Crying Wolf: Lone Terrorists

and the Application of

Leaderless Resistance

Michael Futcher

21st September 2012

A dissertation presented in the University of Salford in partial fulfilment of the

requirements for the degree of MA Intelligence and Security Studies

@00086304 ii

Table of Contents:

Declaration of Word Length ii

Abstract iii

1. Introduction 1

1.1 The problems of the case study approach 5

1.2 Going forward 9

2. Crying wolf: A definitional debate 10

2.1 The 'lone' in 'lone wolf' 14

2.2 'Lone wolf': An inappropriate term? 17

3. 'Leaderless resistance' and lone wolf theory 20

3.1 Leaderless resistance: A sign of weakness? 26

4. The contemporary trend of lone wolf terrorism 30

4.1 The inevitable defeat of leaderless resistance 32

5. Lone wolves and their habitats 34

5.1 The ideological foundation 36

5.2 The enabling environment 39

5.3 The psychology of lone wolves 44

6. Conclusion 48

Bibliography 52

Declaration of Word Length

The length of this dissertation is 12,752 words,

exclusive of the bibliography, abstract and footnotes.

@00086304 iii

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to place lone wolf terrorism within its correct context

regarding the leaderless resistance approach advocated in many extremist circles.

This is done by emphasising that one can define 'lone wolf' in such a way that the

term can be used interchangeably with 'autonomous cell' without prejudicing its

meaning. It suggests that, whilst lone wolf terrorists are not a new phenomenon,

there is a conscious attempt by contemporary extremist movements to harness such

individuals in their ideological struggles. There is, therefore, a spike in the popularity

of lone wolf tactics sustained by the emphasis on leaderless resistance in extremist

discourse, rather than a growing trend. When lone wolf terrorism is placed in this

context, its vulnerabilities become much more illuminated. It allows one to recognise

that this phenomenon does not occur in a vacuum, and consequently that one can

endeavour to confront the 'habitats' in which lone wolves are bred. It argues that

leaderless resistance is destined to be discredited and fall from popularity within the

extremist milieus, with the essential caveat that there will always be rogue

individuals willing to act violently on their beliefs.

@00086304 1

1. Introduction

On the afternoon of 22nd July 2011, a car bomb exploded outside a government

building in Oslo, the capital city of Norway, killing eight and injuring 209. Less than

two hours later, as emergency responders treated those at the scene of the atrocity, a

man posing as a police officer began shooting at a youth camp on the island of Utøya,

killing 69 and injuring 33, before surrendering to armed police.1 The man, later

identified as right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik, had planned both attacks

alone and had executed them both with chilling efficiency. Perhaps more so than any

other attack in the post-9/11 period, Breivik's attacks implanted the danger of this so-

called 'lone wolf' terrorism in the public consciousness. US President Barack Obama

specifically invoked the Norway attacks when he spoke of lone wolves being 'the most

likely scenario that we have to guard against right now'.2 Indeed, with high-profile

attacks such as those in Norway, the Fort Hood shootings by Major Nidal Hasan in

November 2009 and, most recently, the attacks by Mohammed Merah in France in

March 2012, it could be strongly argued that lone wolf attacks are, at least in the

public perception, currently the most dangerous terrorist threat to Western

democracies.

This dissertation shall attempt to contribute to the growing literature

concerning lone wolf terrorism, yet offer a different slant to the majority of academic

studies into the phenomenon, if indeed the threat can be labelled as such. It is

encouraging that the emergence of academic literature addressing lone wolf terror

has corresponded with the growing popular concern with the matter, although the

1 BBC News, 'Timeline: How Norway's terror attacks unfolded', BBC Online, 17th April 2012. Available

at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14260297. Accessed on 15th August 2012. 2 CNN, 'Obama: Biggest terror fear is the lone wolf', 16th August 2011. Available at: http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/obama-biggest-terror-fear-is-the-lone-wolf/. Accessed on 15th August 2012.

@00086304 2

quantity of dedicated studies is still sparse. Previous high-profile lone wolf attacks

spawned literature which largely aimed to place such acts into a wider narrative of

the struggle between governments and extremist movements, in which the

perpetrators were painted as deeply immersed in the extremist cause. For example,

after the Oklahoma City bombing of 19th April 1995, in which Timothy McVeigh had

detonated a car bomb which killed 168 and injured hundreds more, much of the

academic material addressed the threat of the American militia movement to which

McVeigh was deemed to belong, rather than the solo nature of his act.3 Whilst there

is merit in this approach, and this dissertation shall address such lone wolf 'habitats'

in Chapter 5, it does not provide a comprehensive appraisal of the threat.

In contrast, the more recent academic texts on lone wolf terrorists strive to

present this more comprehensive analysis. Ramón Spaaij's 2012 work

Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism,4 an expansion on an earlier article published

in the academic journal Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,5 should be considered the

starting point for research into the topic, as it addresses all the major facets of lone

wolf terror with commendable academic rigour. George Michael's recent Lone Wolf

Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance6 is a similarly commendable work,

expanding on a subject he addressed ably in 2003's Confronting Right-Wing

Extremism and Terrorism in the USA.7 Indeed, the connection between lone wolf

terrorism and the theory of 'leaderless resistance' (discussed in Chapter 3) is perhaps

3 For a review of some of this literature, see Kaplan, Jeffrey, 'April 19', Terrorism and Political

Violence, Vol. 9(2), Summer 1997, pp135-142. 4 Spaaij, Ramón, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention

(New York: Springer, 2012). 5 Spaaij, Ramón, 'The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment', Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism, Vol. 33(9), 2010, pp854-870. 6 Michael, George, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt

University Press, 2012). 7 Michael, George, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA (London:

Routledge, 2003).

@00086304 3

the most important thematic approach in academic studies, and it fits neatly into the

wider debate in contemporary terrorism studies regarding the networks (or lack

thereof) of terrorists, articulated most notably by Marc Sageman in his 2008 work

Leaderless Jihad.8 Other scholars address the problems of the boundaries of what

constitutes a 'lone wolf', the crux of the problem being whether a terrorist can be

considered alone if he has a tangible, or even merely ideological, support structure

(this is discussed in Chapter 2). To date, the most fully-realised piece of work on this

aspect has been Raffaello Pantucci's 'Typology of Lone Wolves', a 2011 paper on

Islamist lone wolves published by the International Centre for the Study of

Radicalisation.9

George Michael has noted that academic study on lone wolf terrorism has

been split into those who identify it as part of a leaderless resistance trend, as

suggested above, and those who see it as the actions of anomalous individuals that

should be 'consigned to the field of abnormal psychology'.10 Whilst this dissertation

shall argue that lone wolves fit better within the concept of leaderless resistance,

acknowledgement should also be given to the psychology and radicalisation

processes of lone wolf terrorists, as discussed in Chapter 5. Although often seen as a

subset of the wider research into terrorist psychology and radicalisation, there are

dedicated studies, including an excellent 2011 article in the journal Counselling

8 Sageman, Marc, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, PA:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 9 Pantucci, Raffaello, 'A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists',

Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, March 2011. Available at: http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf. Accessed on 14th August 2012. 10

Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, p2.

@00086304 4

Psychology Quarterly by Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley.11 The case study

by Kathleen Puckett, a criminal profiler who worked on the investigations into lone

wolves Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph, which was published in a book co-

written with Terry Turchie in 2007 named Hunting the American Terrorist,12 can

also be seen as part of this niche. These and many other texts shall be utilised in this

dissertation, although regrettably there is not enough time to pay tribute to all of the

high-quality scholarship which has addressed the problem of lone wolf terrorism.

As a side-note, an interesting aspect of studies into lone wolf terror concerns

the availability of material written by the perpetrators themselves. Breivik

infamously released an encyclopaedic 'compendium' of his beliefs, aims and planning

of his attacks13 (commonly referred to as his 'manifesto', though Breivik never uses

this term), whilst Kaczynski, commonly known as the 'Unabomber', had his

manifesto published by the New York Times and Washington Post whilst still a

fugitive, having promised to stop his attacks if this was done. Titled 'Industrial

Society and Its Future', it has since been picked up by a number of publishers.14 Most

studies of lone wolves cite such primary sources when attempting to dissect an

individual's motivations for committing a terrorist attack. Whilst there is no doubt

that these texts do provide insight into the minds of the perpetrators, a note of

caution should be struck. As Beau Seegmiller warns, any writings or interviews given

by a lone wolf post-attack presents them with a opportunity to evaluate their own

11 Moskalenko, Sophia & McCauley, Clark, 'The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism', Counselling

Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 24(2), June 2011, pp115-126. 12 Turchie, Terry D. & Puckett, Kathleen M., Hunting the American Terrorist: The FBI's War on

Homegrown Terror (New York: History Publishing Company, 2007). 13 Berwick, Andrew (Anders Behring Breivik), 2083: A European Declaration of Independence (2011).

Available at: http://info.publicintelligence.net/AndersBehringBreivikManifesto.pdf. Accessed on 15th August 2012. Andrew Berwick is a pseudonym. 14 Perhaps the best version is a revised edition published in Kaczynski, Theodore J., Technological Slavery: The Collected Writings of Theodore J. Kaczynski, a.k.a. "The Unabomber" (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 2010), pp36-120.

@00086304 5

actions. Consequently, they may 'frame and present [their] actions as part of a

meaningful endeavor that may not have necessarily been the case in the actual

sequence of events'.15 In other words, personal motivations may have contributed to,

or even dominated, an individual's decision to commit an act of violence, but in

reflection, said individual may justify the act as a necessary part of a wider political

struggle. A cautionary tale in this regard is the case of John Allen Muhammad, the

so-called 'Washington sniper' who in 2002 (with the help of an accomplice) killed ten

people and injured another three. The motivations of Muhammad, a Muslim, were

intensely personal, yet later in prison he wrote 'an erratic screed about jihad'.16

Therefore, whilst they are often useful, such post-fact justifications should not be

taken at face value.

1.1 The problems of the case study approach

The majority of studies on lone wolf terrorism all try to analyse selected case

studies to reach conclusions about lone wolves, an approach which it is argued here

is insufficient to comprehensively address the phenomenon. Peculiarly, these same

studies often acknowledge the limitations of the case study approach. For example,

Puckett states that she knew she would 'have trouble making meaningful

generalizations' from the relatively small data pool of lone terrorists,17 whilst Spaaij

selects just five cases to attempt to represent the many varied faces of the

phenomenon, yet at the same time notes 'the absence of a single, standardized profile

15 Seegmiller, Beau, 'Radicalized Margins: Eric Rudolph and Religious Violence', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19(4), 2007, p516. 16 Jenkins, Brian Michael, 'Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist

Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11', Occasional Paper, The RAND Corporation, 2011, p3. Available at: http://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/rand_op343.pdf. Accessed on 14th August 2012. 17

[Part 2] by Puckett, Kathleen M., in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, p242.

@00086304 6

of a lone wolf terrorist'.18 Herein lies the fatal weakness of the case study approach

when lone wolves are concerned. Acts which can be classified as examples of lone

wolf terrorism are incredibly diverse. Lone wolves can be found across many

countries, across a vast spectrum of ideological grievances and employing different

methods. Therefore, it is difficult to reach adequate conclusions when adopting a

case study approach, unless one is willing (and able) to apply dozens of case studies

encompassing this vast array of ideologies, cultures, methods and eras. Indeed, how

could one possibly accommodate such diverse cases as Merah (Islamist, spree/serial,

France), Breivik, (anti-Islamist, bomb/spree, Norway) and Hasan (Islamist, spree,

USA)? These all occurred within the last few years, for three different reasons and in

three different countries. This is before we have even considered older cases such as

McVeigh (anti-federalist, bomb, USA), Rudolph (anti-abortionist, serial bomber,

USA), Baruch Goldstein (ultraorthodox Jew, spree, Israel) and Kaczynski (anti-

technologist, serial bomber, USA).19 This is to say nothing of those individuals who

were not successful. No study could select appropriate cases from such a diverse

pool, and so any case study approach inevitably dilutes the conclusions of the work in

question.

