xxi bomber command, monthy activity report 1 june 1945

8/6/2019 XXI Bomber Command, Monthy Activity Report 1 June 1945

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XXIBOMBER COMMAND

MONT.J-ILY ,ACTIV /T ,Y REPORTClae.elfloatiOl1 canoen~ 1Ir ' ,_DOD D lREC 'l IVE 10. 5200.9, e r : r e c l : l ~ . " " .\ I/ I I j\ I /

I JUNE, 1945r j- ~ ,"

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XX I BOMBER COMMANDH IGHL IGHTS FOR M AY

MINIA/q MISS/oAls3"-/9-1&.-IS-20-ZZ24--2r.t:n MAY1+0r. TON5 RELEt/SEOt~cELLEIJT R5IJLT5

Or:.._AI(EOIL REFINERY/0 MAY5104 7 0 1 ' 1 5 45% DA.HA~EO ";"'901 ' 1 ' 1 UII.I '>I'" ~R..!I/14- ICo MAY

G/:H To~/~ {P.1lM~lIE 5< 1 MIL5

113 RO SCU

05f1IMII ""VIIL OIL STORA",!/0 MAY3 . 1 ': 3 Taws 90 % DAA1AtiED

TOKYO U"-8"" flllEIi23-2S Mll' .t D' fl j T OJ/ 5 '240 Mll'U 5Q IUliE~

YOJ(OJ./AMR UR,8RfoI A/{EA2q .111'z s n Tows 1.44 M o,,-! S . MILES

tJR,8RN PRi1

".".L'5HU t SJIIKoJ(1J IIIRFlelD3-4-5-7-8-/0 /1 MRY1584 TON5 R(UIIS(L2

MIT5UBISHI Al e WORKs14-/1i! Ml'!'4fP S ~ "~iI!E DAM-A ee a

3995 BOMBING SORTIES 421 MINING SORTIES93

WEATHER STRIKESORTIES

82PHOTOSORTIES

28FIGHTER ESCORT

SORTIES\

10SEA SEARCH

SORTIES

* 102 HOURS FLOWN PER ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT* 86 HOURS FLOWN PER ASSIGNED CREW IN THEATER* 6.4 LONG RANGE SORTIES PER AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED* 2.00/0 OF AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT LOST* 93% OF AIRBORNE AI C .BOMBED ALL TARGETS* 24594 TONS RELEASED O~ ALL TARGETS* 6.4 TONS CARRIED PER AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT


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x x r BOMBER COl:. ' i i jiAND

M ONTH LY ACThVITY REPORT5 June 1945

PAET I S 'rREN GT 1-1 OF T HE COiV 1M AN DPAnT II USE OF A IRCRA F T A N D CREW SP ART III i v 1A INTENANCE AND O TH ER F ACT OH S A FF EC TIN G

USE OF A IH CRAF T A N D CREW SPART IV EFF S CT IVEN ESS OF A IRCRA FT ON M ISS ION SPA RT V R E S T J L ' ! : ' SPA f ~T V I COST OF l\USSIONEiPART VII APPEND IX

Prepared By3 3. rd St at is ti cal Co nt ro l U ni t

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AIN IT IALS : /10.DA T E: 5 June 14 5


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. . . . . -,----~PARTI -- STRENGTHF'THECOM1VIAND

1. ~llovE?rnentf UnitsWith only a. few exceptions, all units assigned or attached to

Headquar-ter-s XXI BomberCommandand its five wings have now arrived in thetheater. The ret:1aining one-third of the 58th Wing ground echelon willarrivE,. in June as will the 827th Chemical Company. All ground echelons ofthe 3l5th Wing are in place, but flight echelons are arriving slowly dueto faHure to complete Northwest Field on schedule, and this movement v , illnot be completed until July. All units of the 509th Composite Group arenow in place or enroute except for the 1st Ordnance Squadron, scheduled toarrive in June and July. The 41st Photo Reconnaissance Squadron is due toarrive in the theater in June. All units of the Combat Staging Center arenow in p.l.ace at Iwo,2. Personnel strength

At the end of the norrth the strength of the Commandn the theaterV\'aS 8,888 offi cer-a and ,1 .8 , 192 enlisted men, or a total of 57,080 comparedto an ultimate strength of about 79,500 per sonne.I ,

As of 1 June, the Commandhad 709 aircruft and 872 crews in thet.heat.cr compared to 616 aLrcr-af't, and 770 cr,3WSas of 1 Mayand a proj ectedauthorized strength of 993 VeF;[ heavy aircraft and 1639 very heavy crews on1 December 1945. The Lncr-ease in strength for the month was largely due tothe arrival of 58th Wing aircraft, the other Wings remaining at &.boutthesame strength. The essigned crew to "'.ircr.:tft ratio for 1 June was only 1.2to 1, tho sam8 ratio as the previous month. The projected strength, however,v!ill ultimately be 1.65 to 1.

Based on latest cr-evrflo" Lnf'crmat.Lonand also on estimates fromthe 58th and 73rd Wlne;son the crews expected to complete their tour ofduty in June,losses will oxceed replacements by about 41 crews in June.Approximately 105 crews are expected to complete their tour of duty and78 cr-ews (4874 planned sorties x 1.6% loss rate) are expected to be lostthrough attrition. Thin totul of 183 crews is compared to the 142 creYlSexpncted to arrive during the month. The large outflow of crews duringthese first fe'ii morrth s of crews completing their tours will not be asserious as previously anticipated because of the I,dditional crews to besent to tho Commandbeginning in July. However, urrtLl. these cr-ewsarrivethe Command.does face a diminution of its effort and an apparent decreasein its cr ew exper-Ience Levo.l, ThE;prusent low crews to aircraft ratioand !IInximumeffort condit.ions plus the fnilurc to meet immDture theat.errequirements by building up an excess of ere 0:8 over the .r-equtr-edhavelargely pr-ovcnt.ed bombgr-oups from equalizing their crew expericmce atdosi.r-ed levels. Hence, a,; of 1 June the '73rd Wing found itself viith 1 + 1 %of its pilots and airplane commander-shav.irig in excess of 21 crew creditsorties, and the 58t.h 1"ing L , l Y / o . The 313th Winghad 35%of its pilot cr-edi,t:Jortit:.s bunched in t.he 16-20 florti


