soldiers of the 119th InfantryRegiment were guiding their supporting tanks through the towns streets and aroundbomb craters in the pitch-black darkness.

Although the ground attack on July 25 had advanced beyond the Saint L-Periersroad, there was a general mood of disappointment among American commanders. Thebombing seemed at best to have disrupted the German defenses in only a portion of thetarget area, and the penetration of the enemy defenses had roughly been about twomilesconsiderably short of expectations. Eisenhower promised never to use heavybombers again in direct support of ground troops.

American footsoldiers and armor pass a destroyed panzer. Cobra was marked by lightning advances that madeGeorge Patton and Third Army household names in America.


WWII QUARTERLY 27

In his postwar memoir Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower recalled that Operation Cobrawas launched seven weeks after D-Day from a line that the Allies had expected to gainby D-Day+5. He seemed to share the doubts that other senior commanders expressedthat Cobra was destined to become another Goodwood. Bradley, however, refused totake counsel of his own doubts.

Eisenhower wrote of Cobra, Progress on the first day was slow, but that evening Gen-eral Bradley observed to me that it was always slow going in the early phases of suchan attack and expressed the conviction that the next day and thereafter would witnessextraordinary advances by our forces. The event proved him to be completely correct.

On the evening of July 25, the Americans simply could not comprehend the fact that,after a hard day of fighting, the Germans were on the verge of collapse. Their defensiveline from Lessay to Saint L had been breached in seven locations. Hausser and Choltitzcommitted reserves to stop the American advances, but neither realized that Panzer Lehrhad been so badly mauled and that Hbcrevon had fallen to the 30th Division. Mean-while, a renewed attack by the Canadians south of Caen diverted the attention of Kluge,who maintained for a time that the strongest attack was yet to come and would belaunched by Montgomery.

On the morning of July 26, the American infantry divisions were still struggling towardtheir objectives of the first day, but Collins gambled and ordered the armored columnsto advance anyway. The task of clearing roads of their own troops and of the Germansto the extent of their penetrations added to the tactical burdens of Maj. Gens. MantonEddy of the 9th Division and Leland Hobbs of the 30th Division.

The motorized 1st Infantry Division and Combat Command B of the 3rd ArmoredDivision, under Maj. Gen. Clarence Huebner, attacked toward Marigny but were unsuc-cessful in wresting high ground around the town from the Germans that afternoon.Marigny was not in American hands until the morning of July 27. To the east, the sit-uation developed solidly in the Americans favor. Early on the 26th, the 2nd ArmoredDivision, under Maj. Gen. Edward Brooks, headed toward St. Gilles.

Although his original mission was to guard the southern flank of the Cobra offensive,Brooks was determined to advance. With Colonel Charles Lanhams 22nd Infantry Reg-iment attached, Combat Command A (CCA) of the 2nd Armored, led by Brig. Gen.Maurice Rose, spearheaded the drive, passing through the 30th Division and crossing

the Saint L-Periers road, where a Sher-man tank was blown up by antitank fire.Undeterred, Rose pressed ahead andencountered only sporadic resistance.

Shortly after noon, fighter-bombersdestroyed four PzKpfw IV tanks and atank destroyer that had held up the CCAcolumn for a short time, and within a fewhours the Americans had taken St. Gilles.While the infantry of the 30th Divisioncleared pockets of resistance, Rose pressedahead along the St. Gilles-Canisy road.Panzer Lehr had been responsible for thedefense of the road, and its virtual destruc-tion during the bombing left the routeuncontested. Combat Command A did notencounter appreciable resistance until itreached the town of Canisy. Tactical airsupport once again helped to clear the way.

The advance of CCA continued throughthe night. Finally, Rose ordered a haltabout 2 AM on the 27th along a road junc-tion north of le Mesnil-Herman. CombatCommand A had lost fewer than 200 men,three Sherman tanks, and two trucks. Atthe end of Roses run, there was no doubtthat the German front had been signifi-cantly penetrated.

All day on the 27th, elements of the 2ndArmored Division fought to extend theirprotective positions on the eastern flank ofthe Cobra advance route, while the 1st

A column of American tanks rushes intothe city of Avranches to knock out pocketsof resistance, August 1, 1944.



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Division and CCB of the 3rd ArmoredDivision continued their struggle to clearMarigny and the surrounding high groundto open the way for the main thrust of theCobra exploitation phase: the capture ofCoutances.

The fall of Coutances would trap thou-sands of German soldiers between VII andVIII Corps, which were already exertingpressure southward. The Germans hadreacted to the threat of encirclement,falling back with a defensive line facingeastward and consisting of elements of the2nd SS Panzer Division, 353rd InfantryDivision, 17th SS Panzergrenadier Divi-sion, and a handful of paratroopers stillfighting as infantry. Unable to captureCoutances on the 27th and cut off the Ger-man withdrawal, the 1st Division wasobliged to turn south and take up the roleearlier played by VIII Corps, exerting pres-sure on the Germans south of the roadfrom Coutances to Saint L.

Despite some concerns about the linger-ing German defense of Coutances, it

became apparent to Bradley on the evening of July 27 that a significant breakthrough hadbeen achieved. Rather than slowing down to consolidate his gains, Bradley decided tomaintain Cobras offensive momentum. Things look really good, he informed Eisen-hower. Bradley ordered his corps commanders to allow the enemy no time to regroupand reorganize his forces and to maintain unrelenting pressure on the Germans.

Bradley ordered General Corlett and XIX Corps to attack aggressively west of theRiver Vire and take the high ground between Avranches and Falaise, denying the Ger-mans its use in the event they intended to establish a new defensive line against thegrowing threat of the encirclement of the Seventh Army in Normandy. Montgomerysforces around Caen continued their attacks in support of Cobra.

Significantly, with Third Army set to become operational on August 1 and VIII Corpsbeing reassigned to it, Bradley gave Patton control of the corps ahead of schedule. OnJuly 28, Patton sent the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions through the Cobra breach andCoutances fell to the troops and tanks of the 4th Armored late that day. Most Germanunits were in headlong retreat, and operational integrity was disintegrating. The onlyappreciable resistance in Coutances was offered by a rearguard detachment and peteredout by evening.

With hardly a pause, Patton worked with Middleton to get the 4th and 6th ArmoredDivisions farther south, toward Avranches, the gateway to Brittany. Middleton believedthat only light resistance stood in his way, and German soldiers were beginning to sur-render in large numbers. The capture of Avranches and crossings over the River Seewould open Brittany to the Allied advance, finally freeing Bradleys forces from the con-stricting hedgerow country.

Both armored divisions sped southward. At Brhal, about 16 miles north of Avranches,Combat Command B of the 6th Armored Division encountered a log roadblock that wasbla

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