Two previous master theses are instructive in this regard. Nathan Springer20

and Liesbeth van der Heide21 have both adopted a case study approach to try to gain

18

Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p13. 19

It is recognised that the ideologies of these terrorists are more complex than summarised here but, for the sake of brevity in the above argument, it is hoped that one would acknowledge that such concise generalisations are necessary. 20 Springer, Nathan R., 'Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of

Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst', Master Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009, pp1-87. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514419&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.p. Accessed on 9th July 2012. 21

Van der Heide, Liesbeth, 'Individual Terrorism: Indicators of Lone Operators', Master Thesis, University of Utrecht, August 2011, pp1-91. Available at: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-

@00086304 7

insight into the lone wolf phenomenon, and their conclusions can be found freely on

the internet. Van der Heide's stated goal was to find a profile for 'lone operator'

terrorists that was time-independent, but concluded that there was no clear profile.22

It therefore stands to reason that case studies were an inappropriate method to try to

get to grips with this question. To her credit, van der Heide recognises that any

conclusions she might make would be 'largely conditional' on her selected case

studies, from which she cannot provide satisfactory generalisations about lone wolf

terrorism.23

This leads one to the second problem with adopting a case study approach. As

Matthijs Nijboer warns, 'there is always the risk that important factors have been left

out'.24 A scholar may, consciously or subconsciously, limit his or herself to cases

which conform to their own pre-formed opinions, omitting problematic cases which

may be too complex or contradictory. For example, McVeigh is often removed as a

case study as he had two accomplices and therefore, for many, fits uneasily into their

definitions of lone wolves. Indeed, some have gone so far as to suggest (albeit

plausibly) that he was part of a shadowy terrorist group, with McVeigh carrying out a

plot hatched by a wider extremist body,25 possibly as revenge for the execution of

white supremacist murderer Richard Wayne Snell scheduled for 19th April 1995.26

Others discount McVeigh as the substantial death toll of his act does not fit in with

theses/2011-0902-202354/MA%20Thesis%20Liesbeth%20van%20der%20Heide.pdf. Accessed on 14th August 2012. 22

Van der Heide, 'Individual Terrorism', p73. 23

Ibid., pp74-75. 24 Nijboer, Matthijs, 'A Review of Lone Wolf Terrorism: The Need for a Different Approach', Social

Cosmos, Vol. 3(1), 2012, p37. Available at: http://socialcosmos.library.uu.nl/index.php/sc/article/viewFile/43/38. Accessed on 3rd July 2012. 25 Gumbel, Andrew & Charles, Roger G., Oklahoma City: What the Investigation Missed - and Why it Still Matters (New York: William Morrow, 2012), pp19-21. 26

Ibid., p14.

@00086304 8

the accepted wisdom that the lethality of lone wolf attacks is modest.27 As this study

shall address in Chapter 2, there are many problems with the definition of lone wolf

terrorism. Some may permit the likes of McVeigh to be classified as lone wolves,

whereas others may find such a classification unacceptable. Studies which form

conclusions and recommendations with the former view in mind may find those

results are unusable to those with the latter view.

Springer's thesis is an example of the dangers of this approach. He adopts as

case studies the three 'most prolific' lone wolves from US history - McVeigh,

Kaczynski and Rudolph - to try to uncover a common 'chronological pattern of

radicalization' that can be used to identify future potential threats.28 However,

analysing just three cases is insufficient to identify common characteristics of dozens

of lone wolves. If Springer were to broaden his study by even a handful of cases, he

would find many who do not follow such patterns. Furthermore, choosing the 'most

prolific' cases is erroneous. Unsuccessful plots are just as instructive as successful

ones in understanding the phenomenon, particularly when it comes to radicalisation,

a process unconcerned with eventual success or failure. Regarding terrorism

research, Sageman warns that some 'compelling' cases can take attention away from

more comprehensive analysis.29 There is a danger that more famous cases might

overshadow their less successful counterparts, distorting research into the lone wolf

phenomenon. As stated earlier, Breivik's attacks in Norway have implanted the

danger of lone wolf terrorism in the public consciousness. But lessons about lone

wolves cannot be learned solely by studying Breivik, or McVeigh, or Kaczynski. There

27

For example, see Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p29. 28

Springer, 'Patterns of Radicalization', p79. 29

Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p16.

@00086304 9

must be an acceptance that lone wolf terrorism is an incredibly diverse phenomenon,

and it cannot be truly understood by focusing on a few high-profile cases.

1.2 Going forward

With a case study approach therefore deemed to be inadequate, the problem

becomes: how does one begin to understand lone wolf terrorism? In the research for

this study, it has become increasingly clear that there is little academic consensus

regarding the phenomenon. This study does not presume that it can generate such a

consensus, but it will attempt to address some of the more contentious elements.

Chapter 2 shall address the problems of how to define lone wolves, and attempt to

provide a clearer picture of what exactly constitutes a 'lone wolf'. It will attempt to do

so by linking lone wolves to the theory of 'leaderless resistance' first espoused by

right-wing extremists in the USA but also adopted in various guises by other

movements, including radical Islamism. Chapter 2 will also address whether 'lone

wolf' is too romanticised a term, suggesting an image of an honourable, vigilant

guardian rather than a socially-inept, often psychologically-disturbed loner.

Chapter 3 will place lone wolves in their proper context within the theories of

leaderless resistance, providing an overarching narrative of 'lone wolf theory'.

Chapter 4 shall then address the contemporary trend of lone wolf terrorism, and

whether it is truly a new threat, as President Obama warns above. Chapter 5 shall

then address the matter of a lone wolf's 'habitat'. It is argued here that despite the

popular stereotype, no 'lone' wolf operates in a vacuum, and all have a support

structure of some sort, providing either material, emotional or ideological

sustenance. Chapter 6 concludes the study, drawing on the previous chapters to

emphasise how lone wolf terrorists, and their supporting habitats, fit into the concept

@00086304 10

of leaderless resistance. Much of the literature reviewed above propose general

counter-terrorism recommendations to help keep lone wolves at bay, and there is no

need to regurgitate such conclusions here. However, it should be acknowledged that

there are no definitive, foolproof responses that will make the problem of lone wolf

terrorism disappear. Measures can be taken to improve the odds for counter-

terrorism bodies, but lone wolves will always be a concern for security services.

Rather, this dissertation seeks to place lone wolf terrorism within its correct context

regarding the leaderless resistance approach advocated in many extremist circles.

2. Crying wolf: A definitional debate

That academia has yet to reach a consensus on the definition of a 'lone wolf'

should come as no surprise to anyone interested in terrorism and security studies.

Indeed, there is no widely accepted definition of terrorism itself, let alone lone wolf

terrorism. Marc Sageman notes that terrorism is 'a little like obscenity: people

believe they know it when they see it, but cannot define it'.30 However, there are a

number of common characteristics which can be found in most definitions, as noted

by George Michael. These include: the deliberate nature of the act; the violent nature

of the act, targeted at civilians; the intention to instil fear; the need for an audience;

and the intention for the act to achieve a political goal.31 Using Michael's common

criteria, one might suggest for this study a more succinct definition of an 'act of

terror' as: A deliberate, violent act targeted at civilians, which is intended to instil

fear in a wider audience with the intention of achieving a political goal.

30

Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p15. 31 Michael, George, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism', in Logan, Keith Gregory & Ramsay, James D.

(eds.), Introduction to Homeland Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), p316.

@00086304 11

Despite this basic definition, there are still numerous problems as to what

constitutes terrorism, particularly when one addresses lone wolf terrorism. Many

presumed lone wolf attacks are actually hate crimes, where an individual has

attacked another on the basis of his race or creed, but which lack one or more of the

above definitional elements. Such people are clearly engaging in politically (or

racially) motivated violence, but it is unclear whether they intended for their act to

play to a wider audience or simply lashed out as a cathartic release of their personal

prejudices. For example, in April 2000 Richard Baumhammers killed five people of

various races and creeds during a shooting spree in Pennsylvania. The targets of his

attack could be said to be chosen as a result of his neo-Nazi beliefs (including the fact

that he spared a white man), but the timeline of the attacks suggests an opportunistic

outlook, rather than a methodical, pre-planned attack designed to play for an

audience.32

There is also one other interesting area of contention: the similarities between

lone wolf terrorists and spree or serial killers. There are a number of shared traits,

such as the act of mass murder itself, the personalisation of one's motive for killing

and the internal psychological processes which compel one to act alone. (With

regards to lone wolf terrorists, the latter two are discussed in Chapter 5). If there is

one major difference, it is the political element which is absent, or less prominent, in

the motivation of common killers. Terrorists define their individual identity in social

terms, in which they see themselves in service to a higher cause than the self (see

Chapter 5.2). Criminals, on the other hand, are self-centred or have interests which

32 Martin, Gus, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, second edition

(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), pp17-18.

@00086304 12

are unlikely to extend beyond a small personal group.33 This may be the key

difference between lone wolf terrorists and mere killers: the latter are inherently

selfish, whereas lone wolves often have a perverse sense of altruism. Even so, this is

not a clear demarcation line as spree killers may often allude to ideas which

transcend the self. For example, Seung-Hui Cho, who killed 32 and injured 17 during

a shooting spree at Virginia Tech in April 2007, ranted against rich 'brats' and

'snobs', positioning himself 'as a vehicle of class revenge'.34 To this end, he spoke of

dying as a martyr to 'inspire generations of the weak and the defenceless people'.35

Therefore, unlike Baumhammers, he intended for his act to resonate with an

audience, yet is still unlikely to be regarded as a terrorist as defined by Michael.

This suggests that the difference between lone killers and lone wolf terrorists

is one of degree, rather than of separation. Lone wolves have political aims, but

'political violence' is not a separate phenomenon - rather, it is one of many strands of

violence. When the line is blurred, it becomes difficult to differentiate between the

two. Indeed, this line may be blurred to such an extent that one commentator has

suggested that, in addition to 'going postal', a slang term used for those who commit

homicidal rampages, there is now a process of 'going jihad', where political and

personal grievances mix with deadly results.36 It is beyond the remit of this

dissertation to address this issue comprehensively, though it does serve as an

33 Mullins, Sam, 'Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism: A Social Psychological Perspective', Studies

in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32(9), 2009, p821. 34 Kellner, Douglas, Guys and Guns Amok: Domestic Terrorism and School Shootings from the

Oklahoma City Bombing to the Virginia Tech Massacre (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), p42. 35 Quoted in Ibid., p38. 36 Jenkins, Brian Michael, 'Going Jihad: The Fort Hood Slayings and Home-Grown Terrorism'.

Testimony presented before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 19th November 2009, pp1-2. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT336.pdf. Accessed on 19th July 2012.

@00086304 13

example of the problems of where to draw the line on what constitutes lone wolf

terrorism. It is an issue which is touched upon occasionally in terrorism literature,

but has yet to be grappled with in a dedicated study (although Leena Malkki and

Clark McCauley have lectured on the topic).37 Regrettably, this dissertation cannot

serve as that study as it focuses on the linkage between lone wolf terror and

leaderless resistance, but it remains an interesting and important avenue for further

research.

Indeed, the doctrine of leaderless resistance complicates the matter even

further. As we shall see in Chapter 3, under this doctrine political extremists are

encouraged to act on their own initiative. Lacking an organisational structure for

planning an elaborate attack, such individuals may simply choose to pick up a gun

and shoot some people who do not share their skin colour or political ideology. These

acts, though intended by the perpetrators to be part of a larger 'leaderless resistance'

movement, could easily be understood as a hate crime or a killing spree as much as

an act of terror.38 To complicate things further, some right-wing leaders have

suggested hate crimes may count as leaderless resistance by helping to 'foment a

revolutionary atmosphere'.39 There is also the problem of whether the attacks were

primarily personal or politically-motivated, which is often impossible to determine.

For example, Jessica Stern notes that Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed two CIA officials at

a set of traffic lights in January 1993, could have either been motivated by the USA's

support of Israel (as Kansi himself professed) or personal revenge. She could only

37 Centre for Police Research, 'Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism', Conference Programme,

Uppsala University, 24-26 September 2012. Available at: http://www.polisforsk.uu.se/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=c6e0%2bS3k0bg%3d&tabid=3095&language=sv-SE. Accessed on 4th September 2012. 38

Michael, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism, p173. 39

Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, p47.

@00086304 14

speculate, despite interviewing him extensively.40 The process of designating whether

someone is a terrorist or a psychopath is therefore often inherently subjective,

relying on the individual judgement of the scholar or psychologist.

2.1 The 'lone' in 'lone wolf'

Easily the most misunderstood element of the definition of lone wolf terrorism

is the word 'lone'. Many studies define 'lone wolf' terrorism by relying on the crutch

of differentiating it from group or networked terrorism. Consequently, common

definitions are some variation of the one offered by Fred Burton and Scott Stewart: 'A

lone wolf is a person who acts on his or her own without orders from - or even

connections to - an organization.'41 The solo nature of the act therefore becomes its

'most pertinent characteristic',42 a view which this author believes to be erroneous.

Certainly, this approach is useful in understanding lone wolf terrorism, but not in

defining it. In this respect, the debate over whether this type of terrorism should be

known as 'lone wolf' or 'lone actor' terrorism43 is irrelevant.