5/20

PARTI -- STRENGTHF'THECOMIVlAND

With only a. few exceptions, all units assigned or attached toHeadquar't.ere XXI BomberCommandand its fi ve ~lings howe now arrived in thet.heat er . 'I'he renaining one-third of the 58th Wing ground echelon willarrive. in June as will the 827th Chemical Company. All ground echelons ofthe .315th Wing are in place, but flight echelons are arriving slowly dueto failure to complete NorthweBt Field on schedule, and this movement V I illnot be completed untH July. All units of the 509th Composite Group arenow in place or enroute exc8pt for the 1st Ordnance Squadron, scheduled toarri vv : in June and July. The 41st Photo Reconnn.Lasance Squadron is due toarrive in the theater in June. All units of the Combat Staging Center arenow in p.l.ace at Iwo,2. Personnol strength

At thE' end of the norrth the strength of the Commandn the theaterwas 8,888 officers end 1.8,192 enlisted men, or a t.ot.a.l of 57,080 comparedto un u.lt i.mat.e str('ngth of about 79,500 personnel.

As of 1 June, the Commandhad 709 aircraft and 872 crews in thetheater compared to 616 a.i r cr-aft and 770 cr-ews as of 1 ]1,1aynd a proj ectedauthorized strength of 993 very heavy [drcrd't and 1639 very heavy cr-ews on1 December 1945. 'I'he Lncr-er.se in strength for tho month was largely due tothe arr-Lva), of 58th Wing [J.ircruft, the other Wings remaining at "bout thesame strength. The e.ssigned crew to ~'.i1'craft ratio for 1 June was only 1.2to 1, tho SlUnG rntio as the previous Donth. The projected strength, however,v:ill ultimately be 1. 65 to 1.

Based on Latest cr-ewf'Lowinformation and also on estimate". fromtho 58th and 73rd \';j.ngs em the crews expected to comp.Lee their tour ofduty' in June, losses will exceed replilc0monts by about 41 crews in June.Approximately 105 cr-ev.s ar e expected to complete their tour of duty and78 creve (4874 planned sorties x 1.6% Ions rate) are expec t.ed to be lostthrough attrition. 'I'hia t.o tu.L of 183 C1'OVfSs compared to the 142 cr-ewsexpected to arrive during the month. The Lar-ge outflow of cr-ewsduringthese first f'sw months of crews completing their tours will not be asserious as previously nnticipatod because of the ::.dditional crews to besent to the Commandbeginlling in July. However, until these crews arrivetho Commanddoes f'ace a d.l.minution of its effort and an appar-ent, decreasein its cr-ewexperience LevoL, The pro sent low cr-ews to [,ircraft ratioand maxf.mumeffort conditions plus the f'ai.Lur-eto meet immature theaterr-equtr-emeut.s by building up un excess of cr-ews over the required havelargely pr-ovonted bombgroups from equalizing their crew exper-Ience [ltdosi.r-cd levels. Hence, as of 1 June the: ?3rd llling found itself Viith 1+1%of its pilots and c.irplalw commander-shavi.ng in excess of 21 crew creditsorties, and tho 58th fTing L , C Y / o . The 313th Winghsd 35%of its pilot creditaor-t.Lc s bunched in tbe 16-20 sor-t.Le class. It:i.snot. expected that enoughaddf,t.LonvL crews will arrive in tim!) to preclude the se Lar-geblocks ofcrevs from comp.Le. L n g their tom' wi .h m dd.sproport-Lono.e Ly short periodsof time. .;"l-

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6/20

PART II. U SE OF AIRCRAFT A~n CRIDVS1. l;:!ours: Sorties Flown Per B-22 Aircraft and Crew

S u ll l i U J RYF H O UR S & SORTIES58TH 73RD 3l3TH 3l4TH XXI BCM AY APR MAY APR MAY APR W l A Y APR M . - I I . .Y

Aver B-29 Alc "~.r3gd 154. 179 192 173 .1'77 146 186 512 710Atier B-29 Crews As gd 168 249 235 217 ;213 180 223 659 8/+1

To tal Co mbat Sorties 923 1409 1269 1112 1167 966 1191 3487 4558Sorties Per A I c Asgd 6.0 7. 9 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.6 6. 4 6.8 6.4Sorties Per CreVf Asgd 5 . 5 5.7 5.4 5.1 5. 5 54 5.4 5.3 5. 4B-29 Hours Flown -

Fer A / c Asgd - Co mbat 85 108 91 88 92 98 96 96 91Per A / c Asgd - Total 0' 117 102 100 105 115 107 108 102.Per Cr -ew Asgd - Co mbat 78 78 74 70 77 79 80 74 77Fer Crew Asgd - Total 86 84 83 80 87 93 89 84 86NOTE: . Co mm an d t ot al LncLud-. S 3 l5 th 1 ii in gM ny f ig ures .

