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 W orld W ar T wo, the Institutionalization of Labor and the CIO’s Red Scare Purge

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World War Two, the

Institutionalization of Labor andthe CIO’s Red Scare Purge

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Coming into the 1940s

!  Passing of the National Labor Relations Act

emboldened labor unlike never before.!  Labor was afforded certain rights unlike before – the right

to exist without criminalization, right to organize withreprisal

!  With the new rights bestowed to labor and the

competition between the AFL and CIO – labor steadilyincreased in membership.

!  The institutional structures and policies thatdeveloped in the 1930s changed the relationships

among workers, unions, employers, and government. !  Organized labor – especially the CIO – became

increasingly involved in politics and an alliance with theDemocratic Party was solidifying.

!  Labor became institutionalize (solidified during WWII) 

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Pearl Harbor attacked! – December 7, 1941

The U.S enters World War II on December 10, 1941

Ten days after Pearl Harbor FDR summoned labor andmanagement to plan new measures of industrial cooperation.!

 

Did not want strikes and lockouts to affect war-time production

!  Agreed to three point: " 

No strikes or lockouts for the duration of hostilities; " 

Peaceful settlement of all industrial disputes; "

 

The creation of the National War Labor Board - a tripartite board, withlabor, management and the public each represented by four members. "

 

Empowered to hand all labor controversies affecting the war effort.

!  Both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress ofIndustrial Organizations agreed to the “no strike” pledge!

 

In exchange – labor was recognized by management and were ableto implement “maintenance of membership” clauses in theiragreements.

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!  The bitter, adversarial roles that previously existed between labor andcapital was now tempered by this new partnership – between laborleaders, business and government - Exchanged a measure of unionsecurity and new social legitimacy and labor stability.

!  Those considered “respectable” labor leaders were brought into thenation’s power elite: Presidential advisory boards, foreign policycouncils and congressional staff. !  Sidney Hillman (CIO) and William Knudsen (Gen. Motors) severed co-

directors for the Office of Production Management.

Legislative lobbying began to replace rank-and-file activism

!  Greater separation from membership as labor leadership developsgreater cooperation with management.

This also provided an excuse for a lack of militancy within leadership – making leadership less vulnerable to pressure from their own rank-and-file.

!  Union leadership – AFL and CIO – pushed for speed ups andreinforced the narrative the strikes were unpatriotic. 

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Strike!

!  Early on strikes were greatly reduced:!

 

1941 – 4,288 strikes – 2,360,000 involved - 23,000,000 man-dayslost

1942 – 2,968 strikes – 840,000 involved - 4,180,000 man-days lost

By the summer of 1942 – some labor leaders began to argue

that workers interests were being ignored.!  Angered by the effects of the Little Steel formula - recognized

that rising prices justified wage adjustments, but limited inequityincreases to no more than 15% of the January, 1941 wage rate.Formula did not match inflation costs. (Labor argued that costsincreased by 43%)

In addition, labor was also angered at the passing of theEconomic Stabilization Act, essentially freezing wages atthe level of September 15, 1942.

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!  By 1943 – A few unions - like the UMWA - began to defy the earlier pledges

engaging in a series of successful strikes – 4 national strikes till FDR seizedthe mines – Gov’t neg. with UMWA – victory for union.!  1943 – 3,752 strikes – 1,980,000 involved - 13,500,000 man-days lost.

UMWA strike led to the passing of the Smith-Connally Act - The Actallowed the federal government to seize and operate industries threatenedby or under strikes that would interfere with war production, and prohibitedunions from making contributions in federal elections.! 

First Used: Philadelphia Transportation Company Strike (Sickout) –White workers wenton strike in response to the hiring of black workers – August 106, 1944.

Despite the UMWA most of labor still honored the no-strike agreement.

Faced with this united front of the government, employers, and their ownunions, workers developed the technique of quick, unofficial strikesindependent of and even against the union structure. (Wildcat strikes)

!  The number of such strikes began to rise in the summer of 1942, and by1944, the last full year of the war; more strikes took place than in anyprevious year in American history.! 

1944 – 4,956 strike – 2,120,000 involved – 8,720,000 man-days lost

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Gender, Race and Labor

!  Due to the transitions into wartime production labor scarcity

superseded labor surplus.!  1942-45 – the highest level of full employment in American history

!  Workers had steady job, security of employment and rising real incomes

!  The need for labor led to the increase of African-American andwomen in industries they previous had no access to.

!  Many women were not housewives coming out of their homes to aidthe war effort, but rather were coming out of low-wage jobs forbetter pay and opportunity.

!  In 1940, women made up 25 percent of the workforce. Five years laterthey made up 36 percent.

African-Americans left low-wage domestic unskilled and agricultural jobs for more skilled and better-paying defense work. !  As with WWI with the great migration, African-Americans migrated north

and west for opportunities. This time on a large scale (1915-18 – 350,000)(1941-1945 – three to five million. 

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!  White women found entry into better jobs easier thanblack men and women. But it was understood by maleworkers, their unions and the companies that women

were to stay in the industries only through the durationof the war.

!  Thirty-one AFL affiliates barred black members, as didthe railroad brotherhoods.!

 

Ex: International Association of Machinists barred blacks frombecoming members." 