At this point it is important to place lone wolf terrorism within its proper

context of what can broadly be termed 'leaderless resistance', whether espoused by

right-wing theorists such as Louis Beam or jihadist strategists like Abu Musab al-

Suri. The term 'lone wolf' in its terrorism context was first coined in the 1990s by the

40 Stern, Jessica, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, new edition (New York:

HarperCollins, 2004), p181. 41 Burton, Fred & Stewart, Scott, 'The "Lone Wolf" Disconnect', STRATFOR Security Weekly, 30th

January 2008. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect. Accessed on 31st May 2012. 42 Phillips, Peter J., 'Lone Wolf Terrorism', Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol.

17(1), 2011, p5. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623573. Accessed on 31st May 2012. 43 Pantucci, Raffaello, 'What Have We Learned About Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik?',

Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5(5-6), December 2011, p41 n1. Available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/what-we-have-learned. Accessed on 31st May 2012.

@00086304 15

right-wing extremists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis.44 This is a fact that many studies

acknowledge, but few realise the true importance of when it comes to defining lone

wolf terrorism. For Curtis and Metzger, 'lone wolf' was intended to be a romanticised

term for a decentralised cell of the sort advocated by Beam and others. This cell could

be comprised of a few people, or even a sole individual, as Beam acknowledges.45 The

phrase 'lone wolf' could therefore be used interchangeably with 'decentralised cell',

without prejudicing its meaning.

An individual employing leaderless resistance tactics could therefore be a lone

wolf, but so too could a small, tightly-knit cell. (Though perhaps, to avoid semantic

confusion, a cell should not be referred to as a 'lone wolf' but rather a cell of lone

wolves, or a 'lone wolf pack' of the sort outlined by Pantucci).46 For this reason,

McVeigh was a lone wolf, even though he didn't act completely alone, as he was part

of a very small cell and therefore acting in accordance with the far right's

understanding of the term.47 A number of terrorism studies have addressed

leaderless resistance when grappling with the lone wolf dilemma, failing to recognise

that they are one and the same. The overemphasis on the 'lone' in 'lone wolf' is to

blame for this confusion. Rather, instead of focusing on 'lone', we should focus on the

'wolf' in 'lone wolf', as this is a word which is a substitute term for 'cell'. Lone wolves

are, in essence, decentralised or autonomous 'lone cells'.

44 COT Institute for Safety, Security and Conflict Management, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', Case Study for

Work Package 3 Paper, 6th July 2007, p13. Available at: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf. Accessed on 14th May 2012. 45 Beam, Louis, 'Leaderless Resistance', The Seditionist, Issue 12, 1992, no page numbers. Available at:

http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm. Accessed on 17th August 2012. 46 Pantucci, 'A Typology of Lone Wolves', pp24-29. 47 Jackson, Paul, 'Solo Actor Terrorism and the Mythology of the Lone Wolf', in Gable, Gerry & Jackson, Paul, Lone Wolves: Myth or Reality? (Ilford: Searchlight, 2011), p80. Available at: http://www.lonewolfproject.org.uk/resources/LW-complete-final.pdf. Accessed on 9th June 2012.

@00086304 16

Therefore, whilst the 'lone' element of lone wolf is useful in understanding the

phenomenon, it is not its defining element. Rather, the defining element of lone wolf

terrorism is its operational security. The ability to operate under the radar of security

services is the predominant driving force behind the adoption of leaderless resistance

by extremist movements (as discussed in Chapter 3), whether a cell or an individual.

Regardless of their wider support structures providing material or ideological

support, when it comes to the actual planning and execution of the terrorist attack,

'the direct influence [control] or support of others, even those sympathetic to the

cause, is absent'.48 The intention is to prevent security services from learning of the

plans, either by keeping it to oneself (if the lone wolf is an individual) or by keeping

the cell a tight-knit network of no more than a few people. In this sense, 'lone' does

not mean 'individual', but rather independent and autonomous, lacking a trail of

evidence to a wider network.

This has led to some confusion as to whether so-called 'grassroots operatives',

such as the Islamist bomber cells in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July

2005, could be classified as lone wolves. The answer is, of course, that they cannot.

Whilst they may appear to qualify in that they were tightly-knit cells whose plans

were not known outside of their own co-conspirators, they had ties, however small,

to a larger organisation. The members of both cells, as with later attackers such as

Faisal Shahzad and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, received training from more

established terror networks in the likes of Yemen and Afghanistan. By reaching out

to an established network, they had brought (or ran the risk of bringing) the

attention of security services. This compromised operational security (which, as we

have noted, is the defining characteristic of lone wolves), at which point they ceased

48

Spaaij, 'The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism', p856.

@00086304 17

to be lone wolves. Had the above-mentioned cells not sought out external help and

executed their acts regardless, they could conceivably still be classified as lone

wolves.

The case of Mohammed Merah may seem to be a problem in this respect.

However, whilst Merah did seek external training, he avoided the established

channels of contact and managed to stay under the radar, helped by his successful

deception of the French security services as to his reasons for visiting Afghanistan

and Pakistan.49 He therefore managed to preserve his operational security and left no

obvious evidence of any connections to an external network. Whilst seeking points of

contact with the wider al-Qaeda movement, Merah operated in such a way as not to

compromise his plans. He can therefore be seen as a sort of entrepreneurial lone

wolf, looking for others to provide him with a skill-set but always intending to strike

out on his own.

2.2 'Lone wolf': An inappropriate term?

Having recognised that the term 'lone wolf' was coined in its terrorism context

by the right-wing extremists Metzger and Curtis, it is pertinent to ask whether 'lone

wolf' is too romanticised a term. It is appealing to other political extremists, lauding

the achievements of these violent individuals, and perhaps encouraging copycats.

Though leaderless resistance is essentially an admission of weakness on the part of

extremist movements (as discussed in Chapter 3.1), the term 'lone wolf' allows

individuals to paint this weakness as part of a romantic struggle. As Roger Griffin

explains:

49 Lakhani, Suraj, 'Mohammed Merah - Lone Wolf or Al-Qa'ida Operative?', Royal United Services Institute. Available at: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F6C9350E3EE5/. Accessed on 11th May 2012.

@00086304 18

This is the age, not of mass assaults on the citadels of liberal decadence

led by paramilitary troops in coloured shirts and sporting sinister

emblems, but of leaderless resistance, the lone, uniformless warrior

priest... who remains inwardly loyal to the cause and retains his

anonymity in the midst of the pleasure-seeking crowd. The national

phoenix is grounded for the duration. The coming of the new order is

indefinitely postponed.50

Indeed, some lone wolves, such as Breivik, seem to relish this role as the 'lone

vanguard',51 and that would certainly have been the aim of Metzger and Curtis. It

might therefore be argued to be beneficial to dispense with 'the lupine metaphor'52,

or at least modify it. Certainly, counter-terrorism narratives could focus on the often-

amateurish nature of lone wolves, attacking the disconnect between the lone wolf

ideal and reality; 'stray mutts' rather than lone wolves.53 Often, lone wolf terrorists

operate alone because they have been rejected by a group or have a level of social

inadequacy that negates forming meaningful group ties (see Chapter 5). This hints at

a certain pathetic vulnerability, as Brian Michael Jenkins notes:

[their] behavior seems to more closely resemble that of stray dogs, who

may be found alone or in packs, estranged from but dependent on

society, streetwise but lacking social skills, barking defiantly, and

potentially dangerous but at the same time, suspicious, fearful,

skittish... They wander about in the shade of the... ideology, sniffing at

50 Griffin, Roger, 'Shattering Crystals: The Role of "Dream Time" in Extreme Right-Wing Political

Violence', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15(1), Spring 2003, pp81-82. 51 Pantucci, 'What Have We Learned About Lone Wolves?', p33. 52 Stevens, Tim, 'The Myth of the Lone Wolf', The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

Available at: http://www.icsr.info/blog-item.php?id=247. Accessed on 14th May 2012. 53 Stewart, Scott, 'Cutting Through the Lone-Wolf Hype', STRATFOR Security Weekly, 22nd September 2011. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110921-cutting-through-lone-wolf-hype. Accessed on 31st May 2012.

@00086304 19

the edges of violence before making a move. Most are arrested before

they get that far.54

The contrast to Griffin's text could hardly be more marked. Contemporarily,

'lone wolf' is associated with operating autonomously and under the radar. Using

Jenkins' approach, we can manipulate the term to enhance the negative connotations

of being lost, or exiled from a group. Rather than dispensing with the lupine

metaphor, it should perhaps be embraced and corrupted. 'Stray terrorism' is much

less appealing than lone wolf terrorism. However, it is perhaps futile to suggest this

as a possible remedy, as the term has become embedded in the popular collective

consciousness. There will never be an eradication of the phrase in relation to

terrorism; even if it were possible to purge it from respectable media, it would linger

in extremist discourse, inspiring yet more individuals to violence.

Overall, it has become clear in this chapter that the definitional debate

regarding lone wolf terrorism is rather complex. Nevertheless, some general

observations can be made, which will serve us well in subsequent chapters. As Stern's

encounter with Kansi reminds us, any judgement on classifying lone wolves is

inherently subjective, or rather inherently speculative. As Ramón Spaaij notes, there

will always be 'some degree of arbitrariness' when addressing lone wolves, and

perhaps terrorism in general.55 This should be (reluctantly) accepted as a necessary

by-product of studying such a diverse and interesting topic, which is constantly

evolving in response to the contemporary security environment. Most importantly,

for the purposes of this dissertation, the term 'lone wolf' must be seen in its original

54 Jenkins, 'Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies', pp21-22. 55

Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p11.

@00086304 20

context as a replacement term for decentralised cells or individuals in leaderless

resistance theory. It is to this theoretical background that one shall now turn.

3. 'Leaderless resistance' and lone wolf theory

It is necessary to discuss leaderless resistance theory, in order to both provide

context to the links to lone wolf terrorism discussed in Chapter 2, and to provide an

overarching theme for this dissertation. 'Leaderless resistance', as theorised by Louis

Beam, is essentially the right-wing appropriation of a concept which has existed in

one form or another since the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, Beam openly cites

Colonel Ulius Louis Amoss, who sought to use the theory to counter a potential

communist invasion of the USA in the early 1960s, as his source.56 Broadly speaking,

leaderless resistance can be placed into the wider discourse regarding 'netwar', an

observation noted by other terrorism scholars.57 Netwar, as defined by John Arquilla

and David Ronfeldt, involves actors who:

generally consist of dispersed, often small groups who agree to

communicate, coordinate, and act in an internetted manner, often

without a precise central leadership or headquarters. Decisionmaking

may be deliberately decentralized and dispersed.58

These actors may be groups, organisations or, most significantly for our purposes,

individuals.59 This is akin to Beam's outlining of the leaderless resistance concept:

56 Kaplan, Jeffrey, '"Leaderless Resistance"', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9(3), Autumn

1997, p87. 57 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, new edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p39. 58 Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,

1996), p5. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR789.html. Accessed on 9th August 2012. 59

Ibid., p9.

@00086304 21

Utilizing the Leaderless Resistance concept, all individuals and groups

operate independently of each other, and never report to a central

headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction, as would

those who belong to a typical pyramid organization.60

The interconnectivity of these leaderless groups or cells (which, as we

discussed in Chapter 2, can be termed 'lone wolves') is a feature which is difficult to

translate from theory into reality, a more complicated endeavour than Arquilla and

Ronfeldt's definition might suggest. Often when leaderless resistance theory is

applied to the real world, problems of co-ordination become a significant

disadvantage. As Marc Sageman has noted, 'the followers are in command'61 and a

terrorist organisation cannot direct lone wolves as it can its operatives in a more

traditional hierarchical network. For example, Gilbert Ramsay has argued that al-

Qaeda seeks, on a strategic level, to commit mass casualty attacks against the West

rather than symbolic attacks directed at particular groups.62 Despite this, it is more

common in contemporary extremist discourse to 'emphasise religious and spiritual

justifications' for global jihad in order to appeal to and radicalise individuals, to the

extent that strategically-important targets are discarded in favour of more symbolic

ones.63

Consequently, the likes of Mohammed Merah would attack Jewish

schoolchildren and Muslim soldiers serving in Western armies, intending to 'send a

message' rather than commit large-scale murder. Al-Qaeda, with its more perceptive

60

Beam, 'Leaderless Resistance', n.p. 61

Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p120. 62 Ramsay, Gilbert, 'Targeting, Rhetoric and the Failure of Grassroots Jihad', Journal of Terrorism

Research, Vol. 3(1), Summer 2012, p28. Available at: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/415. Accessed on 31st August 2012. 63

Ibid., p34.