As shown in the abo ve t able, 102.2 hours per assigned airc raft wereflown during May co mpared to 107.8 hours in April and t he planned figurein April of 100 hours. This decrease was expect ed because of the arrivalof 58th an d 315th Win g ai rcraft, whic h flew 94.1 hours and 37.3 hours perai rcraft, res pectively, an d because the planned flyin g time for the 73rd,313th, and 314th Wi ngs called.for approximately the number of hours andsorties per aircraft t hat were performed. The 58th lacks one-third of i t smaintenan ce perso nnel, an d the 315t h wi .L l . n ot bec ome ful ly o perat io nal un-til Jul y.An examination of each Win g's performance in terms o f hours and sor-ties flown per ai rcraft and c rew on hand, di scloses that t he 73rd Win g,with an in crease of 13 ai rcraft duri ng the month am a decrease of 14 crews,fl ew fewer sorties and hours tban the previous month. The 313th Win g, w:Ltha slight inc rease in aircraft and slight decrease in crews, bettered theirApri l record. The 3l4th Wing, with an i ncrease of about 40 aircraft aOOcrews, flew les s flyi ng hours than the mon th before an d about the samen um ber o f s ort ies .The Command agai n f'Lew an excessive number of hours per assignedcrew in the theat er in May, attai ning 86.2 hours compared to 83.8 hours inApril, 86.4 in March, an:! the 60 hours plann ing figure prescri bed for lon gterm uti lizatio n of crews. As indicated i n Part I of this report, t heco ntinuat ion of the rat io of assigned crews to aircraft at only 1.2 t o 1makes it diffi cult to reduc e the excessive number o f hours flown per crew.

B-29HOURS FLOWN PER Alc B - 2 9HOU RS FLOWN PER CP..E\'VTRNG OTHER TOTAL COMBAT TRNG OTHFR TOTALOMBAT

26.02 1.03 1. 16 28.31.69 37.81O V 34.75 1.371.51 33.91 1.02 2. 50 37.43

8~25 42.503.70 55.41EG 50.20

JAN 57.98 26.97 7. 286.80 9.93 11.2542.09 12.79 5.11 59.99 33.40 10.15 4.05 47.60E B

3.97 114. 85 75.9/;. 7.35 2. 98 86. 27. 7801.10A R8.62.20 107.81 .93 83. 75

1.44 86.2495.51 11.10 74.20PR

76.971.22 9. 28 7.83.71 102.21AY


7/20

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3. .1[_tiJ.ization of Aircrnft on MMimumEffort Mission Drws84.1% of a.i.r-cr-o't, on hand or 7/;1%of aircraft assigned were

utilized on mRximumeffort mission days during May. There were five maxi-mumeffort missions during the month, two to Nagoya, two to Tokyo, and oneto Yol;:olwma.Of the 84.1%utilized, 80.6% wer-e airborne on combat miss ionsem u 3.5% on other misstons , The 73rd Wing utilized H9.2%of its aircrafton hand compared to 8 L , . 7 % for the 58th Wing, 83.0% for the 314th Wing and7 7 . C J % for the 313th Wing.

In addition to the 3,995 bombing sorties conducted by very heavyaircraft during May, there uere 421 mining sorties, 93 weather strikemiss.Ione , 82 photo r-econnaf.ssancc and radar scope missions, 28 fighternavigational end escort sorties, C'nd10 sea search sorties .

915%of t.he weather strikes were effective dur-Ing the monthcompared to 92%in April. Mechanical failure was the sale reason for the2%non':'effectiv8.

Photo reconna.i asance per f'orrnanc e v/as at the lowest ebb in threemonths, 34%of ('.irborne aircraft nborting compared to 16.7% in April and17$ in March, and only 56%of the airborne aircr[cft. getting good to exellentphoto r-esul.t.s compar-edto 63%in March and 78.2% in' April. The chiefreason for tho rise in the non-effective rate was bad weather. LargelydUGto the reassignment of several F-131s to each Wing in addition to tho3rd Photo Rcconna.i.asance Squndr-on, t.hesc [!ircraft averaged 52.6 hours in. Maycompar-ed to 1t1 hours in April and 28 in March. The 3rd Photo Squadronaveraged 55.3. hours on the aircraft in its possession. F-13 aircraft,hOV.'8v8r,were used for other purposes t.han reconnaissance during the month,and one WHS lost on IJ bOIDDingmission.

Principle use of the 30 B-241s in the Commn.nduring Maywas for"IO:).th


8/20

.....~.. .' .-"''''. .'. t " ~~\ I"': ".;:J.. ,_.. ~ '. . .PP.ETIII. MAINTENANCENDOTHl'.:RACTORSAFFECTINGUSE:OFAIRCRAFTANDCREWS1. Maintenance

For the past three months, the percent of aircraft on hand which werein comnu ssdon daily has shown a steady increase, the figures being 47%for;'ilarch, 52)"~f'cr April, and ~ 2~; for May. This increase should have per-mit.ted a higher percent of aircraft on hand scheduled "for missions duringl-:Iay, 8.1hough the per-cent of scheduled actually decreased from 24%of planedays ava.iLab.Le in April to 21%in May. These increases in the percent ofaircl't>.ft in commt.ssl.on further aggravate the low r-at.Lo of crews to aircraft,making it increasingly difficult to crew all available planes.

As further shown in Parts IV and VI of this report, both the numberof aircX'aft aborto and aircraft losses due to maintenance increased slightlyduring ll'lay. 6.4% of airborne aircraft aborted in May because of maintenanceand materiel f'adLur-es compared to 5. 7;~in April and 5.8% in March. (Seet.ab.Le on page 9). At the same time 21%of aircraft losses wer-e due to me-chani cal, r-easons in May compared to 11%in April. A large portion of thesewere caused by failures on te.klS-offb. It should be noted failures of bothequipment and ma.i.rrtonance personnel contributed to this abort increase,wrlile the per-cent of engi.ne f'a'i.Lur-es .remained constant.