Saw them as an inferior group that would burden the union

Feared if they were allowed to join that southern white members wouldsecede from the union.

Many unions, including CIO organizations, hadsegregated locals.!  Even in the CIO – white workers threaten to strike if black

received more skilled job.

!  UAW and UMWA fought for the rights of their black members,

embracing the heritage of the CIO.

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!  1941 - A. Philip Randolph

!  Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters

!  Threatened a march on Washington

and to bring "ten, twenty, fifty thousand

Negroes on the White House lawn.”!

 

Demand for good jobs and fair

employment – Led to FDR to sign

Exec. Order 8802 - Fair Employment

Practices Commission – prohibited racial

discrimination in the national defenseindustries – including unions and comp-

anies engaged in war-time production.

In 1945, 1.25 million African Americans

worked in manufacturing.

!  The heritage of discrimination against blacks and women in many unionsand the missed opportunities for broadening the appeal of the labormovement would come back to haunt it in the decades that followedWorld War II.! 

Perception that union’s face was white and male.

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After the War

!  Between 1940-45 – Union membership rose from 9 million toalmost 15 million (27 percent to 36 percent); CIO doubled itsmembership.

Presidents Murray and Green of the CIO and AFL signed a"Charter of Industrial Peace" with Eric Johnston, president of theU.S. Chamber of Commerce, in March 1945. "It's Industrial Peace

for the Post-War Period!" read the front-page headline of C.I.O.News

!  However –

!  Conservative became alarmed over the growing power of laborunions and its increasing involvement in politics.

In addition, as World War II drew to a close and millions ofworkers faced unemployment with widespread layoffs, as well as areduction of hours, slashed and deflated wages and price inflation.

!  Attempts to resolve the issues with the National War LaborBoard failed.

!  Relationship between management and labor quickly unraveled.

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The Strike Wave of 1945-46

In September 1945 – 43,000 petroleum workers and 200,000 coal workers

struck!

 

In October – 44,000 lumber workers, 70,000 teamsters and 40,000 machinists joined them.

November – UAW called its first major strike against GM since the companyunionized. 180,000 workers in GM plants across the country.

At the beginning of the new year (1946) over 2 million workers were on strike,which included:! 

 January 1946 - 174,000 electrical workers, 300,000 meatpackers, and 750,000steelworkers.

April 1946 – 350,000 miners

May 1946 – 250,000 railroad engineers and trainmen nationwide

Dec 1946 - 120,000 miners, rail and steel workers in the Pittsburgh region!

 

In total, 4.3 million workers participated in the strikes. According to laborhistorian, Jeremy Brecher, it was “"the closest thing to a national general strike ofindustry in the twentieth century."

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Backlash and the Taft-Hartley Act!

 

The post-war strike wave ignited an offensive campaign from the anti-labor side.

The corporate community and their congressional allies unleashed a propagandacampaign that portrayed labor as a selfish special interest that ill-served thepublic.

The anti-union drive coalesced in 1946 around the demand for modification ofthe Wagner Act (NLRA).!  Arguing that the law only outlawed employer practices, leaving labor free to engage in

improper and coercive behavior.

!  Created an imbalance of power – too far to the side of labor.

Taft-Hartley Act (1947)!  Outlawed unfair labor practices of unions

!  No secondary boycotts,

Right-to-work laws,

!  Company had the right agitate against unions,

!  Closed shop outlawed,

!  180 day cooling off period during a labor dispute that put imperil national health orsafety.

!  Required unions to give 60-days notice for the termination or modification of anyagreement.

!  Not allowed to make contributions or expend any of their funds in political campaigns

Officers were required to file affidavits that they were not members of the CommunistParty or of any organization supporting it.

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Post-War & Cold War Hysteria

!  After the WWII – it was clear that

tension between the US and the USSRwas going to shape the current andfuture global landscape. Thisincreasingly became the central issueof postwar American life.

!  Communist infiltration of U.S. tradeunions became the main topic of

conversation in the late 1940's.

Both the AFL and the CIO supportedthe foreign policies of the government- Truman Doctrine of containingSoviet power via military and financialaid to countries; favored the Marshall

Plan; defended Truman’s reasons forthe conflict in Korea; and even tookfunds from the CIA and helpedcombat left-wing influences in thelabor movements in W. Germany,France, Italy, Latin America and ThirdWorld countries.

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!  Since its beginning the CIO enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with

radicals since its founding in 1935. ! 

Members of the communist union TUEL (Trade Union Education League) were recruitedinto the CIO at the very beginning because of their politics.

Much of the leadership within the CIO had previous or current radical ties – either withTUEL, I.W.W., Communist Party or other radical political parties.

At first it opposed the language of the Taft-Hartley pertaining to communists inleadership.

During the 1948 election, many on the far Left broke rank from the laborleadership that supported Truman – instead supporting Henry Wallace and the

Progressive Party. Especially in the CIO this was viewed as a betrayal of labor’sinterest (i.e., support of Truman/Democrats)

Following year at its national convention in 1949, the CIO revised itsconstitution to make communists ineligible for executive office and to providefor expulsion by a two-thirds vote any affiliate following the “communist line.”

!  This act ultimately undermined the more militant tendencies within the labormovement and cemented the more institutionalized and mainstream aspects ofthe labor movement. Moving away from movement-based labor to more of abusiness model.