@00086304 22

understanding of strategic jihad, would surely have preferred the latter, but had no

way of directing Merah to do so. Such problems have led leaderless resistance

campaigns to be correctly described by one journalist as 'more like spontaneous

combustion than someone... lighting a match'.64 Leaderless resistance ensures

beleaguered organisations still have rather dangerous teeth, but robs them of the

freedom to choose when and who to bite.

Nevertheless, despite this disadvantage, leaderless resistance theory fits neatly

into the larger discourse regarding netwar. This is a useful framework as it allows us

to observe that it is not a concept limited solely to far-right movements as Beam

wished, but one whose principles have been adopted by a number of extremist

movements. For example, a spokesman for the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), a

radical environmentalist group, described its composition as a 'series of cells across

the country with no chain of command and no membership roll'.65 Perhaps most

significantly in the contemporary security environment, it is a concept which has

been adopted by the radical Islamist movement. Abu Musab al-Suri, loosely

described by one biographer as the 'jihadi equivalent' to Beam,66 explained his ideas

in 2004's The Global Islamic Resistance Call thus:

We should advise him [the jihadist] to pursue his everyday life in a

natural way, and to pursue jihad and Resistance in secrecy and alone,

64 Gibbs, Nancy, 'The Fort Hood Killer: Terrified... or Terrorist?', Time Magazine, 11th November

2009. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1938698,00.html. Accessed on 29th July 2012. 65

Quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p38. 66 Lia, Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri

(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2007), p6 n8.

@00086304 23

or with a small cell of trustworthy people, who form an independent

unit for Resistance and for the individual jihad.67

Of course, with the absence of an organisational structure, there is a need to

replace this with a suitable alternative to provide some degree of cohesion. All the

above movements suggest a shared ideology as the correct replacement. Arquilla and

Ronfeldt point out that by emphasising a set of shared principles to which all

members subscribe, one can develop 'a central ideational and operational coherence

that allows for tactical decentralization', as every member already has a general sense

of what they must do.68 Consequently, al-Suri notes that, with the lack of

'organizational bonds of any kind', the only bonds are those of a 'program of beliefs, a

system of action, a common name, and a common goal'.69 An activist for a second

environmentalist group, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), proclaims that members

act 'in accordance with our own conscience',70 whilst Beam adopts a similar line,

suggesting that each individual makes 'a private decision in the quietness of his heart

to resist... by any means necessary'.71 Therefore, leaderless resistance relies on a

shared ideology to link together individual acts of terror into a wider terrorist

campaign narrative on behalf of the movement.

However, there are problems with relying on such an elusive and subjective

concept as ideology. Paul Joosse argues that the adoption of leaderless resistance

67 Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance Call', Chapter 8, Section

4 of 'The Global Islamic Resistance Call' (2004), in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p393. 68 Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David, 'The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)', in Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt,

David (eds.), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p9. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch1.pdf. Accessed on 9th August 2012. 69

Al-Suri, 'The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance Call', p422. 70

Quoted in COT, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', p53. 71

Beam, 'Leaderless Resistance', n.p.

@00086304 24

allows individuals to commit actions in accordance with their own personalised

ideology rather than the wishes of the movement's leadership,72 an argument which

is in line with the one articulated by Ramsay above. Whilst this is acceptable for the

radical environmental movement which seeks little more than increasing the number

of 'direct actions' in order to halt the degradation of nature,73 Joosse argues such

ideological diversity dilutes the aims of other movements such as the far-right who

seek to co-ordinate lone wolves under one banner to achieve lasting political change.

Such revolutionary change cannot be achieved if ideological purity is compromised.74

Indeed, the need for ideological harmony throughout the movement has been

accepted wisdom for the far-right ever since it was demanded as an essential

condition for victory by Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf.75

To counter these problems, the theorists each propose a 'political arm' of the

organisation to guide the terrorist 'lone wolf' arm. Beam suggests that 'organs of

information' and propaganda allow the lone wolves to stay informed and act

accordingly.76 Another far-right activist, the Odinist David Lane, notes that this

political arm must be 'scrupulously legal' and 'rigidly separated' from the lone wolf

cells, as it will face intense scrutiny from security services.77 In the jihadist sphere, al-

Suri notes that his brand of Islamist resistance requires investment in 'a variety of

nonfighting fields - proselytizing, media, education, and defining elements of our

72 Joosse, Paul, 'Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation

Front', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19(3), 2007, p363. 73

Ibid., p356. 74

Ibid., pp353-354. 75

Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, p59. 76

Beam, 'Leaderless Resistance', n.p. 77

Quoted in Kaplan, '"Leaderless Resistance"', p89.

@00086304 25

religion'.78 Similar to Lane, he also stresses that propagandising 'contradict[s] [the

principles of] secrecy' and consequently can never be combined with terrorist

operations.79 The American anti-abortion movement provides one example of how

such a political arm can direct its cells whilst remaining superficially legal. Anti-

abortion websites often list the names and addresses of abortion doctors, and suggest

some kind of retribution (whether divine or human) against them, whilst avoiding

explicit incitement to violence. Lone wolves can then take their cues from this

information.80 Similarly. a significant school of thought suggests that the

contemporary incarnation of al-Qaeda is that of a 'global social movement' nurtured

around a common jihadist ideology.81 In this respect, al-Qaeda becomes a 'strategic

communicator' for the wider movement.82 By elaborating on the need for a political

arm, the leaderless resistance theorists hope to mitigate the need for management of

cells by providing a strategic narrative into which all willing lone wolves can frame

their actions.

Indeed, it is with this in mind that it has been suggested that leaderless

resistance is not actually 'leaderless'. Orla Lynch and Christopher Ryder note the

semantic distinction between leadership and management, with the former being

concerned with inspiring individuals and 'setting [a] strategic vision' and the latter

78 Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'Call to Global Islamic Resistance' [condensed translation] (2004), in Lacey,

Jim (ed.), A Terrorist's Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri's Islamic Jihad Manifesto (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), p7. 79 Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'Theory on the Organization and System of Action in the Global Islamic

Resistance Units', Chapter 8, Section 5 of 'The Global Islamic Resistance Call' (2004), in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p454. 80 Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, p100. 81 Bartolo, Romain, 'Decentralised Leadership in Contemporary Jihadism: Towards a Global Social

Movement', Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 2(1), June 2011, p46. Available at: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/173. Accessed on 8th June 2012. 82 Michael, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism', p331.

@00086304 26

about achieving said vision 'through day-to-day activities'.83 Of course, 'managerless

resistance' has less of a ring to it than leaderless resistance, but it is perhaps closer to

the actual nature of the concept. By including a political arm, leaderless resistance

theory is, somewhat paradoxically, providing a leader that inspires and contributes

strategic direction. Rather, the lone wolf cells lack a hierarchical manager, and

provide self-management on a day-to-day basis.

3.1 Leaderless resistance: A sign of weakness?

A common theme in studies of lone wolf terrorism is that leaderless resistance

is a strategy born out of organisational weakness. Jeffrey Kaplan in particular is an

adherent of this view, labelling the concept as 'more a mark of despair than a

revolutionary strategy',84 whilst Simson Garfinkel argues its adoption is an

'admission of failure' and 'a last-ditch effort to keep a struggle alive in the face of an

overwhelming opposition'.85 Such arguments suggest that the primary reason for the

adoption of leaderless resistance is the success of counter-terrorism bodies in

breaking up and prosecuting more conventional extremist and terrorist

organisations. For example, Bruce Hoffman argues that leaderless resistance was

adopted by the far-right in order to 'avoid the mistakes of the past' made by groups

such as the Order, which was undermined by arrests and informants.86 The far-right

leaders would therefore be more inclined to endorse a concept in which they had

83 Lynch, Orla & Ryder, Christopher, 'Deadliness, Organisational Change and Suicide Attacks:

Understanding the Assumptions Inherent in the Use of the Term "New Terrorism"', Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 5(2), August 2012, p268. 84

Kaplan, '"Leaderless Resistance"', p80. 85 Garfinkel, Simson L., 'Leaderless Resistance Today', First Monday, Vol. 8(3), March 2003, no page

numbers. Available at: http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1040/961. Accessed on 31st May 2012. 86 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p115.

@00086304 27

deniability and were shielded from prosecution.87 Indeed, the emphasis on the

benefits of organisational security provided by leaderless resistance supports this

claim.

A similar theme can be found with regards to the contemporary global

Islamist movement. As Rodger Bates notes, 'the growing effectiveness of

counterterrorism techniques' has made al-Qaeda successes on the scale of 9/11 much

harder to achieve.88 Al-Qaeda must therefore shift to encouraging less complex

individual attacks in order to stay relevant during a period of 'limited possibilities' for

central planning of terrorist spectaculars.89

Interestingly, this weakness is admitted by the prominent lone wolf theorists

discussed earlier in this chapter. Beam's article has a surprising aura of despair,

lamenting the 'ever increasing persecution and oppression' by the authorities in a

country where '[t]hose who love liberty, and believe in freedom enough to fight for it,

are rare'. He concedes that leaderless resistance is a 'child of necessity', the only

feasible option for the far-right movement.90 As with Beam, al-Suri chides the

contemporary malaise of his movement, noting that there are only a small number of

jihadists resisting the enemy. This is not only because of the 'viciousness' of the

American-led War on Terror, but also the 'decadence and the individual acceptance

87 Chermak, Steven M., Freilich, Joshua D. & Simone Jr., Joseph, 'Surveying American State Police

Agencies About Lone Wolves, Far-Right Criminality, and Far-Right and Islamic Jihadist Criminal Collaboration', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33(11), 2010, p1022. 88 Bates, Rodger A., 'Dancing with Wolves: Today's Lone Wolf Terrorists', The Journal of Public and

Professional Sociology, Vol. 4(1), April 2012, p4. Available at: http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=jpps. Accessed on 9th August 2012. 89 Centre for Terror Analysis, 'The Threat from Solo Terrorism and Lone Wolf Terrorism', Danish

Security and Intelligence Service, 5th April 2011, p5. Available at: https://www.pet.dk/~/media/Engelsk/the_threat_from_solo_terrorism_and_lone_wolf_terrorism_-_engelsk_version_pdf.ashx. Accessed on 9th August 2012. 90

Beam, 'Leaderless Resistance', n.p.

@00086304 28

of colonialism and defeat within the ummah [the global Muslim community]'.91 With

surrender unacceptable, 'the sole method for confrontation that presents itself in

light of this situation is war by secret bands of disconnected cells'.92 Both Beam and

al-Suri therefore candidly admit the weakness of their movements, and propose

leaderless resistance in response to this.

That the rise of lone wolves and leaderless resistance is due to successful

counter-terrorism is an important observation. It may provide a morale boost for

democratic societies disheartened by the rise in lone wolf violence, as it is evidence

that counter-terrorist efforts have been effective. However, it should be pointed out

that weakness is not defeat. Both Beam and al-Suri remain convinced of the

righteousness of their causes. Beam hopes that 'America can still produce the brave

sons and daughters necessary' for the struggle, and that '[i]t's not over till the last

freedom fighter is buried or imprisoned', or the enemy is defeated.93 Al-Suri

reassures his followers that jihadism is not 'threatened with extinction, because God

proclaimed for his ummah longevity, triumph, and victory'. Rather, they are

threatened with a generation of hardship, humiliation and destitution due to their

own inaction.94 Interestingly, Paul Jackson argues that lone wolves are actually an

'optimistic concept', providing passionate and restless individuals with an

opportunity to act whilst the movement awaits its inevitable righteous victory.95

Therefore, leaderless resistance is not always seen as an admission of failure, but a

strategy of endurance whilst the movement regroups and overcomes its weakness.

Long-term victory is still expected, but postponed indefinitely.

91 Al-Suri, 'Call to Global Islamic Resistance', p5. 92

Ibid., p28. 93

Beam, 'Leaderless Resistance', n.p. 94

Al-Suri, 'Call to Global Islamic Resistance', p5. 95 Jackson, 'Solo Actor Terrorism', p83.

@00086304 29

However, some commentators argue that leaderless resistance is no longer a

sign of weakness. Sageman, for example, argues that its adoption was only an

'admission of failure' before the advent of the Internet.96 Whilst acknowledging that

the post-9/11 War on Terror has led to the degradation of the core al-Qaeda

organisation and compelled it to morph into a movement of 'leaderless jihad',97

Sageman argues that the information revolution ensures this is not a weakness.

Rather, it is more akin to 'a Darwinian evolution by natural selection', in which the

al-Qaeda movement adapted to its 'hostile physical environment' by finding

sanctuary online, improving its potency rather than fleeing its enemies.98 This

allowed it to flourish as a 'bottom-up' movement in an environment where the

security services were used to preying (to continue the Darwinian metaphor) on 'top-

down' organisations.99 However, whilst the role of the Internet may be incredibly

important in enhancing the potency and global reach of lone wolf terrorism, it is not

necessarily a driver of the phenomenon. As the presence of the lone wolf theorists

above demonstrates, and as Chapter 4 shall elaborate, al-Qaeda (and, by extension,

other terrorist movements) cannot be seen as 'a merely spontaneous evolution. It has

had its intelligent design too'.100 Sageman's approach leaves no room for such

nuance, as it focuses on the former to the exclusion of the latter.