Highlighting the mafrrtenance picture of the month was the performanceof the 58th Wing, whdch flew within 6%of t.ho Commandaverage hours andsorties per asai.gned a'i rcr-af't, although it had 25%less maintenance personnelper A l e on hand. In addition, this Wing consistently indicated the highestpercentage of a.ircraft in commi.ssi.on daily and the lowest non-effective air-craft due to mechani.ce.L or' me.i.nt.enance personnel roasons.

In re.Lat.Lon to the manber of aircraft scheduled for missions, the totalmaLrrt.enanee f's.i.Lur ea, both air and gr ound, present some important relation-ships whLch r ef'Lec't not only on the degree of maintenance, but also on thedifferences in the scheduling' policy between the Wings.

FAILUHETOBOMBAJ)..'YARGET58TIi 73RD 313TH _l14TH TOTALMJ..YAPR l.llAYAPR i I f l J - \ . Y APR MAY MAR APR iV lAY

TOTPLANEDAYS ONHD 4767 5383 5939 5192 5480 4372 5753 12424 15364 21960TuT A l e SCHEDDLED 936 1342 1189 1155 1182 1098 1238 2023 3595 4545% OF PLANEI:,l\YSSCHED 1~.6 24.9-'20.0 :22.3 21.5 25.1 21.5 16.3 234 20.7~mCE A };'D M Al N T FAILUr~ES~~

FA I LUP . .w T O 'fA KE CFF~'* 18 40 )0 57 56 /+ 9 66 56 146 170...:ii.BOf~HEi . ' . . N G I N E FAILUHES 24 32 37 46 3 9 30 4l 77 108 141AIRBORNE\lECHFAILUHES 10 12 25 22 26 10 19 39 44 80M A l N T PERSONNELFAILURES 16 -r I 15 16 20 8 10 32 38 61J . . < ; .

TOTAL 68 98 107 141 141 97 136 24 336 452

.~OF Y L A . I N T FAILUREElTOSCHED 7.3 7.3 9.0 12.2 11.9 8.9 11.0 10.1 9.3 9. 9c. OFSPAREA l c SUBSTITUTED 7 2 : 3 ') 2 27 21 9 32 33''m GROUND&AIR ABORTSD U ETO M A U l T 61 96 10t\. 138 139 70 115 195 304 419~OF NETABOHTSTOSCHEDULED6.5 7.2 8.7 11.9 11.3 6.4 9. 2 9.6 8 . 5 9.2~Including all failures resulting in failure to bomb any target.*Including only those failures attributable to maintenance or materiel.:ct


9/20

During the month of Muy, u steadily increasing backlor, of groundedaircraft [It Iwo .Timahighlighted the existenco of n growing madrrtenanceproblem. '1'h8 extent of activity at Iwo for the month is indicated by thetable be Lov, cover-Ing the four-week period froin 3 Mayto 30 i \ l !p.y, 19Lf5.

UINDING S AT TWO J IM AMAINTEUANCE% OFN llfl.BER S ORT IES--- ----- % OFB~!~ER SORTIESREFUEL ING% OFN UM BER S O RT IES----W F .EK TOT 1 \LENDING SORT IES

9 Mc.y 695 105 15.1 23 3.3 128 18.416 lViay 1730 8L. 4.9- 26 1 . 5 no 6.4. .~ May 1018 26 2.6 9 .9 35' 3.5( . . - '30 May 1141 ___l __5.3 L . 1 _l& 102 -~TOTH 458/.. 276 6.0 99 2.2 375 8.2

The aver-age time it took to r-epe.Lr aircraft at Iwo during themonth of Mn_yis indicated by the f'o'lLowfng table. Included in the elapsedtime is such time as was spent by the r-epalr-ed a.i.rcrat't mvaiting pick upfor roturn to its bas e , an interval nvero.ging about 1-1/2 days per a.i.r-p.Lane

PERIODNO. OF

COMPLETEDPLANES

NO. OF DAYS A VER AG E T IM EEL 1\PS ED BET WEEN P ER COilt1 P LET ED

ARRIVAL & DEPARTT JRE PLANE

AVG Dl\yS P k'\NESO N H AND AT ENDOF PERIOD IL - 'l.DBEEN AT 'nvo

4.69.9 5 . 56.82544115436

1 "Nby - 15 Mry16 May - 31 l


10/20

3. i\1nintcn~tnCG of Bomber COUUl1c.1.ndircraft at the GunmAir DepotDuring the month of May, GnamAir Depot showed a substantial im-

provement over !l!ic.rch I. nd April in the time consumed in the repair of B-29and F-13 oircruft, as indicnted in the table below:

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NO. OF A l c AVERAGEDAYS AVERAGEELAPSEDRETURNEDTO A l c WERE DAYE!BEFOREf'.iONTH TACTICALUNITS IN DEPOT 1 i J O R K STAR'rEDIVIr,rch 2 36 5l'pri.l 8 52 8.5May 12 23 3.7

The backlog of B-29 and F-13 aircrllft on hillldin tho depot in-cr-eased from D . daiLy nveruge of 12.8 planes on hand in April to 13.4 pl.ane son hand during May. This increc.se is not believed to be excessive, sincethe average backlog in terms of man hours during May seemed consistent wit.hwor-k Loads normuliy required for efficient oper-o t.Lons ,

According to Int'ormat.Lon submitted by the depot, in the sectionsof the depot performing inspection, aero repair, sheet metc.l, and flighttesting Qctj.vities, the distribution of backl.cg and m an hours consumedappear0d as follows:

TYPEOFPLANli..