Overall, therefore, one can see that leaderless resistance is a concept not

limited to one ideology. Most importantly, though its adoption often signals

weakness on the part of the terrorist movement that employs it, weakness is not

96 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p143. 97

Ibid., p149. 98

Ibid., p121. 99

Ibid., p143. 100 Cruickshank, Paul & Ali, Mohannad Hage, 'Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda',

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 30(1), 2007, p2.

@00086304 30

defeat. There is often a candid acknowledgement that the movement cannot achieve

victory in the contemporary security environment, but there is also an assurance that

such a day will come. This inspires lone wolves such as McVeigh and Breivik to inflict

heavy costs on the societies that have the misfortune to encounter them. Whilst the

movements that created these lone wolves are in a period of weakness, there is often

nothing more dangerous than a wounded animal, cornered and desperate.

4. The contemporary trend of lone wolf terrorism

As discussed in the introduction, high-profile attacks by the likes of Breivik,

Hasan and Merah have ensured that lone wolves are, at least in the public

perception, currently the most dangerous terrorist threat to Western democracies.

However, lone wolf terrorism is not in itself a new phenomenon, and elements can be

found in nineteenth-century anarchism. Indeed, the common stereotype of

anarchism at the time was of 'the lone, crazed anarchist sitting in a run-down

apartment putting together a bomb'.101 Prominent anarchist leaders like Peter

Kropotkin would extol the virtues of 'lonely sentinels' who carried out 'acts of illegal

protest, of revolt, of vengeance'.102 Interestingly, Kropotkin also paints such sentinels

as the passionately restless actions of those individuals who could not bear to wait for

the masses to prepare for revolution.103 This can be seen in line with the argument

outlined by Paul Jackson in the previous chapter that the lone wolf concept provides

restless individuals an opportunity to act whilst awaiting inevitable victory.

101 Thorup, Mikkel, 'The Anarchist and the Partisan - Two Types of Terror in the History of Irregular

Warfare', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20(3), 2008, p339. 102 Quoted in Jensen, Richard Bach, 'Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in

Nineteenth Century Europe', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16(1), Spring 2004, p124. 103 Fleming, Marie, 'Propaganda by the Deed: Terrorism and Anarchist Theory in Late Nineteenth-

Century Europe', Terrorism, Vol. 4(1-4), 1980, p7.

@00086304 31

Most notably, anarchists were ideologically-bound to accept the legitimacy of

'individual terror', due to the movement's emphasis on the historical achievements of

individual heroes.104 This can be compared to the attempts by contemporary Islamist

thinkers to reframe the concept of individual jihad 'from a religious revivalist concept

to a tactical tool of terrorism'.105 Due to their organisational weakness (as discussed

in Chapter 3.1), these movements emphasise the benefits of lone wolf terrorism, such

as organisational security. They therefore seek to mobilise lone wolves in their

movements, proclaiming individual actions as being struck on behalf of the cause.

There is certainly evidence of extremist movements operating with this intent. As

was discussed extensively in Chapter 3, theorists like Louis Beam and Abu Musab al-

Suri have sought to appropriate lone wolves as the key element of a leaderless

resistance strategy for their beleaguered movements. Furthermore, al-Qaeda has

often sought to lionise Islamist lone wolves as role models for jihad, as spokesman

Adam Gadahn did after Nidal Hasan's Fort Hood attack in 2009.106 One can

therefore see a conscious attempt by extremists to utilise lone wolves in their

ideological struggles.

However, there is no objective upwards trend in lone wolf terrorist violence.

One study found that between 1968 and 2007, lone wolves accounted for only 1.28

percent of all terrorist incidents in Western countries,107 which has been interpreted

as suggesting that they are 'black swan occurrences' of negligible concern.108 Whilst,

104 Iviansky, Ze'ev, 'Individual Terror: Concept and Typology', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.

12(1), January 1977, p44. 105 Bates, 'Dancing with Wolves', p4. 106 Pantucci, 'A Typology of Lone Wolves', pp6-7. 107 COT, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', pp16-17. 108 Bakker, Edwin & de Graaf, Beatrice, 'Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches

Addressed', Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5(5-6), December 2011, p45. Available at:

@00086304 32

historically-speaking, lone wolf terrorism is a minority endeavour lacking a clear

trend, Ramón Spaaij has pointed out that there are significant spikes in activity in

certain periods.109 Jeremy and David Carter identify one such spike as the 2009-

2010 period, when a number of high-profile lone wolf attacks spanning numerous

ideologies took place in the United States, including Hasan's Fort Hood attack, the

murder of abortion doctor George Tiller, the shooting at an army recruiting office in

Little Rock, Arkansas and the shooting at a Holocaust museum in Washington by

white supremacist James von Brunn.110 Carter and Carter also cite the foiled attacks

by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Faisal Shahzad as examples during this period

but, as was discussed in Chapter 2.1, they are not lone wolves within our definition of

the term as they compromised operational security by relying on traceable outside

networks. It might therefore be suggested that the West may currently be undergoing

such a spike in lone wolf activity, perhaps a generational spike which is artificially

sustained by the increasing emphasis placed on leaderless resistance in extremist

discourse.

4.1 The inevitable defeat of leaderless resistance

Such is the potential length of this spike that some scholars have attempted to

frame it as a new 'wave' of terrorism. Jeffrey Simon, for example, has suggested that

the internet has revolutionised how terrorism is conducted, allowing lone operators

to become 'significant players' rather than the black swans of previous generations.111

Because of this information revolution, lone wolves will become 'a permanent [and http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/preventing-lone-wolf. Accessed on 31st May 2012. 109 Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p32. 110 Carter, Jeremy G. & Carter, David L., 'Law Enforcement Intelligence: Implications for Self-

Radicalized Terrorism', Police Practice and Research, Vol. 13(2), April 2012, p139. 111 Simon, Jeffrey D., 'Technological and Lone Operator Terrorism: Prospects for a Fifth Wave of Global Terrorism', in Rosenfeld, Jean E. (ed.), Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves Theory and Political Violence (London: Routledge, 2011), p48.

@00086304 33

prominent] fixture in the world of terrorism'.112 This suggestion that lone wolf

terrorism cannot be extinguished is disconcerting, but it is also partly erroneous. It is

correct that lone wolf terror cannot be eradicated, as there will always be violent

individuals willing to act on their beliefs. However, viewing lone wolf terrorism as an

evolutionary phenomenon does not tell the whole story; as discussed in Chapter 3.1,

there has been intelligent design too.113

The reason lone wolf terrorism is undergoing a spike in activity is partly

because of the championing of the concept of leaderless resistance by a number of

extremist movements. This concept may become discredited in time, leading to its

fall from favour or abandonment. As Simson Garfinkel argues, 'ideologies require a

constant stream of new violent actions' in order to maintain interest and

credibility.114 Whether due to the failure of plots, frustration at the lack of progress,

or successful counter-narratives aimed at defusing tension and discouraging

political violence in fringe communities, lone wolf terror will eventually cease to be

seen as a viable option for revolution, a conclusion that the anarchist movement

reached in the early twentieth century.115 Far from being undefeatable, lone wolf

terror on a strategic scale is inherently fragile and condemned to being defeated and

discredited. As discussed in Chapter 3.1, leaderless resistance is seen as a holding

measure whilst the movement awaits its righteous victory. When this victory does

not arrive, followers become disenchanted with the strategy. Certainly, some

individuals will continue to engage in acts of lone wolf terrorism, which should

112

Simon, 'Technological and Lone Operator Terrorism', p61. 113

Cruickshank & Ali, 'Architect of the New Al Qaeda', p2. 114 Garfinkel, 'Leaderless Resistance Today', n.p. 115 Novak, Derry, 'Anarchism and Individual Terrorism', Canadian Journal of Economics and

Political Science, Vol. 20(2), May 1954, p176.

@00086304 34

certainly be guarded against, but the idea itself will fall out of favour within the

extremist milieus.

Overall, the contemporary concern with lone wolf terrorism is not the result of

an objective upwards trend, as there have always been prominent acts of individual

terror, whether political assassination, serial bombing or spree killing. Rather, the

contemporary trend is one of extremist movements seeking to harness the potential

of lone wolves in line with leaderless resistance theory. This has led to a spike in lone

wolf activity advocated by extremist movements, rather than a growing trend. It

requires greater attention from security services for the duration of this spike, but it

is erroneous to treat it as a revolutionary and inexhaustible phenomenon, regardless

of the equalising potential of the internet. Beam's ideas will eventually fall from

favour, as will al-Suri's. There is signs that this may already be happening in the

American far-right movement, with writers such as Steven Barry heavily criticising

the strategy.116 This may take a generation or more, but security services will

eventually grapple with other threats which are unforeseeable today, and lone wolf

terrorism will continue to be a persistent thorn perpetrated by individuals rather

than an explicit strategy endorsed by extremist movements.

5. Lone wolves and their habitats

Having addressed the contemporary application of lone wolf terrorism and

linked it to leaderless resistance theory, this study shall now address the lone wolves'

habitats. After all, it would be futile if one were to link the lone wolf phenomenon to

its wider theoretical advocates if there was no evidence that the lone terrorist

116

Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, pp47-48.

@00086304 35

perpetrators were influenced by such ideas. There is strong evidence that many lone

wolves are indeed influenced by the ideas circulating in extremist circles.

Lone wolf terrorists do not commit their violent acts out of the blue, although

such attacks may appear as such to a security establishment that had not anticipated

them. Indeed, there is wide academic consensus that, despite carrying out the attacks

independently, lone wolves do not arise out of a vacuum.117 As Terry Turchie has

noted in a slightly different context, '[e]very Lone Wolf, no matter how isolated he is

at the outset of his mission, originates in a pack'.118 Indeed, the broader non-

terroristic connotations of the term 'lone wolf' is of a canine who has been exiled

from or abandoned by its pack. This perhaps examples the usefulness of the lupine

metaphor in understanding this peculiar form of terrorism, as lone wolf terrorists are

removed from their support structures in a similar way to lone wolves in the natural

world are removed from their packs.

Beatrice de Graaf and Eelco Kessels identify three layers of how lone wolves

radicalise in their habitats, and these serve as a useful framework for this chapter.

The first is the extremist ideologies which serve as the foundation for their

radicalisation. Insufficient on its own to induce violent action, a second necessary

layer is an enabling environment which inspires and sustains the potential lone wolf

- an intensification of their ideology. The third layer is psychological - the presence of

117 Bakker, Edwin & de Graaf, Beatrice, 'Lone Wolves: How to Prevent This Phenomenon?',

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, Expert Meeting Paper, November 2010, p4. Available at: http://icct.nl/userfiles/file/ICCT%20EM%20Lone%20Wolves%20Paper.pdf. Accessed on 12th June 2012. 118

[Part 1] by Turchie, Terry D., in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, p109.

@00086304 36

mental illness or personal circumstances which make an individual susceptible to

violent radicalisation.119

5.1 The ideological foundation

The first of these, the ideological outlook of the individual, serves as the

foundation for their future radicalisation. As Ramón Spaaij notes, this 'exposure to

ideologies justifying terrorism is a key ingredient in the mix' that leads to the violent

commitment.120 Most lone wolves have in their history some involvement with

radical groups, or at least a notable interest in radical politics. Timothy McVeigh had

been associated with the Christian Patriot and militia movements in the USA, but

was not warmly welcomed in either.121 David Copeland, the right-wing nail-bomber

who killed three and injured over a hundred more in London in April 1999, was a

member of the British National Party (BNP), before leaving dissatisfied to join the

more extreme National Socialist Movement.122 In the aftermath of his attacks,

Anders Behring Breivik's past was the source of much speculation regarding his links

to extremist groups. It appears he was deeply invested in activities organised by the

far-right Norwegian Defence League (NDL) and its English counterpart, the English

Defence League (EDL), before being kicked out of the NDL for being 'too extreme'.123

Therefore, it seems that a recurring theme among lone wolves is their

rejection by radical groups or, as in Copeland's case, their voluntary withdrawal of

119 De Graaf, Beatrice & Kessels, Eelco, 'Lone Wolves and Their Enabling Environment', ICCT

Commentary, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 29th July 2011. Available at: http://icct.nl/vervolg.php?h_id=6&s_id=43#BGEK. Accessed on 31st May 2012. 120

Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p49. 121

Michael, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism, p107. 122 McLagan, Graeme & Lowles, Nick, Mr. Evil: The Secret Life of Racist Bomber and Killer David

Copeland (London: John Blake Publishing, 2000), pp216-219. 123 Ravndal, Jacob Aasland, 'A Pre-Trial Profile of Anders Behring Breivik', CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5(3), March 2012, p9. Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss37.pdf. Accessed on 31st May 2012.

@00086304 37

membership due to frustration at the refusal to support violence. As discussed in

Chapter 1.1, the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism is too diverse to make general

conclusions based on case studies, but one might tentatively suggest that a

government liaison with such groups might help identify potential lone wolves who

are considered too extreme even for the extremists. Indeed, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) has emphasised in a 2009 memorandum the identification of

those 'who have voluntarily left a[n] [extremist] group due to their perception of the

group's inactivity, or those forced from the group for being too extreme and or

violent'.124 Of course, there would be some groups resolutely unwilling to help the

government. For example, one could not see the anti-federalist far-right militias in

the United States liaising with the FBI that they despise to identify such individuals,

no matter how dangerous they may be. Nevertheless, there is potential in this

approach, especially with regards to groups which do not advocate violence.

This autonomous behaviour, pushing beyond the boundaries of the extremist

groups with which they associated, suggests the mind of a lone wolf is one which is

unburdened by the social pressures which neuter the violent tendencies of most

radicals. As Spaaij notes, there is an almost autodidactic characteristic in a lone wolf

terrorist, in which an appetite for self-study allows them to personalise their

ideology.125 In what Kathleen Puckett describes as the 'essential finding' of her

study,126 she notes that, like other extremists, lone wolves retain a paranoid

personality that makes connections and sees conspiracies everywhere. However, due

to their rejection, voluntary withdrawal or social inadequacy, they are unable to

124 Fields, Gary & Perez, Evan, 'FBI Seeks to Target Lone Extremists', The Wall Street Journal, 15th

June 2009. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124501849215613523.html. Accessed on 15th June 2012. 125

Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p57. 126

[Part 2] by Puckett, in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, p272.

@00086304 38

share this with others. Despite their inability, they still need to make a connection,

and so ideology becomes the substitute, the one thing that cannot reject them.

Undiluted by group interaction (and the moderating voices that come with it), their

cherished ideology becomes more personalised, further alienating them from the

extremist milieu. Ideology becomes dominant and the individual the only 'true

believer'. He is in his own mind the only one devoted to it, to the point of engaging in

terrorist violence in pursuit of its goals.127

Therefore, ideology is a potent force in the radicalisation of a lone wolf

terrorist. As Puckett's findings suggest, it can come to dominate an individual's

mindset and legitimise - perhaps even necessitate - the application of violence.

However, it remains merely a foundation for our analysis. Terrorism is, by definition,

carried out by those with extremist ideologies, but the majority of extremists are not

terrorists.128 This suggests that an extremist ideology is, in isolation, insufficient to

drive one to commit acts of terror. Indeed, the lone wolf anti-abortionist terrorist

Eric Rudolph, in noting that his actions were 'wholly consistent' with his ideology,

queried why 'the majority of so-called pro-lifers don't act in a similar manner'.129 The

answer is, of course, that they lack the psychological makeup that make an individual

susceptible to violent radicalisation. Puckett's findings suggest the need for a mind

plagued with social inadequacy, rejection or strong-willed independence (to be

discussed in Chapter 5.3). Indeed, we should be thankful that the majority who adopt

such radical views do not act on them as violently as Rudolph did. Furthermore, an

individual needs to already be committed in order to become more deeply

127

[Part 2] by Puckett, in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, pp268-271. 128

Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, p30. 129 Quoted in Vollers, Maryanne, Lone Wolf: Eric Rudolph and the Legacy of American Terror (New

York: HarperCollins, 2007), p303.

@00086304 39

radicalised. Enabling environments therefore perform the important function of

making available these ideas in the first place. Ideology is therefore a foundation for

lone wolf radicalisation, but by itself is not sufficient to explain it.

5.2 The enabling environment

No act of lone wolf terrorism emerges from a vacuum. As Mark

Juergensmeyer points out, even solo actions have 'networks of support and

ideologies of validation behind them, whether or not these networks and ideologies

are immediately apparent'.130 As stated above, lone wolves often have prior

connection to extremist groups in which they developed their ideology. But providing

access to ideological material is not the most important function of enabling

environments. As Marc Sageman argues, ideological propaganda 'merely reinforce[s]

already made-up minds';131 it is unlikely that a person would invest his or her time

indulging in extremist material unless they already found such material appealing.

Rather, it is the discussion of these ideas which allows for more intensive

radicalisation.132 Extremist movements provide forums for such discussion, and

permit the dissemination of new ideas. Of course, for our purposes the most

important idea spread within various extremist movements is the theory of leaderless

resistance.

Indeed, the need for a political arm in leaderless resistance theory, as outlined

by Louis Beam and Abu Musab al-Suri in Chapter 3, suggests that lone wolf theorists

are aware that their target audience does not exist in a vacuum and will listen to

130 Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, third

edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), p11. 131

Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p114. 132

Ibid., p116.

@00086304 40

outside direction. Indeed, if potential lone wolves did not engage with the wider

extremist community, there would be no point in the likes of Beam and al-Suri

proclaiming the virtues of leaderless resistance, as there would be no audience

willing to act on it. The presence of an enabling environment provides the

articulation of a narrative which allows individuals to see their lone wolf actions as

one part of a community-wide struggle: a broader campaign of leaderless resistance.

Fiction is often useful in this regard. The Turner Diaries, an infamous far-right novel

written by William Pierce in 1978, has been described as 'a blueprint for committing

violent acts', describing how terrorism can overthrow the established political system

and replace it with a new order. Such material augments factual theory by the likes of

Beam.133 Indeed, The Turner Diaries has been said to have directly inspired a

number of far-right lone wolves, including McVeigh and Copeland.134 McVeigh even

seemed to agree with the popular consensus that the book was his 'Bible'.135

Such an environment of both factual and fictional material provides not only

the narrative, but also justifications for violence and recommended tactics.136

Furthermore, it also provides suitable targets. For example, McVeigh attacked a

government building in Oklahoma City, much as his literary hero Earl Turner had

done in Pierce's novel.137 Chapter 3 noted how anti-abortion websites may unsubtly

list the names and addresses of abortion doctors, but the influence of an enabling

environment on a lone wolf's choice of target may be more indirect. For example,

Theodore Kaczynski sent a bomb which killed an advertising executive who had

133 Jackson, 'Solo Actor Terrorism', p83. 134 Michael, George, 'Blueprints and Fantasies: A Review and Analysis of Extremist Fiction', Studies in

Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33(2), 2010, p153. 135 Michel, Lou & Herbeck, Dan, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & the Oklahoma City

Bombing (New York: Regan Books, 2001), p304. 136

Bates, 'Dancing with Wolves', p5. 137

Michael, 'Blueprints and Fantasies', p154.

@00086304 41

spearheaded the oil company Exxon's public relations campaign after the Exxon

Valdez oil spill of March 1989. Despite his predominantly anti-technologist views,

the Unabomber is widely believed to have been motivated by reading radical

environmentalist material for this particular attack.138

These enabling environments also provide lone wolf terrorists with a sense of

validation. Thoroughly committed to their ideology, they see in the extremist

community an ideal which they wish to transfer to the wider society. The extremist

community espouses values which the lone wolves view as righteous, and therefore

seek to impose upon others. Because of this, some lone wolves often see themselves

as the true saviour of their community, group or nation, saving it from decadence or

destruction. The ideology becomes more important than the individual identity, and

the lone wolf begins to define himself through his commitment to his cause. McVeigh

appears to have formulated a fantasy of the 'ultimate warrior' with himself in the

starring role as the first hero of the second American Revolution, an act he hoped

would come about as a result of his bomb in Oklahoma City.139 Similarly, Breivik,

despite his narcissistic personality, saw himself as in service to a higher cause - the

preservation of European identity. He therefore targeted the Norwegian Labour

Party in both a government building in Oslo and a Labour Party-run youth camp on

Utøya as he saw this party as responsible for encouraging multiculturalism and mass

Muslim immigration into Norway.140

138 Taylor, Bron, 'Religion, Violence and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the

Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10(4), Winter 1998, p28. 139 Meloy, J. Reid, 'Indirect Personality Assessment of the Violent True Believer', Journal of

Personality Assessment, Vol. 82(2), 2004, p142. 140 Stewart, Scott, 'Norway: Lessons from a Successful Lone Wolf Attacker', STRATFOR Security Weekly, 28th July 2011. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110727-norway-lessons-successful-lone-wolf-attacker. Accessed on 31st May 2012.

@00086304 42

Noting the inability of many lone wolves to fit into society, Ami Pedahzur and

Arie Perliger have speculated that the individuals may see their attacks as a form of

social rehabilitation. By harming one's enemies and restoring the society to its 'true'

state (according to their ideology), they hope to earn the appreciation and affection

of the community which has spurned them.141 Enabling environments are therefore

dangerous not just because they actively encourage lone wolves to commit violence,

and provide them with a leaderless resistance framework in which to do it, but also

because they provide them with an ideological ideal for which they are prepared to

commit mass murder to attain.

It is also perhaps worth briefly noting that an enabling environment does not

necessarily have to be extremist. Lone wolves do not exist in a vacuum, but nor do

they exist in an exclusively extremist vacuum. For example, during his trial Breivik

argued his own negative views on multiculturalism are similar to those of 'the three

most powerful [mainstream] politicians in Europe': British Prime Minister David

Cameron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and then-French President Nicolas

Sarkozy,142 who had 'all admitted multiculturalism does not work'.143 Therefore, it

needs to be acknowledged that lone wolves may be influenced by the politics of the

wider society, rather than just the minority ideologies espoused in the extremist

fringes. It must be emphasised here that whilst extremists are on the fringes of

society, they are not absent from society. Jeffrey Stevenson Murer notes that, in

141 Pedahzur, Ami & Perliger, Arie, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press,

2011), p158. 142 Kundnani, Arun, 'The Anti-Islamist: Anders Behring Breivik's Manifesto', ICCT Commentary,

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 23rd April 2012. Available at: http://icct.nl/vervolg.php?h_id=6#AK. Accessed on 12th June 2012. 143

Siddique, Haroon & Pidd, Helen, 'Anders Behring Breivik gives evidence - Tuesday 17 April', The Guardian News Blog, 17th April 2012. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/17/anders-behring-breivik-live-updates. Accessed on 31st August 2012.

@00086304 43

liberal Western societies, political extremists commit a form of 'ideocide', espousing

views which are so offensive to their fellow citizens that they are shunned by society.

This prevents them from being engaged in rational debate which may dilute their

extremist and violent ideas, and transforms the inevitable conflict between the

political majority and minority into a 'zero-sum game' in which the latter feels

compelled to commit violent acts to preserve its virtue.144

There is therefore a duty of care on the part of all society to ensure that

extremist ideas are not shunned and ignored, but confronted and discredited. As one

potential course, Raffaello Pantucci recommends that the mainstream political

parties should assume greater responsibility in countering extremist language when

it emerges through democratic debate.145 The exemplary actions of Norwegian

society in response to the actions of Breivik serve as a role model for such counter-

narratives in future, as it processed his criminal prosecution through established

channels and refused to engage in knee-jerk responses.146 Indeed, the tragedies in

Oslo and on Utøya led to a reaffirmation of Norwegian democratic values which

brought worldwide praise.147 Furthermore, the decision to try Breivik as sane rather

than insane showed that Norway was prepared to confront the reality of his crimes. A

diagnosis of insanity would have allowed both the far-right and the wider society to

paint him as 'a loner, a violent psychopath and a freakish aberration', rather than the

144 Murer, Jeffrey Stevenson, 'Security, Identity, and the Discourse of Conflation in Far-Right

Violence,' Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 2(2), November 2011, p18. Available at: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/188. Accessed on 8th June 2012. 145

Pantucci, 'What Have We Learned About Lone Wolves?', p40. 146 Fisher, Max, 'What America Can Learn from Norway's Anders Breivik Trial', The Atlantic, 18th

April 2012. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/what-america-can-learn-from-norways-anders-breivik-trial/256066/. Accessed on 9th July 2012. 147 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 'Norway's Trial, and a Democratic Lesson', Open Democracy, 24th April 2012. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hylland-eriksen/norways-trial-and-democratic-lesson. Accessed on 9th July 2012.

@00086304 44

product of extremist discourse.148 Such action would have discouraged the society

from confronting and discrediting the ideas and environment that spawned him.