MONTHLYHOURSUSED-------%F _itMNHOURS TOTAL.1",NHOlI l~S . TOT 1 ~L

14,900 75.6~ . ,GOO 24.419,700 100.0

39,90211,662

77.422.6, B-29 & F-13j OthC! l ' r . Aircraft,t Totalt 100.0

The slightly grec.ter proportion of ava.LLab'Le manhour s being spent onB-29 aircraft than the ratio of the two backl og figures is consistentwith the,pr8sence of aircraft in the "Other" category being lower priorityt.hun B-291 s and F-13' s ,

4. Aircraft lAlt of Commission for PartsThe j .OCp situation in the Commandduring the month of M ay showed

cont.Lnuod improvement over previous months. Pl.ane days lost due to AOCPwas only 0.96% of total pl.ane days ave.Ll.e hLe, The GuamAir Depot wasstill continuing to fill 75%of 1':.11AOCPr-equests in the month of May.This is R substantial Lncroase over t.he Feb. figuro of 55~br.nd M~r.figure of6 8% . There was however a s.Li.ght, increase in the month of May in the %of p.Lc.ncs grounded for 3-4 days , and 5-7 days as shown below:

DAYSPLANESGROUNDED APRIL

90.4%8.1%1.5%

83.2%13.7%3.1%

1-2 days3-4 days5-7 days

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11/20

This increase in days gr-oundedmay be due to 1 ' . . possible Incr-ease in cargobacklog et the Depot, Inasmuch as Iwo has grea.tly increased the demands beingmade upon tr[1.nsport aircraft of the Depot.

During the month of May, 39 AOCPequest.s were received from IVIO.'I'he GuamAir Depot filled 82% of these requisitions. Of the 39 requests ofiilhich t.her-o is a record, 26 were for R-3350 engines and 8 requests were foroiJ. coo'Ler s . The average elapsed time be tween requisition and receipt ofpart s grounding B-29 aircraft at 111'0 was 6.3 days.5. Supply F1'..ctors

The supply 17.ndlow of engines as presently projected ar; suffic-i8nt to meet the requirements of the Commandhrough the month of Septemberand should net become p. factor htnder i.ng operations. Shipments are set upto provide [\ maximum60 day stock LeveL of spares and a minimumof 45 daysstock level. As of 31 Mayt.he overuge hours on cumulative pulled engineswas 251: . .9 hours. This wos an Lncr-ea se of 21 hours over the 30 April figureof 233.3 hours. The average. hours on pulled'engines for the period 1-15Nil.l,y-ecched 295.1 hours. The highest period yet recorded on engine pullswas an aver-age of 320.9 hours for the 73rd Wingfor the 154 engines pulledin the> tHOweek period ending 31 May19/+5. This figure exceeds the 319hour pr-ojecti.on of the life expectancy of R-3350 eng'ines in the theater.

ThE;supply of chemi.ca.l ammunftdon (E-46, E-48, Mf.-1:1l7f.l, AN-M76,AN-lv'47A2NP) ) , however, gives evidence of fc.lling considerably belowrequired stock levels. Ir rv o n t.o t- y a s of 31 M EW was 19,027 tons representing2537 potontinl sorties. The estimGted inventory for )0 June includingthu cxpoc tcd t.rrival of 30,149 tons is 10,026 tons or only 1336 sorties.This fe.lls 105,824 t.on s short of the 60 day stock level desired by theCommand.

During the pas't month the Commandset up requisition objectiveson th:; following classes of supply:

a. Aircraft Partsb. Signal Parts (Ground)c. Signal Pnrts (Air)d. Ordnance Parts (Ground)e. Ordnance Parts (Air)

These books wer-e set up to showproj ected 30 days c.onsumpt.Lonon thesepar-ts and 60 day levels wher-e applicable. Although not within the scopeof t.his pcper , future reports will compare stock levels with objecti vesand will aneIyze other supply items which give evidence of hindering opera-tions.

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12/20

6. Non-lwatlc~bility of Combat Crews As A Factor Effecting UtilizationAn aver-age of 16!2% of assigned crews were not ava.LLabl,e for

comb.'.'..tduring the two week period ending 31 May. With the extremely lowcrew to ftircrc:ft ratio under' which the Command is opernt.Lng , this percen-tr:ee becomes incrcmsingly significant-. As shown in the table below, thechief r'ecsons for non-avad.Lcbf.Li t.y were crews not fully trEined, D.S. C 'tLead crew school in the United States, and sickness.

COMBflTCRKIi{ift.EMBERVAILABILITYBASEDONAVERAGEORALLCREWPOSITIONS

16-31 MAY

58th Wing 73rd Wing 313th Wing 314th H i n g XXI BC% OF % OF. % OF % OF % OFASGD ASGD ASGD ASGD ASGD

.Assigned 100.~ 100.0% 100.0% lOO.C!f, r co .o s-!AVai1r'_ble 87.8 84.7 76.4 86.4 83.8c:1J1ot Available 12.2 15.3 23.6 13.6 16.2, Combat. Injuries .8 .5 .9 .3 .6

I Sickness 2.2 1.5 1.9 2. 6 2.0I Puss, Leave, Furlough .1 . 1 .1 .1At Rest Camp 2.6 1.7 1.8 1.6Grounded For Rest .1 6.7 .4 1.8

DS(other t.han TD ld .1 2.2 2.5 .4 1.3I or" 3ch in US)i DS to Id crw sch in US 1.9 1+.9 4.3 3.3 3.7I 6.3 1.1 5.4 4.1 41Not Fully TrainedI1Awaiting Reclassificn- .8 .1 .3 . 2tionr Other 2.3 . 4 .8

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13/20

P A R T I V . E F F ~ C T I V E N E S 3 O F A I R C P ~ F T O N M I S S I O N S1. Percent of Airborne Aircraft Bombi ng

i ; B0i11BING FRI lv l&~Y 'I'ARGbT - MAY ;' {,OM BI NG A L L T A B . GE T S10D 1------9 t { 9p ; 260 -~r/'/'/ /I~O - ////

- iv ll\.y100 ---- ... 0 8'7.4[7:. . . . '/': j t - :1//. . l // /V ,: ~ l 1,/"/" .; 1 ~/,-".- ,,,: '/ ,//'// ,,. "r// ,I ,th J14th ,.. /

~a 1IO~~~-~ _ _ - L- = _ _ ~~~~1~3~

91.980 81 )

6C

40 r20 -

oThe per;:ent o f ai rbo rn o airc raft bo mbi ng t he pri mary target ro sei n (iiay t o 89.4~S compar-ed t o 84.6~; i n Apri l and 84. 5% i n l Jjarc h. The per-

cent o f airborne aircraft bombi ng al l target s was s l ightly l ower i n Maythan the: previ ous t n o mo n ths, 92.4% bombi ng al l target s again s t 93 .1% i nbo th March and April . The 58th Wi ng had the highes t percen tages and the3 13t h Win g 'the Lo weat .2. Causes for No n-Effec tivenes s

DU E; ;to an Lncr-ease i n mai nt enan ce and mec han ical fai lures , t he abortrate wen t up for the sec ond mo n th i n Suc cGs s io n . The May abort rate was7.6% airborne aircraft co mpared t o 7.0% i n April and 6.9% in March. Theserates are detai led i n the fol l owi ng table:F AI LU Rl , I ; T O BOMB A N Y T A R G E TAs A Percen t Of Airborne58TH 73R.D 313TH 3J.L..TH TOTAL

M . A Y MAR.!APH!MAY i v 1 J l J l APRIIIfl.AYA R APR MAY M A R APR MAY1A11'T & M A T E R I _ E L F A I L U R E ~ -

Engine Failures 1-.2 . 6 3 . 5 2.5 3 . 2 2.8' 4.2 3.1, 2.1 3 . 2 3 . 5 3. 0 3 . 2 3 . 2M ec han ic al F a. ilUl'8S 1.1 1.0 0.9 2.2 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.6 1.1 1.6 1.5 1. 3 1.8F au lt y Mai nt & Insp 1.7 1.5 1.1 1. 3 1.2 1.4 1.7 0.5 0 . 8 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.4Total 5.516.0 4.5 6 . 7 5.6 7.6 7. 3 5.2 5.1 5.9 5.8 5.7 6.4, e R . l ! . ' FAILU'?..ES- I i

A l e COlllllmnder I _ C ? _ : J o 3 0. 3 0.2 0 . 3 0.5 0. 2 0. 3 0.5 0.1 0. 3 0.4 0.2t - - ' - = = - - 0.02o-Pilot 0.1 - - - - - - - -. - 0.1ngineer - - - 0.2 0.2 - 0.2 - 0. 3 - 0.1 0.1---Bombardier - 0.1 - 0.1 0. 3 0.1 0.2 - - 0.9 0.2 0.03 0.3-Navigator - - - - - - 0.1 0. 3 0. 3 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.05R adar H adi o Operat or - - - - 0.4 - 0.1 - - 0.1 0.2 - 0.05.G1ll'.Jlcrs - - - - 0.1 - 0.1 - - - 0.04 - 0.02Total I 0.5 0.4 o 'J 0.5 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.2 1 ')0.8 0.6 0.8~ . . . .!BATHER. - - - 0.1 - 0.4 0.1 - 0.1 - - 0.1 0.05WEMY ACTIOIJ_ 3 ' ' ' ' 0.1 o " 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1~ .:. - -) TH E R F A IL D RE S-

Small Formation - - - - - - - - - - - - -Dibehed Enr-out.e - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 - - - - 0.1 0.05 0.02C ir cl ed S ur vi vo rs 0.2 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.1 - - - - 0. 04 0.03 O~~0.1 o ,..,0. 2 0.4 0.5 0.;2 0.1 0. 3 0.2 0.2riknown & Other - .:. - 0.2Total o ?0.2 9 . 2 0.3 0.5' 0.6,0.2 - 0.1 0. 3 0. 3 ,0.3 0.2. .!RAMi TOTAL 6.6 6.8 5 .2 7 .7! 7. 79 .21 8. 3 5 .7 ;6 .9, 7. 4 6 .9 T7 .0 7.6-


14/20

PARTV. HESULTS1. Destruction of Targets

As shownLnAppendix A, during Maythe Commandperformed three \night and three day urban area missions totaling 1950 sorties, 36 daylighttactical missions toto.ling 768 sorties, 10 night mining missions totaling421 sorties, and t.wodaylight missions against individual strategic tar-gets totaling 277 sorties. In these missions, 15,934 tons of incendiar~iss, 6,:~55 tons of high explosives, und 2,406 tons of mines for a totalof 2.4,595 tons ,mre dropped on Japanese targets. The greatest t.cnnage inone raid in lillF history was achieved; in the Nagoyan.id of 16 May, when468 aircra.ft dropped 3696 tons out of a. force of 522 aircraft airborne.This is cOr.Jparedto th0 8th AFrecord of 2923 tons by 1248 aircraft againstCologne, Q distance of about 325 miles, on 17 October 1944.

As detuil8Q on the "highlights" page at the beginning of this report,38.8 square milos including numerous A A J < ' numbered targets within thbG:lareasYlcrL;burned out in Mc:.yo bring the total to date to 92.7 square milesof urban areas. Destruction to in:Evidual industric.l primary targets forMaywas as follows:2.. Kawanlsh'i, A lc Plant, Kobe - 39%damagedb. Hiro Nava],i/e Factory, Kure.- 71.5%damagedc. Oshima Naval Oil Storage, Oshima - 90%damagedd. Otake Oil Refinory, Otake - 45%ciumagedc. 'I'okuycma Coal Yards and Naval Fuel Station - 49.6%damagedf. Mitsubishi A lc Works, Nagoya - 46. 5;~damagedfor a totalof 68.5% to date. Maydamagewas a result of urban areastrikes.