There is also a need for governments to operate with restraint, guarding

against the ''cowboy' style [law] enforcement' which places the state at odds with

many political fringe movements.149 One need only remember the law enforcement

fiascos at Waco and Ruby Ridge in the USA, against which a new generation of

uncompromising armed civilian militias developed.150 Indeed, the two events were

key motivations for McVeigh to press ahead with the Oklahoma City bombing.151 It is

beyond the remit of this dissertation to propose counter-terrorism

recommendations, but a call for restraint has self-evident merit. Breivik may have

shown the damage that a lone wolf can do, but Norway showed how a democratic

society must respond. Counter-narratives offer the best way of disrupting the

enabling environments of lone wolves, both in discrediting the ideas of those who

have committed violent acts and in discouraging others from following their lead.

5.3 The psychology of lone wolves

The third and final layer of the framework provided by de Graaf and Kessels is

the psychological element. This contends that there must be the presence of a mental

illness or peculiar set of personal circumstances which make an individual

susceptible to violent radicalisation where others would not. As suggested in Chapter

148 Fekete, Liz, 'The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre', Race & Class, Vol. 53(3),

January-March 2012, p31. 149 Anthony, Dick & Robbins, Thomas, 'Religious Totalism, Violence and Exemplary Dualism: Beyond

the Extrinsic Model', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 7(3), 1995, pp38-39. 150 Durham, Martin, 'Preparing for Armageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot Movement and the

Oklahoma City Bombing', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 8(1), Spring 1996, p68. 151 Wilkinson, Paul, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, third edition

(London: Routledge, 2011), p118.

@00086304 45

5.1, the fact of the matter remains that there are many people populating extremist

milieus, but only a few engage in lone wolf terrorism. It therefore stands to reason

that there is a psychological element that differentiates these few from the masses

who do not act on their beliefs.

An attempt to find such a psychological element is complicated by the fact that

it is difficult to determine whether the decision to commit acts of terrorism and

political violence is a sign of psychological disturbance. Sageman notes that the

contemporary academic consensus is that there is no set 'terrorist personality', and

notes the failure to find one in the past forty years of terrorism research.152 Lorenzo

Vidino also makes the important observation that even if a terrorist suffers from

mental illness, their targets are not random but often chosen for their political

symbolism or association.153 This suggests that the political motivation is not

completely consumed by a psychological disturbance; lone wolves therefore retain at

least some rational cognitive ability. Nevertheless, there is some quantitative

evidence to show that the rate of psychological disturbance is higher amongst lone

wolves than group-based terrorists,154 and so a discussion of the psychology of lone

wolves is important.

Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley argue that something must occur in a

lone wolf's background that 'make[s] the political personal'.155 There is a combination

of support for extremist ideas cultivated by the enabling environments discussed in

152 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p17. 153 Vidino, Lorenzo, 'Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional

Phenomenon?', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32(1), 2009, p10. 154 Hewitt, Christopher, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (New York: Routledge, 2003), p80. 155

Moskalenko & McCauley, 'The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism', p125.

@00086304 46

Chapter 5.2 with a personal event or experience which moves the individual beyond

mere sympathy towards an obligation to act.156 For example, the anti-Islamist Breivik

related several instances of when he had been attacked by Muslims, although the

truth of this cannot be determined.157 Kaczynski spoke of a technological society

'inexorably imposing on me',158 whilst Rudolph spoke of his personal confrontation

with 'the horror of abortion', experiencing 'the sense of hollowness... I felt dirty and

wanted to wash the... indifference off me with a Brillo pad'.159 Moskalenko and

McCauley note that empathy and 'positive identification' with others is a common

trait in human psychology, most commonly manifested in affection towards family

and friends, celebrities, sports teams, fictional characters and pets.160 Lone wolf

terrorists redirect this empathy towards the extremist ideology they have been

exposed to by their enabling environments, to such a degree of intensity that they are

willing to sacrifice their lives or liberty.161

This intense personalisation of one's political views is made possible by the

autodidactic and individualistic psychological makeup of the lone wolf in question, as

discussed in Chapter 5.1. Puckett points out that lone wolves tend to be rather

intelligent, or at least independently-minded. She deduces that their 'locus of control'

is more likely to be internal rather than external; they are 'able to look to [their] own

ideas as authority for [their] actions' rather than relying on a group. This allows them

to appropriate the extremist ideas to which they have been exposed and mould them

156

Moskalenko & McCauley, 'The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism', p125. 157

Pantucci, 'What Have We Learned About Lone Wolves?', p33. 158 COT, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', p29. 159

Quoted in Vollers, Lone Wolf, p302. 160

Moskalenko & McCauley, 'The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism', p122. 161

Ibid., p124.

@00086304 47

to their own personal circumstances.162 Matthijs Nijboer notes how such a conclusion

has also been reached by marketing research, where 'lone wolves' in a non-terroristic

context are highly committed individuals who attach little importance to social

interactions and do not trust others to complete the task at hand.163 The fact that

similar traits can also be found in marketing research supports our argument that

lone wolves are not necessarily psychologically disturbed, but rather follow rational,

though extremely uncommon, psychological processes.

Overall, therefore, one can see how the three layers of radicalisation outlined

by de Graaf and Kessels provide an explanation for how lone wolf habitats develop

and set an individual on the road to political violence. In reverse order, there is often

a psychological element which makes an individual vulnerable to violent

radicalisation. This is often a potent mix of the political with the personal, made

possible by the lone wolf's individualistic nature. A lone wolf is then exposed to an

extremist environment which enables him to frame his grievances within a wider

cause. The individual may also be exposed to the theory of leaderless resistance at

this stage. Finally, the lure of extremist ideology becomes dominant, supplanting

social needs and allowing an individual to see himself as the only 'true believer'. This

compels him to become a lone wolf terrorist and act in pursuance of his ideology.

One can therefore find little fault in Spaaij's assertion that 'violent radicalization

takes place at the intersection of an enabling environment and individual

trajectories'.164 Individual circumstances and the lure of the extremist milieu

conspire to create a habitat which breeds lone wolf terrorists.

162

[Part 2] by Puckett, in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, p265. 163 Nijboer, 'A Review of Lone Wolf Terrorism', p37. 164 Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p47.

@00086304 48

6. Conclusion

This dissertation has attempted to provide greater clarity to the complex

nature of lone wolf terrorism, to reduce the instances of 'crying wolf'. In conclusion,

it has found that lone wolf terrorism fits neatly into the doctrine of leaderless

resistance as articulated by extremists across a number of ideologies, from Louis

Beam on the far-right to the jihadist Abu Musab al-Suri. In explaining this

conclusion, it is essential to remember the origins of the term 'lone wolf' in its

terroristic context. As coined by the right-wing extremists Tom Metzger and Alex

Curtis, it was originally intended to be a romanticised term for a decentralised or

autonomous cell of the sort found in Beam's popular 'Leaderless Resistance' article.

Individuals like Timothy McVeigh could therefore be described as lone wolves, even

if they did not act completely alone, when one considers the terrorist etymology of

the term. Therefore, throughout this dissertation 'lone wolf' has been used

interchangeably with 'autonomous cell within a wider movement' without

prejudicing its meaning.

Unfortunately, the bulk of academic studies into lone wolf terrorism fail to

make this connection, or at least fail to recognise its importance. This is arguably

because of the overemphasis on the word 'lone' in 'lone wolf'. These studies often

assume 'lone' to mean individual rather than autonomous or independent, and

consequently discard valid cases of lone wolf terrorism erroneously. The solo nature

of the terrorist becomes, for many, the dominant point of reference. Whilst this is

indeed useful in understanding lone wolf terrorism, it does not define it. In this

author's view, the defining element is the benefit of operational security. When

championing the leaderless resistance concept, extremist advocates emphasise these

benefits. Indeed, it has been shown in this dissertation that leaderless resistance can

@00086304 49

be reasonably portrayed as a sign of weakness from the organisation or movement

which adopts it, as it is often advocated following a period of intensified counter-

terrorism scrutiny of the organisation in question.

Recent academic studies, most notably George Michael's Lone Wolf Terror

and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance, are encouraging in that they seek to analyse

lone wolf terrorism within the context of leaderless resistance. Michael is correct in

cautioning that leaderless resistance is largely an academic construct, and that we

must be careful not to attribute the unorganised and sporadic nature of some

psychopathic individuals to a wider conspiratorial movement.165 However, many

individuals do act as lone wolves within a wider leaderless resistance operation, and

it is therefore encouraging that there is a growing awareness that the two concepts

complement one another, rather than splitting hairs over whether a particular

individual acted alone or not.

When lone wolf terrorism is placed in this correct context, its vulnerabilities

become much more illuminated. Operating on the fringes of a movement, or even

exiled from it altogether, one can begin to see lone wolves as stray mutts rather than

the romantic, vigilant guardians they would certainly rather be portrayed as. In doing

so, it becomes easier to accept the argument that lone wolf terror is, for the most

part, less dangerous than group terrorism in terms of casualties. This may go some

way to mitigating the fear and apprehension a society inevitably experiences when it

is confronted with such 'bolts from the blue'. Whilst lone wolf terrorism should

always be guarded against, and security services in particular should not become

complacent, it is always likely to be a persistent irritant rather than an existential

165

Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, p38.

@00086304 50

threat to one's society. Placing it within the context of leaderless resistance

encourages one to accept it as a by-product of society's eternal campaign against

extremism and intolerance. There will always be lone individuals seeking to instil

political terror, and society should not be deterred.

This also illuminates the problems extremist movements have in harnessing

the potential of leaderless resistance and the lone wolves therein. To continue to

exhaust the lupine metaphor, leaderless resistance effectively involves groups letting

their lone wolf cells off the leash, from which point they lose control of who and when

they bite. These problems are seemingly remedied in leaderless resistance theory by

the creation of a political arm within an organisation to guide the lone wolves.

However, at best organisations retain only a negligible degree of control over lone

wolves, and ideological purity may be irreversibly soiled by the adoption of leaderless

resistance. Often, organisations are reduced to claiming actions post-fact as being

struck in pursuit of their goals - a trait which can be increasingly seen with regards to

al-Qaeda.

However, it has been noted in this dissertation that, whatever organisational

weakness that the adoption of leaderless resistance illuminates, weakness is not

defeat. These extremist organisations retain the belief in the righteousness of their

causes, and see the employment of lone wolves as a stop-gap measure whilst the

movement endures its darkest hour. These movements still represent a threat; as

Chapter 3 concluded, there is often nothing more dangerous than a wounded animal,

cornered and desperate. Nevertheless, leaderless resistance is destined to being

discredited, as indeed it was by the anarchist movement in the early twentieth

century. Eventually, all ideas which promise victory, but are so flawed that victory

@00086304 51

remains unattainable, are discarded. As this dissertation has shown, there are

significant flaws in leaderless resistance theory which suggest it is not a viable long-

term strategy for many extremist movements. There will always be lone wolves,

individuals seeking to engage in political violence, but the prominence of those who

advocate and lionise such acts will fluctuate.

Finally, this dissertation showed how individual circumstances and enabling

environments mix to create a habitat which breeds lone wolves. Indeed, if the theme

of this dissertation could be summed up in one sentence, it would be as follows: Lone

wolf terrorism does not occur in a vacuum. Certainly, this is not a unique statement;

it is one cited or alluded to in just about every source in this author's bibliography.

But in recognising and emphasising this point, one can move away from the

hindrances of crying wolf and the common assumption that nothing can be done to

prevent or interdict these lone wolves. Lone wolves operate in identifiable habitats

that support and often incite their acts of terror, and place them within a wider

leaderless resistance narrative. Confronting these habitats, both in law enforcement

measures and in counter-narratives, offers the best way to protect society from the

lone wolf's bite.

@00086304 52

Bibliography Books: Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996). Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR789.html. Accessed on 9th August 2012. Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David, 'The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)', in Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David (eds.), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), pp1-25. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch1.pdf. Accessed on 9th August 2012. Gumbel, Andrew & Charles, Roger G., Oklahoma City: What the Investigation Missed - and Why it Still Matters (New York: William Morrow, 2012). Hewitt, Christopher, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (New York: Routledge, 2003). Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, new edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, third edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003). Kellner, Douglas, Guys and Guns Amok: Domestic Terrorism and School Shootings from the Oklahoma City Bombing to the Virginia Tech Massacre (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008). Lia, Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2007). Martin, Gus, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, second edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006). McLagan, Graeme & Lowles, Nick, Mr. Evil: The Secret Life of Racist Bomber and Killer David Copeland (London: John Blake Publishing, 2000). Michael, George, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA (London: Routledge, 2003). Michael, George, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012). Michael, George, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism', in Logan, Keith Gregory & Ramsay, James D. (eds.), Introduction to Homeland Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), pp313-350.

@00086304 53

Michel, Lou & Herbeck, Dan, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: Regan Books, 2001). Pedahzur, Ami & Perliger, Arie, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). Sageman, Marc, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). Simon, Jeffrey D., 'Technological and Lone Operator Terrorism: Prospects for a Fifth Wave of Global Terrorism', in Rosenfeld, Jean E. (ed.), Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves Theory and Political Violence (London: Routledge, 2011), pp44-65. Spaaij, Ramón, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention (New York: Springer, 2012). Stern, Jessica, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, new edition (New York: HarperCollins, 2004). Turchie, Terry D. & Puckett, Kathleen M., Hunting the American Terrorist: The FBI's War on Homegrown Terror (New York: History Publishing Company, 2007). Vollers, Maryanne, Lone Wolf: Eric Rudolph and the Legacy of American Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). Wilkinson, Paul, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, third edition (London: Routledge, 2011). Manifestos: Berwick, Andrew (Anders Behring Breivik), 2083: A European Declaration of Independence (2011). Available at: http://info.publicintelligence.net/AndersBehringBreivikManifesto.pdf. Accessed on 15th August 2012. Kaczynski, Theodore J., 'Industrial Society and Its Future' (1995), in Kaczynski, Theodore J., Technological Slavery: The Collected Writings of Theodore J. Kaczynski, a.k.a. "The Unabomber" (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 2010), pp36-120. Leaderless Resistance Theory: Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'Call to Global Islamic Resistance' [condensed translation] (2004), in Lacey, Jim (ed.), A Terrorist's Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri's Islamic Jihad Manifesto (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp1-196.

@00086304 54

Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance Call', Chapter 8, Section 4 of 'The Global Islamic Resistance Call' (2004), in Lia, Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2007), pp347-439. Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'Theory on the Organization and System of Action in the Global Islamic Resistance Units', Chapter 8, Section 5 of 'The Global Islamic Resistance Call' (2004), in Lia, Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2007), pp440-456. Beam, Louis, 'Leaderless Resistance', The Seditionist, Issue 12, 1992, no page numbers. Available at: http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm. Accessed on 17th August 2012. Journal Articles: Anthony, Dick & Robbins, Thomas, 'Religious Totalism, Violence and Exemplary Dualism: Beyond the Extrinsic Model', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 7(3), 1995, pp10-50. Bakker, Edwin & de Graaf, Beatrice, 'Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches Addressed', Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5(5-6), December 2011, pp43-50. Available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/preventing-lone-wolf. Accessed on 31st May 2012. Bartolo, Romain, 'Decentralised Leadership in Contemporary Jihadism: Towards a Global Social Movement', Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 2(1), June 2011, pp44-61. Available at: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/173. Accessed on 8th June 2012. Bates, Rodger A., 'Dancing with Wolves: Today's Lone Wolf Terrorists', The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology, Vol. 4(1), April 2012, pp1-14. Available at: http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=jpps. Accessed on 9th August 2012. Carter, Jeremy G. & Carter, David L., 'Law Enforcement Intelligence: Implications for Self-Radicalized Terrorism', Police Practice and Research, Vol. 13(2), April 2012, pp138-154. Chermak, Steven M., Freilich, Joshua D. & Simone Jr., Joseph, 'Surveying American State Police Agencies About Lone Wolves, Far-Right Criminality, and Far-Right and Islamic Jihadist Criminal Collaboration', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33(11), 2010, pp1019-1041. Cruickshank, Paul & Ali, Mohannad Hage, 'Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 30(1), 2007, pp1-14. Durham, Martin, 'Preparing for Armageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot Movement and the Oklahoma City Bombing', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 8(1), Spring 1996, pp65-79.

@00086304 55

Fekete, Liz, 'The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre', Race & Class, Vol. 53(3), January-March 2012, pp30-47. Fleming, Marie, 'Propaganda by the Deed: Terrorism and Anarchist Theory in Late Nineteenth-Century Europe', Terrorism, Vol. 4(1-4), 1980, pp1-23. Garfinkel, Simson L., 'Leaderless Resistance Today', First Monday, Vol. 8(3), March 2003, no page numbers. Available at: http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1040/961. Accessed on 31st May 2012. Griffin, Roger, 'Shattering Crystals: The Role of "Dream Time" in Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15(1), Spring 2003, pp57-95. Iviansky, Ze'ev, 'Individual Terror: Concept and Typology', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12(1), January 1977, pp43-63. Jensen, Richard Bach, 'Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16(1), Spring 2004, pp116-153. Joosse, Paul, 'Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation Front', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19(3), 2007, pp351-368. Kaplan, Jeffrey, 'April 19', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9(2), Summer 1997, pp135-142. Kaplan, Jeffrey, '"Leaderless Resistance"', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9(3), Autumn 1997, pp80-95. Lynch, Orla & Ryder, Christopher, 'Deadliness, Organisational Change and Suicide Attacks: Understanding the Assumptions Inherent in the Use of the Term "New Terrorism"', Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 5(2), August 2012, pp257-275. Meloy, J. Reid, 'Indirect Personality Assessment of the Violent True Believer', Journal of Personality Assessment, Vol. 82(2), 2004, pp138-146. Michael, George, 'Blueprints and Fantasies: A Review and Analysis of Extremist Fiction', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33(2), 2010, pp149-170. Moskalenko, Sophia & McCauley, Clark, 'The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism', Counselling Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 24(2), June 2011, pp115-126. Mullins, Sam, 'Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism: A Social Psychological Perspective', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32(9), 2009, pp811-830. Murer, Jeffrey Stevenson, 'Security, Identity, and the Discourse of Conflation in Far-Right Violence,' Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 2(2), November 2011, pp15-26. Available at: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/188. Accessed on 8th June 2012.

@00086304 56

Nijboer, Matthijs, 'A Review of Lone Wolf Terrorism: The Need for a Different Approach', Social Cosmos, Vol. 3(1), 2012, pp33-39. Available at: http://socialcosmos.library.uu.nl/index.php/sc/article/viewFile/43/38. Accessed on 3rd July 2012. Novak, Derry, 'Anarchism and Individual Terrorism', Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 20(2), May 1954, pp176-184. Pantucci, Raffaello, 'What Have We Learned About Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik?', Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5(5-6), December 2011, pp27-42. Available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/what-we-have-learned. Accessed on 31st May 2012. Phillips, Peter J., 'Lone Wolf Terrorism', Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 17(1), 2011, pp1-29. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623573. Accessed on 31st May 2012. Ramsay, Gilbert, 'Targeting, Rhetoric and the Failure of Grassroots Jihad', Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 3(1), Summer 2012, pp27-38. Available at: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/415. Accessed on 31st August 2012. Ravndal, Jacob Aasland, 'A Pre-Trial Profile of Anders Behring Breivik', CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5(3), March 2012, pp6-10. Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss37.pdf. Accessed on 31st May 2012. Seegmiller, Beau, 'Radicalized Margins: Eric Rudolph and Religious Violence', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19(4), 2007, pp511-528. Spaaij, Ramón, 'The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33(9), 2010, pp854-870. Taylor, Bron, 'Religion, Violence and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10(4), Winter 1998, pp1-42. Thorup, Mikkel, 'The Anarchist and the Partisan - Two Types of Terror in the History of Irregular Warfare', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20(3), 2008, pp333-355. Vidino, Lorenzo, 'Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32(1), 2009, pp1-17. News Articles: BBC News, 'Timeline: How Norway's terror attacks unfolded', BBC Online, 17th April 2012. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14260297. Accessed on 15th August 2012.

@00086304 57

CNN, 'Obama: Biggest terror fear is the lone wolf', 16th August 2011. Available at: http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/obama-biggest-terror-fear-is-the-lone-wolf/. Accessed on 15th August 2012. Fields, Gary & Perez, Evan, 'FBI Seeks to Target Lone Extremists', The Wall Street Journal, 15th June 2009. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124501849215613523.html. Accessed on 15th June 2012. Fisher, Max, 'What America Can Learn from Norway's Anders Breivik Trial', The Atlantic, 18th April 2012. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/what-america-can-learn-from-norways-anders-breivik-trial/256066/. Accessed on 9th July 2012. Gibbs, Nancy, 'The Fort Hood Killer: Terrified... or Terrorist?', Time Magazine, 11th November 2009. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1938698,00.html. Accessed on 29th July 2012. Siddique, Haroon & Pidd, Helen, 'Anders Behring Breivik gives evidence - Tuesday 17 April', The Guardian News Blog, 17th April 2012. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/17/anders-behring-breivik-live-updates. Accessed on 31st August 2012. Commentaries: Burton, Fred & Stewart, Scott, 'The "Lone Wolf" Disconnect', STRATFOR Security Weekly, 30th January 2008. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect. Accessed on 31st May 2012. De Graaf, Beatrice & Kessels, Eelco, 'Lone Wolves and Their Enabling Environment', ICCT Commentary, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 29th July 2011. Available at: http://icct.nl/vervolg.php?h_id=6&s_id=43#BGEK. Accessed on 31st May 2012. Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 'Norway's Trial, and a Democratic Lesson', Open Democracy, 24th April 2012. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hylland-eriksen/norways-trial-and-democratic-lesson. Accessed on 9th July 2012. Jenkins, Brian Michael, 'Going Jihad: The Fort Hood Slayings and Home-Grown Terrorism', Testimony presented before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 19th November 2009, pp1-5. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT336.pdf. Accessed on 19th July 2012. Kundnani, Arun, 'The Anti-Islamist: Anders Behring Breivik's Manifesto', ICCT Commentary, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 23rd April 2012. Available at: http://icct.nl/vervolg.php?h_id=6#AK. Accessed on 12th June 2012.

@00086304 58

Lakhani, Suraj, 'Mohammed Merah - Lone Wolf or Al-Qa'ida Operative?', Royal United Services Institute. Available at: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F6C9350E3EE5/. Accessed on 11th May 2012. Stevens, Tim, 'The Myth of the Lone Wolf', The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. Available at: http://www.icsr.info/blog-item.php?id=247. Accessed on 14th May 2012. Stewart, Scott, 'Cutting Through the Lone-Wolf Hype', STRATFOR Security Weekly, 22nd September 2011. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110921-cutting-through-lone-wolf-hype. Accessed on 31st May 2012. Stewart, Scott, 'Norway: Lessons from a Successful Lone Wolf Attacker', STRATFOR Security Weekly, 28th July 2011. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110727-norway-lessons-successful-lone-wolf-attacker. Accessed on 31st May 2012. Reports and Papers: Bakker, Edwin & de Graaf, Beatrice, 'Lone Wolves: How to Prevent This Phenomenon?', International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, Expert Meeting Paper, November 2010, pp1-8. Available at: http://icct.nl/userfiles/file/ICCT%20EM%20Lone%20Wolves%20Paper.pdf. Accessed on 12th June 2012. Centre for Police Research, 'Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism', Conference Programme, Uppsala University, 24-26 September 2012. Available at: http://www.polisforsk.uu.se/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=c6e0%2bS3k0bg%3d&tabid=3095&language=sv-SE. Accessed on 4th September 2012. Centre for Terror Analysis, 'The Threat from Solo Terrorism and Lone Wolf Terrorism', Danish Security and Intelligence Service, 5th April 2011, pp1-7. Available at: https://www.pet.dk/~/media/Engelsk/the_threat_from_solo_terrorism_and_lone_wolf_terrorism_-_engelsk_version_pdf.ashx. Accessed on 9th August 2012. COT Institute for Safety, Security and Conflict Management, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', Case Study for Work Package 3 Paper, 6th July 2007, pp1-111. Available at: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf. Accessed on 14th May 2012. Jackson, Paul, 'Solo Actor Terrorism and the Mythology of the Lone Wolf', in Gable, Gerry & Jackson, Paul, Lone Wolves: Myth or Reality? (Ilford: Searchlight, 2011), pp79-88. Available at: http://www.lonewolfproject.org.uk/resources/LW-complete-final.pdf. Accessed on 9th June 2012.

@00086304 59

Jenkins, Brian Michael, 'Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11', Occasional Paper, The RAND Corporation, 2011, pp1-43. Available at: http://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/rand_op343.pdf. Accessed on 14th August 2012. Pantucci, Raffaello, 'A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists', Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, March 2011. Available at: http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf. Accessed on 14th August 2012. Theses: Springer, Nathan R., 'Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst', Master Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009, pp1-87. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514419&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.p. Accessed on 9th July 2012. Van der Heide, Liesbeth, 'Individual Terrorism: Indicators of Lone Operators', Master Thesis, University of Utrecht, August 2011, pp1-91. Available at: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2011-0902-202354/MA%20Thesis%20Liesbeth%20van%20der%20Heide.pdf. Accessed on 14th August 2012.