Not only hUG t.he act c . - l l damage to precision targets increased, butthis greEter destructiqn has been uchieved at a relatively lE:sS cost. Forexample, in terms of squar-e feet of damage per a..rcraft lost, there wasonly one raid between Novemberand February in wh.i.chover .300,000 sq. ft.of roof area "as damagedper aircraft lost. However, in March there wasone such raid, followed by 5 in April and ;; in May. Moreover, duringt.heso recent months, thore have been an increasing number of raids inwhich no aircraft were lost.Missions against airfields on Kyushu and Shikoku continued until

11 Mayin support of Ok.inawa operations. The need for this assistancewas obv.Lat.edby the f.ncr-eased utilization of carrier-borne aircraft inthese oper-atd.ons , and the Commandonce mor-e was a.ble to concentrate onstrategic bombing. Damageassessmont figures comparable to the aboveare not (l.Bc8rto.inable for this type of target, but bombing accuracy datafor these strikes is included in a succeeding paragraph.According t.o the 11.-3mining section, strategic mining operationswere at their height in May, and up to 27 Maythe Commandhad placed4,765 mines in Japanese inland waters. The significance of the InlandSea to Japanese shipping cannot be over-emphasized us it contains theports of Kuru, Hiroshima, Kobe, Osaka, 'I'okuyamaand others of lesser size.In addition to this it offers a protected waterway to shipping, a primaryneed due to t.he penetration which our submarines and aircraft am theirinadequate lane; transportation have effected. Finally, thru the Shi.1Jlono-

seki Straits is the shortest route to Northern waters. For these reasons,mining the Inland Sea has received high priority, and each day that Japan-ese shipring movementsare cut is a drain on the effectiveness of Japan asa fighting nation. These mining operations have been directed primarilyagaLnst three types of targets, as follows:a. Easber-n and Western entrances to Shimonoseki Straits - 80%ofJapanese shipping in th inner zone norraally goes through these waters.Closure of these Str.").it..shas forced diversion of the enemy's shipping toroutes south of Kyushuwhere it has been subject to vigorous attacks byour submarines and aircraft.b. Major Ports - The largest port for merchant shipping in theEmpire is in the Kobe-Osaka area, and blockade mine fields laid ar ourd the

small island of Awaji have beon very effective toward reducing merchant


15/20

shipping activi ties. Also , at o n nnne f'LeLds pl anted in the water-sa.ro und Kobe an d Osaka have had this s ame effect becaus e mine sweepi ngclos 6 to sh::'psand in con fined waters i s a sl ow proce~s. Min ing of thepo rts o f Nagoya, Tokyo, and the s eas o f Miyazu and Tsu:r.uguin Nort hernHonshu has aLs o been ac compl ished wit h s ucces s.c . Naval BasGs - The main naval bas e i s at Kure and t he m aj or it yof naval ships have been stati oned in the Kure-Hiroshima area. The watersnHve been mined to reduce the flexibili ty o f Japanese naval operation s bythe corrt i. nua.Lthreat which mine fields pres ent to shi pping movement. Thishas been c hi efl y a t ac ti cal . o perat :i ;o ni n s uppo rt o f t he Oki nawa c am pl l. ign .

2. Bo mbing AccuracyBombing acc uracy data for the mo nth is roughly divis ible int o' twos ec ti on s; s tri kes agai ns t prec is io n t arget s and s tri kes ag ai ns t K yu shua ir fi el d t ar ge ts .For these mi ssion s, acc uracy figures have been obtained from theOperat ions Aml ysis Section , giving the c ircul ar error for as man y fo r-mat io ns as s uf fi ci en t phot ography was available t ' Nh er e p os s ib le , c al -culations of t he circ ular error were based on actUL1.1bursts observed,but if this ras i mpo ss ibl e, c al cul at io ns were made u ti li zi ng bo mbs -i n--air pho tography. This latter method, altho ugh n ot co mpletely reli able,do es permi t ac curat e c ul cul at io n. :3wi thi n appro xi mat el y 1000 feet . Thefollowi:ng t.abul.at.Lon suamar Lzo s t he data for the miss ions again st pre-

c is i on t ar ge ts .B OMBIN G ACCU RACY ON PRECISION TARG ETS

iV Jay19 45NUMBER OF FORMATIONS vUTH CIRCULAR ERROR OF

~hng 0-10001 1000-2000 1 2000-3000 1 OVGr 3000' Total58th 7 4 2 2 1573rd 6 6 6" 4~r 22, .314th 1 7 0 0 821 Be 14 17 8 6 45* Enc Ludee a to tal of eight formation s which did not bomb o n bri efedaimi ng point becaus e of s moke c ondit ions (Miss ion M.6).

NOTE: Data for 6 format ions not included because o f insufficient phot os.Exam in at io n o f t.hie tabl e indic ates t hat o n the who le the Command 1 saccuracy 111lsbeen go od. Of /,5 aimi ngs, o nly s ix resulted in gross errors,incl uding fo ur of the 73rd Wing in which the briefed aimi ng poi nt was notused. It sho uld be noted that thes e missic ns were conducted against com-paratively light ly defended targets in the Kl~e and Ko be regions. Thisundoubtedly co ntributed to the successful bon bing results . Comparis onamo ng !. 'l in gsn ci ic at es t hat al l o f t hem at tai ned appro xi mat el y t he s amedegree of' pro f'LcLen cy , The abo ve tabl e i nc lu des o nl y vi sual s ight in g~ Informa t ion is available for five radar s ighti ngs on Missi on 172 againstt he K aw un is hi A l e . Plant ~ Ko be. For thes e formation s, the circular errorwas 5,8001, 1 2, 00 0' , 1 7, 25 01, 18,300 1 a nd 2 4, 40 0' .All strikE;3 a gains t the Kyushu airfield ins tallations were flown bythe 313 th ani 314th Wings, and from data derived from availabl e aerialpho togrc phs, co mpari sons between the bombin g ac curac y of these Wi ngs maybe made as follows: lOfJ IB ING ACCURACY O N KY US HU M IS SIO N SMay 1945

N UM B E R OF F ORMATION S WITH CIRCU LAH. ERROR OFWing 0-1000' 1000-2000' 2000-3000 1 Over 3 000 1 TotrJ.3l3th 6 1 1 0 8 I14t h 5 4 0 3 1221 Be 11 5 1 3 20NOTE: Data for 12 missions not included because o f insufficient photos.

-12-._~r';, .-Z'r~" ." -~ 1 ~ ; '"


16/20

From the information Ilvailable, the 313th Wing would seem to havet.he ha.ghcr bombing accuracy for the80 missions. This difference maypoae.i.b.Ly beexp'La.i.ned by t.he methods of briefing used, the 314th Wingde:::igmting an .i';.ir.lingPoint rather than the assigned MPI.). Jc.p


17/20

PARTVI. COSTOFMISSIONS1. Aircraft and Crew Lo.sses

Both u.Lr cr-aft and crew loss rates increased in Mayfor the secondconsecutive month. The aircraft loss rate was 18.G%of U.E. comparedto 18.2~bin April and 14.3% in March. This was equivalent to 2%ofairborne ['.ircraft in Muy, 1.6% in April und 1.3% in March. The crewloss rate was 17.7% of U.E;., a slight decrease from the 18.2%Aprilfigure but higher than the 11.2% rate of March. However, expressed ona. sortie bas i,e, crew member casualties were 1.5% of airborne comparedto 1.4% in April and 1.0% in March.

Inasmuch as 4 1 + of the 90 aircraft lost during the month were loston Tokyo miSSions, it may be expected that losses ma.ylevel off as thechief 'I'okyo urea targets are destroyed. An exact, analysis of causesfor aircruft losses is difficult this month because of the large per-cerrtage of unknown losses. However, as shown below, the percent lostto mechanica1 reasons increased 10%over the April Rate.I CAUSEs FOR 8-29 A/~J':;OSsES MAY I

I : : : : : ~ : : o n 3~ ~~: ~: :~: II Acci.derrt , Wen & Po" 5 8% 12 13%:j WarWeary 4 6 % 34 38ci 11!I Unknown, 14 23% pIi1 T___t_.a_16~_~_1_0_0_%__0_1_0_0%~:

APh' i!I19 23% i11 13% Ii '34 40%

I I14 17% i:7 % 184 100% I

i t l L L YEnemyAction 1. . 0 %5Combat Oper 1 1 %I . UnknownReclasE: &Reorg 23%j,_16 26%Rotation 6

Total 62 100%

2. Effect on Losses of Fighter Escort

During April and Mayfighter escort was furnished for four missions.One of these missions W"tS against Kyushu airfields ani no enemy fighters

were encountered. On the three remaining missiuns, the attackir~ forceencountered enemy opposi tion, with the following r esul,ts. Onmission58, a total of 531 attacl


18/20

L~. Battle DarJHgeThe percent of aircraft bcmbing which were battle-damaged de-"ex-cased in lvl : : ty to 15% compar-ed t(! 17.1% in April a nd 8.9% in March.The 314th ging suffered the most d 3 J l \ a g e w i t h a rate of 17.2%. The

58th VJinghad 15.2~, the 73rd Wing 14.1% and the 313th Vhng 13.6%.AYl:'il rr.t.e s had be en 18.8% for the 313th Wing, 15.7% for the 73rd~ling "end 15. 5% " fer th " .314th i.ring. FInk was still t .he maj or causafor aircro.ft lost and dumaged , as indiceted by the f'o.l l.owi.ng t.abl,e .

PEHCEh'1' OF' TOTAL A le LOST .luID DJJ.q l~GEDJ,~nmrv Febr-uar-y iViarch April MayE!1emyj\irc1'[.ft 5J..6% 3 4 . 6 % 5 . 3 % 14.8;~ 8.5%Flak 12.7% 42 .6~6 77.8% 61.5% 72.2%Flak and Aircraft 15.9% 8.0% 3.2% 15.7% 6.5%Accident & Mechanical 2.5% 4.9% 2.0% 2 . 2 % 3.0%

I OwnGuns 7.0% 4.3% 0.8% 1.7% 1.4%lith:~~.~_nknown 10.2% 5.6~; 10.9% 4.1% 8.4%

5. Air-Sea RescueThe percerrt uf crew member-s rescued frem those dovmat sear oae slightly in May to 47ib f'r-om the 35%April figure. A total of227 e r OY I member-s were Loet a t sea during the month, Lnc l.ud.i ng 122

known to have dl.t.ched , 72 bailing out OV6r water, and 33 in aircraftcrashing at ;:;el:.. In addition, '7 5 of 73 crew member-s par'achut.ed overIwo safely. 'I'lre Lncr-eusd ng percent rescued in Maywas unic ubtedlypartly the result of an Lncr-er.s ing number of air-sea r escue facilities.A comj.ar-Lsori of f'aci.Li,ties in April a11(1111ayollows:

AlR-SFJ'\. ftESCUE nCILlTlESFacility AQril Max

Number of submarines 50 '7 7Number' of superclumbos (B-:::9) 55 75Number of duabos 48 83NUf .1ber cf surfaCE: ships 45 70198 305Sorties 3487 4558 Sorties Per Fadf-ity 17.6 14.9

_ " "I _ ...

. .


19/20

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20/20

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xxi bomber command, monthy activity report 1 june 1945

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